
ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor aan
de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,
op gezag van de rector magnificus
prof.dr. V. Subramaniam,
in het openbaar te verdedigen
ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie
van de Faculteit Religie en Theologie
op donderdag 7 februari 2019 om 13.45 uur
in de aula van de universiteit,
De Boelelaan 1105

door
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geboren te Joannina, Griekenland
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Man, the greater world contained in a lesser, the concurrence of all things, the recapitulation of God’s creatures, which is why he was produced last of all, just as we put an epilogue at the end of speeches; in fact, one could say that this universe is the composition of the person of the self-subsistent Logos.¹

He [i.e. man] is placed in the world like a treasure inside a large house which is far more valuable than the house containing it, or like an intricate and expensive vessel belonging to a king kept inside his palace. The palace is made out of very large stones which are easy to find, whereas the vessel is decorated with small stones, which are rare and very costly.²

But the eyes are blind. One must look with the heart...³

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¹ St Gregory Palamas, *Homily 53, On the Entry of the Theotokos into the Holy of Holies II*, 55.824-7, ΠΣ 6, 579 (ΠΑΕ 11, 330-2), trans. Veniamin, 439 (modified): Ἄνθρωπος γὰρ, ὁ μεῖζων οὗτος ἐν μικρῷ κόσμῳ, ἡ συνδρομὴ τοῦ παντός, ἡ ἀνακεφαλαίωσις τῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ κτισμάτων, διὸ καὶ παρήχθη πάντων ὅστις ὅσπερ ἡμεῖς ἐν λόγους τοὺς ἐπιλόγους ποιοῦμεν-οίοινε γὰρ τι σύγγραμμα τὸ πᾶν τούτο φαίη τις ἂν αὐθυποστάτου Λόγου...

² *Hom.* 26, 1.15-9, ΠΣ 6, 294-5 (ΠΑΕ 10, 154), trans. Veniamin, 206: Καὶ σύνεστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐντεθησαυρισμένος τῷ κόσμῳ, καθάπερ ἐν οὐκίᾳ μεγάλῃ πολυσίλβῳ τι χρήμα, πολλῷ τῷ μέτρῳ τοῦ περιέχοντος ὁλμίωτερον, και οἱ οἷον ἐν βασιλείας βασιλικῆς τις σκεύη ποικίλη καὶ πολυτίμητος· τὰ μὲν γὰρ μεγίστους λίθους, ἀλλ’ εὐώνους καὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσιν, ἡ δὲ σμικροῖς ἄλλα δυσπορίστοις καὶ πολυτιμήτοις ἐσκεύασται.

For my wife, Efrosyni,
and our children, Aglaia, Angelos, Spyros, and Malamatenia

Αγγελον εἰρήνης, πιστὸν ὀδηγόν, φύλακα τῶν νηρῶν
καὶ τῶν σωμάτων ἡμῶν, παρὰ τοῦ Κυρίου αἰτησόμεθα
Publications based on this PhD thesis

A. Peer-reviewed Articles

1. ‘The Notion of Eros (Love) and the Presence of St Augustine in the Works of St Gregory Palamas Revisited’, Analogia: The Pemptousia Journal for Theological Studies Volume 5, Special Series – Part 3 (2018), 19-33. [based on ch. 2.4 of the thesis]


B. Other Articles

1. ‘Ἡ Βιβλική καὶ Πατερικὴ παράδοση γιὰ τὸ κατ᾿ εἰκόνα τοῦ Θεοῦ στὸν ἄνθρωπο καὶ ἡ συμβολὴ τοῦ ἁγίου Γρηγορίου Παλαμᾶ: εἰσαγωγικὴ προσέγγιση’ [The Biblical and Patristic Tradition on the Image of God in Man and the Contribution of St Gregory Palamas: Introductory Approach], ΒΕΛΑΑ (Scientific Anniversary of the University Ecclesiastical Academy of Vella, Ioannina) 8 (2017-9), 189-223 [in Greek]. [based, mainly, on ch. 1 of the thesis]

2. ‘The Superiority of Humans over the Angels due to Participation in the Eucharist: Is St Gregory Palamas based on St John Damascene?’, forthcoming in Sobornost 40:2 (2018). [based on ch. 3.2.c of the thesis]

C. Forthcoming conference presentations:

1. ‘St Gregory Palamas on the Spiritual Senses: Ecstasy, Apophasis, Theosis, and the Passionate Part of the Soul’, accepted for presentation at the Inaugural Conference of the International Orthodox Theological Association (IOTA) in Iasi, Romania, 9-12 January 2019 (Theological Anthropology & Moral Theology Section; session on Emotions, Passions, and Virtue). [based, mainly, on ch. 7.1 of the thesis]

At this point I feel the need to express my deep gratitude in seeing the present work completed. I am grateful and glorify first the Triune God who deemed me worthy to study and write about Orthodox anthropology, and second St Gregory Palamas, into whose texts I tried to delve, and from which I gained great profit and delight.

However, it should be mentioned that the whole process of writing the current thesis, apart from being delightful, was also very demanding and difficult. About five years of systematic and hard work were required. Undoubtedly, it could not have been completed without the help and support of many beloved persons. 

First, I am indebted to my main supervisor, Fr Andrew Louth. From the very first moment of our acquaintance, at the Oxford Patristics Conference (summer 2011), and up until today, I have been the recipient of his gentleness and kindness. He transmitted many things to me and a lot of knowledge, and his help was determinative in the writing of this thesis. I shall always remember his professionalism, his constant encouragement to strenuously keep up my work, but also the fact that he prompted me to work responsibly and diligently in order to reach the desired goal. Especially engraved in my memory will remain our many discussions on academic (as well as many other) topics when he visited Athens and of course the moments that we were able, as teacher and pupil, to stand before the Holy Altar and concelebrate. Moreover, I am especially grateful to Fr John Behr for his willingness to act as this thesis’ promotor, since Fr Andrew, as former visiting professor at VU, could not be the formal promotor.

But first and foremost I would like to express my thanks to my Bishop, His Eminence Nikolaos, Metropolitan of Mesogaia and Lavreotiki, with whose blessing and constant support I was able to start and also continue without obstructions my doctoral studies. During this time, it was from his hands that I was deemed worthy to receive the two degrees of priesthood, but it was also he himself who first advised me to write on the subject of anthropology and, moreover, study Palamas. In addition, he always motivated me to continue with zeal my effort and he was always willing to discuss issues whether they were theological or otherwise, whenever I needed his help and guidance.

I owe as well a debt of gratitude towards my parents, Spyros and Aigli, for the many sacrifices that they undertook in raising me and my brother by offering us so
many things, but also for their constant interest and encouragement during the writing of my dissertation; likewise my brother, Andreas, for our beautiful and fruitful relationship, as well as my grandparents, Andreas and Kleopatra, for their immense love and support. Moreover, I especially would like to express my gratitude toward my father-in-law, Naoum, who helped me with his counsel and corrections to the text, as well as to my mother-in-law, Tenia, and all our relatives, for their unreserved love and solidarity; primarily to the late grandma Frosso, for her wholehearted love and assistance.

It is indispensable that I thank the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece for granting me a scholarship for the conduct of this PhD project (2012-6).

I am extremely grateful to my spiritual father, Archimandrite Christodoulos Kogionis, for his continuous and discerning guidance and aid.

Fr Demetrios Bathrellos was one of the first persons who inspired and encouraged me to begin this dissertation. I can with great pleasure and honour say that he has been for me both a teacher and a fellow traveller, eager to help me in many issues—not only academic—, a true spiritual friend and brother. The contribution of Fr Maximos Constas was also very significant; he read parts of this work at various stages and generously offered his advice—which came out of his great experience—, as well as our stimulating conversations. At this point I could not but also remember my Professors at the School of Theology of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens (UoA), since through them I first came into contact with the wealth and beauty of academic theology.

Fr Michael Bakker’s—the Director of ACOT—help was determinative both at the beginning of the thesis, but also at the various practical issues that often appeared. I am also grateful to him for his willingness to act as this thesis’ co-promotor and for his important remarks and corrections on the text. Moreover, it is necessary that I thank my co-priest, Fr Chrestos Noulas, for his understanding and constant support, coupled with our collegial cooperation; similarly our parishioners, of Panagia Vlachernon Pallinis, as well as all the priests of our Metropolis, for their love and ethos.

Furthermore, I would like to extend my sincerest thanks and appreciation to the following persons, who either reviewed parts of the current work and offered their remarks, or helped me through our conversations or in other ways: Metr. Kallistos Ware, Bishop Alexander Golitzin, Revd Dr Kristian Akselberg, Prof. Alexandros Alexakis, Dr Dmitry Biriukov, Prof. Paul Blowers, Mr Stavros Bozovitis, Prof. David
Bradshaw, Fr Evangelos Ganas, Mrs Olga-Maria Gkaragkounis-Skondras, Revd Dr Demetrios Harper, Revd Prof. Archim. Nikolaos Ioannides, Prof. Konstantinos Kornarakis, Fr Chrysostom Koutloumousianos, Mrs Alexandra Labridou, Revd Prof. Nikolaos Loudovikos, Dr Basil Lourié, Dr Nicholas Marinides, Prof. Joseph Munitiz, Prof. Nonna Loudovikos, Dr Mario Pinakoulas, Prof. Marcus Plested, Prof. Demetrios Rajois, Prof. Antonio Rigo, Prof. Joost van Rossum, Dr Norman Russell, Prof. Robert Sinkewicz, Revd Prof. Vasileios Theremos, Prof. Torstein Theodor Tollefsen, Prof. Alexis Torrance, Dr Angelos Tsakirakis, Fr Apostolos Tsolakis, Prof. Stavros Yangazoglou. I am also grateful to Mr Vincent DeWeese, who provided important input regarding the linguistic and grammatical aspects of my English language usage. Of course, for all possible mistakes or shortcomings in the thesis the author is solely responsible.

Additionally, I thank the staff of the following Libraries for their eager service: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Theology of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, The Gennadius Library, and the Study-Room of Byzantine and Neo-Hellenic Philology (Philosophical School of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens).

Last, but not least, it is imperative that I wholeheartedly thank my wife, Efrosyni. Without her love, patience, tolerance and support, it would have been impossible for me to complete this project; likewise our children Aglaia, Angelos, Spyros, and Malamatenia for the great pleasures that they give us, and for the fact that they carry the image of God every day in our household. May they forgive me for the moments that they lacked my presence in favour of my research. My dedicating to all of them this dissertation, as a humble antidoron, is but a small reflection of my immense love and gratitude.
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Abbreviations

Note: About the references to critical editions of the Palamite texts, and the translations used, see the relevant notes in the beginning of the bibliography.

CCSG
*Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca* (Turnhout: Brepols, 1977–)

Ch.

[For instance, Ch. 56.2-9, 148-150 means: Chapter 56, lines 2-9, pp. 148-150 in Sinkewicz’s ed.; cf. notes in the beginning of the Bibliography]

GNO
*Gregorii Nysseni Opera*

GCS
*Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte* (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrich; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag; Walter de Gruyter, 1897–).

JThS
*Journal of Theological Studies*

Kotter

NT
New Testament

OT
Old Testament

PG

PLP

PTS

SC
*Sources Chrétienes* (Paris: Cerf, 1942-)

SVSP
St Vladimir’s Seminary Press

SVTQ
*St Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly*
**TLG** Thesaurus Linguae Graecae: a Digital Library of Greek Literature (Project Director: Maria Pantelia)

**Veniamin** *Saint Gregory Palamas: The Homilies*, edited and translated from the original Greek with an introduction and notes by Christopher Veniamin; with the assistance of the Monastery of St. John the Baptist, Essex, England (Waymart: Mount Thabor Publishing, 2009)

**ΠΑΕ** Παναγιώτης Κ. Χριστού και συγγραφέων, Περιγραφή του Παλαμά. Τις έργα, 11 τόμους, Ελληνικός Πατέρας της Εκκλησίας (Θεσσαλονίκη: Πατερίκαι Εκδοσεις Γρηγορίου ο Παλαμάς, 1981-6) [abbreviations ΠΑΕ and ΠΣ are borrowed from Sinkewicz, ‘Gregory Palamas’, 138]

**ΠΣ** Παναγιώτης Κ. Χριστού και συγγραφέων, Περιγραφή του Παλαμά. Συγγράμματα, 6 τόμους (Thessaloniki: Kyromanos, 1962-2015) [this is the critical edition of the whole of the Palamite corpus]
Introduction

In Greek Mythology, the Sphinx, a feathered monster with the body of a lion and the head of a woman, was said to guard the entrance towards the ancient city of Thebes. In order for a person to be allowed to pass, he had to answer the well known Riddle of the Sphinx: ‘Which creature has one voice and yet becomes four-footed and two-footed and three-footed?’ If one did not know the answer, then the Sphinx strangled and devoured him. However, Oedipus found the solution: ‘Man—who crawls on all fours as a baby, then walks on two feet as an adult, and then uses a walking stick in old age.’

From one point of view, the riddle of the Sphinx has not lost its significance for our modern society. Our era is perhaps unique in history, for two reasons, both having to do with the human person. First, man\(^1\) has such huge resources of power that he never had in the past. Second, man encounters such great dangers and problems which, in past epochs, were unimaginable. Thus, on the one hand, technology grows rapidly and amazingly, medicine works ‘miracles’, and education, communication and transportation are easier than ever. On the other hand, it is as if man is not satisfied with his life. Even nowadays many wars are taking place around the world, a great percentage of the global population lives in poverty, many people—small children included—die from serious diseases, the traditional idea of the ‘family’ is confronted by severe challenges, many young people seem to have no desire for creativity or hope for a better life, psychological problems and disorders (e.g. depression) have seriously increased.

Before all these dangers and problematic situations, can Christian theology offer something worthy of the challenge? In my view, it can offer many important things. In fact, the articulation of a genuine and modern Christian anthropology—i.e. the teaching of the Church about man, both soul and body, its great value and potentialities—seems to be the only real and effective resistance to the effort of all those who try to diminish the importance of the human being so as to control him. Moreover, the need to clearly and persuasively articulate such an anthropology, capable of guiding contemporary man

\(^1\) In Greek the word *anthropos* (ἄνθρωπος) refers to both male and female. In this thesis it is translated as ‘man’.
correctly, seems nowadays more urgent than ever. As Metropolitan Kallistos Ware has insightfully argued, ‘The master-theme of Orthodox theology in the twentieth century has been ecclesiology; in the twenty-first century, the centre of interest is shifting to the doctrine of the human person’. Therefore, anthropology will be a primary focus of theological reflection in our era. In such a way, it could offer a firm answer to many contemporary problems, personal, political, religious, bioethical etc.

For all of these reasons the present thesis examines some specific points of St Gregory Palamas’ anthropology. In particular, it focuses on two principal areas: First, the image of God, namely in what way man images the Holy Trinity, his creator. Specifically, this thesis tries to prove why and how man is regarded greater than the angels, in terms of the imago; and, moreover, why this is due to the human body. In an era where the notion of the image has such a central place, speaking of the image of God in man is, undoubtedly, a major anthropological element of very crucial importance. As Metropolitan Nikolaos of Mesogaia and Lavreotiki has expressed it,

In an era that has sunk man to the level of biological existence..., that recognizes him only as a machine that is technologized, or as information that is programmed, or as a social being with profits, rights and commitments, that nullifies every perspective of his, that flattens his value, ...[we] Orthodox recognize man as being made ‘in the image and likeness of God’ (Gen. 1:26), as ‘a living creature that is being deified [ζῶον θεομενον]’, as called to become ‘partaker of the divine nature’ (2 Pet. 1:4)...  

Second, the current thesis deals with the spiritual senses, namely the power hidden in man which renders him capable of knowing divine realities, of meeting God. Specifically, this thesis tries to demonstrate that, for Palamas, the human body has a

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2 For an important relevant analysis, see Metropolitan Kallistos Ware, *Orthodox Theology in the Twenty-First Century*. Doxa and Praxis: Exploring Orthodox Theology (Geneva: WCC Publications, 2012).


very crucial place in spiritual perception. As will be shown in Part II, Palamas would not disagree with the valuable secret that the fox reveals to the *Little Prince*, towards the end of the well known novella of Antoine de Saint-Exupéry—if of course such a statement would be placed in the correct theological context: ‘It is only with the heart that one can see rightly; what is essential is invisible to the eye’.\(^5\) On the contrary, modern man is a rationalist, and cannot easily accept such a statement.

Ordained metropolitan of Thessaloniki in 1347, recognized as a saint in 1368 and acknowledged as a major theologian and Father of the Orthodox Church, Gregory Palamas (ca 1296-1357) produced a rich and highly influential corpus of writings.\(^6\) While a monk and ascetic, he was the central figure during the so called hesychast controversy (ca 1335-51). The matter at stake was mainly human knowledge of the divine: whether man is truly able to know God. Palamas was fervently opposed to the extreme apophaticism of his opponents—which could lead to agnosticism—, and supported the reality of this knowledge: man is not only able to know *something* about God, but even to be united with him, through the divine uncreated activities


In this union the whole person takes part, both soul and body. This is theosis, and it is the central idea in the mind of Palamas, around which he develops the rest of his theology.

Structure of the Thesis

The structure of the present thesis is as follows. Initially, in the Introduction, a review of the relevant scholarly literature is presented. Moreover, the emergence of the question of the human person in the context of the hesychast debates is traced, as well as some key anthropological notions. These sections define the context in which this study moves, and help the reader better understand the subsequent chapters. In particular, Part I tries to prove that, according to Palamas, man is greater than the angels, as far as the image of God is concerned; and, additionally, that this is due to human corporeality. In order to achieve this aim, it provides an overview of St Gregory’s teaching on the image of God (ch. 1). Then, it moves on to an analysis of a major issue, namely why man is believed to bear some reflections of the Holy Trinity in himself (ch. 2). These two chapters provide the basis for the treatment of our main topic, specifically why man is regarded as superior to the angels, in terms of the imago Dei (ch. 3). Finally, a brief treatment of the likeness to God (kath’ omoiosis) is presented (ch. 4), again with reference to the angels, so that the reader may gain a fuller account of the question: it is shown here that, concerning the kath’ omoiosis it is the angels that are greater than humans.

Part II follows, which explores a most interesting topic: the Palamite αἴσθησις νοερά, namely man’s spiritual senses. In particular, it tries to demonstrate that the body occupies a very central place in spiritual perception: this will be shown in ch. 7.

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7 There is often a problem in the translation of the word ‘ἐνέργεια’ in English. It is generally acknowledged that its exact meaning is not perfectly captured by the word ‘energy’, because the latter may have some other connotations too, that could confuse the reader. For an explanation about why the term energéia is better rendered as activity, rather than energy, see the Introduction of Torstein Theodor Tollefsen, Activity and Participation in Late Antique and Early Christian Thought, Oxford Early Christian Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 4 (cf. p. 186). Therefore, in this thesis the term ‘activity’ (or ‘activities’) is used; through it we refer to this specific reality that the Greek word ‘ἐνέργεια’ (or: ‘ἐνέργειαι’) refers to. The use of the word ‘activity’ had been also proposed by Louth (‘The Reception of Dionysius in the Byzantine World: Maximus to Palamas’, Modern Theology 24.4 (2008), 596 [=Sarah Coakley and Charles M. Stang (eds), Re-Thinking Dionysius the Areopagite (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 66]), since in English energy ‘rather suggests a potentiality for activity’, a capacity (what one would call in Greek δύναμις).
However, in order to reach such an aim, it is necessary that, first, a) the Palamite teaching about the spiritual senses be contextualised, placed in its historical and theological context (ch. 5), and b) the αἴσθησις νοερὰ (intellectual perception) be analysed (ch. 6), since this is the key notion in understanding Palamas’ teaching on this topic (i.e. spiritual perception). This means that the main research questions that are pursued in Part II are the following: Is man able to gain knowledge of God, according to St Gregory? How is this possible? What is the role of the divine light and of the ‘eyes of the soul’? What is the place of ‘ecstasis’ and in what sense does the body have an important role in the activation of the spiritual senses? Finally, the general conclusions of the current thesis are presented.

**Methodology of the Thesis**

In this thesis we shall engage with the *œuvre* of St Gregory Palamas, especially with the following texts: a) *The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters*; b) the *Triads*, mainly *Triad 1,3* (see, e.g., Part II of the thesis); c) the *Homilies*, or *Sermons*; and d) the *Hagioretic Tome*. However, in order for our examination to be as thorough as possible, other Palamite texts will be referenced as well.

As far as the methodology of the thesis is concerned, the following should be mentioned: First, a close reading and examination of the primary sources is attempted. Namely, first of all the author has tried to carefully read what Palamas himself has written about the image of God and the spiritual senses, with all the aforementioned research questions in mind. Second, a deep and careful analysis and interpretation of those points is carried out. That is, at a second level, we try to understand what Palamas wants to say, and then express it in our own words. Third, we seek to engage in dialogue with the secondary literature concerning each of these topics. Some aspects of modern scholarship are accepted, while others are approached critically.\(^8\) Our view will be mainly theological. However, philosophical viewpoints will be also considered, in so far as they belong to Palamas’ understanding of the human hypostasis or provide a framework for comprehending his arguments. Finally, through a deep analysis of all the above, an effort is made to answer the specific research questions that each chapter and section pose.

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\(^8\) See, e.g., ch. 7.3, where some arguments of R. Sinkewicz are critically assessed.
Regarding the possible sources of Gregory’s anthropology, we intend to trace them to the Bible and to the basic anthropological texts of patristic literature, that is in Fathers such as John Damascene, Maximos the Confessor, Nemesios of Emesa (On the Nature Of Man), Dionysios the Areopagite, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzen, Evagrios of Pontus, Macarios, Diadochos of Photiki, Niketas Stethatos, Nikiphoros the Monk, Theoleptos of Philadelphieia, John Klimakos and Isaak of Syria.

The work of Palamas has been thoroughly studied in scholarship, including its implications for anthropology. Thus, one may wonder: ‘what else could be said here?’ However, despite the multitude of studies, it could be supported that there remain many aspects in the teaching of Palamas on man that await thorough study and analysis. I hope that this fact will become obvious through the present review of the scholarly literature as well as from the treatment and analysis of the subsequent chapters.

1. Literature Review: the Status Quo of the Present Research

It has been, correctly, stated that ‘One of the most significant contributions made by Palamas lies in his original and inspired synthesis of the theological anthropology of the Eastern Fathers.’ In this section the most important works related to the current research—namely Palamas’ theological anthropology—are recorded. Initially, let us

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9 Cf. Christou, ΠΣ 1, 326-35.
10 For instance, as St John argues, humans manifest the divine image more than the angels, because they give life to the body. This is also supported by Palamas. Cf., e.g., his Chapters 38-9. This whole subject, as well as the possible influences of Palamas from the Damascene, is examined in ch. 3.
11 For instance, Palamas gives to the body a salient place in spiritual experience. This point of eastern spirituality may be traced back to Diadochos, Macarios and John of the Ladder. Concerning the dependence of Palamas on those authors, see mainly ch. 7 of this thesis.
refer to the critical editions of the Palamite corpus. The first critical edition of Palamas’ major work The Triads or Defence of the Saint Hesychasts (Ὑπὲρ τῶν ἱερῶς ἑσυχαζόντων/Pro hesychastis) was that of Meyendorff, in 1959. In the years to follow a significant critical effort was realized: the publication in critical editions of the entire Palamite corpus by Prof. Panagiotis Christou. This edition remains the most basic resource for Palamite studies today. However, in spite of their great value, both


For an inventory of the manuscript tradition and a list of ancient editions of Gregory’s writings, see Meyendorff, Introduction, 331-9.


Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ Συγγράμματα [Gregory Palamas: Writings], ed. Panagiotis K. Christou et al. (critical edition), 5 vols. [the sixth, and last, volume was edited very recently, i.e. in 2015, by V. Pseftogas, and contains the Homilies of Palamas] (Thessaloniki: Kyromanos, 1962-2015) [=ΠΣ]. For the contents of these volumes, see the Bibliography of our thesis. For an edition of the texts with a modern Greek facing translation, see Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ Άπαντα τὰ Ἐργα [Gregory Palamas: The Complete Works], ed. Panagiotis K. Christou et al., introduction, text, translation (in modern Greek), commentary (this ed. uses the critical texts, where available), 11 vols, Έλληνες Πατέρες τῆς Ἑκκλησίας [Greek Fathers of the Church] (ΕΠΕ) 51, 54, 61, 63, 87, 88, 120, 121, 72, 76, 79 respectively (Thessaloniki: Paterikai Ekdoseis Grigorios o Palamas, 1981-7) [=ΠΑΕ]. Recently has also been made a convenient edition of the Palamite corpus (Greek prototype with Italian translation) in E. Perrella et al. (eds), Gregorio Palamas. Atto e luce divina (Milan: Bompiani, 2003-6) (3 vols.; see the Bibliography of the current thesis for the details of each volume). This work contains an interesting introduction, which explores not only the theological significance of Gregory’s work, but also its philosophical and epistemological implementations. Cf. Yangazoglou, ‘Ὁ Ἅγιος Γρηγόριος Παλαμᾶς καὶ ἡ νεώτερη δυτική θεολογία’, 46.

editions of Meyendorff and Christou seem to have some shortcomings. Moreover, in 1988 Robert Sinkewicz produced a critical edition of Palamas’ eminent work *The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters* (Κεφάλαια ἑκατὸν πενήντα καθηκόντα Φυσικά καὶ Θεολογικά, ἡθικά τε καὶ πρακτικά καὶ καθαρτικά τῆς Βαφλαμάτιδος λόγης / *Capita physica, theologica, moralia et practica CL*). It has been asserted that this is an edition which obeys all the necessary modern textual rules.

Now let us refer to the relevant secondary bibliography. First and foremost, in 1936 Basile Krivochéine wrote a paper on Gregory’s *Ascetic and Theological Teaching*. Furthermore, in 1938 Fr Dumitru Stăniloae published in Romanian his important book *The Life and Teaching of Saint Gregory Palamas*. About ten years later, Archimandrite Cyprien Kern published an article regarding the basic elements of
Palamas’ thought, where he devotes some pages to Gregory’s ideas on cosmos and man (p. 171-85). Moreover, Kern published in 1950 a monograph on Palamas’ anthropology, in Russian. However, as Mantzaridis points out, Kern did not have access to the greater part of our theologian’s works, including some of the most important among them.

The most known recent author to produce an important work based on the complete writings of Palamas is Fr John Meyendorff. He studied Gregory’s texts in manuscript form and even published some of them himself. In 1954, he wrote on the hesychast subject of ‘returning to one’s own self’ and in 1959 he published his very important introductory study on Palamas. In this pioneering—and even today fundamental—study, Meyendorff treats many anthropological issues, such as the knowledge of God (173-5), knowledge through creation (176-8), image and likeness (178-9), original sin (179-80), sin and death (181-3), transmission of death (183-4), the two different anthropologies of Barlaam (platonic-Evagrian) and the hesychasts (biblical-patristic) (199-201), purification and ‘monological prayer’ (‘prayer of the heart’) (203-6), the participation of the body in prayer (206-7) and in eternal life (208), the true meaning of the psychophysical method of prayer (209-10), the role of the heart (211-2), the link between incarnation and anthropology (213-5), the Christian notion of ‘returning to one’s own self’ (215), baptismal grace (217-8), redemption, deification and their link to the sacraments and generally to the life of the Church (Ecclesiology) (223-56), the distinction between essence and activities and theology’s existential dimension (279-310).

Meyendorff also treated these and similar subjects in another of his books. Furthermore, as already mentioned in the beginning of this section, in 1959 he published the critical edition of one of the most important texts of Palamas, which

25 Georgios Mantzaridis, The Delleication of Man, 13. Moreover, as Sinkewicz (‘St. Gregory Palamas and the Doctrine of God’s Image’, 857) notes about Kern’s monograph, ‘although it was a noble beginning, is now dated.’
27 Meyendorff, Introduction.
contains many anthropological references and implications: the Triads or Defence of the Holy Hesychasts (Ὑπὲρ τῶν ἱερῶν ἡσυχαζόντων). Another critical edition of this text was made by Panagiotis Christou in 1962.

Nevertheless, Meyendorff’s oeuvre has not been left uncriticized. Fr John Romanides wrote two articles (in 1960-1 and 1963-4) engaging in a strong—and sometimes acerbic—critique. It seems that the critique of Romanides is, in general, correct. His main points of disagreement are the following: a) Barlaam cannot be classified as a nominalist, b) Palamas is the correct interpreter of Dionysios the Areopagite (the author of the Corpus Areopagiticum) and not Barlaam, c) the ‘debate was neither over dualistic and monistic anthropologies, nor over the part of man which prays unceasingly, as Father John [Meyendorff] thinks, but rather over the mode of union between body and soul’, d) ‘Palamas... is identifying the revelatory experiences of the uncreated light before and after the Incarnation as well as before and after the formation of the Church as Body of Christ’, whereas Meyendorff ‘restricts this divinization not only to the Incarnation, but also to the sacraments of the Church, thus excluding from it even the apostles at the time of the Transfiguration on Mount Tabor.’ As far as I know, Meyendorff never replied to this criticism. Moreover, as shown in the following lines of this Review, one can find voices critical of Meyendorff’s work in recent scholarship as well, without of course scorning his significant and pioneering contributions.

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30 Ὑπὲρ τῶν ἱερῶν ἡσυχαζόντων, in ΠΣ 1 (Thessaloniki: Kyromanos, 1962 and 2010).
32 In his anthropology Palamas relies heavily on Dionysios, mainly on matters regarding theosis. This will become evident in Part II of this thesis.
33 And, it can be argued, over the important place that the body has in the spiritual life; this will be mainly shown in ch. 7 of the current thesis.
34 Regarding the deifying experience of the Apostles during the Transfiguration, see ch. 6.2.e. About the Illuminations in the Old and New Testament, and whether they are symbolic or real, see ch. 6.2.d.
To these remarks I would like to add the following. In Meyendorff’s *Introduction* it is obvious that he believes that in the Fathers one may find two different types of anthropology: one that is based on the intellect, the ‘intellectualist’ account, and another that is based on the heart, the more ‘spiritual’ account. In the first case Meyendorff places Evagrios (or even Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysios, and Maximos), whereas in the second one mainly Macarios. Hence, he contrasts ‘an “intellectual mysticism” based on a Neo-Platonist dualist doctrine of man, and the “mysticism of the heart,” which is more Biblical and, sometimes, Stoic’. Moreover, Meyendorff believes that Palamas belongs to the second line of thought, placing emphasis on the heart.

In my view, Meyendorff is correct in arguing that one may find these two different ways of thinking about the human person. However, the emphasis he places in his approach does not seem to me very accurate, because Palamas draws on both of these approaches and even combines them. In this thesis it is shown how he gives proper emphasis to both the role of the intellect and the heart. Therefore, this sharp contrast may not accurately reflect Palamas’ mind on the topic.

Besides, as Kallistos Ware argued, there is not in fact any real opposition between these two ‘anthropologies’. It would be more correct to argue that both of

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36 It seems that the first to have argued such an idea in scholarship is Irénée Hausherr, in his article ‘Les grands courants de la spiritualité orientale’, *Orientalia Christiana Periodica* 1 (1935), 114-38.


39 Meyendorff supports this opinion in many places in his book, making it as one of his basic arguments.

them express the same reality, but in different ways.\textsuperscript{41} Besides, it must be remembered that a central hesychast aim is to ‘draw the intellect into the heart’. For this reason both approaches are essential to our effort to understand Palamas, and articulate a comprehensive anthropology.\textsuperscript{42} Finally, it seems to me that Meyendorff’s account is motivated by his reading of Palamas’ strong opposition to the ‘intellectualism’ of Barlaam, something that is, however, true.

In 1960, the great Orthodox theologian Fr Georges Florovsky delivered a lecture in Thessaloniki about Palamas’ connection to the patristic tradition. There he pointed that

St. Gregory was suspected of subversive innovations by his enemies in his own time. This charge is still maintained against him in the West. In fact, however, St. Gregory was deeply rooted in the tradition. It is not difficult to trace most of his views and motives back to the Cappadocian Fathers and to St. Maximus the Confessor, who was, by the way, one of the most popular masters of Byzantine thought and devotion. Indeed, St. Gregory was also intimately acquainted with the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius. He was rooted in the tradition. Yet, in no sense was his theology just a ‘theology of repetition.’ It was a creative extension of ancient tradition. Its starting point was Life in Christ.\textsuperscript{43}

It is our hope that this thesis, among other things, will justify the above thoughts of Florovsky.

In 1963 Georgios Mantzaridis, Professor at the Theological School of the University of Thessaloniki, published his book, \textit{The Teaching of Gregory Palamas on

\textsuperscript{41} The texts of Macarios are a very representative example, for in them one finds no opposition between \textit{nous} and \textit{kardia}. On the contrary, these two seem to ‘cooperate’, since the former is said to dwell within the latter. Palamas makes frequent use of this idea, citing Macarios. See, e.g., \textit{Tr. 2.2,29}. Cf. the section about some basic anthropological notions in the Introduction of this thesis, and ch. 7.2.f.

\textsuperscript{42} Besides, even Meyendorff himself often acknowledges that Palamas integrates in his teaching elements from both of these approaches. See, e.g., \textit{Introduction}, 221 or 243-4 (\textit{=Study}, 155 and 174 respectively).

the Deification of Man. As Metropolitan Kallistos Ware has noted, ‘By concentrating upon the single topic of deification, Professor Mantzaridis supplements Fr John’s [Meyendorff] general survey in a most illuminating fashion.’ This book deals with the foundation of the teaching on man’s deification (15-39), the sacramental and ecclesiological nature of deification (41-60), its moral aspect (61-85), mystical experience (87-115) and its consummation (resurrection and the vision of God) (117-125). Mantzaridis depicts Palamas as an ‘existential’ theologian who endorses a ‘synthetic’ view of the human person and regards man as an integral unity of the physical and the spiritual. So, ‘the divine image in man involves his body as well as his soul’. Moreover, in this book, we see how Gregory applies his distinction between essence and activities in his doctrine of theosis, affirming thus the possibility of direct vision and communion with God.

Ten years later Amphilochios Radović issued his doctoral dissertation on The Mystery of the Holy Trinity according to St Gregory Palamas, where he mentions some thoughts about man as an ‘icon’ (‘εἰκών’) of the Holy Trinity and about purification as prerequisite of the revelation of the Trinity to man.

Nevertheless, Palamite theology, apart from ardent supporters, also had its own opponents. In 1974, a special issue of the French Dominican journal Istina pointed out the supposed lack of patristic foundation for Palamas’ theology (Houdret, Garrigues, Nadal, Le Guillou). In fact, in modern scholarship, it was Jugie in 1932 who first

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portrayed Gregory as an innovator and distant from the Fathers. Yet Lossky and Meyendorff responded to Jugie setting Palamas in his patristic context. This time, André de Halleux, Barrois, and Yannaras responded against the Istina accusations. Furthermore, two years later, Rowan Williams found Palamas' theology problematic and defended Thomas Aquinas, while Kallistos Ware clarified some of Gregory’s opinions and strongly supported the latter’s teaching.

Additionally, in recent years, Wendebourg—to my view, falsely—regarded Palamite theology as defective and lacking continuity with that of the Fathers. On the other hand, let us mention here parenthetically, some modern scholars are very sympathetic towards Gregory, trying, moreover, to establish a convergence between his teaching and that of Aquinas [Marshall (1995), Anna Williams (1999), Loudovikos (2010)].

55 Meyendorff, Introduction.
63 Anna N. Williams, The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and Palamas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). For a brief discussion on this book, see below in the current Literature Review.
Palamas’ teaching on the passions and virtues is dealt with in Anestis Kesselopoulos’ important book published in 1982. The main subjects treated are the notion of passion (πάθος) (23-54), its phenomenology (55-77), repentance and the purification (79-113), the virtue as the ‘mean’ (μεσότης) of the spiritual life (115-159) and the notion of the ἔνθεον πάθος, that is having a communion in the divine life (161-210).

In the same year, Robert Sinkewicz showed that the hesychast controversy was initially a conflict not over the nature of grace (i.e. created or uncreated), but over the nature of man’s knowledge of God. Moreover, he wrote in 1986 an interesting paper about the image of God in Palamas’ major work The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters. Apart from outlining the main characteristics of this doctrine, he also traces Gregory’s possible sources for the psychological triad of ‘intellect, knowledge, love’ (νοῦς, λόγος, ἔρως) mainly in St Theoleptos of Philadelpheia and St Gregory of Sinai, but not in Augustine or Thomas Aquinas.

Furthermore, as already mentioned at the beginning of this Review, in 1988 Sinkewicz created a critical edition of The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters. In addition to the excellent edition as well as his translation of the aforementioned original text, Sinkewicz gives also a very useful commentary on the Chapters. Particularly important to our survey are his comments on ‘The Divine Nature and its Triadic Image in Man’ (p. 16-34). A year later George C. Papademetriou wrote a paper on Palamas’ view of the human body, whereas four years later, Kallistos Ware compared the hesychast Jesus Prayer with two other traditions of prayer (yoga and sufism), by highlighting more specifically the value attributed to the body in each of these traditions.

In 1994 the Dominican Jacques Lison published his doctoral dissertation on the Pneumatology of Palamas. Written under the supervision of the Roman Catholic pro-
Palamite theologian Fr André de Halleux, \footnote{See indicatively André de Halleux, ‘Palamisme et scolastique: Exclusivisme dogmatique ou pluriformité théologique?’, \textit{Revue théologique de Louvain} 4 (1973), 409-42 and idem, ‘Palamisme et tradition’, where, as mentioned above, he counters the arguments for Palamas’ disconnection from the patristic tradition.} it is generally accepted as a balanced and well-articulated approach to Gregory’s thought. \footnote{For two important reviews see those of a) Jean-Claude Larchet in \textit{Revue d’histoire et de philosophie religieuses} 74.4 (1994), 449-51 and b) Andrew Louth in \textit{JThS} 48.1 (1997), 308-10 respectively.} It is placed in an ecumenical perspective and it aims—apart from clarifying Palamas’ teaching—to bring into close dialogue Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic theology. Additionally, it possesses none of the scholastic hostility shown toward Palamite theology by certain western scholars in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. \footnote{See, for example, the following general remarks from the Conclusion: ‘À partir de là, il nous paraît opportun de consacrer la présente conclusion générale à vérifier une dernière fois dans quelle mesure la doctrine palamite des énergies incréés est en harmonie avec la tradition théologique et spirituelle qui inspirait sa systématisation face aux antihésychastes’ (271); ‘Bref, il nous paraît injuste de reprocher à l’Hesychaste de ne pas avoir toujours suffisamment situé les énergies divines dans leur contexte sotériologique’ (275); ‘La synthèse de notre auteur est authentiquement chrétienne’ (278); ‘La doctrine palamite des énergies incréés nous semble ainsi s’intégrer naturellement dans les grands thèmes théologiques, sotériologiques, ascétiques et mystiques qui l’avaient suscitée et qu’elle voulait défendre’ (279).} Moreover, this book deals with many anthropological issues, such as the Palamite doctrine of participation (133-72), sacramental life (Baptism, Eucharist) (173-193), the role of ascesis in the life of virtue and prayer (193-207), union with God, adoption and deification (207-19), the results of deification by the Spirit (221-70), such as the experience of the Spirit, the vision of the uncreated light and the participation of the body in grace. Furthermore, Lison also treats the subject of deification according to St Gregory in a paper of his from the same year, giving a synoptic account of this teaching. \footnote{Jacques Lison, ‘La divinization selon Grégoire Palamas: Un sommet de la théologie orthodoxe’, \textit{Irénikon} 67 (1994), 59-70.}

The same topic was covered by two other books published three years later, in 1997. Reinhard Flogaus undertook a systematic comparison of theosis in Palamas and Luther and placed their teaching in an ecumenical perspective. \footnote{Reinhard Flogaus, \textit{Theosis bei Palamas und Luther: Ein Beitrag zum ökumenischen Gespräch} (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997). Cf. Gerhard Podskalsky, \textit{Review, Byzantinische Zeitschrift} 91.1 (1998), 118-20.} On the other hand, Kyriakos Savvidis stressed the importance of Maximos’ theology of deification for Palamas and examined the way in which Gregory integrated this teaching into his own
system. Flogaus’ book is also very important for yet another reason: he there publishes for the first time his findings on whether and how Palamas utilised the works of St Augustine, and specifically the Greek translation of his treatise De Trinitate by Maximos Planudes. In particular, he presents with documentation many parallels, not only there, but also in two other articles (in 1997 and 1998 respectively).

In about the same period with Flogaus’ first treatment of the above subject, in 1997, that is almost simultaneously but independently, John Demetracopoulos, makes nearly identical discoveries as Flogaus, in his book on Palamas and Augustine. So, it is proven that in Palamas’ oeuvre one can find many textual borrowings from Augustine’s De Trinitate. However, it should be noted that Sinkewicz and Lison were very cautious in seeing a direct influence of Augustine on Palamas. Nevertheless, Lison, in contrast to the former, did not want to exclude the possibility of some ‘indirect’ influence.

This debate was continued in 1999 and 2000 by Joseph Lössl. Drawing heavily on Flogaus’ articles, he pointed out that ‘Augustine’s influence on the development of Palamite trinitarian thought should therefore no longer be categorically ruled out, but

82 Mainly in Palamas’ Chapters, Homily 16 On the Incarnation, Contra Beccos, and Ad Xenam.
83 Sinkewicz, The One Hundred, 18.
seriously taken into account in any further venture to explore this fascinating field of Byzantine theology’, but he believes that, for Flogaus, Palamas is, mistakenly, an ‘Augustinian’ theologian. However, Flogaus renounces such criticism. This whole subject regarding the Presence of St Augustine in the Palamite corpus is approached in ch. 2.4 of the current thesis, where a fuller survey of the literature is also given.

In 1999 Sinkewicz composed a very important paper on Palamas’ apprehension of the concept of *spiritual perception*. This paper will help us to a great extent in Part II of this thesis, regarding Palamas’ doctrine of the spiritual senses; however, it will be argued there that it is not without certain disadvantages and problems. In the same year, Anna Williams, in her book *Ground of Union*, attempted a comparative study on the issue of deification in Palamas and Aquinas. This is a very interesting and promising topic, but, as has been noticed, the author does not take the argument much further, simply concluding that ‘the ground that Aquinas and Palamas share is vast compared to the points at which they diverge’ (175). Moreover, this conclusion was strongly challenged by Joost van Rossum, a former student of Meyendorff, who does not find any compatibility between Aquinas and Palamas. He believes that the God of Thomism is *the God of Aristotle*, and that, in the end, we have two different concepts of God.

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90 For the relevant literature survey, see ch. 5.2.
91 See ch. 5.2 and the Concluding Remarks of ch. 7.
93 Norman Russel, ‘The Reception of Palamas in West Today’, 17. For a review of Williams’ book, see that of David Bradshaw, *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 38.4 (2000), 586-8. According to Bradshaw, in her attempt to reconcile Palamas and Aquinas, Williams does not refer to their differing attitudes toward the body and the senses, where surely one can find crucial differences. Additionally, Williams ‘idea that [for Palamas] the distinction of *ousia* and *energeia* is merely nominal also will not bear scrutiny’ (587-8). For a much more positive stance towards Williams’ book, a dialogue with its critics, and an effort to improve and expand some of its points—along with some insightful thoughts on Aquinas’ *deificatio*— see Luke Davis Townsend, ‘Deification in Aquinas: a *Supplementum to The Ground of Union*, JThS 66.1 (2015), 204-34.
94 Joost van Rossum, ‘Deification in Palamas and Aquinas’, *SVTQ* 47.3-4 (2003), 365-82.
Nevertheless, this statement seems a bit exaggerated. Recent scholarship—though not always\(^95\)—tends to see some convergence, or at least some similarities, between Palamas and Aquinas.\(^96\) Namely, despite their differences—which are indeed crucial on specific points—\(^97\), one can find common ground. Moreover, van Rossum does not adequately explain his view that Palamas’ and Aquinas’ ‘different approaches to the divine transcendence also imply a different anthropology: that of Aquinas can be characterised as platonist and dualistic (at least within this context), while the anthropology of Palamas and the hesychasts is holistic: when the human being is united with God, he becomes himself pneuma’.\(^98\)

In the meanwhile Stavros Yangazoglou has written an interesting monograph in 2001 on the conjunction of Christology and Pneumatology in the work of Palamas.\(^99\) While not a purely anthropological study, one can find in it useful points for the present thesis, such as the relationship between man and the cosmos (54-60), the trinitarian image and likeness (66-82), freedom and repentance (83-108) and the divinization of the humanity (281-304). A year later Sinkewicz writes an excellent general article on Palamas, which is divided into the following parts: biography, theology, conclusions and general bibliography.\(^100\) Particularly important for our survey are the sections ‘The

95 For instance, David Bradshaw finds many problems in the teaching of Aquinas, from a theological-philosophical perspective, mainly regarding the essence/activities distinction. See his Aristotle East and West. Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 267-8 (indicatively). For Bradshaw’s comparative approach between Palamas and Aquinas, see p. 221-62 of the aforementioned book.


97 E.g. on the distinction between essence and activites, the Filioque, the ancestral/original sin etc.


Palamite Theological Defence of Hesychast Mystical Experience’ (155-161) and ‘The Problem of Profane Learning and Palamite Anthropology’ (164-171). In the first section Sinkewicz treats topics such as the nature of divine illumination, the goal of monastic prayer and the phenomenon of ‘spiritual perception’ (νοερὰ αἴσθησις), while in the second, he takes up the themes of the value of knowledge, the image and likeness of God and the rank of man in the cosmic hierarchy. These points will prove to be of great importance for our thesis, and will be discussed at length. Furthermore, it is worth noting, that Sinkewicz here recognizes, for the first time, that there are indeed in Palamas’ texts ‘direct citations from Augustine’s De Trinitate in the Greek translation by Maximos Planoudes’ (163, 170).101

Fr Alexander Golitzin, in the same year, argued that both Dionysios the Areopagite and Gregory Palamas are ‘within the ascetico-mystical tradition of Eastern Christianity’ (165).102 Through his impressive paper, in his effort to prove this, he initially rejects the accusations of some scholars, according to whom Dionysios was so much influenced by the Neo-Platonism that a ‘Christological corrective’ needed to be applied to his theology by Palamas (and earlier by Maximos the Confessor) rather than Barlaam. This belief was first expressed by Fr Meyendorff.103 But other scholars also followed,104 among them recently Adolf Ritter.105 Golitzin writes extensively against Ritter’s paper, based largely on the aforementioned article of Romanides.106 Golitzin shows that in fact Gregory, and not Barlaam, was the faithful and accurate interpreter of Dionysios’ thought, which contains nothing problematic in the first place.107

104 For some examples, see Golitzin, ‘Dionysius’, 166-7.
106 Romanides, ‘Notes on the Palamite Controversy’.
107 Golitzin, ‘Dionysius’, 170 argues that Gregory is ‘correcting the mis-reading of the Areopagite which Ritter (and Meyendorff) effectually share with Barlaam’ and that Meyendorff’s correctif ‘is not only not “incontestable,” but that it is an illusion, a scholarly invention.’ (167). For some general points about the influence of Dionysios on Palamas and the other participants in the hesychast controversy, see Andrew Louth, ‘The Reception of Dionysius in the Byzantine World: Maximus to Palamas’, Modern Theology 24.4 (2008), 595-8.
In 2004 Norman Russell in his excellent book *The Doctrine of Deification* devoted some pages to Palamas’ teaching on divinization (304-9) and the dissemination of hesychast spirituality (309-11).\(^{108}\) Two years later, he traced possible points of continuity and doctrinal change in Gregory’s doctrine of *theosis*.\(^{109}\) Here Russell, after sketching briefly—but substantially—the personalities, politics and the philosophical methods that appeared during the hesychast controversy, engages with the theological issues, particularly the theme of ‘participation in God’. He points out that the latter issues were all related to the correct exegesis of the Transfiguration of Christ on Mount Tabor (367). After a well-documented analysis of the data, Russell concludes—correctly in my view—by stressing that Palamas, ‘[h] by approaching theosis from the new perspective of his particular understanding of hesychasm [he] succeeded in shaping a philosophical notion of deification which has elements of both continuity and change... Only a willingness to look at the issues from a different perspective could have brought them (i.e. his opponents) to an understanding of what, in all sincerity, they were unable to see’ (378-9). Eventually, ‘[h]is version of theosis was enshrined in Orthodox teaching as a result of his canonization by the synod of 1368, but among the intellectuals for whom it was intended it remained—and still remains—controversial’ (379).

In 2006 Joost van Rossum revisited the theme of the ‘Christological Corrective’.\(^{110}\) He believes that there is indeed a difference between Dionysios and Palamas, ‘if not in essence, then at least in *emphasis* and language (in the sense of the French word *langage*)’ (351) and he traces this difference in the ecclesiology of both theologians (351-3). Moreover, Flogaus returns to the discussion of Augustine’s influence on Palamas in 2008, about ten years after his first treatment of the issue, by claiming that he believes it ‘to be undeniable that Palamas made use of Augustine in various writings. He did so not only by letting himself be inspired by some Augustinian arguments, which he incorporated in his own writings, but also by simply exploiting

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\(^{108}\) Norman Russell, *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). See, indicatively, p. 309: ‘...the official canonization of Gregory Palamas, whose proclamation as a saint enshrined the hesychast doctrine of deification as the Orthodox Church’s noblest expression of the content and purpose of the spiritual life. This doctrine was to have enormous influence, especially in the Slavic world.’


Augustine’s notions, ideas, and arguments for a different purpose. Finally, in some cases, he used Augustine’s words in order to support a concept that was the opposite to what Augustine had originally meant’ (75).111

In his interesting lecture, Flogaus firstly recounts the relevant academic conversations of the past years (63-74). Secondly, he demonstrates the various ways in which Palamas used the writings of Augustine (75-80).112 Finally, David Bradshaw in 2009, in a very interesting article, tried to articulate the notion of ‘drawing the mind into the heart’ through prayer and what this indicates about the Eastern Christian understanding of the human person, through a comparative study of how the intellect and the heart are approached in East and West.113

In 2012 Torstein Tollefsen published an important book on the notion of Activity and Participation, both in the Philosophers, such as Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, and in the Fathers, such as Sts Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysios, and Maximos.114 He devotes the final chapter (i.e. ch. 7) to St Gregory Palamas. There one can find, albeit presented in a very brief and general form, a number of significant anthropological references.115

It is widely accepted that modern scholarship has examined the works of St Gregory Palamas at great length. This is obvious from the current literature review. However, as far as I know, Palamas’ theological anthropology has not been the subject of adequate attention.116

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115 Certain problems may be found in Tollefsen’s approach to Palamas. For a brief critical evaluation, see ch. 5.2 of this thesis. Here let us only note the following. In his approach to St Gregory (see Activity and Participation, 185-206) Tollefsen almost exclusively refers to some of Palamas’ Chapters and to Tr. 1.2 and 1.3, also providing a few citations from the Homilies. One difficulty that a reader of this chapter faces is that the author is not very accurate in his citations; for instance, he almost never refers to a specific critical edition of the Palamite texts, or to the relevant lines and pages. If these were provided, the potential reader would be certainly assisted better in his effort to understand Palamite theology.
of a special monograph, which would take into account the entire Palamite corpus:116 the aforementioned studies, as have been presented and discussed by the author in this section, cover only some aspects of this topic, usually peripherally and partially.

Therefore, this thesis aims to fill this gap. Its primary focus is to illustrate the following two Palamite contentions. First, that man is to be regarded as superior to the angels, in terms of the imago Dei. This is due to human corporeality. Second, that the body has a crucial role in spiritual perception. In order to achieve this aim, the current thesis also engages with the following research questions, which seem not to have been fully examined in the existing scholarship: a) why is man believed to bear some reflections of the Holy Trinity in himself? b) Is man able to gain knowledge of God? How is this possible? And what is the role of the divine light and of the ‘eyes of the soul’ in this process? c) What is the place of ‘ecstasis’? d) How does Palamas understand the intellect (‘νοῦς’), its essence and activities, in the context of his imago and spiritual senses theology? Which exactly is the intellect’s role and why does it have such a salient place? e) How does Gregory approach the heart and the soul? f) What is the place of the body? g) What is it, finally, to be human according to St Palamas? To this end, this study explores the sources of Palamas’ anthropology and how he is incorporating his teaching on the distinction between essence and activities in his anthropology.

In this way, we hope that it will contribute to several areas of research. First of all, it will be of great importance to the general study of patristic anthropology. It will show the influence of the classical patristic anthropological views on Palamas, placing him within his proper theological context. Last but not least, it will try to highlight his original contributions to the development of the tradition. This will help us better understand the roots and the inner sense of hesychast theology, which is a fundamental part of the Eastern Orthodox teaching and life. But, first of all, let us briefly observe how the question of the human person appears during the hesychast controversy.

116 As it is well known, there exist many studies specifically written on the anthropological teaching of other Church Fathers. For instance, about Maximos the Confessor, see the classical study of Lars Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator: The Theological Anthropology of Maximus the Confessor (Chicago: Open Court, 1995) (the 1st ed. was published in 1965; this one is revised and enhanced).
2. The Historical and Theological Context: the Emergence of Hesychast Anthropology During the Fourteenth Century

In this section we shall try to see how questions regarding anthropology emerged in the context of the hesychast debates. In particular, we shall focus on the two main issues that this thesis is concerned with, namely the spiritual senses and the image of God.

Undoubtedly, important information regarding the historical and theological context of these topics could be drawn from many points of the Palamite corpus. However, here we shall limit our approach to just one crucial document: namely the Hagioretic Tome.

This text has as its aim to defend, in the form of an official declaration, the teaching of the hesychasts over against their opponents. It was written by Palamas in 1340, signed by twenty leading monks of Mount Athos, and confirmed by the local bishop of Hierissos in Chalkidiki, who declared that the whole of Mount Athos subscribed it. Therefore, as has been noticed, 'this makes it clear that Palamas is expressing, not merely his own personal opinion, but the accepted teaching of the Holy

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118 The historical and theological context of the debate around man’s spiritual senses is also briefly outlined in ch. 5.3 of this thesis, there based exclusively in Tr. 1,3.

119 Hagioretic Tomos (or Tomos of the Holy Mountain) [Ἀγιορειτικός τόμος ὑπὲρ τῶν ἱερῶς ἡσυχαζόντων διά τοὺς ἔξι ἱδίας ἀπειρίας καὶ τῆς πρός τοὺς ἁγίους ἀπειθείας ἀθετοῦντας τὰς τοῦ Πνεύματος μυστικὰς ἐνεργείας κρείττον ἢ λόγον ἐν τοῖς κατὰ πνεῦμα ζῶσιν ἐνεργουμένας καὶ δι’ έργων θεωρουμένας, ἄλλ’ οὐ διὰ λόγων ἀποδεικνυμένας], ed. Vasileios Pseftogas, in ΠΣ 2 (Thessaloniki, 1966 [20102]), 567-78 (PG 150, 1225C-1236). For a concise presentation and analysis of it, see Christou, ΠΣ 2, 551-3. Hierotheos Vlachos, *Ὁ ὁμός Γρηγόριος ὁ Παλαμᾶς ὡς ἁγιορεῖτις* [St. Gregory Palamas as a Hagiorite] (Livadeia: Birth of the Theotokos Monastery (Pelagias), 20073; 1st ed. 1992), 305-26. In this last book one may see the tight connection of Palamas with the spirituality of Mount Athos, throughout his whole life [English trans. by Esther Williams: *St. Gregory Palamas as a Hagiorite* (Levadia: Birth of the Theotokos Monastery, 1997)].
Mountains’.  The *Tome* affirms that the divine light is uncreated, and that it is able to be sensibly perceived by man.

*The Information Drawn from the Tomos Regarding the Anthropological Issues*

In the first lines of the *Hagioretic Tome*, Palamas argues that the doctrines of the Church, that are now ‘known to all in common and proclaimed openly’, were initially ‘mysteries of the Law of Moses’, and ‘foreseen in Spirit by the Prophets alone’. In the same way ‘the mysteries of the evangelical life are the good things promised to the saints in the age to come; these are granted to and foreseen by those deemed worthy of sight by the Spirit, and to these in measure as a partial foretaste’. Here Palamas wants to argue that the hesychasts play the role that the Prophets occupied in the Old Testament: to come to knowledge of the mysteries of God and reveal them to the faithful. Let us note here the emphasis Palamas lays on the role of the Holy Spirit: man comes to knowledge of God through the activity of the Spirit. As Palamas always argues, through the divine uncreated activity.

In the Old Testament some people were reluctant to listen to what the Prophets had to say. For instance, some Jews may have found problematic the teaching of the Prophets that the Logos and the Spirit are coeternal, because one may have had in mind the biblical phrase that ‘The Lord our God is one Lord’ (Dt. 6:4). And so, from piety, one would have denied the truth. But, Palamas goes on to say, ‘Similarly, perhaps now too it could happen that a person fails to listen with reverence to the mysteries of the Spirit known only to those who have attained purification by virtue’.

It is interesting that Palamas recognizes that there indeed appeared some objections to the hesychast teaching motivated by piety, namely because it was regarded by some persons as innovative. Nevertheless, Palamas draws the following parallelism: as those teachings of the past were finally proved to be correct, despite the objections

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122 This teaching, of course, was not directly exposed in the Old Testament. However, Palamas, following the tradition of the Fathers, regards it as clearly implied in many points, if the Old Testament is read through the prism of the New.
of some Jews, in the same way the teaching and life of the hesychasts will be proved to be correct and genuine, despite the opposition to them by some contemporary Christians.

Let us note here the important role Palamas attributes to the pursuit of the virtues, *ascesis*, as a way of knowing God: this is indeed a most central notion in his thought and teaching.\(^{124}\) Thus, this is why one should trust the hesychasts, for they ‘have been initiated by experience (πείρᾳ) itself’, and ‘for the sake of the evangelical life [they] have not only renounced the acquisition of possessions, human honour and the evil pleasures of their bodies, but have also confirmed this renunciation through submission to those with greater maturity in Christ’. Here Palamas stresses a virtue very crucial for him, that of obedience. Furthermore, the hesychasts, ‘for having devoted their time to themselves and to God through stillness and freedom from cares, and by transcending themselves through pure prayer and, having attained God through a mystical union with him that transcends the intellect, they have been initiated into the realities that transcend the intellect’. However, ‘there are others who have been initiated by the respect, faith and love they show to such persons’.\(^{125}\)

Then Palamas mentions three Fathers (Sts Dionysios, Maximos, and Macarios) who refer to the deifying gift (θεοποιὸν δῶρον).\(^{126}\) Here, on the one hand he wants to introduce the idea of the ‘divine uncreated activities’, and on the other hand the notion of the ‘uncreated light’, which, according to Macarios, is ‘the nourishment of the incorporeal beings, the glory of the divine nature, the beauty of the age to come, a divine and heavenly fire, an ineffable and intellectual light (φῶς ἄρρητον καὶ νοερὸν), a pledge of the Holy Spirit, the sanctifying oil of gladness’.\(^{127}\)

But there was a major accusation made against the hesychasts. In particular, sometime before the summer of 1337, Barlaam accused the hesychast monks of Messalianism.\(^{128}\) In the meanwhile, he had come into contact with some hesychasts who

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\(^{124}\) For *ascesis* as a way of attaining the virtues, see Kesselopoulos, *Πάθη καὶ ἀρετές*, 147-59.

\(^{125}\) *Tomo*, Prologue, ΠΣ 2, 568.18-569.2, trans. Sinkewicz, 183-4.

\(^{126}\) *Tomo*, Prologue.3-18, ΠΣ 2, 569.


\(^{128}\) For a study and evaluation on the sources of Barlaam’s criticism of the hesychasts, see Antonio Rigo, *Monaci esicasti e monaci bogomili. Le accuse di messalianismo e bogomilismo rivolte agli esicasti ed il problema dei rapporti tra esicismo e bogomilismo*, Orientalia Venetiana II (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1989), 39-103.
introduced him to their practices. So, on the basis of what he had heard, or what he had read, he denounced the hesychast monks to the Standing Synod in Constantinople.\textsuperscript{129} The Synod, however, declared his accusations as having no firm basis.\textsuperscript{130}

It should be mentioned that the Messalians (or \textit{Euchites}, from the Greek \textit{Eỵ́χίται}) were a heretical group that appeared in Mesopotamia in the 370’s. In general, they rejected the sacraments of the Church, and accepted only what they called ‘the pure prayer of the heart’, through which they considered that union with the Godhead was attained. Moreover, they seem to have believed that the essence of God could be perceived through the bodily senses.\textsuperscript{131}

Palamas of course knew about the accusation of Messalianism from Barlaam and his followers. This is why Gregory attacks ‘[w]hoever... ranks with the Messalians and calls ditheists those who say that this deifying grace is uncreated, ingenerate and a distinct reality’. For Palamas, ‘if indeed there is such a person, let him know that he stands in opposition to the saints of God and, unless he should repent, casts himself out of the inheritance of the saved and himself falls away from the one who alone by nature is God of the saints’.\textsuperscript{132} Gregory introduces here his basic doctrine of the essence/activities distinction, and stresses the uncreated character of the divine activities. If someone rejects this, and uses the accusation of Messalianism, then he is opposed to God. On the other hand, whoever believes this mystery, ‘and does not reject

\textsuperscript{129} For a brief approach to this issue, see ch. 5.3 of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{130} Sinkewicz, ‘Gregory Palamas’, 133.
\textsuperscript{131} About the Messalians, see Klaus Fitschen, \textit{Messalianismus und Antimessalianismus. Ein Beispiel ostkirchlicher Ketzergeschichte}, Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte 71 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998). Columba Stewart, ‘\textit{Working the Earth of the Heart’; The Messalian Controversy in History, Texts, and Language to A.D. 431} (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). Marcus Plested, \textit{The Macarian Legacy: The Place of Macarius-Symeon in the Eastern Christian Tradition}, Oxford Theology and Religion Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), mainly 16-27, but also \textit{passim}. It is worth noting that, as Plested notes (ibid., p. 27 n. 60), by the time of Palamas ‘the term Messalian was used as a synonym for Bogomil. It is a characteristic of heresiology to stigmatize newer heresies with the name of an older heresy...’ As far as the Bogomils are concerned, they were also a heretical group, which rejected ecclesiastical hierarchy and showed a Manichaean dualism. They probably firstly appeared in the tenth century. For an important historical study regarding the relationship between hesycashm and the Bogomiles, see Rigo, \textit{Monaci esicasti e monaci bogomili}. About the Bogomils, see Fitschen, \textit{Messalianismus und Antimessalianismus}, 323-33. For an older study, see Dmitry Obolensky, \textit{The Bogomils: A Study in Balkan Neo-Manichaeanism} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948 [1st paperback edition, 2004]).
\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Tomos}, 1, ΠΣ 2, 569.19-570.4, trans. Sinkewicz, 184.
out of ignorance what is said openly, but is ignorant of the way of the mystery, let him not disdain to seek out and learn from those who do know’.  

But Palamas continues by bringing to the fore some very important parameters. He argues that perfect union with God cannot ‘be attained by imitation and disposition alone without the deifying grace of the Spirit’, as happens with ‘people of the same character who are also loved by one another’. Moreover, the grace of God is not ‘a habit of rational nature which is attained through imitation alone’; on the contrary, it is ‘a supernatural illumination and an ineffable and divine energy which is invisibly seen and incomprehensibly conceived by those deemed worthy’. If one denies any of these, ‘let this man know that he has fallen without knowing it into the deceit of the Messalians’.  

Through these arguments, Palamas wants to stress the fact that union with God is not the result of human effort alone, but, mainly, of divine grace. He was aware of the teaching of Barlaam, that man may attain union with God through human knowledge. In particular, Barlaam ‘insisted that access to God could normatively come only through careful logical inference from creation and scriptural revelation’. But Palamas deems this very dangerous to the spiritual life. And he adds that ‘if deification takes place by a natural power and is naturally encompassed by the bounds of nature’, then ‘one who is deified will by all necessity be God by nature’.  

To support his arguments, St Gregory refers to a very crucial passage of St Maximos, where it is mentioned that ‘the grace of divinization is completely unconditioned (ἄσχετος ἐστι παντάπασιν), because it finds no faculty or capacity of any sort within nature that could receive it, for if it did, it would no longer be a grace but the manifestation of a natural activity latent within the potentiality of nature’. If the latter were the case, ‘it would rightly be a work of nature, and not a gift of God, and a person so divinized would be God by nature and would have to be called so in the proper sense’. And St Maximos wonders: ‘How, then, divinization could make the divinized person go out of himself (Πῶς δὲ καὶ ἐξίστησιν ἐαυτῷ τὸν θεοῦμεν ἡ

133 Tomos, 1.4-8, ΠΣ 2, 570, trans. Sinkewicz, 184.  
134 Tomos, 2.13-21, ΠΣ 2, 570, trans. Sinkewicz, 184.  
137 Tomos, 2.21-4, ΠΣ 2, 570, trans. Sinkewicz, 184.
θέωσις), I fail to see, if it was something that lay within the bounds of his nature (εἰ τοῖς ὑπὲρ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς περιεύληπτο).\(^{138}\)

Based on St Maximos, Palamas concludes that ‘The grace of deification is therefore beyond nature, virtue and knowledge, and all such things are infinitely inferior to it’. And he adds something very crucial: ‘For all virtue and imitation of God on our part render the person who has acquired them fit for divine union, but grace effects the ineffable union itself (ἡ δὲ χάρις αὐτῆς τελεσιουργεῖ τὴν ἀπόρρητον ἐνωσιν).’\(^{139}\) In other words, as it has been put recently by Paul Blowers, ‘deification transforms human nature but is not naturally acquired’.\(^{140}\)

Palamas is also aware of another accusation. The hesychasts were teaching that the intellect is located in the heart or in the head (ἢ τῇ καρδίᾳ ἢ τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ).\(^{141}\) But for their opponents this was a hint of Messalianism.\(^{142}\) However, Palamas explains that this is not justified. By mentioning that ‘the intellect is located in the heart or in the head’ one simply declares the fact that ‘the intellect is in the body because it is joined to it’.\(^{143}\) To support his argument, he refers to Macarios, who argues that ‘the activity of the intellect is in the heart’.\(^{144}\) Moreover, one should not take as contradictory the argument of St Gregory of Nyssa, that ‘the intellect is neither inside nor outside the body, since it is incorporeal’.\(^{145}\) Besides, there is not any contradiction in saying, on the one hand, ‘that the divine is not in a place’, and on the other hand,


\(^{139}\) Tomos, 2.13-19, ΠΣ 2, 571, trans. Sinkewicz, 185.

\(^{140}\) Blowers, Maximus the Confessor: Jesus Christ and the Transfiguration of the World, 305.

\(^{141}\) If we are to translate ἐγκεφάλος as brain here, we must have in mind that there are different understandings between the ancient and the modern era, as far as the brain is concerned.

\(^{142}\) Tomos, 3.3-5, ΠΣ 2, 572.

\(^{143}\) Tomos, 3.11-3, ΠΣ 2, 572, trans. Sinkewicz, 185.

\(^{144}\) Tomos, 3.7-8, ΠΣ 2, 572, trans. Sinkewicz, 185. In particular Macarios argues that the intellect is found in the heart. See his Homily 15, 20.283-7, ed. Dörries, PTS 4, 139: ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἐστιν ὁ νοος... We shall analyse this crucial passage of Macarios, in ch. 7.2.f.

\(^{145}\) Gregory of Nyssa, Περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου (De opificio hominis), PG 44, 177B.
‘that the Word of God was once within a virginal and unblemished womb, since there it was joined beyond rational sense to our constitution out of an inexpressible love for humanity’.  

But why is Palamas insisting on this point, namely that the intellect is found in the human brain? As it is known, the intellect is the human faculty through which man is united with God.147 But in this union the human body also takes part.148 This is why Palamas regards it important to stress the fact that the νοῦς is ‘located in the human heart or brain’, meaning in the human body more generally.149 Moreover, as will be shown in this thesis, he strongly insists that both the intellect and the body a) are closely involved in union with God, and b) are connected to the two specific issues that we shall examine: first, the image of God, namely how man images his creator, and how it is possible for him to attain the likeness. And, second, the doctrine of the spiritual senses, that is to say, how man is capable of ‘seeing and tasting’ God.

From this presentation, it is clearly shown that anthropology has a most central place in the hesychast debates. Perhaps, it would not be false to argue that the matter at stake was mainly the human person; indeed, man lies at the core of Palamite theology. But, before going on to analyse the two aforementioned specific points in the anthropology of Palamas, let us first examine some basic notions in his relevant teaching. These notions will help us better understand the subsequent analysis conducted in Parts I and II.

3. The English Translation of νοῦς and αἴσθησις νοερά

In this point, let us make a pause to search for the most adequate translation of the Palamite νοῦς and αἴσθησις νοερά, two notions that we shall very frequently meet in

147 For an analysis of the notion of intellect, cf. the next section of the Introduction.
148 This fact will be analysed below, in the relevant chapter regarding the participation of the body in the divine realities (ch. 7).
149 Palamas discusses this point also in Tr. 1,2,1.1-12, 393 (75.8-20). [It should be here noted that for Palamas’ Triads we first refer to ΠΣ 1 and then to Meyendorff’s ed.; cf. the relevant note in the beginning of the Bibliography.] He there explains that the body is not something evil, therefore one should not be afraid to argue that the nous abides in the body: ‘As for us, we regard it as evil for the intellect to be [or: be caught up] in material thoughts [or: to dwell on fleshly thoughts], but not for it to be in the body, since the body is not evil [in itself]’. We quote this passage in the Conclusion of Part I; cf. ch. 7.
this thesis. In general, when one tries to translate texts of Palamas into English, he comes face to face with a very difficult situation: how can one translate the word νοερὸς, so as to transmit, in an exact and precise way, what Palamas intends to say? Of course, this is not a problem faced only in the Palamite texts; it is a general difficulty that a scholar of the Greek Fathers (and Philosophers) faces. And the complexity lies exactly in the fact that all the words that have been proposed for translating νοερὸς and its derivatives (such as mind, intellect, intellectual, intellective, intelligent etc.) do not have exactly the same meaning as their Greek original.

