Chapter 1

General Introduction
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Separatist movements occur in many countries across all continents around the globe, from Australia, Asia, Africa, Europe, to America (Beary, 2011; Hewitt & Cheetham, 2000). Besides being a prevalent social phenomenon, separatist movements are also identified as the major source of intergroup violence in the world today (Walter, 2009). To illustrate, more than fifty per cent of all civil wars from 1980 to 2003 (Marshall & Gurr, 2003) were fought between ethnic minority groups that sought greater autonomy or independence, and the majority groups that resisted their demands. Moreover, empirical estimates suggest that separatist conflicts are the most protracted types of civil war. Evidence for this is found in that non-separatist civil wars between 1940 and 1992 on average lasted less than five years, whereas separatist civil wars within the same period lasted nearly eight years (Walter, 2002). Given its prevalence, violence, and intractability, separatist conflicts have drawn special attention from both scholars and practitioners (Al Qurtuby, 2015; Bakke, O’Loughlin, & Ward, 2009; Missbach, 2011), who consider it important to find ways that can contribute to the development of peace and reconciliation following secessionist disputes.

Despite its importance, reconciliation in separatist conflicts is barely covered within the social psychological literature—and even less so regarding possible interventions to promote it. The main goal of this dissertation is to fill these gaps by investigating the relevant factors in implementing social-psychological interventions that hold potential for promoting reconciliation in separatist conflicts. To this end, this dissertation integrates insights about the facilitating factors of intergroup reconciliation from the existing social psychological literature and applies them to the context of separatist conflict. In the current dissertation, secessionist disputes are considered as stemming from conflicting interests between two groups: (1) the non-separatist majority group and (2) the separatist group. The first refers to ethnic groups that support their integration within a parent nation, whereas the latter group involves ethnic minorities that challenge integration and are actively calling for independence or autonomy from the superordinate body. Based on the existing relevant work, it is assumed that separatist conflicts lead the non-separatist majority groups (Shnabel, Nadler, Canetti-Nisim, & Ullrich, 2008; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, Dovidio, & Carmi, 2009) and the separatist groups (Sani, 2005; Sani & Reicher, 2000; Sani & Todman, 2002; Shnabel et al., 2008, 2009) to experience divergent threat perceptions. These perceived threats in turn activate corresponding psychological motivations to cope with the threats, which differentially influence each of the disputing parties’ support or willingness for engaging in reconciliation. To make interventions effective in promoting reconciliation, I reason that they should be designed to carefully take into account those varying threat perceptions and psychological motivations between the non-separatist majority groups and the separatist groups. The specific contextual background for empirically examining these ideas is the separatist conflict in Indonesia, an enduring historical problem which remains without resolution (Stott, 2017).

Below, I will briefly review intergroup reconciliation and the application of this concept to the specific context of separatist conflict. I will also briefly explain the separatist conflict in Indonesia as the case study of the current dissertation. The theoretical backgrounds which elucidate the conflicting perspectives (i.e., the divergent threat perceptions and psychological motivations) of the non-separatist majority and the separatists are then discussed, to examine social-psychological factors and interventions that contribute to the promotion of reconciliation in separatist conflict. Finally, an overview of the main body of the current dissertation will be presented.
The defining characteristics of separatism

To get a better understanding of the factors predictive of eventual reconciliation in separatist conflicts, it is important to first define separatism. Oxford English Reference Dictionary (Pearsall & Trumble, 1996) defines separatism as “the advocacy of a state of cultural, ethnic, tribal, religious, racial, governmental or gender separation from the larger group.” According to the Cambridge International Dictionary of English (Procter, 1995), separatism refers to “the belief held by people of a particular race, religion, or other group within a country that they should be independent and have their own government or in some way live apart from other people.” The Dictionary of Social Science (Calhoun, 2002) defines separatism as a concept that “stresses resistance to integration within a society or culture on the part of a people or other group.” The SAGE Glossary of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (Sullivan, 2009) thinks of separatism as “a political movement that favours the autonomy and sovereignty of a nation that is presently apart of a larger sovereign state.”

Evident from the definitions listed above, separatism is conceptualised in many different ways, and can take multifarious forms. It can involve broad social categories such as gender separatism, denoting, for example, the aspiration of women to withdraw their relations with men (Taylor, 1999), or racial separatism, for instance, the aspiration of Black people to protest their integration with White people (Hughes & Hertel, 1990). When separatism involves these broad social categories, it has nothing to do with a state, but instead with relationships between groups within a society (Calhoun, 2002). Separatism can also involve narrower social categories such as ethnic, religious, or cultural groups that fight for autonomy within, or full independence from a sovereign state (Calhoun, 2002). Yet regardless of these diverse definitions and forms of separatism, at the root of all separatist movements is the principle of self-determination, i.e., the right of group members to decide how and by what parties they should be governed (Beary, 2011). The idea behind this principle is that the separatist communities believe that they can be better off controlling their own economic, political, and socio-cultural affairs (Griffiths & Savic, 2009).

The focus of this dissertation is on separatism in its narrow form, such that it refers to a political movement that is fought for by distinct ethnic, religious, or cultural groups of people that call for autonomy or independence from a state. This kind of separatism is characterised with diverse motives and demands (Harris, 2009; Spencer, 1998). The varying motives can be broadly clustered into two categories: realistic and identity motives (Beary, 2011; see also Chapters 2 and 3). Realistic motives revolve around economic and power issues in which the separatist groups aspire to cultivate their own natural resources (e.g., Ross, 2004), and to take control over the sovereignty of their own region (e.g., Gorenburg, 1999). Identity motives relate to socio-cultural issues where the separatist groups want to uphold their unique identities in terms of language or ethnicity (e.g., Hobsbawm & Kertzer, 1992), and religion (e.g., May, 1992). Regarding the demands, most separatist groups aim at full political secession (e.g., Doyle, 2010), but some just seek greater autonomy (e.g., Siroky & Cuffe, 2015).

Separatist conflicts are also characterised by a combination of direct and structural violence (Beary, 2011). As for direct violence, separatist conflicts involve deliberate acts of aggression between members of the disputing parties, including torture, murder, and other extreme humiliations (Walter, 2009). As for structural violence, separatist conflicts involve also the manner by which social institutions are unjustly arranged. From the perspective of the separatist portion of society, structural violence takes shape via marginalization and isolation of power by the central government (Ashraf, 1994; Beary, 2011; Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010). This marginalization is commonly rooted in the fact that most of separatist regions are located far from the central
government. There are abundant examples around the globe that show that separatist movements are indeed more prevalent among members of peripheral groups such as those in South East Asia (Brown, 1988), Russia (Slocum, 1995), Canada (Olk, 1982), Western Europe (Zariski, 1989), and China (Bhattacharya, 2003).

Separatist conflicts typically pit the separatist groups against a non-separatist majority (from heretofore referred to as “the majority group” or simply as “the majority”) as represented by the central government (Beary, 2011), which is the focus of this dissertation. Indeed, there are some cases where separatist conflict involves third parties, which oftentimes turns the secessionist dispute from a domestic matter into an international affair (Saideman & Ayres, 2000). A recent example of this is the separatist movement among the people of East Ukraine, which has been backed by the Russian Federation but resisted by the government of Ukraine, which finds support from Western European countries and the United States (Gigova, Lapin, & Butenko, 2017).

