Chapter 5  Promoting Reconciliation in Separatist Conflict: The Effect of Morality Framing

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Abstract
In separatist conflict, the majority group and the separatist group alternate in their roles as victim and perpetrator. We examined in a field experiment \(N = 316\) how framing prior ingroup wrongdoings in terms of violations of moral ideals or violations of moral obligations affects the majority’s willingness to reconcile with the separatist group. As expected, for those high in national identification, a moral ideals framing was more effective in promoting reconciliatory attitudes and emotions, whereas a moral obligations framing resulted in stronger reconciliatory attitudes and emotions among low identifiers. Moreover, participants who were reminded of ingroup wrongdoings endorsed reconciliation more than participants who were not reminded of ingroup wrongdoings, regardless of their moral framing. These findings extend prior knowledge on the beneficial effects of wrongdoings reminders to the context of separatist conflict, and demonstrate the importance of the moral framing of such reminders.

Keywords: morality framing, ingroup wrongdoings, separatist conflict, reconciliation, group identification

Separatist conflict poses a challenge to nations because of its oftentimes violent nature and high material and human costs (Walter, 2009). Policy makers are therefore calling for social interventions that can promote peace and reconciliation in separatist conflict (Qurtuby, 2015). Despite this pressing need, there is a remarkable shortage of empirical research that looks into factors that can facilitate reconciliation of separatist conflict—and even more so regarding factors that can form a basis for social intervention. One exception is a recent study by Mashuri, van Leeuwen, and van Vugt (2018). Their research showed that members of the parent nation who were reminded of the harm they had inflicted on the separatist group reported more favourable attitudes towards conflict reconciliation than those who were reminded of how much they had helped and supported the separatist group. This finding is potentially interesting for practitioners, as it suggests a relatively straightforward way of promoting positive attitudes towards reconciliation.

The current study builds on this prior work by investigating in more detail the mechanisms by which a reminder or ingroup wrongdoings can ultimately contribute to conflict reconciliation. We do so by focusing on the role of morality framing (Does, Derks, & Ellemers, 2011). Specifically, we investigated whether a reminder of prior ingroup wrongdoings promotes reconciliatory attitudes when framed as a violation of moral obligations, or whether it promotes these attitudes when framed as a violation of moral ideals. We reasoned that moral ideals framing is more effective than moral obligations framing in promoting reconciliatory attitudes, but only among people who have a strong identification with their parent nation. A better insight into the effects of morality framing could therefore provide policy makers with useful knowledge for the implementation of concrete actions or programs, with the ultimate goal of promoting peace in separatist conflict.

Research context
We conducted our research in the Republic of Indonesia, where separatist tension in West Papua is rife. West Papua has been integrated into Indonesia through the Act of Free Choice in 1969. However, the legitimacy and legality of this act has been questioned by many West Papuans, spurring their demand for separation from the republic (Saltford, 2003). Factors such as exploitation...
of natural resources and military suppression in West Papua strengthened the secessionist claim, which renders this issue an unresolved national problem (MacLeod, 2015).

We focused our attention on members of the non-separatist Indonesian majority (from hereon referred to as ‘the majority’) because this group tends to exercise stronger military and political powers than the separatist group. Moreover, majority groups are commonly expected to take the moral high ground in conflict situations and initiate reconciliation processes (Vandello, Michniewicz, & Goldschmied, 2011). Intervention programs therefore stand a better chance of being successful when aimed at members of the majority.

The primary focus in the current research was on reconciliation, which was assessed by measuring reconciliatory attitudes, emotions, intentions, and behaviours. In doing so, we attempted to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the nature of reconciliation by addressing its multiple dimensions (Nadler, Malloy, & Fisher, 2008).

**The moral side of separatist conflict**

Separatist conflict involves a strong moral component. Morality communicates what is right or wrong, just or unjust in human behaviour (Haidt & Graham, 2007). In separatist conflict, both the majority and the separatist group typically claim that their actions are morally right and justified, while labelling the other party’s actions as immoral. Separatist groups may feel morally entitled to (violently) oppose their integration into the larger nation because they perceive this integration as inappropriate, illegitimate, or imposed (Tomz, 1994). In contrast, the majority tends to believe in the appropriateness and legitimacy of the integration (Walter, 2009) and construes the separatist group’s stance as a violation of their constitutional laws and its acts of resistance as terrorism, thus legitimising (violent) acts of suppression of the separatist group (Bookman, 1993). As a consequence, the majority and the separatist group often wind up in a mutual cycle of acts of aggression (Webb, 2016).

Since the cycle of aggression that characterizes separatist conflict perpetuates because both parties do not construe their acts as *wrongdoings* - but rather as justified responses to the other party’s wrongful actions—a potentially promising strategy to break this cycle could focus on convincing each party of the immorality of their actions (Čehajić & Brown, 2008; Čehajić, Effron, Halperin, Liberman, & Ross, 2011). Previous research conducted in other types of intergroup conflict showed that people who were reminded of their group’s (prior) wrongdoings vis à vis another group experienced increased feelings of collective guilt (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2006; Zebel, Zimmermann, Viki, & Doosje, 2008) and shame (Gausel, Leach, Vignoles, & Brown, 2012; Johns, Schmader, & Lickel, 2005). Such feelings of collective guilt and shame are strongly linked to positive attitudes and behaviours towards the outgroup, including support for reparative actions (Brown, González, Zagefka, Manzi, & Čehajić, 2008; Mashuri, van Leeuwen, & Hanurawan, 2016; van Leeuwen, van Dijk, & Kaynak, 2013; Zebel et al., 2009).