In particular, nous does not have the meaning of ‘thinking about something’. It means either the organ of thought (i.e. who or what does the thinking) or the thought itself (i.e. the content of thought/meaning). However, through the word nous the Fathers usually refer to this human faculty that is capable of reaching God, of attaining union with God, ‘knowledge’ of God. For this reason it is regarded as the highest faculty of the soul. This is why when one translates νοερὸς as intellectual or intellective, one is not totally accurate. The same goes for νοητός, if it is translated as intelligible or something similar. Moreover, the real problem with νοερὸς/νοητός is not so much an issue of simple translation, as much as the different understandings of how νοερὸς knows, in classical, medieval, and post-Cartesian thought. As has been explained,

the words ‘mind’ and ‘intellect’ and their derivatives (intellection, intellectual, etc.) have quite different overtones from the Greek nous. The most fundamental reason for this is a cultural one: the Greeks were pre-Cartesian; we are all post-Cartesian. We say, ‘I think, therefore I am’, that is, thinking is an activity I engage in and there must therefore be an ‘I’ to engage in it; the Greeks would say, ‘I think, therefore there is that which I think — ta noeta.’ What I think is something going on in my head; what the Greek thinks, ta noeta, are the objects of thought that (for example, for

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150 It should be noted that Palamas seems not to be always consisent in his usage of the words ‘νοερὸς’ and ‘νοητός’, since sometimes he uses them interchangeably. For instance, in Tr. 1,3,10 he calls the pledge (ἀρραβὼν) of the divine light ‘intelligible and intellectual, or better spiritual’ (φῶς νοητὸν καὶ νοερὸν, μᾶλλον δὲ πνευματικόν). See Tr. 1.3,10.22-3. 420 (131.9-10) (about this ἀρραβὼν, see, e.g., ch. 5.4.e of this thesis). For another characteristic example, see Tr. 1,3,3.

Plato) exist in a higher, more real world. This means that *nous* and its derivatives have a quite different feel from our words, mind, mental, intellect, intellection, etc. Our words suggest our reasoning, our thinking; *nous, noesis*, etc. suggest an almost intuitive grasp of reality.\textsuperscript{152}

Taking the above clarifications in account, in this thesis we usually use ‘intellect’ for νοῦς, ‘intellectual’ for νοερός and ‘intellective’ for νοητός.\textsuperscript{153} As far as the αἴσθησις νοερά is concerned, the solution Sinkewicz provides is to translate it as ‘spiritual perception’. In his effort to support his choice, he mentions two arguments. First, he writes that ‘In *Triad* 1.3.20 Palamas decided that this power or faculty should be called “spiritual perception”, just as Solomon called it “a spiritual and divine perception”’.\textsuperscript{154} Sinkewicz continues arguing that ‘Palamas appears to be following here the same exegetical tradition as Origen in *Contra Celsum* 1.48’. Sinkewicz then refers also to Gregory of Nyssa, *In Canticum canticorum oratio* 1.3, and concludes that ‘This interpretation would justify the translation of the adjective as “spiritual” rather than “intellectual”’. Finally, he mentions *Tr*. 1.3,21 where Palamas, indeed, speaks about the αἴσθησιν πνευματικήν.\textsuperscript{155}

Two remarks could be made here. First, in *Tr*. 1.3,20 there is no reference to the word πνευματική, which would justify the use of ‘spiritual’, but only to words such as νοεράν and θείαν (divine). Second, in some points of his *oeuvre* Palamas does indeed speak about the αἴσθησιν πνευματικήν. Moreover, as will be shown in Part II, Palamas, very often says that man sees the divine light ‘spiritually’ (πνευματικῶς). This is why, to my view, Sinkewicz chooses the rendering ‘spiritual perception’; and why, perhaps, he may be somewhat justified in his choice. In other words, he prefers this rendering, because we then speak of a ‘spiritual perception’: man ‘senses’ the Divine, and this is accomplished through his spiritual faculties. However, in the majority of cases, Palamas speaks about the νοερά (not πνευματική) αἴσθησις. For this reason, it seems to me that it would be more accurate to render it as ‘intellectual perception’. Undoubtedly, this


\textsuperscript{153} This seems to be consistent with the preferences of the English translators of *The Philokalia*, i.e. Palmer, Sherrard, and Ware.

\textsuperscript{154} ‘The Concept of Spiritual Perception’, 377.

translation is not entirely precise. Nevertheless, it avoids the problem of rendering νοερά as spiritual, since this more accurately translates the term πνευματική.\footnote{Tollefsen, in his chapter on the ‘Theology of St Gregory Palamas’ (see his Activity and Participation, 204-5), refers once to αἰσθήσεις νοερά καὶ θεία, which he translates as ‘intellectual and divine sensation’. However, it seems to me that ‘perception’ would be a better choice than ‘sensation’, because the latter is primarily connected with the body. Besides, for Palamas αἰσθήσεις here refers mainly to the νοῦς, although, as will be shown, it also permits of important participation by the body. Furthermore, ‘perception’ seems to be a better choice, because it is actually concerned with the way that the outer world is grasped and perceived by a person, whereas ‘sensation’ is just a feeling.}

But these remarks prompt us to examine, at the outset, some fundamental terms in the anthropology of Palamas, which have to do with the intellect and the soul. This examination will help us better understand the analysis that follows in later parts of this thesis.

4. The notions of the νοῦς (intellect), διάνοια (reasoning), ψυχή (soul), and καρδία (heart) in the thought of Palamas

noted that in the Palamite texts these terms are sometimes used interchangeably. Thus, this presentation will help us better examine Palamas’ understanding of the *imago Dei* and the spiritual senses, which follows in the next chapters.

*a. The Powers of the Soul*

First of all, in his second sermon *On the Entry of the Theotokos into the Holy of Holies*, St Gregory speaks about the five powers of the soul: αἰσθησις (sensation), φαντασία (imagination/fantasy), δόξα (opinion), διάνοια (reasoning), and νοῦς (intellect). In particular, in section 56 he explains what exactly each power refers to. First, ‘Sensation (αἰσθησις) is a non-rational power, capable of knowing and comprehending perceptible objects when they are present’. Obviously, this refers to man’s physical sense perception.

Second, ‘Imagination has its starting point in sensation [or: in the senses], but exercises its ability even in the absence of objects which can be perceived by the senses. It could be perhaps also called intellect (νοῦς), in so far as it can act without such objects; although, as not existing outside divisible things, it is passive’. As Veniamin comments, ‘St. Gregory is pointing out that imagination may be referred to as mind [i.e. nous], in the sense that the imagination has the ability to operate on its own, independently, without the stimulus of sensory objects’. However, ‘it is still necessarily

Archimandrite Efrem, ‘Η χρήση τῆς λογικῆς και νοερᾶς ένεργείας τοῦ ἁνθρώπου κατά τὸν Ἁγιο Γρηγόριο Παλαμᾶ’ [The Use of Logic and Intellect (nous), according to Saint Gregory Palamas], in Mantzaridis (ed.), *Ὁ Ἅγιος Γρηγόριος ο Παλαμᾶς στήν ἱστορία καί τό παρόν*, 769-79. Some useful points may be found in Georgios Takarides, *Η οντολογία του νού κατά τον Ἁγιο Γρηγόριο Παλαμᾶ* [The Ontology of the nous According to Saint Gregory Palamas], unpublished MA thesis, submitted in the faculty of Theology, at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (Thessaloniki, 2010).

158 Kesselopoulos, *Πάθη καί ἀρετές*, 57.
159 *Hom.* 53, *On the Entry of the Theotokos into the Holy of Holies II*, 55-6, ΠΣ 6, 579-80 (ΠΑΕ 11, 332-4). The translation is from the edition of Veniamin, 439-40 (modified). As happens with the translation of the * Chapters* by Sinkewicz, in his translation Veniamin renders *nous* as mind; thus, for reasons of consistency, I usually modify this rendering by writing ‘intellect’.
160 For the following, see *Hom.* 53, 56.851-62, ΠΣ 6, 580 (ΠΑΕ 11, 334), trans. Veniamin, 440 (modified).
limited to its experience of the created, material world—“things divisible”’. For this reason ‘it is passive and, unlike the *nous* proper, incapable of separate existence’.163

Third, ‘Opinions (δόξα) originating from the imagination are irrational judgements, but not those which come from reasoning (διάνοια); for the ability to form opinions is natural to both’.164 In other words, if one makes an opinion based only on his imagination, this opinion is probably non-rational, since it does not derive from reasoning (*dianoia*), namely from ‘the discursive or reasoning aspect of the soul’.165 On the other hand, *dianoia* ‘is always logical, and comes eventually, by means of a gradual process, to opinions in accordance with reason’.166 That is, ‘*dianoia* is the logical power which completes, through several detailed reflections, the δόξα, namely opinion’.167

Palamas now makes an interesting clarification: ‘All these mental powers were formed, and act, by means of the primary organ, man’s natural spirit within the brain’.168 This means that the aforementioned powers need the existence of a healthy human brain to be exercised. However, this is their great difference from the human intellect: ‘The intellect, by contrast, has no organ, but is an essence complete in itself, able to operate independently, even though it lowers itself to the level of man’s natural life which develops through reasoning’.169 In other words, the activity of the intellect should not be constrained to either sensation or reason, because the intellect goes far beyond reasoning: the *nous* is the faculty whereby man is united with God. As Metr. Kallistos expresses it, ‘The *nous* enables us, not simply to know about God, but to know God’.170

In general, in the writings of the Fathers one may see this distinction between intellect (*νοῦς*) and reason (λόγος-λογική). These are two parallel, but different, powers of the soul.171

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165 Veniamin, 628 n. 901.
167 Efrem, ‘The Use of Logic and Intellect (*nous*)’, 770.
170 Ware, ‘*Nous and Noesis*’, 163.
171 See Romanides, *Ῥωμαίοι ἢ Ῥωμηοί Πατέρες τῆς Ἐκκλησίας*, 145.
What should be added here is that Palamas follows the Platonic division of the soul into three parts or powers: the reasoning-irascible-desiring (logistikon, thymikon and epithymitikon). These powers are cured through Christ’s Incarnation. The logistikon refers to nous, the thymikon to ἅθυμιός (anger) and the desiring to ἐπιθυμία (desire). The irascible and desiring are often called the ‘passionate’ part of the soul. Moreover, Palamas believes that the logistikon should guide the thymikon and epithymitikon, namely the passionate part should be subordinated to the intellect. On the other hand, as will be shown, Barlaam falsely regarded impassibility (ἀπάθεια) as the ‘mortification of the passionate part of the soul’. But this was strongly rejected by Palamas, as distorting the genuine anthropology. But let us now examine the difference between nous and dianoia.

b. Nous and Dianoia

St Gregory makes a very interesting distinction, regarding the potentiality of man to see the divine realities. In Tr. 2,3,15 in particular, based on St Isaac the Syrian, he argues that man has two ‘eyes of the soul’ (δύο ὀφθαλμοί, κεκτήμεθα ψυχικοί), namely two ‘seeing powers’. These have to do not with physical seeing, but with spiritual vision, and are different from one another, in terms of their ‘operation’. With the first, man is able to contemplate God through created reality. In other words, thereby man sees the mysteries of God, ‘namely the power of God and His wisdom and His providence for us, which one may understand through the majesty of His governance over us.’ Perhaps here Palamas has in the back of his mind the theology concerning the divine logoi. Through the second eye, ‘we see the glory of his holy nature, whenever God

173 See, e.g., Tr. 2,2,19. Cf. Kesselopoulos, Πάθη καί ἀρετές, 60. Palamas attaches to this fact an important reason for why man is superior to the angels, in terms of the imago Dei, namely the ‘faculty of self-governance’. See relevantly ch. 3.2 of this thesis.
174 For an analysis of this issue, see ch. 7.1.c.
175 See Ἀββᾶ Ίσαάκ τοῦ Σύρου. Λόγοι Ἀσκητικοί, Homily 45, critical ed. by Marcel Pirard (Mount Athos: Holy Monastery of Iviron, 2012), 540.
176 Tr. 2,3,15,12-20, 551 (417,13-23); ...ἐν ἐνὶ μὲν γὰρ ὀρθικῇ τὸ ἑκκρυμμένα ἐν τοῖς φύσεις όρόμεν, ἕγουν τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν περί ἡμᾶς πρόνοιαν αὐτοῦ τὴν καταλαμβανόμενη ἐκ τῆς μεγαλειότητος τῆς κυβερνήσεως αὐτοῦ εἰς ἡμᾶς.
177 The question whether Palamas uses the teaching about the logoi in his anthropology is briefly examined in ch. 2.1.
be contented to introduce us into the spiritual mysteries’. Hence, this ‘eye’ refers to spiritual contemplation: this is what we shall examine, in Part II of this thesis, as man’s spiritual senses.

Furthermore, as Palamas clarifies some lines below, the first type of seeing refers to ‘knowledge obtained through the creatures regarding their Creator’, namely knowledge of God through the creation, and the second type to ‘contemplation, not of the divine nature ...but of the glory of His nature’, namely participation in His divine activity, theosis. He concludes this section, ‘Therefore, this is the glory through which we possess in us and, properly speaking, see God’. Consequently, it could be said that these two ‘eyes’ are respectively the dianoia (reasoning) and the nous. And, as archimandrite Efrem puts it, the nous is ‘the intellectual activity in the heart of man through which the divine contemplation is attained, as well as the empirical (ἐμπειρική) knowledge of God through the uncreated divinizing (θεοποιῶν) activities of God’. But this remark brings to the fore a very crucial notion for Palamas, that of the ‘heart’.

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178 *Tr.* 2,3,15.20-2, 551 (417.23-5): ...καὶ ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ ὑφαίσθησιν ἔχουμεν τὴν δόξαν τῆς φύσεως αὐτοῦ τῆς ἀγίας, ότε εἰς τὰ μυστήρια τὰ πνευματικὰ εὐδοκήσας ὁ Θεός εἰσέλεξεν ἡμᾶς.

179 This reminds us of the so-called natural theology, namely that type of theology which seeks in nature arguments for the existence of God.

180 *Tr.* 2,3,15, 551.26-552.17 (417.29-419.24): ...καὶ ἀπάντηση τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν κτισμάτων προσγινομένην γνώσιν τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτά, τὸ δὲ θεωρίαν ὧν τῆς θείας φύσεως... ἀλλὰ τῆς δόξης τῆς φύσεως αὐτοῦ...

181 *Tr.* 2,3,15.18-9, 552 (419.24-6): Αὕτη ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ δόξα, δι’ ἓς κτίσεως καὶ ὡς κτήτορος κύριος τῶν Θεῶν. It seems to me that Meyendorff (Défense, 418) is not correct in translating the first part of this sentence [*C’est donc là la gloire par laquelle nous sommes possédés à l’intérieur de nous-mêmes et par laquelle à proprement parler nous voyons Dieu*] as ‘...nous sommes possédés à l’intérieur de nous-mêmes...’ (i.e., ‘through which we are possessed in the interior of ourselves’; I am grateful to Dr Aigli Siouti for discussing with me this point). Christou (ΠΑΕ 2 [ΕΠΕ 54], 443) gives a much more accurate rendering.

182 See Efrem, ‘The Use of Logic and Intellect (nous)’, 771, where he refers to *Tr.* 1,3,45. This is a very crucial Palamite text, which will be analysed in ch. 7.1.f of this thesis.
c. The Heart

The heart (καρδία) is the spiritual centre of the human person. Thus, Palamas argues that the soul is found in the whole body, but without having a specific place. However, it uses as its primary organ the heart. St Gregory is very much influenced by a key text of Macarios, which we shall meet again in Part II, regarding the spiritual senses: ‘...the heart directs and governs all the other organs of the body. And when grace pastures the heart, it rules over all the members and the thoughts. For there, in the heart, the intellect (νοῦς) abides as well as all the thoughts of the soul and all its hopes. This is how grace penetrates throughout all parts of the body’.

Based on this, Palamas concludes that ‘our heart is the place of the rational faculty, the first rational organ of the body’. But man’s intellect is often misled by the physical senses and, thus, guided to sin. For this reason, it is essential that man gather and return his intellect to his interior, to the heart. As Palamas states, ‘when we seek to keep watch over and correct the rational power of our soul (λογιστικόν) by a rigorous sobriety, with what are we to keep watch, if we do not gather together our intellect, which has been dissipated abroad by the (physical) senses, and lead it back

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183 As Gendle (The Triads, 125 n. 24) puts it, the ‘Heart (kardia) in the Greek tradition is not just the physical organ, or the affections and emotions, but the spiritual centre of man’s being, his inmost self, where the encounter with God takes place’. The role of the human heart in spiritual perception, according to Palamas, is examined in ch. 7.2.f of this thesis. It should be here noted that, in his translation of the Triads, Gendle renders nous as ‘mind’; however, for consistency in this thesis, when I cite passages from this translation, I modify it by writing ‘intellect’ (i.e. for nous).

184 See, e.g., Hom. 19, On the Samaritan Woman, 14.226-9, ΠΣ 6, 234 (ΠΑΕ 9, 563), trans. Veniamin, 159: ‘...the soul does encompass the body with which it was created, and is everywhere within it, not in spatial terms nor as being contained by the body, but as enclosing and containing it, since it is in God’s image in this respect as well’ (Ἡ μὲν τοις ψυχής, συνέχουσα τὸ σῶμα ὃ καὶ συνεκτισθή, πανταχοῦ τοῦ σώματος ἔστιν, οὐχ ὃς ἐν τῷ ποσῷ, οὐδ’ ὃς περιεχομένη, ἀλλ’ ὡς συνέχουσα τε καὶ περιέχουσα τὸ σῶμα, κατ’ εἰκόνα καὶ τούτῳ ἔχουσα Θεοῦ).

185 Tr. 1,2,3, 395.17-396.6 (79.18-81.7). Cf. the comment of Christou in ΠΣ 1, 395-6 n. 4.

186 Macarios, Homily 15, 20.283-7, ed. Dörries, PTS 4, 139: ἡ γὰρ καρδία ἑξεμονεῖται καὶ βασιλεύει ὅλου τοῦ σωματικοῦ ὁργάνου, καὶ ἐπάν κατάσχει τὰς νομᾶς τῆς καρδίας ἡ χάρις, βασιλεύει ὅλων τῶν μελῶν καὶ τῶν λογισμῶν· ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἐστιν ὁ νους καὶ ὅλη οἱ λογισμοὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἡ προσοδικία αὐτῆς, διό καὶ διέρχεται εἰς ὅλα τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος [the translation is drawn from Pseudo-Macarius. The Fifty Spiritual Homilies and Great Letter, translated, edited and with an introduction by George A. Maloney, S.J., preface by Kallistos Ware, Classics of Western Spirituality (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1992), 116]. In Tr. 1,2,3 Palamas cites this passage with some small differences. He also refers to it in some other points of his texts. Cf, e.g., Tr. 1,3,41.16-21, 452 (199.29-201.3).

187 Tr. 1,2,3,8-10, 396 (81.11-3), trans. Gendle, 43: Οὐκοῦν ἡ καρδία ἠμῶν ἐστὶ τὸ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ταμείου καὶ πρῶτον σαρκικὸν ὄργανον λογιστικὸν.
again into the interior, to the selfsame heart which is the seat of the thoughts?\textsuperscript{188} As Kesselopoulos notes, the intellect is scattered outside when it opens its ‘gate to the passions’.\textsuperscript{189} And some lines below Palamas writes: ‘Can you not see, then, how essential it is that those who have determined to pay attention to themselves in inner quiet should gather together the intellect and enclose it in the body, and especially in that “body” most interior to the body, which we call the heart?’\textsuperscript{190} Consequently, from the above it is shown that Palamas draws a distinction between soul, intellect, and heart, even this is not always made in a most clear way.\textsuperscript{191} These observations lead us to the next section.

d. Nous: Essence and Activities

Another very interesting aspect of St. Gregory’s teaching on the nous is how in the intellect one may find a distinction between essence and activity, like in God: ‘the

\textsuperscript{188} Tr. 1,2,3.10-4, 396 (81.13-7), trans. Gendle, 43 (slightly modified): Τὸ τοῖνον λογιστικὸν ἡμῶν ἐν ἀκριβεῖ ἥψει σπεύδοντες ἐπισκέπτεσθαι καὶ διώρθωσι, τίνι γ’ ἀν ἐπισκεφαλίμεθα, εἰ μὴ τὸν ἐκκεχυμένον διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων νουν ἡμῶν ἐξοθέν συναγαγόντες πρὸς τὰ ἐντὸς ἐπαναγάγομεν καὶ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν καρδίαν, τὸ τὸν λογισμὸν ταμείον;

\textsuperscript{189} Πάθη καί ἀρετές, 32.

\textsuperscript{190} Tr. 1,2,3.19-22, 396 (81.23-6), trans. Gendle, 43 (slightly modified): Ὀρᾶς πῶς ἀναγκαίωταν τῶν προηγμένων ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ προσέχειν ἑαυτοὺς ἐπανάγειν καὶ ἐμπερικλεῖν τὸ σώματι τὸν νοὸν, καὶ μάλλα στὸ ἐν τὸ σώματι ἐνδότατον σώματι, ὁ καρδίαν ὀνομάζομεν;

\textsuperscript{191} As Kallistos Ware (‘The Soul in Greek Christianity’, 66) writes, regarding the understanding of the soul in the Fathers, ‘First, there is the notion of the heart as the unifying centre of our personhood, open on the [one] side to the abyss of our unconscious, open on the other to the abyss of divine grace. Second, there is the understanding of the nous or intellect as a faculty far higher than the reasoning brain – a visionary power, creative and self-transcending, that reaches out beyond time into eternity, beyond words into silence’. For an interesting article, which examines this ‘abyss of our unconscious’ from the standpoint of both patristic theology, as well as modern psychology, see Michael Bakker, ‘Into the Abyss of the Unconscious’, Communio Viatorum 55.3 (2013), 255-75. It is worth noting that comparing the teaching of the Fathers with that of modern psychology, in terms of anthropology, could be of great benefit to both camps. For a recent approach, see again Bakker, ‘Maximus and Modern Psychology’, in Pauline Allen and Bronwen Neil (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Maximus the Confessor, Oxford Handbooks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 533-47. In a similar way, moreover, it would also be interesting to bring Palamas into dialogue with modern psychology. For a relevant attempt, see that of Fr Vasileios Thermós, Ἀναζητώντας τὸ πρόσωπο. Ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδὴς ἑαυτὸς κατὰ τὸν Donald Winnicott καὶ κατὰ τὸν Ἰ., Γρηγόριο Παλαμᾶ [Searching for the Person. True and False Self according to Donald Winnicott and St. Gregory Palamas] (Athens: Armos, 1998).
essence of the intellect is one thing, its activity another’. The activity of the nous is thought and intuition, and, therefore, is somehow distinct from its essence, yet not totally separated from it. In Mantzaridis’ own words, ‘it cannot be identified with the intellectual nature from which it originates; yet neither can it be viewed as entirely different from it. And although the energy of the intellect is distinct from its nature, as consequence from cause, it is nevertheless related and united with the intellectual nature in being its intellectual expression’. Obviously, we have here an example of how the Palamite distinction between essence and activities is applied to the anthropology.

As shown above, the intellect’s essence is found in the heart. Moreover, it is ‘immovable’ (ἀμετάβατος), and ‘never abandons itself’ (τὴν μηδέποτε ἑαυτὴν ἀπολείπουσαν). On the other hand, however, as Fr Efrem clarifies, ‘The activity of the intellect... goes over [μεταβαίνει] and is scattered outside [διαχέεται έξω] through the senses and the thoughts [λογισμῶν]. The ascetic tries to bring this activity back into its essence, through intellectual [νοερὰ] prayer, so that the intellect return to itself and, then, be united with God’. A brief analysis of this situation, what the hesychasts call ‘drawing the intellect into the heart’, is attempted in ch. 7.1.f of the current thesis. This is what Palamas calls, based on St Dionysios, the ‘circular’ movement of the intellect, in opposition to the ‘direct’ one; the former is superior to the latter. And, of course, for Palamas this union, namely theosis, is attained only through participation—both of the intellect and the body—in God’s uncreated activity. Besides, as will be shown in this thesis, the human body has an extremely great value and place in the anthropology of St Gregory.

Undoubtedly, this assessment of the foregoing key terms is rather brief; many other points could be highlighted to support and clarify the above. However, it seems

192 Tr. 1,2,5,26, 397 (83.27-8), trans. Gendle, 44 (modified): ἄλλο μὲν οὐσία νοῦ, ἄλλο δὲ ἐνέργεια. The same argument is also found in To the most holy and wise in things divine, Daniel, Metrop. of Ainos 5.11-2, ed. N. Matsoukas, ΠΣ 2, 378.
193 Mantzaridis, The Deification of Man, 17.
194 Tr. 2,2,26,24-5, 533 (375.28-30).
195 Cf. Tr. 2,2,26,20-7, 533 (375.24-31).
196 Efrem, ‘The Use of Logic and Intellect (nous)’, 772. Cf. Tr. 1,2,5,16-9, 398 (85.14-17). Tr. 2,2,25,27-30, 532 (373.30-3).
198 As far as the participation of the body in the divine realities is concerned, see ch. 7 of this thesis. Regarding the body’s great value, in terms of the image of God, see ch. 3.
essential—and, perhaps, more fruitful—to examine these notions in the context of the two central ideas in the anthropology of Palamas that this thesis studies, namely the image of God and the spiritual senses. There it will be shown that the intellect, for instance, is the primary *locus* of the *imago Dei* in man, as well as the basic human faculty in the union between man and God. Therefore, let us now begin the examination of these two points.
How much greater is the human intellect than the heavens! It is the image of God, knows God, and alone of everything on earth can, if it wishes, become God, exalting man’s humble body at the same time.1

In thee, O Father, was preserved unimpaired that which is according to God’s image; for thou didst take up the Cross and follow Christ. By thine actions thou hast taught us to despise the flesh for it passes away, but to care for the soul which is a thing immortal. Wherefore thy spirit holy (.....) rejoices with the angels.2

If our creation in God’s image means that we are to seek God, to honor him as God (i.e., as the Creator and Lord of all things), and to thank him as the Author of life and of every good gift, then we may assume that there is a disposition to do so in every human life, no matter how little we see of it in a given case.3

This Part analyses and presents the teaching of St Gregory about the image of God in man. Our main aim is to prove that, according to Palamas, man is greater than the angels, as far as the image of God is concerned; in addition, to show that this is due to the human body. To achieve such an aim, first a general sketch of the Christian theology about the image of God is presented, as well as an overview of Palamas’ own teaching (ch. 1). Second, a very crucial side of his theology is analysed, namely the trinitarian reflections in man (ch. 2). These two chapters will provide the basis for the treatment of our main aim in ch. 3. Finally, in ch. 4 the likeness to God is briefly approached, so as to give a fuller account of the whole question.

The notion of the ‘image of God’ (kat’ eikona tou Theou or imago Dei) has always occupied a prominent place in Christian theology.4 It first appeared in the Old

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1 St Gregory Palamas, Hom. 26, Delivered at harvest time. Also concerning the spiritual harvest, 2.20-3, ΠΣ 6, 295 (ΠΑΕ 10, 154) [=Hom. 53, On the Entry into the Holy of Holies II, 56,842-4, ΠΣ 6, 580 (ΠΑΕ 11, 332)], trans. Veniamin, 206: Πόσον ύπερανόο κρείττων ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, ὃς εἰκὼν τέ ἐστι Θεοῦ καὶ Θεὸν οἶδε καὶ μόνος τῶν ἐγκοσμίων, εἰ βούλεται γίνεται, συναναφέρων τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἀνθρώπων, τοῦ σώματος τῆς ὀρθόδοξης κατανόησις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

2 Common Troparion for a monk (Tone 8; emphasis added).


4 On the ‘image of God’ there exists a huge bibliography. Indicatively, see Panayiotis Nellas, Ζῶον Θεομένον. Προοπτικές γιά μια ἀρθόδοξη κατανόησις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (Athens: Epopteia,
Testament, is found in the New, and the majority of the Church Fathers approach it, though in different ways. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the image of God is also very often used in the liturgical texts of the Eastern Orthodox Church. In addition, great figures of the Mediaeval era referred—often to a great extent—to the *imago Dei*, as well as many modern theologians. Among all those approaches, one should doubtless pay attention to St Gregory Palamas’ own contribution. This Part of our thesis, tries to present his approach and also trace its importance and potential interest for Christian theology.

Robert Sinkewicz, about 30 years ago, made two important comments about the image of God, as approached by Palamas in his *Chapters*. In particular he argued that ‘One of the most significant contributions made by Palamas lies in his original and inspired synthesis of the theological anthropology of the Eastern Fathers. The penetrating character of this synthesis is most evident in his teaching on the divine image in man.’ And elsewhere, that ‘Palamas produces not merely a synthesis of the patristic doctrine [i.e. of the image of God], but a genuine theological development

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5 Many references to the *imago Dei* are found in the Divine Liturgy, Baptism, Wedding, Funeral service, daily offices of the various commemorated saints etc. For instance, in the prayer before the *Trisagion Hymn* of the Divine Liturgy, the celebrant reads: ‘Holy God, at rest in the holy place, hymned by the Seraphim with the thrice holy song, glorified by the Cherubim and worshipped by every heavenly Power, out of non-existence you brought the universe into being and created humankind according to your image and likeness, adorning it with every gift of your grace...’, trans. Archim. Ephrem Lash, *The Divine Liturgy of Our Father among the Saints John Chrysostom* (Chipping Norton: Nigel Lynn, 2011), 28 (italics added).


within the Church’s tradition to meet the needs of the controversy with which the Church was confronted’. 8

But a question now arises: to what extent are these comments correct? Is it true that Palamas’ *imago Dei* is indeed that significant? And for what reasons? These are the main questions that Part I pursues. Moreover, it deals with more specific research questions, such as the following: where is the *locus* of the image of God? Why does Palamas refer to the Trinitarian reflections in man? Last, and most important, do the angels also have the *imago*, and, if they do, who bears the image to a greater extent, humans or angels?

As far as I know, there is no study that thoroughly examines the image of God according to St Gregory. 9 For this reason, Part I traces Palamas’ conception of man as created in the image of God. In particular we shall try to understand how Gregory used what he read in the Scripture and the Fathers about this topic, as well as outlining his own contribution. The truth is that he found in the tradition, and he read, ideas that he found useful for his own thought; the decoding of his reasoning will now be our aim. As mentioned already, our main goal is to show how for Palamas man is greater than the angels, in terms of the image of God. But first we shall briefly outline some basic points of the *imago* story.

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8 Sinkewicz, *The One Hundred*, IV.
9 Undoubtedly, there are indeed some very important contributions on this matter, such as the following: Sinkewicz, ‘St. Gregory Palamas and the Doctrine of God’s Image in Man’. Idem, *The One Hundred*, 16-34. Jeremy D. Wilkins, “‘The Image of this Highest Love”: the Trinitarian Analogy in Gregory Palamas’s *Capita 150*, *SVTQ* 47.3-4 (2003), 383-412. Edmund Hussey, ‘The Palamite Trinitarian Models’, *SVTQ* 16.2 (1972), 83-9.
Ch. 1. Introduction

1. The Background

a. The Bible

In the Old Testament the image of God is a very important notion, although not called upon very often, at least in a direct or evident way. Moreover, the notion of the image has a central place in Greek philosophy: in Plato, the Stoics, and Neoplatonism. Thus, it was a commonplace of ancient philosophy that ‘like is only known by like’. A special emphasis is given to the image of God by Philo, a Hellenistic Jewish philosopher who lived in Alexandria, who is in the middle of these traditions. Furthermore, in the New Testament the *imago Dei* acquires a Christological nuance: it mainly refers not to human beings in general, but to Christ. So, for St Paul, Christ is ‘the Image of the invisible God’. This is a very crucial point, to which we shall return below. But let us now see how the Fathers approach the *imago Dei*.

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10 The following publication was based on this chapter: Al. Chouliaras, ‘The Biblical and Patristic Tradition on the Image of God in Man and the Contribution of St Gregory Palamas: Introductory Approach’, forthcoming in BΕΛΛΑ (Scientific Anniversary of the University Ecclesiastical Academy of Vella, Ioannina) 8 (2017) [in Greek].
11 See, mainly, Gen. 1:26-7, 5:1-3, 9:6. For the notion of the image, see also Wisdom 7:24-8.
12 There exist some studies on how these trends affected the Fathers in their own construction of the *imago* theology. For instance, Merki has examined Gregory of Nyssa’s conception of the notions ‘ὁμοίωσις Θεοῦ’ (likeness to God) and ‘ἐικὼν Θεοῦ’ (image of God) in comparison to Plato’s and the Neoplatonists’ comprehension of these subjects. See Hubert Merki, O.S.B., ὌΜΟΙΩΣΙΣ ΘΕΟΥ. Von der platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gottählichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa, Paradosis. Beiträge zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur und Theologie VII (Freiburg: Paulusverlag, 1952).
14 Nellas, Ζώον Θεοίμενον, 19 (=Deification in Christ, 21).
For the Church Fathers, man’s being *kat’ eikona tou Theou* makes it possible for him to know God, who ontologically is utterly different and therefore unknowable. Moreover, it seems that much more important for the Greek Fathers is not how to identify the image, but how the idea of an image provides them with a way of thinking about God’s relationship to humanity, and vice versa. In other words, through the *imago* they find a means to express their conviction that man resembles his Creator to a great extent. Consequently, human beings are able to have a firm relationship with God and be guided to union with Him, to *theosis*.

Thus, among the Fathers, one can locate a number of different approaches to the *imago Dei*. Generally speaking, they connect the image with such properties as rationality, free will (τὸ αὐτεξούσιον), perception, and the ability to attain the ‘likeness’ of God (resemblance or καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν). Sometimes they attribute it to the intellect, to the body and the soul, and so on. But some Fathers connect the image to the person as a whole. It is worth noting that this variety of approaches appears not only from author to author, but often within the treatises of a single writer. However, they usually regard the intellect (νοῦς) as the basic point of the divine image in man, but in various ways.

Nevertheless, it has been noticed that in early Christian theology we do find some attempts to connect the *imago Dei* with the body, but these efforts entailed the danger of an anthropomorphic conception of God. This is perhaps the main reason why

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19 For instance, Mantzaridis (The *Deification of Man*, 16) mentions Clement of Alexandria and Gregory of Nyssa. Each of them, in two different works of his, presents two different approaches to the image of God.
this approach was not more prevalent. Thus, on the one hand, we have Irenaeus’ claim that the whole man, body and soul, bears the image of God. The same impression is given by Cyprian and Lactantius. On the other hand, the Alexandrian theologians link the image principally with the soul. With this position we find Cyril of Jerusalem and John Chrysostom claim that the imago is not in the body. However, the Cappadocians do not leave the body out when they consider the image, since they regard it as closely linked to the soul. But here again one can observe an emphasis on man’s spiritual part.

In particular, in the Alexandrian tradition it seems clear from the beginning that the imago Dei is connected only to the soul and, specifically, to the intellect (νοῦς).

21 Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 114-5.  
23 Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 115.  
24 Catech. 4, 18 (PG 33, 477B).  
25 Cf. Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 115. In this page, n. 147, the following authors are mentioned: Tertullian, Hilary of Poitiers, Zeno of Verona, Philastrius of Brescia, Ambrose of Milan, and Augustine.  
Additionally, Philo regarded the body simply as the sanctuary of the image. Clement has the same restrictions and Origen clearly adapts the Philonian position; he claims that the *imago* is essentially invisible and he connects it exclusively with the soul. The body is for him the temple containing the *imago*. However, one must note that this is an immensely powerful image, namely the body as a temple containing the *kat’ eikona*: it ascribes to the body a high dignity, that of preserving and guarding the *imago*. Yet the *imago* is still not seen as being reflected by the body. Moreover, Athanasios and Cyril of Alexandria insist on the soul as locus of the divine image.²⁸ This also happens with St Macarios of Egypt (fourth century).²⁹

Let us note here that Philo regarded only the νοῦς, the highest part of the human soul, as the image of God.³⁰ Origen likewise traces the *imago* in the intellect, where, according to him, the *pre-existent* part of the soul is to be found. Furthermore, Evagrius also indicates the image not in the body, but in the νοῦς, because of its incorporeality and its potentiality of becoming a recipient of God.³¹ It should be here underlined that Clement sees the νοῦς as the ‘image of the Image’ (*eikon* Εικόνος).³² The reason is that the image of God is the Logos. This last sentence is very crucial: it could be argued that is an extension of the fundamental patristic theology of the image and, moreover, has a very significant implication, namely that man is *logikos*.

²⁹ As Plested notes (The Macarian Legacy, 34), Macarios ‘associates the image of God principally with the soul. He observes: ‘It was not of Michael and Gabriel, the archangels, that God said, ‘Let us make [man] after our image and likeness’, but of the intellective essence (νοερὰ ὑσία) of man, that is, his immortal soul’ (ii 15.22). Its dignity is supreme: the entire creation cannot equal the worth of a single soul (i 27.2.6; ii 15.43). The body is in a sense the icon of the soul, the image of the *imago Dei* (I 18.7.1–3).’
³⁰ It should be underlined that, strictly speaking, Philo does not belong in the patristic tradition, because he is not recognized as a Father of the Church; however, he has probably influenced some Fathers.
Man as logikos

It is worth noting that often, for the Fathers, far more important than finding the image in various qualities is the idea that the Logos is the Image of God, and man, as logikos, is created *kat’ eikona*. By ‘logikos’ is suggested something more than ‘rational’; it implies that man is created in the image of the Logos. 33 Certainly, this is what Clement has in mind, when he sees the nous as ‘the image of the Image’, as mentioned above. More specifically, saying that man is *logikos* suggests that he participates in the Logos, who is the image of God. This produces a notion of image which is bound up with man’s relationship to the Logos. 34 Several Fathers are conscious that this further relates man, as an embodied being, to the Logos who became incarnate. Thus, man is the image of Christ and it is through this that the body participates in humanity’s being *kat’ eikona tou Theou*. 35 The theology of the image is essentially relational. 36

To sum up, the true image of God is Christ. Hence, strictly speaking, man is not the image of God, but man is made ‘according to the image of God’. This is what is written in Genesis (1:26): κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ Θεοῦ. Therefore, when one sees the expression ‘man is the image of God’ in the current thesis, one should take into regard that it is used in a conventional way. To be precise, man is the ‘image of the Image’, as we have already shown.

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34 Louth, Introducing Eastern Orthodox Theology, 86-7.
36 I owe this remark to my main supervisor, Fr Andrew Louth.
Palamas seems to follow this line of thought. As will be argued in this chapter, he also regards the Logos as the Image of God *par excellence*.\(^\text{37}\) He contends that the saints ‘became living icons of Christ and the same as he is, more by grace than by assimilation’.\(^\text{38}\) Moreover, one of his arguments about the superiority of man over the angels, in terms of the *imago*, is not only based on human corporeality, but also bears a strong Christological and incarnational nuance.\(^\text{39}\)

From the above it is shown that through St Maximos the Confessor (sixth-seventh century) we have a relatively fixed tradition surrounding the *imago Dei* as far as the *locus* in which it is most manifest: the *nous*.\(^\text{40}\) In the following it will be argued that Palamas follows this same line of thought and sometimes expands it. Moreover, he also ascribes a crucial role to the body, in terms of the *kat’ eikona*, to such an extent that his different treatments of the theme could sometimes be acknowledged as original and unique in patristic literature.

2. An Overview of Palamas’ Teaching

a. Prologue

For St Gregory Palamas, man stands at the peak of the created order. He is placed immediately after God and is superior even to the angels. He was brought forth on the final day of creation, after all things; all the sensible world was created for his sake. A crucial reason for this high dignity is his creation in the image of God.\(^\text{41}\)

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\(^\text{37}\) Theophanes, 26, ed. Christou, ΠΣ 2, 252.16-8.27 and 253.1-4 respectively (PG 150, 949AB): ‘...ὁ ἡμέτερος νοῦς... ἐπεὶ μὴ ἀπαράλλακτός ἐστιν εἰκόνα.

\(^\text{38}\) Ch. 76.3-4, 170 (78.11-2) (=Ch. 111.15-6, 210 (97.4-5)): καὶ ζῶον τινες εἰκόνες Χριστοῦ καὶ ταύτῳ μᾶλλον αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν χάριν ἂν ἀφομοίωμα. Here Gregory quotes Maximos the Confessor, Amb. 21, 15.24, ed. Constas, vol. 1, 444: καὶ γενέσθαι ζῶον εἰκόνα Χριστοῦ... (PG 91, 1253D).

\(^\text{39}\) See ch. 3.3 of this thesis (the faculty of sense perception, the ‘αἰσθητικὸν’).

\(^\text{40}\) Thunberg, *Microcosm and Mediator*, 117.

\(^\text{41}\) Ch. 24.1-8, 106 (48.7-14): Οὕτω δὲ πρῶτον τι τῶν ὄντων ἐν τῇ κτίσει παρῆκε παρήχθη καὶ μετὰ τὸ πρῶτον ἔπερον καὶ μετ’ αὐτὸ πάλιν ἄλλο καὶ ἔφεξεν, καὶ μετὰ πάντα ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὡς τιμῆς τῆς παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ προμηθείας τοσούτης ἥξειται, ὡς καὶ τὸν αἰσθητὸν τούτον ἀπάντα κόσμων πρὸ αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι δι’ αὐτῶν, καὶ τὴν τῶν οὐρανῶν βασιλείαν εὐθὺς ἀπὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου δι’ αὐτὸν ἔτοιμασθῆναι πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ βουλὴ περὶ αὐτοῦ προηγήσασθαι, καὶ χειρὶ Θεοῦ καὶ κατ’ εἰκόνα πλασθῆναι Θεοῦ... Cf. Sinkewicz, ‘Gregory Palamas’, 169-71. For the *Capita of
Gregory regards the creation of man as the crown of the whole creation. God 'put himself within His creature through His divine grace, and showed man as a living being upon earth in His own image and likeness, capable of knowing Him.' Thus we see two initial consequences of the *kat' eikona*: man is capable of receiving God and of knowing God. For Palamas, these both are effected through participation in the uncreated divine activities.

In the previous lines, a brief history of the *imago Dei* was offered. In what follows it is argued that Palamas, along with the majority of the Fathers, utilised many ways of construing the image without proposing one of them as the only one. This shows that his main aim is not to provide the perfect solution to the 'imago problem', but to see how he can exploit this means—i.e. the image—in his greater theological project. Maybe this is the reason for why Palamas does not systematically treat the subject of the image of God; he does not devote a special treatise to it. But rather he offers passing insights on the *imago* in many places within his corpus.

In my opinion, the main concern of Palamas is to articulate his confident belief that man is able to have a firm and close relationship with his creator. This relationship is effected through participation in the uncreated divine *energeiai*, through which, for our author, man attains theosis and regains the *kath' omoiosin*. Gregory regards the latter, resemblance to God, to be the most important goal for man; the *imago* is just the foundation and basis, the basic premise which grants him the opportunity to continue in his pursuit of this goal. For this reason he strives to interpret the high—the highest,

Palamas we refer to both critical editions of Sinkewicz and Christou; cf. the notes in the beginning of the Bibliography. Let us note that Sinkewicz uses the word 'mind' for the Greek word 'νοῦς'. On the other hand, the editors of the texts of the Philokalia prefer the word 'intellect', which we also utilise. For this reason, we usually modify the translation of Sinkewicz on this point, writing 'intellect' instead of 'mind'. For a brief yet concise meaning of the term 'intellect' as utilised by the philokalic writers, see The Philokalia, vols 1, 2, 3, 4, pp. 362, 384, 360, and 432 respectively.

42 Hom. 17, Explaining the Mystery of the Sabbath and of the Lord's Day, 3.35-8, ΠΣ 6, 205 (ΠΑΕ 9, 488.5-7), trans. Veniamin, 135: ...καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, ὅτι καὶ ἑαυτὸν διὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ θείας χάριτος ἐνθεοίς καὶ κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν οἰκεῖαν, γνωστικὸν ἑαυτοῦ ζώον ἐπὶ γῆς ἀναδέξας τὸν ἅνθρωπον;

43 As far as I know, in the patristic tradition, at least this of the Greek East, one can discover only rare occasions, if any, that an ecclesiastical author devotes a whole treatise to the *imago Dei*.

44 In Palamas’ *Chapters* one can find many references to the image of God. These are usually reiterations of other treatments of this subject, found in his other works, mainly his *Homilies* and *Triads*. It is often the case that it is in these treatises—and not in the *Chapters*—that his meaning is more fully expressed. Thus, it is necessary that these texts also be seriously considered in order to articulate a sufficient account of Palamas’ *imago Dei*. 
indeed—place of man in the hierarchy of creation. As a major way to establish this, he develops his *kat’eikona* theology.

We could sum up Palamas’ approach—and, indeed, the whole patristic stance towards the image—in the following way: ‘man is created in the image of God. One can present many different explanations for this. Because he resembles to God to such an extent (the *kat’eikona*), he can attain the *kath’ omoiosin*, that is union with God, both in this life and in the life to come.’ For this reason St Gregory tries, in many ways, to explain why man resembles God, how he is created *kat’ eikona tou Theou*. As will be shown below, these ways include a) reflections of the Trinitarian Persons in man, in particular the Logos and the Holy Spirit; and b) the superiority of human beings over the angels, as far as the *imago* is concerned, which is based in his corporeality, something that proves the great value Gregory attributes to the human body. In Part I, these ways will be traced, along with their patristic context.

*b. Where is the Locus of the Imago Dei?*

But now let us treat a first question that arises: where does Palamas locate the image of God, i.e. in which part of the human person? Sometimes he seems to attribute it to the whole person, body and soul. It will be seen that not only does he find reflections of the Holy Trinity in the human soul, but he also closely relates the *imago* with the human

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45 It seems that the following words of Nonna Verna Harrison apply to Palamas too (‘Women and the Image of God according to St. John Chrysostom’, 264-5): ‘The standard Orthodox understanding of the image of God in the human person is that it is constitutive of human identity as such and comprises those human faculties that enable us to practice virtue and enter into communion with God. Accordingly, the likeness is understood as the actualization of this potential for virtue and communion through our free choice and cooperation with God. The likeness is thus an intensification and fuller actualization of the image. This position, though it oversimplifies patristic anthropology, is often regarded as representing a consensus of the Greek Fathers. John of Damascus summarizes it in his comment on Genesis 1:26: “Intellect and self-determination manifest what is according to the image, and likeness in virtue to the extent possible manifests what is according to the likeness”’. For the reference to St John, see his *Expositio fidei* 2.12.19-21, ed. P. B. Kotter, *Expositio fidei* (‘Εκδόσεις ἀκριβῆς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως; On the Orthodox Faith]. Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, 2, PTS 12 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1973), 76. However, it will be shown that Palamas adds his own special nuance to the *imago* theology.
body. Nevertheless, it seems to the author of this thesis that it would not be unfair to argue that Palamas locates the *kat’ eikona* only in the human intellect, the *nous*.\(^46\)

As already mentioned, the Church Fathers usually locate the image in the *nous*, though in various ways. For Palamas the image of God is placed in the intellect and not in the body, because the very nature of the intellect is the superior human part: ‘it is not the bodily constitution but the very nature of the intellect [nous] which possesses this image and nothing in our nature is superior to the intellect. If there were something superior, that is where the image would be.’\(^47\) Elsewhere he exclaims: ‘How much greater is the human intellect [nous] than the heavens! It is the image of God, knows God, and alone of everything on earth can, if it wishes, become God, exalting man’s humble body at the same time’.\(^48\)

Of course, these statements of Palamas do not signify an undervaluation of the human body. As will be shown further on, Gregory firmly connects the *imago* with corporeality, attributing great value to the body. Besides, worth noting is the way in which Palamas connects the intellect with the body in the aforementioned passage: the *nous*—in which the image of God is located—carries along with it (συναναφέρων) the human body in the process of *theosis*\(^49\).

Here we must make a parenthesis. In recent scholarship, it has sometimes been attempted to show that Palamas locates the image both in the soul and the human body.\(^50\) A basic passage used to justify this is found in a work called *Prosopopoiiai* (Προσωποποιίαι), often ascribed to Palamas. In this work, we read the following dialogue between the soul and the body: ‘I [i.e. the human body] would argue, based

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\(^46\) As John Demetracopoulos (Ἀὐγουστῖνος καὶ Γρηγόριος Παλαμᾶς, 161 n. 252) correctly underlines, ‘for Palamas... the *imago* clearly refers to the human soul only and not both to his body’ (the emphasis is from Demetracopoulos).

\(^47\) *Ch.* 27.1-5, 110 (50.1-4): Τὸ γὰρ κατ’ εἰκόνα τούτο, οὐχ ἡ τοῦ σώματος ἐξει θέσις, ἀλλ’ ἡ τοῦ νοῦ πάντως φύσις, οὐ μηδὲν κατὰ φύσιν κρεῖττον. Εἰ γὰρ ἦν τι κρεῖττον, ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἢν υπῆρχε τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα. Gregory relates the *imago* only to the human soul also in his *Apod.* 2, 8.4-11, ΠΣ 1, 85) and in his *Hom.* 11, *On the Precious and Life-Giving Cross*, 2.10-3, ΠΣ 6, 132 (ΠΑΕ 9, 284.2-4).


\(^49\) This point, about man ‘carrying’ with him the creation towards *theosis*, and, moreover, the fact that this is made in order for the image of God to be completed, will be approached in ch. 3.2.b of this thesis.

\(^50\) Demetracopoulos (Ἀὐγουστῖνος καὶ Γρηγόριος Παλαμᾶς, 161 and 164) cites some relevant secondary literature.
on human physiology, as expressed in the Scripture (cf. Gen. 1.26), that man cannot be
said to be only soul or only body, but both together, both having been made in the image
of God, as it is said. 51

This implies that both the soul and the body were created in the image. So, one
could argue that Palamas locates the image both in the soul and the body. However, it
has been definitively proven that this text belongs not to St Gregory, 52 but to St Michael
Choniates. 53 Besides, it has been shown that this excerpt, read carefully in its broader
context, does not really locate the imago in the body. 54

51 Prosopopoiai, Dialogues on soul and body [Προσωποποιίαι], PG 150, 1361BC:
Ἰσχυρισάμην γάρ ἐκ τῆς γραφικῆς ἀνθρώπου φυσιολογίας ὀρμώμενον, μὴ ἃν ψυχῆν μόνην,
μήτε σῶμα μόνον λέγεσθαι ἀνθρώπον, ἄλλα τὸ συνισφότερον, ὃν ἐς καὶ κατ’ εἰκόνα πεποιη-
κέναι ὁ Θεὸς λέγεται.

52 For the relevant literature, see Demetracopouloς, Αὐγουστῖνος καὶ Γρηγόριος Παλαμᾶς, 162.
For why this passage was mistakenly attributed to Palamas, see Martin Jugie, ‘Palamas
Grégoire’, 1749 and Meyendorff, Introduction, 335. Moreover, it is, correctly, not included in
the critical edition of Palamas’ oeuvre made by Christou, nor does Sinkewicz include it in his
chronological catalogue of Gregory’s works (see his ‘Gregory Palamas’, 138-55).

53 St Michael Choniates (c. 1138-1222) was the last bishop of Byzantine Athens and a very
learned personality, who, apart from his strong Christian faith, had a great fondness towards
classical antiquity. As has been pointed out, he ‘is one of the most fascinating historical
individuals because in him the three cultural pillars of the western world –Greek, Christian,
Roman– came together in a most sincere and humane way as he attempted to resolve their
deeper contradictions in a time of exceptional turmoil’ [Anthony Kaldellis, ‘Michael Choniates:
a classicist-bishop and his cathedral (1182–1205 AD)’, in idem, The Christian Parthenon.
Classicism and Pilgrimage in Byzantine Athens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009), 156]. For him, see Foteini Kolovou, Μιχαήλ Χωνιάτης. Συμβολὴ στὴ μελέτη τοῦ

54 For an interesting and clever clarification, see again Demetracopoulos, Αὐγουστῖνος καὶ
Γρηγόριος Παλαμᾶς, 163. However, we cannot agree with the—rather indirect—attempt of
Demetracopoulos to support that Orthodox theology holds a disparaging view of the human
body. See, e.g., p. 164 (where he writes about Lossky the following: ‘...in that place, where,
based on the two passages of the Προσωποποιίαι and the Chapters, he tries to show that
“orthodox tradition” ostensibly does not undervalue the body’), but also p. 165. From my point
of view, the patristic teaching, if read correctly, and in its proper context, has many positive
elements that could contribute to our effort to articulate today a genuine and fruitful theology
that will respect and honour the human body. That will elevate it to its genuine rank. Moreover,
the relevant teaching of Palamas could play a pivotal role in this effort. See, relevantly, ch. 3
and 7 of this thesis.
c. The Logos as the Undeviating Image: the Christological Dimension

St Gregory regards the Only-begotten Son as the undeviating (or ‘exact’) image of God the Father (ὅ τοι Πατρός ὀπαράλλακτος εἰκὼν), and the human being as an indistinct image (ἀμυνοφρά εἰκών). While man is in the image of God, it is only in an obscure way. Besides, as stated already, in the New Testament the *imago Dei* has a mainly Christological meaning. But Gregory also presents an interesting argument: the Son is the image of God the Father, whereas the Holy Spirit is the image of the Son. It is worth noting here that the point about the Spirit being the image of the Son is not unknown in the Greek fathers.

In another occasion Palamas identifies the *imago*—and also the likeness—with the ‘breath of life’ (πνοή ζωῆς) and the ‘living soul’ (ζῶσα ψυχή), namely the rationality and eternality of the soul, as well as with the fact that the soul is full of divine grace.

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55 Possibly here Gregory is influenced by St John Damascene, who is most likely based on Gregory Nazianzen. See respectively, John Damascene, *Contra imaginum calumniatores orationes tres*, III, 18.19-20, ed. P. Bonifatius Kotter, OSB, *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos*, 3, PTS 17 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1975), 127, trans. Louth, 97: ‘The Son is the Father’s image, natural, undeviating...’ ([*idem*, *Sanctum Pascha* (Orat. 45)], 9 (PG 36, 633B)). It is very interesting that this phrase (ἡ γὰρ ὀπαράλλακτος εἰκὼν τοῦ Πατρός) is also found in the first *stichiron* troparion of the vespers of the 25th December in the Orthodox Church, namely in the first hymn of the Christmas vespers. This is a very characteristic case of how the dogmatic theology of the Fathers inspires and imbues the Church offices.


57 For a presentation of Logos-Christ as the archetype of man, according to Palamas, see Yangazoglou, *Koinonia Theósōn*, 77-82.


60 *Apod*. 2, 8.5-12, ΠΣ 1, 85: Τί δὲ ἐνέφωσε: 'Πνοήν ζωῆς'. Τί ἔστι 'πνοήν ζωῆς'; 'Ψυχήν ζώσαν'. Διάδικτον σε Παλάσι: ἑγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἀνθρώπος εἰς ψυχήν ζώσαν' (1 Cor. 15:45). Τί δὲ ἔστι ζώσαν; Λείψων, ἀθάνατον, ταύτων δ' εἰπεὶ λογικὴν· ἢ γὰρ ἀθάνατον λογικὴ· καὶ οὐ τούτο μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κεχωρισμένην θείως. Τοιαύτη γὰρ ὢντος ζώσα ψυχή. Τούτῳ δὲ τῷ κατ' εἰκόνα ταύτων, εἰ δὲ βούλει καὶ καθ' ὁμοιώσιν· ὦ τῆς ζημίας, ἐκ τίνος εἰς τὶ μετεβάλομεν.
Moreover, Palamas considers free will to be the great prerogative of man and the crucial component of the imago Dei. This was also stressed by Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, Maximos the Confessor, John Damascene, and other Fathers.\textsuperscript{61} This view has great significance for our contemporary society, where one sees a proliferation of various mechanisms intended to control man’s capacity for free thinking and willing.\textsuperscript{62}

In particular, Gregory argues that God has created man as self-governing, with control over his actions (αὐτεξούσιον), so that, if he uses his self-ruling power well, he can walk towards good and not evil.\textsuperscript{63} As will be analysed below, in the relevant subsection, this ruling power, if utilised prudently, grants the imago to man more fully than the angels.\textsuperscript{64} From the very beginning, God made man in his image and likeness (Gen. 1:26) so that man, looking towards his archetype, i.e. God, would not deviate from the road of goodness. Moreover, God shows his kindness to man to a greater extent in comparison to the other creatures. Additionally, through imitation, God invites man to continually pursue His goodness: exactly due to humanity’s creation in the imago, through imitation of God he can attain goodness, but not of course to the same degree as God.\textsuperscript{65} On another occasion Gregory maintains that

The will to do good and to be as well disposed towards all as we are towards ourselves is therefore also inborn (ἐμφυτὸν) in us. We were all made in the image of Him who is good. Then when sin entered and multiplied, it did not extinguish our self-love, since it was not at all opposed to that, but it cooled down love for one another, the crown of the virtues, changed it and rendered

\textsuperscript{61} Mantzaridis, The Deification of Man, 20. Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 118-9.

\textsuperscript{62} This fact can be seen in political parties, economic institutions, religious movements etc.

\textsuperscript{63} Macarios also connects vividly the faculty of will with the imago. See Plested, The Macarian Legacy, 34.

\textsuperscript{64} See ‘The Faculty of Self-Governance and Man’s Dominion over the Created World’ (ch. 3.2).

\textsuperscript{65} See Hom. 36, On Saint Matthew’s Gospel for the eleventh Sunday after Pentecost, 1.1-12, ΠΣ 6, 389-90 (ΠΑΕ 10, 410.1-412.7): Ὁ Θεὸς αὐτεξούσιον πλάττει τὸν ἀνθρώπον μεγάλης αὐτὸς προμηθείας ἡξίουσιν, ὥστε μὴ πρὸς τὸ κακόν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἄγαθον νέεσι, τῷ αὐτεξουσίῳ καλῶς χρησάμενον. Εὐθὺς οὖν αὐτὸν ποιῶν, κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦτον ἐαυτὸν ποιεῖ καὶ ὀμοίωσιν, ὡς ἂν αὐτὸς τε πρὸς τὸ ἀρχήτυπον ἄγαθόν βλέπῃ τῷ ἐκπίτη τῆς ἁγιάστῃσι, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς πάλιν πρὸς αὐτόν, ὡς πρὸς οἰκείαν εἰκόνα μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὰ παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ πάντα γεγονότα, πλοῦσιν δικαίως τὴν οἰκείαν χρηστότητα κάνον τῶν ἔξεσ ἐπιδείχεται. Καντεῦθεν πάλιν ἐκ περιουσίας ἔλκει τοῦτον διὰ μιμήσεως πρὸς τὴν σύμμετρον αὐτῷ καὶ κατάλληλον ἁγιάστῃσι. Καὶ γάρ ἄγαθον εἶναι καὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπον δυνατὸν κατ᾽ εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τοῦτον μιμήσεως, ἀπαραλλάκτως δὲ καὶ ὅσον ἄγαθός ἐστιν ὁ Θεός, καὶ ἀνθρώπων τινα εἶναι, τῶν ἀδινάτων ἐστίν.
it useless. As a result, He who renews our nature, recalling it to the grace of His own image (ὁ ἀνακατανύσων ἡμῶν τὴν φύσιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς οἰκείας εἰκόνος χάριν ἀνακαλούμενος) and putting his laws, as the prophets tell us, in our hearts (Jer. 31:33), says, ‘As ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise’ (Mt. 7:12 and Lk. 6:31)...”

Therefore, in order to attain the likeness, it is essential that all the virtues, and especially love, are pursued. To express the need to work for good, and not for evil, Gregory also employs St Paul’s argument, and writes the following:

‘...as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly’ (1 Cor. 15:48-9) ...and laying aside everything to do with the coats of skins (δερματίνους χιτῶνας) in which we were clothed because of the transgression (Gen. 3:21), let us stand on holy ground (cf. Exod. 3:5), each one of us marking his own holy ground through virtue and steadfast inclination towards God.

Consequently, Palamas states that when man walks on the road of virtues, then he is moved from the state of the image of God, to that of the likeness.

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66 Hom. 45, On the Gospel for the Second Sunday of Luke, 5.81-90, ΠΣ 6, 481 (ΠΑΕ 11, 76.3-13), trans. Veniamin, 355-6: Οὐκόναι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθοποιοῦν ἐθέλειν καὶ πρὸς πάντας διακαίθαι καλῶς, ὡς καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτούς, ἐμφυτον ἡμῖν ἔστιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ ἄγαθου γεγόναμεν ἅπαντες, ἀλλ’ ἐπεισελθοῦσα ἡ ἁμαρτία καὶ πληθυνθεῖσα τὴν μὲν εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἐκάστου ἡμῶν ἁγάπην οὐκ ἔσβησεν, ἀτε μηδὲν ἐναντιωμένην αὐτῇ, τὴν δὲ πρὸς ἀλλίθως ἁγάπην, ὡς κεφάλαιον τῶν ἀρετῶν οὖσαν, κατέγυμνε καὶ ἠλλοίοσε καὶ ἠχρείωσεν. Ὄθεν ὁ ἀνακατανύσων ἡμῶν τὴν φύσιν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῆς οἰκείας εἰκόνος χάριν ἀνακαλούμενος, διδοὺς τοὺς αὐτοῦ νόμους κατὰ τὸ προφητικὸν εἰς τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν, «καθός θέλετε, φησίν, ἵνα ποιῶσιν ὡμίν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ ὑμεῖς ποιήσετε αὐτοὶς δομοίωσι». 67 For an analysis of the theology of the ‘garments of skin’ (δερματίνους χιτῶνας), see Nellas, Ζώον Θεούμενον, 45-114 (=Deification in Christ, 43-104). Palamas does not seem to visit very often this topic (i.e. of the ‘garments of skin’). However, it is implied in many points of his oeuvre. Yangazoglou (Κοινωνία Θεώσεως, 98-108) gives an interesting presentation of Palamas’ relevant approaches, placing them in the context of the Saint’s soteriology. Kesslopoulos (Πάθη καὶ ἀρετές, 52) makes just a brief reference to the ‘garments of skin’.

68 Hom. 21, On the Ascension of our Lord and God and Saviour Jesus Christ, 17.219-25, ΠΣ 6, 255 (ΠΑΕ 10, 42), trans. Veniamin, 176: Ως οὖν ἐφορέσαμεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοικοῦ, φορέσωμεν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου... καὶ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς δερματίνους χιτῶνας ἀποθέμενοι σχέσιν, οὐς ἐκ παραβάσεως ενδεδύμεθα, στῶμεν ἐν γῇ ἁγίᾳ, τὴν καθ’ ἑαυτῶν ἑκατόστος γῆν ἁγίαν δι’ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ἁκλίνους πρὸς Θεὸν νεύσεως ἅπαντες.
The Restoration of the Image of God

These remarks lead us to a very significant topic, that of the restoration of the imago. Palamas often stresses that in the fall, whereas man rejected the resemblance to God (the καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν), he did not lose the kat’ eikona. Nevertheless, the image of God in man was blackened and the basic task of Christ is to restore it. This is a theme that comes up often in Palamas’ thought: the Logos takes up flesh in order to reveal the truth, renew the image of God, and guide humanity unto its archetype, namely God. Thus, as hinted above, Christ is ‘He who renews our nature, recalling it to the grace of His own image’. Worth noting is that here Palamas sees Christ as the Image, to whom man should return.

But how could this be achieved? Perhaps through knowledge? For St. Gregory human knowledge and wisdom are not on their own able to restore the image of God in the soul. He strongly insists on this point, because he believes that his opponents, in particular Barlaam, argued that man could attain knowledge of God and assimilation to Him simply through reason and human knowledge. He names his adversaries ‘iconognosts’ (εἰκονογνώστες), since they ‘pretend that man receives the image of God by knowledge, and that this knowledge conforms the soul to God.’ Elsewhere Palamas wonders how it is possible for ‘the wisdom of the flesh to grant the divine image to the soul’: for him this is unthinkable. Besides, Adam possessed ‘natural wisdom’ more than any man who came after him; nevertheless, he did not keep the image.

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69 Ch. 39.9-10, 126 (57.5-6): …τὸ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν εἶναι θέιαν ἀποβαλόντες, τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα σώκ ἀπολέσαμεν.
70 Απόδ. 2, 9, ΠΣ 3, 85.30-86.2: …ὡς ἂν ᾐσοποιήσας ἀνακαίνισή τὴν ἀμαιρωθεῖσαν εἰκόνα.
71 Tr. 1,1,5-7-10, 365 (17.21-4): ‘ὁ πρὸ τὸν αἰώναν ὄν’ καὶ μετ’ αὐτὸν φανείς καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐλθόν εἰς τὸν κόσμον ἵνα μαρτυρήσῃ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ’ καὶ ἀνακαινίσῃ τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἄρχοντον ἐπαναγάγῃ.
73 Tr. 1,1,10.6-8, 384 (19.19-21), trans. Gendle, 28: …καὶ τοὺς ἑἰκονογνώστας τούτους, οίς φασίν ἐκ τῆς γνώσεως τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα τὸν ἀνθρώπον λαμβάνειν καὶ δι’ αὐτῆς κατὰ Θεόν μορφοφεύεται τὴν ψυχήν. Cf. Gendle’s note 31 in p. 120.
74 Tr. 1,1,2.17-9, 362 (11.24-5): Ἡ τοιῶν τῆς παρκάς σοφία, πώς τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα παρέδεται; For Barlaam’s position towards human knowledge, and the reaction of Palamas, see Sinkewicz, ‘The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God in the Early Writings of Barlaam the Calabrian’.
75 Tr. 1,1,22.9-11, 386 (63.1-4): Τῆς δὲ φυσικῆς σοφίας καὶ τοῦ Ἀδωνί εἶπεν, τινὶ τῶν μετ’ αὐτῶν περιείναι λέγεται, καθ’ τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα πρώτῳ πάντων μη φυλάζαντι.
Furthermore, for Palamas, man is made in the image of God more so than all other creatures. One great proof of this is the Incarnation, namely the hypostatic union of the two natures of Christ, divine and human, in the one person of the Logos. In other words, the fact that human nature was able to be joined to the divine in one person: ‘Human nature was shown to have been created in the image of God to a greater extent than the rest of creation and this kinship with God was such that human nature could be joined to Him in one person.’ It is worth noting that, for Gregory, God adorned human nature to such a great extent ‘because He was going to clothe Himself in it’. Through the Virgin Mary the Logos would receive flesh and blood to become man. ‘Because in His wisdom and love for mankind He was making provision for this, He honoured our nature with many and varied gifts.’

Additionally, St Gregory presents two other significant reasons for why God created man in his image and likeness. First an eschatological point: ‘...to enable man at some time to contain the greatness of God’s kingdom, the blessedness of God’s inheritance and the perfection of the heavenly Father’s blessing, by which everything visible and invisible was made.’ The image and likeness of God, inherent in man, are

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76 Hom. 16, 18.286-8, ΠΣ 6, 192 (ΠΑΕ 9, 448.15-8), trans. Veniamin, 123 (modified). Veniamin writes in his translation: ‘Human nature was shown to have been created in the image of God, unlike the rest of creation’. The original text reads as follows: Γέγονε τοίνυν ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Υἱὸς ἀνθρώπος... ἵνα δειχθῇ, πῶς ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις παρὰ πάντα τὰ κτίσματα κατ’ εἰκόνα ἐκτίσθη Θεοῦ· τοσοῦτον γὰρ ταύτη τὸ συγγενὲς πρὸς Θεόν, ὡς καὶ δύνασθαι συνελθεῖν αὐτῷ πρὸς μίαν ὑπόστασιν... (the emphasis is mine). So it seems that it would have been better rendered as ‘Human nature was shown to have been created in the image of God at a greater extent than the rest of creation’.


78 Hom. 26, 3.34-5, ΠΣ 6, 295 (ΠΑΕ 10, 156.6-7), trans. Veniamin, 207: Τοῦτο δὴ καὶ προοικονομιών σωφρός ἄμα καὶ φιλανθρώπως, οὕτω πολλαῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ παντοδαπαῖς αὐτὴν ἐτίμησε χάρισιν.

the factors that push him towards the pleasure of the divine kingdom, towards Paradise. Moreover, it is the potentiality of the likeness that renders man capable of participating in the life of Paradise. The image and likeness both have an intensely eschatological character.  

Second, a Christological reason: as mentioned above, man was created in the image of God so that one day the taking up of flesh by the Logos could occur. In particular, in Homily 60, On The Holy Feast of Theophany, Palamas argues that the whole Old Testament was pointing to the Incarnation. Moreover, all creation was waiting and looking towards the ‘dispensation whereby God became human’ (τὴν θεανθρωπίνην οἰκονομίαν). Additionally, man ‘was also brought into being in the beginning because of Him [i.e. the Logos], being formed according to God’s image, so that one day he might contain his archetype.’ This means that man was granted the imago, so that the Logos could receive human nature. The Son of God is the archetype, and humanity is made in His image. It seems that Palamas has in mind here the fact that the Logos is the ‘express image of the Father’ and humanity’s archetype; as already mentioned, the Logos is the image, whereas man is created according to the image (κατ’ εἰκόνα). Here Palamas possibly has in mind man as logikos.

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80 Cf. Hom. 4, 12.170-2, ΠΣ 6, 75 (ΠΑΕ 9, 124), trans. Veniamin, 29: “Come”, He Says, “you who made good use of the earthly, perishable and fleeting world in accordance with my will, and inherit as well the lasting, heavenly world which is now at hand.” Palamas very often stresses the indispensability of conforming our will to God’s one.

81 Hom. 60, 19, ΠΣ 6, 655 (ΠΑΕ 11, 532).


83 Hom. 60, 20.294-5, ΠΣ 6, 655 (ΠΑΕ 11, 532), trans. Veniamin, 502 (slightly modified): Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἢ ἀπὸ ἁρμῆς παρηχομένη τοῦ ἁνθρώπου δι’ αὐτὸν [i.e. τὸν Υἱόν], κατ’ εἰκόνα πλασθέντος τοῦ Θεοῦ, ίνα δυνηθῇ ποτε χωρῆσαι τὸ ἄρχεται... Here Palamas refers to the Son (δι’ αὐτὸν). This is clear, if one takes into account the previous paragraph in the relevant text (i.e. par. 19).

84 Cf. Heb. 1:3: ὁ γὰρ ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ.

85 This is what Christopher Veniamin, 648 n. 1172 comments based on this point. In fact, Gregory does not clearly explain his meaning here. But it seems that Veniamin’s interpretation is compatible with Gregory’s thinking in this point, because, as shown before, Palamas uses this interpretation elsewhere. Cf. Theophanes, 26.16-8.27, ΠΣ 2, 252 and 1-4, 253, where the Only-begot Son is the identical image of God (ἡ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκών) and man is an indistinct image (ἀμυδρὰ εἰκόν).