**Intergroup reconciliation: A general overview**

Scientists across disciplines have investigated reconciliation. Primatologists (e.g., de Waal, 2000) for example suggest that reconciliation occurs when former adversaries have a friendly reunion after a violent confrontation. In a similar vein, researchers in international relations and political science (Bercovitch, 1995; Burton, 1987; Deutsch, 1973; Kriesberg, 1992; Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994;) have conceptualised reconciliation as the formal conclusion of intergroup conflict, symbolised in an agreement on reciprocally acceptable solutions through negotiation, bargaining, mediation, or arbitration. Social psychologists initially focused their investigation on interpersonal reconciliation in which they converged upon a definition that rests on the cessation of conflict (Nadler, 2012). The dominant findings within this social psychological literature is that interpersonal reconciliation, which refers to the reduced likelihood of dyadic future conflict, occurs when perpetrators are willing to apologise for their wrongdoings, and the victims are willing to forgive past relational transgressions (Exline, Worthington, Hill, & McCullough, 2003; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997).

The following social psychological research on intergroup reconciliation was spurred by social psychologists’ concern over their observation that, unlike intergroup conflicts, intergroup conflicts do not diminish with the cessation of violence (Nadler, 2002). This is because years of intergroup conflict generate negative feelings of anger and revenge, as well as negative intergroup perceptions such as distrust, victimhood, and prejudice (Bruneau & Saxe, 2012; Halperin, 2011). Literature (e.g., Christie, Tint, Wagner, & Winter, 2008; Nadler, 2002) suggests that formal peaceful agreements are not a sufficient way of dealing with such psychological barriers. In overcoming these difficulties, peace psychologists and social psychologists (e.g., Bar-Siman-Tov, 2004; Nadler, Malloy, & Fisher, 2008) have come to realise that intergroup conflict does not automatically vanish with the termination of open violence. Hence, intergroup reconciliation should be grounded on the establishment of peaceful and sustainable intergroup relations.

Indeed, the primary outcome of intergroup reconciliation should not just be the end of conflict and violence, which is also referred to as negative peace (Biton & Salomon, 2006). Rather, it should materialise in positive peace, a peace that is stable and durable and that does not easily revert to the vicious cycles of conflict and violence (Biton & Salomon, 2006; Hermann, 2004). However, to achieve this positive peace, intergroup reconciliation needs a process within which each disputing party should develop and maintain certain attitudes, emotions, intentions, and behaviours (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004; Kelman, 2004; Nadler, Malloy, & Fisher, 2008). In the present dissertation I propose to synthesize these arguments, and subsequently explain how it is that intergroup
reconciliation is a multidimensional construct comprised of attitudinal, emotional, intentional, and behavioural dimensions.

Intergroup reconciliation presupposes harmonious relations between the disputing groups (Nadler, 2012). In this regard, one group should learn to develop trust and positive views towards, as well as to consider the perspectives and interests of its adversary group (Auerbach, 2009; Kriesberg, 2007; Pettigrew, Tropp, Wagner & Christ, 2011). These relations conducive to intergroup reconciliation are also dependent upon the disputing groups’ willingness to express feelings of collective guilt and shame, and to reflect on their accountability for any wrongdoings (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2008). In the current dissertation, I label these positive cognitive orientations as “reconciliatory attitudes” (e.g., intergroup trust, positive intergroup attitudes and stereotypes, perspective-taking) and those collective feelings as “reconciliatory emotions” (collective guilt, collective shame).

However, intergroup reconciliation involves not only relational aspects but also structural aspects (Nadler, 2012). By structural aspects, I mean that intergroup reconciliation is more than mere rhetoric without the perpetrating groups’ willingness to carry out programs or policies that aim to amend the past or current injustice and disadvantages of the victim groups (Rouhana, 2011). These programs or policies may take shape via affirmative actions (Pratkanis & Turner, 1996), intergroup cooperation, and official apology (Kelman, 2004). However, these reparative actions are commonly negotiated and then executed by the government upon reaching a formal agreement with the victim groups (Bercovitch, 1995; Kriesberg, 1992; Rubin et al., 1994). This kind of reconciliatory effort oftentimes does not justly represent the members on both sides of the dispute, which makes it fall short of securing genuine peace (Knox & Quirk, 2000; Lipschutz, 1998).

To ensure stable and durable peace, the members of the disputing parties should take part in the reparative actions by demonstrating their support for these initiatives (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004). I refer to this support for the government’s reparative actions with the term “reconciliatory intentions”. These involve impersonal reconciliatory actions initiated by the government, and the society members’ response where they themselves express support for these actions. The feasibility of this reconciliation process depends not only on the support of the elite social strata such as academics and political leaders, but also, more importantly, that of the wider segments of the respective societies (Auerbach, 2009). However, intergroup reconciliation does not end with such society members’ impersonal actions (Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004). It still requires the individual involvement of the society members to perform actions that provide new experiences of promoting peace through, for example, collective actions, meetings, ceremonies, volunteerism, donations, and so forth. I label this in the current dissertation as “reconciliatory behaviours”.

I will integrate the diverse terminologies of reconciliation into reconciliatory attitudes, reconciliatory emotions, reconciliatory intentions, and reconciliatory behaviours. I do so because in the current dissertation I assume that conflict reconciliation is a complex process that involves multiple constructs of attitudes, emotions, intentions, and behaviours, as well as the interrelations among these constructs (Bakke et al., 2009). My main interest is to analyse each of these constructs as a latent variable, and integrate them into a structural model and test the plausibility of their interrelations with empirical data (Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002). To explain the interrelations among the multiple constructs, I base our arguments on the theory of planned behaviour (TPB; Ajzen, 1991) and its extended version (e.g., Moons & De Pelsmacker, 2015). TPB posits that attitudes predict behaviours via intentions. The extended version of TPB includes emotions as another predictor and posits how emotions, along with attitudes, predict behaviours via...
intentions. Combined together, I contend that reconciliatory attitudes and emotions promote reconciliatory intentions, which in turn enhance reconciliatory behaviours.

**Intergroup reconciliation in separatist conflicts**

Given that separatist conflicts typically involve the majority and the separatist group, intergroup reconciliation in this type of collective friction presupposes the active participation of both sides (Bakke et al., 2009). Therefore, a thorough investigation into the perspectives of both parties, or how the majority and the separatist group alike feel and think about reconciliation, is necessary. Despite this ideal precondition to reconciliation, the current dissertation puts emphasis on the perspectives of the majority, for two main reasons. First, the majority relative to the separatist group is expected to take the moral high ground in collective disputes involving both groups (Vandello, Michniewicz, & Goldschmied, 2011). This is because the majority, as opposed to the separatist group, commonly exercise stronger military and political powers (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2007). Second, the majority is typically assigned a role as initiator of reconciliation because of its dominant status vis-à-vis the separatist group (Satha-Anand, 2016). Overall, these arguments are taken to suggest that intervention programs aimed at promoting reconciliation among members of the majority may stand a better chance of being successful.