Recently, Mashuri et al. (2018) studied how reminding members of a majority group of their group’s harmful acts towards a separatist group affected their attitude towards this group. Members of the majority group were either confronted with various ways in which their group had harmed the separatist group (i.e., the wrongdoings condition), or various ways in which their group had helped the separatist group (i.e., the rightdoings condition). This research showed that a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings elicited stronger feelings of being a perpetrator compared to a reminder of ingroup rightdoings. This sense of perpetratorhood ultimately enhanced reconciliatory attitudes towards the separatist group. This study did not include a control condition, however. As a consequence, it is unclear whether a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings promoted a sense of perpetratorhood, or whether a reminder of ingroup rightdoings suppressed a sense of
perpetratorhood. An important aim of the current research was therefore to address this issue by comparing responses to a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings with responses in a neutral control condition.

The overview of research outlined in the previous illuminates an obvious and deceptively simple path towards promoting reconciliation: by reminding people of their ingroup’s wrongdoings. We used the term ‘deceptive’ because there is one major hurdle on the road. Members of perpetrating groups often deny the illegitimacy and harmfulness of their actions when confronted with them, trying to justify them instead (Cohen, 2001). This effect is particularly pronounced among high identifying group members, for whom the group is a central aspect of their identity (Costabile & Austin, 2017; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). Considering ingroup acts as wrong and immoral is in direct violation of the need for a positive ingroup identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As a consequence, high identifying group members often reject the wrongfulness or immorality of their actions in an attempt to protect their identity (Bilali, Tropp, & Dasgupta, 2012; Lowery, Knowles, & Unzueta, 2007; van Leeuwen et al., 2013; Zebel, Doosje, & Spears, 2009). Low identifiers, on the other hand, tend to adopt a more practical stance and attempt to repair their group’s wrongdoings (Doosje et al., 2006; Klein et al., 2011). This is because low identifiers, by virtue of their group membership, are still implicated by their group’s reputation even when they do not feel strongly attached to their group (van Leeuwen et al., 2013).

The denial of the immorality of ingroup actions by high identifiers signifies a defensive reaction to historical wrongdoings that impedes intergroup reconciliation (for reviews, see Bilewicz, 2016). For instance, several studies found that a reminder of ingroup responsibility for past wrongdoings resulted in more dehumanisation of the victim group, which reduced feelings of empathy (Čehajić, Brown, & González, 2009), collective guilt (Kofta & Slawuta, 2013), and favourable outgroup attitudes (Hodson & Costello, 2007). Separatist conflict may therefore benefit from a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings to promote reconciliation, but only when these collective misdeeds motivate the majority to acknowledge the immorality of its actions against the separatist group—and this includes the high identifiers. To this end, we investigated the effect of morality framing in the current research. That is, we confronted all participants with wrongful acts committed by their majority group against the separatist group, but participants were induced to think of these wrongdoings either as violations of moral ideals, or as violations of moral obligations.

**Morality framing: Moral ideals versus moral obligations**

Morality framing has to do with the way in which the harmfulness and injustice of ingroup actions towards another group are highlighted, in an attempt to raise ingroup members’ concerns over the immorality of their actions (Kreps & Monin, 2011; Wolsko, Ariceaga, & Seiden, 2017). Does and colleagues (2011) made a distinction between a framing of ingroup wrongdoings in terms of a violation of moral ideals versus a framing in terms of a violation of moral obligations. Moral ideals are associated with prescriptive morality, which reflects concerns over what people should do and is aligned with an approach-orientation tendency (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). Moral obligations are associated with prescriptive morality (Does et al., 2011), which reflects concerns over what people should not do and is aligned with an avoidance-orientation tendency. Moral ideals thus motivate people to achieve positive outcomes that connote rewards, goals, incentives, and other desirable end-states. In contrast, moral obligations make people more sensitive to negative outcomes that connote punishments, conflicts, and other undesirable end-states (Does et al., 2011).

Does, Derks, Ellemers, and Scheepers (2012) observed that participants who were encouraged to frame ingroup wrongdoings as a violation of moral ideals were more motivated to view them as a challenge rather than as a threat, whereas participants who viewed ingroup
wrongdoings as a violation of moral obligations tended to experience them as threatening, as opposed to challenging. In another study, Does et al. (2011) found that framing existing structural inequality in terms of a violation of moral ideals (i.e., promoting fairness or equal treatment of people with different ethnic backgrounds), compared to a framing in terms of a violation of moral obligations (i.e., preventing unfairness or unequal treatment of people with different ethnic backgrounds) promoted support for reparative actions on behalf of a disadvantaged group. Moreover, van der Toorn, Ellemers, and Doosje (2015) showed that participants who were persuaded to take actions to improve the ingroup’s moral conduct reported less rationalisation of ingroup misdeeds and increased feelings of collective guilt, compared to participants who were persuaded to avoid ingroup misconduct.

Because of their respective associations with positive or negative consequences, we argue that a framing of ingroup wrongdoings in terms of a violation of moral ideals is less likely to cause resistance and denial of ingroup harm than a framing in terms of a violation of moral obligations. A framing of ingroup wrongdoings in terms of a violation of moral ideals should therefore be particularly impactful among high identifying group members, as they are prone to defend their national identity by rejecting negative ingroup information. Support for the moderating role of identification can be found in research by van Leeuwen and colleagues (2013, Study 2). They observed that high identifying group members were more willing to help a victimized outgroup than low identifiers when appealed to their feelings of collective pride over their historical positive treatment of this group. However, when appealed to their feelings of collective guilt over the ingroup’s maltreatment of this outgroup, high identifiers were less willing to help the outgroup than low identifiers. Van Leeuwen et al. (2013) argued that high identifiers respond so well to appeals to feelings of collective pride because they are motivated to associate positive outcomes with the ingroup, while negative outcomes are discarded. Low identifiers, on the other hand, are less defensive about such negative outcomes, which increases the odds that they accept these outcomes and attempt to restore them.