86 See above, in our brief presentation of the teaching of the Fathers on the imago Dei (i.e., in ch. 1.1.b), for what logikos means for them.
3. Conclusions

So far we have attempted to sketch a general introduction to Palamas’ *imago* theology. Gregory uses many of the approaches found in the previous tradition, mainly stressing the fact that the Logos is *the* Image of God. But, he also focuses on the Incarnation, and Christ Incarnate as the Image. At the same time, he tries to bring into focus the role of man as *logikos*, and his relationship with Christ, in terms of the image of God. These points will become clearer through the more systematic examination of Palamas’ *imago* theology that will follow in the next Part of our thesis. Now, specifically, two major elements of his teaching will be depicted, namely why man images the Holy Trinity, and—what constitutes our main aim—why he is superior to the angels in virtue of the *kat’ eikona*. Let us first examine the former.
Ch. 2. *Imago Trinitatis*: The Trinitarian Reflections in Man

*Introductory Remarks*

In this chapter we shall examine the *imago Trinitatis* according to Palamas. This examination will serve as the basis for the later treatment of this Part’s main aim, namely why man is greater than the angels in terms of the image of God.

But, first of all, what is in fact a ‘Trinitarian reflection in man”? In broad terms we could say that it is an element or condition in the human person—usually in the human soul or intellect—that resembles the Holy Trinity. It is a point that permits us to make an analogy between man and the Trinity. So far it is shown that man is made in the image of God for many different reasons. Now it will be argued that there is also another reason: man has the *imago* because he somehow reflects in his inner constitution the Holy Trinity.

Recent scholarship has dealt a good deal with Palamas’ Trinitarian reflections in man. Nevertheless, it seems that this subject is not central, but quite peripheral in Gregory’s theology. Hence, in what follows it is pointed out that it is rarely used in his corpus and does not receive there an eminent place. Moreover, Palamas’ arguments are expressed in a laconic way making them difficult to fully interpret. In other words, his opinions are very difficult to understand, because Palamas is very succinct and does not provide many clues. In particular Gregory makes use of this approach in his *Chapters* 34-38 and, in a brief form, his *Homily* 60. These points, of course, correspond only to a very small portion of his oeuvre.

So why, at last, have Gregory’s Trinitarian reflections attracted such a high degree of interest among modern scholars? The main reason is, perhaps, that the

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1 For a nice basic approach, see Sinkewicz, *The One Hundred*, 16-34. A detailed analysis of Gregory’s thought, as presented in his *Chapters*, has been attempted by Wilkins, “‘The Image of this Highest Love’”, 383-412. Cf. also Hussey, ‘The Palamite Trinitarian Models’, 83-9. Here we shall not merely reiterate their arguments; we shall rather critically engage with their most basic points, placing them in the context of Gregory’s *kat’ eikona* theology, as well as try to offer some new insights on this whole topic.

2 Of note is that Wilkins’ interpretation, whereas more advanced than Hussey’s one, is—as he himself confesses (see “‘The Image of this Highest Love’”, p. 410)—not entirely sufficient, because it is not very clear what exactly Palamas wants to express in this text. Cf. our comments in the end of this chapter (in the ‘Concluding Remarks’).

3 *Hom.* 60, *Delivered on the Holy Feast of Theophany. Disclosing the Mystery of Christ’s Baptism as far as is possible*, ΠΣ 6, 645-56 (ΠΑΕ 11, 506-34).
Trinitarian image theology in Greek thought is rather minor, compared with the Latin Augustinian tradition, where it is pivotal. Additionally, Palamas seems to be using ideas from Augustine when he discusses the Trinitarian image.\(^4\)

Moreover, although the theology of the Trinitarian reflections has its roots in the early Christianity and is sometimes used by the later Fathers, it does not occur very often in late Byzantium.\(^5\) In particular, Palamas is one of the few late Byzantine writers who were directly concerned with this topic, and wrote about it at length. If one compares Palamas’ contribution to other relevant approaches from Byzantine theologians, one realizes that Gregory usually treats as he does his theme in a somehow more extensive and advanced way. Indeed, one can find in his approach some uncommon, if not unique and original, positions. Last, but not least, Gregory finds a way, mainly based on man’s reflections of the Trinity, to exalt the human rank in comparison to the angels. And this is certainly very significant: man is placed higher than the angels, for he images and reflects the Holy Trinity to a greater extent than the angels do. This last point, which is the central aim of the current Part, will be treated in detail in the next chapter. But these initial considerations guide us to our first point.

1. The Human Intellect and its \(\lambda\delta\gamma\omega\zeta\)

The first Trinitarian reflection that Gregory explores is that of the Logos. Initially in Chapter 34 he speaks about the divine nature, its unity, and its characteristics. His terminology is taken, to a great extent, from Dionysios the Areopagite, the alleged author of the Corpus Areopagiticum.\(^6\) Gregory comments that the divine nature possesses goodness as its substance while all the goods one can find in the rational creation are but reflections of this divine goodness, the latter’s goodness infinitely transcending all the former goods.\(^7\)

This chapter provides a basis for the presentation of the Trinitarian analogies. Thus, in the next chapters Palamas passes from the Godhead to the three divine persons.

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\(^4\) This crucial subject is discussed in the relevant section of the current chapter, i.e. ‘The Presence of St Augustine’.

\(^5\) The patristic context of this teaching is depicted in the relevant section of this chapter.

\(^6\) Sinkewicz, The One Hundred, 16-7. For the relevant references to Dionysios, see ibid., p. 116-9 (e.g. \(\upsilon\pi\rho\zeta\omega\omega\zeta\;\kappa\alpha\iota\;\upsilon\pi\rho\epsilon\gamma\theta\omicron\varsigma\;\varphi\omicron\varsigma\varsigma\;\varsigma\) and \(\upsilon\pi\rho\epsilon\gamma\alpha\gamma\theta\omicron\varsigma\;\omicron\alpha\gamma\alpha\theta\omicron\tau\iota\varsigma\)).

\(^7\) For an analysis of Ch. 34 and an attempt to connect it with the Trinitarian reflections and the whole Palamite system, see Wilkins, “‘The Image of this Highest Love’”, 390-5.
Now, he moves from the *Corpus Areopagitcum* to the theology of the Alexandrian school. In the latter, the Godhead is perceived as Intellect (Nous) from which the Word (Logos) proceeds as from a source. In Chapter 35 Gregory depicts the four senses that the ‘word’ (λόγος) may have. First, there is the προφορικός λόγος, which is expressed externally in sounds. This λόγος is moved by the intellect, even though it does not belong properly to it, rather to the body. Furthermore, the mental image of the sounds of a word before it is expressed externally is the ἐνδιάθετος λόγος. Third, we have the λόγος ἐν διανοίᾳ; this is the mental concept that comes before the expression in a word and is gradually shaped in the intellect. Finally, the λόγος ἐμφύτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναποκείμενος τῷ νῷ, the naturally inherent λόγος, is ‘a word in the sense of the knowledge latent or immanent in the intellect’, a ‘word naturally stored up within our intellect’.

Therefore, according to Palamas, we have the following schema: λόγος ἐμφύτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναποκείμενος τῷ νῷ -> λόγος ἐν διανοίᾳ -> ἐνδιάθετος λόγος -> προφορικός λόγος.

From the foregoing meanings, Gregory considers only the last one (i.e. the λόγος ἐμφύτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναποκείμενος τῷ νῷ) to be a suitable analogy for the relation of the divine Logos, the second person of the Holy Trinity, to God the Father, understood as intellect. All the other types of word are related to materiality or temporality. But this type offers a way to meditate on the Word’s generation from the Father, while the Logos has His own perfect hypostasis. Though distinct, he is consubstantial to the Father and perfectly identical to him. Moreover, this word ‘is in the sense of the word naturally stored up within our intellect, whereby we have come into being from the one who created us according to his own image (κατ’ εἰκόνα oikeián), namely, that knowledge which is always coexistent with the intellect.’

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8 Sinkewicz, *The One Hundred*, 17.
9 Ch. 35.1-16, 118-120 (53.26-54.6): …καὶ λόγος οὗ κατὰ τὸν ἡμέτερον προφορικόν λόγον, οὗ νοῦ γὰρ οὕτος, ἀλλὰ σώματος νῷ κινουμένον· οὗδὲ κατὰ τὸν ἡμέτερον ἐνδιάθετον λόγον, φθόγγον γὰρ οἰονεὶ τύποις κάκεινος ἐν ἡμῖν διατίθεμενος γίνεται· ἀλλ’ οὗδὲ κατὰ τὸν ἡμέτερον ἐν διάνοιᾳ λόγον κἂν χωρίς φθόγγον ἢ, ἐπιβολὰς ἀσομάτως πάντη συμπεραιώμενος, κάκεινος γὰρ μεθ’ ἡμᾶς ἐστι καὶ διαλειμμάτων δεῖται καὶ χρονικῶν οὐκ ὀλίγων διαστημάτων, διεξοδικὸς προίκι, καὶ οἷς ἀρχῆς ἀπελοῦς πρὸς τὸ ἐντελὲς συμπέρασμα προσάγειν· ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν ἐμφύτως ἡμῖν, ἢ, οὐ γεγόναμεν παρὰ τοῦ κτίσαντος ἡμᾶς κατ’ εἰκόνα οἰκεῖαν, ἐναποκείμενον τῷ νῷ λόγον, τὴν οὐ καὶ συνεπάρχουσαν αὐτῷ γνώσιν...

Cf. Sinkewicz, *The One Hundred*, 17.
10 Ch. 35.14-6, 120 (54.3-6) (emphasis added).
Is Theology of the ‘logoi’ Present Here?

This is the first Trinitarian analogy of the image of God that Gregory mentions. However, Palamas leaves the reader with an important question. What exactly does he mean by this λόγος ἐμφύτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναποκείμενος τῷ νῷ? Some attempts to provide a solution can be found in scholarship,¹¹ but it seems that a definite answer cannot be easily given. Moreover, a discussion has begun about the roots of Gregory’s approach.¹² Thus, Hussey attempts to trace the source of Palamas’ use of the notion of logos here to Maximos the Confessor’s elaboration of the logos theology.¹³ Additionally, Wilkins finds here some resonances with this Maximian theme.¹⁴ This is a very interesting path, but, in my view, it is difficult to find strong arguments in its support.¹⁵ It seems to the author of this thesis that such a relation could not be easily proven, because such references only appear very rarely, at least directly and explicitly.¹⁶ Palamas was indeed

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¹² As mentioned above, the general patristic context of Palamas’ Trinitarian analogies will be analysed in the relevant section of this chapter.


¹⁴ ‘‘The Image of this Highest Love’’, 402-5. For an important recent approach, see Tollefsen, Activity and Participation, 186-200 (mainly 190-2, 200).

¹⁵ Wilkins himself admits that the problem cannot be not readily solved. As he explains, he has ‘not explored the possible sources for Palamas’s analogy of the procession of the word. However, we are led to affirm the strong presence of a Maximian theme operative in Palamas’s conception of the innermost logos in us and its relation to the divine Logos. At the same time, the position we have arrived at is not merely Maximian; the Maximian theme is integrated into an intellectual analogy for the divine processions, an analogy derived from a meditation on the trinitarian image of God in the human person’ (‘‘The Image of this Highest Love’’, 405).

¹⁶ As Tollefsen (Activity and Participation, 192) puts it, ‘There is one question that poses itself on the background of the Capita 150.87: can we draw any definite conclusions regarding a doctrine of logoi in Palamas? Perhaps not’. And he continues, ‘It may a fortiori be doubted that Palamas has worked out for himself anything like the metaphysics and cosmology of St Maximus. Even so, I also doubt that Palamas would have denied any of Maximus’ teachings, even if he did not consciously integrate them into his own theological system. It cannot, therefore, be taken for granted that he had a sophisticated doctrine of logos’.
aware of the λόγοι τῶν ὄντων, and he sometimes refers to them. Yet it appears that he does not significantly exploit them, neither here, nor anywhere else. Moreover, Tollefsen seems to be correct in finding problematic how Palamas does not seem to make a clear distinction between the logoi and the divine activities.

On the other hand, a very plausible justification for why Palamas does not utilise further the logoi theology has been given recently by Fr Maximos Constas. The latter argues that it was Barlaam who first appealed to the doctrine of the logoi. In particular, as mentioned in the First Question of Triad I, namely in the beginning of the hesychast controversy, ‘Barlaam claimed that the “inner principles (λόγοι) of creation”, which are grounded in the “divine, primal, and creative mind”, have corresponding “images” (εἰκόνες) in the soul’. Moreover, as Constas clarifies, Barlaam ‘believed that knowledge of these images could be obtained through science and philosophy and would consequently lead to direct knowledge of God’. For this reason, Palamas opposes such an opinion and argues that ‘it is “rather unfitting for a man to believe that he has discovered the inner principles within the mind of the Creator”, since Paul says: “Who can know the mind of the Lord?” (Rom. 2:34)’. As Constas notes, Palamas ‘concludes that, if one cannot know the inner principles of the divine mind, then neither can one know their images by means of secular wisdom’. What could be added here is that St Gregory wonders some lines below: ‘How it is possible for the wisdom of the flesh to grant the image of God to the soul?’ In other words, Palamas wants to argue that it is not possible to attain true knowledge of God through merely human wisdom.

Consequently, Palamas seems to have tried to keep away from Barlaam’s teaching regarding the logoi, so as to avoid appearing to be in agreement with him.

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17 For instance, in his Ch. 87 he speaks about the logoi of God, the uncreated ‘predeterminations and volitions’ (see Ch. 87.7-10, 184-6 [85.13-5]), though Palamas here refers to Dionysios, and not to Maximos.

18 Activity and Participation, 191.


21 Constas, ‘St Maximus the Confessor’, 45. Cf. Tr. 1.1.2-3 (in particular, the exact reference to this argument is Tr. 1.1.2.7-11, 362 [11.13-7]).

22 Tr. 1.1.2.17-9, 362 (11.24-5): Ἡ τοῖνων τῆς σαρκὸς σοφία, πῶς τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα παρέξεται;
Constas seems to be correct when arguing that ‘Palamas’ seemingly summary dismissal of it’ is rather surprising, and when writing that

It is to be regretted that the scholastic-humanist assault on Hesychasm prevented Palamas from developing Maximus’ doctrine of the *logoi* into an Orthodox *analogia entis*, according to which God and his creatures would not be brought under the same general category of being and which would account fully for their irreducible differences. Instead Barlaam’s untenable claims for the ability of unaided human reason to know the mind of God made it necessary for Palamas to stress the discontinuity between human and divine reason and to reiterate Maximus’ emphasis on the *cessation* of all cognitive activity—sense perception and intellection alike—in the experience of union with God.

In other words, as has been stated, if Palamas had not left aside the *logoi* theology, he ‘might have developed an Orthodox version of *analogia entis*, more satisfactory than what we find in St Thomas Aquinas’.

However, notwithstanding the foregoing, in scholarship it is not often mentioned that there is at least one passage where Palamas seems to clearly identify the *logoi* with the activities. In particular, in *Tr. 3,2,24* Palamas speaks

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23 Constas, ‘St Maximus the Confessor’, 45.
24 Constas, ‘St Maximus the Confessor’, 46 (the emphasis comes from the original text). About the ‘cessation of all activity’ in theosis according to Palamas, see ch. 7.1.e of this thesis.
25 Andrew Louth, ‘Neo-Palamism: Fr John Meyendorff and some Greek neo-Palamites’, in his *Modern Orthodox Thinkers. From the Philokalia to the Present* (London: SPCK, 2015), 187. As Romanides (Πομπάγοι ή Ρωμηοί Πατέρες τῆς Ἐκκλησίας, 131) notes, in western theology ‘it is believed that there is an analogy of the being (τοῦ ὄντος) and faith between the created essences, and the uncreated archetypal forms (εἰδῶν) or ideas or reasons (λόγων), and, therefore, one is able to trace the realities around the divine essence by penetrating, through the human reason, the essence and the universal concept of the beings (τῆς καθ’ ὄλου ἐννοιαν τῶν ὄντων). Consequently, it seems that Romanides (same page, and passim in this book) is correct in arguing that Barlaam was influenced by western theological categories, and tried to apply them on Byzantine theology. However, this is a very complicated topic, a complete analysis of which goes far beyond the scope of this thesis. What should be noted here is that even among western theologians the *analogia entis* has been strongly criticized. An important example is Karl Barth. For a relevant study, as well as whether there could be traced a real convergence between Barth and Orthodox theology in terms of the notion of ‘analogy’, see the interesting article of Andrew Louth, ‘Analogy in Karl Barth and Orthodox Theology’, in Ashley John Moyse, Scott A. Kirkland, and John C. McDowell (eds), *Correlating Sobornost. Conversations between Karl Barth and the Russian Orthodox Tradition* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2016), 189-210.
about the divine activities, calling them principles (ἀρχῆ/ἀρχαί), and writes the following: ‘All these principles are nothing other than the logoi of beings and the exemplars (παραδείγματα), which are, on the one hand, participable by beings, but (at the same time,) also beyond (those) beings, for they exist and pre-exist in the creative intellect, and because everything was made according to them’.26 Therefore, Romanides seems to be correct when arguing that Palamas identifies the logoi of the beings with the divine activities.27 Furthermore, it could be assumed that in his mind Palamas sees no difference between the logoi and the activities; this could be one reason why he does not explore this topic further.

However, to sum up, this is a subject that requires more extensive research, for a definitive word to be said.28 Therefore, let us now move on to the second Trinitarian reflection in man. We will see that things are quite complicated here as well.

2. The ἔρως of the Intellect for its λόγος

So far we have traced the analogy of the Logos. Now, we look at Chapter 36 where Palamas tries to find a suitable analogy for the Holy Spirit.29 He points out that, generally, it is not possible to consider a word without spirit (πνεῦμα).30 Therefore the

26 Tr. 3,2,4.19-23, 675 (685.23-7): Καὶ μὴν αἱ τουχαί ἀρχαὶ οὐδὲν ἐπερόν εἰς ἢ οἱ λόγοι τῶν ὄντων καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα, μεθεκτοὶ μὲν τοῖς οὐσίν, ἐξηρτημένοι δὲ τῶν ὄντων, ὡς τῷ δημιουργικῷ νῷ ἐνυπάρχοντες καὶ προϋπάρχοντες, καθ’ οὓς γέγονε τὰ πάντα. I draw this passage from Romanides, Ρωμαίοι ἤ Ῥωμηοί Πατέρες τῆς Ἐκκλησίας, 154.
28 For a small, yet useful, comparative approach between Maximos’ logoi and Palamas’ uncreated activities, see Lars Thunberg, Man and the Cosmos. The Vision of St Maximus the Confessor (Crestwood, New York: SVSP, 1985), 137-43. Thunberg regards Maximos to be a precursor of Palamas: the logoi could be interpreted as energies in the Palamite sense, even Maximos never spoke as such in an explicit way (see p. 137-8). However, Thunberg, as he himself confesses (p. 138-9), does not bring forward enough evidence for his position. For an important discussion on the relationship between the logoi and the activities, see Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology, 169-89 (part IV, ch. 4). See also, Joost van Rossum, ‘The logoi of Creation and the Divine “Energies” in Maximus the Confessor and Gregory Palamas’, Studia Patristica 27 (1993), 213-7.
29 Ch. 36, 120-2 (54-5). For an interesting analysis of the analogy of the Spirit, see Wilkins, “The Image of this Highest Love”, 405-10.
30 Ch. 36.2-3, 120 (54.16-7): … λόγον δὲ πνεύματος χωρίς οὐδ’ ἂν τις νοήσῃ ἐννοήσῃ… Here Palamas is probably inspired by St Gregory of Nyssa, Oratio Catechetica, 13M (ed. Ekkehardus Mühlenberg, Opera Dogmatica Minora: Oratio Catechetica, GNO 3.4 [Leiden: Brill, 1996], 8.18) who argues that ‘God cannot be without his Word’ (μὴ ἄλογον εἶναι τὸν
Divine Word ‘possesses’ a Spirit, the Holy Spirit. 31 Gregory refers here (‘συμπροϊόν’) to the consubstantiality of the Logos and the Spirit, because both have their origination from the Father, as well as to their mutual eternal relationship.

Also in this chapter Palamas distinguishes different types of πνεῦμα, as he did previously in his treatment of λόγος. First of all, we have the breath which comes forth with the word when the latter is expressed through our lips: when someone speaks, in every case we have a movement of the breath—respiration. But this is not a suitable analogy for the Holy Spirit, because corporeality is involved here and, of course, in God there is nothing corporeal.32 Second, the incorporeal spirit that accompanies the immanent or discursive word is as well an unfitting analogy, because, as a motion of the intellect, it is connected with temporality and incompleteness.33

Finally, there is the spirit as love-ἔρως. In particular the Holy Spirit is ‘the ineffable love of the Begetter towards the ineffably begotten Word himself.’ Moreover, the Son also has this love for the Father and ‘also experiences this love towards the Begetter, but he does so inasmuch as he possesses this love as proceeding from the Father together with him and as resting34 connaturally in him.’ From the Incarnate Word we have learnt that the Spirit is a distinct hypostasis who belongs both to the Father and

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31 Ch. 36.3-4, 120 (54.17-8): διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἄγνω ὁ ἐκ Θεοῦ Θεὸς λόγος συμπροϊόν ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς ἔχει.
32 Ch. 36.5-7, 120 (54.18-20): πνεῦμα δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὸ συνόν τῷ ἡμετέρῳ διὰ τῶν χειλέων λόγου, σῶμα γὰρ τούτο καὶ δι’ ὀργανικῶν σωμάτων ἐναρμόζεται τῷ ἡμετέρῳ λόγῳ.
33 Ch. 36.7-11, 120-2 (54.21-4): ἀλλ’ οὖν κατὰ τὸ συνόν, εἰ καὶ ἀσωμάτως, τῷ καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἐνδιαθέτῳ καὶ κατὰ διάνοιαν λόγῳ, κάκειν γὰρ ὅρμη τίς ἐστὶ τοῦ νοοῦ, τῷ ἡμετέρῳ λόγῳ συνδιατεινομένη χρονικῶς καὶ διαστημάτων δεομένη τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ εἰς ἀτέλειος προϊόνσα εἰς τελείωσιν.
the Son. Furthermore, the Spirit owes his being only to the Father, but is sent forth (in the 
edonomy) from both the Father and the Son to those who are worthy.

For Palamas, the clarification of the Holy Spirit as love is the suitable analogy for the 
imago Dei. He explains this in the next chapter, describing the relation of the intellect to its immanent knowledge (λόγος) as love and yearning (ἔρως and ἔφεσις):

“Our intellect too, since it is created in the image of God, possesses the image of this highest love in the relation of the intellect to the knowledge which exists perpetually from it and in it, in that this love is from it and in it and proceeds from it together with the innermost word.”

In other words, it is precisely because our intellect is created kat’ eikona, that it also possesses an ‘ineffable love’ like the Divine Intellect—i.e. God the Father—possesses the Holy Spirit. Moreover, ‘The insatiable desire of men for knowledge is a

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35 As Sinkewicz (The One Hundred, 123 n. 58-9) indicates, Palamas refers here to the biblical passages Jn 15:26: ‘The Spirit of Truth, who proceeds from the Father’ and Prov. 8:30: ‘I was the one (i.e. Wisdom) who rejoiced together with him’ (‘ἔγό ήμνη ἤ προσέχαμεν’). Regarding the second passage, Hussey (‘The Palamite Trinitarian Models’, 85) notes the following: ‘Gregory’s quotation is: ἔγό ήμνη ἤ συνέχαμον αὐτό. This is probably a free citation of Proverbs 8:30b—ἔγό ήμνη ἤ προσέχαμεν. The context of the passage in Proverbs celebrates the excellence of wisdom and its presence with God before creation. Gregory’s alteration of the prepositional prefix does some violence to the original text.’

36 Ch. 36.11-15 and 28-31, 122 (54.25-9 and 55.13-5): ἑκέινο δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνωτάτου λόγου οἶν τις ἐρως ἐστὶν ἀπόρρητος τοῦ γεννητόρος πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν ἀπορρητὸς γεννηθέντα λόγον, ὡ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐφεραύστης λόγος καὶ ύπος χρητίζεται πρὸς τὸν γεννητόρα, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐκ τοῦ πατρός ἔχει αὐτὸν συμπροελθόντα καὶ συμφυον τὸν ἀπορρισμένον... διὸ παρ’ ἀμφισέβηκαι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀξίους πέμπεται, μόνον δὲ τοῦ πατρός καθ’ ὑπάρχῃ ὑπάρχῃν... διὸ καὶ παρ’ αὐτοῦ μόνον ἐκπορεύεται καθ’ ὑπάρξῃν. Gregory here stresses the fact that the Holy Spirit derives His existence only from God the Father, but is sent to the creation from the Father through the Son. This is the standard opinion of the Byzantine Fathers and the Orthodox Church. As is well known, Gregory was a fervent opponent of the Filioque. His most representative texts are his two Apodictic Discourses (ed. Bobrinsky, ΠΣ 1, 23-153). For a recent and succinct summary of his approach, with some insightful remarks and useful bibliography, see A.E. Siecienski, The Filioque. History of a Doctrinal Controversy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 145-7. For Palamas’ stance on the Filioque, see the important analysis of Jean-Claude Larchet, in his ‘Introduction’ to Saint Grégoire Palamas, Traités apodictiques sur la procession du Saint-Esprit, traduction et notes par Emmanuel Ponsoye, Collection l’Arbre de Jessé (Paris-Suresnes: Les Éditions de l’Ancre, 1995), 14-104. On the matter of the Filioque in general, see Peter Gemeinhardt, Die Filioque-Kontroverse zwischen Ost- und Westkirche im Frühmittelalter, Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 82 (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2002). Siecienski, The Filioque. Theodoros Alexopoulos, Der Ausgang des thearchischen Geistes: Eine unterschied der Filioque-Frage anhand Photios’ Mystagogie, Konstantin Melitiniotes’ Zwei Antirrhetic und Augustins ‘De Trinitate’ (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht unipress, 2009).

37 Ch. 37.1-4, 122 (55.16-9): Τούτου τοῦ ἀνωτάτου ἔρωτος τήν εἰκόνα καὶ ὁ κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ Θεοῦ κτισθεὶς ἦμαν ἔχι νοὸς πρὸς τήν παρ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ διηγεκόμεν ὑπάρχοντα γνώσιν, παρ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τούτων ὄντα καὶ συμπροελθόντα παρ’ αὐτοῦ τῷ ἐνδοτάτῳ λόγῳ.
very clear indication of this even for those who are unable to perceive their own innermost being.\textsuperscript{38} That is to say, man’s lust for knowledge is a clear proof of the intellect’s love towards its immanent knowledge (λόγος). Therefore, the love of the νοῦς for its λόγος images the ἐρως of the Father for the Son, i.e. it images the Spirit. This is the second important reflection of the Holy Trinity in man: the other crucial reason, along with the analogy of the Logos, illustrating how man is created in the image of God.

\section*{3. The Patristic Context}

In order to achieve a fuller understanding of Palamas’ teaching on the Trinitarian reflections in man, the relevant patristic background must be examined. This will be done in the current section.

\subsection*{a. From the Early Christian Era to St John Damascene}

Initially, it should be underscored that the notion of a Trinitarian image, as already presented, suggests a direct imaging of the Holy Trinity in the human soul or intellect.\textsuperscript{39} But this notion seems to be limited among the Greek Fathers; it was never developed to a great extent.

Nevertheless, even in the early Christian era there were efforts to ground the belief in a triune God by using human analogies. Thus, the Apologists, in the late second century, exploited the terms ‘intellect’ and the ‘word’ which proceeds from the intellect, in order to explain the relation between the Father and the Son. According to them, first we have the internal word (ἐνδιάθετος λόγος), and second its externalized form (λόγος προφορικός). Sinkewicz gives the following representative example from Theophilos

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ch. 37.5-7}, 122 (55.19-22): Καὶ τοῦτον δεῖμα ἐναργέστατον καὶ τοῖς μὴ τὰ ἐνδοτάτω ἐσώτερον δυναμένοις καθοράν ἡ πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀκόρεστος ἔφεσις. Demetracopoulos (Ἀὐγουστῖνος καὶ Γρηγόριος Παλαμᾶς, 88) points out that Palamas here alludes to the well-known first line of Aristotle’s \textit{Metaphysics}: πάντες ἀνθρώποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὄργανον φύσει [see \textit{Tῶν μετὰ τὰ φυσικά A}, 980\textsuperscript{a}, ed. Werner Jaeger, Oxford Classical Texts (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), 1].

\textsuperscript{39} As Hilarion Alfeyev underlines, this notion is entirely Christian, with no roots at all in the Hellenistic Tradition (\textit{St Symeon the New Theologian and Orthodox Tradition}, Oxford Early Christian Studies [New York: Oxford University Press, 2005], 182).
of Antioch (second century):\textsuperscript{40} ‘For before anything came into existence God had this [i.e. τὸν λόγον τὸν ὄντα διὰ παντὸς ἐν καρδίᾳ Θεοῦ] as his Counsellor, his own Intellect and Intelligence (νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν). When God wished to make what he had planned to make, he generated this Logos, making him external (τὸν λόγον ἐγέννησεν προφορικόν).’\textsuperscript{41}

The Alexandrian tradition often exploited the Νοῦς-Λόγος analogy as well. This can be traced through Origen,\textsuperscript{42} Dionysios of Alexandria,\textsuperscript{43} St Athanasios,\textsuperscript{44} and St Cyril.\textsuperscript{45} In the fourth century this analogy is developed to include the πνεῦμα; the Holy Spirit, which had already taken a central place in the Trinitarian controversies. For example, St Gregory Nazianzen uses this analogy, in virtue of the existing relation between sensible and intelligible realities. He argues that ‘we do know one and the same nature of the Godhead, recognized by the characteristics unoriginate, generacy and procession, on the analogy of our mind, word and spirit, to the extent that intelligible realities resemble sensible ones and the most significant the least, whereas no image quite arrives at the truth’.\textsuperscript{46} It is likely that the Nazianzen is the first basic source on which Palamas draws.

St Gregory of Nyssa (fourth century) expands this analogy (Nous-Logos), though stressing its inadequacies. He argues that in human nature can be found elements that remind us of the Divinity.\textsuperscript{47} Thus he points out that the human word is from the intellect, but has a distinct hypostasis; it is not identical to the intellect. The same occurs with the Logos and God the Father: they share the same nature, but the Logos is a

\textsuperscript{40} Sinkewicz, The One Hundred, 21.
\textsuperscript{41} See Theophilos of Antioch, Ad Autolycum 2.22 (PG 6, 1088B). For another relevant approach, see Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 10, PG 6, 909A.
\textsuperscript{42} De principiis 1.1.6, ed. Koetschau, GCS 5, 20-3. Idem, Com. in Ioan. 1.38 (42), ed. C. Blanc, SC 120, 198-202 (or: ed. Preuschen, GCS 4, 49-50).
\textsuperscript{43} In Athanasios, De sententia Dionysii 23,6, ed. Hans-Georg Opitz, Athanasius Werke, vol. 2.1 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1940), 63-4.
\textsuperscript{45} Thesaurus de sancta trinitate 6, PG 75, 80C.
\textsuperscript{46} Hom. 23, Εἰρηνικος γ’ (De pace 3) 11, PG 35, 1161C-1164A, trans. Sinkewicz, The One Hundred, 22: αὐτοὶ δὲ μὴν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν εἰδέναι φύσιν θεότητος, ἀνάρχον, καὶ γεννήσει, καὶ προόδῳ γνωριζομένην, ὡς νῦ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ λόγον, καὶ πνεῦματι (ὅσον εἰκάσαι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά, καὶ τοῖς μικροῖς τὰ μέγιστα, ἑπεξεργασμένα εἰκόνα φανέρων πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν).
\textsuperscript{47} Oratio Catechetica, 17M, ed. Mühlenberg, GNO 3.4, 12.4-8, trans. Sinkewicz, The One Hundred, 22: ‘As we have come to a knowledge of the Word by proceeding analogically from matters that concern us to the transcendent nature, in the same way we can be brought to a conception of the Spirit, by contemplating in our nature certain shadows and resemblances of his unspeakable power.’
distinct hypostasis. Moreover, the Spirit is a distinct person, though consubstantial with both the Father and the Son. Of note is how the bishop of Nyssa distinguishes the human word and spirit from the Logos and the Holy Spirit. So, in a way, he is a forerunner of Palamas, who, as hinted above, distinguishes between different types of word and spirit.

This teaching of St Gregory of Nyssa becomes a main source for St John Damascene’s (seventh-eighth century) own contribution to the subject of the Trinitarian reflections, in his On the Orthodox Faith, probably his major, and most known, oeuvre. Moreover, in another work of his, John traces the basis of the analogy between the human intellect, word, and spirit, and the Holy Trinity, in the imago Dei. In particular he uses a psychological image of the Trinity consisting of intellect, word, and spirit (νοῦς, λόγος, πνεῦμα). It has been noticed that John derives this idea from Gregory Nazianzen and Maximos the Confessor. However, it should be underlined that the connection of this Trinitarian analogy with the imago was not something widespread in the previous tradition. Nonetheless it had been used before by Theodoret of Cyr (Cyrus) and St Anastasios the Sinaite.

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48 *Oratio Catechetica*, 16M, ed. Mühlenberg, GNO 3.4, 11.12-12.3.
51 *Expositio fidei*, 6-7, ed. Kotter, 15-7. For an analysis of the resemblances between Palamas’ teaching and the Damascene’s one (and, moreover, Gregory of Nyssa’s *Oratio Catechetica*) on this point, see Demetracopoulos, Αὐγουστῖος καὶ Γρηγόριος Παλαμᾶς, 90-1.
56 Sinkewicz, *The One Hundred*, 23. Let us note that St Augustine used some psychological triads in the image of the Holy Trinity. It is generally maintained that he is a most possible source of Palamas. The whole problematic of this issue is analysed in the relevant section of this chapter, i.e. ‘The Presence of St Augustine’.
But let us now turn our attention to St Maximos the Confessor (sixth-seventh century) who, in the meanwhile, had also used the aforementioned analogy and seems to be the basic source for both the Damascene and Palamas.  

Specifically, Maximos’ *imago Trinitatis* could be depicted as following. In *Ambiguum* 7 he argues that the human νοῦς, λόγος, and πνεῦμα, that is ‘our whole self’, should be conformed to their archetype, ‘that great Intellect, Logos, and Spirit’, namely to the triune God. Obviously, this has to do both with the notion of the image and the *kath’ omoiosin*. In addition, in *Ambiguum* 10 the aforementioned triad of the human soul is presented again, ‘to the extent that this is possible’, as an image of the Trinity.

Furthermore, some lines below in the same *Ambiguum* Maximos speaks about some characteristics of the sanctified man that reflect a number of attributes of the Holy Trinity: simplicity and unity, the habit of the virtues, and ‘laying aside the condition of his naturally divided faculties thanks to the grace of God, with whom he has become one’ (καὶ τὴν ἰδιότητα τῶν κατὰ φύσιν μεριστῶν δυνάμεων διὰ τὴν τοῦ ένωθέντος Θεοῦ χάριν ἀποθέμενος). These characteristics reflect respectively the divine unity and simplicity, the divine Goodness, and God’s unifying work. As Thunberg observes, ‘the three functions seem to be easily recognizable as those of the Father, the Son and the Spirit respectively—and we can also add that the second element, characterized as the imitation of divine goodness, if we compare it with the other texts we have studied, alludes also indirectly to the free development of the likeness to God in man and to deification, seen as a divine incarnation in human virtues.'
It is worth noting that here could be found many important similarities with Palamas’ teaching. For instance, as already mentioned in the Overview of the previous chapter, Gregory vividly connects the likeness to God with the practice of the virtues and the imitation of the divine goodness.65 Additionally, some relevant points will be hinted at below, in the section regarding ‘The Spiritual and Ethical Dimension of the kath’ omoiosin’ of ch. 4. It could even be supported that in this specific teaching of Maximos we have a reference to the work of the divine activity and a seminal form of the distinction between essence and activities.66 Besides, for Maximos the attainment of the likeness is connected with the divine activity (energeia).67 This is undoubtedly a similarity with Palamas’ theology, though Gregory insists on this topic to a much greater extent.68

*About the Distinction between Essence and Activities*

At this point let us make a small parenthesis. Sometimes we seem to regard the distinction between essence and activities in God as something that Palamas simply

65 As Adam Cooper puts it, ‘Thunberg has rightly recognized this holism when he points out that likeness to God in Maximus is “consistently related to the life of virtues and the vita practica”’ (The Body in St Maximus, 98; he refers to Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 128). The connection of the image and likeness of God to the practice of the virtues is a familiar theme in Byzantine theologians. See for instance Symeon the New Theologian, *Hymn. 44*.93-213, ed. Johannes Koder, Joseph Paramelle and Louis Neyrand, Syméon le Nouveau Théologien, *Hymnes 41-58*, critical text, French translation and notes, vol. iii, SC 196 (Paris, 1973), 76-86. Here it is clear that the likeness to God should be attained through the practice of the virtues. As H. Alfeyev explains, for Symeon ‘one will never understand this image (εἰκών) unless one first purifies one’s own image from passions. When one is purified by one’s good deeds, one becomes godlike and “the perfect image of the Prototype”. Then the Holy Spirit is sent to man...’ (St Symeon the New Theologian, 183). Obviously, one can see a great resemblance with Palamas’ relevant teaching (cf. our comments on the likeness to God according to Palamas, in ch. 4 of this thesis).

66 However, a thorough research on this theme is beyond the scope of the current study. For the ‘logic’ of union and distinction in Maximos, which pervades almost the whole of his oeuvre, see the important book of Törönen, Union and Distinction in the Thought of St Maximus the Confessor (2007).

67 See Cooper, The Body in St. Maximus the Confessor, 98. For instance, Maximos, in a beautiful and lucid way, connects the likeness with the divine activity in Quaestiones et dubia 111.1, ed. Declerk, 170.

took from the tradition, i.e. from the previous Fathers. But, if that were the case, one would justifiably invite the following objection: why is it that it is only in the Third Triad that he settles down to using it as the centre of his defence of the hesychasts? It is widely accepted that Gregory wrote his Third Triad in about the spring-summer of 1340, while the first two Triads around the spring of 1338, and the spring-summer of 1339 respectively. After presenting the distinction between the essence and activities in his Third Triad, Palamas uses it as a basic tool in setting forth his theology, perhaps his most crucial argument. So, if he had simply taken it from tradition, why didn’t he already use it from the very beginning of his defence of the hesychast practice of prayer?

Maybe a possible explanation would be that one could indeed find this distinction in the previous tradition, but in a rather ‘latent’ form. In other words, some previous Fathers had indeed spoken about such a distinction, but they had rather placed it in a different context, and, perhaps, did not articulate it so explicitly. Besides, they had not faced the same theological problems as Palamas; and, it is well known that the Fathers wrote their treatises in order to confront the specific theological problems of their era. Of course, this does not mean that previous Fathers had not used this distinction, but only that they did not express it as clearly as Palamas felt it necessary. As Tollefsen argues, ‘it is wise to remember that Palamas was the first Christian thinker who was forced because of controversy into the extremely difficult task of exhibiting in precise, philosophical language what earlier thinkers could allow themselves to sketch in much broader terms’.

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69 I owe this remark to my main supervisor, Fr Andrew Louth.
70 See Sinkewicz, ‘Gregory Palamas’, 139.
71 In this point—and especially regarding the possibility of finding passages in the Cappadocians that resemble to the approach of Palamas—see the important article of Alexis Torrance, ‘Precedents for Palamas’ Essence-Energies Theology in the Cappadocian Fathers’, Vigiliae Christianae 63 (2009), 47-70.
72 For how the doctrine of essence and activity was approached from previous Fathers, see the very important discussion of Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology, 148-60 (and, for St Maximos specifically, see p. 160-9).
73 Activity and Participation, 195 (Tollefsen had already expressed this same opinion in his The Christocentric Cosmology, 148). It is very interesting that in this work Tollefsen regards the Palamite distinction compatible both with the patristic tradition, as well as with Aristotelian philosophy. The same happens with David Bradshaw’s Aristotle East and West [and also his ‘The Concept of the Divine Energies’, Philosophy and Theology 18.1 (2006), 93-120; republished in Constantinos Athanasopoulos and Christoph Schneider (eds), Divine Essence and Divine Energies. Ecumenical Reflections on the Presence of God in Eastern Orthodoxy (Cambridge: James Clarke, 2013), 27-49]. Cf. Marcus Plested, ‘Gregory Palamas’, 303. For a significant recent effort to show that Palamas’ use of energeia is a traditional patristic concept, see the learned book of Larchet, La théologie des énergies divines (2010). For the topic of
Moreover, let us not forget that the distinction between essence and activities in God is also found in the early writings of Palamas, even if not so explicitly as in his third *Triad*. For instance, in *Tr. 1,3* a central notion is that God is both invisible and visible, communicable and incommunicable. This of course implies the aforementioned distinction: man may have communion with the divine activities, not the essence. Therefore, one would agree with Robert Sinkewicz that ‘The first enunciations of the Palamite distinction between God’s essence and his energies occur even at this early stage where the context is the nature of man’s knowledge of God. Here began the great debate of fourteenth-century Byzantium’.

But let us now continue tracking the theological *milieu* within which Palamas develops his *imago Trinitatis*.

c. Symeon the New Theologian and Niketas Stethatos

Recently, Bishop Alexander Golitzin has made a very interesting suggestion: he has suggested that, as concerns Palamas’ *imago Trinitatis*, two other sources are the most plausible, i.e. St Symeon the New Theologian (ca. 949-1022) and, his disciple, Niketas Stethatos (ca. 1005-85). In recent scholarship, as far as I know, it seems that essence and activities in St Gregory of Nyssa, and how man comes to knowledge of God through the uncreated divine activities, see Nikolaos Xionis, *Oüσία καί ἐνέργεια τοῦ Θεοῦ κατά τόν Ἅγιο Γρηγόριο Νόσσας* [Essence and Activities of God according to Saint Gregory of Nyssa] (Athens; Grigoris, 1999).

74 ‘The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God in the Early Writings of Barlaam’, 240.
75 This section (i.e. ch. 2.3.c), with some slight changes, was presented at the *Seventeenth International Conference on Patristic Studies* held in Oxford, August 2015: see Al. Chouliaras, ‘The *Imago Trinitatis* in St Symeon the New Theologian and Niketas Stethatos: Is this the Basic Source of St Gregory Palamas’ own Approach?’, in Markus Vinzent (ed.), *Studia Patristica XCVI: Papers presented at the Seventeenth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 2015. Volume 22: The Second Half of the Fourth Century; From the Fifth Century Onwards (Greek Writers); Gregory Palamas’ *Epistula III* (Leuven-Paris-Bristol, CT: Peeters, 2017), 493-503.
77 For his life and teaching, see Alfeyev, *St Symeon the New Theologian* (2005).
there is no other occasion of someone discussing this topic in detail or even making a similar suggestion. Therefore, it would be very interesting to test its validity.

Golitzin, first points out that Symeon and Stethatos both made use of the triad ‘nous-logos-psyche’ as an analogy of the Holy Trinity. They, moreover, expanded upon what Gregory Nazianzen had written. In other words, they built on this triad, which had been used by the Nazianzen, offering their own insights. This expansion Golitzin regards as Palamas’ most plausible source. Trying to prove this, he assumes that Palamas had access to both Symeon and Niketas. As he mentions, Gregory is ‘certainly aware of and mentions the New Theologian elsewhere in his oeuvre.’

Furthermore, Palamas undoubtedly knew the work of the Nazianzen, but one can see that he also develops this work, with regards to the aforementioned psychological triad. Golitzin believes that, ‘Palamas seems thus to be carrying on a certain trajectory of thought to which his more proximate predecessors had already contributed.’

But let us now test this hypothesis, which, at first glance, gives the impression of solving a difficult problem, i.e. what exactly are the sources of Palamas. Indeed, one who studies Palamas’ teaching regarding the imago Dei, when reading this hypothesis, receives the impression of having discovered something valuable. In what follows, though, it is argued that, whereas this hypothesis-suggestion seems plausible, it is not without certain problems and one cannot bring much evidence to support it.

a new edition of Stethatos’ Life of Symeon—which is the only direct biographical account of Symeon that we have. See Richard P.H. Greenfield (trans.), Niketas Stethatos: The Life of Saint Symeon the New Theologian, Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library 20 (Cambridge, MA; London: Harvard University Press, 2013). This edition provides the best Greek text available—uniting the advantages of the two editions we have so far, i.e. Hausherr’s (see above) and Symeon Koutsas’ ones [Ἅγιος Συμεὼν ὁ Νέος Θεολόγος. Ὁ Βίος τοῦ Ἁγίου, introduction, translation, critical text, commentary (Athens: Akritas, 1996), 46-390]—as well as an excellent translation of this text. Moreover, it offers a very helpful introduction and notes. For a recent review, see Andrew Louth’s one, in Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2013.11.64 (online available at http://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2013/2013-11-64.html; accessed 25/09/15).

It is worth noting that Sinkewicz, in his account of Palamas’ sources, does not mention Symeon or Niketas at all (see The One Hundred, 21-34).

These will be presented in a moment.


However, as will be shown, this fact should not be taken for granted.

To begin with, let us consider how both Symeon and Niketas use the psychological triad and, then, compare it with Palamas’ approach. Symeon the New Theologian has indeed many interesting things to say about the image of God, in terms of its Triadic reflections. First, he sees the human reason (λόγος) as the image of the divine Logos. Second, he regards the human soul as the image of God. This is done in the following way: initially, he writes that the soul is the image of the Logos, but then he speaks more generally, arguing that the soul is the image of God (and afterwards—some lines below—of the Holy Trinity). This is stated in Christological terms:

He (the Logos) is coeternal with the Father and the Spirit.
In the same manner my soul is in His image,
For it has intellect (νοῦς) and reason (λόγος),
And it maintains them by nature
Undivided (ἀτμητα), without confusion (ἀσύγχυτα)
And consubstantial (ὁμοούσια):
The three are unified in one,
But are distinguished.

In other words, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit have a common nature and are undivided; but the same goes for the soul, the intellect, and the reason. Therefore the soul is in God’s image. Next, Symeon specifies his argument by writing that the human soul is the imago of the Holy Trinity. In particular, the Holy Spirit abides in the Father and proceeds from Him. The same applies to the human intellect, in relation to the soul: the intellect is in the soul and proceeds from it. Furthermore, the intellect gives birth

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84 For a general presentation of Symeon’s imago theology, see Alfeyev, St Symeon the New Theologian, 181-4. This work provides the basis for the following analysis. For an interesting nice presentation of some basic points, see also Golitzin, Saint Symeon the New Theologian on the Mystical Life, vol. 3, 147-56. For Symeon’s anthropology in general, see p. 175-190 of Alfeyev’s book. For a fuller view, see André F. Lascaris, ‘The Liberation of Man in Symeon the New Theologian’ (D. Phil. Thesis; Oxford, 1969).
85 Hymn. 44.30-1, ed. Koder, 72: κατ’ εἰκόνα οὐν τοῦ λόγου δέδοται ἣμῖν ὁ λόγος.
86 Hymn. 44.35-7, ed. Koder, 72: λογικὴ εἰκόνα τοῦ λόγου.
87 Hymn. 44.40-50, ed. Koder, 72-4. The trans. is from Alfeyev, St Symeon the New Theologian, 183.
88 Hymn. 44.63-92, ed. Koder, 74-6.
89 Hymn. 44.74-8, ed. Koder, 76.
to reason eternally and sends it out, making it familiar and accessible to everyone. It is never separated from reason and, at the same time, it gives birth to reason and keeps it within itself. But the same happens with God the Father, who gives birth eternally to the Son and is never separated from Him. Accordingly, the soul is made κατ’ εἰκόνα of the Holy Trinity.

Symeon, furthermore, has some powerful things to say concerning the imago, insofar as it is regarded in its triadic manifestation. For instance, he evokes a new (perhaps original?) triad—which does not seem to come up again in Palamas—, namely ‘God, soul, and body’. Symeon uses this triad to stress the image of God in man and, in order to do so, he utilises Christological terminology again—indeed, with a Chalcedonian nuance. It is worth citing the relevant passage:

We have thus demonstrated that, just as God is worshipped in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit without confusion and without division, so in turn does man, without confusion or division, become in God a god by grace in both his soul and body; neither does the body turn into a soul, nor does the soul transform into divinity, nor is God commingled with the soul, nor does the soul congeal with the flesh, but God remains what he is as God, and the soul what it is by nature, and the body such as it was fashioned, of clay. He [i.e. Christ] who has paradoxically bound all these together, and has mingled what is both intelligible and immaterial with clay, unites himself with both at once without confusion, and I myself become according to his image and likeness... Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are the one God Whom we worship. God, soul, and body is the human being made in the image of God and is deemed worthy to be god.

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90 *Hymn.* 44.79-92, ed. Koder, 76. In this last schema we see the traditional view—which reappears in Palamas—of the Father as the divine Intellect (Nous) and of the Son as the divine Logos; the Λόγος proceeds from the Νοῦς.

91 For this remark and the accompanying insightful thoughts I am grateful to Prof. Alexis Torrance.

Here Symeon speaks of deification. He underlines that the deified man, while fully united with God, preserves his own body and soul; these elements are not lost. It is then, in *theosis*, that man truly becomes according to God’s image and likeness.\(^93\) This new triad ‘God, soul, and body’ is, most likely, an original—even unique—approach. To my knowledge, it does not appear in Palamas.

But a detailed treatment of Symeon’s *imago* theology cannot be pursued in the current essay. Let us now briefly look at Niketas Stethatos’ contribution to the matter, continuing to test the proposed thesis of Golitzin.\(^94\) First, Niketas traces the image in the tripartite division of man, as follows.\(^95\) God is worshipped in Father, Son, and Spirit. But in God’s image, i.e. man, one can also trace three parts, namely soul, intellect, and reason: through these three parts man venerates God. The three divine persons are co-eternal and consubstantial (*συναΐδια τε καὶ ὅμοούσια*) and there is one God, who is divided in three persons, but in an undivided manner (*καὶ ἔστι Θεός ἀδιαιρέτως ἐν προσώποις τρισὶ διαφορόμενος*). Likewise, in man, the three elements—soul, intellect, and reason—are co-existent and consubstantial (*συμφιήτε καὶ ὅμοούσια*). Accordingly, man is considered to be made in the image of God exactly due to this tripartite division.\(^96\)

Furthermore, Niketas parallels the origination of the Logos from the divine Nous to the origination of the human word from the intellect: as the human reason is born from the intellect impassibly (*ἀπαθῶς*) and unchangeably (*ἀρρεύστως*), and remains inseparable from the intellect, in the same way one should understand the origination of the Logos from God the Father.\(^97\) Again, this is what Symeon had also argued; it is likely that Niketas borrows this idea from his teacher, Symeon.\(^98\) It should be noted that Niketas calls the human reason ‘consubstantial and co-eternal to the

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\(^93\) It is interesting that both Palamas himself seems to stress the fact that only in deification man truly becomes according to God’s image and likeness. See, relevantly, our section in the next chapter regarding ‘The Faculty of Self-Governance and Man’s Dominion over the Created World’.

\(^94\) In the following I am based on Niketas Stethatos, *De anima* (*Περὶ ψυχῆς*), ed. Darrouzès, 56-153 and specifically on part ‘v’, p. 82-6 (*What does the ‘image and likeness to God’ mean and which is the essence of the soul?*). The first number in the reference indicates the chapter, the second the relevant lines and the third the page in the critical edition.

\(^95\) *De anima*, 21.1-3, ed. Darrouzès, 82-4.

\(^96\) *De anima*, 21.4-14, ed. Darrouzès, 84.


\(^98\) Or, perhaps, from the previous patristic tradition, where one can find this argument expressed often.
intellect’ (τῷ σῷ νῷ ὁμοούσιος τε καὶ συναϊδίος), an expression which brings to mind the well known reference of Palamas—and already mentioned above, in his first Trinitarian analogy (see ch. 2.1)—to ‘the word naturally stored up within our intellect... that knowledge which is always coexistent with the intellect’ (‘τόν ἐμφύτως ἡμῖν... ἐναποκείμενον τῷ νῷ λόγον, τὴν ἀεὶ συνυπάρχουσαν αὐτῷ γνώσιν’).

In conclusion, Niketas locates the image of God in the ‘intellectual soul, the intellect and the reason, the one and undivided nature, the coexistent and consubstantial and undivided’.

This happens because the intellect and the reason, both always united with the soul, image the Son and the Spirit: the Logos and the Pneuma are consubstantial and undivided, and they are never separated from the Father.

As shown earlier, this triad, viz. νοῦς, λόγος, and ψυχή, is also used by Symeon but, interestingly enough, it is not evoked in this form by Palamas. Gregory speaks of nous-logos-pneuma and by ‘pneuma’, he does not seem to mean ‘soul’; he refers rather to the ‘love’ (ἐρως) which exists both in the Trinity and the human soul. On the one hand, the Holy Spirit is the eros of the Father towards the Son. On the other hand, the human spirit (pneuma) is the eros of the intellect for its own immanent λόγος.

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99 As mentioned above, Symeon points that the divine Logos is ‘co-eternal’ with the Father and the Spirit. The soul is also συναϊδίος with the intellect and the reason, and this is why the soul is made in the image of the Logos. See Hymn. 44.40-4, ed. Koder, 72-4: ὁ Θεός Λόγος ἐκ Θεοῦ, συναϊδίος τε ἔστι τῷ πατρὶ καὶ τῷ πνεύματι. Ὁδὸς σὺν καὶ ἡ ψυχή μου κατ’ εἰκόνα τούτου ἔστι...

100 Palamas, Ch. 35.14-6, 120. Another point where Palamas and Niketas seem to resemble is about the ‘Written Word’. Both of them refer to the human word in a specific way: it exists in the intellect and ‘takes up flesh’ through speaking and, especially, writing. Furthermore, they both relate this fact with the Incarnation, the embodiment of the Divine Logos [it is the faculty of ‘sense perception’ (αἰσθητικῶν) in Palamas (see ch. 3.3 of our thesis, for an analysis], for which man bears the image of God to a greater extent than the angels: though in Niketas it is not placed in the same context. See Palamas, Ch. 63.12-8, 158, and Stethatos, Contre les Juifs, 10.1-12, ed. Darrouzès, 424). This could be indeed a possible point where Palamas is influenced by Stethatos. However, these two authors seem to have a different goal: Stethatos tries to find a human analogy to ‘explain’ the Incarnation of the Logos, and present it as an argument to the Jews. On the other hand, Palamas wants to exalt man over the angels, in terms of the imago. For more on this, see ‘The Faculty of Sense Perception (αἰσθητικῶν)’ in the next chapter of this thesis.

101 De anima, 22.1-3, ed. Darrouzès, 84: Εἰκὼν γὰρ Θεοῦ ψυχή νοερά, νοῦς καὶ λόγος, ἤ μία καὶ ἀδιάρρητος φύσις, ἡ ὁμοούσιος καὶ ὁμοούσιος καὶ ἀδιάρρητος.

102 De anima, 22.3-10, ed. Darrouzès, 84.

103 Ch. 36.11-3, 122.

104 Ch. 37.1-4, 122. For an analysis, cf. ch. 2.2 of the current thesis.
Moreover, Gregory identifies this pneuma with a power of the soul, its vivifying power (ζωοποιούσς δύναμις), namely the power that moves the body.\(^{105}\)

This new element, the introduction of ‘pneuma’, is a point where it seems that Palamas deviates from the teaching of Symeon and Niketas and, one could even say, the entirety of the previous tradition, adding something original. Of course, the triad had also been used before in this form (nous-logos-pneuma) by certain Fathers, as already mentioned,\(^{106}\) but it seems that St Gregory attributes a different meaning to ‘pneuma’: he connects the ‘pneuma’ with the ‘eros’ and the vivifying power. Despite the fact that both of these approaches had already appeared in previous Fathers,\(^{107}\) Palamas seems to be offering something new here.

From the above statements it has been shown that Gregory’s approach does indeed possess some similarities with Symeon’s and Niketas’ teaching. But there are also some differences. For instance Gregory does not exploit Symeon’s triad of ‘God, soul, and body’; nor does he see the soul as the image of the Logos, as Symeon did. At least as far I can tell, he only sees the human intellect as the image of the Logos. In addition, St Gregory does not seem to follow Symeon in another very important argument of his—unmentioned thus far—, namely in seeing a Trinitarian reflection in

\(^{105}\) See, for instance, Palamas’ Chapter 38 (ed. Sinkewicz, 124). Here Palamas argues that man, exactly because he possesses a body and the soul’s vivifying power, has the image of God to a greater extent than the angels. For an analysis of this power, see ch. 3.1 of this thesis.

\(^{106}\) Mainly Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzen, Augustine, Maximos, and John Damascene. On another occasion, it would be very interesting to research what exactly do these authors mean by ‘pneuma’. A possible explanation is that they simply refer to the ‘soul’, but there may be some other connotations too. Niketas Stethatos for instance, in some places of his \textit{oeurve}, identifies the pneuma with the human soul, the ‘intellectual and immortal’. See, e.g., Stethatos, \textit{Traité contre les Juifs}, 8.5-6 and 9.4-5, ed. Darrouzès, 420 and 422 respectively. Moreover, often pneuma has the meaning of divine grace, i.e. the grace of the Holy Spirit. Cf. Vlachos, \textit{Ὀρθόδοξη ψυχοθεραπεία}, 118-9.

\(^{107}\) For instance, see the contribution of Augustine, from whom Palamas borrows, most probably, the notion of ‘love’ (see the next section of this chapter). At this point it is worth underlining that when the Fathers use this psychological model (nous-logos-pneuma), they are not just going through philosophical exercises or engaging in intellectual speculation. They are trying to find analogies between man and the Holy Trinity, so as to explicate further the relationship between the creature and the Creator. In addition, by this means they often try to explain their own spiritual and mystical experiences. Golitzin expresses this well, based on both Symeon’s and Augustine’s contributions (\textit{Saint Symeon the New Theologian on the Mystical Life}, vol. 3, 133): ‘Symeon reaches for the analogy of the soul, almost instinctively, to explain his experience. He wants an “inner” explanation of the Trinity which is based at once on his own experience of himself, hard-won through the tempering of traditional asceticism, and on the gratuitous gift of God’s self-revelation. This is not so very different from Augustine. He, too, struggled and was also accorded an experience of the divine majesty, and he, too, then turned inward to find the explanation for both.’
‘the unified function of the three faculties of the soul’, i.e. reason, irascibility, and desire (‘logistikon, thymetikon, epithymetikon’).

Consequently, it cannot be demonstrated with certainty from their points of commonality that Palamas’ most likely sources are Symeon and Niketas. Besides, these formulations had also been used much earlier than Symeon and Stethatos. Moreover, it seems that the two aforementioned authors make wider use of the Trinitarian reflections than Palamas.

But there is also another major question, related to our topic: did Palamas even have direct knowledge of Symeon’s and Niketas’ corpus? Palamas’ teaching indeed possesses many similarities to that of Symeon, mainly regarding the following subjects: the vision of God, the divine light, deification, Eucharistic spirituality, and Christocentrism. Meyendorff, moreover, believes that he surely relies on Symeon.

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108 Symeon, Eth. 4.424-9, On the Graces and Gifts disclosed within dispassion (apatheia), ed. Darrouzès, 38. Cf. Golitzin, Saint Symeon the New Theologian on the Mystical Life, vol. 3, 131. Golitzin argues, in the same page, that this passage is most probably ‘unique in Greek patristic literature.’ There is, though, another passage which resembles it. It comes from St Theoleptos of Philadelpheia (1250-1322), a late Byzantine bishop and ascetic (see the next subsection for details), and is found in his Monastic Discourses, Disc. 1, Discourse explaining the hidden activity in Christ and showing briefly the goal of monastic profession, 24.282-5, ed. R. Sinkewicz, The Monastic Discourses, critical ed. and trans. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1992), 100: ‘In this way, then, prayer calls the powers of the soul back from the dispersion caused by the passions, binds them to one another and to itself, uniting the tripartite soul to the one God in three hypostases’ (Οὕτως οὖν ἡ προσευχὴ τῆς ψυχῆς δικαλομένη καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν συνδέουσα, τὴν τριμερὴ ψυχὴν τῷ ἐν τρισὶν ὑποστάσεσιν ἑνὶ Θεῷ ὁικεῖοι).

109 Alfeyev, St Symeon the New Theologian, 277 n. 19. Meyendorff, 221 (=A Study, 155). Meyendorff believes, quite fairly, that ‘these elements of the personal and prophetic mysticism of Symeon are found expressed in Palamas with a theological rigor’ not present in the New Theologian (ibid., my translation). Moreover, Alfeyev notes that ‘in his teaching on prayer Palamas was certainly influenced by the Method of Sacred Prayer and Attentiveness, ascribed to Symeon’ (St Symeon the New Theologian, 277 n. 19). The Method was an ascetic text that would go on to have a great impact on Hesychasm. It was a short text, containing, among others, a psychosomatic technique to be used during the Jesus Prayer; this text was attributed to Symeon by the thirteenth-century Hesychasts, and until 1927. However, recent scholarship has shown that it is most likely not written by Symeon, despite the fact that some of its points are very close to the latter’s teaching (see Alfeyev, St Symeon the New Theologian, 276-7). It is possible, though, that it sprang out from Symeon’s circle of students. For more details regarding the ‘Method’, see The Philokalia, ed. Palmer, Sherrard and Ware, vol. 4, 64-6.

110 This reality, namely that Palamas’ and Symeon’s teachings bear many similarities, along with the possibility of Palamas being influenced by Symeon, is characteristically, though naively, expressed through a seventeenth-century Jesuit’s statement, according to which Symeon was the ‘fons omnis erroris Palamici’ (‘the source of all of Palamas’ errors’)! [Cited in Golitzin, Saint Symeon the New Theologian on the Mystical Life, vol. 3, 140, who refers to Karl Holl, Enthusiasmus und Bußgewalt beim griechischen Mönchtum: eine Studie zu Symeon dem Neuen Theologen (Leipzig, 1898), 3.]
Nevertheless, Palamas hardly ever mentions Symeon and Niketas; to my knowledge, he mentions Symeon’s texts only once in his corpus, and only once does he refer explicitly to Niketas’ *Vie de Syméon*.111 He refers rather to better known Fathers, such as Gregory Nazianzen, Dionyssios, Maximos, or John Damascene.112 This is quite surprising, considering the proximity of the similarities between Palamas’ and Symeon’s theology.113 Nevertheless, as Alfeyev underlines, ‘A convincing explanation of this might be found in the fact that, *being always involved in polemic*, Gregory deliberately limited himself to references to those Fathers *who were authorities for his opponents*, whereas Symeon’s influence was considerable *only* in Hesychast monastic circles.’114

This is an interesting theory, but, in my view, not conclusive. First, scholarship needs to clarify whether Palamas’ opponents were familiar with—and perhaps used—the theology of Symeon and Niketas.115 Let us not forget that some of them were monks

111 Meyendorff, *Introduction*, 221 n. 114 (= *A Study*, 155). Meyendorff, in particular, mentions two references to Symeon’s texts and one to Niketas’ *Life*. First, in *Triads* 1.2.12, 404-6 (99-101) Palamas mentions explicitly Symeon and his *Life*. Moreover, he refers implicitly to the *Method* (which, as mentioned before a while, is, most probably, not an authentic text). Palamas there argues that Symeon’s life was almost from beginning to end a miracle and that he [i.e. Symeon] was glorified by God through ‘supernatural miracles’. Moreover, Symeon’s writings are, according to Gregory, ‘writings of life’ (συγγράμματα ζωῆς). In the same passage Palamas refers also to other great ascetic writers and acknowledges himself as walking in the same tradition as them (ΠΣ 1, 404-5; ed. Meyendorff, 99). From all the above, it is obvious that Palamas regarded Symeon highly. Furthermore, Meyendorff also mentions another reference to Symeon. In particular he refers to an unedited text called ‘*Ἔτερα Κεφάλαια*’ (for the available Manuscripts, see his *Introduction*, 284). According to Meyendorff, this text is the only occurrence in Palamas’ oeuvre that he speaks of his own personal experience of grace. But this scenario bears some problems. First, as far as I know, this text cannot be traced in the critical edition of Gregory’s corpus (i.e. Christou’s one, nor in the list of works that Sinkewicz provides; see his ‘Gregory Palamas’, 138-55). Thus, as it seems, this text is not ascribed to Palamas from his critical editors, despite Meyendorff’s certainty of its authenticity (*Introduction*, 284: ‘il n’y a pas lieu, je crois, de douter de leur authenticité’). It is noteworthy that Alfeyev, in his brief treatment of Symeon’s *aufnahme* from Palamas, does not mention at all this alleged work of Gregory (*St Symeon the New Theologian*, 277-8). Furthermore, from my point of view, the fact that nowhere else in his oeuvre does Palamas reveal his own personal experiences, at least so directly, is a strong indication that this text does not come from his pen. Nevertheless, this point needs much more research—most likely, paleographical—to be fully clarified; but this goes beyond the scope of our thesis.


113 Golitzin mentions another possible point of contact between Symeon and Palamas. The latter refers to St Paul’s vision as a paradigm of seeing the divine light of the word to come (cf. ch. 7.1.a of this thesis); but this had been already used by Symeon. See Golitzin, *St Symeon the New Theologian on the Mystical Life*, vol. 3, 182 (and esp. n. 27).

114 Alfeyev, *St Symeon the New Theologian*, 277; emphases added.

115 As it seems, Alfeyev does not discuss this subject in his book.
(e.g. Barlaam) or well known ascetics (in the case of Gregory Akindynos). However, if an initial hypothesis is to be formulated, this scenario does not seem very possible.\textsuperscript{116}

But, second, why should one regard Palamas as ‘\textit{being always involved in polemic}’? For instance, in his sermons (\textit{Homiliai}) to his flock in Thessaloniki Palamas does not seem to refer explicitly to Symeon; these sermons, however, do not have a polemical purpose. On the contrary, they are rather intended for the spiritual and ethical support of the faithful and are presented in a rather irenic way. Moreover, by the time they were delivered, the Hesychast turbulence had passed away; the Church had already expressed her self-consciousness and endorsed the Palamite theology through the relevant Synods and official texts. So, how can this absence be explained?\textsuperscript{117} Shouldn’t he have made use, by that time, of the widely known and revered ascetic Symeon, who belonged undoubtedly in the Hesychast climate?

A simple possible explanation would be that patristic and Byzantine sermons in general do not cite difficult theological and monastic writings. But, does this lack, perhaps, mean that Palamas did not in fact know well the work of Symeon? That could be possibly attributed, for instance, to the fact that Palamas did not have direct access to the relevant manuscripts. Is it, at last, clear that Gregory knew more than Symeon’s \textit{Life}, composed by Stethatos? To my view, this should not be at all taken for granted. Anyway, it is difficult to definitively support the position held by Golitzin that Palamas drew directly on the work of Symeon and Stethatos.\textsuperscript{118}

To sum up, for all the above reasons, the ‘Symeon-Niketas’ case is not easily proven and, therefore, the question about Palamas’ sources still remains quite open. Nevertheless, Palamas indeed pursues the same line of thought as Symeon and Niketas

\textsuperscript{116} It is noteworthy that in the index of names of Alfeyev’s book neither of these two names (i.e. Barlaam or Akindynos) appears.

\textsuperscript{117} It is striking that also in the \textit{Philokalia} Symeon seems to have a rather ‘marginal’ place (I owe this remark to my main supervisor, Fr Andrew Louth); from his voluminous—and very important—writings, St Makarios and St Nikodemos, the editors, chose only two for inclusion (see vol. 4 of the English ed. of the \textit{Philokalia}).

\textsuperscript{118} Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, as Golitzin (\textit{St Symeon the New Theologian on the Mystical Life, vol. 3}, 136) points out, there are enough manuscripts (of good quality) ‘which have come down to us from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries’. On the other hand, there is indeed the possibility that Palamas knew this work (or some parts of it) through the ‘oral tradition’. As far as I know, there has not been written any detailed essay regarding the potential influence of the New Theologian on Palamas. Thus the question remains open. Such a work would be very useful and welcome. For a nice basic account of Symeon’s nachleben in later Eastern Orthodox tradition (Byzantine, Russian and, also, contemporary), see Alfeyev, \textit{St Symeon the New Theologian}, 275-87. Cf. Golitzin, \textit{Saint Symeon the New Theologian on the Mystical Life}, vol. 3, 136 and 182-3.
in virtue of the fact that he also provides an expansion to the traditional triad nous-logos-pneuma, as they had already done, about three centuries before him, and moreover, because he belongs, as they do, to this patristic tradition that one would justifiably call, in Golitzin’s words, ‘ascetico-mystical’.119

d. Gregory of Sinai and Theoleptos of Philadelphiea

But let us now move to another very interesting suggestion, regarding the patristic context of Palamas’ imago Trinitatis. In particular, Sinkewicz has found two contemporary parallels to Palamas’ elaboration:120 Sts Gregory of Sinai (ca. 1275-27 November 1346) and Theoleptos of Philadelphiea (1250-1322). Let us now examine this suggestion. Gregory the Sinaite was a very important figure for the hesychast revival in the fourteenth century.121 He was a well known ascetic who lived for many years on Mount Athos, but in other regions too, mainly in a place called ‘Paroria’, which is found on the mountains near the borders between the Byzantine Empire and Bulgaria.

It is known that Palamas and the Sinaite were on the Holy Mountain of Athos during the same period. But, among scholars, opposite views have been expressed about whether they were in personal contact and to what extent. In particular, Balfour has argued that Palamas was indeed the disciple of the Sinaite.122 Sinkewicz found his arguments convincing and, moreover, concluded ‘that there was a direct dependence of Palamas on Gregory of Sinai in the case of the doctrine of God’s image in man’.123 But the translators and editors of the English Philokalia maintained that many of the presented arguments from Balfour on the alleged relationship between Palamas and the Sinaite ‘remain speculative’.124 Nevertheless, it is nowadays acknowledged that Palamas did indeed know Gregory of Sinai personally and was acquainted with his

120 See respectively, Sinkewicz, The One Hundred, 25-8 and 29-34.
122 See his article ‘Was St Gregory Palamas St Gregory the Sinaite’s Pupil?’, SVTQ 28 (1984), 115-30.
123 The One Hundred, 28
124 The Philokalia, ed. Palmer, Sherrard and Ware, vol. 4, 207 n. 2.
work. Furthermore, their theological angle is very similar. In general, the Sinaite in his teaching insists both on the ‘active’ life and the ‘contemplative’ life, namely the practice of the virtues and the continuous invocation of the Jesus Prayer respectively.