Separatist conflicts spur reactions from both the governments and the separatist groups (Horowitz, 1981). The governmental responses may range from acceding to the separatist demands and granting autonomy or federalism to the separatist regions, to the other extreme of further suppression of separatist movements (Spencer, 1998). The governmental reactions therefore could be peaceful or otherwise violent, and this depends on certain contexts. To illustrate, Cunningham (2011) found that the governments were more willing to make concessions to internally divided separatist groups than to unitary ones. Walter (2000) reported that from 1940 to 1996, 70% of the governments resisted negotiating with the separatist groups, especially when the goal of these groups was a demand for political independence as opposed to other goals such as gaining greater autonomy. Moreover, in related research Walter (2006) found that, using data across separatist movements from 1956 to 2002, the central governments were less willing to accommodate the demands of the separatist groups especially in countries in which the number of the secessionist groups and the perceived value of the disputed land were high.

Some separatist groups are willing to accept autonomy or federalism through programs granted by the central government as a form of devolution (Bermeo, 2002; Ghai, 2000; Gurr, 1994, 2000). However, other separatist groups have rejected such gestures from central governments and instead opt for continuing their armed struggle, aiming at full independence (Ayres & Saideman, 2000; Hale, 2000; Jenne, Saideman, & Lowe, 2007). Separatist groups decide to engage in the wars with central governments, especially in the context of an economic motive to preserve their precious natural resources (Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011; Ross, 2004). Moreover, Jenne et al. (2007) reported that separatist groups escalated their schismatic movements when they had a great bargaining power vis-à-vis the central governments, resided in a concentrated territory, and were backed by external forces.

These observations imply that although governments and separatist groups are frequently unyielding in conflict, they can still move towards peaceful accommodation. As such, promoting reconciliation between the disputing parties in separatist conflicts is still possible, albeit challenging (Walter, 2006); and it is very important as well given the prevalence, intractability, and violence characteristic of these disputes.
The Separatist Conflict in Indonesia

The current dissertation applies the insights about intergroup reconciliation discussed above to the context of separatist conflict in Indonesia. Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, but the country has been dealing with separatist movements initiated by various ethnic groups ever since (Kingsbury & Aveling, 2003). There are several separatist groups in Indonesia’s history, but in this dissertation I highlight the most prominent ones. The first are the people of South Moluccas who self-proclaimed the Republic of South Maluku (Indonesian: Republik Maluku Selatan [RMS]) in 1950 (Rosenzweig, 1994). The second is the Free Papua Movement (Indonesian: Organisasi Papua Merdeka [OPM]), established during 1965 in West New Guinea territory, which is currently referred to as the provinces of Papua and West Papua under the Indonesian administration (King, 2004). The third is Free Aceh Movement (Indonesian: Gerakan Aceh Merdeka [GAM]) that fought against Indonesian government forces starting in 1976 (Schulze, 2003). The fourth is Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Indonesian: Fretilin). This separatist movement wages war against the Indonesian forces that annexed East Timor and declared it as the 27th province in 1976 (Martin, 2001).

Separatist movements no longer exist in the South Moluccas or East Timor regions. The RMS has left Indonesia after the defeat of its capital city Ambon in 1950, and this separatist group settled in the Netherlands as a government in exile since then (Rosenzweig, 1994). The United Nations sponsored an act of self-determination in 1999 for the people of East Timor to vote for their integration with or independence from Indonesia. This referendum had shown that the people of East Timor were in favour of independence, which motivated the Indonesian government to relinquish control of the territory (McCloskey & Hainsworth, 2000). GAM in Aceh surrendered their separatist movements and dissolved their armed wings following a 2005 peace agreement where the GAM had accepted special autonomy programs granted by the Indonesian government (Wennmann & Krause, 2009). OPM in West Papua is currently the most active and violent separatist movement in Indonesia. This separatist group has even radicalised its struggle by declaring open war on the Indonesian military and non-Papuan civilians during the process of this dissertation in 2015 (Ambarita, 2015). Even recently, on November 05, 2017, the OPM held 1,300 villagers hostage in Tembagapura district, Mimika Regency, Papua, (“Papua police face difficulty seeking release of 1,300 villager hostages”, 2017), as a protest to demand West Papua’s independence from Indonesia.

This dissertation focuses on the separatist conflict in Aceh (see Chapter 2, Study 2.1) and, more particularly, in West Papua (see Chapter 2, Study 2.2; Chapter 3, Studies 3.1 and 3.2; Chapters 4 and 5). Aceh is included because separatist sentiments among Acehnese remain high, although the independence movement itself in that region is no longer active (Smith, 2010). Moreover, despite the Indonesian and Acehnese governments having made a deal with the autonomy program as mentioned above, this peace agreement in its later development is fragile since mutual trust between both sides is low, and unemployment in Aceh is considerably higher than in other provinces (“Indonesia: Deep distrust in Aceh as elections approach”, 2009). Tensions between the Indonesian and Acehnese governments are also still prevalent, especially over the interpretation and implementation of the autonomy program in Aceh (Cochrane, 2013). In the case of West Papua, this dissertation includes this region as a case study with two reasons. First, as described above, the separatist movement in West Papua is still on-going. Second, despite that the Indonesian central government granted special autonomy to West Papua in 2001, many Papuans have rejected this gesture from the central government, as evident in a march in June 2010, where thousands of Papuans were demanding a referendum on self-determination (Pemberton, 2010). Indeed, the special autonomy program has substantially increased financial investments in West Papua.
However, West Papuans tend to believe that the control of the autonomy remains in the hands of the Indonesian government such that this program is considered as having little to no contribution toward making the West Papuans more empowered themselves (Harvey, 2010). In sum, Aceh and West Papua serve as the contextual backgrounds of the current dissertation because separatist sentiments in the two regions are currently intense, arguably hampering the implementation of the Indonesian government’s reconciliatory program. Investigating factors that predict the majority and the separatist group’s support for reconciliation in responding to separatist conflicts in Aceh or West Papua are therefore highly relevant to the current Indonesian context, which is the focal focus of the present work.

The explanations above demonstrate how the Indonesian government is willing to execute reconciliatory programs, despite these gestures having been formidable resisted by the separatist groups. The questions that remain unanswered are; do such reconciliatory programs initiated by central governments truly represent the aspiration of and, thereby, find support from the majority it represents? Does this support also reflect the majority’s reconciliatory attitudes and emotions towards the separatist group? May the support also translate into the majority’s reconciliatory behaviours? The current dissertation attempts to answer these questions, using relevant social psychological theories and empirical findings. This literature serves as a social psychological account of the potential antecedents of the majority’s reconciliation in separatist conflicts, in order to get a better insight into the dynamics of reconciliation among that particular group. These social-psychological perspectives of the majority on intergroup reconciliation are elaborated in the following section. This will be followed by another section which discusses the social- psychological perspectives of the separatist group.