Applying these findings to the current research, we argued that, in the context of separatist conflict, a confrontation with ingroup wrongdoings while primed with a violation of moral ideals mindset should be more conducive of reconciliatory attitudes and emotions among high identifiers than among low identifiers. A confrontation with ingroup wrongdoings while primed with a violation of moral obligations mindset, on the other hand, should promote low identifiers’ reconciliatory attitudes and emotions more than those of high identifiers (Hypothesis 1). We also included a control condition in this study in which no wrongdoings or morality frame was activated, but did not advance any predictions regarding the effect of identification here.

The effect of reminders of ingroup wrongdoings

In the previous section, we argued that high identifiers primed with a violation of moral ideals would be more responsive to confrontations with ingroup wrongdoings than high identifiers primed with a violation of moral obligations, whereas the opposite should be true for low identifiers. A second aim of the current study, however, was to investigate the effect of confrontations with ingroup wrongdoings per se, regardless of morality framing. This is because prior research (i.e., Mashuri et al., 2018) investigated such effects only in comparison to confrontations with ingroup rightdoings, which leaves it unable to answer the question whether a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings promotes reconciliation, or whether a reminder of ingroup rightdoings suppresses reconciliation. An important aim of the current research was therefore to address this issue by comparing responses to a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings with responses in a neutral control condition. Previous research looked at the effect of ingroup wrongdoings on the degree to which
group members experienced a threat to the moral status of their ingroup (i.e., morality threat), and the degree to which they responded to this threat by seeking social acceptance and attempting to restore their group’s moral image (i.e., compensatory needs). In the following section, we will discuss these concepts in more detail and advance predictions regarding the effect of a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings (regardless of morality framing) as compared to a neutral control condition. In line with prior research (Mashuri et al., 2018), and because there is no solid theoretical ground for expecting a moderating effect of group identification, the following predictions will not involve national identification.

The mediating role of morality threat and compensatory needs

The needs-based model of reconciliation (NBMR: Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009) posits that perpetrating groups often experience a threat to their group’s morality. Morality threat within the NBMR refers to feelings of moral inferiority as a result of negative actions that have harmed the victim group. According to the NMBR, morality threat is positively related to compensatory needs for social acceptance and restoration of moral image. Social acceptance refers to the need to be socially accepted by the victim group, e.g. through friendships and cooperation. Restoration of moral image refers to the general desire to improve the ingroup’s moral image in the eyes of the victim group (Shnabel et al., 2009; Shnabel, Nadler, Canetti-Nisim, & Ullrich, 2008).

The compensatory needs for social acceptance and restoration of moral image reflect the perpetrating group’s desire to establish good rapport with the victim group. Construed as such, they are thought to be the antecedents of support for reconciliation with the victim group (Tov-Nachlieli, Shnabel, & Nadler, 2013). Supporting this argument, within the context of separatist conflict, Mashuri et al. (2016, 2018) found that the majority group’s compensatory needs for social acceptance and restoration of moral image positively predicted reconciliatory attitudes and reconciliatory emotions towards the separatist group.

Mashuri et al. (2016) also found that members of the perpetrating majority group reported high levels of morality threat. In line with the NBMR (Shnabel et al., 2009), this morality threat was positively associated with the compensatory needs for social acceptance and restoration of moral image. These compensatory needs, in turn, were positive predictors of reconciliatory attitudes (i.e., positive intergroup attitudes, positive intergroup stereotypes, intergroup trust, Study 1) and reconciliatory emotions (i.e., collective guilt, collective shame, Study 2). The NBMR suggests that morality threat typically stems from past harm committed by the perpetrating group against the victim group. Indeed, Mashuri et al. (2018) found that reminding the majority of its past wrongdoings against the separatist group increased the extent to which it felt threatened in its morality. These observations are aligned with prior work (Doosje et al., 2006; Mashuri et al., 2018; Zebel et al., 2008). Taken together, we predicted that participants in the wrongdoings condition would experience more morality threat and stronger reconciliatory attitudes and reconciliatory emotions than participants in the control condition (Hypothesis 2). We also expected that morality threat would be a positive predictor of compensatory needs of social acceptance and restoration of moral image, which themselves would mediate the role of morality threat in predicting reconciliatory attitudes (Hypothesis 3a) and reconciliatory emotions (Hypothesis 3b).

Using the theory of planned behaviour (TPB; Ajzen, 1991; Moons & De Pelsmacker, 2015) we complemented reconciliatory attitudes and emotions with reconciliatory intentions and behaviours. Previous research revealed that reconciliatory intentions were the most proximal predictor of reconciliatory behaviours, and that they mediated the role of reconciliatory attitudes and emotions in predicting reconciliatory behaviours (Mashuri et al., 2016). We therefore predicted that participants in the wrongdoings condition would report stronger reconciliatory attitudes than
participants in the control condition, and that reconciliatory attitudes in turn would positively predict reconciliatory behaviours by enhancing reconciliatory intentions (Hypothesis 4a). Second, we predicted that participants in the wrongdoings condition would report stronger reconciliatory emotions than participants in the control condition, and reconciliatory emotions would positively predict reconciliatory behaviours by enhancing reconciliatory intentions (Hypothesis 4b).