But let us briefly check the Sinaite’s approach. In his Discourse on the Transfiguration, Gregory of Sinai argues that ‘Man is the image and glory of the Trinity in that he possesses essentially and hypostatically an intellect and word and spirit which belong to a single nature and which are inseparable.’ Moreover, Sinkewicz proved that paragraphs 18-21 of this Discourse provide some close parallels to Palamas’ Homily 60, On the Holy Feast of Theophany. In both texts the main subject is the image of God in man and, mainly, its triadic structure.

In particular, in paragraph 18 of his Discourse on the Transfiguration Gregory of Sinai mentions three arguments that resemble Palamas’ approach: a) God the Father is the Father of the Logos and ‘the transcendent Intellect beyond intellect’, b) ‘we shall see the archetype in the image and from our own selves the transcendent one’, c) no one can see and know the Father unless the Son reveals Him, ‘as the word reveals...

125 I am grateful to Prof. Antonio Rigo for this remark.
126 The Philokalia, ed. Palmer, Sherrard and Ware, vol. 4, 208.
127 His works were published for the first time in the Philokalia, composed by St Nikodimos of the Holy Mountain (1749-1809) and St Macarios of Corinth (or ‘Notaras’; 1731-1805) in Venice (1782). They were also published again in the five-volume reprint in Greek (Athens, 1961, vol. 4, 31-88). For the English translation, see The Philokalia, ed. Palmer, Sherrard and Ware, vol. 4, 212-86. Unfortunately, many of his works have not been critically edited, as far as I can know. This lack had been already remarked 30 years ago by David Balfour, whose words remain still up to date: ‘What would be even better, of course, would be a critical Greek text, with apparatus and biblical and patristic references on one page, and a modern translation with explanatory notes on the other. But such editions are unfortunately costly nowadays and the reading public for them is shrinking’ (‘The Works of Gregory the Sinaite’, Θεολογία 53.2 (1982), 698 n. 141; italics added). The last sentence is particularly timely today. Due to the financial crisis, all over the world, the humanities in general are indeed debased, in virtue of supporting more technical and practical orientated branches. But this, of course, has a crucial impact on the values of contemporary life; modern man is extremely orientated towards economy and technology, and seems to lose sight of the great and constant values of life. Anyway, a critical edition of the Sinaite’s corpus would help us better understand his potential influence on Palamas.
129 In particular, the sections 3 and 4 of this Homily; for the text, see ΠΣ 6, 647 (ΠΑΕ 11, 510-2). For Sinkewicz’s analysis, see The One Hundred, 27-8.
130 Discourse on the Transfiguration, par. 18.240-1, ed. Balfour, 660: νοῦς ὁ ὑπὲρ νοῦν ὑπερούσιος.
131 Ibid., par. 18.252-3, ed. Balfour, 660: ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι τὸ ὑπερψηλόν, ἡ ἐκαστῷ τὸ ὑπερούσιον (the trans. is from Sinkewicz, The One Hundred, 27).
the intellect hidden in it and the intellect reveals in the spirit the word which proceeds from it'.\textsuperscript{132}

In paragraphs 19-20 the Sinaite develops his arguments in detail. Sinkewicz summarizes the basic notions as following:

The intellect contains naturally the word which reveals it; the word possesses by nature the mind intellect which begets it; and voice makes the word known, for it is a living and revelatory energy of the word. This constitutes an analogy for the Trinity, where in the Spirit the Son is known, in the Son the Father is known by nature and substance, and in the Father the Son is known by causal relationship and the Spirit by procession. But the Sinaite notes that certain qualifications are necessary. It must be understood that the intellect experiences no dissipation in its association with the word but rather belongs to the word naturally and hypostatically. The word does not go forth and dissolve into the air. Rather it refers to rationality itself, as it inheres hypostatically in the intellect. Nor does spirit refer to a mere movement of the air. It is an essential living power which is self-subsistent, comes forth in word and produces sound in the air.\textsuperscript{133}

Moreover, Sinkewicz provided another passage of Gregory of Sinai which seems very similar to Palamas’ own teaching. It comes from the Sinaite’s \textit{Acrostic Chapters}: ‘In like manner there is in man intellect, word and spirit. Neither can intellect exist without word nor without spirit; each subsists in the others and in itself. For intellect speaks through the word and word is made manifest through the spirit. According to this model man bears an obscure image of the ineffable and archetypal Trinity, disclosing even now the divine image in which he is created.’\textsuperscript{134}

From all the above Sinkewicz concludes that ‘the parallels are striking, especially given the historical contemporaneity of the two writers’, and that ‘it is

\begin{footnotes}
\item[132] Ibid., 18.272-5, ed. Balfour, 660: ὡς λόγος τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ κρυπτόμενον νοῦν καὶ νοῦς τὸν ἐξ αὐτοῦ προερχόμενον λόγον ἐν πνεύματι.
\item[133] Sinkewicz, \textit{The One Hundred}, 27 (slightly modified; Sinkewicz writes ‘mind’ instead of ‘intellect’).
\end{footnotes}
reasonable to conclude that there was a direct dependence of Palamas on Gregory of Sinai in the case of the doctrine of God’s image in man.\textsuperscript{135} However, from my point of view, some objections could be raised here. Surely one can trace some important similarities. Nevertheless, our data are, perhaps, not so strong as to permit us to think about ‘striking parallels’, or to be certain about ‘a direct dependence of Palamas’ on the Sinaite, in terms of the \textit{imago Dei}. Besides, such approaches were also found in the previous tradition.\textsuperscript{136}

On the other hand, as far as Theoleptos’ approach is concerned, the following can be briefly noted. He was the bishop of Philadelpheia, an important Byzantine city in Asia Minor.\textsuperscript{137} As an ascetic personality, Theoleptos’ teaching has a deeply ascetical and mystical nuance; and for this reason his style is very much like that of Palamas. In Theoleptos’ oeuvre \textit{hesychia} (silence/quietude) and \textit{nipsis} (vigilance) have a central place. He is considered as a forerunner of the Hesychasts. It has been also suggested that he used to be, for a period, the spiritual father of Palamas, but this hypothesis seems to be highly unlikely.\textsuperscript{138}

Between his approach and Palamas’, some similarities can be found. Theoleptos makes use of the triad ‘intellect, word, and love’ (νοῦς, λόγος, ἔρως/ἀγάπη),\textsuperscript{139} as well as ‘intellect, word, and spirit’.\textsuperscript{140} He describes the activities of the three parts of the soul, the fact that ‘the intellect seeks God through its own natural word’ and that ‘the intellect with its word attains union with God in love.’ Moreover, speaking about Christ’s baptism in the Jordan, he refers to the tripartite image in man as an ‘obscure

\textsuperscript{135} Sinkewicz, \textit{The One Hundred}, 28.
\textsuperscript{136} See, for instance, the approaches of the early Apologists, Gregory of Nyssa, the Nazianzen, or even Symeon the New Theologian and Niketas Stethatos (all mentioned above, in this section). By the way, do our texts permit for a knowledge, and use, of Symeon and Niketas from the Sinaite? But this goes beyond the scope of our thesis.
\textsuperscript{139} MD 23, 1-2, 7, 13-4, 57-9, ed. Sinkewicz, 352, 354-6, 358, 380.
\textsuperscript{140} MD 1, 18, ed. Sinkewicz, 96.
reflection of the Trinity’. Furthermore, he connects the *imago Dei* with the Jesus prayer.\footnote{141} Nevertheless, despite these similarities, it does not seem to me very accurate to argue that ‘The coincidences are so felicitous that there can be little doubt regarding the dependence of Gregory Palamas on the teaching of Theoleptos of Philadelpheia.’\footnote{142} Undoubtedly, there are close similarities, but, at least in my view, they do not show for sure that Palamas borrows from Theoleptos. However, it is very possible that Gregory knew the general *oeuvre* of Theoleptos and was influenced by it.\footnote{143}

Sinkewicz makes, moreover, an attempt to trace the source of Palamas’ use of the notion of the ‘eros’ in Theoleptos’ use. Indeed, it is very interesting the way Theoleptos inserts the idea of ‘love’ in his analysis of the parts of the inner self.\footnote{144} However, as will be shown in the following section, St Gregory most likely borrows the use of ‘eros’ from St Augustine. But, as has been maintained, a possible version is that Theoleptos’ use of the notion of ‘eros’ prepared Palamas for his own appropriation of the relevant Augustinian theme.\footnote{145}

And a last question: which case is more likely to be true, the ‘Symeon-Niketas’ or the ‘Gregory of Sinai-Theoleptos’ narrative? I would opt for the second, but we cannot be certain. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that Palamas makes use of both these traditions, providing at last his own approach through a fruitful, and sometimes original, combination of them.

e. *Imago Trinitatis*: Why?

Now that we have established the patristic framework of Palamas’ approach, a crucial question arises: why does Palamas prefer this approach to the *imago Dei*? In particular, why does he give such an emphasis to man’s reflection of the Holy Trinity?

\footnote{141}{For all these, see Sinkewicz, *Theoleptos of Philadelpheia*, 33.}
\footnote{142}{Sinkewicz, *Theoleptos of Philadelpheia*, 33.}
\footnote{143}{Cf. Louth, ‘St Gregory Palamas and the Holy Mountain’, 51.}
\footnote{144}{MD 23, 13-5, ed. Sinkewicz, 358. For an analysis of Theoleptos’ approach here, see Sinkewicz, *Theoleptos of Philadelpheia*, 44-6.}
\footnote{145}{Louth, ‘St Gregory Palamas and the Holy Mountain’, 56-7. I agree with Demetracopoulos (Αὐγούστιος καὶ Γρηγόριος Παλαμᾶς, 89) that Theoleptos too, possibly, borrows this notion (‘eros’) from Augustine’s *De Trinitate*; but this requires a specific essay to be proved. Sinkewicz does not mention at all the possibility of Theoleptos having been influenced by Augustine.}
Sinkewicz offers an interesting explanation. Initially he gives two reasons why the triadic character of the *imago* was not widespread in patristic literature. As is well known, the controversies around the Trinity occurred in the fourth century. But the debate on the image of God had started long ago, from the time of the apologists of the second century, or even from the era of the New Testament. A great part of the disputes involved questions about the location of the *imago* (soul, intellect, or body) or its basic qualities (rationality, freedom of choice, and dominion over the world).

Moreover, the Cappadocians proposed a ‘cautious, apophatic reverence for the mystery of God,’ against Eunomios’ claim of perfect knowledge of God’s essence. Therefore, Sinkewicz continues, they may have been hesitant to suggest Triadic reflections as expressions of the *imago Dei*. In other words, they wanted to fulfill a double aim: on the one hand to express the reality that God’s inner being is totally unknown, thus striking at Eunomios’ main argument, and on the other hand to avoid an ‘agnostic’ view, according to which man cannot have any direct knowledge of God.

Barlaam fell into the latter trap, in the fourteenth century, going to the opposite extreme of Eunomios. Consequently, Palamas may have found it indispensable to stress the high dignity of the human person—his superiority to the angels—and the potential for true and direct communion with God. One of Gregory’s main means for doing this was his elaboration of the *imago Trinitatis*, a subject that was latent in the tradition and needed further elaboration and development. In the next chapter of this thesis, it will be shown how Palamas exalts the high rank of man, in comparison to the angels, based on his *imago* theology. But so far an important aspect of Palamas’ sources was left untouched, namely the possibility of Augustinian influence, to which we shall now turn.

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146 Sinkewicz, *The One Hundred*, 24.
147 For the above, see Sinkewicz, *The One Hundred*, 24.
4. The Presence of St Augustine

‘Since one of the wise and apostolic men says...’

This section revisits the use of certain Augustinian expressions and passages in the works of St Gregory Palamas, mainly regarding the Trinitarian reflections in man, the imago Dei, and the notion of eros (love). Having already presented Palamas’ theology regarding the eros of the nous (intellect) for its logos (ch. 2.1-3), here we provide, first, a brief review of the literature regarding the Augustinian presence in Palamas. Second, we continue with our assessment of this presence. We demonstrate that Gregory does indeed borrow phrases from Augustine, but he does not always use or incorporate the latter’s ideas; sometimes (e.g. in the case of the Filioque) he even comes to the opposite conclusion. In other words, despite similarities, one also finds crucial differences between Augustine’s and Palamas’ relevant approaches. Finally, four possible reasons—not often stressed in scholarship; the third probably mentioned for the first time—are proposed to explain why Palamas takes up the notion of eros from the Bishop of Hippo: a) the ‘eternal rest’ (ἀίδιος ἐπανάπαυσις) of the Holy Spirit on the Son; b) his willingness to oppose to the Filioque; c) the appeal to a major notion in Palamas’ anthropology, namely the ‘vivifying power’ (ζωοποιὸς δύναμις) of the human soul; and d) the Holy Spirit’s ‘eternal resplendence’ (ἀίδιος ἔκλαμψις/ἔκφανσις). In conclusion, it is argued that this endeavour of Palamas could also today inspire Orthodox theology in its effort to engage in dialogue with Western thought and in its attempt to articulate a genuine and persuasive voice in our era.

a. Reviewing the Literature

A very contentious subject in the recent literature has been the presence, or lack thereof, of St Augustine in St Gregory Palamas’ writings, and especially in his theology.

148 This section (ch. 2.4), with some changes, has been accepted for publication in Analogia: see Al. Chouliaras, ‘The Notion of Eros (Love) and the Presence of St Augustine in the Works of St Gregory Palamas Revisited’, forthcoming in Analogia: The Pemptousia Journal for Theological Studies Volume 5, Issue 1, 2018.
149 Contra Gregoras II, 43.10-4, ΠΣ 4, 296: ...ἐπεὶ καὶ τις τῶν σοφῶν καὶ ἀποστολικῶν ἀνδρῶν φησιν... (St Gregory Palamas referring, indirectly, to St Augustine).
150 For an overview of the recent literature and some remarks that carry the discussion further, see Flogaus, ‘Inspiration’, 63-80. See also Demetracopoulos, Αὐγουστῖνος καὶ Γρηγόριος
concerning the image of God. The well-known Roman Catholic scholar Martin Jugie was the first to open the debate. In 1932 he argued that Palamas, in his theology of the divine processions, and specifically in his Chapters, has a theory identical to that of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. As we saw, Palamas uses the notions of nous, logos, and pneuma and stresses that the Holy Spirit is ‘the ineffable love of the Begetter towards the ineffably begotten Word himself.’ Jugie regards these considerations as quite ‘curious and unusual’ for a fourteenth-century Byzantine theologian. He believes that Gregory borrowed them either from Augustine’s De Trinitate, translated by Maximus Planoudes around 1280, or from Aquinas’ Contra Gentiles, translated by Demetrios Cydones in 1354.


152 Ch. 36.11-3, 122. Cf. Ch. 35 and 37-9.


154 Martin Jugie, ‘Palamas Grégoire’, 1766-7. For the *imago Dei* according to Thomas Aquinas, see D. Juvenal Merriell, *To the Image of the Trinity. A study in the Development of Aquinas’ Teaching* (Toronto: Pontificial Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990). In this book, Merriell regards Augustine to be the foundation of Aquinas’ relevant teaching. However, recent scholarship rejects the possibility of an influence of Aquinas—or any other Scholastic theologian—on Palamas, regarding the *imago Dei*. See Demetracopoulos, *Αὐγουστίνος καὶ Γρηγόριος Παλαμᾶς*, 83 and 154, n. 222. Cf. Georgios Martzelos, ‘Τὸ Ἁγίο Πνεῦμα ὡς “ἐρως ἀπόρρητος” μεταξύ Πατρός καὶ Υἱοῦ κατά τὸν Ἁγιὸ Γρηγόριο Παλαμᾶ’ [The Holy Spirit as
Additionally, in 1959, Fr John Meyendorff expressed surprise to find a psychological image rather like that of St Augustine, in Palamas’ thirty-sixth Chapter.\footnote{Meyendorff, Introduction, 316 (A Study of Gregory Palamas, 232).} Moreover, in another context, he characterizes Gregory as ‘l’un des auteurs les plus “augustinien” de l’Orient chrétien’.\footnote{Meyendorff, Introduction, 175 (= A Study, 118: ‘...one of the most “Augustinian” writers of the Christian East’).} Gregory’s point of view here is the doctrine of grace: Palamas, as Augustine had already done in his anti-Pelagian writings,\footnote{On this subject see the relevant study of Dominic Keech, The Anti-Pelagian Christology of Augustine of Hippo, 396-430 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).} insists on man’s incapability of reaching God by his own power alone.

A reaction comes from Edmund Hussey, in a paper of his in 1972.\footnote{Hussey, ‘The Palamite Trinitarian Models’, 83-89.} Initially he presents his English translation of Chapters 35-7, and then discusses them in detail. He admits that Jugiè’s and Meyendorff’s observation of a ‘psychological’ trinitarian model is, at first glance, justified. This applies especially to Ch. 36. ‘But’, in Hussey’s words, ‘the unexplained and abrupt transition from “word” to “knowledge” in Chapter 35, and the equally abrupt and unexplained transition from “breath” to “love” in Chapter 36, suggest that Gregory has interwoven an “ontological” word-breath figure and a “psychological” knowledge-love figure.’\footnote{Hussey, ‘The Palamite Trinitarian Models’, 85-6.}

Hussey tries to prove that Gregory’s models are mainly ontological and not psychological.\footnote{By ‘psychological’, we refer to elements that have to do with human psychology, such as thought, love, soul, etc., whereas by ‘ontological’, to points related to the ontology-existence, such as the constitution of the intellect. From my point of view, Jeremy D. Wilkins provides a more worked and well-grounded—though a little bit sophisticated and sometimes difficult to apprehend—interpretation of Palamas’ Ch. 34-8 than Hussey’s (see Wilkins, ‘“The Image of this Highest Love”’). Moreover, Wilkins tries to prove in a more adequate way the balance between the ontological and the psychological character of these chapters, contrary to Hussey who gives a clear priority to the ontology. Here again, it seems that Wilkins is more objective. It is noteworthy that Wilkins, in this article, traces some interesting similarities and divergences, between Palamas’, Aquinas’, and Augustine’s teaching (divine goodness-unity, communion with God, etc.).} The reason for this position is Hussey’s effort to stress the difference between Palamas’ and Augustine’s psychological models. This effort is justified, because there is indeed a divergence.\footnote{As Hussey (‘The Palamite Trinitarian Models’, 89) writes, ‘there is no question here of constructing a theology of the Trinity out of any model, as Western theology has tended to do}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Meyendorff1} Meyendorff, Introduction, 316 (A Study of Gregory Palamas, 232).
\bibitem{Meyendorff2} Meyendorff, Introduction, 175 (= A Study, 118: ‘...one of the most “Augustinian” writers of the Christian East’).
\bibitem{Keech} On this subject see the relevant study of Dominic Keech, The Anti-Pelagian Christology of Augustine of Hippo, 396-430 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
\bibitem{Hussey1} Hussey, ‘The Palamite Trinitarian Models’, 83-89.
\bibitem{Hussey2} Hussey, ‘The Palamite Trinitarian Models’, 85-6.
\end{thebibliography}
the word which is expressed externally in sounds (προφορικὸς λόγος), as well as the mental image of the sounds of a word before it is expressed externally (ἐνδιάθετος λόγος), and the mental concept that comes before the expression in a word and is gradually shaped in the intellect (λόγος ἐν διανοίᾳ). However, the only suitable analogy he finds to express the relation of the second person of the Trinity to God the Father is the λόγος ἐμφύτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναποκείμενος τῷ νῷ, the naturally inherent λόγος, that is, ‘a word in the sense of the knowledge latent or immanent in the intellect’, a ‘word naturally stored up within our intellect’. However, the only suitable analogy he finds to express the relation of the second person of the Trinity to God the Father is the λόγος ἐμφύτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναποκείμενος τῷ νῷ, the naturally inherent λόγος, that is, ‘a word in the sense of the knowledge latent or immanent in the intellect’, a ‘word naturally stored up within our intellect’. However, the only suitable analogy he finds to express the relation of the second person of the Trinity to God the Father is the λόγος ἐμφύτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναποκείμενος τῷ νῷ, the naturally inherent λόγος, that is, ‘a word in the sense of the knowledge latent or immanent in the intellect’, a ‘word naturally stored up within our intellect’. However, the only suitable analogy he finds to express the relation of the second person of the Trinity to God the Father is the λόγος ἐμφύτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναποκείμενος τῷ νῷ, the naturally inherent λόγος, that is, ‘a word in the sense of the knowledge latent or immanent in the intellect’, a ‘word naturally stored up within our intellect’. However, the only suitable analogy he finds to express the relation of the second person of the Trinity to God the Father is the λόγος ἐμφύτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναποκείμενος τῷ νῷ, the naturally inherent λόγος, that is, ‘a word in the sense of the knowledge latent or immanent in the intellect’, a ‘word naturally stored up within our intellect’. However, the only suitable analogy he finds to express the relation of the second person of the Trinity to God the Father is the λόγος ἐμφύτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναποκείμενος τῷ νῷ, the naturally inherent λόγος, that is, ‘a word in the sense of the knowledge latent or immanent in the intellect’, a ‘word naturally stored up within our intellect’. However, the only suitable analogy he finds to express the relation of the second person of the Trinity to God the Father is the λόγος ἐμφύτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναποκείμενος τῷ νῷ, the naturally inherent λόγος, that is, ‘a word in the sense of the knowledge latent or immanent in the intellect’, a ‘word naturally stored up within our intellect’. However, the only suitable analogy he finds to express the relation of the second person of the Trinity to God the Father is the λόγος ἐμφύτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναποκείμενος τῷ νῷ, the naturally inherent λόγος, that is, ‘a word in the sense of the knowledge latent or immanent in the intellect’, a ‘word naturally stored up within our intellect’. However, the only suitable analogy he finds to express the relation of the second person of the Trinity to God the Father is the λόγος ἐμφύτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐναποκείμενος τῷ νῷ, the naturally inherent λόγος, that is, ‘a word in the sense of the knowledge latent or immanent in the intellect’, a ‘word naturally stored up within our intellect'.

Hussey underlines that this is not just a psychological model, constructed according to human measures. We have to understand the logos not only as a word or thought, but primarily as our point of communion with God. This is the type of logos which reflects the second person of the Trinity, who is generated from the Father.

Robert Sinkewicz, as already remarked, offers a significant commentary on Palamas’ Chapters. As far as the presence of Augustine is concerned, he does accept the existence of similarities between the Chapters and Augustine’s Trinitarian analogies at first. Nevertheless, he argues that, in virtue of these parallels, there is a temptation to conclude that Palamas really assimilated some of Augustine’s ideas. However, Sinkewicz is totally opposed to such an idea. He believes that, while Gregory speaks of the knowledge immanent in the intellect, he does not equate this with the intellect’s knowledge of itself (notitia sui). Moreover, Palamas mentions the relation of the intellect to the knowledge naturally inherent in it, but he does not depict this as the intellect’s wanting its self-knowledge (amor sui and voluntas sui). Last, but most important for Sinkewicz, Palamas never concludes that the Holy Spirit is the relation of love between the Father and the Son. ‘Faithful to the Church’s tradition, Palamas

with the so-called psychological model.’ Wilkins (“The Image of this Highest Love”, 402) notes that the two most known triads of Augustine are ‘memory, understanding, and will’ (memoria, intelligentia, voluntas), and ‘mind, knowledge, and love’ (mens, notitia, amor).

Cf. Ch. 35.1-16, 118-20.

Hussey, ‘The Palamite Trinitarian Models’, 86. A very interesting topic for further research would be to examine whether the theology of the λόγοι τῶν ὄντων is present here. Cf. our analysis of this point in ch. 2.1.

Sinkewicz, The One Hundred, 18.


maintained that the Holy Spirit is identical in every way with the divine goodness (i.e. the divine nature) and with the Father and the Son, except in hypostasis. The Spirit has his own perfect hypostasis, which is defined by its derivation from the Father by procession.”

Jacques Lison, some years later, shared with Sinkewicz the same hesitation in seeing a direct influence of Augustine on Palamas, but unlike Sinkewicz did not want to exclude the possibility of some ‘indirect’ influence. However, he also argued that the relevant teaching of Palamas is not the same as Augustine’s. For this reason, he believes that if there really is an Augustinian influence, it is merely superficial.

However, in 1996-7 we have the first documented proofs about Palamas’ borrowings from Augustine. In particular, Reinhard Flogaus and John Demetracopoulos, almost simultaneously but independently, identify a number of parallels between the Greek translation of Augustine’s De Trinitate by Maximus Planoudes and Palamas’ oeuvre. After these discoveries, a direct Augustinian influence on Palamas cannot be denied. However, let us now make some comments about what exactly this influence may be.

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167 Sinkewicz, The One Hundred, 18. Wilkins (“The Image of this Highest Love”, 387-88) criticises Sinkewicz’s stance, reminding that Augustine, in his De Trinitate, regards the Holy Spirit as a person, exactly in the same way as the Father and Son, stressing the equality of the divine persons. Wilkins indicatively refers to De Trinitate, VII.4.6; VII.6; V.9; I.7,13; VI.7. As it seems Wilkins is correct here, but one finds his claim too strict (ibid., 388) that ‘despite Sinkewicz’s erudition it is difficult to detect in his remarks the kind of deep understanding of Augustine that would be required to assess whether in fact Palamas’s ideas bear any important resemblance to them; rather they perpetuate a dubious and thoroughly apologetic caricature’. However, for a more grounded rejection of Sinkewicz’s specific argument, see Demetracopoulos, Αὐγουστῖνος καὶ Γρηγόριος Παλαμᾶς, specifically 13-7, 52-4, 83-94, 115. For all the parallels between Palamas’ Chapters and Planoudes’ translation of Augustine’s De Trinitate, see pp. 183-93.

168 Lison, L’Esprit répandu, 89. Idem. ‘L’Esprit comme amour selon Grégoire Palamas: une influence augustinienne’”. In this paper (p. 331), referring to Sinkewicz’s thesis, Lison rightly declared that ‘Aucun argument ne nous semble en tout cas infirmer la possibilité d’une influence augustinienne’ (“In any case, it seems to us that no argument is able to [definitively] rule out the possibility of an Augustinian influence”).


171 Αὐγουστῖνος καὶ Γρηγόριος Παλαμᾶς, specifically 13-7, 52-4, 83-94, 115. For all the parallels between Palamas’ Chapters and Planoudes’ translation of Augustine’s De Trinitate, see pp. 183-93.

172 Mainly in Palamas’ Chapters, Homily 16 On the Incarnation, Contra Beccos, and Ad Xenam.

173 This is admitted also by Sinkewicz, in his latest, and very important, work on Palamas, i.e. ‘Gregory Palamas’, 131-88; at 163-4.
**b. Assessment: Augustine and the notion of eros**

To summarize, we may draw the following conclusions. There is indeed a parallel in Palamas’ and Augustine’s conceptions of the *imago Dei*. Nevertheless, one can find some crucial differences. First, in order to express his Triadic analogies, Augustine seems to base his ideas on human psychology. He finds Trinitarian reflections present in the functions of the soul: initially in the triad intellect, understanding, will, and then in the more developed form of memory, understanding, and love.

On the contrary, Palamas most probably draws on a common patristic tradition, though not much developed, which finds a Trinitarian image in the intellect (*nous*), word or reason (*logos*), and spirit (*pneuma*). It seems that Palamas, having read Planoude’s translation, found some useful tools, which he exploited in order to elaborate his views more fully. Therefore, we should speak instead of a borrowing of words, not of ideas as such. As has been remarked, ‘Gregory’s borrowings do not

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174 But why doesn’t Palamas ever mention his source, i.e. Augustine’s *De Trinitate*? For an interesting justification and some plausible reasons, see Demetracopoulos, *Διάγωσιν καὶ Γρηγόριος Παλαμᾶς*, 107-10. In general, a possible explication would be that some Byzantines were facing Augustine with suspicion due to his support for the *Filioque*; this fact may have prevented Palamas from explicitly mentioning his source. Cf. Plested, *Orthodox Readings of Aquinas*, 59. However, it did not prevent him from indirectly referring—in another work—to Augustine as ‘one of the wise and apostolic men...’ (*ἐπεὶ καί τις τῶν σοφῶν καὶ ἀποστολικῶν ἀνδρῶν φησιν...*); see Palamas, *Contra Gregoras II*, 43.10-4, ΠΣ 4, 296.


176 Andrew Louth, ‘The Reception of St Augustine in Late Byzantium’, 118.

177 As already stated in ch. 2.3, this tradition is mainly carried by Gregory Nazianzen, Maximus the Confessor, and John Damascene.

178 In another text of his (*Contra Beccum*), Palamas once refers to the Holy Spirit as ‘the communion and love of the Father and the Son’ (κοινωνίαν καὶ ἀγάπην... τοῦ Πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον). See ed. Panagiotis Papaevaggelou, ΠΣ 1, 164.14-5. Here Gregory speaks of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father alone.

179 With this agrees Flogaus, ‘Palamas and Barlaam Revisited’, 31. Amphilochos Radović, in his study on Palamas’ Triadology, does recognize that Gregory’s psychological triad is an Augustinian one, but he stresses the different way Palamas uses it. In particular, he comments that Augustine, based on this triad, concludes by supporting the *Filioque*, whereas Palamas concludes the opposite. See A. Radović, *Τὸ μυστήριον τῆς Αγίας Τριάδος κατὰ τῶν Ἁγίων Γρηγόριον Παλαμᾶν* (Thessaloniki: Patriarchal Institute for Patristic Studies, 1973 and 1991), 53-4. Flogaus mentions something similar (‘Palamas and Barlaam Revisited’, 20-1) about Augustine’s understanding of Father and Son as one principle of the Spirit: Palamas uses Augustine’s passage, but comes to the opposite conclusion, viz. that the Father is the sole principle of both the Son and the Spirit. Flogaus refers to Augustine, *De Trinitate V*, 13, 14 and Palamas, *Ch. 132*. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Augustine’s treatment of the procession of the Holy Spirit is entirely unpolemical. He did not know that the Eastern Fathers did not
extend to what is the live nerve of Augustine’s reflections—the Spirit as “something common”, *commune aliquid*, to the Father and the Son.\(^{180}\) Alexander Golitzin calls this ‘a quietly selective appropriation’ and argues that it is very clear that Palamas quite liked much of what he had read in *De Trinitate* and, moreover, found that those sections which he particularly liked, all of them from the latter part of Augustine’s work, could be easily and naturally engrafted into already existing elements within Greek Christian literature in such a way as to enrich and deepen the whole. In this regard, Gregory was a good deal bolder and more confident of the strength of his tradition than are many modern Orthodox theologians... Palamas did not then accept the whole of Augustine on the Trinity, but only that (and it seems to have been quite a lot) which he appears to have felt could be enfolded without rupture or strain into the already existent theological *Gestalt* of the Greek East.\(^{181}\)

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accept the *Filioque*; he thought that they also supported the same belief. Were he aware of their stance, it is very possible that he would not have insisted so much on it, or that he would even have expressed the opposite position. Cf. Louth, ‘The Reception of St Augustine in Late Byzantium’, 119-20: ‘Augustine does not argue for the *Filioque* against those who reject it, rather he takes for granted an understanding of the Spirit who proceeds *ex utroque*, from both [cf. Brian Daley, ‘Revisiting the “Filioque” (Part I): Roots and Branches of an Old Debate’, *Pro Ecclesia* 10 (2001), 31-62]. Someone convinced of the doctrine of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father alone might well have read these affirmations of the procession *ex utroque* as referring to the procession of the Spirit in the Divine Economy, not within the Trinity itself. Augustine does not work with a sharp distinction between *theologia* and *economia* in the way the Greeks did, and continue to, nor did he know a creed that affirmed that the Spirit *ex Patre procedit*—proceeds from the Father.’ Therefore, one would agree with Demetracopoulos that we cannot know for sure what exactly Palamas believed about whether Augustine supported the Filioque or not (*Αὐγουστῖνος καὶ Γρηγόριος Παλαμᾶς*, 156-7, n. 227).

\(^{180}\) Louth, ‘The Reception of St Augustine in Late Byzantium’, 118. Cf. Plested, *Orthodox Readings of Aquinas*, 43-4. As Metr. Kallistos Ware points out, the analogy of the ‘mutual love’ that St Augustine uses is developed by some Latin authors of the Middle Ages, mainly Richard of St Victor (twelfth century). Moreover, it has a central place in the Trinitarian theology of some Russian religious-philosophical thinkers, in the end of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, such as Vladimir Solovyov, Fr Pavel Florensky, Fr Sergius Bulgakov, Nicolas Berdiaev, and Paul Evdokimov (‘Τὸ ἀνθρώπινο πρόσωπο ώς εἰκόνα τῆς Ἁγίας Τριάδος: Ἀπὸ τὸν ἱερό Αὐγουστίνο στὸν Ἅγιο Γρηγόριο τὸν Παλαμᾶ’ [‘The Human Person as an Image of the Holy Trinity: from St Augustine to St Gregory Palamas’], speech at the *Honorary Degree Nomination* of Metr. Kallistos Ware (Thessaloniki, 3.6.15) [available online at http://www.pemptousia.gr/authors/kallistos-ware/; accessed 6.7.15]).

That is why, from our point of view, one should not be puzzled by Palamas’ endeavour, as often happens in recent scholarship.182

182 Flogaus (‘Palamas and Barlaam’, 1-5 and idem, ‘Inspiration’, 68-73) mentions some examples of scholars (not only Orthodox) who thought that the theology of the Bishop of Hippo had many problems, and, for this reason, tried to omit the possibility of an Augustinian influence on Palamas. For an interesting relevant presentation, see also Plested, Orthodox Readings of Aquinas, 29-34, 44. In general, a very critical stance towards the theology of St Augustine is held by the late Fr John Romanides. For instance, see his Ρωμαίοι ἢ Ρωμηοί Πατέρες τῆς Ἐκκλησίας, 5-194 (passim). There, in many points (see, for example, pp. 17-8, 56-9), he argues that a great part of Western theology has been influenced, through the centuries, by some erroneous points of the theology of St Augustine and, for this reason, led to numerous problems. For instance, Romanides finds a great problem in Augustine’s interpretation of the Old Testament theophanies (see, for example, p. 58). It should be noted that David Bradshaw argues something similar (see ‘The innovations of Augustine’, in his Aristotle East and West, 222-9). This whole stance of Romanides, though perhaps somehow exaggerated, is very interesting. However, a detailed assessment of it and the arguments he brings to support it, goes beyond the scope of this article [for several objections to the relevant positions of Romanides and Bradshaw (and also Christos Yannaras, who seems to walk on this same line of thought), see some of the contributions in Papanikolaou and Demacopoulos (eds), Orthodox Readings of Augustine (2008) (e.g., pp. 208-9, 212-3, etc.). For Bradshaw’s response, see pp. 244-51 in the same book, and for his contribution, where he again approaches critically some points in Augustine’s teaching, see ibid., 227-43]. Recently, Hierotheos Vlachos (Metropolitan of Nafpaktos) (‘Τά ἑκατόν πεντήκοντα κεφάλαια τοῦ Ἁγίου Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ’ [The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters of Saint Gregory Palamas], Θεολογία 80.1 (2009), 5-25) has maintained something similar. He finds many incompatibilities between De Trinitate and Palamas’ teaching; he therefore finds it very unlikely (almost impossible) for Gregory to have borrowed some lines from it (see mainly pp. 7-9, 12-4, 16, 18, 19-20 of the aforementioned article). In particular, he supports that Palamas could not possibly have used Augustine, because Barlaam, Palamas’ opponent, was relying heavily on the Bishop of Hippo. However, as we mentioned, Palamas is sometimes only using the words, not exactly the ideas of Augustine. Moreover, Metr. Hierotheos presents three hypotheses: first, that a specific abstract from the Chapters (Ch. 133.1-3: Θέσεις καὶ ἕξεις καὶ τόποι καὶ χρόνοι καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον οὐ κυρίως ἐπὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ λέγονται, ἀλλὰ μεταφορικῶς, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἐπὶ μόνου τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀληθέστατα ἢν λέγοιτο), which is taken from the fifth chapter of De Trinitate, is interpolated: someone other than Gregory has added it. Second, that the major part of the text was indeed written by Palamas, but a posterior theologian, who knew the teaching of Augustine, added whole paragraphs. Third, and most probable according to Metr. Hierotheos, the Chapters is a work of a later theologian, who knew the teaching of both Palamas and Augustine and made a synopsis of those. Here, he makes two suggestions: either Theophanes of Nicaea (ca. 1315/20–ca. 1380/1) or Gennadios Scholarios (ca. 1398/1405–after 1472). However, from our point of view, these hypotheses are not likely to be true, because both critical editors of the Chapters (i.e. Sinkewicz and Christou) have accepted the authenticity of this text. Moreover, as we have seen, Palamas also exploits Augustinian expressions in other texts, which undoubtedly derive from his pen (for instance in Contra Beccum). For a brief response to Metr. Hierotheos’ paper, see Georgios Martzelos, ‘Τό Ἅγιο Πνεῦμα ᾧς “ἔρως ἀπόρρητος”’. 
c. Why does Palamas borrow the notion of eros?

We have left the most important question for the end: why, at last, does Palamas borrow the notion of eros from Augustine? To what end? Georgios Martzelos gives two plausible reasons: first, Palamas, through eros, merely refers to the patristic teaching of the ‘eternal rest’ (ἀίδιος ἐπανάπαυσις) of the Holy Spirit on the Son, in the context of the intra-Trinitarian relationships. Second, Palamas tries to preclude any possible interpretation of Augustine’s teaching supporting the Filioque (because, as shown, Gregory uses this idea of eros to oppose the Filioque).

Furthermore, it seems to me that there are two other important reasons, which are rarely—if ever—stressed in the scholarly literature. Initially, through the notion of eros Palamas is guided to the idea of the ‘vivifying power’ (ζωοποιὸς δύναμις) of the human soul, namely the power of the soul that grants life to the body. We shall consider this power extensively in ch. 3.1. It will be there shown that, as Sinkewicz explains, ‘[t]his human spirit or life-giving power in the body is an extension of the intellectual love (νοερὸς ἔρως).’ For the present, let us only mention that for St Gregory the ζωοποιὸς δύναμις is a basic means of explaining how man bears the image of God to a greater extent than the angels. Moreover, it is closely connected with the human body and occupies a major place in Palamas’ anthropology. Consequently, it could be argued that, very likely, Palamas borrows the notion of eros in order to exalt the rank of the human person, via his imago Dei theology.

Last, but not least, one further reason could be invoked as to why St Gregory borrows the notion of eros from St Augustine. It has been maintained that Palamas, in his theology regarding the procession of the Holy Spirit, was probably influenced by the views that Gregory of Cyprus had developed about fifty years earlier. The latter

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183 See, for instance, the relevant quotation from St John Damascene mentioned above: *Expositio fidei* 8.173, ed. Kotter, 25: καὶ ἐν Υἱῷ ἀναπαυόμενον [i.e. the Holy Spirit].
184 See Martzelos, ‘Τὸ Ἀγιο Πνεῦμα ὡς “ἔρως ἀπόρρητος”’, mainly 11, 18-21.
185 The following reason (i.e. the third one), as far as I know, has never before been proposed in scholarship to explain why Palamas borrows the topic of eros. It is, most likely, underlined for the first time in this thesis.
186 The One Hundred, 19; emphasis added.
argued two important things. First, one can say that the Holy Spirit is ‘of the essence of the Son’ and thus refer to their consubstantiality, but the Father remains the sole cause of the hypostatic existence of the Holy Spirit, in the same way as the Father is the only source of the divinity; namely, the Spirit derives his existence only from the Father.\(^{189}\)

Second, however, the manifestation of the Holy Spirit from the Son (ἐκ Πατρὸς δι’ Υἱοῦ) should not be taken only as the Spirit’s temporal mission (ἀποστολή; i.e., in the economy), but also as the Spirit’s ‘eternal resplendence’ (ἀίδιος ἐκλαμψις or ἐκφανσις; that is, at the level of theology).\(^{190}\) For this reason, according to Gregory of Cyprus, one may say that the Holy Spirit is (or exists) from the Father through the Son (ἐκ Πατρὸς δι’ Υἱοῦ; or even of the Father and of the Son), without, however, admitting that the Spirit derives his existence from both the Father and the Son.\(^{191}\) In particular, the expression ἀίδιος δι’ Υἱοῦ ἐκλαμψις signifies the property (or: capability), which the


\(^{189}\) See, for example, Gregory of Cyprus, On the procession of the Holy Spirit, 270D-271A: Ἄπει δὲ οὖσα, παντὶ που δήλων ὡς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας λεγόμενον τοῦ Πατρὸς, καλῶς ἂν ἔχῃ καὶ εὐσεβοῖς καὶ ἐκ τῆς Υἱοῦ λέγονται. Μία γὰρ, καὶ ὡς οὖσα οὐκ ἔστιν ὡς όποιος ποτὲ διάφανος δεχότοι... Διότι δὲ μία τοῦ εὐσεβοῦς οὐσίας λεγόμενον τοῦ Πατρὸς Πνεῦμα, καὶ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐπάρχουσα οὐσία ἐκεῖνη. Πλην οὐ διὰ τὸ τοῦτο ἢ ἄλλη καὶ ἐκ τῆς Υἱοῦ ὑποστάσεως τὸ Πνεῦμα.... For other relevant references to this text of the Cypriot, see Larchet, ‘Introduction’, 97-8, n. 164.

\(^{190}\) For instance, see Gregory of Cyprus, On the procession of the Holy Spirit, 290C: ...καὶ ἠκούει [the Holy Spirit] δι’ αὐτοῦ [i.e. the Son] καὶ ἀπολάμβανε καὶ πέφυκε κατὰ τὴν προαιώνιον τοῦτοι καὶ ἀιδίων ἐκλαμψιν.... For similar references to the works of the Cypriot, see Larchet, ‘Introduction’, 98-9, n. 165. For an in depth theological analysis of the ἀιδίων ἐκλαμψιν according to the Cypriot, see Savvatos, Ἡ Θεολογικὴ ὀρολογία, 180-228.

\(^{191}\) Cf. Siecienski, The Filioque, 141-3. The theology of the Cypriot influenced greatly the Council of Constantinople (Blachernae) in 1285. See, for example, the relevant Synodal Tome, which, besides, he himself authored: Ἐκθέσεις τοῦ τόμου τῆς πίστεως κατὰ τὸν Βέκκου (PG 142, 240C): ...δι’ Υἱοῦ γὰρ ὄμολογουμένος αὐτὸς ἀιδίων ἐκλαμψιν καὶ ἀναδείκνυται θεορίαν ὁ Παράκλητος.... ἐκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὴν εἰς ἡμᾶς χαρήναν καὶ ὀπάσικαν καὶ ἀποστολήν.... For a good and succinct discussion of the eternal ἐκφανσις of the Holy Spirit, with references both to Church Fathers and modern theologians, see Demetrios Bathrellos, Σχέδια Λογιακής Θεολογίας. Μέ βάση τὸ συγγραφικὸ ἔργο τοῦ Ἀγίου Συμεών Θεσσαλονίκης (†1429) [Orthodox Dogmatics at the End of Byzantium: the Case of St Symeon of Thessalonica] (Athens: En Plo, 2008), 140-7 and 153-7.
Son eternally has, of sending the Holy Spirit within the context of the divine economy, as an expression referring to the eternal life and communion of the divine persons.\textsuperscript{192}

Palamas takes up these two ideas in his \textit{Apodictic Discourses}, though the second one in a much more moderate way, and definitely not as explicitly as the Cypriot.\textsuperscript{193} In general, as far as I know, nowhere does Palamas in his \textit{oënuvre} explicitly refer to the αἴδιος ἐκλαμψις or ἐκφανσις, about which Gregory of Cyprus speaks at length, or at least to the extent and with the clarity of the latter. Although Palamas often uses the word ἐκφανσις or its derivatives, it is not in the same context we are writing about now (usually, he uses it in reference to the uncreated activities or to the vision of the divine light\textsuperscript{194}).\textsuperscript{195}

\textsuperscript{192} Savvatos, \textit{Ἡ Θεολογικὴ ὀρθολογία}, 234.

\textsuperscript{193} For the first one, see mainly \textit{Apodictic Discourse} II, 30, 62-8, 73, ed. Bobrinsky, ΠΣ 1, 105, 133-40, 144-5 respectively; for similarities to the second one, see \textit{Apodictic Discourse} II, 65, 69, 75-6, ΠΣ 1, 136-7, 141-2, 146-7 respectively. Cf. Larchet, ‘Introduction’, 99, n. 167. It seems, therefore, that both Gregory of Cyprus and St Gregory Palamas establish a connection between \textit{theology} and \textit{economy}, as far as the procession of the Holy Spirit is concerned. However, there are two reasons why this connection is not of the same type as that of which Latin theologians of their epoch spoke. First, the latter ignored or rejected the distinction between essence and energies. Second, they conceived the procession of the Spirit based on his manifestation in the \textit{economy} (for the above, see Larchet, ‘Introduction’, 102). Nevertheless, there is indeed a relation between \textit{theology} and \textit{economy}. But, as Larchet notes, what is important, is to distinguish the energy of the Holy Spirit from his hypostasis, both in \textit{theology} and \textit{economy}. Because, in both cases, what is manifested is not the \textit{hypostasis} of the Spirit, but his energy, the divine uncreated energy, ‘which, in reality, is the energy which shines forth or radiates from the common essence of the three divine hypostases, from the Father, through the Son, in the Spirit’ [ἐκ Πατρὸς, δι’ Υἱοῦ, ἐν Λύκῳ Πνεύματι] (‘Introduction’, 102). Cf. Plested, \textit{Orthodox Readings of Aquinas}, 38. Consequently, Gregory of Cyprus and Gregory Palamas show that there is indeed a relation between, on the one hand, the eternal manifestation and resplendence of the Holy Spirit from the Son, and, on the other hand, the manifestation or mission of the Spirit from the Son to humanity (or to creation). Larchet stresses a crucial theological reason for this: ‘the energy, of the Spirit, which is sent, manifested, breathed forth \textit{[insufflé]} and given to human beings, is nothing else than the divine uncreated energy; it is somehow included \textit{[include]} with the latter, which would radiate even if the world was not created and there were no humans to receive it.’ Thus, in the Fathers one can find ‘two modes of energetic manifestation of the Spirit’, the eternal and temporal, if such a distinction can be drawn (‘Introduction’, 101).

\textsuperscript{194} See, e.g., \textit{Tr.} 1,3,4,5-7, 413 (115.1-2; emphasis added): ...καί ὡς ἀληθῶς κρύφτον καὶ τὴν ἐκφανσιν ἔχοντος, τὸ θεωσάτων καὶ πάντων καυσόσατων..., where Palamas argues that God’s manifestation (ἐκφανσις) is truly a mystery.

\textsuperscript{195} Reinhard Flogaus is correct in arguing that Palamas never refers to the Cypriot. However, Flogaus’ stance on this matter does not seem to me very plausible, because he bluntly rejects the possibility of Palamas being influenced by Gregory of Cyprus. In particular, Flogaus writes that Palamas ‘...explicitly repudiated the possibility of eternal revelation as a Latin impiety and understood revelation, like creation, to be a temporal effect (ἀποτέλεσμα) of the eternal energy. Obviously, Palamas’ stance on the Filioque question was much more traditional, inflexible and unyielding to the Latin position than that of the Cypriot. Very likely, he saw in the Patriarch’s attempt to mediate between East and West in this crucial question a betrayal of the Orthodox
Nevertheless, it seems to me possible that Palamas, using the notion of eros, has in the back of his mind the arguments of Gregory of Cyprus mentioned above.\textsuperscript{196} The reason is that Palamas uses some expressions which at times resemble the Cypriot’s approach. In particular, as shown above in ch. 2.2, for Palamas the Son possesses eros (i.e. the Holy Spirit) as, first, ‘proceeding from the Father together with him [i.e. the Son]’, and, second, ‘as resting connaturally in him’.\textsuperscript{197} This may indicate the fact that, according to Palamas, the Spirit is manifested from the Father through the Son, not only in economy, but also in theology.\textsuperscript{198}

Consequently, it is possible that Palamas borrows his concept of eros from Augustine, among other reasons, in order to underline the reality of the eternal manifestation and resplendence of the Holy Spirit. But, even if this is true, he makes this connection in a rather obscure way; he does not give us enough clues to state our case in stronger terms.

\textsuperscript{196} If this is true, it is a very important point, because, it is generally acknowledged that this position of Gregory of Cyprus, if it were accepted by all sides, could be a solution to the vexing problem of the Filioque. As Larchet has argued, Gregory of Cyprus and Gregory Palamas developed ‘une théologie orthodoxe du Filioque’ (‘Introduction’, 102). Plested, referring to Palamas, uses the same expression, namely ‘an Orthodox filioque’ (Orthodox Readings of Aquinas, 389). Savvatos mentions something similar (Ἡ Θεολογικὴ όρολογία, 224–235). Siecienski (The Filioque, 147) makes a very interesting comment, which is directly related to our discussion: ‘While the Latin doctrine remained heterodox, there was thus a sense in which the filioque could be interpreted in an orthodox manner and not simply in reference to the economy. Palamas thus offered the Byzantines a constructive alternative to the prevailing unionist and conservative tendencies of his contemporaries, keeping alive the via media established by Maximus the Confessor and Gregory of Cyprus. However, while Gregory’s theology was accepted by no fewer than three local councils (often referred to as the Palamite councils of 1341, 1347, and 1351), it remained controversial enough that at Ferrara-Florence its introduction was forbidden by the emperor.’ Nevertheless, in my view, it is a subject open for debate—namely whether Palamite theology was absent from Ferrara-Florence because it was controversial among the Byzantines, or for diplomatic and political reasons; but we do not have space to treat the subject in this thesis.

\textsuperscript{197} Cf. Plested, Orthodox Readings of Aquinas, 36–7, where it is mentioned that ‘[t]here are antecedents for this kind of language in the Byzantine tradition: Maximus the Confessor’s intuition of the fundamental congruity of procession “through” and “from the Son”; John of Damascus’ eternal “resting” of the Spirit in the Son; or Gregory of Cyprus’ eternal “shining forth” of the Spirit through the Son.’ For St Maximus the Confessor, see his Letter to Marinus (PG 91:136AD). For St John and Gregory of Cyprus, see above in this section.
d. Some Concluding Thoughts

This section dealt with the presence of St Augustine in St Gregory Palamas’ oeuvre, with special attention given to reflections of the Trinity in man and the notion of eros. It was hinted at that Palamas did indeed use some of Augustine’s own words, but without fully incorporating his ideas. In particular, he cannot have borrowed his triad *nous-logos-pneuma* from the Bishop of Hippo, because Augustine’s triads are always some variant of mind-word-will or love. Undoubtedly, though, Palamas located some parallels between his own thinking about the Triadic image and that of Augustine, and found rather attractive the way in which Augustine gives love (ἔρως) a central place.

The reader, however, at this point, cannot help but wonder: how does the interpretation of this section differ from those of J. Demetracopoulos, R. Flogaus, and R. Sinkewicz? As shown, our text builds on the findings of Demetracopoulos and Flogaus concerning the use of certain Augustinian passages from Palamas; something that scholarship, in general, nowadays accepts. However, it seems that the aforementioned scholars, despite their important contributions on the topic, did not discover the deeper reasons and aims that motivate Palamas’ endeavour. This is the gap that this section has tried to fill; it can be considered something of a theological *supplementum* to their work.

To this end, we first referred to Martzelos’ relevant analysis and suggestion, namely a) the ‘eternal rest’ (ἀίδιος ἐπανάπαυσις) of the Holy Spirit on the Son and b) the rejection of the *Filioque*. Second, we proposed two other reasons as a likely solution to the question at hand, namely c) the ‘vivifying power’ (ζωοποιῶς δύναμις) of the

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199 As Wilkins (“The Image of this Highest Love”, 410) puts it, ‘this thunderbolt from the Augustinian sky seems but a passing squall in the total pattern of Gregory’s thought.’

200 Cf. Louth, ‘The Reception of St Augustine in Late Byzantium’, 118: ‘Augustine’s triadic analogies seem to be derived from his understanding of human psychology; he is looking for reflections on the Trinity in the operations of the souls, moving from mind, understanding and will to the more adequate memory, understanding and love.’

201 In Sinkewicz’s words, ‘Although Palamas is wholly traditional in seeking a Trinitarian analogy in the human person’s νοῦς, λόγος, πνεῦμα, he appears to develop this analogy further through the influence of his reading of Augustine’s *De Trinitate*’ (‘Gregory Palamas’, 170, n. 121).

202 As far as Sinkewicz is concerned, we mentioned that, he initially, in his early writings on Palamas, rejected the possibility of an Augustinian influence, either direct or indirect; but he changed his opinion in his later article in *La theologie byzantine* (2002). However, let us not forget that Sinkewicz has rightly indicated some points of divergence between Palamas’ theology and that of Augustine; cf. ch. 2.4.a of this thesis.
human soul, a major notion in Palamas’ anthropology, and d) the Holy Spirit’s ‘eternal resplendence’ (ἀίδιος ἐκλαμψις). These are the four possible reasons (a–d) suggested in this section as to why Palamas takes up Augustine’s notion of *eros*, and, as far as the third reason is concerned, it is likely the first time that this has been mentioned in scholarly literature.

In closing, if we may add a final word, we would note the following: what is important for us today is to think about how Palamas’ endeavour could inspire Orthodox theology in our own era. We saw that Palamas borrowed an important notion from what most would consider a ‘heterodox’ environment. Does this entail that Orthodox theology nowadays, being deeply based on its rich tradition (dogmatic, liturgical, canonical, etc.), could indeed, at the same time, trace useful points in *loqui* that may seem ‘foreign’ at first sight? What exactly would this mean? How could it be achieved? Would there not be certain hazards involved? And how could they be overcome? Undoubtedly, St Gregory’s example has much to teach us, but what exactly this entails will require further and more thorough examination.

### 5. Conclusions

In this chapter the Trinitarian reflections in man according to St Gregory were presented. First, we saw the analogy for the Logos and, second, the reflection of the Holy Spirit. The patristic background of Palamas’ teaching was illustrated and it was shown that he draws mainly on Gregory Nazianzen, Maximos the Confessor, and John Damascene. In addition, some other plausible scenarios were tested (i.e. about a possible influence from Symeon the New Theologian, Niketas Stethatos, Gregory the Sinaite, and Theoleptos of Philadelphieia). About the presence of St Augustine, as far as the *imago Dei* is concerned, it was hinted that Palamas did indeed use some of Augustine’s own words, but he did not fully incorporate his ideas. As shown, Palamas

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203 As far as I could know, reasons (c) and (d) have not been proposed by Demetracopoulos, Flogaus, or Sinkewicz.

204 For the moment, it suffices to say that a great Father and spiritual teacher of the Orthodox Church, St Nikodimos the Hagiorite (†1809), despite being deeply rooted in Eastern spirituality, wrote some of his most well-known texts (e.g., *Unseen Warfare* [Ὁ Ἀόρατος Πόλεμος]) by drawing heavily on western theologians.
located parallels between his own thinking about the Triadic image and that of Augustine and found useful the way in which Augustine gives love a crucial place.

In this chapter was also underlined that the relevant texts of Palamas are very difficult to fully interpret, for their author does not offer significant help to the reader. Gregory is very laconic in explaining his thinking and does not give enough evidence to interpret what he really has in mind. Therefore, it is difficult for us today to fully understand what exactly he desired to express; our sources are limited. Moreover Palamas uses these triadic analogies only rarely in his corpus; as far as I know only in Ch. 34-8. He does refer, however, to the Trinity as Intellect, Word, and Spirit also in Homily 24, On Pentecost, but he does not mention there its reflection in the divine image in man, nor does he see the Spirit as the love between Father and Son. As has been highlighted, this whole approach is rather ‘peripheral to his theological project.’

So, a question arises: does Palamas really regard these statements as crucial and important? If the answer is affirmative, why doesn’t he use them more often in his writings? A response would be that this approach is very sophisticated and would be difficult for Palamas’ flock to comprehend. For instance, this may be why it is not used in his Homilies from his time as Archbishop of Thessaloniki. Besides, Gregory’s main aim in these Chapters is to articulate a theology of the divine processions, namely to approach the generation of the Son and the ekporeusis of the Spirit. The reflections in man seem to be just a means to interpret those processions. Nonetheless, this does not diminish their value and their significance in Palamas’ thought.

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206 Wilkins’ interpretation, though insightful and very interesting, is not entirely sufficient, because it is not very clear what exactly Palamas wants to express. As Wilkins himself confesses (‘‘The Image of this Highest Love’’, 410), ‘The interpretations suggested above are hypothetical. Any would-be exegete of these passages has to contend with the fact that they are simply underdetermined. This means no interpretation will be more than probable; perhaps none will be more than simply plausible. I have attempted to shed light on the exegetical difficulties by appealing to data beyond the text: namely, the realities of mind to which Gregory is referring. I have supplemented this strategy by noticing the similarities between Gregory’s statements and those of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, who asked similar questions in the context of a similar mystagogy. Nevertheless, while I consider this approach exegetically valid and potentially fruitful, I cannot claim to have verified my hypothesis about Gregory’s analogy for the divine processions. I claim only that my reading is more plausible than the alternatives known to me’ (emphasis added).
207 Cf. Sinkewicz, The One Hundred, 18 n. 49.
208 Wilkins, ‘‘The Image of this Highest Love’’, 412.
209 A huge emphasis on these analogies has been given in recent scholarship, maybe disproportional to Gregory’s own intention. This is however justified, because the reflections in man are not very commonly used in the late (and post) Byzantine theological world.
Rezeptionsgeschichte

Furthermore, it should be noted that an interesting research path would be to investigate whether Palamas’ *imago* theology influenced later generations. This project will not be pursued here in detail, but a small indication will be provided. In particular, as has been recently underlined,\(^{210}\) there is indeed such a direct influence in the work of a great ecclesiastical personality of the late Byzantine period, St Symeon of Thessaloniki (second half of the fourteenth century-1429). Symeon argues that man images the Holy Trinity and not simply some of its properties. Particularly, the human intellect images the Father, the human reason (or word) images the Divine Logos, and the vivifying power (ζωοποιούσις δύναμις) of the intelligible soul images the Holy Spirit.\(^ {211}\) Of note is Symeon’s use of the soul’s vivifying power, which gives life and motion to the body:\(^{212}\) as will be shown in the next chapter of this thesis (ch. 3.1), this is the same way that Palamas uses this notion.

Furthermore, according to Symeon, a second way in which man images the Triune God is the fact that the human intellect gives birth to its reason (λόγος) and also loves this reason. This reflects the Father’s origination of the Son and the procession of the Spirit, because the Spirit is the living love (ἀγάπη ζώσα) which rests on the Son.\(^ {213}\) Last, a third kind of imaging lies in how man seeks and explores with his intellect and reason the truth regarding the divine Intellect and Logos.\(^ {214}\) Consequently, Palamas has been correctly suggested as Symeon’s most possible direct source, as far as Symeon’s

\(^{210}\) Demetrios Bathrellos, Σχεδίασμα Δογματικῆς Θεολογίας, 190-1. It is on this work that the following presentation is based.


\(^{212}\) *Epistula ad fideles Orientis de pietate*, 119.290-1: καὶ ζώσα, ζωοποιούσα παρέχει τῷ σώματι δύναμιν, τό ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ζωοποιοῦν προδήλως φανεροῦσα Πνεῦμα. Cf. some lines below (300-1): καὶ εἰ μὴ ζωοποιοῦν εἶχε δύναμιν διὰ τῆς νοερᾶς ψυχῆς ἀνθρώπως, οὐκ ἂν καὶ τὸ υλικὸν τοῦτο σῶμα ζῶν καὶ κυνόμενον εἶχε.

\(^{213}\) *Epistula ad fideles Orientis de pietate*, 120.308-10: Καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα ὡς ἀγάπην ζώσαν προέρχεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ λέγουσι τινες καὶ τῷ Υἱῷ ἀναπαύεσθαι, καὶ έν ἡμῖν δὲ τούτῳ έστιν ἰδέαν.

\(^{214}\) *Epistula ad fideles Orientis de pietate*, 119-20.
imago Trinitatis is considered. It now remains for scholars to discover whether other late or post-Byzantine authors are influenced by the Palamite imago Dei.

Heretofore two basic reasons were sketched supporting why man has such a strong resemblance to God, according to St Gregory: the analogy of the Logos and of the Holy Spirit in the human person. In particular, Palamas stresses that man is so highly exalted, that he bears within himself a reflection of the Holy Trinity. However, as will be shown later on, Gregory believes that Trinitarian reflections can be also detected in the angels, like in man. Therefore, a major question is raised now, which, as stated in the introduction, is the main concern of this Part: who manifests the imago more fully, man or the angels?

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215 Bathrellos, Σχεδίασμα Δογματικῆς Θεολογίας, 190-1 n. 90. The third reason of imaging according to Symeon does not appear in this specific and clear form, as far as I know, in Palamas’ teaching. Therefore it is very possible that it is an original idea, if of course Symeon has not borrowed it from the previous patristic tradition; something that has to be searched further.
**Ch. 3. The Image of God in Man and the Angels**

**Introduction. The Superiority of Man:** ‘τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἄγγέλων μᾶλλον κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ Θεοῦ...’

So far we examined the ways in which man images the Holy Trinity according to St Gregory. As far as the question posed just before, in the end of ch. 2, Palamas has a firm answer: man is superior to the angels as far as the image is concerned, but inferior to them in terms of the *kath’ omoiosin*. The latter will be addressed in more detail below, in ch. 4. Now, regarding man’s superiority, this is based on three principles, which share one common parameter: man’s corporeality, namely the human body. In other words, Palamas fervently believes that man manifests to a greater extent the *imago Dei* than the angels, due to his body, for three specific reasons: 1) the soul’s vivifying power (*ζωοποιος δύναμις*); 2) the faculty of self-governance (*τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν ἀρχικὸν*); and 3) the faculty of sense perception (*αἰσθητικὸν*). The examination and analysis of these reasons is the purpose of the current chapter.

1. **The Soul’s *ζωοποιος δύναμις*: the Pneumatological Dimension**

First of all, let us approach what Sinkewicz calls the pneumatological aspect of the *imago Dei*. Palamas demonstrates this in *Chapter 38*. Initially he mentions that ‘the intellectual and rational nature of the angels also possesses intellect, and word from the intellect, and the love of the intellect for the word, which love is also from the intellect and ever coexists with the word and the intellect, and which could be called spirit since it accompanies the word by nature’. That said, Palamas argues that the

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1 Sinkewicz, *Gregory Palamas*, 171.
3 *Ch. 38.1-5, 124: Ἐχει µὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀγγέλων νοερὰ καὶ λογικὴ φύσις νοῦν τε καὶ λόγον ἐκ τοῦ νοὸν καὶ τὸν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἐρωτα τοῦ νοοῦ, δός καὶ αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ἐκ τοῦ νοοῦ καὶ σύνεστιν ἀεὶ τὸ τε λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῷ καὶ πνεῦμα ἄν καλοῖτο, ὡς τῇ λόγῳ φύσει συμπαρομαρτὼν.*
angels also have the \textit{imago}, and that Trinitarian reflections can be also found in the angels, as happens in man—as analysed in the previous chapter of this thesis.

However, there is a crucial difference. The spirit of the angels is not life-giving (\textit{ζωοποιόν}); it has no vivifying power, because the angels have no body. On the other hand, the intellectual and rational human soul was created in conjunction (\textit{συνεκτίσθη}) with an earthly body. For this reason, the soul has received from God a spirit which is also \textit{ζωοποιόν}, ‘through which it [i.e. the soul] conserves and gives life to the body joined to it’.\textsuperscript{4} Consequently, ‘The intellectual and rational nature of the soul, alone possessing intellect and word and life-giving spirit, has alone been created more in the image of God than the incorporeal angels.’\textsuperscript{5}

Through this observation Palamas attributes a lofty value to the human soul: without the soul’s energy, the body has no life. He continues by arguing that the human spirit, ‘the life-giving power in his body, is intellectual love (\textit{νοερὸς ἔρως}); it is from the intellect and the word, and exists in the word and the intellect, and possesses both the word and the intellect within itself.’\textsuperscript{6} As Sinkewicz explains, ‘This human spirit or life-giving power in the body is an extension of the intellectual love (\textit{νοερὸς ἔρως}).’\textsuperscript{7} Obviously this view helps Gregory to stress the likeness of the human spirit to the Holy Spirit, who, as already analysed, is ‘the ineffable love of the Begetter towards the ineffably begotten Word himself.’\textsuperscript{8} Moreover, this spirit is the soul’s loving bond with its own body (\textit{τοσοῦτο γὰρ ἔρασμιαν ἔχει δι’ αὐτοῦ φυσικὸς τὴν πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον σῶμα ἡ ψυχή συνάφειαν}), which is so intense, that the soul never wishes to leave and be

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\item \textsuperscript{4} Ch. 38.5-11, 124: ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἔχει καὶ ζωοποιόν τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦτο, οὐδὲ γὰρ συνημμένον εἴληφεν ἐκ γῆς παρὰ Θεοῦ σῶμα, ἵνα καὶ ζωοποιόν τε καὶ συνημμένον ἐλάβη πρὸς τοῦτο δύναμιν. ἡ δὲ νοερὰ καὶ λογικὴ φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐπεὶ γηνὴν συνεκτίσθη σῶματι καὶ ζωοποιόν ἔλαβε τὸ πνεῦμα παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ, δὴ οὐ συνέχει καὶ ζωοποιεῖ τὸ συνημμένον σῶμα, παρ’ οὐ μὲ καὶ δείκνυται τοῖς συνιοῦσιν, ὅτι νοερὸς ἐστὶν ἔρως τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πνεῦμα... In the following lines it will be shown that Gregory probably relies here on St John Damascene (for an analysis, see the next section) and on St Maximos the Confessor.
\item \textsuperscript{5} Ch. 39.1-4, 126: Ἡ νοερὰ καὶ λογικὴ φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς, μόνη νοῦν ἔχουσα καὶ λόγον καὶ πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦσα, μόνη καὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων αγγέλων μάλλον κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ Θεοῦ παρ’ αὐτοῦ δεδημοσίωργηται.
\item \textsuperscript{6} Ch. 38.11-14, 124: ὅτι νοερὸς ἐστὶν ἔρως τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου πνεῦμα, τὸ τοῦ σώματος ζωοποιόν, ὅπερ ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ ἔστι καὶ τοῦ λόγου ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τῷ νῷ ἔστι καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχει τὸν τε λόγον καὶ τὸν νοῦν.
\item \textsuperscript{7} Sinkewicz, \textit{The One Hundred}, 19. For the ‘intellectual love’ see our analysis in the previous chapter, regarding ‘The ἔρως of the Intellect to its λόγος’.
\item \textsuperscript{8} Ch. 36.11-13, 122.
\end{itemize}
separate from the body ‘and will not do so at all unless force is brought to bear on it externally from some very serious disease or trauma.’

It is noteworthy that here we see the importance with which Gregory regards the human body: the soul ‘loves’ it to a great extent. Moreover, let us note that in another context Gregory makes the following parallelism: the body’s death occurs when it is abandoned by the soul’s ζωοποιούσα δύναμις. In the same way, the separation of the human soul from God, namely from the Holy Spirit’s vivifying power, entails the soul’s death. Therefore the soul plays for the body the role which the Spirit has for the spiritual life of the soul. Consequently, the soul images the Holy Spirit. From the above it is proved that for St Palamas ‘the image of God in the human person possesses a fuller and truer analogy for the Holy Spirit—who is the life-giving and vivifying power of God’—, always in comparison to the spirit of the angels.

A similar statement about this topic is also found in another place of the Palamite corpus, in Homily 60, On the Holy Feast of Theophany, this time in a more elaborated form. In this text Gregory preaches about the Baptism of Christ. First, he mentions that in the creation of man by God, the Holy Trinity was made manifest. But in the creation of all the other creatures only the Father and the Son were revealed. Moreover, God gave to man ‘the breath of life’ (Gen. 2:7). This for Gregory was the Holy Spirit. In the same way, when human nature was ‘recreated in Christ’ (ἀναπλαττομένης ἐν Χριστῷ), namely in the Baptism of Christ in the river of Jordan, the Holy Spirit was manifested through His descent from heaven. Thus, again the salvific mystery of the Holy Trinity was revealed. Therefore, according to Gregory, a Triadic manifestation took place again. But now a question comes up: why and how is the mystery of the Trinity revealed both in the creation and the recreation of man?

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9 Ch. 38.14-17, 124.
10 Hom. 16, 7.117-21, ΠΣ 6, 186 (ΠΑΕ 9, 432-4). To the most venerable nun Xenia 9.6-9, ΠΣ 5, 197. Of course, however, Palamas believes in the immortality of the soul. He devotes all of Chapter 32 to this matter. Cf. Mantzaridis, The Deification of Man, 22-3. For an analysis of how Palamas sees the ‘death of the soul’—what the Fathers call ‘spiritual’ or ‘intelligible’ (νοητοὐς) death—, see Kesselopoulos, Πάθη καὶ ἀρετές, 44-54.
13 See ΠΣ 6, 645-56 (ΠΑΕ 11, 505-35).
14 Hom. 60, 3-4, ΠΣ 6, 647-8 (ΠΑΕ 11, 510-2). Gregory uses this same argument, though more briefly, in his Oratio Apodictica 2, 18.1-11, ed. Bobrinsky, ΠΣ 1, 95.
In his effort to answer the aforementioned question, Gregory takes the chance to highlight the lofty dignity of man: ‘Not just because man is, on earth, the only *initiate* into this mystery and the only creature to venerate it, but because he alone is according to the *image of the Trinity*.’¹⁵ Before examining how he supports the latter argument, about the image, let us have a glance at the former idea, regarding the role of man as initiate (μύστης). It is most probably borrowed from Gregory Nazianzen’s *In Theophania*, where the Nazianzen points out that God created man ‘προσκυνητὴν μικτὸν, ἐπόστην τῆς ὀρατῆς κτίσεως, μύστην τῆς νοουμένης’,¹⁶ or from John Damascene’s *Expositio Fidei*, who uses exactly the same words as the Nazianzen.¹⁷ However, we can detect a small difference. Both the latter and John call man an ‘initiate of the intelligible creation’, whereas Palamas names him an ‘initiate of the Holy Trinity’. The same occurs in the other two instances, to my knowledge, where Palamas exploits this argument in his oeuvre, namely in *Oratio Apodictica* ²¹⁸ and in Chapter 26¹⁹: Palamas again calls man μύστης of God, or of the Trinity.