The perspective of the majority

Separatist conflicts are commonly characterised by mutual transgressions in which the majority and the separatist group alike alternate in the roles of perpetrator and victim (Trumbore, 2003; Webb, 2016). Despite this common duality, the present dissertation emphasizes the role of the majority as perpetrator (see Chapter 2, Studies 2.1 and 2.2; Chapter 5) and the separatist group as victim (see Chapter 3) in conflicts assumed to pit the first group against the latter. The reason for this is that in separatist conflicts, the majority is commonly more powerful than the separatist group, either in terms of economy or military (Harbom & Wallenstein, 2007; Horowitz, 2003). Having a more dominant position, the majority compared to the separatist group is likely to experience less psychological (e.g., stress, trauma) or physical (i.e., injury, death) suffering over the course of their conflict (Bartkus, 1999; Beary, 2011). The majority may thereby find it hard to deny its role as a perpetrator of violent acts against the separatist group (Harbom & Wallenstein, 2007). An exception is made, however, in which Chapter 4 of this dissertation simultaneously assesses the majority’s sense of competitive victimhood and perpetratorhood. This is because each disputing party in separatist conflicts tends to view its own goals and actions as legitimate, whereas the goals and actions of opposing groups are viewed as lacking legitimacy. In this regard, the majority views its resistance and even oppression toward separatist movements as justified reactions to the secessionist demands and claims that it considers illegitimate (Lehning, 2005; Wellman, 2005). There may be a tendency of the majority to construe itself primarily as the victim instead of the perpetrator, this subjective claim being commonly observed in protracted intergroup conflicts (Bar-Tal & Salomon, 2006; Nadler & Saguy, 2003; Shaw, 2003).

According to the needs-based model of reconciliation (NBMR; Shnabel et al., 2008, 2009), perpetrators and victims experience divergent threats and motivations to cope with these threats following violence. This basic tenet of NBMR has been applied to interpersonal domains as well
(Shnabel & Nadler, 2008). A later extension of the NBMR has been successfully tested in intergroup domains, either within the context of direct violence by the perpetrating group against the victim group (e.g., Shnabel et al., 2008, 2009) or structural, indirect violence by the dominant group against the subordinated group (e.g., Shnabel, Nadler, Dovidio, & Ulrich, 2010; Shnabel, Nadler, Ullrich, & Aydin, 2013). The NBMR (Nadler & Shnabel, 2015; Shnabel et al., 2008, 2009; Shnabel & Nadler, 2015) suggests that due to the wrongdoings the dominant group has committed against the victim, subordinated group, the first group feels threatened in its moral reputation in the eyes of the latter group. This sense of morality threat denotes how the perpetrating group is concerned about the ways the victimized group pejoratively views it as the violent, cruel, aggressor, or, in sum, the immoral group (Shnabel et al., 2008, 2009). In other words, morality threat within NBMR mirrors so-called negative meta-stereotype, which refers to the negative characterisations another group holds about people’s own group (Vorauer, Main, & O’Connell, 1998). Indeed, studies have provided empirical evidence which observe perpetrating groups’ preoccupation with their own perceived immorality (Shnabel et al., 2009).

According to the ‘group identity lens’ model (Verkuyten, 2009), social identification makes people sensitive to anything that can harm their group. Greater group identification consequently generates greater threat perceptions. This model is derived from self-categorisation theory (SCT; Turner & Reynolds, 2001) suggesting that when people strongly identify with their group, their particular social identity becomes salient, which motivates these people to feel, think, and behave on the basis of that social identity rather than their personal identity. Strong group identification as a result makes people feel directly implicated in anything that may have important consequences for their group. In support of the group identity lens model, Verkuyten (2009) found that the more the Dutch identified with their nation, the more they reported that the presence of minority groups in the Netherlands (i.e., Muslim immigrants) poses a threat to the Dutch norms, values, and culture. Applying the insight of the group identity lens model to the context of the current research, it is argued in this dissertation that the more the majority identifies with parent nation the more likely it is that this particular group experiences morality threat in its conflictive relations with the separatist group.

The integrated threat theory of prejudice (ITT; Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios, 2016) suggests that the dominant group is prone to symbolic or identity threat perceptions, as shown in the research by Stephan et al. (2002). Morality threat is categorised as one form of symbolic or identity threat (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), which emerges in part because dominant group members are concerned about the moral superiority and legitimacy of their norms and values which are questioned by the dominated groups (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). Dominant group members are therefore expected to be sensitive to the judgement of the dominated group that they are immoral, because this negative evaluation may undermine the legitimacy of their group’s reputation (Saguy, Chernyak-Hai, Andrighetto, & Bryson, 2013). Applying these arguments to the context of separatist conflicts, it is argued that the more the majority views its group as dominant in relation to the separatist group, the more the first group feels threatened regarding its moral legitimacy in the eyes of the latter group.

The NBMR suggests furthermore that because people are driven to act in ways that can maintain their group’s positive identities, morality threat produces the perpetrating group’s specific motivational states. In particular, to cope with the morality threat it experiences, the perpetrating group is motivated to meet two compensatory needs, these being the need to be socially accepted by the victim group and the need to restore its moral image (Shnabel & Nadler; 2015; Siman Tov-Nachlieli, Shnabel, & Nadler, 2013). The need for social acceptance may be expressed through the
perpetrating group’s willingness to form friendships and cooperation with the victim group, whereas the need for a restored moral image is expressed through the first group’s willingness to support and perform virtuous actions towards latter group to reassure its moral identity (Shnabel & Ullrich, 2013). Empirical evidence for these compensatory needs has been demonstrated in prior research, for example, Siem, von Oettingen, Mummendey, and Nadler (2013) observed that the dominant, advantaged group expressed a stronger desire to be liked and be viewed as fair, reflecting the markers of need for social acceptance and the restoration of moral image. Saguy, Dovidio, and Pratto (2008) reported how dominant, advantaged groups demonstrated relatively greater preference for behaviours such as intergroup dialogue in situations of intergroup contact.

The NBMR posits that the compensatory needs for social acceptance and restoration of moral image drive the perpetrating group to be more willing to reconcile its conflict with the victim group. In support of this rationale, Shnabel et al. (2009) found that the perpetrating groups (i.e., Jews [Study 1] and Germans [Study 2]) were more willing to reconcile with the victim groups (i.e., Arabs [Study 1] and Jews [Study 2]) when the first groups received a message of acceptance from the latter groups. Shnabel, Nadler, and Dovidio (2014) found that a message of acceptance from the victim group induced a greater willingness to reconcile, as opposed to the same message from a neutral third party. Similarly, Bilewicz and Jaworska (2013) revealed how the perpetrating group’s (Polish in Poland) need for social acceptance gave rise to its reconciliatory attitudes towards the historically wronged victim group (i.e., Jewish people in Poland). Moreover, Barlow et al. (2015) observed that expressions of apology by the perpetrating group (i.e., non-Aboriginal Australians) that was accepted by the victim group (i.e., Aboriginal Australians) enhanced the first group’s sense of a restored moral image, which ultimately fostered its endorsement of reconciliation with the latter group. Mazziotta, Feuchte, Gausel, and Nadler (2014) reported that inducing people to think of their group as the perpetrator enhanced their need for social acceptance, which was ultimately a positive predictor of empathy towards, as well as willingness to participate in cross-group contact with the victimized group.