Method

Participant and design. Participants were 316 Javanese women ($M_{age} = 40.48$, $SD_{age} = 6.67$) who took part in the study in exchange for a small fee. Participants (all non-students) were members of a large Islamic organisation in Central Java, Indonesia. Despite its religious orientation, the organisation has nationalistic and non-political missions, and it supports the Indonesian secular national ideology. Participants were recruited from three branches of the mass organisation, and their age did not differ across the three branches. The design of the research was a quasi-experiment, in which we randomly assigned the three branches to one of three conditions: moral ideals ($n = 101$), moral obligations ($n = 107$), and control ($n = 108$). The moral ideals condition and the moral obligations condition comprise the two levels of the independent variable morality framing. The moral ideals and moral obligations conditions combined were also compared against the control condition, as the two levels of the independent variable reminder of in-group wrongdoings.

Procedure and measures. Prior to the experiment, invitation letters were distributed to members of three branches of the organisation. Signed by the leader of the mass organisation, the letters informed all members, except those in the control condition, that research participation involved watching a documentary about how the Indonesian government has treated indigenous West Papuans. The letters also described the location, estimated duration, as well incentive of the research. Of the 320 members who received the invitation letters, 316 (98.75%) took part in the research. This high response rate, which is presumably attributable to the fact that the organisation’s leader supported the study, ensures the virtual absence of non-response bias.

The research was carried out in a room inside the central office building of the organisation, which can accommodate a maximum of 200 participants. Upon reading and signing informed consent, participants were handed a questionnaire. Unless otherwise indicated, answers were assessed on five-point scales which ranged between 1 (strongly disagree) and 5 (strongly agree). Scales were created by averaging participants’ responses to the items. The questionnaire commenced with eight items to assess national identification (e.g., “Being an Indonesian is an important part of my identity”; $\alpha = .78$), adapted from Roccas, Klar, and Leviatan (2006). Participants in the moral ideals condition and moral obligations condition, but not those in the control condition then were presented with a documentary.

The documentary, which lasted twenty-two minutes, featured clips and commentary about how the Indonesian government’s actions had affected West Papuans with respect to five themes, derived from previous research (Mashuri et al., 2018). These five themes included economic underdevelopment, social and political injustice, militaristic-repressive approach, exploitation of natural resources, and human resource underdevelopment. \(^3\) In the documentary, a professional newscaster narrated the clips about the five themes and described how each set of actions occurred in the past and continue in the present, along with their harmful impacts on West Papuans. The documentary also included sections of an interview between the newscaster and the leader of participants’ organisation, in which the leader confirmed and acknowledged the various governmental actions featured in the documentary.
After watching the documentary, participants in the moral ideals condition and moral obligations condition were asked to briefly describe the central message of the documentary. Participants in the control condition did not watch the documentary but instead continued with the questionnaire. Participants in all conditions then were presented with a single item to assess perceived harmfulness of the Indonesian government’s actions to West Papuans (i.e., “The actions of the Indonesian government towards indigenous Papuans are harmful to indigenous Papuans”), and two items to assess perceived harmfulness of the government’s actions to the positive image of the majority group of non-Papuans (e.g., “The actions of the Indonesian government towards indigenous Papuans taint the positive image of non-Papuans”; \( r = .54, p < .001 \)). These two measures were included to check the effectiveness of the reminder of ingroup wrongdoings, which were adopted from Mashuri et al. (2018).

Participants in the moral ideals condition and moral obligations condition were then asked to read a short text which was used to manipulate morality framing, which was adapted from Does et al. (2011). To induce a moral ideals framing, participants were asked to write down at least 4 concrete examples of their possible actions and decisions that can achieve the ideals of promoting peace and reconciliation between themselves and indigenous West-Papuans. To induce a moral obligations framing, participants were asked to list at least 4 concrete examples of their possible actions and decisions that can meet the obligation of avoiding conflict and violence between themselves and indigenous West-Papuans.

Participants in all three conditions were then asked to complete the remainder of the questionnaire. Perceived distributive justice was assessed with five items (e.g., “Similar products cost the same in Papua and in other parts of Indonesia”; \( \alpha = .86 \)), as was perceived procedural justice (e.g., “The Indonesian government treats Papua the same as other regions in Indonesia”; \( \alpha = .84 \)). These two measures assessed the effectiveness of the reminder of ingroup wrongdoings, and were adapted from Tyler and Blader (2009). Morality threat was assessed with four items (e.g., “I fear that ill-treatments by the Indonesian government of indigenous Papuans in Papua may justify the indigenous Papuans’ view of other Indonesians as immoral”; \( \alpha = .82 \)), adopted from Mashuri et al. (2016). Need for social acceptance was assessed with four items (e.g., “It is important for me that indigenous Papuans are willing to open their door for other Indonesians to befriend them”; \( \alpha = .78 \)), as was need for restoration of moral image (e.g., “It is important for me to convince indigenous Papuans that other Indonesians are trustworthy and non-violent”; \( \alpha = .76 \)). These two measures were combined into a single construct of compensatory needs (based on Shnabel et al., 2009).