Has he done this by accident, or does he have a theological purpose? The explanation for this difference is, to my mind, that Palamas desires to stress the high rank of the human person, both from the time of his creation, but mainly after the Baptism of Christ (*Theophania*), which was the second creation of man. Moreover, he wants to interpret how the Holy Trinity was revealed in the two creations: one reason is that man not only is an initiate of the intelligible creation, namely of the angels and the human soul, but also a μύστης of the Trinity, a guide that knows, even in part, and instructs the Trinitarian mysteries. The latter prerogative, namely that man is an initiate

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¹⁵ *Hom.* 60, 4.57-9, ΠΣ 6, 647 (ΠΑΕ 11, 512), trans. Veniamin, 495 (modified): Οὐ μόνον ὃτι μόνος μύστης καὶ προσκυνητῆς ἐπίγειος ἐστιν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ’ ὃτι καὶ μόνος κατ’ ἐικόνα ταύτης (emphasis added).

¹⁶ *Oratio* 38.11, PG 36, 324A (=*Oratio* 45.7, PG 36, 632AB).


¹⁸ *Oratio Apodictica* 2, 18.3-5, ed. Bobrinsky, ΠΣ 1, 95: ἐδει δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου γενομένου μηδὲν τῶν τῆς Τριάδος προσώπων ἀνεπιγνωστὸν εἶναι, ἂς ἐπιλάττετο μύστης καὶ προσκυνητῆς ἐπίγειος.

¹⁹ Ch. 26.6-7, 110: κάκεινο (τοῦ πλάσαντος, i.e. God) μόνου μύστης καὶ προσκυνητῆς εἶ. 
of the Holy Trinity, is evidently more significant than the former. Thus, the slight modification of the Nazianzen’s and John’s words is probably not incidental.

Furthermore, a second question ensues: does Palamas believe that only man, in all creation, is an initiate of the Holy Trinity? This would unequivocally help Gregory in his effort to exalt man over the angels. However, it seems that he does not make use of this argument. He only reaches the point of calling man ‘on earth, the only initiate of the Trinity’ (‘μόνος μύστης καὶ προσκυνητὴς ἐπίγειος ἔστιν αὐτῆς’), leaving aside the angelic nature, which is celestial and not earthly. Therefore, it is most probably implied that for Palamas the angels are also considered as initiates of the Trinity. In fact, in his mind, the angels may be truer initiates than man, because, as will be shown below, the angels have the kath’ omoiosin in a purer way. Nevertheless, it could be argued that Gregory leaves the reader here a bit confused.

b. The Only Creature Made in the Image of God

Let us now turn our attention to the argument of Palamas that man is the only creature made in the image of God. This argument is supported in the following way. Initially two kinds of creatures are distinguished: rational creatures, i.e. angels and humans, and the irrational animals. The latter have only a vivifying spirit, but this is not self-subsistent. Moreover, they lack intellect and reason. The first part of the aforementioned argument is further explained in Chapter 31, in the following way. The ‘soul’ of the animals is the life of the body it animates. This life is dependent on something else, i.e. the body, and is not self-subsistent. Thus animals possess life not as essence, but only as activity. ‘For the soul (of the animals) is seen to possess nothing other than the activities operated through the body, wherefore the soul is necessarily dissolved together with the passing of the body.’ So the soul of the animals is mortal as

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20 Hom. 60, 4.58-9, ΠΣ 6, 647 (ΠΑΕ 11, 512); italics added.
21 See ch. 4.1 of this thesis.
22 Hom. 60, 4.60-2, ΠΣ 6, 647 (ΠΑΕ 11, 512), trans. Veniamin, 495: ‘Sensible and irrational animals have only a living spirit, which is incapable of independent existence, and is completely devoid of intellect or reason’ (Τὰ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὰ καὶ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων πνεύμα μόνον ἔχει ζωτικόν, ἀλλ’ οὐδέ τούτο καθ’ ἐαυτό ψυχατασθαι δυνάμενον, νοῦ δὲ καὶ λόγου τελέως ἁμοιρεῖ).
the body is and it dies when the body dies. Consequently, the animals are not created in the *imago Dei*.

As far as the angels are concerned, they are intelligible and rational, therefore they possess intellect and reason. Nonetheless, they do not have vivifying spirit, because they lack a body to be vivified. Therefore ‘man is the only creature who, in the image of the tri-hypostatic Being, has intellect, reason and spirit which gives life to his body inasmuch as he also has a body which needs to be infused with life.’

From this point of view, only he is made *kat’ eikona*. Moreover, the revelation of the Holy Trinity in the recreation of man, in the Baptism of Christ, reminds that the Trinity is like ‘the archetype of the image in our soul’ (ὁ οὖν ἄγγελος ἐκείνου τῆς κατὰ ψυχὴν ἡμῶν εἰκόνος). It is worth noting here that, for St Gregory, both the angels and humans possess life as an essential part of their being, namely they are immortal. However only man ‘possesses life also as an energy or activity which passes on life and animation to his body’: man has the life-giving energy to vivify his body, something that the angels do not possess. Thus from the above he concludes that man is superior to the angels, in terms of the *imago*, due to his corporeality.

c. The Patristic Context

But here a crucial question arises: how was St Gregory guided to this idea of the *ζωοποιὸς δύναμις* and why does he give it such importance? It is possible that Palamas reached this argument through reflecting on the essence-activities distinction. God has, apart from his essence, his activities. Gregory now refers to the life-giving energy of

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23 *Ch*. 31, 114: Ἡ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων ἑκάστου ψυχή, ζωή ἐστι τοῦ κατ’ αὐτὴν ἐμψυχοῦσα. οὐκ οὐσίαν, οὐκ ἐνέργειαν ἔχει ταῦτα τὴν ζωὴν, ὡς πρὸς ἔπειρον οὐσίαν, ἀλλ’ οὐ καθ’ αὐτὴν. αὐτὴ γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔπειρον ἔχουσα ἄρα, ὅτι μὴ τὰ ἐνέργειά με ἀνάγκη. θνητὴ γὰρ ἐστι τοῦ σώματος οὐχ ἤττον, ἐπεὶ πᾶν διὰ τὸν σωματικὸν ἔχει καὶ λέγεται∙ διὸ καὶ θανόντι συναποθνήσκει. θνητὴ γὰρ ἐστι τοῦ σώματος ἐπεὶ καὶ σῶμα τοῦ γενομένου.

24 *Hom.* 60, 4.64-6, ΠΣ 6, 647 (ΠΑΕ 11, 512), trans. Veniamin, 495: ἄνθρωπος δὲ μόνος κατ’ εἰκόνα τῆς τρισυποστάτου φύσεως νοῦν ἔχει καὶ λόγον καὶ πνεῦμα τοῦ σώματος ζωοποιούν, ἐπεὶ καὶ σῶμα τοῦ ζωοποιούμενον.

25 *Hom.* 60, 4.68-9, ΠΣ 6, 647 (ΠΑΕ 11, 512), trans. Veniamin, 495.


27 Palamas argues that man is the only creature made *kat’ eikona* also in *Ch.* 26.4-6, 108-10: μόνος γὰρ (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) ἀπάντων ἐγγείον τοις καὶ οὐρανιῶν ἐκτίσθη κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ πλασαντος.... Moreover in *Ch.* 40.1-4, 126 he points that the triadic nature of the soul (‘νοερά, λογική τε καὶ πνευματική’; intellectual, rational and spiritual) is made in the image more so than others.
the Holy Spirit. Analogically, in the human soul, apart from its essence, one can identify its life-giving energy, which is manifested in how it vitalises the human body. Therefore, Palamas may insist on his argument regarding the ζωοποιός δόναμις because it reminds him of his favourite distinction between ousia and energieia.

Moreover, what is the patristic context of this idea? Is it found in any of the previous Fathers? First, it should be noted that ‘giver of life’ (τὸ ζωοποιόν) is one of the epithets attributed to the Holy Spirit in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed. Second, Sinkewicz points to Theodoret of Cyrus’ (end of fourth-middle fifth century) argument that the human soul ‘possesses within itself both a rational and an animating faculty’ (καὶ τὸ λογικὸν καὶ τὸ ζωτικὸν). However, Theodoret does not elaborate on the notion of the ζωτικὸν.

In addition, St Maximos the Confessor uses a similar notion, the κινητικὸν αἴτιον, in his effort to prove that the human soul is not corporeal. He argues that both the created world, i.e. the cosmos, and man have a relationship/reference to an immutable cause. For the cosmos this cause is God, who naturally moves it. But for man, in Thunberg’s words, ‘it is the substantial cause of movement (τὸ κινητικὸν αἴτιον), which is fixed in itself but in relation to which the organic existence of the body is moved.’ This cause of the soul has the imago because, in relation to it, the whole of man moves, as the whole cosmos does in relation to God.

In particular, exactly due to this fixity, man reflects the world in his relationship to God as the first Cause. Thus this fixity is made kat’ eikona tou Theou and man serves

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28 Let us remember that, for Palamas, one may find in the human intellect a distinction between its essence and activities; cf. section 4.d in the introduction of this thesis.
29 ‘Καὶ εἰς τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ Ἁγιόν, τὸ Κύριον, τὸ Ζωοποιόν...’ It should be also pointed that this word (ζωοποιόν) or its derivatives are very very often used in the patristic literature, as well as and in the daily offices of the Eastern Orthodox Church.
31 Maximos, Epistle 6, PG 91, 429B-432A. It should be underlined that this resembles a traditional Platonic argument, regarding the immortality of the soul and its moving power (e.g. in Phaedo and Phaedrus). See, for instance, Richard Stanley Bluck, Plato’s Phaedo. A translation of Plato’s Phaedo with Introduction, Notes and Appendices, The International Library of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1955; repr. 2001), 29-32.
32 Thunberg, Microcosm and Mediator, 138.
33 Thunberg (Microcosm and Mediator, 138) argues that this cause of movement is ‘represented in principle by the mind’ and ‘at the same time bears the image of God’. Nevertheless, it seems to me that in the specific extract (Ep. 6, PG 91, 429B-432A) Maximos speaks only about the soul, without arguing definitely that the κινητικὸν αἴτιον is found in the intellect. However, it is possible that Thunberg has in mind—though without mentioning it—another more helpful Maximian passage which clarifies the subject.
as a microcosm in how he mirrors the cosmos. Furthermore, as will be hinted at in the following section regarding man’s dominion over the created world, John Damascene uses some arguments very reminiscent of Palamas’. Therefore, Palamas seems to be basing his thinking on those two authors (mainly John), though the expression ‘ζωοποιὸς δύναμις’ of the soul, and at least in this particular framework, it is probably a ‘system’ of his own invention.\(^{34}\) But these remarks open the topic of the faculty of self-governance and its placement within the framework of the imago.

2. The Faculty of Self-Governance and Man’s Dominion over the Created World

The second important reason, for why man is superior to the angels in terms of the image of God, is the faculty of self-governance and his dominion over the created world. Palamas’ arguments are deployed in Ch. 62.\(^ {35} \) Initially he stresses that in the nature of the human soul is contained ‘on the one hand a faculty of governance and dominion and on the other hand one of natural servitude and obedience’ (3-5).\(^ {36} \) Moreover, God created the human will and the appetite together with the intellect, so that the former elements, along with the body, are ordered by the intellect (5-9). Gregory refers here to the intellect’s government of the will: the human will should not be left unrestrained, but always guided by the intellect, so that it follows God’s will. Nevertheless, man often deliberately decides to follow the path of sin. Thus he is

\(^{34}\) It is possible, to my mind, that Palamas draws here also on Nemesios, a fourth-century bishop of Emesa. But this requires to be searched further, so as to reach a safe conclusion. See his work *De natura hominis*, ed. Moreno Morani, Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1987) (=PG 40, 504-817). For the English translation, along with a useful introduction and comments, see the important edition of R.W. Sharples and P.J. van der Eijk, *Nemesius. On the Nature of Man*, translated with an introduction and notes, Translated Texts for Historians 49 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2008).

\(^{35}\) *Ch. 62*, 154-6.

\(^{36}\) *Ch. 62.1-5, 154-6*: Οὐ κατὰ τοῦτο μόνον μᾶλλον τῶν ἀγγέλων ὁ ἄνθρωπος κατ’ εἰκόνα πεποίηται Θεοῦ, ὅτι συνεκτικὴν τε καὶ ζωοποιὴν ἔχει δύναμιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἄρχειν. ἕστ ὡς ἐν τῇ τῆς ἡμᾶς ψυχῆς φύσει, τὸ μὲν ἔμελεμονικὸν τε καὶ ἀρχικὸν, τὸ δὲ φύσει δουλεύον τε καὶ ὑπῆκοον.
opposed, first, to God, who wants man to prefer virtue over sin, and, second, to man’s—
i.e. the intellect’s—ruling power.37

However, God granted man the privilege to rule over the earth,38 exactly
because of the faculty of dominion within him.39 Thus man has the right to govern
the creation, for he governs—or at least, is called to govern—his body and his internal self,
namely his psychological/internal movements. But the angels do not have such a faculty
of dominion, because they have no body. Therefore Palamas connects the faculty of
governing the creation to man’s corporeality: ‘angels do not have a body joined to them
so that it is subject to the intellect’.40

He continues his analysis by mentioning that the good angels have obtained an
intellectual will which ‘is perpetually good and required no charioteer at all’, while the
fallen angels’ intellectual will is ‘perpetually evil’.41 This means that the angels have
no need of a power controlling their will, in contrast to man whose soul possesses a
ruling power. Consequently, the angels do not have the prerogative of ruling the world
that man has. To establish this, Palamas calls on the following example: Satan, who is
an angel, albeit a fallen one, had no dominion over the earth in the beginning; the proof
for that is that he had to steal it. It was not rightfully his, but man’s. After the fall, ‘The
good angels were appointed by the universal sovereign [i.e. God] to keep watch over
the affairs of earth’, until man is restored to the cosmos’ lordship, to his proper rank.42

37 Ch. 62.5-9, 156: θέλησις, δρέξεις, αξίθησις, καὶ ἀπλῶς ὅσα μετὰ τὸν νοῦν τῷ νῷ συνεκτίσθη
παρὰ Θεοῦ, κἂν ἡμεῖς ἔστιν ἐφ’ ὅν φιλαμαρτήσωμεν γνώμη µὴ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ παντοκράτορος
µόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ προσόντος ἡµῶν ἐµφύτως αὐτοκράτορος ἀρημαζόµεν.
38 This is a standard Biblical teaching; cf. Gen 1:28: ‘And God blessed them, and God said to
them, “Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the
fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the
earth’”.
39 Ch. 62.9-10, 156: ὁ µέντοι Θεὸς διὰ τὸ ἐν ἡµῖν ἄρχικὸν καὶ τῆς γῆς ἀπάσης παρέσχε τὴν
κυριότητα. Throughout the chapter Gregory calls this power of self-governing ἐµφύτως
αὐτοκράτωρ (8-9) and τὸ ἐν ἡµῖν ἄρχικὸν (9-10).
40 Ch. 62.10-2, 156: ἀγγέλωι δὲ συνεξεζηµένου σῶµα ὁµ´ ἔχουσιν, ὡς καὶ ὑπεξεζηµένου ἔχειν
tὸ νῷ. As will be shown in a while, Palamas here is, probably, drawing on St John Damascene.
However, it will be observed how Gregory’s approach is both similar to, and yet different from,
John’s.
41 Ch. 62.12-4, 156: τὴν δὲ νοερὰν θέλησιν, οἱ µὲν ἐκπεσόντες διηνεκῶς κέκτηνται πονηρὰν, οἱ
δὲ ἄγαθοι διηνεκῶς ἀγαθὴν καὶ ἡµῶν µηδαµῶς δεοµέν.
42 Ch. 62.14-19, 156: τὸ δ´ ἐπίγειον κράτος ὁ µὲν πονηρὸς οὐκ ἔχειν, ἀλλ’ ἤρπασεν, ὅθεν δὴλον
ὡς οὐκ ἄρχον ἐκτίθη τῆς γῆς· οἱ δὲ ἄγαθοι τῶν ἄγγελων ἐπισκοπεῖν τὰ κατ’ αὐτὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ
παντοκράτορος προσετάχθησαν μετὰ τὴν ἡµῶν ἐκπτωσίν καὶ διὰ ταύτην τῆς ἀξίας, εἶ καὶ µὴ
Consequently, the angels are servants and ministers, not only of God, but of man as well.\textsuperscript{43}

It is evident how clearly Palamas connects the ability of governing the world with man’s true rank. The cosmos is of great value; hence man is able to govern it only if his proper rank is maintained. When man lost his high dignity, he then lost this ability, and angels were called in to replace him, though not exactly in the same way. Therefore it is absolutely essential that man be restored to his proper place. But what does Palamas mean by referring to man’s restoration to the cosmos’ lordship, to his proper rank? Undoubtedly Palamas refers to the re-establishing of a true relationship with God, to walking again on the road of the \textit{kath’ omoiosis}, namely theosis. In order to activate the faculty of dominion and manifest truly the \textit{imago}, man has to be restored to his proper rank; he must obtain again his resemblance to God. Thus, the \textit{kat’eikona}, apart from being the foundation for the \textit{kath’ omoiosis}, is also the effect of the latter. In other words, when man is deified, only then he is truly restored to the true image.\textsuperscript{44}

Let us point out, though, that Gregory does not explicitly call for such a restoration, but rather this is inferred from the context of his sayings in the current \textit{Chapter} (62). Particularly, although he speaks about ‘the reduction of our rank that ensued’ after the fall (17-8), he hastens to add that this reduction was not ‘complete because of God’s love for mankind’ (18-19).\textsuperscript{45} It is interesting how Gregory is not fully disappointed by man’s fall. On the one hand, he mentions the grave consequences that followed from it, namely the loss of his faculty for dominion over creation, but on the other hand, he encourages man by stressing that he could have this faculty restored again. Palamas provides strong motivation for man to struggle. One could easily observe his diligent care as preacher and pastor—his strong interest for his flock. Moreover, for Gregory the \textit{kat’eikona} has not been entirely lost in the fall, but has only been corrupted.\textsuperscript{46} The same, one would argue, occurs for the faculty of dominion, which is a basic parameter of the \textit{imago}.

\textsuperscript{43} Mantzaridis, \textit{The Deification of Man}, 20. Cf. Apostle Paul’s reference to the angels, in Heb. 1:14: ‘for they are all ministering spirits sent forth to serve, for the sake of those who are to inherit salvation’.

\textsuperscript{44} For the likeness to God, see ch. 4.

\textsuperscript{45} Ch. 62.18-9, 156: μετὰ τὴν ἠμῶν ἔκπτωσιν καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴς άξιας, εἰ καὶ μὴ παντελῆ διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν, καθάρσειν.

\textsuperscript{46} Cf. Palamas, \textit{Apod.} 2, 9, ΠΣ 1, 85.30-86.2: ὡς ἂν ζωοποιήσας ἀνακαινίσῃ τὴν ἀμαμωθεῖσαν εἰκόνα. \textit{Tr.} 1,1,5.7-10, 365 (17.21-4).
a. The Patristic Context

But what is the patristic context of Palamas’ approach? Initially, it is worth stating that man’s dominion over the irrational creation has often been related to the divine image in the patristic literature.47 Thus, it is used by Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria, and the Antiochene school.48 Moreover, as Thunberg pinpoints, St Maximos the Confessor considers it natural to man as a spiritual being ‘both to subordinate himself to the Logos of God and to have dominion over the irrational part of himself.’49 Additionally, Maximos relates the ‘self-governing and freewilling activity’ with the image of God, and not with the likeness.50 Unequivocally one can see in this point a great resemblance to Palamas’ teaching, though in this context Gregory does not speak about subordination to the Logos.51 Consequently, it could be argued that the following thoughts of Thunberg about Maximos might be also ascribed to Palamas: ‘Dominion, as a reflection of the image character of man, is, thus, realized already when the human

47 For instance, see what Alfeyev (St Symeon the New Theologian, 184 n. 68) notes about Symeon the New Theologian and the previous Fathers: ‘In his other writings Symeon also develops the idea that the image of God in man consists of his dominant role in the universe. All these notions are borrowed from preceding Fathers and reflect the traditional approach to the theme of God’s image and likeness in man’ (emphases added). Alfeyev refers here to a) Hymn 33, where Symeon the New Theologian connects the imago with man’s dominion over the earthly creatures and over his passions. See, ed. Koder, 414.18-24 (‘The man, whom He created after His image and likeness…dominates over the earthly [creatures]…and over passions—this is what is meant by “in the image”…’; the trans. is from Alfeyev), and b) Discourse 45 (Action de grâces 1; ‘First Thanksgiving’), 1-13, in Symeon le Nouveau Théologien, Catéchêses 23-34, Action de grâces 1-2: introduction, texte critique et notes par Mgr Basile Krivochéine, traduction par Joseph Paramelle, Tome III, SC 113 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1965), 304-6.


50 See Quaestiones et dubia iii, 1.1-20, ed. Declerk, 170. He calls these activities respectively ‘τὸ αὐτοδόξασθαι καὶ αὐτοεξεύον’, Cf. Cooper, The Body in St Maximus, 97-8.

51 This topic, however, probably arises in other places of the Palamite corpus.
mind, which is primarily responsible for the manifestation of this image, functions as the spiritual subject of the whole of man.\textsuperscript{52}

Furthermore, it is worth underlining that, like Palamas, Maximos also stresses the high value of the body, by pointing to its importance for the \textit{imago}. As Thunberg again puts it, ‘The body is in Maximus... in different ways implied—not in the localization of the image of God in man, but in relation to its realization—which is to Maximus a necessary consequence of its recognition.’\textsuperscript{53} Therefore, Palamas is most probably following this same line of thought by attributing great value to the body through the \textit{kat’ eikona} theology.

It seems that this point, regarding the faculty of dominion—which, to my knowledge, has not been adequately stressed by scholars\textsuperscript{54}, is important for Palamas’ understanding of the \textit{imago Dei} and generally for his anthropology. Gregory argues that man manifests the \textit{kat’eikona} more fully than the angels, because, in contrast to them, among others he disposes the faculty of dominion. Moreover, he has this faculty in virtue of his corporeality. Therefore man resembles more to God,\textsuperscript{55} who is the general governor of all creation, exactly because he has a body.

\textit{b. Man and the Cosmos}

Furthermore, in this same \textit{Chapter} (62) Palamas expresses some views worth noting about the relationship between man and the \textit{cosmos}. First, he mentions that the angels ‘did not own power over the earth’ initially and were ‘not created as rulers of the earth.’\textsuperscript{56} On the contrary, God ‘gave us lordship over all the earth.’\textsuperscript{57} This establishes a closer affinity of man to the cosmos, than the angels have. Man is the sovereign of the world, the angels are only its servants.

Moreover, Gregory argues that God granted man the potential of governing the creation due to his internal faculty of dominion. By this is suggested, though not

\textsuperscript{52} Thunberg, \textit{Microcosm and Mediator}, 120.
\textsuperscript{53} Thunberg, \textit{Microcosm and Mediator}, 120.
\textsuperscript{54} For instance, Sinkewicz and Christou devote to it a simple reference in their commentary of the \textit{Capita}. See Sinkewicz, \textit{The One Hundred}, 35 and Christou, \textit{ΠΣ 5}, 19.
\textsuperscript{55} Ch. 62.1-2, 154: ...μᾶλλον τῶν ἀγγέλων ὁ ἀνθρώπος κατ’ εἰκόνα πεποίηται Θεοῦ...\textsuperscript{56} Palamas refers to Satan, who is an angel, in Ch. 62.14-5, 156: τὸ δ’ ἐπίγειον κράτος... οὐκ ἔχειν [the evil one]... οὐκ ἄρχων ἐκτίσθη τῆς γῆς.
\textsuperscript{57} Ch. 62.10, 156: ...τῆς γῆς ὑπάσχει παρέσχε τὴν κυριότητα. Cf. Gen 1:28.
explicitly stressed, that man should govern the world in the same way as he does with his own will and appetite. But the God-like man always tries to conform his own will to God’s will and generally to subordinate his internal movements to the rule of the intellect. This is how he rules himself.\textsuperscript{58} Hence, analogically, it could be said that man should try to rule the creation guiding it to the resemblance of God, to divinization. And, of course, this implies that man ought to exert this faculty in a way God would approve, that is not as a tyrant, but as God’s steward.

A major subject is raised here, that of the divinization of creation. As it is well known, it is the patristic teaching that man, on his way to theosis, carries along with him (συμπαρασύρει) the whole creation.\textsuperscript{59} Of course Palamas does not mention specifically this topic in the current Chapter (62), but perhaps he has this idea in mind. Furthermore, he may have been influenced by the idea of man as microcosm and cosmic mediator, which is widespread among the fathers. In this understanding, man is regarded as a ‘small world’ (μικρός κόσμος), a mirroring of the whole creation. In other words, some points can be discovered inside man that resemble the outer cosmos, because ‘he bears within himself the elements of all creation.’\textsuperscript{60} And is not Gregory here making a parallelism between man’s internal world and the cosmos, by mentioning that man ought to govern the creation in the same way as he governs himself? Thus, even by allusion, Palamas seems to have in his mind man as a microcosm.\textsuperscript{61}

Besides, St Gregory exploits this notion in other parts of his work as well. For instance, in Homily 26 he argues that in a paradoxical manner God recapitulates (συγκεφαλαιωσάμενος) in man the whole creation, notwithstanding man’s smallness: ‘He made man in a mysterious way, gathering together and, so to speak, summing up

\textsuperscript{58} It is very interesting that this theological teaching about the \textit{imago Dei} imbues the liturgical life of the Church. See, e.g., the \textit{troparion} of the Vespers of St Sabbas the Sanctified (†fifth December): ‘You [i.e., St Sabbas] set your intellect as master over the deadly passions, keeping the image unharmed through the ascetic life. Thus you rose into the perfect likeness, for bravely curbing nature, you hastened to subject to that which is better, and made the body servant to the spirit. Therefore you were revealed as the chief of those living the monastic life, a citizen of the desert, a master teaching those who come to you, a perfect example of virtue...’ (the translation [slightly modified] is drawn from http://lit.royaldoors.net/2014/10/29/december-5-2014-our-venerable-and-god-bearing-father-sabbas-the-sanctified; accessed 2.12.2015).


\textsuperscript{60} Thunberg, \textit{Microcosm and Mediator}, 132-3.

\textsuperscript{61} It should be noted that, the word ‘μικρόκοσμος’ does not seem to appear as such (i.e. in this specific form) in the Fathers, but rather as ‘μικρός κόσμος’. Perhaps ‘microcosmos’ is a coinage of the Renaissance. For this remark I am grateful to my main supervisor, Fr Andrew Louth.
all creation in one small creature.’\(^{62}\) In addition ‘That is why he was last to be created, belonging to both the visible and invisible worlds and adorning (ἐπικοσμοῦντα) them both.’\(^{63}\) Elsewhere Palamas supports that man was created at the end of the whole process of creation so that the whole cosmos could be recapitulated in him. Moreover, by his creation, sense perception and the intellect were united.\(^{64}\)

Furthermore, since both man and the cosmos have the same artificer, that is God, they have a close affinity in virtue of their way of construction. However, they have two significant differences: the cosmos is greater than man as far as size is concerned, whereas man exceeds the cosmos by understanding and reason.\(^{65}\) Furthermore, man is incomparably more valuable than the whole cosmos.\(^{66}\) From the above it is shown that Palamas does indeed make use of the notion of man as microcosm.\(^{67}\)

We should also mention another important argument of St Gregory that is quite relevant here. In at least one place in his corpus, he argues that the spiritual man—the one who attains union with God and contemplates God—reaches God through divine grace, carrying along with him ‘every kind of creature, as he himself participates in

\(^{62}\) Hom. 26, Delivered at harvest time. Also concerning the spiritual harvest, 1.3-5, ΠΣ 6, 294 (ΠΑΕ 10, 152.6-9), trans. Veniamin, 206: τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀπειραγόμενον παραδοξοῦν, εἰς ἐν καὶ βραχὺ πλάσμα συναθροίσας, καὶ οἷον συγκεφαλαιωσάμενος τὴν ἄπασαν κτίσιν.

\(^{63}\) Hom. 26, 1.5-7, ΠΣ 6, 294 (ΠΑΕ 10, 152.9-12), trans. Veniamin, 206: Διὸ καὶ ὤψατον τούτον ἐξημούργησε, τῶν κόσμων ἁμοφόρων ἐξήμων καὶ ἁμοφόρως ἐπικοσμοῦντα τοὺς κόσμους, τὸν ὀρατόν τούτον λέγο καὶ τὸν ἀόρατον...

\(^{64}\) Hom. 17, Explaining the mystery of the Sabbath and of the Lord’s day, 3.34-8, ΠΣ 6, 205 (ΠΑΕ 9, 488), trans. Veniamin, 135: ‘[God] demonstrated a work worthy of his own Counsel... He crowned the whole of creation, brought together into unity the senses and the intellect...’ (ἄλλα καὶ βουλής ἡξίων ὑπέδειξεν οἰκείας ἐργον [i.e. the creation of man], συγκεφαλαιωσάμενος τὸ πᾶν, αἰσθήσαν τε καὶ νοῦν συναγαγὼν εἰς ἐν),

\(^{65}\) Hom. 26, 1.12-4, ΠΣ 6, 294 (ΠΑΕ 10, 154), trans. Veniamin, 206: ‘Man and the world were both the work of the same Craftsman, and have much in common, but whereas the world is larger in size, man is more excellently constructed’ (Ὡς γὰρ ἐνὸς τριῶν τὸ τρίτον τῆς κατασκευῆς ἄνθρωπός τε καὶ κόσμος, οὐτω παλλὴν ἔχουσι πρὸς ἀλλήλα τὴν συγγένειαν ὑπερέχουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων, ὦ μὲν τὸν μεγέθει, ὦ δὲ τῇ συνέσει). Perhaps a better rendering of the phrase ‘ὁ δὲ τῇ συνέσει’ would be that man exceeds the cosmos ‘by understanding and reason’.

\(^{66}\) Hom. 26, 1.15-9, ΠΣ 6, 294-5 (ΠΑΕ 10, 154). Here Palamas expresses his argument in a beautiful and poetic manner (for the exact passage, see the beginning of the current thesis). Cf. trans. Veniamin, 206: ‘He (i.e. man) is placed in the world like a treasure inside a large house which is far more valuable than the house containing it, or like an intricate and expensive vessel belonging to a king kept inside his palace. The palace is made out of very large stones which are easy to find, whereas the vessel is decorated with small stones, which are rare and very costly.’

\(^{67}\) St Maximos also uses this notion (of man as a microcosm), and one could draw from his approach some important implications regarding the ecological problem of our era. For a brief, but important, speculation of this topic, see Tollefsen, The Christocentric Cosmology, 228-9.
everything and is also able to participate in the one who lies above everything, in order for the image of God to be completed (or: fully manifest) (ἀπηκριβωμένον ἦν). 68

This passage has the following implications: First, man bears in him all the elements found in creation, therefore man serves as a microcosm. Second, man is united with creation by virtue of his body, but it is also possible that he be united with God. Third, the human body has a role in man’s union with God; the body is not left aside. And, fourth, in his union with God, man bears with him, and offers to God, the rest of the material creation; in this way the image of God in man is completed and fully manifest. 69 This is, of course, another point where Palamas shows the great importance of the material creation (cosmos), and at the same time, stresses how crucial it is for man to respect and guard the creation. Meyendorff is correct in arguing that in Palamas one finds ‘the elements of Christian materialism which, instead of wishing to suppress matter which has revolted against the spirit through the effect of sin, gives it the place the creator assigned to it, and discovers the way which Christ opened for it by transfiguring it and by deifying it in his own body’. 70

68 I am grateful to Fr Nikolaos Loudovikos for stressing me this point. For the passage, see Palamas, Kατὰ Ακινδόνου (Against Akindynos) 7,11.36.25-8, ed. L. Kontogiannis, V. Phanouragakis, ΠΣ 3, 488: ἀγγέλας ὡς ἄληθος ἄλλος ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς Θεοῦ γεγονός καὶ δὴ ἔκαστον πᾶν εἰδὸς κτίσεως αὐτῷ προσαγαγόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν μετοχῇ τῶν πάντων καὶ τοῦ ὑπὲρ τὰ πάντα δὲ μεταλαγχάνειν ἦν, ἵναι καὶ τὸ τῆς εἰκόνος ἀπηκριβωμένον ἦν (the same passage is also found in other two places of the Palamite corpus, i.e. Epistolary Discourse to the philosophers John and Theodore 18.23-6, ΠΣ 5, 239, and To the most venerable nun Xene 59.18-21, ΠΣ 5, 224). See relevantly Loudovikos, ‘Palamas’ Understanding of Participation’, 132 (the trans. of the aforementioned Palamite passage is borrowed from there) [=’Η κατανόηση τῆς ἀναλογίας ἀπὸ τὸν Παλαμᾶ ὡς ἀναλογία διαλογικῆς συν-ενέργειας’, in idem, Ό Μόχθος τῆς Μετοχῆς, 42]. Here Loudovikos makes a significant anthropological (and ecclesiological) remark: for Palamas, man, in order to reach God, has to essentially be united with the creation—and, for this reason—with his fellow humans. In Loudovikos’ own words, ‘horizontal participation becomes an absolute prerequisite of the vertical. In ecclesiological terms, that means that it is only in the process of the realization of the ecclesial dialogical/analogical synergetic communion that elevation to God can be achieved.’ (‘Palamas’ Understanding of Participation’, 132). Moreover, this remark has a great value from an ecological point of view, and sheds some light on Palamas’ understanding of man as a ‘priest of the creation’. 69 Cf. Hom. 26, Delivered at harvest time. Also concerning the spiritual harvest, 2.20-3, ΠΣ 6, 295 (ΠΑΕ 10, 154) [=Hom. 53, On the Entry into the Holy of Holies II, 56.842-4, ΠΣ 6, 580 (ΠΑΕ 11, 332)], trans. Veniamin, 206: Πόσον οὐρανοῦ κρείττον ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, ὡς εἰκόνα τέ ἐστι Θεοῦ καὶ Θεοῦ οἶδα καὶ μόνος τῶν ἐγκοσμίων, εἰ βούλεται γίνεται, συναφέρων τὸ σῶμα τῆς πατεισόμεθας του τοῦ Θεοῦ. 70 Meyendorff, Meyendorff, Introduction, 222 (=Study, 156).
c. St John Damascene: a Possible Source?

So far two reasons were indicated for man’s greater manifestation of the *imago* in comparison to the angels: the ‘vivifying power’ and the faculty of self-governance. It will be now argued that a similar approach can be found in the *oeuvre* of St John Damascene. However, it will be shown that Gregory’s approach is both similar to, and yet different from, John’s.

The latter presents how humans manifest the *kat’ eikona* to a greater degree than the angels in two points of his treatise *On the Two Wills in Christ* (*De duabus in Christo voluntatibus*; or *Against the Monothelites*), namely sections 16 and 30. Initially, he mentions that the angels and human souls have some common elements in terms of the image of God, namely life, understanding, and will. Yet the human soul manifests in a deeper way the *imago* because of the body: in virtue of its ‘governing the body and granting it life and movement and freely, in accordance with its own appetite or will, leading the body and its irrational appetite, desire and aggression and instinctive movement, and naturally ruling its own body as its own servant. Therefore, more than the angels is the human being said to be in the image.’

The two central notions here are a) the governing of the body and the internal self, and b) the soul’s granting life to the body. But these exactly are the two reasons, presented in the current chapter, which Palamas invokes, in order to support the superiority of man over the angels in terms of the *imago*: he makes an appeal to the faculty of dominion and the soul’s ζωοποιός δύναμις.

Despite the great similarities—and in some cases nearly identical expressions—shared by John and Gregory, we can still discern certain differences in their approaches. First, John speaks about the λογική ψυχή which grants life and movement to the body (τούτῳ μεταδίδοναι ζωῆς καὶ κινήσεως). Gregory refers to the ‘νοερά καὶ λογική

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71 This section (i.e. ch. 3.2.c), with some changes and additions, has been accepted for publication in *Sobornost*, under the following title: ‘The Superiority of Humans over the Angels due to Participation in the Eucharist: Is St Gregory Palamas based on St John Damascene?’

72 John also speaks about the superiority of humans over the angels by virtue of the body in his *Three Treatises on Divine Images* (*Orationes de imaginibus tres*), III, 26. But this extract will be analysed afterwards, in the section regarding man’s superiority to the angels due to his participation in the Eucharist (ch. 3.4).

73 *Volunt.* 16.5-10, ed. Kotter, 199. The translation is drawn from Louth, *St John Damascene*, 122. For the original text of John, see the table below.

74 *Volunt.* 16.3.6, ed. Kotter, 199.
φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς’ which has received from God the life-giving spirit (ζωοποιὸν πνεῦμα), ‘through which it conserves and gives life to the body joined to it’ (δι’ οὗ συνέχει καὶ ζωοποιεῖ τὸ συνημμένον σῶμα). Additionally, this provides Gregory an occasion to reflect on this spirit and to interpret it as intellectual love (νοερὸς ἔρως), a connection that John does not make.

Furthermore, the Damascene speaks about the soul’s ‘governing of the body and freely, in accordance with its own appetite or will (αὐτεξουσιώς), leading the body and its irrational appetite, desire and aggression and instinctive movement (ἀγείν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ἄλογον ὄρεξιν, ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ τὴν καθ’ ὁρμὴν κίνησιν), and naturally ruling (ψυκικὸς ἀρχεῖ) its own body as its own servant (ὡς ἰδίου φυσικοῦ δούλου). Palamas, as shown previously, exploits these notions, but to different ends. The relationship between these two authors, along with some parallels of content, is depicted in the following schema:

**Gregory Palamas**

[Ch. 62 (or 38, if indicated)]

ή δὲ νοερὰ καὶ λογικὴ φύσις τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐπει δὲ γηνῷ συνεκτίσθη σῶμα καὶ ζωοποιὸν ἔλαβε τὸ πνεῦμα παρὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ, δι’ οὗ συνέχει καὶ ζωοποιεῖ τὸ συνημμένον σῶμα.

θέλησις, ὀρέξεις, αἴσθησις, καὶ ἀπλῶς διὰ ἑαυτῶν καὶ τῶν νοῶν τὸ νῦν συνεκτίσθη παρὰ τὸν Θεοῦ, κἂν ἡμεῖς ἐστίν ἐφ’ ἐνφιλάμαρτῃμοι γνώμῃ καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ τὴν καθ’ ὁρμὴν κίνησιν ἄρχειν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ἄλογον ὄρεξιν καὶ τὴν καθ’ ὁρμὴν κίνησιν.

ἀγγέλων δὲ συνεζευγμένον σῶμα οὐκ ἐχούσιν, ὥστε καὶ ὑπεζευγμένον ἐχείν τὸ νῦν.

**John Damascene**

[Volunt. 16 (or 30, if indicated)]

tὸ ἐν σώματι πολιτεῦσθαι καὶ τούτῳ μεταδίδοναι ζωῆς καὶ κινήσεως.

καὶ τὸ αὐτεξουσίος κατ’ οἰκείως ἄγείν ἦτοι ἠλέησεν ἐγείν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ἄλογον ὄρεξιν, ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ θυμὸν καὶ τὴν καθ’ ὁμοίως κίνησιν.

καὶ τὸν ἰδίου φυσικὸν δοῦλον ὡς καὶ ὑπεζευγμένον τὸν οἴκειον σωμάτως.

καὶ ψυκικὸς ἀρχεῖν ὡς ἰδίου φυσικοῦ δούλου τοῦ οἴκειου σωμάτως / ὡς καὶ ὑπεζευγμένον τὸν οἴκειον σωμάτως (8-9) / ὡς καὶ ἀγγέλων.

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75 Ch. 38.7-10, 124.
76 See ch. 2.2 of this thesis.
77 Volunt. 16.6-10, ed. Kotter, 216: κατά τὸ φύσει ἀρχικόν—φύσει γὰρ ἔχει δοῦλον ἡ ψυχή τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἐξουσιάζει αὐτοῦ.]
John does not mention something similar

From this schema we can see that there are some similarities between Palamas’ and John’s approach. Nevertheless, it should be acknowledged that these ideas are quite usual in the Greek patristic tradition (e.g. Gregory Nazianzen, Maximos etc.), so one could not argue for sure that Palamas here relies exclusively on John. Besides, there exist some differences, between their approaches. Gregory relates both the faculty of self-governance and the dominion over the cosmos with the *kat’ eikona*, whereas John, in this context, does not mention man’s lordship over the earth.78 However, John says something similar. He argues that both humans and the angels are in the image of God on the grounds that they are rational, intellectual, and free; nevertheless ‘the whole of creation finds its unity both in God and in human kind’. Consequently, ‘the divine image is also manifest in the human role of being the “bond of intellectual and sensible creation”, “which the Son of God was to become; for he did not become an angel, but a human being”.79

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78 Nevertheless, John connects the image with human free will and human rule over the rest of creation in *De Imag.* III, 20.4–7, ed. Kotter, 128, trans. Louth, 98: ‘For just as the intellect (the Father) and the word (the Son) and the Holy Spirit are one God, so also mind, word [or reason] and spirit are one human being, in respect of its being both self-determined [or: free] and sovereign’ [Ὅσπερ γὰρ νοῦς (ὁ πατήρ) καὶ λόγος (ὁ υἱὸς) καὶ πνεῦμα τὸ ἄγγελον εἰς Θεός, οὕτω καὶ νοῦς καὶ λόγος καὶ πνεῦμα εἰς ἄνθρωπος, καὶ κατὰ τὸ συνέξωσιν καὶ τὸ ἄρχον]. Some lines below, John cites Gen. 1:28 (‘and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth’).

79 Louth, *St John Damascene*, 122 (from where the translation has been used). For John’s text, see *Volunt.*, 30.8.11, ed. Kotter, 216: καὶ κατὰ τὸ συνάγειν πᾶσαν τὴν κτίσιν—ἐν τε γὰρ τῷ Θεῷ ἐνορθάεται πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις καὶ ἐν τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ· σύνδεσμος γὰρ ἐστι νοητῆς καὶ αἰσθητῆς κτίσεως καὶ ὁτι κατ’ εἰκόνα, οὐ ἐμελλε γίνεσθαι ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ· οὐ γὰρ ἄγγελος γέγονεν, ἀλλ’ ἄνθρωπος.
On the other hand, Gregory does not use explicitly this last idea of the Damascene, namely man as a ‘bond’ (σύνδεσμος). However, as indicated above, he may have in mind the notion of man as a microcosm. Thus, perhaps, there is also here similarity with the Damascene (or, perhaps, again, Gregory the ‘Theologian, Maximos etc.). Overall, it may be supported that Palamas’ treatment is more elaborate and advanced than John’s. Perhaps he has borrowed John’s reflections, building his own insights on them.

But we left for the end a very plausible suggestion: it is possible that Gregory did not know the specific extract of John, even though, as indicated, there exist some resemblances in it to his own teaching. Obviously, one cannot assume that Palamas had read everything. In addition, it should be noted that the manuscript tradition of *De duabus in Christo voluntatibus* is very thin: there are only two Athos manuscripts that survive from earlier than the fourteenth-century. This is quite different from the abundant attestation of *Dialectica* and *Expositio fidei*. So it may be possible that Palamas did not in fact have access to *De duabus voluntatibus*.

Of course, however, this does not preclude the fact that Palamas may have known it (or some parts of it) through the so-called ‘oral tradition’, namely from material and tradition passed down by word of mouth through generations. It should be noted, however, that an important objection to the aforementioned statements would be the fact that, nowadays, we have no way of knowing exactly how many copies were still available in the fourteenth century when Palamas lived. Undoubtedly, one cannot safely judge based only on what survives today. Thus, what survives today may give us only an indication.

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80 As Cooper (*The Body in St Maximus*, 103) underlines, Nemesios is the first Christian author to stress the fact that man is a ‘bond’, uniting in himself two ‘distinct orders of cosmic reality’, the intelligible and the sensible, the rational and the irrational one.

81 See ch. 3.2.b.

82 Namely, Athous Dionys. 175 (thirteenth century), and Athous Laurae 283 (fourteenth century). See Kotter, *Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos*, vol. 4, 161 (for all the Greek manuscripts, see p. 161-2).

83 It has been suggested that these two works—which often appear in the manuscript tradition as one work, i.e. the *150 Chapters* of the Damascene—have probably guided Palamas to write his own *150 Chapters*. See Louth, ‘St Gregory Palamas and the Holy Mountain’, 58-9 n. 12.

84 It should be noted, however, that the second ms. (i.e. Athous Laurae) was at Holy Monastery of Megisti (Great) Lavra, where Palamas had lived for a period (namely ca. 1316-ca. 1320: see Sinkiewicz, ‘Gregory Palamas’, 132).
Hitherto, in our effort to fulfil the objective of the current chapter, we saw two reasons for man’s place above the angels in the hierarchy, as far as the *imago Dei* is concerned: the vivifying power of the soul and the faculty of dominion. In addition, there is also another, no less important, cause: the faculty of sense perception, to which we shall now turn our attention.

3. The Faculty of Sense Perception (αἰσθητικόν): the Christological-Incarnational Dimension

Having depicted the pneumatological aspect of the *imago Dei* in the human person, namely the soul’s ζωοποιώς δύναμις, Palamas traces the Christological dimension in Ch. 63. Firstly he mentions that the triadic character of human knowledge places man higher than the angels, as far as the image is concerned. This happens not only because it is triadic (as God is Trinity), while in the angels it is not, but, moreover, since ‘it encompasses every form of knowledge’. In particular, human knowledge has three faculties: the intellectual or intuitive faculty (νοερόν, also referred to as spiritual), the rational or discursive faculty (λογικὸν), and the faculty of sense perception (αἰσθητικόν). These faculties include every form of knowledge. What is more, man is the only creature which possesses, apart from the other faculties, the αἰσθητικὸν. This faculty ‘is naturally joined to that of reason and has discovered a varied multitude of arts, sciences and forms of knowledge: farming and building, bringing forth from nothing, though not from absolute non-being (for this belongs to God), he gave to man alone.’

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85 Ch. 63.1-4, 156: Εἴποι δ’ ἂν τις σὺν πολλοῖς έτέροις καὶ το τριαδικὸν τῆς ἡμετέρας γνώσεως μᾶλλον ἡμᾶς τῶν ἄγγελων δεικνύειν κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ Θεοῦ, οὐ μόνον ὅτι τριαδικόν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι καὶ συμπεριβάλλει γνώσεως ἄπαν εἴδος.

86 Ch. 63.4-6, 156: μόνοι γὰρ ἡμεῖς τῶν κτισμάτων ἀπάντων πρός τοῦ νοερῶ τε καὶ λογικῷ καὶ το αἰσθητικόν ἔχομεν... Sinkewicz (*The One Hundred*, 17) suggests that Palamas merely associates every form of λόγος (the four forms are mentioned in Ch. 35 and were presented in the section of the previous chapter regarding the reflection of the Logos in the human soul, i.e. ch. 2.1) with each of the faculties of the human knowledge. This is a very interesting association. Cf. Wilkins, “‘The Image of this Highest Love’”, 400-1.

87 Ch. 63.6-10, 156: ὥ το λογικῷ συνημμένου εἶναι περικός τεχνῶν τε καὶ ἑπιστημῶν καὶ γνώσεων ἐξειρήματος οἰκοδομεῖται πληθύν· γεωργεῖν τε καὶ οἰκοδομεῖν...
a. Creation ἐκ μὴ ὡντων (‘Out of Nothing’)

Let us make here a parenthesis, for this is a significant point. Palamas argues that man resembles God as far as the ability to create out of nothing is concerned. However Gregory underscores a major difference: God brings forth from absolute non-being, whereas man just ‘from nothing’. Thus he wants to stress that only God creates ex nihilo (‘out of nothing’), while man does create something new, which did not previously exist, but always from material already existing. For instance, man creates objects from raw material. This argument, in my view, is important for Gregory’s anthropology. He stresses, even though not explicitly, that man is created in the image of God—and indeed to a greater extent than the angels—since he participates in God’s characteristic of creating ἐκ μὴ ὡντων. In addition man has the prerogative of participating in this characteristic exactly because he possesses a body. Thus, this is another ground for the superiority of man over the angels, regarding the imago, in virtue of the body.

b. The Human Person and the Incarnate Word

In the rest of Ch. 63, Gregory continues to lay out his arguments concerning the faculty of sense perception. He maintains that God granted exclusively to man ‘that not only could the invisible word of the intellect be subject to the sense of hearing when joined to the air, but also that it could be put down in writing and seen with and through the body.’ In other words, because of the close link between these two faculties, the rational and the αἰσθητικόν, man alone has the capacity of externalizing the invisible

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88 Ch. 63.8-10, 156: ...καὶ προάγειν ἐκ μὴ ὡντων, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἐκ μηδαμίως ὡντων, τοῦτο γὰρ Θεοῦ, μόνῳ παρέσχε τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.
90 Ch. 63.12-5, 158: ἔτι γε μὴ καὶ τὸ τὸν ἀόρατον τοῦ νοῦ λόγον, οὐ μόνον ὑπ’ ἀκοῆς αἰσθησιν γίνεσθαι ἄερα ἐνιμμένον, ἀλλὰ καὶ καταγράφεσθαι καὶ μετὰ σῶματος καὶ διὰ σῶματος ὀρέσθαι παρέσχε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις μόνοις ὁ Θεός.
word of the intellect through the voice, through writing, and through the arts and sciences. That is to say, the invisible word of the human intellect is shown with and through the body.

But this, of course, brings to mind the Incarnation of the Word of God. The Λόγος was invisible, until His embodiment. He was made visible, through taking on flesh. And as St Gregory puts it, ‘Thereby God leads us to a clear faith in the visitation and manifestation of the supreme Word through the flesh in which the angels have no part at all’. This means that through the human activity of ‘embodying’ his invisible word of the intellect, one can be analogically guided to the mystery of the Incarnation of the Divine Logos. But this does not happen with the angels, because they have no body and they cannot externalize their inner word, as man is able to do. Therefore man manifests the image of God more than the angels. This for Palamas is another argument in support of the superiority of man, in terms of the imago, again due to his body.

It is not easy to find a parallel, in patristic literature, for this approach of Palamas, at least to my knowledge. However, Niketas Stethatos—as already mentioned in the previous chapter, regarding the patristic context of Palamas’ imago Trinitatis—presents a very similar argument. He writes that as man makes his own word—which is ‘invisible and impalpable and bodiless’—‘incarnate’ and visible through letters, in the same way God, wanting to recreate the damaged image of man, sent to the creation His consubstantial Son and Word, ‘who is bodiless, invisible, impalpable and not circumscribed’. And, in that way, ‘God the Word “dwelt” (ἔσκήνωσεν) in the Virgin

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91 Perhaps this sounds to the ears of the contemporary human person as an oversimplified approach. As far as I know, science has not been able so far to interpret the great mystery about the exact mechanism of how our ideas are transformed into words. Yet Palamas overtakes this problem simply by speaking about ‘the invisible word of the intellect, which joined to the air, becomes subject to the sense of hearing’; this would be a fair objection against Gregory’s teaching from the campus of a modern reader (in addition, cf. Ch. 35.5-7, 120, where Palamas writes that the word expressed orally ‘does not belong to the intellect but to the body moved by the intellect’). Nevertheless, Gregory’s basic aim is not to explain from a scientific-physiological point of view the above mechanism; undoubtedly he has neither the knowledge, nor the means for such a query. His central purpose is to stress why man is made in the image of God. That is, to underline that much of human characteristics remind us of the Holy Trinity.

92 Here Palamas is probably influenced by the logoi theology. According to it God has in his ‘mind’ the logoi, the inner principles of all creatures. When the suitable time arrives, each creature comes to being through God’s commandment, through the divine activity. Palamas is now speaking about the inner human λόγος (word), which receives material form through the human activity. Thus one can see here a relationship with the logoi. For a discussion on this matter, see the relevant sub-section in ‘The Human Intellect and its λόγος’ (ch. 2.1).

93 Ch. 63.15-8, 158; ...πρὸς πίστιν ἐνίγμων διωρκῆ τῆς τοῦ ἀνωτάτω λόγου διὰ σαρκὸς ἐπιθηματος τε καὶ ἐμφανείας, ὃν οὐδὲν οὐδαμῶς μέτεστιν ἀγγέλοις.
Mary, and was written (γραφείς) in her, as if by the finger of God upon the body of Her (i.e. Mary), who is most pure, and was incarnate’. However, Stethatos does not make any comparison to the angels, in this context.\(^9^4\) Could this be a possible influence of Stethatos on Palamas? This is not an easy question to answer. The two authors seem to have different goals: Stethatos wants to find a human analogy to ‘explain’ and interpret the Incarnation of the Logos. On the other hand, Palamas wants to exalt man over the angels, in terms of the *imago*.

c. Some Concluding Thoughts

In conclusion, we have argued that *Ch. 63* is exclusively written in order to exalt man over the angels. As shown it holds two direct comparisons between humans and the angels, namely only man possesses the αἰσθητικόν, and only man, having a body, points to the mystery of the Incarnation. The latter is vividly reminiscent of Palamas’ assertion that man is an initiate (μύστης) of God.\(^9^5\) as indicated above in the previous section.\(^9^6\)

What could be pointed out here is the very positive stance of St Gregory towards the arts and sciences, and generally, knowledge and technology. He does not reject human knowledge; far from it, he considers it very important. He even attributes to it a constitutive role in man’s possession of the image of God. Additionally, Gregory sees human knowledge and technology as a means of recalling the Incarnation; thereby he

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\(^9^4\) For the reference, see Stethatos, *Contre les Juifs*, 10.1-12, ed. Darrouzès, 424 (emphases added): Ἄσπερ δε πάλιν τὸν ἱδόν λόγον σύ, ἀόρατον ὡς τοιαύτη καὶ ἀναφη καὶ ἀσώματον, συνειματωμένοι καὶ ὀρατον ποιεῖν ἐν γράμμασι καὶ πρὸς σύς αὐτοῦ ἀποστέλλεις, οὕτω καὶ ὁ Θεὸς ἡγέταιν τούτων ἡμερῶν βουλήσεις ἀναπλάσας τὴν φθαρείσαν αὐτοῦ διά τῆς παραβάσεως εἰκόνα, ἐξεπετελέ τὸν ὁμοούσιον αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦν καὶ Λόγον ἐρ′ ἡμᾶς, τὸν ἀσώματον, τὸν ἀόρατον, τὸν ἀναφη καὶ ἀπερίγραπτον... Καὶ Θεὸς ὁ λόγος ἐκθέτων αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῇ, γραφεῖς ὀσπερ δικτύλῳ Θεοῦ ἐν ταῖς σαρξίν αὐτής ταῖς πανάγνοις, καὶ ἐγένετο σάρξ...

\(^9^5\) See Hom. 60, *On The Holy Feast of Theophany*, 4.58-9, ΠΣ 6, 647 (ΠΑΕ 11, 512), trans. Veniamin, 495: ‘Not just because man is, on earth, the only initiate into this mystery and the only creature to venerate it, but because he alone is in the image of the Trinity’ (Οὐ μόνον ὅτι μόνος μύστης καὶ προσκυνητῆς ἐπίγειος ἐστιν αὐτής, ἀλλ’ ὅτι καὶ μόνος κατ’ εἰκόνα ταύτης).

\(^9^6\) It seems that a major subject here is how God could confide to sense perception something of spiritual value. Several of the Fathers address this problem, among them Augustine in *De Trinitate*. In another occasion, it would be very interesting to search whether there are parallels between Augustine’s approach and Palamas’ one. See relevantly, Robert Sinkewicz, ‘The Concept of Spiritual Perception in Gregory Palamas’ *First Triad in Defence of the Holy Hesychasts*, Christianskij Vostok n. s. 1 (1999), 374-90. Matthew R. Lootens, ‘Augustine’, in Paul L. Gavrilyuk and Sarah Coakley (eds), *The Spiritual Senses. Perceiving God in Western Christianity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 56-70. The spiritual senses according to Palamas are examined in Part II of the current thesis.
exalts their role. Moreover, he does not regard physical knowledge and science as something evil *per se*. On the contrary, he deems them important and essential for our lives. However, often in his corpus, he points out that they may lead to false and even disastrous actions. For this reason, he underlines that spiritual knowledge, knowledge of the spiritual world, is superior to natural knowledge, knowledge of the physical world.\(^9\)

It is also very interesting that Palamas was aware of the main scientific developments of his day (e.g. in astronomy) and, when the latter were used in a way which endangered the faith, to attack or degrade Christian theology, he responded.\(^9\) So Palamas seems to be rather acquainted with the burning questions of his time. This fact proves once more that his theological contribution is not merely abstract speculation, but comes as a reaction to his time’s problems and questions: it is totally orientated to the human person and its true needs. Besides, let us not forget that in the first half of the fourteenth century a renewal of philosophical and scientific studies occurred. This was part of the so-called ‘Palaeologan Renaissance’.\(^9\)

Therefore, it could perhaps be argued that Palamas is a forerunner of ‘Modernity’ (the early modern period of modern history),\(^10\) namely a person that seems ready to adapt and react to the radical changes (social, political, religious etc.) that ‘Modernity’ would bring.\(^10\) He is not afraid to engage in dialogue with recent developments in the sciences and arts, trying to get from them what he regards as healthy, and criticizing those aspects which he perceives as problematic.\(^10\) However, this whole point would require its own essay to be fully investigated.

In conclusion, if Palamas lived in our days, he would unequivocally express his great fear and sorrow for the wrong and dangerous use of knowledge and technology by post-modern man. As it is well known, these basic elements of human civilization

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97 The above points are depicted by Sinkewicz in his important article ‘Christian Theology and the Renewal of Philosophical and Scientific Studies in the Early Fourteenth Century: The *Capita 150* of Gregory Palamas’, *Mediaeval Studies* 48 (1986), 334-51. For a comparison between physical and spiritual knowledge, see ch. 5.4 of this thesis.
98 See again Sinkewicz, ‘Christian Theology and the Renewal’.
100 For this remark I am grateful to Fr Antonios Pinakoulas.
101 This point could be further explored through a detailed analysis of Palamas’ *Homilies*; but this falls beyond the scope of the present study.
102 Undoubtedly, also other Fathers could be brought as an example for this fact, e.g. Nemesios of Emesa, the Cappadocians, Maximos the Confessor etc.
are rarely understood in their theological sense due to contemporary society’s secularization. On the contrary, they are often used for the abuse of creation and for the destruction of the cosmos. To sum up, in Sinkewicz’s words,

When knowledge is perverted from its proper end, the dignity of man suffers and the humanist enterprise itself is thwarted. Man starts to serve knowledge, rather than knowledge serving man in the search for his true goal. Created in the triadic image of God and called to grow once again into his likeness, man occupies a unique place in the universe, serving only the Creator but never debasing himself to the level of serving creation. In his advocacy of the high dignity of man, Gregory Palamas must certainly be considered one of the great humanists of the Palaeologan Renaissance. 103

It seems that Sinkewicz’s words, written almost thirty years ago, if read in light of current global problems, are more timely today than ever.

4. The Superiority of Humans over the Angels due to Participation in the Eucharist

So far in this Chapter we saw the reasons for why man bears the image of God to a greater extent than the angels by virtue of his having a body. It seems that Palamas’ approach is unique in Patristic literature; one cannot easily find a similar theology used to exalt the rank of the human person. Nevertheless, among the Fathers, many efforts were made to raise up man in comparison to the angels. 104 Among them, one special,

103 Sinkewicz, ‘Christian Theology and the Renewal’, 351. Of course Sinkewicz does not refer to those ‘humanists’ that were opposed to the Hesychasts.
104 See, e.g., what Symeon the New Theologian writes in Hymn. 14.55-74, ed. Koder, 270-2, where he presents the life offered to man by God—and specifically, the life of a priest and of an hegoumenos (ἡγούμενος; the prior of a monastery)—as one which is higher than the angels (the reference found in Veniamin, 532). Moreover, the title of this Hymn is characteristic (see ed. Koder, 266): ‘Thanksgiving to God for the gifts that he was deemed worthy to receive from Him, and that the dignity of being a priest and an hegoumenos causes awe even to the angels’ (Εὐχαριστία πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν τῶν δωρεῶν ἑνεκα, ὃν παρ’ αὐτῷ ἥξιοθης, καὶ ὃτι φρικτόν καὶ ἀγγέλους τὸ τῆς ἱερωσύνης καὶ ἰησουμενεές ἂξιομα). On another occasion it would be interesting to see further research conducted on this tradition of exalting man over the angels;
perhaps unique, case is that of St John Damascene. Let us look at his approach and see whether Palamas follows this same line of thought.

John undertakes this connection in his Third Treatise on the Divine Images (*De Imaginibus* III), 26.\(^{105}\) As known, in these treatises John tries to support the necessity of venerating the holy icons over against the Iconoclasts, who did not accept the veneration of icons at all. At this specific point of his work (III, 26), John, while speaking about the correctness of icon veneration, takes the opportunity to stress the superiority of man over the angels, because man can participate in the Eucharist.\(^{106}\) John argues that the Son of God became hypostatically ‘a human nature’, a man, and not ‘an angelic nature’.\(^{107}\) Moreover,

Angels do not participate in, nor do they become sharers in, the divine nature, but in divine activity and grace; human beings, however, do participate in, and become sharers of, the divine nature, as many as partake the holy Body of Christ and drink his precious Blood; for it is united to the divinity hypostatically, and the two natures are hypostatically and inseparably united in the Body of Christ of which we partake, and we share in the two natures, *in the body in a bodily manner*, and in the divinity spiritually, or rather in both ways, not that we have become identical [with God] hypostatically (for we first subsisted, and then we were united), but through assimilation (*κατὰ συνανάκρασιν*) with the Body and the Blood.\(^{108}\)


\(^{106}\) On the mystery of the Eucharist according to St John, see Louth, *St John Damascene*, 183-5.

\(^{107}\) *De Imaginibus*, III, 26.47-9, ed. Kotter, 134, trans. Louth, 102-3: Οὐκ ἐγένετο φύσις ἀγγέλου ὑώς Θεοῦ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν, ἐγένετο δὲ φύσις ἀνθρώπου ὑώς Θεοῦ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν.

Therefore, St John continues, those humans who preserve their union to God pure, ‘through the keeping of the commandments’, are greater than the angels.\(^{109}\) Although ‘our nature is a little lower than the angels because of death and the grossness of the body’, ‘through God’s favor and union with him it has become greater than the angels’.\(^{110}\)

It has been argued that ‘the way John develops here\(^{111}\) what is entailed by our having bodies, that by virtue of reception of the Eucharist and consequent deification, humans are superior to angels, seems to be unparalleled.’\(^{112}\) And a question now arises: does this argument also applies in Palamas’ case? Because he speaks a lot about the superiority of the humans over the angels due to their body. In other words, could we find a similar approach in his \textit{oeuvre}? Does Palamas exalt the place of man over the angels, in terms of human corporeality and the participation in the Eucharist? Furthermore, does he make this approach in the context of his \textit{imago} theology?

It seems that one could indeed detect some points with a similar nuance. In particular, Palamas speaks about the superiority of the humans over the angels, due to participation in the Eucharist, in two points of his \textit{Homily 56, On the Holy and Dread Mysteries of Christ}.\(^{113}\) The first reads:

\begin{quote}
Come, He [viz. Christ] says, those of you who have set your heart on eternal life, eat My body and drink My blood (cf. John 6:53), that you may not only be in God’s image, but, by clothing yourselves in Me, the King and God of heaven, you may be eternal and heavenly gods and kings, feared by demons, admired by angels, beloved sons of the celestial Father, living for ever, fairer than the children of men (cf. Ps. 45:2), a delightful dwelling-place for the sublime Trinity.\(^{114}\)
\end{quote}


\(^{110}\) \textit{De Imaginibus}, III, 26.64-7, ed. Kotter, 134, trans. Louth, 103: Ἡ μὲν φῶς ήμῶν βραχύ τι παρ’ ἀγγέλους ἠλαττωμένη διὰ τὸν θάνατον καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος παχυσίαν, ἀλλὰ εὐδοκία καὶ συναφείᾳ Θεοῦ γέγονεν ἀγγέλων μείζων...

\(^{111}\) I.e. in \textit{De Imaginibus}, III, 26.

\(^{112}\) Louth, \textit{Three Treatises on the Divine Images}, 103-4 n. 93.

\(^{113}\) \textit{Περὶ τῶν ἁγίων καὶ φρικτῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ μυστηρίων}, ΠΣ 6, 604-14 (ΠΑΕ 11, 396-420). For a short presentation and analysis of this Homily, see Joost van Rossum, ‘L’Eucharistie chez saint Grégoire Palamas’. For how Palamas approaches the mystery of Eucharist in general, see Lison, \textit{L’esprit}, 183-93.

\(^{114}\) \textit{Hom.} 56, 11.165-70, ΠΣ 6, 610 (ΠΑΕ 11, 412), trans. Veniamin, 465: δεῦτε λέγοντα φάγετε μου τὸ σῶμα, πίετε μου τὸ αἷμα οἱ τῆς αἰωνίου ζωῆς ἐπιθυμητικὸς ἔχοντες, ἵνα μὴ κατ’ εἰκόνα
And the second one:

...from this sacred table, which, according to the psalm, Christ prepared for us in the presence of His enemies (cf. Ps. 23:5), the demons and passions, a spring wells up giving rise to spiritual fountains, letting souls drink and leading them up to heaven. It turns the angels’ faces towards its beauty, and in it is discerned the manifold wisdom of God (Eph. 3:10), causing them to desire to look into (1 Peter 1:12) the gifts bestowed upon us through this blood.115

In these extracts Gregory’s basic aim is to stress how great a privilege is man’s participation in the Eucharist. It is of such high value that, among other things, through Holy Communion, humans become θαυμαστοί ἀγγέλοις, namely admired by the angels.116 Moreover, the angels ‘turn their faces towards the beauty, inside which the multifacted wisdom of God is seen, which [beauty] urges them to wish to look at the gifts that were given through this [Holy] Blood.’ Therefore, in these two ways, Palamas presents the angels to be amazed in front of the high dignity of the Eucharistic mystery.117 Thus, it is implied that man is superior to the angels by virtue of his participating in Holy Communion.
From the foregoing comparison regarding the Eucharist, two points seem to be relevant to the question at hand regarding the possibility of a similar approach in Palamas as in the Damascene, and relevant to the current chapter more generally. First, here Palamas does not exalt man over the angels due to his body. But John does this clearly. Therefore, indeed John’s approach ‘seems to be unparalleled’. Besides, John’s main target is to underline the superiority of human beings, in order to justify the veneration of icons (in the same way, and now more justified, as the Old Testament saints venerated the angels which appeared to them). On the other hand, Gregory’s main aim here is to highlight the great importance of the Eucharist; he mentions the angels only in passing.

At the same time, both approaches have an eschatological character. John believes that humans ‘participate in, and become sharers of, the divine nature (θείας κοινοι φύσεως), as many as partake the holy Body of Christ and drink his precious Blood’. Additionally, he connects participation in Holy Communion—and consequently man’s superiority—with the human body: ‘we share in the two natures, in the body in a bodily manner, and in the divinity spiritually, or rather in both in both ways’. Therefore humans are greater; besides, as John adds, ‘it is not said of them [i.e. angels] in Scripture that they will be seated together with, or be partakers of, the divine glory... not that they will reign together, nor that they will be glorified together, nor that they will seat at the Father’s table...’, as happens with the saints, who are ‘sons of God, sons of the kingdom and heirs of God and fellow-heirs with Christ...’

On the other hand Palamas also with the idea of divinization in mind makes an interesting remark speaking in the voice of Christ: ‘eat My body and drink My blood, that you may not only be in God’s image, but... you may be eternal and heavenly gods and kings, feared by demons, admired by angels...’ Furthermore, it is worth noting that through these words it is perhaps implied, even if not explicitly stated, that man, participating in the Eucharist, passes from the state of the κατ’ εἰκόνα to that of the Ἑῴρων ἡ τῶν ἀγγέλων ὃς μενομομένης τοῦ ἁλλά θεαμάτων φυσίς καὶ Θεόν ἀλλον ἑώρων, μή γεγενημένον μόνον ἐπὶ γῆς δι’ ἄγαθότητα θειάν, γοῦν τε καὶ σάρκα τῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ δι’ ὑπερβολὴν ταύτης καὶ κατὰ Θεοῦ χάριν μεμορφωμένον, ὡς εἶναι τῶν αὐτῶν σάρκα καὶ γοῦν καὶ πνεύμα καὶ τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιθεῖάν τὴν ψυχήν ἐχειν ἐντέλος ὡς ἐναιμίον ύπάκοι ἐν νῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ πνεύματι.

118 Louth, Three Treatises on the Divine Images, 103-4 n. 93.
likeness (theosis) and eternal glory. Moreover, as is evident, his words have an eschatological resonance.121

But now, a significant question arises: why does Palamas, in his effort to underline the superiority of humans over the angels, not exploit the aforementioned arguments of John? It is not an easy task to give a definite answer here. Perhaps Palamas wishes to avoid the phrase ‘humans participate in, and become sharers of, the divine nature’ (‘θείας κοινωνίας φύσεως’), which, as shown, is central to St John’s argument.122

As is well known, Palamas insisted that man participates only in the uncreated divine activity, and not in the divine nature or essence. Of course, the latter, is in no way implied by the Damascene; it is rather the former that he means.123 However, it is possible for Gregory, in front of the danger of a misunderstanding, to have avoided this text. But this is rather unlikely, because it is in fact a biblical quotation (i.e. 2 Peter 1:4).124

Besides, Palamas provides elsewhere an important exegesis of this verse,125 namely in his treatise-dialogue Theophanes.126 This verse had been used by some of Gregory’s opponents, Barlaam, Akindynos, and Gregoras, to prove that God-in-himself is imparticipable, denying, of course, the distinction between essence and activities.