To summarise, in light of the NBMR, in finding the path to reconciliation from collective dispute among the majority, my point of departure in this dissertation is that this particular group is assigned a role as perpetrator in separatist conflict, given its more dominant and stronger position vis-à-vis the separatist group. Exercising this superior position, building on the argument of NBMR, the majority is likely to find it difficult to refute any accusations of being a perpetrator, due to its previous or on-going actions against the separatist group. This salience of perceived wrongdoings in its conflict with the separatist group would threaten the majority’s moral reputation in front of the separatist group. In responding to the morality threat, the majority is likely to report heightened needs for social acceptance and the restoration of a legitimate moral image. In turn, these compensatory needs would be positively associated with the majority’s reconciliation with the separatist group. The present dissertation breaks down reconciliation into four constructs as elaborated in the previous sections: reconciliatory attitudes, reconciliatory emotions, reconciliatory intentions, and reconciliatory behaviours. In this way, I attempt to extend the NMBR by proposing these multidimensional constructs of reconciliation and by examining their interconnections. In particular, I propose a meditational process in which the direct effect of compensatory needs for social acceptance and restoration of moral image on reconciliatory behaviours would pass through reconciliatory attitudes, emotions, and intentions. These perspectives of the majority on reconciliation in separatist conflict are examined in Chapter 2 (Studies 2.1 and 2.2), Chapter 4, and Chapter 5.

The perspective of the separatist group
The NBMR (Shnabel et al., 2008; 2009) posits that committing transgressions makes the perpetrating group suffer from morality threat as explained above, whereas experiencing victimisation makes the victim group suffer from power or agency threat. This power threat implies that the victim group perceives the perpetrating group as decreasing or hampering its sense of power, honour, control, and self-esteem. Power threat in turn is an impetus for augmenting the victim group’s need for subgroup empowerment. Need for subgroup empowerment describes the aspiration of the victim group to restore its power. This aspiration unilaterally implies the perceived importance for the victim group to make its group more empowered by enhancing its sense of power, control, and influence. Bilaterally, the aspiration implies the perceived importance for victim groups to demand of perpetrating groups that they be willing to acknowledge their wrongdoings, to express apology, and take responsibility for the injustices it has caused (Siem et al., 2013).

The NBMR presupposes that when the perpetrating group is able to meet the victim group’s need for subgroup empowerment, the latter group is more willing to reconcile its conflict with the first group. In support of this rationale, previous research found how the victim group’s willingness to reconcile was increased when this group received a message of empowerment from the perpetrating group (Shnabel et al., 2009). In a setting of separatist conflict, the separatist group is likely to have a heightened need for subgroup empowerment and the aspiration to satisfy this need. This is because the separatist group commonly exercises less power than the majority, and this subordinated position makes the first group vulnerable to claim a victim status in its dispute with the latter group (Harff & Gurr, 1989). The aspiration of the separatist group to meet its need for subgroup empowerment is shown in that particular group’s search for real independence from the majority (Jenne et al., 2007). Historically, however, it seems that in separatist conflicts, the separatist group’s need for subgroup empowerment is rarely satisfied by the majority. As stated earlier, the majority more often resists accommodating the separatist group’s demands, typically when these demands relate to complete separation or real independence (Walter, 2000). Accordingly, this dissertation assumes that the separatist group’s need for subgroup empowerment is unsatisfied by default, such that this need should be negatively associated with this group’s support for making reconciliation with the majority.

As put forward above, the issue of power is indeed a pivotal cause of separatist movements. However, anecdotal records illustrate how separatist struggles are not only rooted at power motives, but also identity motives (Aspinall, 2007; Beary, 2011; Spencer, 1998). Indeed, there are some separatist groups that are deeply concerned about the sustainability or continuity of the unique norms and values that they perceive as being incompatible with and undermined by the majority. Sani and colleagues (Sani, 2005; Sani & Reicher, 2000; Sani & Todman, 2002) captured that phenomenon in the term ‘identity subversion’. Identity subversion has been found to foster secessionist intentions by exacerbating the perception that the separatist group’s ability to freely articulate dissent has been hindered by the majority. Identity subversion thereby poses a hindrance for reconciliation because it is accountable for severing the separatist group’s sense of injustice in its relations with the majority (Sani & Todman, 2002). Power motives and identity motives both play a substantial role in hindering the separatist group’s reconciliation, however, it is assumed that the role each motive has is distinct. In particular, power motives describe how the separatist group, as a victim, experience a threat to its sense of control and influence, and this power threat in turn obstructs reconciliation by heightening this particular group’s need for subgroup empowerment. Identity motives describe how the separatist group also feel threatened regarding its subgroup’s norms and values, and this identity subversion ultimately hampers reconciliation by heightening this particular group’s sense of injustice.
This dissertation seeks not only to shed light on the consequences identity subversion and power threat have in obstructing the separatist group’s reconciliatory tendencies as described above. The aim is furthermore to uncover the social-psychological factors that predict the identity subversion and power threat faced by the separatist group. Group identity lens model (Verkuyten, 2009), as explained earlier, postulates that group identification is an antecedent of intergroup threat perceptions. Substantiating this idea, Sindic and Reicher (2009) for example found that greater ethnic identification among Scots was associated with higher levels of the perception that Scottish identity had been undermined by the British majority group. Deriving from this proposition, it is expected that the more separatist members identify with their ethnic group the more they experience identity subversion and power threat. The second factor is perceived subordination, and I build my argument in generating this prediction on integrated threat theory of prejudice (ITT; Stephan et al., 2016). This theory asserts that the dominant group and the dominated group may similarly view their existence to be at stake, with both sides feeling threatened by the other. However, the reasons for such mutual threat perceptions are different (Stephan et al., 2016). As empirically demonstrated in previous research (e.g., Johnson, Terry, & Louis, 2005; Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006), dominant group members perceive they are under threat when they view that the dominated group casts doubt on the legitimacy of their norms, values, or culture (i.e., symbolic or identity threat), or challenges their economic or political resources (i.e., realistic threat). The dominated groups are susceptible to perceiving threats because their symbolic or identity resources, as well as economic and political resources, are oftentimes controlled by the dominant groups (Corenblum & Stephan, 2001; Stephan et al., 2002). Drawing on ITT, this dissertation posits that the more the separatist group feels subordinated in its relations with the majority, the more it experiences identity subversion and power threat. Chapter 3 (Studies 3.1 and 3.2) is focused specifically on testing these perspectives of the separatist group regarding the potential for reconciliation.

I summarise these identified perceptions and beliefs common to majority and separatist groups in a figure presented below (see Figure 1.1). As can be seen, at the core of the figure are psychological motivations of the majority and the separatist group, which shape each party’s reconciliatory stances. The psychological motivations are assumed to stem from the unique experiences the majority and the separatist group have in their mutual relations, and these experiences are triggered by some antecedents.

**Antecedents**
- Majority group:
  - National identification
  - Perceived Dominance
  - Wrongdoings
- Separatist group:
  - Ethnic identification
  - Perceived Subordination

**Typical experiences**
- Majority group:
  - Morality threat
  - Perpetratorhood
  - Competitive Victimhood
- Separatist group:
  - Identity subversion
  - Power threat

**Psychological motivations**
- Majority group:
  - Need for social acceptance
  - Need for restoration of moral image
- Separatist group:
  - Perceived injustice
  - Need for subgroup empowerment

**Intergroup reconciliation**
- Components/Dimensions:
  - **Attitudes** (outgroup trust, positive outgroup attitudes, positive outgroup stereotyping, perspective-taking)
  - **Emotions** (collective guilt, collective shame, empathy)
  - **Intentions** (apology/forgiveness, intergroup Cooperation, affirmative Actions, autonomy)
  - **Behaviours** (personal willingness to participate in peace activities)

*Figure 1.1. Antecedents and consequences of the motivational state of intergroup reconciliation in separatist conflict*
Each empirical chapter in this dissertation, as will be made clear, proposes a model on the basis of the interrelations among the variables presented in Figure 1.1. Chapter 2 examines the role of national identification and perceived dominance in eliciting morality threat, and this aversive experience is assumed to give rise to the majority’s support for reconciliation with the separatist group by augmenting this non-separatist group’s needs for social acceptance and restoration of moral image. Chapter 3 tests a model in which the separatist group experiences identity subversion and power threat. It is argued that identity subversion obstructs the separatist group’s reconciliatory stances with the majority due to its role in triggering perceived injustice, together with power threat due to its role in triggering the need for subgroup empowerment.

Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 highlight a model that serves to test the underlying mechanisms by which a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings is effective as a social-psychological intervention in promoting reconciliation among the majority. In particular, Chapter 4 examines the effectiveness of a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings in activating a sense of perpetratorhood, which is ultimately assumed to be a potent predictor of the majority’s reconciliatory tendencies. Complementing perpetratorhood, Chapter 4 also assesses the majority’s sense of competitive victimhood, which refers to the tendency to view one’s own group as being more anguished than the opposing group (Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008). My argument for simultaneously assessing perpetratorhood and competitive victimhood is that in intergroup conflict, between the disputing parties, either victim or perpetrator groups are prone to claim a victim status because victimhood implies moral superiority or the belief that only the goals and actions of one’s own group is justified (Leach, Bilali, & Pagliaro, 2015; Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012). The majority is therefore likely to feel more victimised compared to its separatist counterpart, despite that the first group typically exercises greater economic, political, and military powers over the latter (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2007). In Chapter 4, it is argued that in a stark contrast to perpetratorhood, competitive victimhood poses a hindrance to the majority’s reconciliatory attitudes.

In Chapter 5, a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings is framed in terms of violations of moral ideals or violations of moral obligations, and tests the effectiveness of each of these morality frames in fostering reconciliation among the majority. A more detailed explanation about these reconciliatory interventions is presented in the following section.

**Interventions to promote reconciliation in separatist conflicts**

This dissertation proposes social-psychological interventions and examines how they contribute to the promotion of reconciliation among disputing parties, especially those of the majority group. My focus on the majority is predicated upon the observation that this non-separatist group is typically assigned a role as the initiator of reconciliation in separatist conflicts, given its dominant status (Satha-Anand, 2016). This dominant status puts pressure on the majority to play a moral high ground in collective conflict and to be the initiator of reconciliatory efforts (Coleman, 2003; Vandello et al., 2011). These efforts can materialise in the form of, for example, autonomy or affirmative programs (Bakke et al., 2009). Social-psychological interventions designed to promote reconciliation in separatist conflict is therefore more likely to be successful when directed toward members of the majority.

The current dissertation utilises information-based interventions to promote reconciliation in separatist conflict, which take the form of vignettes (e.g., Shnabel et al., 2008, 2009) or audiovisual media (e.g., Bilali & Vollhardt, 2013; Paluck, 2009), with the focus on the role of the ingroup rather than the other conflict party or neutral, third party as the source of the information (for differentiation among these interventions, please see Harth & Shnabel, 2015; Shnabel et al., 2014). In particular, the information has to do with reminding the majority of its wrongdoings
against the separatist group. My point of departure is that an appeal to ingroup wrongdoings could be critical self-reflection which can motivate ingroup members to reinvigorate and reform their group (Brander & Hornsey, 2006; Hornsey, 2005; Hornsey & Imani, 2004). However, these reconciliatory processes seem not to be effective because an appeal to ingroup wrongdoings can instead provoke defensive reactions, reflecting how ingroup members engage in a host of moral disengagements when being confronted with their group’s wrongdoings. These moral disengagements may take shape via dehumanisation of the victims, displacement of ingroup responsibility, or minimisation of the harmful impacts (Leach et al., 2015). Moral disengagements hinder reconciliation because they lead to legitimisation of past misdeeds (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006), increased support for future violence (Aquino, Reed II, Thau, & Freeman, 2007), and more favourable attitudes towards violence (Grussendorf et al., 2002). To make an appeal to ingroup wrongdoings that is beneficial to the promotion of reconciliation, those defensive barriers should therefore be overcome.

To overcome those defensive barriers, an appeal to ingroup wrongdoings in this dissertation is delivered by the ingroup source. In doing so, the majority is reminded of its wrongdoings against the separatist group where this information is communicated by the ingroup, i.e., the representative of that non-separatist group. Indeed, relevant literature (Hornsey & Imani, 2004; Hornsey, Oppes, & Svensson, 2002) suggests that negative information which is communicated by the ingroup can reduce defensiveness such that ingroup members agree with such criticism and consider it as constructive. In a similar vein, when a reminder of the wrongdoings against another group is communicated by the ingroup, this negative information is hard to deny such that it induces guilt acceptance from ingroup members (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2006; Zebel, Zimmermann, Viki, & Doosje, 2008).

I take two steps to test the effectiveness of a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings in attenuating the majority’s defensive reactions to the collective misdeeds this group has inflicted upon the separatist group. In the first step, a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings is compared with a reminder of ingroup rightdoings (Chapter 4). I assume that a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings more than a reminder of ingroup rightdoings enhances the majority’s sense of perpetratorhood. Given that perpetratorhood reflects the willingness to acknowledge the harm done and its detrimental consequences to the victim group (Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006) I then argue that it is a potent predictor of the majority’s reconciliatory attitudes towards the separatist group (see Mazziotta et al., 2014).

Moreover, I argue that the positive relationship between perpetratorhood and reconciliatory attitudes is dependent upon the extent to which the majority views the separatist movement and the integration of the separatist group within the parent nation as legitimate. Legitimacy is an important issue in separatist conflicts (Spencer, 1998). The main reason for this is that either the majority or the separatist group tends to engage in legitimisation of their collective misdeeds, which makes separatist conflict frequently violent and intractable (Kingsbury & Laoutides, 2015). The majority resists separatism due to this group’s firm beliefs in the illegitimacy of the separatist movement and, vice versa, the legitimacy of the inclusion of the separatist society within the parent nation. Reconciliation is therefore dependent upon the willingness to acknowledge the legitimacy of separatism or, contrariwise, the illegitimacy of the historical integration (Martinovic, Verkuysten, & Weesie, 2011). Based on these theoretical rationales and empirical findings, I contend in this dissertation that perpetratorhood is positively related to reconciliatory attitudes more pronouncedly when the majority views separatism as legitimate and the integration of separatist society into the parent nation as illegitimate.
This dissertation also assumes that, with reference to NBMR (Shnabel et al., 2008, 2009), the direct impact of perpetratorhood on reconciliatory attitudes as specified above passes via morality threat and compensatory needs for social acceptance and the restoration of moral image. The NBMR suggests that perpetrator groups typically suffer from morality threat due to their wrongdoings against victim groups. Morality threat in turn sets into motion compensatory needs for social acceptance and the restoration of moral image, which ultimately increases perpetrating groups’ favourable attitudes towards making reconciliation with the victim groups.