Intergroup trust (seven items; e.g., “Indigenous Papuans generally have good intentions”; \( \alpha = .75 \)) was adapted from Mutz and Reeves (2005), positive attitudes (four items; e.g., “I enjoy interacting with indigenous Papuans”; \( \alpha = .69 \)) was adapted from Duckitt (2006), and positive stereotypes (four items; e.g., “Indigenous Papuans are generous”; \( \alpha = .82 \)) was adapted from Stephan et al. (2002). Perspective-taking was assessed with three items (e.g., “I can empathize with what West Papuans have experienced”; \( \alpha = .73 \)), adapted from Andrighetto, Mari, Volpato, and Behluli (2012). These four measures were combined into a single construct of reconciliatory attitudes. Collective guilt (four items; e.g., “I feel guilty about the harm done by the Indonesian military to Papuans”; \( \alpha = .92 \)) was adapted from Wohl and Branscombe (2005), whereas collective shame (five items; e.g., “It makes me feel ashamed when I see an international report on the treatment on Papuans by the Indonesian military”; \( \alpha = .88 \)) was adapted from Čehajić (2008). Collective guilt and collective shame were combined into a single construct of reconciliatory emotions.
The questionnaire continued with a measure of the willingness to apologise (four items; e.g., “I think that the Indonesian government should officially acknowledge their fault in mistreating the Papuans in the past”; \( \alpha = .77 \)), adapted from McGarty et al. (2005). Support for intergroup cooperation was assessed with four items (e.g., “Cooperation with the Papuans is the key to United Nation of Indonesia’s success”; \( \alpha = .78 \)), adapted from Scott, Bishop, and Chen (2003). Support for affirmative action was assessed with six items (e.g., “A certain quota of Papuans, even if not all of them are fully qualified, should be admitted to colleges and universities in Indonesia”; \( \alpha = .72 \)), adapted from Swim and Miller (1999). These three measures were combined into a single construct of reconciliatory intentions. Reconciliatory behaviours were assessed with five items (e.g., “Donating blood to indigenous Papuans inside or outside Papua who are in need”; \( \alpha = .80 \)), developed by the authors and modified to suit the context of the current research. Upon finishing the questionnaire, participants were asked to report their age and gender, and were debriefed, thanked, and paid.4

Results

Manipulation Checks

Morality framing. To check the effectiveness of the moral framing manipulation, we followed the same procedure as Does et al. (2011). Two independent coders who were blind to the hypotheses and experimental condition scored participants’ listed actions in response to the morality framing instructions. Responses were coded into three categories: the do’s (i.e., actions or decisions to achieve peace and reconciliation), the don’ts (i.e., actions or decisions to avoid conflict and violence), and the uncategorised (i.e., actions or decisions that do not reflect the do’s and the don’ts). An example of participants’ ‘do’ responses is: “I would like to maintain a friendly communication with West Papuans.” An example of a ‘don’t’ response is: “I would like to insist the Indonesian government to cease its violent acts against West Papuans.” An example of an uncategorised response is: “I love the United Nation of Indonesia.” The inter-rater reliabilities were good (do’s: Kappa=.76, \( p < .001 \); don’ts: Kappa=.81, \( p < .001 \); uncategorised: Kappa = .66, \( p < .001 \)).

We then examined the extent to which morality framing (i.e., moral ideals vs. moral obligations) affected the nature of participants’ motivational strategies (i.e., approach vs. avoidance) instead of the quantity of their motivational strategies (i.e., the number of do’s and don’ts). Inspection of multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) demonstrates that the effect of morality framing on the quantity of the motivational strategies was not significant, meaning that the number of reported do’s and don’ts was statistically the same in the moral ideals condition and moral obligations condition (both \( ps > .05 \)). However, as expected, the chi-square test of independence reveals that morality framing significantly affected the nature of the motivational strategies. In particular, we found that significantly more participants in the moral ideals condition (48%) reported do’s than participants in the moral obligations condition (38%), Pearson \( \chi^2 (1, 208) = 27.319, p < .001 \). In contrast, significantly more participants in the moral obligations condition (38%) reported don’ts than participants in the moral ideals condition (21%), Pearson \( \chi^2 (1, 208) = 19.634, p < .001 \).5

Taken together, these findings indicate that the manipulation of morality framing was successful.

Reminder of ingroup wrongdoings. Given the unequal sample sizes of the wrongdoings condition \( n = 208 \) and the control condition \( n = 108 \), and the observation that these groups had unequal variances on many of the measures, we used Welch’s \( t \)-test to assess mean differences (as recommended by Delacre, Lakens, & Leys, 2017). The perception that the actions of the Indonesian government had harmed West Papuans was significantly higher in the wrongdoings condition \( (M = 3.34, SD = 1.33) \) than in the control condition \( (M = 2.37, SD = .97) \), \( t(279.65) = 54.58, p < .001, d = .65, \) power = 1.00. Participants in the wrongdoings condition also reported a stronger perception that the actions of the Indonesian government towards West Papuans harmed the image of the
majority ($M = 3.02$, $SD = .92$) than participants in the control condition ($M = 2.21$, $SD = .74$), $t(260.48) = 72.93$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.08$, power = 1.00. Both perceived distributive justice ($M = 3.24$, $SD = 1.10$) and procedural justice ($M = 3.65$, $SD = .91$) were lower in the wrongdoings condition than in the control condition (perceived distributive justice: $M = 3.52$, $SD = .73$, $t(294.66) = 6.91$, $p = .009$, $d = .29$, power = .79; perceived procedural justice: $M = 3.97$, $SD = .62$, $t(291.49) = 13.42$, $p < .001$, $d = .47$, power = .99). These findings demonstrate that a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings successfully motivated the majority to acknowledge the immorality of these actions.

**Hypotheses Testing**

Table 5.1 reports bivariate correlation between national identification, morality framing, and their interaction term with reconciliatory attitudes, emotions, intentions, and behaviours. National identification was significantly correlated with the reconciliatory measures, but morality framing did not correlate with any of the reconciliatory measures. However, the interaction term between national identification and morality framing was significantly correlated with all reconciliatory measures.

We then examined the first structural model as presented in Figure 5.1, which was created by means of *Mplus* version 7.4 with MLR estimator. We used MLR estimator because it is suitable for data containing missing values that violate the assumption of multivariate normality (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2015).