121 In the same line of thought, cf. his Hom. 56, 13.186-9, ΠΣ 6, 611 (ΠΑΕ 11, 414), trans. Veniamin, 465: ‘It makes us new instead of old and eternal instead of temporary; it frees us from death and makes us like evergreen trees planted by the rivers of the water of the divine Spirit (cf. Ps. 1:3), from which is gathered fruit unto life eternal (cf. John 4:36)’ (Τούτο ἡμᾶς καινοῦσ ἀντὶ παλαιῶν πουϊ καὶ ἁδίως ἀντὶ προσκαίρων· τούτο ἡμᾶς ἀπαθανατίζει καὶ αἰειθάλεξ αποργάζεται, ὡς δὲνῦρα πάρα τὰς διεξόδους τῶν ὑδάτων περιτευμένα τοῦ θείου Πνεύματος, ὁποίοι συνάγεται καρπὸς εἰς ζωήν αἰώνιον).
123 See, e.g., what he writes about man in his Expositio fidei 26.34-6, ed. Kotter, 76: ‘...deified, however, by participation in the divine radiance and not transformed into the divine being’ (θεούμενον δὲ τῇ μετοχῇ τῆς θείας ἐλλάμψεως καὶ οὕς εἰς τὴν θείαν μεθιστάμενον οὐσίαν); trans. Louth, St John Damascene, 134. Palamas mentions something similar in his Ch. 111.8-10, 210: οὕς ἄρα τῆς θείας οὐσίας ἐνεστε μετέχειν, οὐδ’ αὐτοῖς τῶς διὰ τῆς θείας χάριτος τεθεωμένους· τῆς δὲ θείας ἐνεργείας ἐνεστε μετέχειν (‘Thus it is not possible to participate in the divine substance, not even for those divinized by grace, but it is possible to participate in the divine energy’).
124 ‘By which he has granted to us his precious and very great promises, so that through them you may become partakers of the divine nature, having escaped from the corruption that is in the world because of sinful desire’ (ὁποῖον τὰ τίμια ἡμῖν καὶ μέγιστα ἐπαγέλλατα δωδόρθητα, ἵνα διὰ τούτων γένησθε θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως ἀποφυγόντες τῆς ἐν κόσμῳ ἐν εἰπόθμιμῳ φθοράς); italics added. It is very interesting that, to my knowledge, in his Homilies Palamas never refers to 2 Peter 1:4 (see the Biblical indices in ΠΣ 6, 707 and ΠΑΕ 9-11).
125 On how this biblical verse was accepted by the Fathers and what interpretation they gave, see the very interesting paper of Norman Russell, “Partakers of the Divine Nature”.
126 See ΠΣ 2, 236-43.
Contrariwise, Gregory’s main argument is that the divine nature (φύσις) and essence (οὐσία) is both communicable/participable (μεθεκτή), and incommunicable/imparticipable (ἀμέθεκτη).127

To reach such a conclusion he bases his arguments on St Maximos the Confessor,128 but on other Fathers as well (such as Sts Chrysostom, Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, and Athanasios). He argues that when we say that the divine οὐσία is μεθεκτή, we are referring to the divine activity (πρόοδος, ἔκφανσις, ἐνέργεια). This is the solution to the whole problem and, as Palamas stresses, it belongs to the consensus Patrum.129 However, it should be noted, the Fathers had many different ways of interpreting 2 Peter 1:4. But Palamas’ approach, in spite offering something new, is, in Russell’s words, ‘based on a sound exegesis of the text’.130 Moreover, this exegesis has been regarded as authoritative in the Christian East from then on.131

To sum up, it should be admitted that it is very difficult for an absolute answer to be given to this question, namely why Palamas does not use the aforementioned argument of the Damascene, about the superiority of humans over the angels. However, there is also another possible explanation: despite some resemblances, it is very likely that Gregory did not have access to the relevant text of John. Let us remember that the

127 Theophanes, IΣ 2, 238.7-10.
128 Although this quotation (2 Peter 1:4) was little used by Maximos, his theology proved very helpful for Palamas to interpret the text at stake.
129 Theophanes, IΣ 2, 243.15-20.
131 Russell, ‘Partakers’, 66. Occasionally, some Fathers are not so clear in their teaching regarding man’s participation in God. This is the case, e.g., with St Symeon the New Theologian, whose terminology on the matter of man’s union with God and deification often confuses the reader. In particular, Symeon does not use the essence-activities distinction in the way Palamas does, that is to say, so explicitly and consistently [on some comments about whether Symeon, through his teaching, anticipates Palamas’ distinction between essence and activities, see Kallistos Ware, ‘Deification in St Symeon the New Theologian’, Sobornost/ECR 25.2 (2003), 7-29]. For instance, sometimes he implies that man participates in the divine οὐσία. However, in general, it is accepted that for Symeon man participates only in God’s activities, while the divine essence is incomprehensible. A justification for Symeon’s confusing terminology would be that this whole problematic had not arisen by his era. Had it been indeed a problem already by then, he would surely have been more careful in his teaching. For all these see Ware, ‘Deification in St Symeon the New Theologian’, 19-22. Alfeyev, St Symeon the New Theologian, 160, 215-25 (mainly 221). Cf. Symeon, Hymn 50.200-2, ed. Koder, SC 196, 170: ‘And so you should think in the Orthodox way [φρονεῖν ὀρθοδόξως] / That I become totally god by communion with God [ὡς μεθ Θεού κοινωνία], / In assurance and knowledge, and not by substance, but by participation [οὐχὶ οὐσία, μετουσίᾳ δὲ]’ (the English trans. is drawn from Alfeyev, St Symeon the New Theologian, 263). For a recent article on this matter, see Dmitry Biriukov, ‘On the Topic of Participation in the Divine Essence According to St Symeon the New Theologian in the Patristic Context’, Scrinium 11.1 (2015), 295-305.
manuscript tradition of *De duabus in Christo voluntatibus* is very thin. But the same goes for the treatises of St John against the iconoclasts. In particular, there survives only one manuscript dated from before the fourteenth century which contains *Imag.* III 26 (it should be also pointed out that it is the only manuscript that contains all three treatises). Consequently, it could be maintained that the most likely explication for why Palamas does not use the approach of the Damascene, regarding our subject, is that St Gregory simply did not know St John’s approach. Nevertheless, of course, there is again the chance that Palamas may have known it through the ‘oral tradition’—a possibility that cannot be excluded.

5. Concluding Remarks

From this chapter a very important conclusion can be made: man possesses the image of God more fully than the angels, because of his corporeality. In particular, as shown in the pneumatological dimension, the soul has been created more in God’s image than the intellectual nature of the angels by virtue of its vivifying power. As Sinkewicz correctly explicates Palamas’ argument, the angels, having word, intellect, and spirit, but no ζωοποιὸν δύναμιν, reflect only the image of the immanent Trinity in its internal relations. On the other hand, as the Christological dimension of the *imago* implies, ‘in man the life-giving spirit communicates outside the intellectual sphere towards the sensible world of the body, just as the life-giving Spirit in the Trinity communicates life beyond the interior domain of the Godhead to the realm of the saving economy’. In conclusion, the divine image in man has both a pneumatological and an incarnational character. Furthermore, it reflects not only *theology* (θεολογία), i.e. the inner being of

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132 See the end of our section regarding ‘The Faculty of Self-Governance and Man’s Dominion over the Created World’ (ch. 3.2).
133 Louth, *St John Damascene*, 199.
134 This manuscript is now found in Naples: Neapol. 54 (II B 16). See Louth, *St John Damascene*, 199 n. 22. Kotter, vol. 3, 36-7.
135 However, it should be noted again that, as mentioned in the end of ch. 3.2.c, nowadays we cannot know for sure how many manuscripts survived in the era of Palamas. Therefore, what survives today gives us just an indication.
137 See ‘The Faculty of Sense Perception’, in ch. 3.3.
the Trinity, but also the economy (οἰκονομία), i.e. the communion of the Trinity ad extra, to creation.138

In my point of view this is a very significant point in Palamas’ anthropology. He argues that the angels reflect only the theology, whereas man images both the theology and the economy. But this means that angels reflect only ‘a part’ of the Holy Trinity—Its inner world—, while man images the Trinity in Its ‘totality’. Undoubtedly this provides man a very high dignity and places him above the angels in the hierarchical order.

Now it can be easily shown how great a value St Gregory attributes to the human body.139 In particular, man manifests more fully the kat’eikona than the angels for three reasons, all based on his corporeality: the soul’s vivifying power (ζωοποιὸς δύναμις—the pneumatological dimension), the faculty of dominion, and the faculty of sense perception (αἰσθητικόν—the christological dimension). If man did not have a body, like the angels, he would not have such a great dignity.

In this point a major question arises: why does Palamas feel the need to lay such strong emphasis on the value of the human body? To give an answer, we must turn our attention to Gregory’s era and to his theological aims. Undoubtedly, as mentioned in the current chapter’s beginning, Palamas’ main goal is to establish man’s high rank and value, so as to ground the potentiality of theosis. A means of accomplishing this is by exalting the body. For Gregory, as shown, his corporeality provides man a greater position in the hierarchy than the angels, and for this reason, he emphasises the body, in order to underline man’s great value. It seems that Gregory is not fully satisfied by the two arguments for man’s resemblance to God mentioned initially in the previous chapter, namely the Trinitarian reflections in man, and needs some more evidence on which to ground his opinion about man’s high dignity. He sees man’s superiority by virtue of his corporeal nature as suitable means toward achieving this goal.

There is an additional crucial reason. Palamas saw the need to defend the body against certain negative attitudes towards it in his epoch. In particular his opponents were attacking the hesychasts’ claim that the human body participated in prayer and in

139 The very positive stance of Palamas towards the human body, in relation to man’s spiritual senses, will be analysed in ch. 7 of this thesis. In the current chapter are mentioned only these points of his theology of the body which are related to the imago Dei.
divine communion or the revelation of the Trinity to man through the uncreated divine light (theophanies). So, for instance, Barlaam could not accept the participation of the body in prayer. But these approaches entailed the danger of undervaluing the body. Thus, for Gregory it is a datum that the body has a central role in prayer and in the theophanies.\(^{140}\) Hence he stresses the importance of the human body, in order to defend it and exalt it to its proper rank. One way to accomplish his aim is through outlining and stressing the image of God in man and especially the role of the body in his theology.

This fact, that an ascetic attributes such a central role to the human body, is very crucial indeed. For this reason, one is puzzled when comes across the idea, sometimes expressed in literature, that Palamite theology undervalues the body. For instance, recently Stelios Ramfos\(^{141}\)—a contemporary Greek philosopher who often writes on theological matters—argued that the theology of Palamas is ‘suspicious of the body and dismissive of reason’; it is ‘a world denying and anti-rational faith and a decisive turn away from history’. Moreover, Ramfos believes that the Philokalia is characterised by ‘a neglect of day-to-day reality’, and an ‘endemic antipathy to hard work’, and that it represents ‘a world-denying form of Christianity’.\(^{142}\)

With all due respect to Ramfos’ erudition and vast philosophical knowledge, one wonders if he is reading the works of Palamas objectively (and of the Philokalia, in general), when he writes that ‘For the neoplatonic thought on which the theology and the ascetic life of the Christian East was based and which Palamas was following

\(^{140}\) This is a central idea for Palamas, which one can find in many points of his corpus. For instance, see \textit{Triads} 1.3.36-8, 447-9 (189-93). As Adam Cooper (\textit{The Body in St Maximus the Confessor}, 3) remarks, Gregory in this extract [\textit{Tr.} 1.3.37.2-8, 448 (191.2-9)] evokes explicitly Maximos the Confessor as a patristic testimony ‘in defence of the notably physical aspects of hesychast prayer when he affirms that it is “through this body and by bodily means” that the faithful will behold the uncreated light of God.’ This whole issue will be analysed in Part II of this thesis, particularly, in ch. 7.

\(^{141}\) For a recent approach to Ramfos’ work (mainly regarding the ‘notion of personhood’), see Louth, \textit{Modern Orthodox Thinkers}, 259-62.

\(^{142}\) For the above see, for instance, the book of Ramfos, \textit{Τό ἀδιανόητο τίποτα. Φιλοκαλικά ριζώματα τοῦ νεοελληνικοῦ μηδενισμοῦ. Δοκίμιο φιλοσοφικῆς ἀνθρωπολογίας} (Athens: Armos, 2010), 400-2 (the translations are drawn from Marcus Plested, \textit{Orthodox Readings of Aquinas}, 3). It should be noted that this book of Ramfos received a lot of theological criticism, based on the fact that it does not grasp the real aim and \textit{ethos} of the Philokalia. See, for instance, Nikolaos Loudovikos, ‘Η Φιλοκαλία, ο μηδενισμός και η κρίση’ [‘The Philokalia, Nihilism and the crisis’], \textit{Εἰκονικροτεία} 3.7.2010 [http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=179332; accessed 16.2.16]. For a critical approach on some aspects of Ramfos’ work (but not on the aforementioned book), see Loudovikos, \textit{Οἱ τρόμοι τοῦ προσώπου καὶ τά βάσανα τοῦ ἐρωτα. Κριτικοὶ στοχασμοί γιὰ μιὰ μετανεωτερική θεολογική ὀντολογία} (Athens: Armos, 2010), 115-52.
without knowing it, the physical body and its sensations are denied in favor of their spiritual version.\textsuperscript{143} It seems to me that an objective approach to the Palamite image of God does not permit such an evaluation.\textsuperscript{144} Arguments presented in this chapter, such as the ζωοποιὸς δύναμις and the αἰσθητικόν, point to a contrary conclusion and show how great a value Palamas attributes to the human body and to physical knowledge, as well as to the sciences and technology as well.\textsuperscript{145}

As already stated, in his imago theology St Gregory does not simply wish to establish why man is created kat’ eikona tou Theou or why he manifests the image more fully than the angels. His supreme goal is to stress the possibility of a strong God-human relationship; the imago is just a means to this end. Therefore he goes on to pinpoint that if man preserves the image, lives according to God’s will, and walks the road of becoming like God (theosis), then the body ‘attains to the promised resurrection and participates in eternal glory’.\textsuperscript{146} But this argument provokes the beginning of a brief discussion about the kath’omoiosin.

\textsuperscript{143} Ramfós, Τὸ ἄδιανόητο τίποτα, 401 (trans. mine).

\textsuperscript{144} In my view, the same may be applied in Palamas’ teaching on the spiritual senses. I hope that this is shown, among others, through Part II of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{145} For an interesting article regarding the importance that Palamas attributes to the body, see Archimandrite Efrem, ‘Ἡ ἀξία τοῦ ἀνθρώπινου σώματος στή διδασκαλία τοῦ ἁγίου Γρηγορίου Παλαμᾶ’ [The Value of the Human Body in the Teaching of St Gregory Palamas], in Mantzaridis (ed.), Ο Ἅγιος Γρηγόριος ὁ Παλαμᾶς στήν ἱστορία καὶ τό παρόν, 217-24.

\textsuperscript{146} Ch. 39.15-7, 126: ...δι’ αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ συνημμένον ἀπαθανατίζει σώµα, τῆς ἐπηγγελμένης ἐξαναστάσεως κατὰ καιρὸν τυχόν καὶ δόξης αὐτίκου μετασχόν.
Ch. 4. The καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν

1. The Superiority of the Angels

So far it has been shown that Palamas deems man to manifest more fully the *imago* than the angels, because of his corporeality. Nevertheless, St Gregory carefully argues that the good angels, those who did not rebel against God, are ‘more worthy of honour than we because they are without bodies and are nearer to the utterly incorporeal and uncreated nature. Or rather, those among them who kept to their proper rank and longed for the goal of their being, even though they are fellow servants, are honoured by us and because of their rank are much more worthy of honour than we are’.

Furthermore, the angels have preserved the perfection of the καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν and for this reason they have a greater dignity than us: ‘even though we possess the image of God to a greater degree than the angels, even till the present we are inferior by far with respect to God’s likeness and especially now in relation to the good angels’; they are much closer to the divine illumination. Besides, ‘the perfection of the likeness of God is effected by the divine illumination that comes from God’. We can see here how clearly St Gregory connects the likeness, i.e. divinization (theosis), with the uncreated divine activity, since for Palamas the divine illumination is identical to the divine activity: theosis is an effect of the uncreated ἐνέργεια. Here we have a resemblance

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1 In the Palamite corpus the likeness to God is closely connected with *theosis*. St. Gregory’s teaching on the latter has been extensively treated in many studies. For this reason here only the most basic points of the καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν will be mentioned, mainly those that are clearly connected to the *imago*. Let us note that some basic elements were already mentioned in the *Overview of Palamas’ Teaching* (ch. 1). For theosis according to Palamas, see Mantzaridis, *The Deification of Man*. Russell, *The Doctrine of Deification*, 304-9. Idem, ‘Theosis and Gregory Palamas: Continuity or Doctrinal Change?’, *SVTQ* 50.4 (2006), 357-79. A.N. Williams, *The Ground of Union*. Kesselopoulos, Πάθη καί ἀρετές, 195-210.

2 Ch. 27.10-5, 110: ...εἰ καὶ ἡµῶν τιµιώτεροι, ὡς σοµάτων ὄντες ἐκτὸς καὶ τῇ ἀσωµάτῳ παντάσαι καὶ αὐτόσων φίλους καὶ Εὐαγγελίου παντότι συνάντησα μαλλον ἐγνήσιντες: μαλλον δὲ οἱ μὲν φυλάζοντες τούτων τὴν ἐκείνην ἡμῶν καὶ τὸ πρὸς ὁ γεγόνασι στέργοντες, εἰ καὶ ὁµόδουλοι, ἀλλ’ ἡµῖν τίµιοι καὶ ἡµῶν τῇ τάξει πολλῷ τιµιώτεροι.

3 Ch. 64.1-5, 158: Ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα μάλλον ἡµῖν τῶν ἀγγέλων ἔχομεν καὶ μέχρι νῦν πρὸς τὸ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν εἶναι τὸν Θεοῦ πολλῷ ἐλαττώμεθα καὶ τὴν ἐκ Θεοῦ θείας ἐλλάµψεως τελεῖται. Cf. Ch. 77 and Sinkewicz, *The One Hundred*, 20.

4 For the subject of God’s nature, being, and activity (ἐνέργεια), and its history from the ancient philosophy to the Neoplatonists, and to authors such as Augustine, Boethius, Aquinas, Dionysios the Areopagite, Maximos the Confessor, and Palamas, see the important book of Bradshaw, *Aristotle East and West* (2004). Cf. idem, ‘The Concept of the Divine Energies’,
with, and a possible influence from, the teaching of St Maximos and St Diadochos of Photiki (a fifth century ascetic, whose works are also included in the Philokalia).⁵

At another point, in *Homily 24, On the Last Judgment*, Palamas supports that ‘When God created Adam our forefather after his image and likeness, He put no evil in him at all, but, together with his soul, breathed into him the grace of the Holy Spirit which kept him new and preserved his divine likeness.’⁶ Therefore, it is divine grace, the uncreated activity of the Holy Trinity, that keeps man conformed to the *kath’ omoiosin*. But these considerations lead us to the spiritual and ethical dimension of the likeness according to Palamas.

### 2. Spiritual and Ethical Dimension

Apart from arguing that the intellectual and rational nature of the soul has been created more fully in the *imago Dei* than the incorporeal angels, Palamas adds that ‘It possesses the image indefectibly even though it may not recognize its own dignity nor think or act in a manner worthy of the one who created him [i.e man] in his own image’.⁷ After the fall of the first-created humans and the subsequent death of the soul through separation from God, the human being lost his likeness to God, but preserved the image. If the soul rejects sin and practices the virtues, it is illumined by God and it receives true and eternal life. Moreover, ‘Through this life it receives also immortality for the body joined to it, for at the proper time the body attains to the promised resurrection and participates in eternal glory’. But if the soul prefers inferior things, it ‘inflicts shameful dishonour upon the image of God’ and is alienated by God.⁸

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⁵ As Thunberg (*Microcosm and Mediator*, 124) notes, for Diadochos ‘The perfection of the likeness is... effected only through illumination, an illumination brought about by spiritual charity, which alone makes the likeness to God perfect’. See Diadochos, *Capita gnostica* 89, *Oeuvres Spirituelles*, ed. Édouard des Places, SJ, SC 5 bis (Paris: Cerf, 1966), 149-50.


⁷ *Ch.* 39.1-6, 126: ...καὶ τοῦτο ἔχει ἀμεταποίητον, κἂν μὴ ἐπιγνῷ τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἀξίαν καὶ τοῦ κτίσαντος κατ’ εἰκόνα οἰκείων ἄξιος φρονήτερον τε καὶ πολιτεύηται.

⁸ *Ch.* 39.6-22, 126: ...τὸ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν εἶναι θείαν ἀποβαλόντες, τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα οὐκ ἀπολέσαμεν. ἀποστέρησαν μὲν σὺν ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν πρὸς τὰ χείρα σχέσιν καὶ προσκολλωμένη δὴ ἀγάπης τῷ κραίττοιν καὶ ὑποταττομένῃ τούτῳ διὰ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν τρόπων τῆς ἀρετῆς,
The heavenly people, those who follow the will of God, are ‘Those who are steadfast and immovable in their faith, who always abound in the Lord’s work and bear the image of the heavenly (Adam) [i.e. Christ] through their obedience to Him.’ 9 Thus steady faith and constant obedience to Christ imprint man with Christ’s image. For this reason the saints ‘became living icons of Christ and the same as he is, more by grace than by assimilation’. 10 Furthermore, during their life on earth the saints are human images of virtue (ἐμψυχοι γὰρ εἰκόνες τῆς ἁρετῆς) and thus they constitute ‘an incentive to virtue (προτροπὴ πρὸς ἁρετήν) for those who hear and see them with understanding.’ 11

The triadic character of the divine image offers man a very high hierarchical place: immediately after God, above all creation. But this high dignity must be preserved through continual remembrance and contemplation of God. By cultivating such a strong desire for God and close relationship with Him, the soul receives ‘the mysterious and ineffable radiance of that [i.e. the divine] nature’. 12 Here Palamas refers to the uncreated activity of the Holy Trinity, which enables the soul to fully manifest the imago Dei and follow the way to the likeness with God, which was lost in the fall.

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9 Hom. 24, On Pentecost, 14.224-6, ΠΣ 6, 282 (ΠΑΕ 10, 116-8), trans. Veniamin, 197: Οἱ ἐδραιοὶ καὶ ἀμετακίνητοι τῇ πίστει, καὶ περισσευόντες ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ τοῦ Κυρίου πάντοτε καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου διὰ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν εὐπειθείας φορέων. Palamas refers here (τοῦ ἐπουρανίου) to Christ, the ‘last Adam’. This is clear from the previous paragraph of this Homily [in particular Hom. 24, 13.219-23, ΠΣ 6, 282 (ΠΑΕ 10, 116)], where the words of St Paul are mentioned about Christ as the last Adam and the second man, the heavenly one and not the earthly (1 Cor. 15:45-47).

10 Ch. 76.3-4, 170 (=Ch. 111.15-6, 210): καὶ ζῶσαί τινες εἰκόνες Χριστοῦ καὶ ταῦτα μᾶλλον αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν χάριν ἢ ἀφομοίωμα. This is a quotation from St Maximos, Amb. 21, 15.24, ed. Constas, vol. 1, 444: καὶ γενέσθαι ζῶσας εἰκόνας Χριστοῦ... (PG 91, 1253D).

11 Hom. 28, On Saints Peter and Paul, 1.16-20, ΠΣ 6, 312-3 (ΠΑΕ 10, 202), trans. Veniamin, 220.

12 Ch. 40.1-12, 126-8: Ἡ μετὰ τὴν ἀνωτάτον τριάδα τριαδικῆς πρόσεγμος, ὡς παρ᾿ ἐκείνης κατ᾿ εἰκόνα καὶ πεποιημένη μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων, νοερᾶ, λογικὴ τε καὶ πνευματικὴ (ταὐτὴ δὲ ἐέστιν ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχή), φυλάττει τὴν ἑαυτῆς τάξιν καὶ μετά Θεον εἶναι μόνον καὶ κοσμεῖται καὶ πείθεσθαι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑποκεῖσθαι καὶ πρὸς Θεόν ὑπεζεύχεται καὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι καὶ πείθεσθαι καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑποκεῖσθαι καὶ πείθεσθαι καὶ τῇ διηνεκεῖ τούτῳ μνήμῃ καὶ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ χάριτι καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρίᾳ καὶ τῇ θεωρία
This activity transmits to the human person love of God and all humanity. Obviously, we have here another example of how the Palamite distinction between essence and activity applies to anthropology. Besides, let us not forget that, for Palamas, participation in the divine activities is a matter of degree, depending on man’s synergy with God. Nevertheless, if we choose the sinful way, we damage our own soul, along with its ‘triadic and supercosmic (ὑπερκόσμιος) world’; we destroy the imago Dei.  

‘Thus,’ as Sinkewicz concisely concludes, ‘the threefold structure of the divine image in the soul has a distinctly dynamic character. It was created by God but is made manifest and preserved by grace. The man who loves virtues returns to himself through the continual remembrance of God effected by practice of the Jesus Prayer in conjunction with the hesychast psycho-somatic method. Then, graced by the divine radiance, the soul recognizes the image of God within itself and is drawn ever closer to his likeness.’

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13 Ch. 40.12-28, 128.
14 Ch. 40.8, 126: θαυμαστῶς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν [the soul] ἐπισπάται.
15 See, e.g., Ch. 40.6-7, 126: τῇ δημιουργίᾳ τούτου μνήμη καὶ θεωρία
16 Palamas presents the Jesus Prayer and the psycho-physical method as ways of achieving continual remembrance of God, in, e.g., Tr. 1.2.7-8, 399-401 (87-91).
17 Sinkewicz, The One Hundred, 20.
Conclusion. The Palamite εἰκὼν Θεοῦ: Palamas’ Dynamic of Thinking of Man as Being in the Image of God

From all the above it is shown that the *imago* has a cardinal place in the teaching of St Gregory Palamas. He uses it frequently in many ways and on different occasions. In the current Part—after providing a short history of the *kat’ eikona* in the Bible and the ecclesiastical writers—we attempted to understand Palamas’ thinking on this topic. Our main aim was to show that, according to Palamas, man is greater than the angels as concerns the *imago*, and, moreover, that this is due to his body.

As demonstrated, for Gregory, man stands at the peak of the created order. He is placed immediately after God and is superior even to the angels, in terms of the *kat’ eikona*. He was brought forth on the last day of creation, after all things; all the sensible world was created for his sake. His creation in the image of God is a crucial reason for his high dignity. The two primary consequences of the *kat’ eikona* are that man is capable of receiving God and truly knowing Him; both of which are effected through participation in the uncreated divine activities. Thus, it may be counted as one of his original contributions his decision to view the *imago* and the resemblance to God through the prism of the essence-activities distinction.

Moreover, Palamas vividly relates the *imago* to the Incarnation of the Logos. One can see a close interaction in his mind, as far as the image is concerned, between a) man made in the Trinitarian image of God, b) the Incarnate Christ, and c) the Logos as the Image of God the Father. In addition it is interesting that a cyclical movement may be detected in his approach. First, he stresses the fact that only in deification is man truly restored to God’s image and likeness. Even though man was initially created in the image of God, this image was blackened and corrupted in the fall. Hence the basic task of Christ is to restore the *imago* and guide man to theosis. In this way, man re-obtains the lost image, and returns to his ‘first state’, to the life of the first-created humans in Paradise. Here *eschatology* meets *protology*.¹

¹ These realities are brilliantly expressed at the second (fourth) *Evlogitarion* of the *Memorial Service*: ‘Of old you formed me from nothing and honoured me with your divine image, but because I transgressed your commandment, you returned me to the earth from which I was taken; bring me back to your likeness, refashioning my ancient beauty [trans. Lash (slightly modified) available online in https://web.archive.org/web/20160305221151/http://anastasis.org.uk/mat-sun.htm (accessed 20.11.16)].
Palamas, along with the majority of the Fathers, utilised many frameworks to understand the image of God, without proposing one of them as the unique and definitive interpretation. Moreover, he regards the kath’ omoiosin, the resemblance to God, to be the most important goal for man; the imago is just the foundation, the basic premise which grants him the opportunity to continue his pursuit of this goal.² This concern to secure the possibility of theosis motivates him to emphasise the high place of man in the creation hierarchy, and he views developing the kat’eikona theology as an important means to this end.

Palamas locates the kat’ eikona in the human intellect. Nonetheless he also ascribes a crucial role to the body, in terms of the imago, to such an extent that his approaches could be acknowledged as unique and without precedent in patristic literature. As far as his conception of the image is concerned, in the above chapters we discerned two main elements: first, how man images the Holy Trinity (namely the Trinitarian reflections), and, second, how he is superior to the angels. According to Gregory, man manifests the kat’eikona more fully than the angels for three reasons, which are all based on his corporeality: a) the soul’s vivifying power (ζωοποιὸς δύναμις-the pneumatological dimension), b) the faculty of dominion, and c) the faculty of sense perception (αἰσθητικὸν-the christological dimension). To sum up, I would fully agree with Sinkewicz:

It should now be clear that Palamas’ teaching on God’s image in man is thoroughly patristic in its foundation, for it draws upon a commonly used analogy for understanding the Trinity and associates this with the doctrine of the image, as certain earlier writers had done, at least tentatively. Gregory’s doctrine is also clearly a development both in certain details and in its general thrust. The analysis of the four meanings of λόγος in chapter 35 goes beyond the common distinction between internal and external word. Most importantly, Gregory determined that there is a difference between the divine image in man and the divine image in the angels, and this difference gives to man a place in the hierarchy next after God and above the angels.³

² It could be argued that in Palamas one observes an emphasis on the likeness to God, in contrast to other Fathers who insist mainly on the imago.
³ Sinkewicz, The One Hundred, 24.
To take this a step further, it could be argued that, for Palamas, the human image is *richer* than the angelic, even though the angelic image is *purer.* In conclusion, it would not be unfair to contend that Palamas’ *kat’eikonā* theology is one of the most advanced and developed approaches to the *imago* in the patristic tradition; perhaps the most well-elaborated, alongside that of St Maximos. Gregory picks up all sorts of resonances from his immersion in the Fathers and seems to exploit almost all the available to him approaches, as well as providing his own original thoughts.

**Some Implications**

What then are we to make of all these? Do the aforementioned arguments have an interest only from a patristic/scholarly point of view or are there broader implications relevant to contemporary man? A first major implication is evident already: Palamas shows great sympathy for and recognition of the value of the human body. This implies that he also fully recognizes and respects, even exalts, all the human activities carried out by means of the body: the quest of science for knowledge, biological needs, the sexual relationship etc. Palamas is a very humane ascetic; one that fully accepts the psychosomatic union that constitutes the human being. Nevertheless, he underlines that all these bodily actions have to be exercised in Christ, and in the way the Church teaches, so as to preserve in the believer the image of God, and guide him towards the restoration of the likeness. In a very important passage, Palamas remembers the words of St Paul (1 Cor. 6:19) and writes:

> Brother, do you not hear the words of the Apostle, ‘Our body is the temple of the Holy Spirit within us (1 Cor. 6:19),’ and again, ‘We are the house of God’ (Heb. 3:6), as God Himself confirms when He says, ‘I will dwell in them and walk in them, and I will be their God’ (Lev. 26:12; 2 Cor. 6:16)? So what sane person would grow indignant at the thought that his intellect dwells in that whose nature it is to become the dwelling place of God [i.e. the body]? How can it be that God at the beginning caused the intellect to inhabit the body? Did even He do so

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4 For this remark I am grateful to my main supervisor, Fr Andrew Louth.
wrongly? Rather, brother, such views befit the heretics, who declare that the body is evil and created by the devil. As for us, we regard it as evil for the intellect to be [or: be caught up] in material thoughts [or: to dwell on fleshly thoughts], but not for it to be in the body, since the body is not evil [in itself].

We shall try to develop more fully this subject of the body and its participation in the spiritual life in the next Part of this thesis, regarding the ‘Spiritual Senses’, particularly ch.7. But there are also, at least, three last questions that remain in need of clarification.

Isn’t the imago located in the human body?

First, one would probably ask, after all: was it correctly supported in the beginning of this Part that, according to Palamas, the imago is located in the human intellect, and not in the body? Because, one could oppose the fact that in this thesis it is shown that Palamas strongly connects the image with the body.

Yes, this is irrefutable, but this does not mean that Gregory locates the image in the body. Let us remember the three main reasons why Palamas relates the imago with the body, namely the Christological and Pneumatological dimensions, as well as the Faculty of Self-Governance. All these reasons simply say that man images God more than the angels, exactly because he possesses a body. Nowhere does he locate the imago

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5 Tr. 1.2.1.1-12, 393 (75.8-20), trans. Gendle, 41 and The Philokalia, ed. Palmer, Sherrard and Ware, vol. 4, 332 (modified; emphases added): Ἀδελφέ, οὐκ ἀκούεις τοῦ Ἀποστόλου λέγοντος ὅτι «τὰ σώματα ἡμῶν νοῦς τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν ἄγιοι Πνεύματος ἐστι», καὶ πάλιν ὅτι «οἶκος τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμεῖς ἔσμεν», ὡς καὶ ὁ Θεὸς λέγει ὅτι «ἐνοικίσαγι ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐμπεριπατήσαι καὶ ἐσομαι αὐτῶν Θεός»; Ὅ τοίνυν οἰκητήριον πέφυκε γίνεσθαι Θεοῦ, πῶς ἄν ἀναξιοπαθὴς ἤς τοὺς ἔχων ἐνοικίσατα τοῖς οἰκίσκες τοὺς αὐτοῦ; Πῶς δὲ καὶ ὁ Θεὸς τὴν ἁρχὴν ἐνόικισε τοῖς σώματι τοὺς νοῦς; Ἅρα καὶ αὐτῶς κακῶς ἐποίησε; Τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους, ἀδελφέ, τοὺς αἱρετικοὶς ἀρμόσει λέγειν, οἵ πονηρὸν καὶ τοῦ πονηροῦ πλάσμα τό σώμα λέγουσιν. Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐν τοῖς σωματικοῖς φρονηματιστὶν εἶναι τὸν νοῦν οἰόμεθα κακῶν, ἐν τῷ σώματι δὲ οὐχὶ κακῶν, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τὸ σῶμα πονηρὸν.
both in the body and the soul. But, moreover, exactly because man possesses a body, this brings him nearer to God, as far as the *imago* is concerned. Of course, as already stated, this does not mean that Palamas undervalues the human body. On the contrary, it has been clearly shown how great a value he ascribes to human corporeality. This will be further explicated in Part II, there in terms of man’s spiritual senses.

*Do the angels, at last, have the image of God, or not?*

Among the Fathers, one can find various answers to this question. For instance, Athanasios—contrary to, e.g., St John Damascene—bluntly denies that the angels have

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6 It seems that Demetracopoulos *(Augustine and Gregory Palamas, 162)* is correct in arguing that (as far as the οἰσθήθηκιον is concerned) ‘the imaging of God in man is clearly located not in the fact that man has bodily senses and therefore sensible knowledge *per se*, but in his ability, through these (senses) and the knowledge they provide (which [senses] constitute, in this instance, not a part but a *conditio sine qua non* of this divine image), to imitate at a certain extent the creative activity of God-archetype—something that angels, being bodiless, cannot do’.

7 Let us not forget the explicit way Palamas makes this clear, as analysed in ch.1.2: ‘it is not the bodily constitution but the very nature of the intellect [nous] which possesses this image and nothing in our nature is superior to the intellect. If there were something superior, that is where the image would be’ *(Ch. 27.1-5, 110)*.

8 Niketas Stethatos has a similar view to that of Palamas. He argues that man’s royalty and self-ruling power are not to be identified with the image, but are just peripheral characteristics of the image (τὸ γὰρ βασιλικὸν τε καὶ αὐτεξούσιον περὶ τὴν εἰκόνα ὁρᾶται καὶ εἰ τι τούτων ὁμοιον...)*(De anima, 22.10-2, ed. Darrouzès, 84)*. It is the same as the crown and the scepter of a king (καθάπερ καὶ τὸ διάδημα καὶ τὸ σκῆπτρον περὶ τὸν βασιλέα), or as the soul’s qualities, such as the absence of a body, quantity and form (ὁσπερ πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον καὶ ἄποσον καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς); or, moreover, as the white and black colour of the body. Knowing these elements, does not mean that we know the essence of the soul and the body; we just know some characteristics of their essence (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐὰν γνῶμεν ταῦτα, ἤδη καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸν σώματος καταλαμβάνομεν, ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῶν) *(De anima, 22.12-7, ed. Darrouzès, 84-6)*. In addition, to resemble God is to practice ‘justice, truth, charity, sympathy and compassion’ (τὸ δὲ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν ἐστὶ τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ ἀληθὲς, τὸ εὔπλαγγχον, τὸ συμπαθές, τὸ φιλάνθρωπον) *(De anima, 23.1-2, ed. Darrouzès, 86)*. And Stethatos continues: ‘In those who practice these virtues one can clearly see the image and the likeness of God; on the one hand they walk according to their nature, but on the other, they are elevated above the irrational animals, because of their high dignity’ *(De anima, 23.2-6, ed. Darrouzès, 86)*: ‘Εν οἷς ὁν ταῦτα ἔνεργει καὶ φυλάττεται, ἐν ἑκεῖνοις ὅρᾶται τρανός καὶ τὸ κατ’ εἰκόνα καὶ καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν, κατὰ φύσιν μὲν δηλαδὴ κινούμενος, κατὰ δὲ ἀξίαν τῶν ἀλόγων ὑπερκειμένοις).
the \textit{imago Dei}.\footnote{Athanasios, \textit{De incarnatione}, 13.28-9, ed. Thomson, 166. Cf. Louth, \textit{St John Damascene}, 122.} However, St Cyril of Alexandria says that the angels do have the image of God.\footnote{See, indicatively, his \textit{Answers to Tiberius} 14 [‘To those who ask if angels exist in God’s image’ (Πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας εἰ καὶ ἄγγελοι κατ’ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ)], in \textit{Cyril of Alexandria. Select Letters}, edited and translated by Lionel R. Wickham, Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 174-5.} For Palamas the angels clearly possess the image of God. He states this explicitly in \textit{Ch. 27}: ‘...every intellectual nature is a fellow servant with us and is \textit{in the image of the Creator}, even though they be more worthy of honour than we because they are without bodies and are nearer to the utterly incorporeal and uncreated nature’\footnote{\textit{Ch. 27.9-12, 110}: σύνδοολος οὐκοῦν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ πᾶσα νοερὰ φύσις καὶ κατ’ εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος, εἰ καὶ ἡμῖν τιμωρείτω, ὡς σωμάτων ὄντες ἐκτὸς καὶ τῇ ἀσωμάτῳ παντάπασι καὶ ἀκτίστῳ φύσις μᾶλλον ἐγγίζοντες (emphasis added).}. If the angels did not also possess the image of God, Gregory would have underlined it. Besides, Palamas supports that the angels have intellect, reason, and spirit. This means that they also have the \textit{imago}, because, as already shown, humans have the \textit{imago}, because they possess nous-logos-pneuma, \textit{kat’eikona} of the Holy Trinity (see ch. 2 of our thesis). Apart from these reasons, Gregory insists that humans have the image \textit{to a greater extent} (μᾶλλον) than the angels. Obviously, in order to make such a comparison, he would have to have presupposed that the angels also possess the image.

\textit{Finally, who is greater, man or the angels?}

Palamas’ method may puzzle some readers. On the one hand he exalts man over the angels exactly because of his corporeality. But on the other hand he exalts the angels because they are bodiless and hence closer to God. Why does he have such a rather strange approach? Might a problem be discovered here? In my view the answer is negative. Palamas knows exactly what he wants to say and accomplish theologically. His purpose is to exalt the place of the human person and to explain to his audience how greatly endowed by his creator man is. However, Palamas knows well that humans easily fall into sin and lose their way when seeking God. And in this way they also lose their high dignity, even temporarily. Therefore Palamas shows us our final goal, our destination: where we should aim. This is \textit{likeness to God}, in which the angels
undoubtedly surpass humans now. Besides, it is known that in the Fathers one sees a progressive movement from the image to the likeness.\textsuperscript{12} This is also true for Palamas.

But what will happen in the ‘age to come’, in Paradise? This has to do with the transformation of the body, and the spiritual senses. But that prompts us to move to the next Part, and explore the Palamite doctrine of ‘intellectual perception’ (\textit{αἴσθησις νοερά}), a notion that combines man’s spiritual union with God (\textit{νοερά}) with his bodily constitution (\textit{αἴσθησις}).

\textsuperscript{12} For a characteristic example, see St Diadochos of Photiki, \textit{Capita 89}, ed. des Places, 149-50.
Part II. The Spiritual Senses: Αἴσθησις νοερά

O taste and see that the Lord is good; blessed is the man who hopes in him.¹

…the mysterious communion and inexpressible vision of the Mystery, the mystical and ineffable contemplation and taste of the eternal light.²

…talking about God and encountering God are not the same thing.³

[...] the phrase ‘in the image’ implies a gift within man but at the same time a goal set before him, a possession but also a destiny, since it really does constitute man’s being, but only in potentiality [ἐν δυνάμει]. The ‘in the image’ is a real power, a pledge which should lead to marriage, that is, to hypostatic union, the unconfused but real and fulfilling mixture and commingling [ἀνάκρασις] of the divine and the human natures. Only then does the iconic or potential being of man become real authentic being. Man finds in the Archetype his true ontological meaning.⁴

Ch. 5. Contextualising the Palamite Spiritual Senses

1. Introduction

Hitherto, the image of God in man according to St Gregory was examined. Now, another very crucial subject of his anthropology will be approached: the ‘spiritual senses’, or, what Palamas prefers to say, the αἴσθησις νοερά. This notion is very important because it combines the bodily element (αἴσθησις) with the intellectual (νοερά). Moreover, as will be shown, it occupies a very central place in Palamas’ thought.

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¹ Ps. 33 (34), 9 (8): γεύσασθε καὶ ἰδεῖτε ὅτι χρηστὸς ὁ Κύριος· μακάριος ἀνήρ, ὃς ἐλπίζει ἐπ’ αὐτόν.
² Tr. 1,3,42.9-11, 454 (203.23-25): ...ἡ κρυφία τοῦ κρυφίου μετουσία καὶ ὁ ἄνεκφραστος, ἡ μυστικὴ καὶ ἀπόρρητος τοῦ αἰωνίου φωτὸς θεωρία τε καὶ γεύσις (emphases added).
³ Tr. 1,3,42.8-12, 453 (201.19-23): ...περὶ Θεοῦ γὰρ τι λέγειν καὶ Θεῷ συντυγχάνειν οὐχὶ ταύταν.
⁴ Panayiotis Nellas, Ζῶον Θεοίμενον, 38 (=Deification in Christ, 37).
Our main aim in this Part is to show that, for Palamas, the human body has a most significant role in his theology of the αἰσθήσις νοερά. This will be mainly shown in ch. 7. But, in order to reach this aim, it is necessary that a) first, the Palamite teaching about the spiritual senses be contextualised, namely placed in its historical and theological context: this is done in ch. 5. There, initially the relevant literature review is presented, as well as the teaching of Palamas’ opponents on this matter. After that a sketch of Palamas’ reaction is depicted, which mainly has to do with the human knowledge of God and the divine light; and b) second, the notion of the αἰσθήσις νοερά be deeply analysed. What is its background? Why does it have such a paradoxical name? What is the role of the eyes of the soul, and what are the presuppositions of seeing the light? These questions are approached in ch. 6.

Finally, in ch. 7 we examine the salient place of the body in man’s sensing of the divine. The main issues that are pursued here are: What is the role of ecstasis, and what is the relationship between apophasis and theosis? Does the passionate part of the soul participate in theosis? What is the role of the heart? At last, what is the place of the body in theosis, now and in Paradise? Finally, we present our conclusions, along with a critical evaluation of some arguments of R. Sinkewicz regarding the role of the body in the αἰσθήσις νοερά.

The doctrine of the spiritual senses is found in many ecclesiastical writers, such as Origen⁵, Gregory of Nyssa⁶, Evagrios, Augustine⁷, Dionysios the Areopagite⁸,

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Dorotheos of Gaza, Isaac the Syrian, John Klimakos, Maximos the Confessor,9 John Damascene, Symeon the New Theologian etc., as well as in later, and even contemporary, theologians, such as Thomas Aquinas,10 Ignatius of Loyola, St Nikodimos of the Holy Mountain11, St Silouan the Athonite, Karl Rahner,12 Hans Urs von Balthasar,13 and Fr Sophrony Sakharov. The theology of the spiritual senses is an effort to explain in words how man is able to perceive God, to sense the divinity, and through which faculties this is achieved. In the words of Nicholas Gendle, ‘In the course of spiritual maturation, the soul must develop faculties analogous to the sense organs of the body, with which to perceive and discern the things of God...’14 Moreover, it is a topic that has recently attracted a lot of scholarly attention.15


10 Cf. the relevant contribution of Richard Cross, in Gavrilyuk and Coakley (eds), The Spiritual Senses, 174-89.

11 For instance, some important references to the spiritual senses may be found in St Nikodimos’ work Ἐγχειρίδιον Σωματωνυμικόν, περὶ Φυλακῆς τῶν πέντε Λειτουργιῶν, τῆς τοῦ Φαντασίας, καὶ τῆς τοῦ Νοὸς, καὶ Καρδίας. Καὶ περὶ τοῦ πούα εἰσάν αἱ πνευματικαί, καὶ οἰκεία τοῦ Νοὸς ἰδοναί (Vienne, 1801). For an English trans., see that of Peter A. Chambers, Nicodemos of the Holy Mountain. A Handbook of Spiritual Counsel, The Classics of Western Spirituality (New York, Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1989).

12 For Karl Rahner and Hans Urs von Balthasar, see the relevant paper of Mark J. McInroy, in Gavrilyuk and Coakley (eds), The Spiritual Senses. Perceiving God in Western Christianity, 174-89.


14 The Triads, 120 n. 33.

2. Reviewing the Literature

As far as Palamas is concerned, it could be said that there has not been a comprehensive study that analyses in depth his teaching on the spiritual senses. However, some important attempts have been made. First, John Meyendorff treated this topic at some points in his seminal study *Introduction à l’étude de Grégoire Palamas* (1959).\(^{16}\) But, as mentioned in the literature review of this thesis, Meyendorff’s approach is not without some problems. Some of them have been pointed out by Romanides.\(^{17}\) This remark gives me the opportunity to say that several important thoughts about Palamas’ spiritual senses may be also found in the latter’s *Ῥωμαίοι Ὑ Ῥωμηοί Πατέρες τῆς Ἐκκλησίας*.\(^{18}\) However, Romanides does not write here specifically on this issue; he, rather, offers his relevant ideas in passing, placing them in his general outline of Palamite theology and spirituality, but without providing a systematic treatment of Palamas’ αἰσθησις νοερὰ.

Second, in a very important article in 1999, Robert Sinkewicz approached the concept of the spiritual senses in Palamas’ *First Triad*.\(^{19}\) In particular, Sinkewicz is here based, almost exclusively, on *Triad* 1,3.

Indeed, it seems that the most important contribution of Palamas, in terms of the spiritual senses, is provided in *Tr*. 1,3. He there sets the groundwork for his teaching and presents almost all of his basic arguments, which he uses again in his later works. This is why our study will also have as its basic source *Tr*. 1,3. But, in addition, another important text of Palamas will be considered, the *Hagioretic Tome*, as well as some other texts of Palamas. However, this thesis will not follow an exegetical method, presenting Palamas’ analysis of these texts chapter by chapter or verse by verse, but a systematic one. In other words, it will try to bring together, highlight and discuss his major theological claims regarding the spiritual senses. Having said this, passages from the Greek text will be frequently quoted, so that the reader may have a direct contact

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\(^{16}\) See mainly p. 205-20 and 231-47. In the partial English trans. of this work by G. Lawrence (*A Study of Gregory Palamas*), see mainly p. 142-56 and 162-78.

\(^{17}\) See his ‘Notes on the Palamite Controversy’ (1960/1 and 1963/4). For a brief presentation, see the literature review of this thesis.

\(^{18}\) *Tome I*, 51-194.

\(^{19}\) ‘The Concept of Spiritual Perception in Gregory Palamas’ *First Triad in Defence of the Holy Hesychasts*, *Christianskij Vostok* n. s. 1 (1999), 374-90.
with Palamas’ own words. In this way, one may be better helped in his effort to grasp the meaning of Palamas’ thoughts.

Our study takes into account Sinkewicz’s article, but also tries to examine the whole subject in a much deeper way, through testing some of the latter’s claims; besides this article is too small (only seventeen pages) to fully cover all the necessary points. In general, although it is very important as a first approach to this topic in a deep and systematic way, it remains but an initial endeavour, and, as will be shown, not without certain problems.20

In addition, there are some points that Sinkewicz treats rather quickly, and others that he does not develop to a significant extent. For instance, a deeper analysis is required in matters such as how man becomes able to see the divine light, namely the presuppositions for such vision, the difference between the illuminations (Theophanies) in the Old and New Testament, the role of the heart, and how the αἰσθησις νοερά is related to the human body. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that, rather surprisingly, this article has not attracted significant scholarly attention; this could be partially explained due to the fact that it may not be easily accessed. However, this paper is indeed fundamental and definitive for any handling of the νοερά αἰσθησις. This thesis has profited a lot from it, and I am, therefore, grateful to Sinkewicz. The latter visited this topic again three years later, i.e. in 2002, in his ‘Gregory Palamas’,21 but he there seems just to summarize his findings of his previous article.

About ten years later, Tollefsen touched the issue of perception of the divine in Palamas.22 Apart from providing some reflections on energeia and participation in God according to Palamas, Tollefsen raises some important questions which are closely related to our subject. First, he wonders what exactly the light on Mount Tabor is, namely what is its ontological status (p. 201). Second, he asks: ‘by what faculty of the soul do the apostles perceive it? In what way is the experience of light adapted to a scheme of spiritual development? What is the role of the Holy Spirit in the experience of light? What does the activity as light accomplish in the beholder?’ (p. 202). Third, ‘how could uncreated light be perceived by created beings?’ (ibid). Fourth, ‘what

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20 Some problematic points are analysed in the Concluding Remarks of ch. 7.
21 Published in La théologie byzantine et sa tradition, 131-88 (see, mainly, p. 155-161).
22 See chapter 7 (‘The Theology of St Gregory Palamas’), in his Activity and Participation, 185-206; mainly section ‘B. The Light of Mount Tabor’, p. 201-6 of this book.
happens to man’ in the divine union? (ibid). And, finally, how are we to understand ‘the terminology of contemplation and vision’? (ibid).

These are indeed very central and crucial questions in one’s effort to trace the Palamite αἰσθησις νοερά. And Tollefsen certainly provides some important thoughts about them. However, his contribution is too brief, shorter than that of Sinkewicz, and, unfortunately, the reader gains just a superficial approach, not an in-depth analysis. Nevertheless, it should be noticed that these questions undoubtedly serve as a guiding point for this thesis too.

23 Tollefsen tries to answer these questions mainly in p. 201-6. It is indicatively that he refers to αἴσθησις νοερά και θεία only once (see p. 204-5).

24 Cf. our comment regarding Tollefsen’s chapter on Palamas in the Literature Review of this thesis. However, to tell the truth, the aim of this chapter is not Palamas’ spiritual senses. It is primarily to show that the Palamite doctrine of the distinction between essence and activities is not an innovation, but may be also found in previous Christian thinkers; moreover, that it is philosophically sound. In my view, Tollefsen accomplishes this aim quite well. Nevertheless, I was not persuaded by his evaluation that a ‘real’ distinction in Palamas’ mind is problematic, as far as the essence and activities are concerned (Tollefsen here refers to Meyendorff’s relevant claim; see, e.g., p. 198: ‘Meyendorff is correct that there is a distinction between God’s essence and his activities. The activities, however, are closely connected with what the divine being is essentially. I somehow sense that the term “real” distinction may suggest too much of a diversity, and I wonder if the whole question and perhaps problem of divine activity and creaturely participation could not be viewed in a slightly different manner”). It seems to me that this is not just a matter of interpretation of Palamas by later, or recent, theologians, but that it lies at the core of his theology: the essence is totally united to the activities, whereas, in the same time, these two are not identical. Besides, let us remember that Palamas’ opponents had the same problem with him. For this reason Palamas devoted many pages to ground and justify this distinction. But, on the other hand, it does not seem to me possible to fully understand this reality through our mind. After all, it is a mystery and, thus, it is primarily to be experienced, and not to be logically comprehended. A similar approach to that of Tollefsen was recently attempted by John Demetracopoulos, who claimed about a ‘mitigation’ of Palamas by his immediate followers: he regards that this may be found in their use of the kat’ epinoian distinction between essence and activities. Again, to his mind, this is in opposition to the ‘real’ distinction of Palamas. See, relevantly, his ‘Palamas transformed. Palamite Interpretations of the Distinction between God’s “Essence” and “Energies” in Late Byzantium’, in Martin Hinterberg and Chris Schabel (eds), Greeks, Latins and Intellectual History 1204-1500 (Leuven-Paris-Walpole MA: Peeters, 2011), 263-372. Once more, it does not seem to me valid to think that the ‘real’ distinction is problematic, and that the kat’ epinoian one of Palamas’ followers serves as a ‘mitigation’ of it. Norman Russell agrees with this evaluation; see his ‘The Reception of Palamas in West Today’, 18-9. Here, Russell provides his opinion, expressing, as he does, his desire to search further this topic in a forthcoming study: it seems that this is done, at least partially, in his recent brief article ‘TheChristological Context of Palamas’ Approach to Participation in God’, in C. Athanasopoulos (ed.), Triune God: Incomprehensible but Knowable (2015), 190-8. To sum up, this whole subject undoubtedly needs thorough research to be fully clarified; but, unfortunately, this goes beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is a very interesting topic, which would surely deserve a serious endeavour, for a definite word to be said.
Furthermore, very recently, in 2014, Marcus Plested visited this subject in an interesting article of his. He there examines the spiritual senses in many authors such as Origen, Evagrios, Gregory of Nyssa, Dionysios the Areopagite, Macarios, Diadochos of Photiki, as well as Maximos, John of Damascus, Symeon the New Theologian, and Palamas. The importance of this article lies in the fact that it provides both an idea of the patristic roots of the spiritual senses, and, at the same time, also how this theology was gradually shaped and developed during the Byzantine era. However, its disadvantage is that all these are offered only in a very brief way. As far as Palamas is considered, what directly interests this thesis, he is given only a very tiny space, about one page, and, thus, only an extremely short sketch of the relevant theology is provided.

To sum up, from this review of the secondary literature, we can see that a deep and systematic study of the Palamite teaching on the spiritual senses is very much needed. This is what we shall attempt in the current Part, always having in mind our main aim, namely to show the crucial role that the human body has in Palamas’ understanding of the spiritual senses.

In his latest work on Palamas, Sinkewicz remarked that, as far as the spiritual senses are concerned, ‘Although Palamas drew upon an earlier tradition, he clearly gave it a new precision of meaning’. But the reader cannot help but wonder: is this comment correct, and why? What did Palamas say exactly on the spiritual senses? To what extent was he based on previous Fathers, and what was, if any, his original contribution? Finally, what is the place of the body in his relevant theology? These are the main research questions that this Part examines. But, first of all, let us briefly look at the historical and theological context of this debate, as well as the relevant teaching of the antihesychasts.

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3. Triad 1,3 (Third Question): The Historical and Theological Context, and the Teaching of Palamas’ Theological Opponents

As Sinkewicz has explained, intellectual perception ‘can be defined in general as the means whereby the human person experiences God or spiritual realities. More specifically, in the controversy between Gregory Palamas and Barlaam the Calabrian, it is the means whereby the human person knows God’. Moreover, as will be shown over the course of this Part, for Palamas the spiritual senses are closely connected with the issues of knowledge, divine illumination, perfection, intellectual perception (αἰσθησις νοερά) and the participation of the body in spiritual realities.

First and foremost, it is very interesting to examine the reasons for why Palamas feels forced to engage in dialogue about these issues. These reasons can be derived from the preamble of Tr. 1,3, namely the Ἑρωτήσεως Τρίτη (Third Question). It should be noted that in the beginning of each of the three sections of Triad I, Palamas has a monk asking a short question to set up the discussion which follows. Each section is an effort to provide an answer to the corresponding question. Palamas uses this means to show that he engaged in the hesychast debates only after having been invited to do so by the Athonite monks. Thus, let us examine the Third Question of the First Triad (i.e., Tr. 1,3).

In the beginning of this question St Gregory argues that those who write against the hesychasts (τούς κατὰ τὸν ἡσυχαζόντων γράφοντας) are not in the position to understand the hesychast teaching and life, because they have not gained the experience which is derived only from spiritual struggle. In particular, he regards them as lacking ‘knowledge’, which derives from a) ‘works’ (ἔργα) and b) ‘experience’ (πείρα) which

28 For a brief discussion of the most adequate English translation of the αἰσθησις νοερά, see the introduction of this thesis.
30 For some useful relevant points (as well as additional bibliography), cf. the second section in the introduction of this thesis (regarding ‘The Historical and Theological Context’).
31 Christou, ΠΣ 1, 336.
32 For a concise presentation of the basic points raised in the Third Question, see Sinkewicz, ‘The Concept’, 375.
is gained only through life (Palamas probably means ‘spiritual life’), and which is ‘the only [thing] certain and irrefutable’ [or: source of knowledge].

Moreover, they ‘absolutely refuse to listen to the Fathers’, they have ‘deviated from the correct way’, and they calumniate the saints. But, more importantly, they often contradict themselves: when they try to speak about illumination, ‘they regard as illusion every illumination which is said to be perceived through the senses’. But, at the same time, they also argue that ‘every divine illumination is sensibly perceived’.

In addition, according to Palamas, those who oppose the hesychasts consider symbolic (συμβολικὸς) every illumination that happened in the Old Testament before the coming of Christ, namely to the Jews and the Prophets. What is more crucial, they clearly regard as sensible (αἰσθητόν δὲ σωφρός) the illumination at the Mount Tabor, during the transfiguration of Christ, as well as the illumination that took place during the descent of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost (Acts 2:1-13). Moreover, for the antihesychasts knowledge is the only illumination that surpasses the senses; thus they regard γνώσις as superior to the (divine) light, and as the aim of every contemplation.

It goes without saying that for Palamas the above points are extremely problematic from a theological point of view. In the following chapters a thorough analysis of his standpoint will be undertaken.

It is noteworthy that, for a period, the antihesychasts—Barlaam included—spent time living close to some hesychasts, so as to acquaint their teaching and life. Palamas mentions that the former pretended to be their disciples, but were not ‘ready or quick at learning’. For this reason, and in order to persuade them, the antihesychasts asked the hesychasts to present to them in writing some of their teachings and practices. According to the former, the hesychasts suggested they entirely abandon the study of divine Scripture, as something evil, and to be attached only to prayer. Through prayer two aims are attained: a) ‘it is prayer that drives away the evil spirits which become

33 Third Question.1-4, ΠΣ 1, 407 (103.1-4).
34 Third Question.4-8, 407 (103.6-10).
35 Third Question.8-11, 407 (103.10-3): ...διό καὶ περὶ φωτισμοῦ λέγειν ἑπεχειροῦντες ἀπαγορεύσωσι μὲν ὡς πλάνην πάντα φωτισμοῦ αἰσθῆσαι ληπτόν, οἱ αὐτοὶ δὲ καὶ πάντα φωτισμοῦθεόν αἰσθῆσαι λέγουσιν ληπτόν...
36 Third Question.12-6, 407 (103.13-8).
37 Third Question.16-8, 407 (103.18-20): Ὑπέρ αἰσθηθηνί δὲ φωτισμὸν τὴν γνώσιν μόνην λέγουσι, διὸ καὶ ταύτην κρείττω τοῦ φωτός καὶ τέλος πάσης ἀποφαίνονται θεωρίας.
38 Third Question.23-5, 407 (103.25-8): Λέγουσι δ᾿ ὃμως ὑποκριθήναι μὲν μαθητεύων, ἀλλὰ οὐκ εὐμαθεῖς, διὸ γραφή διδόναι τὰ παρὰ τῶν διδασκάλων πρὸς αὐτοὺς λεγόμενα λαπαρῆσαι τε καὶ πέσαι.
mingled with the very being of man’, and b) ‘these monks become inflamed in a sensible manner, leap about and are filled with feelings of joy, without their souls being in any way changed’.\textsuperscript{39} Furthermore, ‘They see sensible lights, and come to think that the sign of divine things is a white colour, and of evil things a fiery yellow’.\textsuperscript{40}

Palamas knows that Barlaam and the antihesychasts renounced the above states as being demonic.\textsuperscript{41} He goes on to accuse the antihesychasts of not wanting to engage in a real and sincere dialogue on these matters, of hiding their true purposes behind complex formulations, and of changing their teachings often, so as to confuse their readers and interlocutors.\textsuperscript{42} As the questioning monk of the \textit{Triads} puts it, ‘...in their writings they imitate the many convolutions and perfidies of the serpent, turning back upon themselves in many ways, employing many ruses, and interpreting their own words in different and contradictory manners. They do not possess the firmness and simplicity of truth, but fall easily into contradiction...’\textsuperscript{43}

For these reasons, Palamas regards the antihesychasts—in particular those who reject the hesychast prayer and the divine illumination during it—as having fallen into heresy, like Arius, the great heresiarch of the fourth century.\textsuperscript{44} Hence, he calls them ‘calumniators of the saints’ (συκοφάνται τῶν ἅγιων),\textsuperscript{45} and feels it a great necessity to respond to their delusions and errors.

\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Third Question}, 407.25-408.7 (103.28-105.5), trans. Gendle, 32: πάσης μὲν γραφῆς ἱερᾶς ὡς πονηρᾶς ἀφείσθαι, προεανέχειν δὲ μόνη τῇ εὐχῇ, δι’ ἦς ἀπελευνείσθαι μὲν τὰ πονηρὰ πνεύματα, συνουσιωμένα ὃντα τὸν ἀνθρώπον, ἐκπυρωθείν δὲ τῶν αὐτοῦς αἰσθητάς καὶ σκιρτάν καὶ ἰδέσθαι, μηδὲν ἄλλοιμουμένης τῆς ψυχῆς.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Third Question} 5-7, 408 (105.5-8), trans. Gendle, 32: ...βλέπειν δὲ φύσα τούτους αἰσθητά, σημεῖον δὲ ἠγείρειν τῶν μὲν θείων τὴν ἐπικεχρωσμένην λευκότητα, τῶν δὲ πονηρῶν τὸ ὅλον πυρώδες καὶ ἔναθὸν.

\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Third Question} 8-9, 408 (105.8-10): Τοὺς μὲν οὖν διδάσκοντας αὐτοῦς φάναι ταῦτα γράφουσιν, αὐτοὶ δὲ δαμιονιώδη ταῦτ’ ἐίναι πάντα ἀρνοφαίνονται. For the above accusations against the Hesychasts, as well as some other relevant, see Barlaam, \textit{Epistle 5. Second to Ignatios}, 114-37, ed. G. Schiro, \textit{Barlaam Calabro, Epistole Greche. I primordi episodici e dottrinari delle lotte eiscaste}, Testi e Monumenti I (Palermo: Istituto Siciliano di Studi Bizantini e Neogreci, 1954), 323-4. For the sources of Barlaam’s criticism of the hesychasts, and an analysis of them, see Rigo, \textit{Monaci eiscasti e monaci bogomili}, 39-103.

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Third Question} 8-20, 408 (105.8-21).

\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Third Question} 12-8, 408 (105.12-8), trans. Gendle, 32: ...καὶ διὰ πολλῶν ἃν τις ἐπισκέψατο περιπίπτοντας οἷς κατηγροσά τινι καὶ μᾶλιστα τὸ πολυελικὸν καὶ δολερὸν τοῦ ὄρος ἐν τοῖς ἐαυτῶν μιμομφόνων γράμμασι, πολλὰς τε στροφὰς στερεομένως καὶ πολλὰς ἐξελίπτοντας πλοκὰς καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλα καὶ ἐναντίον τὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἐξηγομένως. Τὸ γὰρ ἐδραῖον καὶ ἀπλόν ὅν τινι ἐξοντες τῆς ἀληθείας, εὐπερίτερποι εἰσὶν εἰς τἀναντία...

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Tr.} 1,3,1, 409-10 (107). In this section, the first of \textit{Tr.} 1,3, St Gregory describes in a very eloquent way the fact that heresy always tries to prove—in a deceitful, yet often successful, manner—it's identity to the truth.

\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Tr.} 1,3,2, 410 (109-11).
Having outlined the historical and theological context of Palamas’ teaching concerning the spiritual senses, we can see that a major difference between the hesychasts and their opponents lies in their doctrine concerning the knowledge of God, and its relation to the divine light. In what follows, Palamas’ relevant response will be analysed.

4. The Reaction of Palamas: Human Knowledge and Divine Light

a. Palamas on Knowledge, and the State of the Question

First of all, let us make some comments on St Gregory’s stance towards human knowledge. In scholarship, an accusation that is sometimes turned against him is that he totally opposes human reason and knowledge. However, it should be underlined that he does not fight philosophy or reason (λογική) in general, but finds problems only in man’s wrong use of philosophy. This is clearly seen in many places of his corpus. As an example one need only think of Tr. 1,3,12. Here Palamas bases his argument on St Paul’s distinction in 1 Cor. 2:14-5 between the ‘spiritual’ and ‘unspiritual’ (or: natural) man (πνευματικός καὶ ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος): 14 ‘Those who are unspiritual [or: natural] do not receive the gifts of God’s Spirit, for they are foolishness to them, and they are unable to understand them because they are [only] spiritually discerned. 15 Those who are spiritual discern all things, and they are themselves subject to no one else’s scrutiny’.

For St Gregory, a person who tries to find ultimate truth through his own thoughts, discussions, and syllogisms, is not a spiritual person (πνευματικός ἄνθρωπος). On the contrary, he is unspiritual (ψυχικός).46 The same could be said for him who tries to teach about vigilance (περὶ νήψεως) without having attained silence and vigilance in his intellect, or if one wants to prove through reason ‘the Good which is beyond reason’ (τὸ ὑπὲρ λόγον ἀγαθῶν). In a totally senseless manner he tries to observe ‘through natural knowledge the things that transcend nature’ (ἀφρόνως ὑπενόησε φυσικῇ γνώσει

46 Tr. 1,3,12.10-4, 422 (135.5-9).
τὰ ὑπὲρ φύσιν κατοπτεύσαι). Besides ‘the depths of God’ are revealed only through the Spirit (cf. 1 Cor. 2:10).

Therefore, as shown from the above, and from many other examples that could be brought to bear on the topic, Palamas criticizes the wrong use of philosophy and reason in general, namely when the latter are used in opposition to faith. For Palamas, if reason is directed towards the achievement of good, then it is something necessary for life and blessed. As he himself puts it elsewhere: ‘But someone thinking correctly would not condemn ignorance in general, nor do we think that all knowledge is good. Why should we consider knowledge an aim in everything that we do?’ The roots of Palamas’ stance towards philosophy, and human knowledge in general, can be found in St Paul’s teaching, who distinguishes between ‘the teaching of human wisdom’, and that of ‘the Holy Spirit’.

On the other hand, as mentioned in the previous section, the opponents of the hesychasts believed that man may attain union with God only through knowledge. In particular, as Palamas points out, they argued that it is not possible to achieve perfection and sanctity, unless one has found ‘true knowledge of the beings’. Moreover, this knowledge is not possible to be found without ‘distinction, reasoning, and analysis’. In other words perfection is attained through the power of reason. However, Palamas could in no way accept these ideas, and strongly opposed them. For him, the only way to attain union with God is through divine illumination, communion with the divine light. Hence, he very often contrasts human knowledge and the divine light, trying to prove the superiority of the latter to the former. But this remark brings us to the next sub-section.

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47 Tr. 1,3.12.17-27, 422 (135.12-23).
48 Cf., for instance, the faculty of sense perception, in Part I of this thesis (ch. 3.3), where Palamas speaks very positively about human science.
49 Tr. 1,3.14.3-5, 424 (139.3-6): Ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ πᾶσαν ἁγιωσάνυ ὑπ’ ἐγκλήμα θοιτ’ ἀν τις εὐφρονὸν, οὐδὲ πᾶσα γνῶσιν οἴμεθα μακαριστόν. Πῶς οὖν πρὸς αὐτὴν ὡς πρὸς τέλος ἀφορώντες πάντα πράξομεν;
50 See, very indicatively, 1 Cor. 2:13; a passage that Palamas refers to in Tr. 1,3.24. But this is a huge subject (namely St Paul’s stance according to human wisdom), that requires an in depth study and analysis, which surely goes beyond the scope of this thesis.
51 Tr. 1,3.13.10-4, 423 (137.9-13): Φασὶ γὰρ μηδένα δύνατόν εἶναι τελειότητος τοῖς καὶ ἀγιώτητος μετέχειν τὴν ἀληθῆ περὶ τῶν ὄντων οὐχ εὐθυκότα δοξάν, εὐρηκέναι δὲ αὐτὴν ἄνευ διαίρεσεως καὶ συμπληγμοῦ καὶ ἁναλόςως ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν. Cf., e.g., Barlaam’s Epistle 1 to Palamas, ed. Schirò, 229-66.
First of all, it is interesting that Palamas does not disagree, in principle, with Barlaam, as far as the possibility of attaining knowledge of God is concerned, namely man’s potentiality to know something about God. Barlaam accepts knowledge of God, but he does so as a vision accomplished through man’s reasoning powers. Palamas goes even further: he accepts knowledge that comes through ‘direct revelation’, namely through direct communion with God. Only the latter is true ‘theology’.

In particular, St Gregory acknowledges that there is indeed knowledge about God and the doctrines concerning Him: this contemplation is called theologia. Moreover, ‘the natural use and movement of the powers of the soul and the members of the body is to effect reformation of the rational image’. Here Palamas refers to the image of God in man which is reformed when man uses his soul and body in a Godly manner. It is worth noting that Palamas mentions not only the soul, but also the body, showing thus the great unity between the two, and, moreover, his great respect and honour for the human body.