On the contrary, competitive victimhood is a hindering factor of the majority’s support for reconciliation. This is because competitive victimhood denotes defensiveness in responding to ingroup wrongdoings such that it triggers justification of, and denial of responsibility for collective violence (Noor et al., 2012). Characterised as such, previous studies (see Young & Sullivan, 2016 for a review) have found that competitive victimhood hinders support for reconciliation given its role in reducing intergroup trust, empathy, and willingness to forgive the adversary group. Based on this literature, this dissertation argues that competitive victimhood catalyses ‘moral licensing’, a defensive reaction denoting the belief that the ingroup treated the outgroup well in the past, which justifies the first group’s lack of endorsement for reparative actions towards the latter group in the present or future (Effron & Conway, 2015). Moral licensing is in turn assumed to decrease reconciliatory attitudes (i.e., intergroup trust, positive intergroup attitudes and stereotypes, and perspective-taking) because of its role in attenuating compensatory needs for social acceptance and the restoration of moral image.

In the second step, I implement two strategies to investigate in more detail the mechanism by which a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings is beneficial to the promotion of reconciliation among the majority. The first strategy has to do with framing ingroup wrongdoings in terms of violations of moral ideals or violations of moral obligations (Does, Derks, & Ellemers, 2011; Does, Derks, Ellemers, & Scheepers, 2012). Moral ideals framing denotes an approach-behavioural orientation (i.e., achieving positive outcomes, for instance being fair and peaceful) describing what people should do in their attempt to repair their group’s wrongdoings. Moral obligations framing denotes an avoidance-behavioural orientation (i.e., avoiding negative outcomes, for example being unfair and violent) describing what people should not do in their attempt to repair their group’s wrongdoings (Does et al., 2011, 2012).

Does et al. (2012) found that moral ideals framing was experienced as less aversive compared to moral obligations framing. Moreover, Does et al. (2011) argued that moral ideals framing is more instrumental than moral obligations framing as a means to boost the moral images of the ingroup. Social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) suggests that the primary motivation of people to join a group is to achieve positive social identity, reflecting on the norms, values, and culture of the ingroup that are considered more superior than those of the out-group. According to SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), group identification denotes the knowledge of, and emotional attachment to the group, and further suggests that, as empirically evidenced in prior work (e.g., Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993; Glasford, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009), positive social identity is typically pursued by high identifiers more so than low identifiers. Drawing on SIT, it is argued that moral ideals framing, by virtue of its role in facilitating the majority to enhance positive social identity of its group (i.e., the moral reputation in the eyes of the separatist group), is more effective than moral obligations framing in promoting greater support for reconciliation, especially among members of that non-separatist group who are high in national identification. Low identifiers, as SIT (Wann & Branscombe, 1990) posits, tend see themselves as non-prototypical members. As such, low identifiers do not view their group as being pivotal for their self-definition,
which makes them readily accept aversive information about their group more than high identifiers. Based on these arguments, I suggest that among the majority low in national identification, moral obligations framing is more optimal to the promotion of reconciliation relative to moral ideals framing.

The second strategy within the second steps aims to uncover the underlying mechanism by which a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings, regardless of how it is morally framed, is effective in promoting reconciliation among the majority. In doing so, I complement an ingroup wrongdoings condition with a neutral control condition. Again, consistent with the first step, a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings is communicated by the representative of the majority. I posit that a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings in promoting reconciliation as indicated in the role of the ingroup wrongdoings condition is more effective than the control condition in eliciting the majority’s perception of its group’s moral defects in the eyes of the separatist group. This perceived morality threat, in line with NBMR (Shnabel et al., 2009), should give rise to the majority’s reconciliatory attitudes and emotions because of its role in augmenting compensatory needs for social acceptance and the restoration of moral image.

**Overview of the current dissertation**

The current dissertation is built around four empirical chapters. The first and second empirical chapters highlight the dynamic processes of reconciliation, but the focus of each chapter is different. The first empirical chapter examines what social-psychological variables predict and mediate the majority’s support for reconciliation, whereas the second is focused on those processes from the perspectives of the separatist group. The third and fourth empirical chapters examine the effectiveness of social-psychological interventions in promoting reconciliation among the majority. Table 1.1 presents schematic overview of each of the four empirical chapters.
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<td>Chapter 3, Study 3.2</td>
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The main goal of Chapter 2 was to examine the social-psychological factors that may facilitate the majority’s support for reconciliation with the separatist group. In particular, Chapter 3 captured morality threat as a key variable regarding the motivation of the majority group’s support of reconciliation with the separatist groups. Previous research (Ellemers & van den Bos, 2012) reveals that group morality matters because people in general are very concerned about the positive reputations and images of their group. This is the case especially for the dominant groups that are more motivated to be liked and to be seen as moral, as opposed to subordinated groups which are more motivated towards being respected and seen as competent (Bergsierker, Shelton, & Richeson, 2010). Aligned with these rationales, the integrated threat theory of prejudice (ITT; Stephan et al., 2016) posits that the dominant group tends to be concerned about its group’s moral reputations when they are questioned by the dominated group. Moreover, group identity lens model (Verkuyten, 2009) posits that the more people identify with their group the more they are sensitive towards anything that can threaten their group. Based on these rationales, national identification and perceived dominance were therefore hypothesised as positive predictors of the majority’s morality threat. Morality threat, with reference to NBMR (Shnabel et al., 2008, 2009), was in turn expected to motivate the majority to support reconciliation with the separatist group because of its role in heightening two compensatory needs: the need for social acceptance and the restoration of moral image. The results from Study 2.1 confirmed these hypotheses by showing that national identification and perceived dominance positively predicted morality threat, and morality threat in turn mediated the role of the two compensatory needs in promoting the majority’s reconciliatory attitudes (i.e., intergroup trust, positive attitudes, and positive stereotypes) towards the separatist group. Study 2.2 replicated these findings and extends Study 2.1 by complementing reconciliatory attitudes with reconciliatory emotions (i.e., collective guilt and collective shame) and reconciliatory behaviours. Supporting the hypotheses that were based on theory of planned behaviours (TPB; Ajzen, 1991) and its extended version (e.g., Moons & De Pelsmacker, 2015), Study 2.2 revealed that both reconciliatory attitudes and reconciliatory emotions were significant positive predictors of reconciliatory behaviours, and that the role of morality threat in fostering reconciliatory emotions and behaviours passed through the compensatory needs for social acceptance and for the restoration of moral image.