We used the structural model because of our interest in examining the relations among the latent constructs within the model instead of the relations among the items within the constructs (Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002). We generated the latent constructs and their indicators within the first structural model on the basis of item parcelling. The initial step was to run an exploratory factor analysis using oblique rotation to look at the dimensionality of the factor structure of each latent construct (Little et al., 2002). For unidimensional latent constructs, we implemented the item-to-construct balance technique to create item parcels. Using this technique, the highest factor-loading item was combined with the lowest factor-loading item, and the second highest factor-loading item was combined with the second lowest factor loading item, and so forth (Little et al., 2002). We used the domain representative technique to produce item parcels for multidimensional constructs. We formed the first parcel by joining the first item of all subscales, the second parcel by joining the second item of all subscales, and so forth (Kishton & Widaman, 1994).
Table 5.1
Mean, Standard Deviation, and Zero Order Correlations among Observed Variables within the First Structural Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. National identification</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.35**</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Morality framing (Moral obligations = 1, Moral ideals = 2)</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. National identification X Morality framing</td>
<td>6.56</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Reconciliatory attitudes</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.39**</td>
<td>.61**</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Reconciliatory emotions</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.51**</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Reconciliatory intentions</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.56**</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Reconciliatory behaviours</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note. M = Mean. SD = Standard Deviation. Reconciliatory attitudes, reconciliatory emotions, reconciliatory intentions, and reconciliatory behaviours were calculated by averaging the composite scores of each of the constructs. The composite scores were obtained by summing the observed scores from each sub-scale within the constructs. Morality framing and national identification were mean-centred.

Figure 5.1. The results of the first structural model examining the interaction effect of morality framing and national identification on reconciliatory attitudes and emotions. Numbers in the model are standardised path coefficients. The boxes represent the observed variable, whereas the circles represent the latent variable. Morality framing and national identification were mean-centred.

Note. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. "" = not significant.
The first structural model had acceptable goodness of fit to the data, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .065 (90% confidence interval [CI] = [.051, .080]), comparative fit index (CFI) = .94, Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) = .93 (for criteria for the goodness of fit, see Hu & Bentler, 1995). As shown in Figure 5.1, morality framing (moral obligations vs. moral ideals) significantly interacted with national identification to predict reconciliatory attitudes, \( \beta = .19, SE = .08, p = .022, 95\% CI = (.028, .356), s^2 = .04, \) power = .81, and reconciliatory emotions, \( \beta = .20, SE = .08, p = .015, 95\% CI = (.040, .363), s^2 = .04, \) power = .85. \(^8\)

As presented in Figure 5.2a, probing analyses revealed that among participants high in national identification, morality framing positively predicted reconciliatory attitudes, \( \beta = .28, SE = .10, p = .004, 95\% CI = [.091, .478]), s^2 = .09, power = .93. Among participants low in national identification, morality framing negatively predicted reconciliatory attitudes, \( \beta = -.30, SE = .09, p = .002, 95\% CI = [-.482, -.113]), s^2 = .09, power = .93, Wald Test[1] = 13.516, p < .001.\(^9\)

**Figure 5.2a.** The effect of morality framing (moral obligations vs. moral ideals) on reconciliatory attitudes among participants high in national identification and low in national identification

*Note.* Reconciliatory attitudes were calculated on the basis their latent scores.

In a similar vein, as shown in Figure 5.2b, among participants high in national identification, morality framing positively predicted reconciliatory emotions, \( \beta = .23, SE = .112, p = .036, 95\% CI = [.015, .436]), s^2 = .05, power = .89, whereas morality framing negatively predicted reconciliatory emotions among participants low in national identification, \( \beta = -.32, SE = .09, p < .001, 95\% CI = [-.490, -.144]), s^2 = .08, power = .91, Wald Test[1] = 11.732, p < .001.\(^9\)
These findings therefore are consistent with the correlation analyses reported in the previous section. Moreover, they corroborate Hypothesis 1 in demonstrating that, among high national identifiers, the moral ideals framing was more conducive of promoting reconciliatory attitudes and reconciliatory emotions than the moral obligations framing. But among low national identifiers, the pattern was reversed such that the moral obligations framing was more effective than the moral ideals framing in promoting reconciliatory attitudes and reconciliatory emotions.

To test the remainder of the hypotheses (Hypothesis 2-4b), we combined the moral ideals and moral obligations conditions into a single condition (“wrongdoings”), and compared it against the control condition. Table 5.2 presents Welch’s t-test analyses, demonstrating that a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings significantly affected all of the measured variables, except for compensatory needs. Specifically, participants in the wrongdoings condition reported significantly higher levels of morality threat, reconciliatory attitudes, reconciliatory emotions, reconciliatory intentions, and reconciliatory behaviours, compared to participants in the control condition. We then analysed the data by means of the second structural model as presented in Figure 5.3, using the same procedure and parcelling techniques as the first structural model discussed in the previous.

The second structural model produced excellent fits to the data, RMSEA = .038 (90% CI = [.023, .051]), CFI = .98, TLI = .97. As shown in Figure 5.3, a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings positively predicted morality threat, $\beta = .24, SE = .06, p < .001, 95\% CI = (.119, .351), sr^2 = .06$, power $= .94$, reconciliatory attitudes, $\beta = .27, SE = .05, p < .001, 95\% CI = (.171, .372), sr^2 = .08$, power $= .94$, and reconciliatory emotions, $\beta = .26, SE = .05, p < .001, 95\% CI = (.162, .355), sr^2 = .06$, power $= .93$. These results are in line with the t-test analyses described in the previous, and they confirm Hypothesis 2. The analyses further showed that morality threat positively predicted compensatory needs for social acceptance and restoration of moral image, $\beta = .40, SE = .07, p < .001, 95\% CI = (.257, .540), sr^2 = .21$, power $= .94$, which themselves positively predicted both reconciliatory attitudes, $\beta = .48, SE = .07, p < .001, 95\% CI = (.342, .613), sr^2 = .30$, power $= .94$, and reconciliatory emotions, $\beta = .26, SE = .07, p < .001, 95\% CI = (.119, .399), sr^2 = .06$, power $= .94$. Moreover, compensatory needs significantly mediated the effect of morality threat on reconciliatory attitudes,
indirect effect: $\beta = .19, SE = .05, p < .001, 95\% CI = (.101, .280), power = .94$), and reconciliatory emotions, indirect effect: $\beta = .10, SE = .03, p = .002, 95\% CI = (.036, .170), power = .93$. Hypothesis 3a and 3b were hence confirmed.