However, Palamas hastens to add that ‘this is not the perfect majesty of the nobility that comes from above, and the union beyond nature of light transcending light’. By so doing Palamas wants to distinguish theologia from theosis, namely theoretical knowledge of God from vision of the divine light. Only through the latter may the following two situations be attained: a) ‘safe theologizing’, and b) ‘the establishment and movement, according to nature, of our powers of the soul and the body’. Here Palamas seems to refer to the transformation of human nature and its return to its state before the fall (‘according to nature’: τὸ κατὰ φύσιν). This is attained through vision of the divine light. The antithesychasts, by having rejected it, ‘have also

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52 Tr. 1,3,15.10-2, 425 (141.14-6): Ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς περὶ μὲν τῆς γνώσεως οὐδὲν ἀντειπεῖν πρός αὐτοὺς αἰροῦμεθα· συνδοκά γὰρ λέγουσιν ἡμῖν, εἰ καὶ μὴ συνιάσω τι λέγουσιν. Cf. the remarks of Christou (ΠΣ 1, 425 n. 3) and Meyendorff (Défense des Saints Hésychastes, 140 n. 6).

53 Christou, ΠΣ 1, 425 n. 3.

54 Tr. 1,3,15.12-4, 425 (141.16-8): Ἐστι γὰρ καὶ ἡ περὶ Θεοῦ καὶ τὸν κατ’ αὐτὸν δογμάτων γνώσις, θεωρία, δ θεολογίαιν ὀνομάζομεν.

55 Tr. 1,3,15.14-6, 425 (141.18-20):...καὶ ἡ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων καὶ τῶν τῶν σώματος μελῶν κατὰ φύσιν χρήσεις τε καὶ κινήσεως ἀναμορφώσεις ποιεῖται τῆς λογικῆς εἰκόνος.

56 Tr. 1,3,15.16-8, 425 (141.20-2): ἀλλ’, οὐ τοῦτο ἐστιν ἡ τελεία τῆς ἀνωθεν ἡμῖν εὐγενείας εὑρέσεως καὶ ἡ πρὸς τὸ ὑπέρφρασις φῶς ὑπερφυῆς ἔνωσις...

57 Tr. 1,3,15.18-20, 425 (141.22-5):...παρ’ ἒς μόνης ἐγκύνται καὶ τὸ θεολογεῖν ἀσφαλῶς καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστάναι τα καὶ κινεῖσθαι τάς ἐν ἡμῖν δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος.
destroyed every virtue and truth’.\textsuperscript{58} This element points us back to Palamas’ idea that man attains the true image of God in theosis.\textsuperscript{59}

For Palamas, divine illumination is superior to knowledge. As he writes elsewhere, ‘there is indeed an intellectual illumination (φωτισμός νοερός), visible to those whose hearts have been purified, and utterly different from knowledge, though productive (παρεκτικός) of it’.\textsuperscript{60} But what exactly, we may ask, is this ‘intellectual illumination’? And why is it ‘productive’ of knowledge?

Palamas argues that illuminations occurred both in the Old and the New Testament. However, he draws a major distinction between a) the light that shone at the beginning of the creation, and the glory that Moses received on Mount Sinai; and, on the other hand, b) the illumination that happens in the New Testament, in the hearts of the faithful. He argues that if the former [i.e. (a)] was a ‘limited knowledge’ (γνώσις ᾄν μετρία), then the illumination that appears in our hearts is a superior illumination. The first light was accessible to the sensible eyes, thus it can be called ‘sensible’. However, the second light can be called ‘intelligible’ (νοητήν), ‘for only the intelligible eyes have access to it, and because it is active within us’.\textsuperscript{61}

But the glory that shone upon Moses’ face was not simply a sensible light. To prove this Palamas brings an argument of St Macarios, that the saints have even now in their souls a light, which is the glory of the light that Moses had in his face.\textsuperscript{62} Based on two relevant arguments, of St Maximos and St Neilos, Palamas concludes that ‘when the intellect has put aside the passions, then it sees itself as a light during prayer, and is illumined by divine light’.\textsuperscript{63}

Moreover, St Gregory argues that the divine light could be called ‘hypostatic’ (ὑποστατικόν). Again he draws on Macarios: ‘the perfect illumination of the Spirit is not only as it were revelation of thoughts, but is a sure and permanent illumination of

\textsuperscript{58} Tr. 1,3,15.20-1, 425 (141.25-6): ταύτην οὖν ἀναφοράς κυνάνειλον πάσαν ἀρετήν καὶ ἀλήθειαν.
\textsuperscript{59} See, e.g., ch. 3.2 of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{60} Tr. 1,3,5.6-8, 415 (117.32-119.2), trans. Gendle, 34: ...ἐστι φωτισμός νοερός τοῖς κεκαθαρμένοις τὴν καρδίαν ἐνορώμενος, ἀλλὸς παντάπασι παρὰ τὴν γνώσιν, ὃς καὶ παρεκτικὸς ἐστιν αὐτής...
\textsuperscript{61} Tr. 1,3,6,2-10, 416 (121.4-13): ...Εἰσέπειν μὲν οὖν αἰσθητοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὑποκειμένην αἰσθητὴν ἀνάγκη λέγειν, καθάπερ ταύτην νοητὴν, νοητοῖς ὑποκειμένην δημασί καὶ ἐντὸς ἠμῶν ἐνεργοῦμενήν.
\textsuperscript{63} Tr. 1,3,7.8-10, 417 (123.12-4): Ὑποκειμένην, ἀνελθέ, σαρφὸς ὅτι νοῦς παθῶν ἀπαλαγεῖς όσς φῶς αὐτὸς ἐκατόν κατὰ τὴν προσευχὴν ὃ ὅτι καὶ θείον περιλάμπεται φωτὶ;
hypostatic light in [their] souls’. And Palamas also presents the hagiographical passages that Macarios uses to support his thought: a) ‘For it is the God who said, “Let light shine out of darkness,” who has shone in our hearts...’ (2 Cor. 4:6); b) ‘...Give light to my eyes, lest I sleep unto death’ [Ps. 12 [13]:4 (3)]; c) ‘O send out your light and your truth; these led me, and they brought me to your holy mountain and to your coverts’ (Ps. 42 [43]: 3); and d) ‘...The light of your face was made a sign upon us, O Lord!’ (Ps. 4:6).65

Based on this evidence Palamas contends that Macarios, by calling this light υποστατικόν, showed clearly that knowledge is not the only illumination, because this light also has ‘hypostasis’. Palamas probably wants to maintain that this light has ‘a superior hypostasis’ than that of knowledge. Thus this becomes for him an argument against the antihesychasts. In Palamas’ own characteristic words, Macarios called the divine light υποστατικόν so as to ‘stop up the mouth of them who consider only knowledge to be an illumination, and thus divert the understanding of many people, and first and foremost their own, by interpreting falsely as knowledge everything that one could say about this light’.66 Furthermore, Palamas uses an argument that he had used previously, namely that even knowledge could be called ‘light’, because the former is produced from the latter.67

Nevertheless, no one has called knowledge that is approached by the senses ‘light’, ‘even if sometimes it constitutes a very safe (and sure) knowledge’: only knowledge which is approached by the intellect and is rational (λογικήν) may be called ‘light’.68 Moreover, every creature that has ‘rational power’ is ‘intellectual light’.69 For

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64 Tr. 1,3,7.13-6, 417 (123.18-21): ἡ τελεία τοῦ πνεύματος ἔλλαμψις οὐχ ὁδὸν νοημάτων μόνον ἁποκάλυψις ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ υποστατικὸν φωτὸς ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς βεβαια καὶ διηνεκὴς ἔλλαμψις. For the exact passage of Macarios, see his Homily 58, 2,1.14-6, ed. Heinz Berthold, Makarios/Symeon Reden und Briefe, vol. II, GCS 56 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1973), 183.

65 Tr. 1,3,7.16-22, 417 (123.21-7): ...τὸ γὰρ, ὅ εἰπόν ἐκ σκότους φῶς λάμψαι ὡς ἔλαμψεν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν, καὶ τὸ φότισσιν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς μου μῆπτοι ὑπενόσῳ εἰς θάνατον’, καὶ τὸ, ἐξ ἀπόστειλον τὸ φῶς σου καὶ τὴν ἀλλήλεων σου, αὐτὰ με δόθησιν εἰς ὅρος ἐγένον σου, καὶ τὸ, ἐπισκέπτομαι ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ φῶς τοῦ προσώπου σου...

66 Tr. 1,3,7.22-6, 417 (123.28-32): Ὑποστατικόν δὲ εἶπεν, ἵν’ ἐμφράξῃ τὰ στόματα τῶν τὴν γνώσιν μόνον οἰωμένον φωτισμὸν καὶ περιτριπτόντων τὴν τῶν πολλῶν διάνοιαν, καὶ πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων τὴν οἰκείαν, τὸ μεταλαμβάνειν εἰς τὴν γνώσιν παρεξηγομένους πᾶν ὅτι περὶ τις τὴν περὶ ἐκεῖνον τοῦ φωτος.

67 Tr. 1,3,7.26-8, 417 (123.32-125.2). Cf. Tr. 1,3,3 and 5.

68 Tr. 1,3,8.1-3, 418 (125.3-6): ...οὐδὲ τὴν ἅπα τῶν αἰσθητῶν προστιθεμένην εἴδοσιν, κατὰ γνώσιν οὕσαν ἔστιν ὅπου καὶ ἀσφαλεστάτην, φῶς πάσποτε τὰς προσηγορεῦσεν, ἀλλὰ μόνην τὴν ἅπα τοῦ νοῦ καὶ λογικήν.

69 Tr. 1,3,8.4, 418 (125.6-7): Οὐδὲν γὰρ ὁρῶμεν λόγου δύναμιν ἔχον, ὃ μη νοερόν ἔστι φῶς.
instance, this is true of the angels, and of the human intellect. Besides, the latter, ‘seeing itself, it sees as a light’. Thus it sees an ‘intellectual light’.  

Furthermore, God, ‘who is beyond every intellectual light and super-substantially transcends every essence’, ‘possesses in himself a mysterious and invisible character, for there is no matter (ἄλη) capable of receiving the divine manifestation’. However, based on the witnesses ‘of the saints who have seen and experienced the splendour of God’, Palamas argues that also God may be seen as ‘intellectual light’ (ὡς φῶς ὀρθάνος νοειν), when He finds suitable and uncovered ‘matter’ (ἐπιτηδείᾳς ἀλης): ‘this is every intellectual and purified essence, which does not bring the cover of evil’. In other words, the saints—and the angels—, who have purified themselves from sin, may see God, and they see Him as intellectual light.

Here St Gregory refers to three New Testament passages: a) Mat. 5:8: ‘Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God’; b) 1 John 1:5: ‘God is light’; and c) John 14:21,23: ‘Whoever has my commandments and keeps them, he it is who loves me. And he who loves me will be loved by my Father, and I will love him and manifest myself to him; 23 Jesus answered him, “If a man loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our home with him”’. 

In addition, Palamas maintains that God reveals himself to the purified intellect ‘as in a mirror’ (ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ), but ‘being in Himself invisible’. Besides, this always happens when an image is seen through a mirror. In this case a paradox appears: ‘the image, although seen, remains invisible, and it is almost impossible to see (an image) through a mirror and, at the same time, to see the object that forms this image in the mirror’. For instance, if one sees a tree through a mirror, it is not possible to be also

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70 Tr. 1,3,8,5-6, 418 (125,7-8).
71 Tr. 1,3,8,6-7, 418 (125,8-10): Ο τε νοος αὐτὸς ἐκατόν ὅραν, ὡς φῶς ὀρθώ· τι τοῖνυν καὶ οὕτως, εἰ μὴ νοερόν ἐκατόν βλέπει φῶς.
72 Tr. 1,3,8,7-12, 418 (125,10-5): Καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ παντὸς νοερὸς φωτός ἐπέκεινα Θεός καὶ πάσης οὐσίας ἐπέκεινα ὑπερουσίας ἐκβεβηκώς... ἔχει μὲν... τὸ κρύφιον καὶ ἀθέαρητον καθ᾽ ἐκατόν, μὴ προκεμενής ὑπῆρ τῆς χωρούσης τὴν θείαν ἐμφάνειαν.
73 Tr. 1,3,8,12-7, 418 (125,15-21): ἤνικα δὲ ἐν ἐπιτηδείᾳς ὑπῆρ ἀπερικαλύπτως ἐχούσης ἐπιλάβηται, τοιαύτῃ δὲ ἔστε πᾶσα νοερὰ κεκαθαρμένη φώσις, τὸ τῆς κακίας ὅπως ἐπιφερομένη κάλυμμα, τηγακάτα καὶ αὐτῶς ὡς φῶς ὀρθάνος νοειν, ὡς δὲ ἀυτῶν τὸν καὶ παθόντων καὶ ἰδιόντων λαμπρότητα θεοῦ ἐδειξείμεν τέ καὶ δειξείμεν ἄγιον.
74 Tr. 1,3,9,6-10, 419 (127,20-5).
75 Tr. 1,3,9,10-4, 419 (127,25-9): ἐμφανίζει δὲ ὡς ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ τῷ κεκαθαρμένῳ νῷ, τὸ καθ᾽ ἐκατὸν ἄριστος ὑπάρχον· τοιαύτῳ γὰρ ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ μορφή· φαινομένη ὡς ὀρθάται καὶ σχεδὸν ἀδύνατον ἐστὶν ὅραν τε ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ καὶ αὐτὸ κατὰ ταὐτό τὸ μορφοῦ τὸ ἐσόπτρον ὅραν.
looking at the tree simultaneously. The same happens in the case of God. Man is seeing God ἐν ἑσόπτρῳ, but in fact not seeing God Himself. Palamas implies here his favourite distinction between essence and activities in God: man sees, and participates in, God’s activities, but not His essence.

This happens in this life to those who have purified themselves through love. But in the age to come, God will be seen ‘face to face’. At this point Palamas draws on St Paul’s words in 1 Cor. 13:12: ‘For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall understand fully, even as I have been fully understood’.  

St Gregory believes that ‘Those who have never experienced nor seen the divine in no way believe that God is seen as light beyond light (ὁς φῶς ὑπὲρ φῶς) but [believe that it] is beheld only rationally (λογικὸς μόνον θεωρεῖσθαι): these are like the blind who experience only the warmth of the sun, but do not believe those who see and say that the sun is radiant.’ Obviously, St Gregory refers here to the opponents of Hesychasm who argued that man is able to reach God through knowledge, and denied the vision of the divine light. Moreover, ‘if the blind try to teach those who are able to see (τοὺς ὁρῶντας) that the sun, the most luminous of all sensible things, is not [in fact] light, then they will cause those who see by means of their physical eyes to laugh’. Something similar happens to those who reject the vision of the divine light: they will be lamented ‘not only by those who really see intellectually (τῶν νοερῶς ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁρῶντων), but also from those who believe (and are trustful) in them (who see)’.

In addition, those who deny the vision of the light will face two major consequences: First, They do not accept and respond to God’s love (eros). In particular, God, ‘who transcends all things, and is incomprehensible and ineffable’, ‘from an excess of goodness towards us, humans (δὴ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀγαθότητος)’, consents to be participable by the intellect and ‘invisibly seen through His super-

76 Tr. 1,3,10.15-6, 419 (129.1-2).
77 Tr. 1,3,10.16-20, 419 (129.2-7): Οἱ δὲ τὸ μή παθεῖν τὰ θεῖα, μηδὲ ἰδεῖν μηδαμῶς πιστεύουσις ὁς φῶς ὑπὲρ φῶς ὁρᾶσθαι τὸν Θεόν, ἀλλὰ λογικῶς μόνον θεωρεῖσθαι, τυφλοὶς έοίκασιν, οἱ τῆς τοῦ ἡλίου θέρμης μόνης αὐτούλιμβανόμενοι τοῖς ὑπόδεικνυόν ὅτι καὶ φαινόμενον ἀληθῶς ἡμὸς ἡμᾶς ἦλιος.
78 Tr. 1,3,10.23-7, 419 (129.7-13). Εἰ δὲ καὶ τοὺς ὁρῶντας οἱ τυφλοὶ μεταδιδάσκειν ἐγχειροῦσιν, ὡς ὁ ὑπὸ ἀίσθητος φανότατος ἀπάντων ἢλιος, καταγέλαστοι μὲν οὓτως τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπόδεικνυόν ἐσονταί. ἐκείνοι δ’ οἱ τὰ παραπλήσια πάσχοντες περὶ τὸν τοῦ παντὸς ὑπερανιδρυμένον ‘ἀγαθοτῆτος ἤλιον’, οἱ παρὰ τῶν νοερῶς ὡς ἀληθῶς ὁρῶντων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τῶν πιστεύοντων τοῖς ὑπόδεικνυόν ἐσονταί ἢλιος.
essential and inseparable (ἀνεκφορίτητον) power’, therefore showing a clear and self-evident (αὐτοψήφη) love. But the opponents of Hesychasm do not respond to this love, thus remaining ‘unable to love’ (ἀνέφραστοι). 2 Second, the antihesychasts do not want to follow the teaching of the saints, and they also carry away with them those people who are obedient to the saints, so they have companions with them when ‘they will see as fire, Him that they have not known as light’, nor believed in. This statement, strict indeed—which though shows how dangerous, from a theological and spiritual point of view, Palamas regards the denial of the direct vision of the divine light—permits us to make some further comments about the divine light. In particular to answer whether it is sensible, and whether it is identical to knowledge.

c. Is the Divine Light Sensible? Is it Identical to Knowledge?

To respond to the aforementioned questions, initially Palamas refers to the ‘fire’ that the sinners will suffer in the eschaton, and contends that ‘this fire [i.e. light] is dark, or better identical to the threatened darkness’ (μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ ἡπειλημένῳ σκότει ταῦτάν). He then brings to mind the words of the Lord who speaks of ‘the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels’. Therefore, this light cannot be sensible, for it has been prepared for the evil angels, who lack sensation (ἀμορφοῦσι γὰρ αἰσθήσεως

79 Tr. 1,3,10, 419.27-420.2 (129.13-9): ...μὴ μόνον ὅτι τοῦ Θεοῦ δι’ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς περὶ ἡμᾶς ἀγαθότητος, ἐκ τοῦ πάντων ἐξήρημένου καὶ ἀλῆτου καὶ ἀφθηκτοῦ, πρὸς τῷ νῦ μεθεκτὸν τε καὶ θεωρητόν ἀφρότος συγκαταβαινόντος καθ’ ὑπερούσιον ἐκατοῦ δύναμιν ἀνεκφορίτητον, αὐτοὶ μένουσιν ἀνέφραστοι πρὸς τὸν αὐτοπικόν καὶ αὐτοψήφην ἐκείνον ἔρωτα... It should be noted, that, as Meyendorff (Défense, 128 n. 3) and Christou (ΠΣ 1, 419 n 6) observe, the notion of συγκατάβασις as resulting to the mystical knowledge is also found in St John Chrysostom, Ad Theodorum lapsum, I, 11, PG 47, 292. It seems very possible that Palamas had this passage in mind; cf. its end, which resembles Palamas’ teaching, as presented earlier: κατοπτεύειν ἐξὶ τὸν βασιλέα αὐτῶν, μηκέτι ἐν αἰνίγματι, μηδὲ δι’ ἐσόπτρον, ἄλλα πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον, μηκέτι διὰ πίστεως, ἄλλα διὰ εἴδους (italics added).

80 Here Palamas draws on St Gregory the Theologian, Oration 21, 2, PG 35, 1084D.

81 Tr. 1,3,10.2-7, 420 (129.19-24): ...ἀλλ’ ὅτι καὶ τοῖς πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἐκεῖνο χειραγωγοῦσι διὰ τῶν πόρων ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας ἄγιοι ὑπό ἐκείνους ἐπεσθηκαί, κατὰ κρήνην ἐκεῖνο τῆς συγκατάστασιν ἐπιχειρεῖσθαι τοὺς πνευμονίους, ὡς ἐν δῖπου κυνοῦς σχοῖνων ὅταν «ὡς πῦρ ἱδέοι» κατὰ τὸν θεολόγον Ἰησοῦν «ὁν ως φῶς ὑπὸ ἐγνώρισιν», οὐδὲ ἐπίστευσαν.

82 Palamas offers a lot of arguments, patristic and biblical, to support his view that the divine light is not sensible. But it falls out of the scope of this study to fully examine and analyse all these arguments. Thus, only the most important and characteristic of them will be approached in this Part.

83 Mat. 25:41: “Then he will say to those at his left hand, “Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels””.
προητοίμασται τοῖς πονηροῖς ἀγγέλοις). Moreover, this darkness is not simply ‘ignorance’ (οὐθ’ ἄπλος άγνοια τοιτι το θανάτος). Here the words of St Paul are invoked (Philip. 2:11): ‘and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father’. Palamas wants to stress here the fact that even the persons who will ‘see the light as fire’ in the age to come they will have a clear knowledge regarding the divinity of Christ. Thus this darkness is not ἀγνοια, and, consequently, the light, which is the opposite of the darkness, is not simply knowledge.85

St Gregory adds here some noteworthy thoughts. This light is not knowledge, but is productive of the ‘ineffable and hidden knowledge of the mysteries of God’. It is ‘the pledge (ἀρραβὼν) which is now seen by the purified in heart’. Therefore, it is not simply knowledge, but ‘giver of the corresponding knowledge’. This ἀρραβὼν is ‘light intelligible and intellectual, or better spiritual’. It is ‘spiritually made present and seen’, and transcends all knowledge and virtue. Furthermore, this light is the only giver of the perfection to Christians. Perfection does not arise from ‘imitation or activity of the reason, but is the effect of revelation and of the grace of the Spirit’. This last argument is indeed crucial: Palamas’ theology is neither pietistic, based only on the pursuit of human virtues and the establishing of a specific moral character, nor humanist, based only on man’s own reason and effort. It is ‘synergetic’, based on man’s good disposition and spiritual struggle in cooperation with God’s grace.

84 Palamas instead of ‘tongue’ (γλῶσσα) writes ‘flesh’ (σάρξ).
85 Tr. 1,3,10.7-18, 420 (129.24-131.4).
86 Tr. 1,3,10.18-21, 420 (131.4-8): ...παρεκτικόν δὲ μᾶλλον τής μυστικῆς καὶ ἀπορρήτου γνώσεως τῶν μυστηρίων τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ ὁ ἀρραβὼν ὑπὸ τοὺς κεκαθαρμένους τὴν καρδίαν ἐνορώμενος. The idea of the ἀρραβὼν τοῦ Πνεύματος, which is time and again mentioned by Palamas, is drawn from St Paul’s 2 Cor. 1:22 and 5:5; and Eph. 1:14. It is also often found in many patristic writings. For some of them, see Christou, ΠΣ 1, 420 n. 4. Moreover, it is widely used in the Church offices. See, e.g., the penultimate prayer in the Office Before Holy Communion: ‘Master, lover of humankind, Lord Jesus Christ, my God, do not let these holy Mysteries be for my condemnation because I am unworthy, but rather for the cleansing and sanctification of both soul and body and as a pledge of the life and kingdom to come...’ (emphasis added); trans. Lash, The Divine Liturgy, 61-2.
87 Tr. 1,3,10.21-7, 420 (131.8-14): ...οὐ γνώσις ἐστιν ἄπλος, ἀλλ’ ἀναλόγου μὲν γνώσεως χορηγός, αὐτὸς δὲ φῶς νοητὸν καὶ νοερὸν, μᾶλλον δὲ πνευματικός, πνευματικῶς ἐγγινόμενος τε καὶ ὁρώμενος, ὑπεροχικὸς ἐξηρημένος πάσης γνώσεως καὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς ἐνταύθας κατὰ χριστιανοῖς τελεύτητος παρεκτικὸς μονώτατος, οὐκ ἀπὸ μιμήσεως ἢ φρονήσεως προσγινομένης, ἀλλ’ ἀποκαλύπτει καὶ χάριτι τοῦ Πνεύματος.
5. Concluding Remarks

In the beginning of this chapter, the historical and theological context of the Palamite spiritual senses was delineated. Special attention was given to the contrast between human knowledge and divine light. It was shown that the latter encompasses the former and goes much further beyond it. However, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter, the core of Palamas’ theology of the spiritual senses lies elsewhere: in his favourite phrase αἴσθησις νοερὰ καὶ θεία (‘intellectual and divine perception’). It is this phrase that comes up time and again when he wishes to stress the potentiality of man to grasp the divine. Hence, it is to this topic that our attention will now turn. The main research questions which will be pursued are the following: what is the background of this phrase? Does it have patristic precedent, or is it of Palamas’ coinage? Why does he use both the terms νοερὰ (intellectual) and αἴσθησις (perception)? Aren’t they, somehow, contradictory? What are the eyes of the soul, and how do they operate? And, finally, which are the presuppositions for seeing the light? Let us now, therefore, examine these topics.

Ch. 6. Αἴσθησις νοερὰ (Intellectual Perception)

1. Inner or Intellectual Illumination

a. Introduction

Hitherto, it was clearly exhibited that divine illumination is superior to human knowledge. As Palamas argues, ‘the illumination (φωτισμὸς) of God, born in us, does [not] provide only knowledge or virtue’. It is something beyond these, for it is ‘light intellectual, truly divine, different from knowledge and virtue’.

And he adds: ‘This light, which enlightens towards truth (τὸ δὲ φωτιστικὸν πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τοῦτο φῶς) both the angels and those humans who have become equal to the angels (ἰσαγγέλων ἄρα καὶ φῶς νοερὸν ἀληθείας θείκον παρὰ τὴν ἁρετὴν καὶ τὴν γνώσιν ἔτερον.

1 Tr. 1,3,40.9-13, 451 (197.16-20): ἔστιν ἄρα καὶ φῶς νοερὸν ἀληθείας θείκον παρὰ τὴν ἁρετὴν καὶ τὴν γνώσιν ἔτερον.
ἀνθρώπων), is God Himself'. Moreover, God 'is truly a secret (ἀπόρρητον) light, and is seen as light (καὶ ὡς φῶς ὄραται), and renders those pure in heart light; therefore He is called light'.

But Palamas wonders what exactly we should call this power of man to be united with God. In his words, ‘What then shall we call this power which is an activity neither of the senses (μήτ’ αἴσθησις) nor of the intellect (μήθ’ ὕλως νόησις)?’ The best answer he finds is what Solomon had many centuries before him provided, in the Old Testament: ‘a perception [or: sensation] intellectual and divine’ (αἴσθησιν δηλονότι νοερὰν καὶ θείαν).

By using these two adjectives, Palamas continues, one understands that this power is neither perception (αἴσθησις), nor intellection (νόησις), ‘for neither is the activity of the intelligence a sensation, nor that of the senses an intellection.’ Therefore, the νοερὰ αἴσθησις is something different.

Or, perhaps, one could call this power ‘union’, but not ‘knowledge’ (ἕνωσιν ἄλλ’ οὐχ γνῶσιν). To support his position, Palamas presents an argument of St Dionysios: ‘One should realize... that our intellect possesses both an intellectual power (δύναμιν εἰς τὸ νοεῖν) which permits it to see intelligible things (tà νοητά), and also the union (or: a capacity for that union; τὴν δὲ ἐνωσιν), that transcends the nature of the intellect, by which it is attached to the things that transcend it [viz. the intellect] (or: that are beyond it; τὰ ἐπέκεινα ἐκατόν).’ Through this passage St Gregory wants to stress two facts. First, there are two faculties in the human intellect: the power of intellection (which is related to dianoia, intelligence), and the power for ‘super-intellectual union’ (ἕνωσις). Second, union with God—and, by extension, the νοερὰ αἴσθησις—is something that transcends human knowledge and intelligence. As Sinkewicz explains, ‘The human intellect has a capacity to think, through which it looks

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2 Tr. 1,3,40,14-8, 451 (197.22-6).
3 Tr. 1,3,20,21-4, 430 (153.4-7), trans. Gendle, 37 (modified).
4 Tr. 1,3,20,24-7, 430 (153.7-11), trans. Gendle, 37: Τῇ γὰρ ἄμφοτερον συνόγα πείθει τὸν ἀκούοντα μηδέτερον νομίσαι τάτην, μήτ’ αἰσθήσης, μήτε νόησιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἡ νόησις αἰσθήσις ποτε, οὔθ’ ή αἰσθήσης νόησις· οὐκόυν ἢ νοερὰ αἴσθησις ἄλλο παρ’ ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν.
on conceptual things, and a unity which transcends the nature of the intellect, through which it is joined to things beyond itself". 7

But, a question arises here: what is the background of the ‘intellectual perception’? Is it to be found in the previous tradition, or is it of Palamas’ coinage?

b. The Background

Let us now examine the term αἴσθησις νοερά in a deeper way. This tradition goes back probably at least to Origen of Alexandria. Origen indeed discusses often the subject of the spiritual senses in his oeuvre. 8 Among others, he uses the phrase ‘αἴσθησιν θείαν εὑρήσεις’, which he ascribes to Solomon, the author of the book of Proverbs. 9 It should be noted that when Palamas introduces the term αἴσθησις νοερά καὶ θεία, he also ascribes it to Solomon. 10 Hence Palamas most likely had in mind the aforementioned passage of Origen. The latter used this expression (‘αἴσθησιν θείαν εὑρήσεις’) perhaps through a combination of Prov. 2:5 (ἐπίγνωσιν Θεοῦ εὑρήσεις), and Prov. 5:2 (αἴσθησιν ἐμὸν χειλέων). 11 Moreover, Origen states that there is an analogy between the physical and spiritual senses. 12 This analogy was accepted by later Fathers, such as St Gregory of Nyssa, St Diadochos of Photiki, St John of the Ladder 13 etc. 14 For instance, St Gregory of Nyssa uses the aforementioned passage of Prov. 5:2, in the context of a

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7 Sinkewicz, ‘The Concept’, 380 (slightly modified; Sinkewicz writes ‘mind’ instead of ‘intellect’). This point probably reminds us of the neo-Platonist Proclus (I owe this remark to my main supervisor, Fr Andrew Louth). For an interesting approach of the intellectual perception as Dionysian unity, see p. 380-2 of the aforementioned article of Sinkewicz.

8 The relevant bibliography regarding the spiritual senses according to Origen was mentioned in ch. 5.1. The most recent approach seems to be that of Mark J. McInroy, Origen of Alexandria, in Gavrilyuk and Coakley (eds), The Spiritual Senses, 20-35.

9 See Origen, Contra Celsum, I.48 (PG 11, 749AB); VII.34 (PG 11, 1469B). The phrase sensum divinum is also found in Origen’s De principiis, I.1.9 (PG 11, 129C); IV.37 (PG 11, 414A).

10 Tr. 1,3,20.21-4, 430 (153.4-7): ...ός ὁ υπὲρ πάντας τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ σεσοφισμένος Σολομόν.

11 Christou, ΠΣ 1, 430 n. 2.

12 See, e.g., Contra Celsum, I.48 (PG 11, 749AD).

13 St John the Sinaite uses the phrase αἴσθησις νοερά. See, e.g, his Ladder 26, PG 88, 1020A: Νοῦς νοερός πάντως καὶ νοεράν αἴσθησιν περιβέβληται, ἤν ἐν ἠμῖν καὶ οὐκ ἐν ἠμῖν ἀσάν ἐξήτησαν μὴ πασσώμεθα. Palamas mentions this passage in Tr. 1,2,4,9-11, 397 (83.8-10). Let us note that Migne, in his edition, writes ἵν’, whereas Christou and Meyendorff ἥν. It seems that their choice is the correct one.

14 Christou, ΠΣ 1, 430 n. 2.
discussion of the spiritual senses, in a classical passage of his first homily on the *Song of Songs*.¹⁵

c. Why the Term ‘νοερά’ (Intellectual)?

In *Tr.* 1,3,33 Palamas explains why the perception of the ‘ineffable divine goods’ is called intellectual (νοερὰ). He presents four important reasons. In the first place, it is beyond natural sense-perception (αἴσθησις), namely, it transcends natural senses.¹⁶

Second, the intellect is the faculty which first receives the divine goods.¹⁷ Therefore, it is correct to argue that ‘Palamas defines the intellect as the primary locus of the faculty of spiritual perception’,¹⁸ or that ‘the intellect is the primary locus for the activity of grace’¹⁹

Third, our intellect is elevated towards the First Intellect (i.e. God) and, according to its own measure (or: capacity/progress) has communion with God. Palamas adds here a crucial qualification: in (or: from) this elevation of the intellect, along with the body—united with it—is transformed into a more divine state (πρὸς τὸ θειότερον μετασκευάζεται). Here St Gregory speaks about the transformation of the human person, and he adds that the transformation of the body is effected through the intellect: ὅτι αὐτῶ. Moreover, Palamas continues by saying that this transformation is a prologue, and a symbol, of ‘the absorption (κατάποσιν)²⁰ of the body by the Spirit’ in the age to come.²¹ This ‘absorption of the body’ is indeed a very central notion in

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¹⁶ *Tr.* 1,3,33.20-1, 444 (183.14-5): διὰ τε τὸ ὑπὲρ αἴσθησιν εἶναι ταύτα φυσικὰν.

¹⁷ *Tr.* 1,3,33.21-2, 444 (183.15-6): διὰ τὸ πρῶτος τὸν νοῦν εἶναι τούτων δεκτικὸν.

¹⁸ Sinkewicz, ‘The Concept’, 378 (slightly modified for reasons of consistency; Sinkewicz writes ‘mind’ instead of ‘intellect’).

¹⁹ Sinkewicz, ‘The Concept’, 386 (again with a slight modification, since Sinkewicz prefers ‘mind’ instead of ‘intellect’).

²⁰ This language is probably influenced by 1 Cor 15:54 (ὅταν δὲ τὸ φθαρτὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσηται ἀφθαρσίαν καὶ τὸ θνητὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσηται θανασίαν, τότε γενήσεται ὁ λόγος ὁ γεγραμμένος κατεπόθη ὁ θάνατος εἰς νίκος). For this remark I am grateful to Fr Maximos Constas.

²¹ *Tr.* 1,3,33.22-6, 444 (183.16-21): ...καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν πρώτον νοῦν ἀνάτασιν τοῦ ἡμετέρου νοῦ ὡς κατὰ τὸ ἐγχώρων μεταλαγχάνων θείως, αὐτῶς τε καὶ δι’ αὐτοῦ τὸ συνημμένον σῶμα πρὸς τὸ θειότερον μετασκευάζεται, δεικνὺς ἐντεῦθεν καὶ προοιμιαζόμενος τὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐπὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰῶνος τῆς σαρκὸς κατάποσιν.
Palamas’ mind. It has an eschatological hue, which, however, sheds light also to contemporary Christian life. And, fourth, a last reason: ‘it is not the eyes of the body, but the eyes of the soul, that receive the Spirit’s power of seeing these things’. For all these reasons, ‘we call this power intellectual (νοερὰ), even though it is supra-intellectual’. But now a second question arises: why is this power also called αἴσθησις (perception)?

d. Why ‘αἴσθησις’ (Perception)?

First of all, St Gregory argues that the giving of God’s mysterious grace is called one of the following: ‘a) contemplation (θεωρία), which the fathers call “exceptionally true” (δέξαμεν ἀληθῆς), b) the activity that the prayer transmits to the heart, c) the spiritual warmth and pleasure that derives from this activity [i.e. (b)], and d) the joyful tear that grace gives’. Palamas adds that ‘The causes of all these are mainly apprehended through intellectual perception (νοερᾶ... αἰσθήσει)’. And he hastens to explain why he uses the term αἰσθήσει. He gives two reasons: a) First, for ‘the manifest nature and clarity of the apprehension, its complete inerrancy and freedom from images of the object formed in the mind’ [or: ‘because this perception is manifest and clear, totally void of error and alien to imagination’]. That is, when man undergoes intellectual perception, then he knows exactly that he has sensed something important. As Sinkewicz explains, ‘In spiritual perception there is an unmediated apprehension of the

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22 The transformation of the body has a long history in Christian thought. See, e.g., Philippians 3:20-1: But our citizenship is in heaven, and it is from there that we are expecting a Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ. He will transform the body of our humiliation [Or: our humble bodies] that it may be conformed to the body of his glory, by the power that also enables him to make all things subject to himself (emphases added). Regarding the transformation of the body, see ch. 7.2 of this thesis.

23 Tr. 1,3,33.26-8, 444 (183.21-3): Οὐ γὰρ οἱ υφόβαλμοι τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλ’ οἱ τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ὁρῶσαν ταῦτα δύναμιν τοῦ Πνεύματος λαμβάνουσι. About the ‘eyes of the soul’, see ch. 6.2.a of this thesis.

24 Tr. 1,3,33.28-9, 444 (183.23-4): διὰ ταῦτα νοερὰν αὐτήν καλούμενη, ὑπὲρ νοερὰν οὖσαν.

25 Tr. 1,3,31.1-4, 442 (177.20-3): Τοιοῦτον γὰρ τί ἐστι καὶ ἢ ἐξαρέτους ἀλληθῆς ὑπὸ τῶν πατέρων ἀνισμαζόμενη θεωρία καὶ ἢ τῆς εὐχῆς ἐγκάρδιος ἐνέργεια καὶ ἢ ἢ αὐτής πνευματικὴ θέρμη τε καὶ ἠμόνη καὶ τό ἢ τῆς χάριτος θυμήρες δάκρυον. As Christou notes, one finds the connection between spiritual warmth, pleasure, and tears, often in the texts of the ascetical writers. E.g., cf. Diadochos, Capita 73, ed. des Places, 132.

26 Tr. 1,3,31.4-5, 442 (177.23-4): Τὰ γὰρ τούτων αὕτα νοερᾶ κυρίως καταλαμβάνεται αἰσθήσει.

27 Tr. 1,3,31.5-6, 442 (177.24-179.1) [trans. Sinkewicz, ‘The Concept’, 385]: Λέγω δὲ αἰσθήσει, διὰ τὸ τρανόν καὶ ἐναργές καὶ ἀπλανής πάντη καὶ ἀφάνταστον τῆς καταλήψεως...
object. There is a direct contact with reality as in sense perception’, 28 b) Moreover, because ‘the human body itself also participates in the grace that operates through the intellect’. 29

In addition, as Sinkewicz summarizes the above, intellectual perception ‘can be said to have a sensible aspect in two senses: first of all... [it] has a certain analogy in natural sense perception; and secondly, there are sensible effects of grace’. 30 The latter is a most crucial point for the Palamite teaching on the spiritual senses: the body does have a role in spiritual perception. 31 St Gregory continues arguing that the body ‘is reformed according to this grace [which is active in accordance with the intellect] and receives, itself, a certain sense (συναίσθησιν) of the mystery hidden in the soul’. 32 In addition, if some spectators see with their physical eyes the persons who undergo this mystery and possess grace, then the body (of the latter) communicates to the former ‘a certain perception of what these persons undergo’. 33

Palamas, referring to 1 Cor. 13:12, 34 writes: ‘What then? Shall we not see in the age to come the invisible face to face, as it is written? Therefore, receiving now the pledge [or: the first-fruits] and prelude of this (vision), those who are purified in their hearts see the intellectual form (of God) that is coming to be in them [or: that is born within them] and which is invisible to the (physical) senses’. 35 The intellect is ‘an

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29 Tr. 1,3,1.7-8, 442 (179.1-2): ...καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ὅτι καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεταλαμβάνει πως τῆς κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργουμένης χάριτος...
31 This role is analysed in ch. 7 of the current thesis. However, it will be there shown (ch. 7.3) that Sinkewicz’s position on this matter is not without certain problems.
32 Tr. 1,3,31.8-10, 442 (179.3-4): ...καὶ μεταρρυθμίζεται πρὸς ταύτην καὶ λαμβάνει τινὰ συναίσθησιν αὐτὸ ποτα ψυχήν ἀπορρήτου μυστηρίου...
33 Tr. 1,3,31.10-2, 442 (179.4-7): ...καὶ τοῖς ἐξωθεν αἰσθητὸς κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἔκεισι βλέπουσι τοὺς κεκαθαρμένους αἰσθησιν τίνα παρέχει τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνεργουμένοιν.
34 ‘For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall understand fully, even as I have been fully understood’.
35 Tr. 1,3,39.22-6, 449 (195.1-5): Τί δέ; Ὡς πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον ἐπὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰώνος ὠφείλετα τὸν ὀφρατον κατὰ τὸ γεγραμμένον; Ὡκοῦν καὶ νῦν τοῦτον λαμβάνοντες τὸν ἄρραβωνα τε καὶ τὸ προσώπον οἱ κεκαθαρμένοι τὴν καρδίαν ὀρθῆς τὴν αὐτοῦ ἐγγυμένην νοσεόν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀπόφασιν αἰσθητῇ μόρφωσιν. We are based here on the translation of Christou (ΠΑΕ 2, 231). Another rendering of this passage could be suggested, given the fact that Palamas, in his Tr. 1,3, speaks very often about a) man’s capability to ‘sense’ the divine, and b) the human body’s crucial role in this process (see his νοσεός αἰσθητής): ‘...those who are purified in their hearts see in a sensible way (αἰσθητής) his [i.e. God’s] intellectual and invisible form that is coming to be in them [or: that is born within them]’ (italics added). This is the translation that Meyendorff provides (‘Ceux qui ont le cœur purifié reçoivent donc dès maintenant le gage et le prélude et en voient sensiblement la figure intellectuelle et invisible qui
immaterial nature’, and ‘a light relative’ to God, who is the superior light. Moreover, through pure and true prayer the intellect is ‘totally elevated towards the real light’, without turning back.36

Then, the intellect, ‘illumined by this first light Itself as the angels do [or: in a manner appropriate to the angels]37, is already transformed in such a way as to acquire angelic dignity’. Palamas continues arguing that in such a case the intellect ‘is shown as being in itself through communion what the archetype is by cause’. 38 In addition, the intellect ‘manifests in itself the splendour of this hidden beauty, and the resplendent and unapproachable dawn’.39 This is what David was referring to, when he wrote ‘And let the splendour of the Lord our God be upon us’.40 Palamas explains that David wrote this line ‘intellectually sensing in himself’ (νοερῶς αἰσθόμενος ἐν ἑαυτῷ), namely through his faculty of intellectual perception.41

2. Seeing the Divine Light

a. The Eyes of the Soul and the Experience of God

As explained thus far, intellectual perception is a notion that touches both the human soul and the body. Palamas clarifies that the activity of this power is in no way material or bodily, as he claims the opponents of the hesychasts believed. On the contrary, it is

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se trouve à l’intérieur d’eux-mêmes’ [italics added]). However, the rendering of Christou seems to me more valid from a philological (namely, grammatical and syntactical) point of view.


37 Tr. 1,3,39.3-6, 450 (195.11-4): ...καὶ οὕτω πρὸς ἀγγελικὴν ἡ ἡμὶ μετασκευασθείς ἡ ἠξίων, ἀγγελισπερίας υπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πρῶτο φωτὸς καταλαμφθείς, αὐτὸ φαίνεται κατὰ μέθεξιν, ο τὸ ἀρχηγῶν κατ’ αἰτίαν ἐστὶ... Cf. Maximos, Epistle 6, 5, PG 91, 429AB. Dionysios, De Divinis Nominibus, II, 6, ed. Suchla, 129-30.

38 Tr. 1,3,39.6-7, 450 (195.14-6): ...καὶ δι’ ἑαυτῶν φαίνει τοῦ κρυφῶν κάλλους ἐκείνου τὴν ὑφαίστητα καὶ τὴν φανοτάτην καὶ ἀπρόσιτον αὐγήν...

39 Ps. 89:17: καὶ ἔστω ἡ λαμπρότητις Κυρίου τοῦ Θεού ἡμῶν ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς...

40 Tr. 1,3,39.8-10, 450 (195.16-9).
‘spiritual and secret’.\(^{42}\) Hence while Palamas does indeed accept the sensible character (or, better, aspect/effect) of divine grace, he strongly rejects the idea that divine grace is a sensible reality, namely that the divine activities are corporeal.\(^{43}\)

But how, then, is one able to recognize the mysteries in which a Christian may participate? This is done through ‘the experience of the eyes of the soul’.\(^{44}\) And what exactly are the ‘eyes of the soul’ (οφθαλμοὶ ψυχῆς), and the ‘experience’ (πείρα) they provide? Are they perhaps to be identified with the human mind or reason (διάνοια)? Palamas is totally negative towards such an interpretation. He explains that διάνοια exercises its faculties both on intellectual and on sensible things: it makes both of them comprehensible through intellection.\(^{45}\)

He provides two examples to clarify this point. First, he argues, if you bring to mind a city (ei διανοή περὶ αυτῆς), without having already seen it, then you have not personally ‘experienced’ this city just because you have thought about it (οὐ τὸ διανοεῖσθαι ταύτην ἐν πείρᾳ γέγονας αυτῆς). The same may be implied as far as knowledge of God and the divine realities is concerned: ‘you have not experienced them [only] by the fact that you have thought or theologized about them’.\(^{46}\)

Second, as far as gold is concerned, ‘unless you sensibly (αἰσθητῶς) acquire it, and sensibly have it in your hands, and sensibly see it, even if you bring ten thousand times (μυριάκις) to your mind the concept of gold’, then you do not possess gold in reality. Of note is the triple use of the adverb ‘sensibly’ (αἰσθητῶς): experience (πείρα) of God is a kind of sensing. In a similar way, as with gold, ‘even if you think ten thousand times of the divine treasures, unless you suffer [or: experience] the divine realities, or see through the intellectual eyes, which are beyond intellation, then [in fact] you do not see, nor have, nor possess something of the divine realities’.\(^{47}\)

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\(^{42}\) Tr. 1,3,34, 444,30-445,5 (183,25-32): ...τοῦ μὴ προσύλους καὶ σωματικὴς οἴεσθαι τὰς πνευματικὰς καὶ ἀπορρήτους ἐνέργειας ταῦτας...

\(^{43}\) Sinkiewicz, ‘The Concept’, 386.

\(^{44}\) Tr. 1,3,34,12-4, 445 (185,8-10): ...εἰσὶν αὐτὴ πείρᾳ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ὁρθαλμῶν οἰῶν ἑγαθῶν καὶ μοστηρίων νυκτὶς ἑρωτανόν τὴν παραγωγήν διδοῦναι.

\(^{45}\) Tr. 1,3,34,16-7, 445 (185,12-3): Ἀπειρήγαρ καὶ τὰ αἰσθήματα καὶ τὰ νοερὰ ἐπίσης διανοητὰ δι᾽ ἑαυτῆς πουλεῖ.

\(^{46}\) Tr. 1,3,34,17-21, 445 (185,14-7): ...οὐ τὸ διανοεῖσθαι ταῦτα καὶ ἀναλογεῖν ἐν πείρᾳ τούτων γίνῃ.

\(^{47}\) Tr. 1,3,34,21-7, 445 (185,17-24): Καὶ καθάπερ χρυσῶν, εἰ μὴ αἰσθητῶς κτῆσαι καὶ αἰσθητῶς ἔχεις ταῦτα χρυσῶν καὶ αἰσθητῶς ὀρᾶς... καὶ μυριάκις περὶ τῶν θείων θησαυρῶν διανοήσῃ, μὴ πάθῃς δὲ τὰ θέατα, μηδὲ ὅτις τῶν νοερῶν καὶ ὑπεράνω τῆς διανοσίας ὁφθαλμῶς, οὔτε ὀρᾶς, οὔτε ἔχεις, οὔτε κέκτησαι τι τῶν θείων ἁλήθεις.
It should be underlined that St Gregory uses the word ‘possess’ (κέκτησαι): through the spiritual senses man comes to a real knowledge of God, a real sensing of the divine. Therefore, it could be said that man ‘possesses’ God. Palamas clarifies the reason that he uses the term ‘intellectual eyes’ (νοεροῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς), ‘for it is in them that the power of the Spirit is implanted, through which [power] those things are seen’. However, the vision of the divine light is beyond the intellectual eyes themselves.  

As Christou correctly notes, here Palamas draws a clear distinction between theoptia, i.e. vision of God, and theologia, i.e. speaking and writing about God; what, in contemporary terms one would call ‘empirical’ (experiential) and ‘academic’ theology respectively. However, it is very interesting that Palamas in no way discards theologizing (or academic theology); he totally accepts it, to the extent that it has as its aim the vision of the divine light, theosis.

b. The Coordination of the Physical and the Spiritual Senses

A very important parameter of intellectual perception for Palamas is the fact that, in some way, the physical and the spiritual senses cooperate. Let us look at his relevant teaching. First, he argues that ‘The intellect naturally perceives one light, and sense perception another’. These two ‘lights’ are different. Sense perception ‘perceives a sensible light which manifests sensible things as sensible’. In other words, one needs a sensible light, so as to be able to see. On the other hand, the light of the intellect is ‘the knowledge inherent in thoughts’. Therefore, ‘sight and intellect do not perceive

48 Tr. 1,3,34,27-30, 445 (185,24-7): Νοεροῖς δὲ εἶπον ὀφθαλμοῖς, ὡς αὐτοῖς ἐγγινομένης τῆς τοῦ Πνεύματος δυνάμεως, δὲ ἡ ὁρᾶται ταῦτα, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὑπὲρ τοὺς νοεροὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐστὶ τὸ πανίερον ἔκελθος θέαμα τοῦ θεοτότου καὶ ὑπερφαοῦς φωτός.

49 ΠΣ 1, 445. Palamas clearly makes the same distinction also in Tr. 1,3,42.

50 Tomos, 6, ΠΣ 2, 575,25-576,2, trans. Sinkewicz, 187: Ἀλλού μὲν φωτὸς ὁ νοῦς, ἔτερον δὲ ἡ ἀισθήσεις ἀντλαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκεν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητοῖ καὶ τὰ αἰσθήτα, ἡ αἰσθήτα, δεικνύσιον...

51 Tomos, 6,2-3, ΠΣ 2, 576, trans. Sinkewicz, 187: τοῦ δὲ νοῦ φῶς ἐστιν ἢ ἐν νοήμασι κειμένη γνώσις. This reminds us of that ‘knowledge which is always coexistent with the intellect’, which Palamas mentions in Ch. 35,14-6, 120: ἅλλα κατὰ τὸν ἐμφύτους ἡμᾶς, ἐξ οὗ γεγόναμεν παρὰ τοῦ κτίσαντος ἡμᾶς κατ’ εἰκόνα οἰκείαν, ἐναποκείμενον τῇ νῷ λόγον, τὴν ἀκό ἑσυνιστάρχουσαν αὐτῷ γνώσιν. For an analysis of this notion, see the section regarding ‘The Human Intellect and Its λόγος’ (ch. 2.1).
the same light; rather, each of them operates according to its own nature and upon those things which are according to its nature’.\footnote{\textit{Tomos}, 6.3-6, ΠΣ 2, 576, trans. Sinkewicz, 187: Όὔ τοι ἀυτὸ τοῖνος φωτός δύνης τε καὶ νοῦς ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι περφύκασιν, ἀλλὰ μέχρις ἅν κατ’ οἰκείαν φύσιν καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἐνεργῆ ἐκάπητον αὐτῶν. }

Nevertheless, there is a point that somehow these two faculties seem to meet each other, and, in a way, ‘coordinate’ with one other. This happens when man receives the ineffable grace of God. As Palamas writes, ‘when those deemed worthy enjoy a share of spiritual and supernatural grace, they see both with their sense perception and their intellect the realities that transcend any sense perception and any intellect’.\footnote{\textit{Tomos}, 6.6-8, ΠΣ 2, 576, trans. Sinkewicz, 187: Ὅταν δὲ πνευματικῆς καὶ υπερσυνῆς εὑμορφησον χάριτος τε καὶ δυνάμεως αἰσθήσει τε καὶ νῦ, τὰ ὑπὸ πᾶσαν αἰσθήσιν καὶ πάντα νοῦν ὑπὸ κατηξιωμένου βλέπονται...} Palamas makes reference here to St Gregory the Theologian, so as to show that this whole situation is a mystery and cannot be adequately explained by the human mind: ‘God alone knows, and those who are acted upon in such a way’.\footnote{\textit{Tr.}, 1.3,9.18-21, 418 (127.5-6): ἂν μὴ μόνον φῶς ἦτεν ὁ νοῦς ὡς θεωρητὸν, εἰ καὶ ἐσχάτων τῶν τοῦτον τὸν ὁμοίων...}

Furthermore, speaking about the activation of intellectual perception, Palamas makes in his \textit{Triads} an interesting distinction between knowledge and light. He gives the following example: when fire is covered by a material which is not transparent, then it may warm this material, but not illuminate it. In the same way, when the intellect is covered by the passions, it may provide knowledge, but not light.\footnote{\textit{Tomos}, 6.9-10, ΠΣ 2, 576, trans. Sinkewicz, 187. Cf. Gregory of Nazianzus, \textit{Hom. 28, Peri Theologiaς (De theologia; Second Theological Oration)}, 19, PG 36 52 B: ἀλλ᾿ οἴδεν ὁ τῶν προφητῶν Θεός, καὶ οἱ τὰ τουτα ἐνεργοῦμενοι...} Now St Gregory tries to explain how the νοερά αἰσθησις may be activated. Initially he argues that the intellect is, on the one hand, light. This light, as mentioned above, may be contemplated (θεωρητὸν) through itself, the intellect.\footnote{\textit{Tr.}, 1.3,9.21-3, 418 (127.5-6): μή μόνον φῶς ἦτεν ὁ νοῦς ὡς θεωρητὸν, εἰ καὶ ἐσχάτων τῶν τοῦτον τὸν ὁμοίων...} On the other hand, the intellect is also a contemplative faculty (θεωρητικὸν), for it is ‘the eye of the soul’.\footnote{\textit{Tr.}, 1.3,9.23-4, 418 (127.6-7): ἀλλὰ καὶ θεωρητικὸν, οἷον ὀφθαλμὸς ὑπαρχὼν τῆς ψυχῆς...} This is most probably drawn from St John Damascene, who writes that ‘as is the eye for the body, in the same way is the intellect for the soul’.\footnote{John Damascene, \textit{Expositio Fidei}, 26.48-9, ed. Kotter, 77: ἀσεπτῷ γὰρ ὀφθαλμῷ ἐν σώματι, οὕτως ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς.}
Palamas explains these statements through the following. In order for a human person to see through his physical eyes, it is necessary that an external light shines upon his eyes: for our vision to be activated, we need light. In the same way, ‘the intellect, in which there is intellectual perception, cannot see and actualize itself, unless the divine light illumines the intellect’.\(^{59}\)

Additionally, Palamas clarifies this point further: ‘Just as physical vision, when it is active, becomes itself light and is commingled with light and, first of all, sees this light poured over all the objects that it sees, so too, in the same manner, the intellect, when it fully actualizes its intellectual perception, becomes itself totally like light, and is with the light, and together with this light it clearly sees the light...’.\(^{60}\) Moreover, this takes place ‘in a way superior not only to the bodily senses, but also to everything that is known to us, and, simply, (superior) to all beings’.\(^{61}\) As Sinkewicz notices, here ‘the Platonic principle that like can only be known by like’ may be found. Thus, the intellect may see the light, because the former is also light. In this way, a great likeness between God and the intellect is affirmed.\(^{62}\)

Furthermore, Palamas speaks about the ‘implanted’ (ἐγγεγενημένην) spiritual power in the eyes of those who see the divine light.\(^{63}\) In addition, he tries again to make a parallelism between physical and spiritual vision. In the first case, when the ‘light’ that is in the eye is united to the sunrays, then it becomes fully actual light (φῶς ἐντελεχεία γίνεται), and thus the eye ‘sees the sensible things’.\(^{64}\) Probably Palamas implies here that in the eye there is the power/potentiality to see the light, but this power needs to be activated from an exterior factor, namely from the light that comes from the

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\(^{59}\) *Tr*. 1,3,9.25-8, 418 (127.8-12): ...όσπερ ἢ κατ’ αἰσθήσιν ὅψας ὕπκ ἄν ἐνεργεία γίγνοιτο, μὴ ἐξωθεὶν ἐπιλάμμασαντος αὐτή φωτός, οὕτω καί ὃ νοῦς ὕπκ ἄν ἐνοερὰν ἐχον αἰσθησιν ὁρώ ᷲ καθ’ ἐαυτὸν ἐνεργεία γίγνοιτο, μὴ τοῦ θείου περιλάμμασαντος αὐτῶν φωτός.

\(^{60}\) *Tr*. 1,3,9, 418.28-419.4 (127.12-8): Ὅσπερ δὲ ἢ ὅψας, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ, φῶς αὐτή τε γίνεται καὶ μετά τοῦ φωτός συγγίνεται καὶ τούτ’ αὐτό πρῶτον ὁρᾷ τὸ φῶς πάσης τοῖς ὁρώμενοις περικεχυμένοις, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ὃ νοῦς, ἡνίκ’ ἂν εἰς ἐντελέχειαν ἀφίκοιτο τῆς νοεμας αἰσθήσεως, αὐτῶς ὅλος ὅσον φῶς ἔστι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ φωτός ἔστι καὶ σύν τῷ φωτὶ γνωστῶς ὁρᾷ τὸ φῶς...

\(^{61}\) *Tr*. 1,3,9.4-5, 419 (127.18-20): ...οὐκ ὑπὲρ τᾶς σωματικὰς αἰσθήσεως μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ πᾶν ὁ τί τῶν ὀμοί νομομοῖο καὶ ἀπλῶς τῶν ὀντῶν πάντων.

\(^{62}\) Sinkewicz, ‘The Concept’, 386. This likeness brings to our mind the fact that the intellect is created in the image of God (see ch. 2.2.b of this thesis). Cf. the relevant comments in the ‘Epilogue’.

\(^{63}\) *Tr*. 1,3,17.1-3, 427 (145.4-6): ...τὴν ἐγγεγενημένην πνευματικῆν δύναμιν τοῖς δίμμασιν αὐτῶν.

\(^{64}\) *Tr*. 1,3,17.10-2, 427 (145.14-6): ...ἢ ἐν ὀρφαλμοῖς αὐγῆ, ἐνωθείσα ταῖς ἑλικαῖς αὐγαῖς, φῶς ἐντελεχεία γίνεται καὶ ὅπου ὁρᾷ τὰ εἰσηθήτα.
sun.\textsuperscript{65} Maybe this is the reason why he chooses to use the word ἐντελέχεια. As is well-known, ἐντελέχεια has the meaning of ‘full, complete reality’, as opposed to δύναμις, which describes the potentiality.\textsuperscript{66}

In the same way, the intellect, ‘when it becomes one spirit with the Lord’ (1 Cor. 6:17), ‘then it clearly sees the things of the spirit’.\textsuperscript{67} However, even in this situation God remains invisible in a mysterious manner that the human mind cannot interpret. Man does not see God in His totality, but sees to the extent that he has made himself receptive of the Holy Spirit’s power.\textsuperscript{68} Again here the essence/activities distinction is found, even in latent form: man does not see the essence of God, but only His activities, and those according to man’s own progress, to the degree of his own synergy. Worth noting here is that elsewhere St Gregory argues that the divine activities are ‘between’ man and God, something like an intermediary between creature and the Creator: ‘...how is it possible that the participable entity [i.e. the divine activity] is not between (μεταξύ) the participants and the imparticipable super-essentiality?’\textsuperscript{69}

Consequently, Palamas argues that the divine light has a similar role as physical light. In order for man to see the things around him, belonging to created reality, he first needs the presence of physical light. In the same way, man needs the presence of God’s uncreated light, in order to see the divine realities. Thus, it could be argued that here ‘the divine Light is not the object but the means of vision and in this role it retains a pneumatological function’.\textsuperscript{70} This means that, through the divine light, the Holy Spirit illumines man.

\textsuperscript{65} This reference to ‘the radiance in the eyes’ could be taken as an allusion to the theory of vision Plato puts forward in the Timaeus, in which the eye has an inner radiance that reaches out and coalesces with the light coming from the object. For this remark, I am grateful to Prof. David Bradshaw.

\textsuperscript{66} See Liddel-Scott, Lexicon, 575 (s.v. ἐντελέχεια).

\textsuperscript{67} Tr. 1,3,17.12-4, 427 (145.16-8): ...οὐκὼ τὰ πνευματικά τραντὸς ὀρῆ.

\textsuperscript{68} Tr. 1,3,17.14-20, 427 (145.18-25): Μένει δ’ ὁμος καὶ ἐκεὶ τρόπον ἐπέρω, ὑψηλότερον ἢ κατὰ τοὺς χαμερηφές λογισμοὺς τῶν τοῖς πνευματικοῖς ἀνθρώπινοι ἀντιλέγειν ἐγχειρούντων, ἀκόρατος ὁ δεσπότης...οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐκείνον, ἀλλὰ καθὼς ἐκείνον ἐποίησε δικτοῦν τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ Πνεύματος δύναμις, κατὰ τοσοῦτο βλέπει.

\textsuperscript{69} Tr. 3,2,24.17-9, 675 (685.21-3): ...πῶς οὗ μεταξύ τῶν μετεχόντων καὶ τῆς ἀμεθέκτου ὑπερουσίτητος καὶ μεθεκτῆ ὀντότητος; It should be noted here that many religious and philosophical systems are concerned with how to bring in contact the Creator with the creatures, and break the existing, between them, gap. For a relevant article, with special mention to the sophiologial controversy in twentieth-century Russian thought, and particularly between Fr Sergii Bulgakov and Fr Georges Florovsky, see Andrew Louth, ‘Theology of the “in-between”’, Communio Viatorum 55.3 (2013), 223-36.

\textsuperscript{70} Sinkewicz, ‘The Concept’, 378.
Furthermore, as Palamas states elsewhere, this light is ‘the gracious [or: delightful] and holy vision of the stainless souls and intellects’, namely the angels. ‘Without it, even the intellect could not see, even with its intellectual perception, when united to those beyond it, despite the fact that the intellect disposes the faculty of intellectual perception, just as the eye of the body cannot see without physical light’.71 Accordingly, Sinkewicz is correct in arguing that ‘This would indicate that spiritual perception is a potentiality or capacity within the soul or intellect, which is actualized by the presence of the divine Light’.72

Trying to support the aforementioned arguments, Palamas says that true knowledge could be called ‘light’ (φῶς). He is based on the words of St Paul: ‘For it is God who said, “Let light shine out of darkness,” who has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Christ’ (2 Cor. 4:6). Dionysios calls this light νοητόν (intelligible),73 whereas Macarios calls it νοερόν (intellectual).74 It is noteworthy that in this passage, some words below, Macarios also refers to the αἴσθησις νοερῶν explicitly.75

Palamas again refers to Macarios. The latter called ‘immortality’ (αἰθανασία) the glory that shone upon Moses’ face.76 Palamas comments that this occurred despite the fact that Moses’ face was mortal.77 For St Gregory this is a reference to the αἴσθησις νοερῶν. According to him, Macarios argued two things: a) as the bodily eyes see the sensible Sun, in a similar way the faithful see the intellectual light (τὸ νοερὸν φῶς)

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71 Tr. 1,3,46.7-10, 458 (211.26-9): ...ψυχῶν δὲ καὶ νόον ἀσπίλων εὕχαρι καὶ ἱερὸν θέαμα, οὐ χωρίς οὐδέν νοερῶν ἐπηκείναι ἀισθήσεων ὡς τοὺς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου ἐνοεμένους. Καθάπερ οὐδὲ ὥσπερ ἐφαβάλμος σώματος τοῦ κατ’ ἀισθήσην φωτός χωρίς.
72 Sinkewicz, ‘The Concept’, 381 (slightly modified; Sinkewicz writes ‘mind’ instead of ‘intellect’).
73 Tr. 1,3,24-6, 411 (111.14-7): ...καὶ ο μέγας Διονύσιος, ὁ τοῦ νοητοῦ, φορητός τοῦ νοητοῦ παρουσία ἐνοετικῆς τῶν φωτιζομένων ἐστίν, εἰς μίαν καὶ ἀληθινήν συνάγουσαν γνώσιν. For the exact form of Dionysios’ text, which is a little bit different, see the critical ed.: De Divinis Nominibus IV. 6.9-10, ed. Suchla, 150: οὕτως ὁ τοῦ νοητοῦ φωτός παρουσία ἐνοετικῶς καὶ ἐνοετικῆς τῶν φωτιζομένων ἐστί...
74 See Macarios, Homily 2, 10,5.24-6, ed. Berthold, I, 20: ἐκ τῆς ἐνεργείας αὐτῆς γνώσας τὸ ἐλλαμμηθὲν εἰς τὴν πνεύματος τοῦ νοερῶν φῶς, εἰ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστίν, οὐ τοῦ σατανᾶ ἐστίν.
75 Macarios, Homily 2, 10,5.26-7 and 2-3, ed. Berthold, I, 20 and 21 respectively (italics added): ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐὰν ἐχθεὶ διάκρισιν, εὐθείᾳ εἰς τῆς νοερᾶς αἰσθήσεως γνώσισκε τὴν διαφορὰν... οὕτως η ψυχή ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς νοερᾶς καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας γνωρίζει τὰ τῶν πνεύματος χρησιμα καὶ τὰ τοῦ σατανᾶ φαντάσματα.
76 See Exodus 34:29: ‘When Moses came down from Mount Sinai, with the two tables of the testimony in his hand as he came down from the mountain, Moses did not know that the skin of his face shone because he had been talking with God’.
77 Tr. 1,3,3.5-6, 412 (111.24-6): ...εἰ καὶ τὸ θνητὸ περιήγησαν προσώπο τότε...
through the eyes of the soul (διὰ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄφθαλμῶν); and b) this light (i.e. the νοερὸν) ‘will be manifested and scattered’ on our bodies, in the age to come, and it will ‘beautify’ them (ὅ κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς ἀναστάσεως προκύψας καὶ ἐπιχυθέν τοῖς σώμασιν ὀρατόμενα καὶ ταῦτα δείξει τῷ αἰωνίῳ φωτὶ).  

However, in this point, an important issue comes up: are there any specific presuppositions for the vision of the divine light?

c. Ascesis, Detachment, Purification: The Presuppositions of Seeing the Light

Palamas believes that there are undoubtedly presuppositions for a person to see the light. Above all, in order for a person to attain the vision of the divine light it is necessary to have ‘the powers of the soul gathered together as far as possible, and to have made sober the guarding of the reasoning (διανοίας)’. This person initially lives ‘meditating in his intellect what is according to nature and pleasing to God’, and then surpasses himself and receives the Holy Spirit, ‘which knows what is God’s as the human spirit (knows) what is within’.  

St Gregory supports that the faithful who see the divine light ‘receive spiritual eyes and have the mind of Christ (cf. 1 Cor. 2:16); through them [i.e. these eyes] they see the Invisible, and conceive (νοεῖσθαι) the Inconceivable’. ‘For God is not invisible in himself, but (is invisible) to those who conceive and see through created and physical eyes’. That is, if one wants to see God, one has to remove himself from a worldly way of living and thinking. This of course does not mean for Palamas that one has to

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78 Tr. 1,3,6-12, 412 (111.26-113.5). Palamas presents these two arguments as a part of a single Macarian treatise. However, it seems that he has borrowed them from different texts of Macarios. Indicatively, for the first argument see Homily 34.2-6, ed. Dörries, PTS 4, 260, and for the second see Homily 2 (Aus Typus III), 1, in Sermones 1-22, 24-27, ed. Erich Klostermann and Heinz Berthold, Neue Homilien des Makarius/Symeon, 1, Aus Typus III, Texte und Untersuchungen 72 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1961), 7.11-6. The role of the body in the age to come is examined in ch.7.2.b of the current thesis.  

79 Tr. 1,3,16.10-2, 426 (143.15-7): ...καὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις ὡς ἐνὸν συναθροίσας καὶ νηφαλύν ἐπιστήσας τὴν τῆς διανοίας ἐπισκοπὴν...

80 Tr. 1,3,16.12-5, 426 (143.17-20): ...πρὸτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ θεαρέστοις διαζῇ κατὰ νοῦν θεορῆμασιν, εἰδ’ ἐαυτὸν ὑπεραναβὰς ὡς ἐαυτῷ λάβοι τὸ ἐκ Θεοῦ Πνεῦμα, δ’ οἶδε τὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὡς τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ... Cf. 1 Cor. 2:11.  

81 Tr. 1,3,16.23-5, 426 (143.29-31): Πνευματικοὶ γὰρ λαμβάνουσιν οὕτως ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ νοῦν ἔχουσι Χριστοῦ, δί’ ὄν καὶ βλέπουσιν τὸν ἀόρατον καὶ νοοῦσι τὸν ἀπερινόητον.  

82 Tr. 1,3,16.25-7, 426 (143.31-145.1): ...οὐ γὰρ ἐαυτῷ ἀόρατος ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς διὰ κτιστῶν καὶ φυσικῶν ὀφθαλμῶν καὶ λογισμῶν νοοῦσι καὶ ὀρώσιν.
necessarily become a hesychast, but that one has to live spiritually, pursuing the virtues and avoiding sin. In addition, Palamas wonders: ‘Would not God evidently communicate the contemplation of His grace to those whom He has joined Himself as a governing (or: authoritative) member?’ Therefore the invisible God becomes visible to the persons that are truly connected with Christ and those who correctly follow Him.

Moreover, Palamas argues that the vision of the divine light is not a natural property of humans; it is not something that all humans are able to do at all times as a faculty deriving from human nature. However, ‘[h]e who does not see understands that he is himself incapable of vision because not perfectly conformed to the Spirit by a total purification, and not because of any limitation in the Object of vision’. In other words, it is not the case that God may not be seen at all, but that man has not been totally purified. The basic prerequisite for seeing the light is that one has to have conformed himself to the Spirit through purification. As Sinkewicz explains, ‘Although the faculty of spiritual perception exists potentially in each person, it is often obscured by sin, the veil of darkness or the dark veil of the evil passions. Purification is then necessary before one becomes receptive to the power of the Spirit’.

But how does man know when he truly sees the light? Palamas gives an interesting answer: ‘...when the vision comes to him, the recipient knows well that it is that light, even though he sees but dimly...’. And he knows that ‘from the impassible joy akin to the vision which he experiences, from the peace which fills his intellect, and the fire of love for God which burns in him’. In other words, man knows that he sees the light from the effects that he observes in his existence, namely joy, peace, burning love etc. Or, to put it another way, one knows that he sees the light by feeling his spiritual senses ‘activated’ and manifested in himself.