The focus of Chapter 3 shifted from the majority to the separatist group and this chapter aimed to examine the motives that may contribute in predicting the separatist group’s support for reconciliation with the majority. Two underlying motives were examined and assumed to have a distinct role in explaining resistance to reconciliation among the separatist group: (1) identity motives and (2) power motives. On the one hand, building upon Sani’s model of group schism (Sani, 2008; Sani & Reicher, 1998; Sani & Todman, 2002), the identity motives propose how the separatist group’s tendency to oppose reconciliation with the majority is ingrained in the first group’s sense of identity subversion. This identity subversion ultimately hinders the separatist group’s reconciliatory stances by exacerbating the perception that the majority has treated them unjustly. Indeed, previous research demonstrates how perceived injustice ignites separatist intentions (Sani & Todman, 2002) and collective protest (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), which altogether reflect reduced reconciliatory stances. On the other hand, in light of NBMR (Shnabel et al., 2008, 2009), the power motives imply that a hindrance for the separatist group’s reconciliatory stances stems from power threat, which is characterised as a barrier of reconciliation because of its role in heightening that particular group’s need for subgroup empowerment. Moreover, the group identity lens model (Verkuyten, 2009) suggests that group identification is an antecedent of threat perceptions, whereas the integrated threat theory of prejudice (ITT; Stephan et al., 2016), points to
the influence of perceived subordination. Study 3.1 empirically supported these arguments by showing that greater ethnic identification and perceived subordination among members of the separatist group were positively associated with greater perceived identity subversion and power threat. Furthermore, Study 3.1 revealed as expected that the role of identity subversion and power threat in obstructing reconciliatory attitudes passed via a distinct path. In this regard, perceived injustice, but not the need for subgroup empowerment, mediated the role of identity subversion in negatively predicting the separatist group’s reconciliatory attitudes. The need for subgroup empowerment, but not perceived injustice, mediated the role of power threat in negatively predicting reconciliatory attitudes. Study 3.2 successfully replicated these results from Study 3.1. Moreover, Study 3.2 extended Study 3.1 by complementing reconciliatory attitudes with reconciliatory intentions and behaviours. Corroborating TPB (Ajzen, 1991), Study 3.2 revealed that reconciliatory intentions mediated the direct impact of reconciliatory attitudes on reconciliatory behaviours.

Chapter 4 discusses testing the effectiveness of a reminder of ingroup wrongdoing, as opposed to a reminder of ingroup rightdoings, as an intervention in promoting reconciliation among the majority. The underlying assumption within this chapter was that information from the ingroup source about the collective wrongdoings (e.g., Doosje et al., 2006; Zebel et al., 2008) compared to the collective rightdoings (e.g., Bilewicz & Jaworska, 2013) is more effective in overcoming the defensive barriers, thereby more promising for promoting the perpetrating group’s reconciliatory tendencies toward the victim group. In support of this rationale, Chapter 4 showed that a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings more than a reminder of ingroup rightdoings decreased the majority’s resistance to its harm inflicted upon the separatist group. This way, a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings appears more effective in enhancing the acceptance of the majority’s actions as being harmful to the separatist group, and reducing the perception that the action of the first group towards the latter is just and fair. This decreased defensiveness was also reflected in the finding that a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings resulted in higher levels of the majority’s acceptance of its role as a perpetrator in separatist conflict compared with a reminder of ingroup rightdoings. This sense of perpetratorhood, as expected, positively predicted the majority’s reconciliatory attitudes towards the separatist group. Moreover, this relationship held true only when the majority perceived that the integration of the separatist group within the parent nation is less legitimate, and that the separatist movement itself is considered as legitimate. Corroborating the NBMR (Shnabel et al., 2008, 2009), the direct effect of perpetratorhood on reconciliatory attitudes was mediated by morality threat and compensatory needs for social acceptance and the restoration of moral image. Finally, Chapter 4 revealed that, in line with the hypothesis, the majority’s sense of competitive victimhood elevated moral licensing, which in turn depressed reconciliatory attitudes by decreasing this particular group’s needs for social acceptance and a restored moral image.

In Chapter 5, I investigated in more detail the mechanism by which a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings effectively contributed to the promotion of the majority’s reconciliatory tendencies. In doing so, I framed ingroup wrongdoings either as violations of moral ideals or violations of moral obligations (Does et al., 2011, 2012). Building upon social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), I assumed that moral ideals framing more than moral obligations framing is beneficial to circumvent high identifiers’ defensive reactions and, as a result, promotes this particular group’s reconciliation in dealing with the wrongdoings by their group. In contrast, among low identifiers, I assumed that moral obligations framing more than moral ideals framing is effective in promoting reconciliation. This is because moral obligations framing is experienced as more aversive than moral ideals framing (Does et al., 2012), and low identifiers are less resistant to such negative information compared to
high identifiers (Wann & Branscombe, 1990). The results revealed that, as expected, for the high-identifying majority, moral ideals framing resulted in greater reconciliatory attitudes and emotions than moral obligations framing. On the contrary, for the less-identifying majority, moral obligations framing resulted in greater reconciliatory attitudes and emotions than moral ideals framing.

In Chapter 5, I also complemented the wrongdoings condition with a neutral, control condition, in an attempt of obtaining more evidence regarding the effectiveness of a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings in promoting the majority’s reconciliatory tendencies. In the wrongdoings condition, participants were presented with a documentary featuring some actions of the majority that were harmful and unjust to the separatist group. In the control condition, participants were not exposed to the documentary. I hypothesised that the wrongdoings condition would trigger more reconciliatory attitudes and emotions than the control condition. I reasoned that the wrongdoings condition more than the control condition increased morality threat, reflecting the majority’s acknowledgement of its collective misdeeds against the separatist group. Through the lens of the NBMR (Shnabel et al., 2008, 2009), my next hypothesis specified that morality threat was positively related to reconciliatory attitudes and emotions given its role in enhancing the majority’s compensatory needs for social acceptance and the restoration of moral image. Finally, based on TPB (Ajzen, 1991), I hypothesised that the effect of a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings on reconciliatory behaviours passed via reconciliatory attitudes, emotions, and intentions.

Supporting the hypotheses, the majority in the wrongdoings condition compared to the control condition reported less defensive reactions in responding to its own group’s misdeeds against the separatist group. The evidence for this was that the majority in the wrongdoings condition more than in the control condition acknowledged that its actions were harmful and unjust against the separatist group. It was found that the wrongdoings condition more than the control condition increased the majority’s morality threat, as well as reconciliatory attitudes, emotions, intentions, and behaviours. I also confirmed that the direct effect of a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings on reconciliatory attitudes and emotions passed via the majority’s morality threat and compensatory needs for social acceptance and the restoration of moral image, and that the direct effect of a reminder of ingroup wrongdoings on reconciliatory behaviours passed via reconciliatory attitudes, emotions, and intentions.

The empirical chapters overviewed above (i.e., Chapters 2-5) were the results of research collaborations. When presenting the complete report of each of the empirical chapters in the next sections of this dissertation, I therefore use the word ‘we’ instead of ‘I’. Important to note is that these empirical chapters are written as individual papers, such that each of them can be read independently.

Finally, Chapter 6 synthesises the findings from the four empirical chapters and highlights their theoretical and practical implications. I also discuss in Chapter 6 the limitations of the current dissertation and offer suggestions for future research, and end with concluding remarks.
Footnote

1 In an Indonesian context, the term “non-separatist majority” constitutes ethnic groups that, unlike Acehnese and West Papuans, do not currently demand independence from the central government. The most prototypical non-separatist majority is the Javanese, which dominate the course and history of Indonesian national politics (Suryadinata, Arifin, & Ananta, 2003). I equate the term non-separatist majority with the majority group or majority, in an attempt to direct my focus on Javanese people. The term majority in this dissertation therefore refers to Javanese, excluding other non-separatist ethnic groups in Indonesia. However, I sometimes use the term “central government” or “the government” when referring to the majority. I do so more particularly under a context where I discuss about the central government as the official decision maker that plans and executes national economic and political policies such as affirmative action and autonomy programs.