Table 5.2
Effects of Ingroup Wrongdoings (Wrongdoings versus Control)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Wrongdoings</th>
<th>Control</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>$SD$</td>
<td>$M$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Morality threat</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>3.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Compensatory needs</td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>4.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Reconciliatory</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>3.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>attitudes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Reconciliatory</td>
<td>3.92</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>3.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>emotions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Reconciliatory</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>3.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intentions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Reconciliatory</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>behaviours</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note. $M =$ Mean, $SD =$ Standard Deviation. Compensatory needs, reconciliatory attitudes, reconciliatory emotions, reconciliatory intentions, and reconciliatory behaviours were calculated by averaging the composite scores of each of the constructs. The composite scores were obtained by summing the observed scores from each sub-scale within the constructs.

The reported findings show that a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings significantly affected reconciliatory attitudes and reconciliatory emotions. Reconciliatory attitudes in the second structural model themselves positively predicted reconciliatory intentions, $\beta = .67, SE = .06, p < .001, 95\% CI = (.558, .787), r^2 = .36, power = .94$), and reconciliatory emotions did too, $\beta = .28, SE = .06, p < .001, 95\% CI = (.158, .402), r^2 = .06, power = .93$). Reconciliatory intentions in turn were a positive predictor of reconciliatory behaviours, $\beta = .66, SE = .05, p < .001, 95\% CI = (.573, .755), r^2 = .55, power = .95$. Supporting Hypothesis 4a, the effect of a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings on reconciliatory behaviours was mediated by reconciliatory attitudes and intentions, indirect effect: $\beta = .12, SE = .03, p < .001, 95\% CI = (.071, .171), power = .94$, as well as reconciliatory emotions and intentions, indirect effect: $\beta = .05, SE = .01, p < .001, 95\% CI = (.021, .075), power = .92$. These results corroborated Hypothesis 4a and 4b.
Discussion

Separatist conflict is dubbed as one of the most intractable and violent of intergroup conflicts (Walter, 2009). Developing social interventions that promote reconciliatory attitudes and intentions is therefore of great importance. To this end, the present work examined the effectiveness of a documentary film that reminded viewers of wrongdoings committed by their own majority group against the separatist group. A documentary film is a cost-effective tool that has the potential of reaching a large audience. By inducing participants to construe the wrongdoings committed by their majority ingroup against the separatist group as either a violation of moral ideals (i.e., achieving peace and reconciliation) or as a violation of moral obligations (i.e., avoiding conflict and violence), we found that a moral ideals framing was more conducive of promoting reconciliatory attitudes and emotions, as well as behaviours, than a moral obligations framing, but only for those highly identified with their parent nation. For low identifiers, a moral obligations framing appeared more promising than a moral ideals framing.

We also observed that participants who were confronted with wrongdoings of their group reported more reconciliatory attitudes and emotions compared to those who were not confronted with these wrongdoings. These findings are in line with prior work in which responses in a wrongdoings condition were compared to those in a rightdoings condition (Mashuri et al., 2018). However, the current comparison with a neutral control condition demonstrates that the observed effect on reconciliation is driven, at least in part, by a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings.
Theoretical implications

When persuaded by means of a moral ideals framing, as opposed to a moral obligations framing, high identifying participants expressed more reconciliatory attitudes and emotions. These findings are noteworthy, given that high identifiers are often found to deny historical wrongdoings of their group and report less collective guilt for these wrongdoings (Klein, Licatta, & Pierucci, 2011; Zebel et al., 2009). A moral ideals framing is thus particularly promising as it may help circumvent high identifiers’ defensive reactions by rendering ingroup wrongdoings less aversive and thus easier to face (Does et al., 2012). Low identifiers, who do not consider their group as pivotal for their self-definition, more readily accept aversive information about their group, which renders a moral obligations framing effective in promoting reconciliatory attitudes and emotions among this group.

Reconciliation is a multidimensional construct, consisting not only of attitudes and emotions but also behavioural tendencies (Nadler et al., 2008; Stephan, 2008). The current study showed that morality framing and national identification combined in predicting reconciliatory attitudes and emotions, but they were only indirectly related to reconciliatory intentions and behaviours, via attitudes and emotions. Reconciliatory attitudes and emotions signify an expression of opinions and feelings, which might be less costly than the concrete actions implied by reconciliatory intentions and behaviours. People are reluctant to support reparations when they view these actions as very costly (Cikara, Brenueau, & Saxe, 2011; Schmitt, Miller, Branscombe, & Brehm, 2008), be it in an immaterial form (e.g., an acknowledgement of the illegitimacy of outgroup harm) or a material form (e.g., financial compensations). Resistance to reparations is often more pronounced among high identifiers, who are more inclined to construe reparations as a threat to their social identity, and thus perceive them as costly (Doosje et al., 2006; Klein et al., 2011). The current findings suggest that, among high identifiers, a moral ideals framing might reduce the perceived costs of expressing reconciliatory attitudes and emotions, and promote a focus on the perceived benefits of reconciliatory initiatives as a means to boost the ingroup’s moral image.

