@techreport{7dc68f12ed644397a05e34548e49d9ea,
title = "Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace",
abstract = "We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We test these predictions using German Socio-Economic Panel data. We find that workers who are more reciprocal are significantly more likely to receive promotion incentives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay.",
author = "Robert Dur and Arjan Non and Hein Roelfsema",
year = "2008",
language = "English",
series = "Discussion paper TI",
publisher = "Tinbergen Instituut",
number = "08-080/1",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Tinbergen Instituut",
}