Limitations and future directions

The current research is not without limitations. Reconciliation in separatist conflict depends not only on the majority’s attitudes, emotions, and actions, but also on those of the separatist group (Walter, 2006). The intervention program in the current study focused on promoting a reconciliatory stance among members of the majority. Other research (Mashuri & van Leeuwen, 2018) has investigated factors that affect separatist groups’ willingness to reconcile. However, to the best of our knowledge, no prior research has investigated how reconciliation of separatist conflict is affected by the interplay between both groups. Opinions or actions by the separatist group could provide a serious hurdle for benign intentions among the majority group, and vice versa. For example, the needs-based model of reconciliation (Shnabel et al., 2009) posits that the willingness of a perpetrating group to acknowledge its wrongdoings can satisfy the victim group’s need for empowerment, which in turn bolsters its favourable stances towards reconciliation. However, expressions of responsibility (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006) or the offer of an apology (Cornetass & Holder, 2008; Philpot & Hornsey, 2008) can be futile when victim groups’ demands focus on realistic reparations such as financial compensations or punishment of perpetrators (Brooks, 1999). Wohl and colleagues (2011) suggested that, to promote trust, a perpetrator group should not only acknowledge its wrongdoings and offer an apology, but also engage in concrete actions to amend the harm it inflicted upon the victim group. If the perpetrator’s apology is rejected by the victim group, the former group’s support for making reparations to the victim groups diminishes (Harth, Hornsey, & Barlow; 2011). Future research could investigate under which circumstances
reconciliatory initiatives by either party are more likely to be met with a positive response among members of the opposite party (Shnabel et al., 2009).

The final limitation is that the current study employed a convenience sample of female participants. Although previous research did not show any differences in men's and women's interpretations of reconciliatory process in dealing with their own group’s wrongdoings (Mashuri et al., 2016, 2018), we still need to exert some caution in generalizing the current findings to both genders.

Practical implication

The current study offers valuable insights for the use of a documentary film as an intervention tool. A documentary is a potentially practical and cost-effective tool, given that video materials are easily distributed via formal (e.g. national television) and informal (e.g., social media) channels, and have the potential to reach a wide audience (Clement et al., 2013). However, documentaries as part of an intervention package might also be criticised on the basis of their feasibility as well as their selectivity. Local or national governments may prohibit the broadcasting or distribution of a documentary when it features a politically sensitive topic. But even when a documentary is not prohibited, it may only reach a limited audience. Since the viewing of the video material is usually voluntary, it may only reach people who are already receptive to its message - a form of preaching to the choir. When employing a documentary film as part of an intervention program, practitioners should therefore be attentive to both the possibility that the material could be banned as well as to the self-selective potential of the material.
Notes
1. Six participants were excluded from analyses as their failure to describe the central message of the documentary.

2. Inspection of between-subjects ANOVA shows that the distribution of participants’ age across the three branches was not statistically different, $F(2, 237) = 2.352, p = .097$. In order to protect participants’ anonymity, other demographic information was not obtained given the sensitivity of the topic within the current Indonesian context.

3. The documentary was pretested in a pilot study ($N = 10$). Participants perceived the documentary as realistic and credible, and reported that the government's actions as described in the documentary were harmful to West Papuans. Participants also were satisfied with the duration of the film and the general quality of the film (the resolution, the stories). Importantly, the film was perceived as not too sensitive and as not risky to watch (which is important, given the political sensitivity of the topic).

4. We also assessed avoidance regulatory focus (nine items; $\alpha = .45$) and approach regulatory focus (nine items; $\alpha = .67$). Data are available upon request.

5. We also found that morality framing did not significantly affect either the number of uncategorised responses [in the moral ideals condition, $M = .28$, $SD = .63$, in the moral obligations condition, $M = .26$, $SD = .82$, $F(1, 207) = .023$, $p = .879$] or the percentage of participants who reported an uncategorised response [in the moral ideals condition: 9.6%, in the moral obligations condition: 6.3%, Pearson $\chi^2 (1, 208) = 2.179$, $p = .183$].

6. We utilised G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) for unequal sample size with pooled variance within each group in order to calculate the effect size and power within these analyses.

7. Following Sterba and MacCallum (2010), the parcelling models used to create the first structural model were compared to the other eight parcelling models. The results demonstrate that the structural parameters of our parcelling models (see the label ‘Model 1’ under Table 5.3 in the supplementary materials) were consistent with those of the other eight parcelling models and the average model (see the label ‘Average Model’ under Table 5.3 in the supplementary materials). We also obtained similar results regarding the structural parameters of moderation analyses for the first structural model (see Table 5.4 and 5.5 in the supplementary materials), as well as the structural parameters of the second structural model (see Table 5.6 in the supplementary materials).

8. In both structural models, the effect size and power were calculated by squaring the semi-partial correlation ($sr^2$) between the exogenous variable and its respective endogenous variable, controlling for any relevant variables, using SPSS 18. Power analysis in the structural model was conducted on the basis of Monte Carlo simulation with 10,000 replications, using Mplus version 7.4 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2015).

9. Following Iacobucci et al. (2015), national identification was categorised into high (above the Median) and low (below the Median). The next step was to test the assumption of measurement invariance for national identification by comparing two models (Wang & Wang, 2012). The first model was specified by freeing all parameters across the two categories, whereas the second model by equalling factor loadings across the two categories. The assumption of measurement invariance is met if the $\Delta$CFI between the first model and the second model is no more than .01. The results revealed that the CFI of the first model was .951, whereas the CFI of the second model was .948 ($\Delta$CFI=.003).