83 Tr. 1,3,16.27-9, 426 (145.1-3): Οἶς δ’ ὁ Θεὸς ἐαυτὸν ἐνήμοσεν ὡς μέλος ἡγεμονικόν, πῶς οὕχι δι’ ἐναυτῷ καὶ τὴν τῆς ἐναυτῷ χάριτος ἐμφανίζει παράσχει θεωρίαν;
84 Tr. 1,3,22.6-7, 433 (157.9-18): Πάντωτε δ’ ἐὰν ἐὰν τὸ ὀπειρωμένον τοῦτο οὐχ ὄρθωσαι. Cf. Gendle, The Triads, 123 n. 44.
85 Tr. 1,3,22.7-9, 433 (157.18-21), trans. Gendle, 39: Ὁ δὲ μὴ ὄρθων συνήσῃς ὡς αὐτός ὄραν ἀδυνατεῖ μὴ τελειοῦσι δι’ ἐντελεστέρας καθαρότητος ἐναρμοσθεῖς τῷ Πνεύματι, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ τὸ ὄρομένον λαμβάνει πέρας.
87 Tr. 1,3,22.9-13, 433 (157.21-5), trans. Gendle, 39: Ὅτε τοῖς τὰ τῆς θεωρίας ὑποβεβηκένες, ἢ τῆς πιγγαυνημένης ὑμιάς ἀπαθοῦς τὸ ὄροντι θυμίους καὶ γαλήνης νοερᾶς καὶ τοῦ ἀνακαμμένου πυρὸς τῆς πρὸς τὸν Θεόν ἀγάπης, ἀκριβῶς ὑδέν ὁ ὄριον ὃτι τοῦτο ἔστιν ἕκεινο τὸ φῶς, εἰ καὶ ἀμφόρωτον ὄρα.
88 This topic is analysed in ch. 7.2 of this thesis.
Moreover, man receives the vision of light 'in proportion to his practice of what is pleasing to God, his avoidance of all that is not, his assiduity in prayer, and the longing of his entire soul for God'. In this way man is always 'being borne on to further progress and experiencing even more resplendent contemplation'. Finally, man 'understands then that his vision is infinite because it is a vision of the Infinite, and because he does not see the limit of that brilliance; but, all the more, he sees how feeble is his capacity to receive the light'.

Palamas insists that in order for man to see the divine light, he has to overcome all human pleasures and be totally given over to God, through obedience to his spiritual guides. Thus, the hesychast, 'is, so to speak, captured by this love (i.e. for God)'. Elsewhere he maintains that one who abandons earthly goods does this 'looking towards the hope of theosis'. Man examines all his actions and thoughts to see whether they pull him down to earth, or they help him achieve this life which is 'superior to all these, and really intellectual, and unmixed with earthly things'.

Elsewhere Palamas writes that the ascetic, through detachment from earthly matters, 'attaches his intellect to the uninterrupted prayer to God, and, through it (i.e. prayer) becomes totally of himself'. Then he finds 'the ascent to the heavens (ἀνοδὸν εἰς οὐρανοὺς εὑρίσκει), and 'the impalpable darkness (τὸν ἀναφή τῆς κρυφιομοῦστου...'}

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89 Tr. 1,3,22,14-6, 433 (157.25-159.1), trans. Gendle, 39: ...καὶ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν δὲ τῆς θεωρίας πράξεως, τῆς τε τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἀποχῆς καὶ τῆς προσοχῆς τῆς προσευχῆς καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἐκ πνεῦμος ὅλης ἀνανεώσεως...
90 Tr. 1,3,22,16-7, 433 (159.1-2), trans. Gendle, 39: ...ἐπὶ τὸ πρόσω φερόμενος ἀεὶ καὶ διανυστέρας περιόμενος τῆς θεωρίας. Cf. the interesting comment of Gendle (The Triads, 123 n. 45): 'Palamas here takes up another leading theme of Gregory of Nyssa: episkasis, the inexhaustible character of the vision of God as rooted in the infinite nature of the Divine. Even in the Age to Come, there can be no end to the good things that God has to reveal; so the soul is always in via, always moving on'.
91 Tr. 1,3,22,17-20, 433 (159.3-6), trans. Gendle, 39: ...καὶ κατεθύνει τὸ ἀπειρον συνίστιν τοῦ ὀρθομένου ὅτι ἀπειρο καὶ τῆς μὲν λαμπρότητος ἐκείνου πέρας οὐχ ὅρα, τῆς δὲ ἐαυτοῦ πρὸς φωτοληψίαν ἐπιπεριστὸς ἐπὶ μᾶλλον ὅρα τὸ ἀδρανές.
92 Tr. 1,3,44, 455.28-456.10 (207.13-26): ...Ο τῇ τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσις καὶ τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξη καὶ τῇ τῶν σωμάτων ἡμοία διὰ τὴν εὐαγγελικὴν ἀποταξίμανος ζωῆν καὶ δὲ ὑποταγῆς τὸν ἐν τῇ κατὰ Χριστὸν ἡλικίᾳ προηκόπτει τὴν ἀποταγὴν ταύτην βεβαιώσας, ὥρα ἐν ἑαυτῷ σφοδρότερον ἀνακαίμωμον τὸν ἁπαθὴ καὶ ιερὸν ἔρωτα καὶ Θεόν ὑπερφυὸς θεωτεί καὶ τὴν ἑπερκόσμιον πρὸς τούτον ἐνοσιν.
94 Tr. 1,3,52,18-21, 462 (221.20-3): ...πρὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα τῆς θεώσεως βλέπον...
95 Tr. 1,3,44,10-26, 456 (207.26-209.12): ...τὴν υπέρ ταύτα καὶ ὄντως νοερῶς ξητεῖ καὶ τῶν κάτω ἀμιγή ζωῆν...
In this situation ‘man has totally gone out of himself, and is entirely given to God’. Moreover, ‘man sees the glory of God and contemplates divine light’. But this light ‘is very little subject to the senses, inasmuch as they are indeed senses’.\(^9\)

But what if one falls into delusion? How may one know whether he sees the divine light indeed, or something else, a demonic imitation of that light? Palamas answers that man should be united to the Church and to the saints, as well as closely following the words and directions of the Fathers.\(^9\) Thereby he will avoid the aforementioned danger.

But let us now turn our attention to an important aspect of the spiritual senses, namely the *theophanies*.

d. *The Illuminations in the Old and New Testament: Symbolic or Real?*

The interpretation of the divine illuminations in the Old and New Testaments occupies a central place in Palamas’ theology of the spiritual senses, and, mainly, whether they were symbolic or real. He frequently visits this subject and presents some very interesting points regarding God’s apparitions, the *theophanies*.\(^9\) Initially, they take place ‘according to a different dispensation that is contrary to both divine and human nature’. In other words, ‘they appear in a manner that is different from both divine and human nature and, so to speak, according to us and beyond us, so that there is no name that could literally indicate them’.\(^9\) With these thoughts, Palamas wants to argue that union with God, which operates through man’s spiritual senses, is something that surpasses human measures and cannot be explained; it remains a mystery, and cannot be fully explored.

\(^9\) *Tr.* 1,3,46, 457.26-458.2 (211.12-20): ...συνάπτει τὸν νοῦν τῇ ἁδικείτω πρὸς Θεόν εὐχῇ, καὶ δ’ αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ὁλος γεγονός...

\(^9\) *Tr.* 1,3,46.5-7, 458 (211.24-6): Ὁλος δ’ ὁτός ἐστὶν ἐστὶν ἐστὶν καὶ ὁλος γεγονός...\(^9\) δόξαν ὧς παρὰ ἡμᾶς ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἡμᾶς ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἡμᾶς ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἡμᾶς ἡμᾶς.

\(^9\) In this subsection only the main points of this huge topic will be analysed.

\(^9\) Palamas discusses this subject in, e.g., *Tr.* 1,3,48-9.

\(^9\) In this subsection only the main points of this huge topic will be analysed.\(^9\) *Tr.* 1,3,4.8-11, 413 (115.4-6): ἑτέρῳ γράφω παρὰ τὴν φύσιν τὴν τέθειαν καὶ ἀναθεματίση τις ἤμας διαφαίνονται καὶ, ὡς εἰσέχει, καθ’ ἡμᾶς ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, ὡς μηδε ὄνομα δηλοτικών αὐτῶν κυρίως εἶναι.
To support his argument, Palamas refers to the visit of the angel to Samson’s parents, Manoah and his wife, in the Old Testament. In particular, Manoah and his wife were amazed because they did not know who their visitor was. Thus they asked the angel about his name. The angel replied ‘Why do you ask this, my name? Even by itself it is amazing’ (θαυμαστόν). Palamas concludes from this dialogue, that the vision of God is also marvellous (θαυμαστή), because it is incomprehensible and nameless (or: impossible to be named). Therefore, it is a true mystery. Furthermore, even if the vision of God is superior to negation, the words that one uses to interpret and express this vision are inferior to the ascent via negation. For this reason this interpretation proceeds by means of examples or analogies. That is, whatever one says about union with God cannot adequately express the reality. This is why one usually adjoins the word ‘as’ (ὡς), in order to articulate the similarities, ‘for the vision is ineffable and beyond every naming.’

But what did the antihesychasts claim about the illuminations of the Old Testament? They believed that they had a symbolic character. However, Palamas replies, this fact shows exactly that there is indeed a ‘holy illumination’ (ἱερὸς φωτισμὸς), whose symbol the aforementioned illuminations are. Thus, quoting three passages from Sts Neilos, Isaac the Syrian and John Chrysostom respectively, he contends that God’s appearance to Moses on Mount Sinai was a symbol of His appearance to the intellect during the time of prayer, when the intellect sees its own situation (κατάστασιν), or purity (καθαρότητα).

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102 Tr. 1,3,4.12-4, 413 (115.8-10): ...ὡς καὶ τῆς ὁράσεως οὗ ἦτον οὐσίας θαυμαστής καὶ πρὸς τῷ ἀλήπτῳ καὶ τῷ ἀνόνυμῳ ἐχούσῃ.
103 Tr. 1,3,4.14-7, 413 (115.10-3): Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ εἰ καὶ ἡ ὁράσις κρεῖττον ἢ κατὰ ἀπόφασιν, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἐρημιτικὸς ἐκεῖνης λόγος ἀποδεῖ τῆς κατὰ ἀπόφασιν ἀνόδου, παραδειγματικὸς ἢ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν προαγόμενος.
104 Tr. 1,3,4.16-9, 413 (115.12-5): ...παραδειγματικὸς ἢ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν προαγόμενος, διό καὶ τῷ ‘ὡς’, ὁμοιωματικὴν φέρον σημασίαν, συνηρτημένων ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλείστον ἔχει τοῖς ὄνομασιν, ὡς ἀρρήτῳ καὶ ὑπεροφώνῳ τῆς ὁράσεως οὐσίᾳ.
105 Tr. 1,3,6.10-2, 415 (119.5-8): Φασὶ γὰρ, ὡς αὐτὸς ἐπέσε, συμβολικὸς εἶναι τοὺς ἐν τῷ πάλαι νόμῳ φωτισμοὺς. Ἐκεῖνοι τοίνυν τοῦτ’ αὐτὸ δεικνύουσιν ὡς ἔστιν ἱερὸς φωτισμὸς οὐ γεγόνασιν αὐτοὶ σύμβολον.
106 In fact scholarship has shown that it is a work of Evagrios where Palamas refers to.
107 Tr. 1,3,6, 415-6 (119-21) (where also the references to the aforementioned three patristic works may be found).
Additionally, in Tr. 1,3,11 Palamas refers again to Moses, and the glory that shone upon his face, quoting a lengthy passage from Macarios.\textsuperscript{108} Here the central notions are the following: the illumination of the Spirit, which is distinguished from knowledge, the glory of the face of Moses, the Incarnation of Christ, and the glory that the faithful receive in the New Testament. After that, St Gregory concludes that the illuminations that occurred in the Old Testament, which were sensible and symbolic (αἰσθητούς καὶ συμβολικούς φωτισμούς), ‘symbolized and prefigured (προϋπέγραψαν) the illumination of the Spirit in the souls of those who—through deeds and truth (τῶν ἔργω καὶ ἀληθείας)—believe in Christ’.\textsuperscript{109}

Heretofore, in this subsection the main points regarding the divine illuminations in the Old and New Testament were approached. However, if one reads carefully the work of Palamas, he will realize without difficulty that St Gregory attributes great importance to the light of the Transfiguration of Christ on Tabor, and its interpretation. Hence, it is there that we shall now turn our attention to.

de. The Light of the Transfiguration of Christ

First of all, St Gregory knew about the antithesychasts’ claim that ‘the light which shone about the disciples on Tabor\textsuperscript{110} was a phantasm and a symbol of such a kind that it comes into being and passes away, but possesses no genuine existence’.\textsuperscript{111} Moreover, they did not regard this light as being ‘beyond all understanding’, but as ‘an activity inferior to understanding’. These arguments, for Palamas, are totally unacceptable, for he believes that they contradict the opinions of the Fathers.\textsuperscript{112} For him, the light of Tabor is the divine light, the divine activity, uncreated and eternal. It is not a symbol, but a distinct reality, a genuine existence. It is, of course, a mystery and beyond all

\textsuperscript{108} In particular, Palamas uses passages (either directly or paraphrasing them) from Macarios, Homily 58, 1, ed. Berthold, II, 182-3.

\textsuperscript{109} Tr. 1,3,12.26-9, 421 (133.20-3): Βλέπεις, ἀδελφέ, πῶς τὸν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἔργω καὶ ἀληθείᾳ πιστεύοντον εἰς Χριστὸν φωτισμοί τοῦ Πνεύματος οἳ ἐν τῷ παλαιῷ προϋπέγραψαν αἰσθητοῖ ἐκεῖνοι φωτισμοί;


\textsuperscript{111} Tomos, 4, ΠΣ 2, 572.19-573.1, trans. Sinkewicz, 185-6: Ὅστις τὸ ἐν Θαβωρίῳ τοὺς μαθητὰς περιαστράψαν φῶς φάσμα λέγει καὶ σύμβολον τοιοῦτον, οἷον ἐν συμβολον τοιοτόν, οἷον γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ οὐ κυρίως εἶναι...

\textsuperscript{112} Tomos, 4.1-3, ΠΣ 2, 573, trans. Sinkewicz, 186: ...καὶ οὐχ ὑπάρ πάσαν νόησιν, ἀλλὰ χείρω νοήσεως ἐνέργειαν, σαφῶς ἀντιφέρεται ταῖς τῶν ἁγίων δόξαις.
understanding, and not, as Barlaam supported, ‘inferior to understanding’. As
Sinkewicz notes, ‘Barlaam would now go so far as to say that knowledge is the only
supersensory illumination; only knowledge could be the goal of contemplation.
Consequently, the hesychast experiences constitute a false and deceitful illumination
because they involve the pursuit of sensory experience’. 113 Palamas refers to the
following words of St John Damascene:

> He [i.e. Christ] was transfigured, therefore, not by assuming what he was
not, nor by changing into what he was not, but by manifesting to his own
disciples what he was, opening their eyes and making of the blind those
who could see. For while remaining in the identical state in which he
appeared previously, he was now seen by his disciples in a manifest way. 114

Here the Damascene mentions something crucial for our subject: Christ ‘opened the
eyes’ of his disciples, so that they could see Him in His glory. This is a very important
point regarding the Palamite doctrine of the spiritual senses. As already shown, Palamas
speaks about the ‘implanted power’ in the eyes of the disciples, namely the power that
God gives to man so that the latter may sense the divine realities.

Based on this, Palamas argues that the ‘most perfect’ vision of God is as light. 115
This is how Moses saw God, and almost all of the prophets, particularly those who saw
Him as ‘a vision of reality and not an illusive dream’. 116 Palamas admits that these
visions had a symbolic character. Nevertheless, this is not the case for the vision of
Tabor: this was not a symbolic light, ‘which comes to being and then dies’. On the

114 *Tomos*, 4.12-7, ΠΣ 2, 573, trans. Sinkewicz, 186: Μεταμορφοῦται τοῖς, οὐχ ὃ σύκ ἦν
προσπλαβόμενος, οὐδὲ εἰς ὃπερ οὐκ ἦν μεταβαλλόμενος, ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἦν τοῖς οἰκείοις 
μαθηταῖς ἐκφαινόμενος, διανοίγων τοῦτον τὰ ὄμματα καὶ ἐκ τυφλῶν ἐργαζόμενος βλέποντας. Μένων
γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐν ταυτότητι, παρ’ ὅ το πρὶν ἐφαίνετο, [Ἑτερον] νῦν τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐκ
φαινόμενος. Cf. John Damascene, *Homilia in transfigurationem salvatoris nostri Jesu Christi*
(Τοῦ μακαρίου Ιωάννου πρεσβυτέρου τοῦ Δμασκηνοῦ λόγος εἰς τὴν Μεταμόρφωσιν τοῦ Κυρίου
καὶ Σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ), 12, ed. Bonifatius Kotter, OSB, *Die Schriften des Johannes
115 *Tr.*, 1.3.26.8-11, 437 (167.5-9): ...ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὡς φῶς εἶναι τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ 
τελεστάτην θέαν.
116 *Tr.*, 1.3.26.12-4, 437 (167.9-11): ...οίς ὑπάρ, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ὄναρ ὕφη. The trans. of ὑπάρ
and ὄναρ is drawn from Liddell-Scott, *Lexicon*, p. 1853 and 1230 respectively.
contrary, the light of Tabor ‘has the value of the second coming of Christ’. Moreover, it will eternally illumine ‘those deemed worthy in the ages without end’.

Thus, St Gregory calls the divine light ‘not sensible’, but ‘intellectual’ (νοερόν). The word νοερόν is probably borrowed from Wisdom 7:22, where Solomon refers to the Holy Spirit. Here Palamas notes a contradiction into which the antihesychasts fall. On the one hand, they regard the light of Tabor as sensible, and on the other hand, they attack the hesychasts of claiming to see a sensible light in their prayer. Moreover, they point their finger at ‘all those who find a sensible element in the divine graces’. In other words, although they deem the light of the Transfiguration sensible, they totally reject the sensible side of God’s grace, namely the fact that the grace of God may have an impact on man’s body. Therefore, they destroy the basis of Palamas’ understanding of the spiritual senses, namely of the potentiality of man’s—as both soul and body—total communion with God. And in Palamas’ eyes this is indeed very dangerous. This is why he wonders: ‘Do you see how very insecure [or: uncertain] and changeful [or: readily besetting] they are? They seem to be awesome [or: skilful] in calumniating [or: speaking ill], but in not seeing something good!’

The spiritual vision at Tabor is ‘ineffable, and invisible through sense perception’. It is not perceived through the sense faculties which are deprived of the ‘power of the rational soul, for this power is the only receptive of the Spirit’s power, through which the light of grace is seen’. That is, the power of the human soul receives the power of the Holy Spirit, and through it the soul sees the light.

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117 Tr. 1,3,26.14-22, 437 (167.11-21): Συμβολικά δ’ ὃμοιος ἀπαντήσεσα δ’ εἶπον τὰ ἑρωτ θεάματα ἐκείνων καὶ τοιῷτα οἷα περὶ βούλωντι· ἤν οἱ ἀντιλέγοντες ἥμιν: ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ καὶ ἡ τοῖς ἀποστόλοις ἐν Θαβῦρ ἀποκαλυφθέσαν ὡς τοιοῦτο συμβολικόν ύπήρχη ψφος, ὡς γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίνεσθαι· τῆς γὰρ μελλουσίδεστερὰς τοῦ Χριστοῦ παρουσίας ἔχει τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ τοῦτ’ ἀυτὸ πορισούμενος δυνατός ἐσται τούς ἄξιους κατὰ τὸν ἄλλητον αἰῶνα... Palamas refers here to Sts Dionysios and Basil the Great.

118 Ἐστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πνεῦμα νοερόν, ὀγιν, μονογενές, πολυμερές, λεπτόν, εὐκίνητον, τρανόν, ἀμόλυντον, σαφές, ἀπίμαντον, φιλάγαθον, ὀξύ, ἀκώλυτον, εὐεργετικόν...

119 Tr. 1,3,27.4-6, 438 (169.1-3): Όρα δὲ τὸ ἀβέβαιον καὶ ἐπιστρατισμὸν αὐτῶν; Δεινοὶ γὰρ εἰσιν ὡς ἐοικε κακῶς λέγειν, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ καλὸν τι συνορᾶν.

120 For the impact of grace on the human body, see ch.7.2 of this Part. For a critical evaluation of some relevant arguments of Sinkewicz, see the concluding remarks of ch. 7.

121 Tr. 1,3,26.14-22, 437 (167.11-21): Συμβολικά δ’ ὃμοιος ἀπαντήσεσα δ’ εἶπον τὰ ἑρωτ θεάματα ἐκείνων καὶ τοιῳτα οἷα περὶ βούλωντι· ἤν οἱ ἀντιλέγοντες ἥμιν: ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ καὶ ἡ τοῖς ἀποστόλοις ἐν Θαβῦρ ἀποκαλυφθέσαν ὡς τοιοῦτο συμβολικόν ύπήρχη ψφος, ὡς γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίνεσθαι· τῆς γὰρ μελλουσίδεστερὰς τοῦ Χριστοῦ παρουσίας ἔχει τὸ ἀξίωμα καὶ τοῦτ’ ἀυτὸ πορισούμενος δυνατός ἐσται τούς ἄξιους κατὰ τὸν ἄλλητον αἰῶνα... Palamas refers here to Sts Dionysios and Basil the Great.

122 For the impact of grace on the human body, see ch.7.2 of this Part. For a critical evaluation of some relevant arguments of Sinkewicz, see the concluding remarks of ch. 7.

123 Tr. 1,3,35.1-3, 446 (185.28-30): ...τὴν ἐν Θαβῦρ γεγενημένην ἀρρήτων καὶ ἀόρατων αἰσθητικὴ δυνάμει πνευματικὴν ἑκείνην συνεκάλεσεν ὦν.
Finally, elsewhere Palamas argues that a) the light of Tabor, b) the light that ‘purified souls’ see in this life, as well as c) the light that the saints will perceive in Paradise, are one and the same reality. Moreover, he maintains that the light on Tabor shone from the flesh of Christ ‘as if from a disc’. In addition, due to God’s will, it shone in a brighter way, so that the disciples see it through their physical eyes too. Furthermore, it was also seen ‘through the heart of those who had their heart purified’.

As Sinkewicz explains, ‘Although the apostles saw the Light of the transfigured Christ on Tabor with their bodily eyes, this took place not naturally but by the mediation of some other power, since the Taboric Light was ineffable and invisible to the natural faculties of perception... The vision of God is thus received through the agency of a special charism of grace’.

f. The Potentiality of Seeing the Divine Light in this Life: a Christological Dimension

In Tr. 1,3,38 Palamas presents an important Christological argument to support the fact that man may see the divine light in this life. Initially, he there wonders: if the divine light, which transcends every perception, was seen through the physical eyes (αἰσθητοῖς

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124 Tr. 1,3,43.10-3, 455 (205.28-31): Ἄρ’ οὖ γέγονε καταφανὲς ὡς ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ ἔστι τὸ θεῖον φῶς, τὸ τε τοῖς ἀποστόλοις ἐν Θαβῶρ ἐωραμένον καὶ ταῖς κεκαθαρμέναις νῦν ἐνορώμενον ἑρμηνεύς καὶ ἢ τῶν μελλόντων ἁγιῶν ἐπίστασις; 125 Tr. 1,3,43.19-24, 455 (207.4-9): ...τὸ φανότερον ἐν Θαβωρίῳ διανείμασαν, ὡς καὶ ὀρθαλμοὺς σώματος ληπτῶν γενέσθαι, ὡς ἠθέλησαν, ὡς καὶ τὰς τὴν καρδίαν ἔχουσι τὸτε κεκαθαρμένην πάσιν δι’ αὐτῆς ἐβλέπετο, τοῦ προσκυνητοῦ σώματος ὡς ἀπὸ δίκιου τινὸς φρικτῆς εξαστράπτον καὶ τὴν καρδίαν αὐτῶν περιστράπτων; Some lines before [Tr. 1,3,43.16-19, 455 (205.34-207.3)] Palamas refers to a passage which he ascribes to St Basil, but which Christou cannot identify (see ΠΣ 1, 455 n. 4); Meyendorff does not make any comment at all regarding the possible author of it: «διεφαίνετο οὖν τι φῶς θείον διὰ ὑελίνων υμένων, τούτεστι διὰ τῆς ἐξ ἡμῶν σαρκοῦ τοῦ Κυρίου, ηθεία δύναμις αὐτοῦ διανείμασαν τοῖς ἔχουσι τοῖς ὀρθαλμοῖς τῆς καρδίας κεκαθαρμένου» (emphasis added). However, Palamas indeed seems to be drawing directly on a work in which Migne’s Patrology is ascribed to St Basil the Great, namely *Homilia in Sanctam Christi Generationem*, PG 31, 1473D: Ἐφαίνετο γὰρ, ὡσπερ φῶς δι’ ὑελίνων υμένων, διὰ τοῦ ἄνθρωπον σώματος ἡ θεία δύναμις, διανείμασα τοῖς ἔχουσι τοῦ ωρθαλμοῦ τῆς καρδίας κεκαθαρμένου... This *Homily* was once placed among the *dubia* of St Basil, but is now regarded in scholarship as authentic. See relevantly Mark DelCiglione, ‘Tradition and Polemic in Basil of Caesarea’s Homily on the Theophany’, *Vigiliae Christianae* 66 (2012), 31-2 n. 5.

126 Sinkewicz, ‘The Concept’, 377. Palamas refers again to the notion of ‘symbol’ in Tr. 3,1,14, making an interesting distinction between ‘natural’ (φυσικῶν) and ‘not natural’ (μὴ φυσικῶν).
ὀφθαλμοῖς)—and it was indeed seen in this way—, does not this entail that it was also seen through ‘the intellectual eyes’ (νοεροὶ ὀφθαλμοῖς)?

Otherwise, this would mean that the soul is something evil ‘that cannot be combined with good’, or that it is something good, but inferior to the body. Because ‘How would it be that the soul is not inferior to the body, if the body is capable of partaking and perceiving of the light of God, whereas the soul is not?’ If the soul does see God in light through the mediation of the human body, then the latter, which is ‘material and mortal’, would be more familiar to God and ‘closer to Him’.

Obviously, this is not the case for Palamas: for him the body is what participates in the divine light through the mediation of the soul. Additionally, it must be said that, whereas Palamas holds the human body in high esteem, he regards the human soul to be superior.

Furthermore, Palamas makes the following claim: the Transfiguration of Christ on Tabor was a preamble of the glorious theophany of God in the age to come; the latter will be visible to man (ὁρατῆς). But the Apostles on Tabor ‘were deemed worthy to receive [this vision] through their bodily eyes’. Therefore, ‘why cannot those purified in heart receive even now the preamble and pledge of God’s theophany, which will then occur through the (human) intellect?’ In other words, if the Apostles saw the light of Tabor through their physical eyes, this entails that they also saw it through their intellectual eyes. Therefore, man may indeed see the light of God through his soul’s eyes, if he has first purified his heart. In this way, it is indeed possible to see God in this life.

127 Tr. 1,3,38.19-24, 448 (191.21-6): Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾿ εἴπερ αἰσθητοῖς ὄφθη ὀφθαλμοῖς τὸ θεῖον καὶ ύπὲρ πᾶσαν αἰσθησιν ὑπάρχον φῶς—ὡςπερ σον καὶ ὑπάρχη, καθάπερ και οἱ τοῖς πνευματικοῖς ἐκείνως ἀνδράσιν ἀντιλέγοντες φασι, κατὰ τούτι ἐκείνως καὶ ἡμῖν ὁμολογούντες— εἴπερ σον τὸ φῶς τὸ θεῖον σωματικοῖς ὄφθη ὀφθαλμοῖς, διατὶ μὴ καὶ νοεροῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὀφθήσεται;

128 Tr. 1,3,38.24-29, 448 (191.27-32): Ἡ πονηρόν τι πρᾶγμα ἡ ψυχή καὶ ἀσυνδύαστον τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ ἀνεπαίσθητον αὐτοῦ, δὲ μηδὲ τῶν παντόλμων κακοδόξων πώποτε τις εἴρηκεν; Ἡ καλὸν μὲν, κρεῖττον δὲ τὸ σῶμα ταύτης: Πῶς γὰρ οὐχ ἦτον ἡ ψυχή τοῦ σώματος, εἴπερ τὸ μὲν σώμα μεταληπτικὸν καὶ ἀντιληπτικὸν ἐστὶ φωτὸς Θεοῦ, ἡ ψυχή δ᾿ οὐχ;

129 Tr. 1,3,38.29-32, 448 (191.32-193.4): Πῶς δ᾿ οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς συγγενέστερὸν τε καὶ προσεχέστερον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐγγίζον Θεῷ τὸ σῶμα τούτοι τῷ θυγατρίᾳ μὲν αὕτη μεσιτεύοντος ἐν φωτὶ Θεοῦ ὁρᾷ, ἀλλ᾿ ὁ δمحافظ σώμα τοῦ καθαρτουμένου φωτὶ Θεοῦ ὁρᾷ, ἀλλ᾿ ὁ σώμα τουτοῦ δι᾿ αὐτῆς;

130 Tr. 1,3,38, 448.32-449.4 (193.4-9): Εἰ δὲ καὶ προσΚύνημι τῆς ἐν ὁδόις μελλοῦσις ὁράτης Ἐρραφανείας ἡ ἐν Θαυμωρίῳ τοῦ Κυρίου μεταμόρφωσις, καὶ ταύτῃ οἱ ἀπόστολοι ὄφραμοι σώματος λαβέναι κατηχόθησαν, διατὶ καὶ τὸ προσκύνημι καὶ τὸ ἄρρηβον τῆς κατὰ νοῦν αὐτοῦ Θεοφανείας ὄφραμοι νῦν λήψονται ψυχῆς οἱ κεκαθαρμένοι τὴν καρδίαν.
To prove this, Palamas brings to the fore a very important Christological argument. Christ, through His Incarnation, united his divine hypostasis, the hypostasis of the Logos, with human nature. Moreover, he received an ‘animated body and an intellectual soul’ (σῶμα λαβών ἐμψυχόν καὶ ψυχήν ἐννοοῦν).\(^{131}\) But, even more importantly for Palamas’ argument, Christ is also united to the human hypostases of all of the faithful. With each of them He is ‘commingled’ through communion in His divine Body, through the Eucharist. Therefore, ‘Christ is united in one body with us and makes us a temple of the whole divinity’. Palamas refers here to St Paul’s Col. 2:9: ‘For in him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily’.\(^{132}\)

For this reason, Christ ‘illumines the souls of those who worthily participate’ in Him through ‘the divine radiance of His body which is inside us’. This will be done in the same way that Christ illuminated the bodies of the Apostles on Tabor. But herein lies an important difference. On Tabor, the body of Christ, ‘which had the source of the light of grace’, was illuminating from outside (ἐξωθεν) those deemed worthy, for it was not yet mixed with them (μήπω φυραθέν). ‘And through the sensible eyes, it was sending in the illumination’. However, now the body of Christ ‘appropriately illuminates the soul from within’, for ‘now it is commingled with us and exists in us’\(^{133}\). Hence Palamas wishes to stress the fact that man is now able to see the divine light in a manner superior to the Apostles on Tabor.

\(^{131}\) As Christou (ΠΣ 1, 449 n. 1) notes, these expressions were initially used by the Fathers against the theologians influenced by Apollinaris of Laodicea (†390). Apollinaris argued that Christ had a human body, and a ‘lower’ soul (i.e. a soul without its rational part), but not a human intellect. The place of the intellect had been taken by the Logos, the second person of the holy Trinity. His teaching was condemned as heretical in the Second Ecumenical Council, in 381 (Constantinople I). For him, as well as the Orthodox reaction to his work, see, indicatively, J.N.D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines* (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1968\(^{3}\) [1st ed. 1958]), 289-301.

\(^{132}\) Tr. 1.3.38.4-14, 449 (193.9-20): ...ἀλλ’ ὦ θαύματος σοφιτικός ἀπολέιπτος ὑπερβολήν, καὶ αὐταῖς ταῖς ἀνθρωποπιάσεις ὑποστάσεις ἐνοῦται, τὸν πιστεύοντον ἐκάστῳ συνανακριβῶς ἐκαίστην διὰ τῆς ἐν ζώμω σώματος αὐτοῦ μεταλήψεως, καὶ σύσσωμος ἑνοῦεται καὶ ναόν τῆς ὄλης θεότητος ἑνοῦεται—καὶ γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ σῶμα «κατοικεῖ πάν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς»—...

\(^{133}\) Tr. 1.3.38.14-21, 449 (193.20-8): ...πῶς οὐχὶ διὰ τῆς θεϊκῆς σαγήνης τοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν σώματος αὐτοῦ τὴς ψυχῆς περισσαπόδαις φωτίσει τὸν ἐξίοις μετεχόντος, ως τὸν μαθητήν ἐν Θαβὼρ καὶ τὰ σώματα ἐφώτισε; Τότε γὰρ μήπω φυραθέν ἡμῖν τοῖς σώμασι τὸν προτός σῷμα ἐν ζώμω ἐφώτισε τὴς ψυχῆς θέματος ἐν τῶν ἐγγίζοντος τῶν ἐμπράξεως ἐξελόθεν ἐφώτισε καὶ διὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ομματών ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχήν εἰσέπεμψε τὸν φωτισμόν· νῦν δὲ ἀνακραθέν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν υπάρχουν εἰκότος, ἐνδοθέν περισσαγίζει τὴν ψυχήν. A similar view is expressed by St John Damascene in his *Homily on the Transfiguration*, 2.38-40, ed. Kotter, PTS 29, 438: Οὐκ ἐξελόθεν ἡ δόξα τοῦ σώματι προσεγίνετο, ἀλλ’ ἐνδοθέν ἐκ τῆς ἄρρητης λάρυ ἡμοῦ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἀπέστατον τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου ὑπερθέου θεότητος.
3. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter the αἴσθησις νοερά (intellectual perception) was examined. As shown, this notion combines in itself both the spiritual and the bodily. In other words, although it is beyond natural sense-perception (αἴσθησις), it touches both the soul and the body. However, the latter has to be transformed so that it may participate in the spiritual realities.

Furthermore, as demonstrated, St Gregory stresses the central place that ‘experience’ (πείρα) has in the spiritual struggle: it is this experience—which is different from reasoning (διάνοια), the power of thinking—that permits man to discern the reality of his communion with the divine life, that he sees God and not a lesser light or trick of the evil one. Moreover, Palamas speaks about the coordination of the physical and the spiritual senses, as well as the ‘implanted’ (ἐγγεγεγενημένη) spiritual power in the eyes of those who see the divine light. Thus, referring to the Light of the Transfiguration of Christ he argues that the disciples saw it through the ‘eyes’ of their soul, but also, in a mysterious manner, through their physical eyes too. Finally, the presuppositions of seeing the light were mentioned: ascesis, detachment, and purification of the heart.

However, a crucial question remains unanswered: how is it possible for man to see the divine light and be united with God? What is the basic requirement, and through which ‘process’ is this vision and union attained? Palamas would answer, through ecstasis, a ‘going out’ of one’s self. Hence, this is where our attention will be now directed. Here we shall try to prove the second point that this thesis pursues, namely that the human body has a central role in Palamas’ theology of the spiritual senses.
1. Ecstasy: Surpassing One’s Self

a. Vision through Self Transcendence

As already mentioned thus far, during intellectual perception man ‘truly sees neither by the intellect nor by the body, but by the [Holy] Spirit’. That is, man sees through the grace of the Holy Spirit, and not through his body. This is not a bodily action. Moreover, man knows that he sees ‘supernaturally a light which surpasses light’. However, ‘he does not know by what organ he sees this light, nor can he search out its nature, for the Spirit through whom he sees is untraceable’. Thus, in the vision of the divine light, man knows that he truly sees the light, but cannot explain exactly either the nature of this vision, or through which faculty it is attained.

To support his argument, St Palamas quotes Apostle Paul. The latter, referring to his vision of the divine light, writes in 2 Cor. 12:2: ‘I know a man in Christ who fourteen years ago was caught up to the third heaven—whether in the body or out of the body I do not know, God knows’. Palamas explains here that St Paul did not know exactly ‘whether it was his intellect or his body which saw’. In other words, what was the faculty through which he was seeing, his intellect or his body? Palamas gives the following answer: St Paul does not see as when one sees through his physical sense perception, namely through physical vision. However, he does see, and, moreover, ‘his vision is as clear as or clearer than that by which the sight clearly perceives sensibilia’.

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1 The following paper will be based on this section (namely ch. 7.1): ‘St Gregory Palamas on the Spiritual Senses: Ecstasy, Apophasis, Theosis, and the Passionate Part of the Soul’, accepted for presentation at the Inaugural Conference of the International Orthodox Theological Association (IOTA) in Iasi, Romania, 9-12 January 2019 (Theological Anthropology & Moral Theology Section; session on Emotions, Passions, and Virtue).

2 Tr. 1,3,21.24-5, 431 (155.5-6), trans. Gendle, 38: Τότε γὰρ ὃς ἀληθῶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος Πνεύματι, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ νῦ, οὐδὲ σώματι ὀρᾶ.

3 Tr. 1,3,21.25-8, 431 (155.6-10), trans. Gendle, 38: Καὶ δι’ ὃτι μὲν ὀρὰ φῶς ὑπὲρ φῶς ὑπερφυῶς οἶδεν ἀκρίβως· τίνι δὲ τούτῳ ὀρᾷ, οὐκ οἶδε τότε, ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐξετάζειν δύναται τὴν τούτου φύσιν, διὰ τὸ ἀνεξήχυστον τοῦ Πνεύματος δι’ οὐ ὀρᾷ.

4 Tr. 1,3,21, 431.28-432.2 (155.10-4), trans. Gendle, 38: ...οὐκ ἔδει εἶπε νοὺς ἢν, εἶπε σῶμα τὸ ὀρὰν.

That is to say, St Paul does indeed see in a specific way, and, moreover, he does see in a very clear way. As Gendle explains, this vision ‘is neither intellection nor sense perception, but transcendental knowledge, directly infused by the Holy Spirit alone’.\(^6\)

Furthermore, in Palamas’ own words, ‘He sees by going out of himself, for through the mysterious sweetness of his vision he is ravished beyond all objects and all objective thought, and even beyond himself’.\(^7\) Palamas maintains here that man sees the divine light through ἐκστάσεως or ἀρπαγή, namely ravishing beyond all objects. Ecstasis is indeed a central point in the mind of the chief authors of the Christian mystical tradition. Even St Paul refers to this: ‘I know a man in Christ who fourteen years ago was caught up to the third heaven (ἀρπαγέντα ἑως τρίτου οὐρανοῦ)…’ (2 Cor. 12:2). Moreover, ‘And I know that this man was caught up (διὶ ἡρπάγη) into paradise—whether in the body or out of the body I do not know, God knows…’ (2 Cor. 12:4). And it should not be forgotten that all these facts refer to ‘visions and revelations of the Lord’ (2 Cor. 12:1), namely St Paul is speaking about his vision of the divine Light.

As Palamas states elsewhere, ‘Our intellect goes out of itself, and thereby is united to God, but in so doing surpasses itself’.\(^8\) Thus, in ecstasis, the intellect goes beyond itself and lives a reality different from that of the normal and everyday. In a similar way ‘even God goes out of Himself, and thereby is united to our intellect, but in condescension’. And he does this out of his great love for humans.\(^9\) Furthermore, Palamas makes another interesting statement: he argues that ‘[u]nder the effect of the ecstasy’, one ‘forgets even prayer to God’.\(^10\) To support this he refers to an interesting passage of St Isaac the Syrian.\(^11\)

\(^6\) *The Triads*, 123 n. 36.

\(^7\) *Tr*. 1,3,21,4-7, 432 (155,15-8), trans. Gendle, 38: Οἱ δ᾿ ἐαυτὸν ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ ὀρισμένου γλυκυθύμιας ἀπορρήτου ἐκστάσεται τε καὶ ἀρπαγέντα οὕτω μόνον παντὸς πράγματος τε καὶ νοηματος πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐαυτοῦ.

\(^8\) *Tr*. 1,3,47,11-2, 458 (213,1-2): Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἡμέτερος νοῦς ἐξω ἐαυτοῦ γίνεται καὶ οὕτως ἐνοῦται τῷ Θεῷ, ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ ἐαυτοῦ γινόμενος.

\(^9\) *Tr*. 1,3,47,12-7, 458 (212,2-8): Ὁ δὲ Θεὸς καὶ αὐτὸς ἐξω ἐαυτοῦ γίνεται καὶ οὕτω τῷ καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἐνοῦται νῦν, ἀλλὰ συγκαταβάει χρώμενος· ὅπερ γὰρ ἔρωτι καὶ ἀγαπητείς θεληγόμενος καὶ δὶ υπερβολὴν αγαθότητος ἐκ τοῦ ὑπὲρ πάντα καὶ πάντων ἐξημημένου ἐξω ἐαυτοῦ ἀνεκφοιτήτως γινόμενος, καὶ κατ’ αὐτὴν τὴν ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἐνοσιν ἡμῖν ἐνοῦται. As Christou (ΠΣ 1, 458 n. 2) notes, the fact that God condescends so that man may see God is also found in Chrysostom, *De Incomprehensibili dei natura III*, 3, PG 48, 722, and Maximos, *Cap. theol.* 1, 31, PG 90, 1093D-1096A.

\(^10\) *Tr*. 1,3,21,7-8, 432 (155,18-9), trans. Gendle, 38: Καὶ αὐτῆς ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκστάσεως ἐπιλαμβάνεται τῆς πρὸς Θεόν δεήσεως.

\(^11\) *Tr*. 1,3,21,8-18, 432 (155,19-30).
In general, *ecstasy* is the situation whereby man goes out of himself, that is he is detached from worldly things, so as to meet God. As Gendle puts it, ‘*Ecstasy* in the Greek Fathers need not imply any kind of paranormal psychological state or loss of consciousness. It is (literally) a “going-out” from oneself, a self transcendence under the influence of love and divine grace. It enables a supernatural mode of cognition of divine things, which is mystical knowledge, after one has ceased to know and see through the functions of the discursive intellect and the senses’.

Therefore, it could be said that through *ecstasy* man moves from perceiving with the physical to the spiritual senses.

**b. Intellectual Perception Superior to ‘Abstraction’ and ‘Negation’ (Apophasis): Theologia and Theoptia**

So far it was shown that the light of God is seen as intelligible (νοητὸν) from the intellect, through the νοερὰ αἴσθησις. ‘Therefore the light of knowledge can never be said to be intellectual (νοερὸν), while that light is, as it were, intellectual when it is active and as intellective (νοητὸν) when it is seen by the intellect through the intellectual perception, and approached by rational souls removes from them their customary ignorance, returning them from a multitude of seeming opinion to uniform knowledge’. Here Palamas refers to St Dionysios the Areopagite, who argues that ‘the Good [i.e. God] is called “intelligible (νοητὸν) light”, for it fills with intelligible light every supra-celestial intellect, removing every ignorance and delusion from the souls in which it is born’. Therefore, Palamas continues, one may distinguish between two different elements: a) knowledge, which appears when ignorance has been removed,


13 Romanides (*Ρωμαῖοι ἤ Ρωμηοί Πατέρες τῆς Ἐκκλησίας*, 146) is correct in noticing that the Christian *ecstasy* is very different from the Platonic one or the *ecstasy* that one finds in religious movements relative to ‘mysticism’ (e.g., in Buddhism, Taoism, Indian religions, Islam etc.).

14 *Tr*. 1,3,3.12-7, 412 (113.6-11): Τὸ γοῦν φῶς τῆς γνώσεως ‘νοερὸν’ οὐδὲποτ’ ἂν τις φαίη, τὸ δὲ φῶς ἐκεῖνο καὶ ὡς νοερὸν ἔστιν ὅτε ἐνεργεῖ καὶ ὡς νοητὸν διὰ νοερᾶς αἰσθήσεως ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ ὀρφᾶται καὶ ταῖς λογικαῖς ἐγνώμονοιν νησαῖς τῆς κατὰ διάθεσιν ἄγνοιας ἀπαλλάττει τούτας, εἰς μονοειδὴ γνώσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιστρέφον δοξασμάτων.

and b) the intelligible (νοητὸν) light, which is able to cause this knowledge.\(^\text{16}\) For this reason the intelligible light is present in the ‘supra-celestial intellect’: to this person that has ‘surpassed himself’ (τὸ ὑπεραναβάντι ἑαυτὸν)\(^\text{17}\).

But to whom does Palamas refer with the phrase τὸ ὑπεραναβάντι ἑαυτόν? Do we have here again a reference to ‘ecstasy’? The answer is affirmative. Here St Gregory exploits his favourite method of comparing man with the angels. Palamas argues that not only does the intellect of the angels surpass itself, but the human intellect also has this ability, if the latter is made angelic through impassibility, purified through asceticism. The human intellect happens then to receive the divine light, and is made worthy of theophany.\(^\text{18}\) In this supernatural vision man is not seeing the essence of God, but he sees God through a divine revelation, according to man’s own measure, his progress in the spiritual life.\(^\text{19}\)

Moreover, this vision is not effected through negation—because man is indeed ‘seeing something’—, but in a manner superior to negation (κρείττον δ’ ἢ κατὰ ἀπόφασιν). St Gregory adds that God is not only beyond knowledge, but also beyond ‘ignorance’.\(^\text{20}\) By so doing, Palamas wants to stress God’s transcendence. It should be noted that Dionysios the Areopagite uses some similar argumentation, and even the word ὑπεράγνωστος, indicating Palamas’ likely dependence on him here.\(^\text{21}\) Furthermore, God’s manifestation (ἐκφάνσις) is truly a mystery, ‘the most divine and extraordinary’,\(^\text{22}\) because His apparitions, although sometimes symbolic, remain unknown in their transcendence.\(^\text{23}\)

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\(^{16}\) Tr. 1,3,3.22-4, 412 (113.17-9): Οὐκοῦν ἄλλο μὲν ἢ γνώσεις, ἢ καὶ τῆς ἁγνοιας ἀπελαυνομένης ἐπίγνωσις, ἄλλο δὲ τὸ νοητὸν φῶς, δ’ παρεκτικὸν ἐστίν αὐτῆς.

\(^{17}\) Tr. 1,3,3.24-6, 412 (113.19-20): Διό καὶ τὸ μὲν νοητὸν φῶς τῷ ὑπεραναβανίῳ νῦ ἐμφανάς ἐγγίνεται, τούτως τῷ ὑπεραναβάντι ἑαυτόν.

\(^{18}\) Tr. 1,3,4, 412.30-413.2 (113.26-29): Ὑπεραναβάλλει δὲ ἑαυτόν οὐκ ἀγγέλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς, ἀγγελοειδὴς δὲ ἀπαθείας γεγονός· οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦ φωτὸς ἐκείνου τεῦξεται καὶ θεοφανείας ὑπερφυοὺς ἀξιοθετεῖται.


\(^{20}\) Tr. 1,3,4.3-5, 413 (113.32-115.1): ...κατὰ ἀπόφασιν μὲν, ὦ—ὁρᾷ γὰρ τι—κρείττον δ’ ἢ κατὰ ἀπόφασιν, τοῦ Θεοῦ μὴ μόνον ὑπὲρ γνώσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπεραγνώστος ὄντος...

\(^{21}\) See, e.g., Dionysios, On the Divine Names, I,4 and I,5, ed. Suchla, 115.6-18 and 116.7-13 respectively.

\(^{22}\) Tr. 1,3,4.5-7, 413 (115.1-2): ...καὶ ώς ἄληθὸς κρύφων καὶ τήν ἐκφάνσιν ἔχοντος, τὸ θειότατον καὶ πάντων καινότατον...

\(^{23}\) Tr. 1,3,4.7-8, 413 (115.2-4): ...ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ θεοειδεῖς ὀψεις, κἂν συμβολικὰ ὄσιν, ὑπεροχικῶς ἔχουσι τὸ ἄγνωστον.
Furthermore, Palamas argues that ‘when the saints contemplate this divine light within themselves, seeing it by the divinising communion of the Spirit, through the mysterious visitation of perfecting illuminations— then they behold the garment of their deification’.  

Perhaps here he draws a) on Evagrius, who argues that ‘It is a sign of impassibility, that the intellect begins to see its own light...’; or b) on St Diadochos of Photiki, who mentions that ‘...when [the intellect] begins being frequently activated by the divine light, it becomes all transparent, to the point of being able to richly see its own light...’ St Gregory continues arguing that when the saints ‘behold the garment of theosis’, their intellect is ‘glorified and filled by the grace of the Word, beautiful beyond measure in His splendour’. And this happens in a similar way ‘as the divinity of the Word on the mountain glorified with divine light the body conjoined to it.’ 

This is an important point. St Gregory argues that the intellect of the deified person is glorified, in a similar way as the body of Christ was transfigured on Mount Tabor. Thus, this is another Christological dimension of the spiritual senses.

After having presented this argument, Palamas gives an interesting exegesis of two biblical verses: a) John 17:22: ‘The glory that you have given me I have given them, so that they may be one, as we are one’, and b) John 17:24: ‘Father, I desire that those also, whom you have given me, may be with me where I am, to see my glory, which you have given me because you loved me before the foundation of the world’. But, Palamas wonders, ‘How can this be accomplished corporeally, now that He

24 Tr. 1,3,5.20-3, 413 (115.16-20), trans. Gendle, 33: ‘Ὅταν δ᾿ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς οἱ ἱεροὶ ἄνδρες τὸ θεοπρεπὲς έκείνο θεωρῶσι φῶς, ὁρῶσι δ᾿ ἡνίκα τύχωσι τῆς θεουργοῦ κοινωνίας τοῦ Πνεύματος κατὰ τὴν ἀπόρρητον τῶν τελεσιουργῶν ἐλλάμψεων ἐπιφοίτησιν, τὸ τῆς θεώσεως ιστῶ τοὺς ὠρῶσι ἔνδυμα...


26 Diadochos, Capita, 40.5-7, ed. des Places, 108: ‘Ὅτι ὁ νοῦς, ὅταν ἀρξήται πικνός ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ φώτος ἐνεργεῖσθαι, διαφανῆς τις ὤλος γίνεται, ὡστε τὸ ἑαυτὸν φώς αὐτοῦ πλουσίος ὄραν, οὓς δέι ἀμφιβάλλειν. Palamas refers to Diadochos, using this argument, also in Tr. 1,3,7.21-5, 416 (121.25-123.1).

27 Tr. 1,3,5.23-5, 413 (115.20-1), trans. Gendle, 33: ...τοῦ νοῦ δοξαζομένου καὶ τῆς ὑπερκάλου πληρομένου ἁγίας ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ Λόγου χάριτος...

28 Tr. 1,3,5, 413.25-414.1 (115.21-3), trans. Gendle, 33: ...καθάπερ ὡς τοῦ τοῦ Λόγου θεότητος θεορείω τὸ συνημμένον ἐπί τοῦ ὄρους ἐνδοξάσθη σώμα.

29 Most probably, Palamas borrows this idea from St Neilos, Epistolae, II, 74, PG 79, 233A.

30 Cf. ch. 6.2.f of this thesis.
Himself is no longer corporeally present after His ascension to the heavens?\textsuperscript{31} In other words, how is it possible that his disciples be where he is, given that he is not bodily present in this world? The answer that our author provides is that this fact ‘is necessarily carried out in an intellectual fashion (νοερῶς)’. And this happens when the ‘intellect becomes supercelestial, and, as it were, the companion of Him who passed beyond the heavens for our sake’.

Then, obviously in theosis, the intellect is ‘manifestly yet mysteriously united to God and contemplates supernatural and ineffable visions, being filled with all the immaterial knowledge of a higher light’.\textsuperscript{33} That is, the intellect is united to God and receives divine knowledge, which comes from the Light of God. In this situation man is not contemplating sacred symbols, accessible through his physical senses, nor is it that he comes to know important elements of theology, e.g., a variety of passages from the Scripture. Rather his intellect ‘is made beautiful by the creative and primordial Beauty, and illuminated by the radiance of God’.

St Gregory wants to stress here the fact that man, in theosis, is not just seeing some symbols, or not just acquiring knowledge—even knowledge related to the Bible, which is, undoubtedly, greatly important—but undergoes something much higher: he is illumined by the light of God and united with Him. More precisely, the deified person has a direct apprehension of the divine realities, which are often symbolically revealed in the Scripture and the Divine Liturgy.\textsuperscript{35} Therefore, it could be maintained that for Palamas personal communion with God is a situation superior to both studying the Bible—and knowing its very important teachings—as well as exploring and decoding

\textsuperscript{31} Tr. 1,3,5.1-6, 414 (115.23-8), trans. Gendle, 33: ...Τούτου δὲ πῶς ἂν γίνοντο σωματικῶς, μηκέτι σωματικῶς αὐτὸν παρόντος μετὰ τὴν εἰς οὐρανούς ἀνάληψιν;
\textsuperscript{32} Tr. 1,3,5.6-7, 414 (117.1-3), trans. Gendle, 33 (slightly modified): Τελείωται τοῖνοι κατὰ πάσαν ἀνάγκην νοερῶς, σπηλικὰ γεγονός ὁ νοῦς ὑπερουράνιος καὶ σῶν ὀπαδὸς χρηματίσας τοῦ ὑπεραναβεβηκότος δι᾽ ἡμᾶς τοὺς οὐρανοὺς...
\textsuperscript{33} Tr. 1,3,5.8-11, 414 (117.3-6), trans. Gendle, 33: ...ἐμφανῶς καὶ ἀπορρήτως ἐνοθείη τῷ Θεῷ ἑκεῖ καὶ τῶν ὑπερσύναμητῶν, ἢ τὸν ἀπορρήτου θεωρήτον, πάσης ἀπὸ γνώσεως, υψηλοτέρου φωτὸς ἀναπαυμέλαιος...
\textsuperscript{34} Tr. 1,3,5.11-4, 414 (117.6-9), trans. Gendle, 33: ...οὐχ ὡς αἰσθητῶν συμβόλων ῥεόν θεωρός, οὐδὲ ὡς ἵερογραφικῆς ποικιλίας ἐπιγνώμων, ἀλλ’ ὡς τὸ καλλοποιοῖς καὶ ἀρχικὸς καλλοποιεῖμονος κάλλει καὶ τῷ Θεοῦ λαμπροῦμενος λαμπρότητι. Here Palamas draws directly on Dionysios the Areopagite. The latter, however, refers to the angels. See, Dionysios, \textit{On the Divine Hierarchy}, VII.2.5-9, ed. Heil and Ritter, 29: θεωρητικὰς δὲ αὐθέντας οὐχ ὡς αἰσθητῶν συμβόλων ἢ νοερῶν θεωροῦσιν οὐδὲ ὡς τῇ ποικιλίᾳ τῆς ἱερογραφικῆς θεωρίας ἐπὶ τὸ θεόν ἀναγομένας, ἀλλ’ ὡς πάσης ἀπὸ γνώσεως υψηλοτέρου φωτός ἀποτελοῦμένας καὶ τῆς τοῦ καλλοποιοῦ καὶ ἀρχικοῦ κάλλους ὑπερουριστοῦ καὶ τριφανοῦς θεωρίας ὡς θεμίτων ἀναπαυμέλαιοι...
\textsuperscript{35} Gendle, \textit{The Triads}, 122 n. 13.
the theological symbolisms hidden in the Liturgy. Again, *theoptia* is superior to *theologia*.

Here, the following point should be kept in mind. As mentioned in the first chapter of this part, after some anthesychasts had lived, for a period, in close proximity with some hesychasts, they argued that the latter proposed to them to fully abandon the divine Scripture, as something evil, and to practice only the prayer (προσανέχειν δὲ μόνῃ τῇ εὐχῇ). However, this stance could in no way be found in the teaching of Palamas. For him the Bible holds a most central place in man’s spiritual life. Besides, the great respect of the hesychasts towards Scripture is proved by the triptych presented by them—in the *Tomas*, through the pen of Palamas—assuring the reader of the correctness of their approach. In particular, they claim that their teaching is grounded on three pillars: a) on the Holy Scripture, b) on the teaching of the Fathers, c) on their ‘meagre experience’. Nevertheless, here Palamas does underline the fact that union with God is much superior to the study of Holy Scripture.

But now one would wonder: why does Palamas feel the need to so strongly stress the difference between *apophasis* and theosis? This question gives us the opportunity to study in a deeper way the relationship between those two parts of the spiritual life.

c. *Apophasis, Theosis, and the Passionate Part of the Soul*

The answer to the aforementioned question is most likely to be found in Barlaam’s extreme apophaticism. As has been stated, for him ‘The only knowledge available is limited to knowledge of God from creation or the ascent by negations’.

Most likely for this reason, in *Tr*. 1,3,21, as well as in some other points of his oeuvre, Palamas feels the need to clarify that union with God cannot be identified with ‘the ascent through the negative way’. By extension, it could be said that theosis is not identical to apophatic theology. The latter differs from the former in three important

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36 *Question 3*, ΠΣ 1, 407.25-408.7 (103.28-105.8).
37 This becomes apparent through many works of his; e.g., his *Homilies*. He there displays a deep knowledge of the Bible, as well as his immense respect and love towards it.
ways: a) ‘it lies within the powers of whoever desires it’; b) it is not capable of transforming ‘the soul so as to bestow on it the angelic dignity’; and c) ‘While it liberates the understanding (διάνοια) from other beings, it cannot by itself effect union with transcendent things’. 40

In other words, ‘the ascent through the negative way’ is something that man may attain based on his own efforts (e.g., knowledge, intellectual powers etc.), if he desires it. However, it is not identical to union with God, which is a very special gift of the Holy Spirit. As Gendle puts it, ‘The cardinal point about the via negativa is that it is neither a species of agnosticism nor itself the vision of God, but rather a necessary preliminary process of mental detachment from created things which provides an image of the otherness of divine ones’. 41

But here another question is raised: what does Palamas mean by stating that divine union transforms ‘the soul so as to bestow on it the angelic dignity’? He explains this in the following lines arguing that ‘purity of the passionate part of the soul effectively liberates the intellect from all things through impassibility, and unites it through prayer to the grace of the Spirit; and through this grace the intellect comes to enjoy the divine effulgence, and acquires an angelic and godlike form’. 42

This passage provides us with very important information. First, the prerequisite of man’s union with God is the purification of the soul’s passionate part, namely the transformation of the passions. This is attained through ascesis, an idea very common in the Palamite corpus. It is worth noting that, as Kesselopoulos points out, Palamas follows the Platonic division of the soul into three parts or powers: the reasoning-irascible-desiring faculties (logistikon, thymikon, and epithymitikon). These powers are cured through Christ’s Incarnation. 43 The logistikon refers to νοῦς, the thymikon to θυμός and the desiring to ἐπιθυμία (desire). Moreover, in the texts of Palamas one may see that these notions are often used interchangeably. 44

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40 Tr. 1.3.21.12-6, 431 (153.24-8), trans. Gendle, 37: Καὶ μή τις ὑπολάβῃ τὴν διὰ τῶν ἀποφάσεων ἄνοδον ἐνταῦθα λέγειν τοὺς μεγάλους. Ἐκείνη γὰρ παντὸς ἦστι τοῦ βουλομένου καὶ τὴν ψυχήν οὐ μετατάττει πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄγγελων ἄξιαν καὶ χωρίζει μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων τὴν διάνοιαν, ἐνοσιν δὲ οὐ δύναται μόνη πρὸς τὰ ἐπέκεινα ποιεῖν.

41 The Triads, 123 n. 30.

42 Tr. 1.3.21.16-20, 431 (153.28-155.2), trans. Gendle, 37: Ἡ δὲ καθαρότης τοῦ παθητικοῦ μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς, πάντων διὰ τῆς ἀπαθείας ἐνεργὸς χωρίσασα τῶν νοῦν, ἐνοι διὰ τῆς προσευχῆς τῆς τοῦ Πνεύματος χάρτη, δι’ ἥς ἐν ἀπολαύσει γίνεται τῶν θείων μαρμαρυγῶν, ἐξ ὧν ἀγγέλοιαδὴς τε καὶ θεοειδὴς καθίσταται.

43 Palamas, To nun Xene, 29, ΠΣ 5, 208.

44 Kesselopoulos, Πάθη καὶ ὁρετές, 57.
Second, this purification leads to impassibility, which ‘liberates the intellect from all things’: this is detachment from the worldly way of thinking and acting. Third, through impassibility and prayer the intellect is united to the grace of the Holy Spirit. Fourth, through this grace the intellect enjoys the divine goods. And thus, finally, the intellect ‘acquires an angelic and godlike form’; man becomes like the angels, who always see God, and even like God Himself. This is theosis.

For this reason, according to Palamas, ‘the Fathers, following the great Dionysios, have called this state “spiritual sensation [or: perception]” (αἴσθησιν πνευματικήν), a phrase appropriate to, and somehow more expressive of, that mystical and ineffable contemplation’. However, Dionysios does not seem to use the phrase αἴσθησις πνευματική in his oeuvre. As Paul Gavrilyuk notes in his article on Dionysios’ spiritual senses, ‘contrary to Palamas’s observation, in his extant writings Dionysius does not use such expressions as “spiritual perception” (αἴσθησις πνευματική), “the eyes of the heart” or “the eyes of faith”, previously deployed by Origen, Pseudo-Macarius, Ephrem the Syrian and other patristic authors. Dionysius draws most of his terms that qualify non-physical perception from the sphere of intellecction’. However, it should be noted that also Diadochos of Photiki (5th c.) uses the phrase αἰσθῆσις πνεύματος.

As shown hitherto, a basic prerequisite for the participation of the body in the divine realities is that the intellect be cleansed (κεκαθαρμένῳ νῷ). Moreover, the passionate part of the soul should be ‘transformed and sanctified, but not reduced to a state of death’. This is an issue of the utmost significance. The opponents of the hesychasts understood impassibility (ἀπάθεια) to be ‘the habitual mortification of the

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45 Tr. 1,3,21,20-3, 431 (155,2-5), trans. Gendle, 37-8 (modified): Διὸ οἱ μετὰ τὸν μέγαν Διονύσιον πατέρας ‘αἴσθησιν πνευματικήν’ προσηγόρευσαν αὐτήν, ὁ καὶ αὐτὸ κατάληλόν ἐστι καὶ ἐμφανικότερον ποι τῆς μυστικῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ ἀπορρήτου θεωρίας. It is interesting that, as shown from this passage, as well as from other references made to Dionysios, St Gregory regards the author of the Corpus Dionysiacum to indeed be St Dionysios the Areopagite, the Apostolic Father and disciple of St Paul. Nevertheless, as is known, this is not accepted by recent scholarship: the author of the Areopagitic Writings is most probably a Christian theologian of the late fifth to early sixth century who lived in Syria. See Andrew Louth, Denys the Areopagite, Outstanding Christian Thinkers (London: Continuum, 2001 [reissued; first published 1989], 14.


47 Diadochos, Capita 15, ed, des Places, 92.

48 Tomos, 6.13-5, ΠΣ 2, 575, trans. Sinkewicz, 187: ἡ νόμος ἔσομαι κατάληλον ἑταρία, μετασκευασθέντος καὶ ἀγαθάκος καὶ ἀγιοσθέντος, ἀλλ’ οὐ καθ’ ἐξίν νεκροθέντος τούτῳ ψυχῆς παθητικό...
passionate part of the soul’. However, Palamas argued something contrary: ἀπάθεια is the passionate part’s ‘habitual activity directed towards superior things, once it has entirely turned away from evil and turned towards the good in that it has renounced evil habits and has acquired a wealth of good ones’.  

Palamas visits again this topic in Tr. 2,2,19. He there writes that the truly impassible person is ‘thus not the man who has killed the passionate part of his soul... for such a one would have no momentum or activity to acquire a divine state and right dispositions and relationship with God’. But this should happen exactly because he will have ‘mortified’ his passionate part. Moreover, a little earlier Palamas had even supported the following:

But we, oh philosopher, were not taught that this is impassibility, namely the mortification of the passionate [part of the soul], but in moving it from evil to good [or: from a worse to a better state], and directing its energies [or: its habituated energy/activity] (καθ έξιν ἐνέργειαν) towards divine things, [when the passionate has] totally turned away from evil things and turned toward good things, and for us the impassible man is one who no longer possesses any evil dispositions, but is rich in good ones, ‘who is marked by the virtues, as men of passion are marked by evil pleasures...’

And he continues, providing some important and clarifying thoughts, namely that the impassible man is

49 Tomos, 6.1-7, ΠΣ 2, 575, trans. Sinkewicz, 187: Ἄστεις... τὴν τοῦ παθητικοῦ καθ’ ἐξιν νέκρωσιν ἀπάθειαν φήσην, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ κρείττω καθ’ ἐξιν ἐνέργειαν ὀλικῶς ἀπεστραμμένου τὰ πονηρά καὶ ἐπεστραμμένου πρὸς τὰ καλά, ὡς τὰς πονηρὰς ἐξεις ἀποκτησάμενου καὶ τὰς ἁγαθὰς μὴ πλουτήσαντος... Palamas also refers to this subject in Tr. 3,3,15. As has been noticed (see Louth, Modern Orthodox Thinkers, 186), he there argues ‘against Barlaam’s understanding of apatheia as killing the passionate part of the soul, asserting that “lovers of good things work a transformation [metathesis] of this faculty, not its killing [or mortification: nekrosis]”’.  

50 Tr. 2,2,19.12-4. 527 (361.29-30), trans. Gendle, 54: Οὔχ ο νεκρώσας τοίνυν, ἐπεὶ καὶ πρὸς τὰς θείας ἐξεις καὶ σχέσεις καὶ διαθέσεις ἐσται ἀκίνητος τε καὶ ἀνενέργητος...  

51 Tr. 2,2,19, 526.24-527.1 (361.9-17), trans. Gendle, 54 (modified): Ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς οὐ τοῦτ’ εἶναι ἀπάθειαν ἔδιδαχθημεν, ὁ φλόσσοφε, τὴν τοῦ παθητικοῦ νέκρωσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀπό τὸν χειρόνον ἐπὶ τὸ κρείττον μετάθεσιν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ θεία καθ’ ἐξιν ἐνέργειαν, ὀλικῶς ἀπεστραμμένου τὰ πονηρά καὶ ἐπεστραμμένου πρὸς τὰ καλά, καὶ οὕτως ἡμιν ἄπαθης, ὁ τὰς πονηρὰς ἐξεις ἀποκτησάμενος καὶ ἐν τὰς ἁγαθὰς πλουτήσας, ὁ «οὕτω ποιοθεὶς ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ὡς οἱ ἐμπαθεῖς ταῖς μὴ καλαῖς ἥδοναῖς»... As Christou (ΠΣ 1, 527 n. 1) notes, this last sentence is a direct quotation from St John the Sinaite, Ladder 29, PG 88, 1149A.
he who has tamed [or: subjected] his irascible and desiring parts, which constitute the passionate part of the soul, to the faculties of knowledge, judgement and reason in the soul, just as men of passion subject their reasoning to the passions. For it is the misuse of the powers of the soul which engenders the terrible passions, just as misuse of the knowledge of created things engenders the ‘foolish wisdom’ (1 Cor. 1:20).\textsuperscript{52}

Furthermore, St Gregory argues that if one uses the three powers of the soul (i.e. the reasoning-irascible-desiring faculties) in a proper way, ‘then through the knowledge of created things, spiritually understood, one will arrive at knowledge of God; and through the passionate part of the soul, which has been orientated towards the end for which God created it, one will practise the corresponding virtues: with the desiring [faculty], one will embrace love, and with the irascible, one will acquire patience’.\textsuperscript{53} Finally, such a person will have subordinated the passionate part to the intellect and, through uninterrupted remembrance of God, reaches total love for both humans and God. To quote a lengthy, yet very characteristic, passage of Palamas, such a person is he

...who has put that part of his soul under subjection, so that by its obedience to the intellect, which is by nature appointed to rule,\textsuperscript{54} it may ever tend towards God, as is right, by the uninterrupted remembrance of Him. Thanks to this remembrance, he will come to possess a divine disposition, and cause the soul to progress towards the highest state of all, the love of God. Through this love, he will accomplish the commandments of Him whom he

\textsuperscript{52} Tr. 2.2,19.1-6, 527 (361.17-23), trans. Gendle, 54 (modified): ...ο ὁτις ὕποταξας τὸ θυμικὸν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικὸν, ἄ συναφότερα ἐστὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς παθητικὸν, τὸ γνωστικὸ καὶ κριτικὸ καὶ λογιζόμενον τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς οἱ ἐμπαθεῖς τῷ παθητικῷ τὸ λογιζόμενον· παράχρησις γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ τά τῶν παθῶν ὑποτρόπια φύσις, καθάπερ καὶ τὴν «μεμωραμένην σοφίαν» ἢ τῆς γνώσεως τῶν ὄντων παράχρησις.

\textsuperscript{53} Tr. 2.2,19.6-12, 527 (361.23-9), trans. Gendle, 54 (modified): ...εἰ δὲ τις καλὸς ταύτῳς χρότῳ, διὰ μὲν τῆς γνώσεως τῶν ὄντων πνευματικῶς ἐκλαμβανομένων τὴν θεογνωσίαν πορίσεται, διὰ δὲ τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς παθητικοῦ, δῆ ὁ πρὸς Θεοῦ πεποίηται κινουμένου, τάς καταλαλύουσας ἀρετὰς ἐγράφεται, τῷ μὲν ἐπιθυμητικῷ τὴν ἁγάπην ἐνστερνόμενος, τῷ δὲ θυμιοδέτι τὴν ὑπομονὴν κατακτώμενος.

\textsuperscript{54} Let us remember that one of the reasons for man’s superiority over the angels in terms of the \textit{imago Dei} is his faculty of self-governance, namely when the intellect guides man’s internal self towards God’s will (see ch. 3.2 of this thesis).
loves, in accord with Scripture (cf. 1 John 4:7-21 and 5:1-5), and will put into practice and acquire a pure and perfect love for his neighbour, something that cannot exist without impassibility.\textsuperscript{55}

As a result of the above, it is clear that the opponents of the hesychasts provided a strange and problematic anthropology; one that, in the eyes of Palamas, bears many dangerous theological consequences. For this reason he decided to enter into this debate and author so many works dealing with these issues.

d. Angels, Humans, and the Vision of the Light

As mentioned above, Palamas argued that divine union transforms ‘the soul so as to bestow on it the angelic dignity’.\textsuperscript{56} This idea permits us to make a small parenthesis and add a few notes on the angels and their vision of the divine light.

First of all, he argues explicitly that the angels do indeed see the divine light.\textsuperscript{57} Moreover, he frequently connects this back to his favourite comparison between humans and the angels. For instance, in \textit{Tr. 1,3,5}, referring to Dionysios, he reminds us that ‘the ranks of supracosmic spirits above are hierarchically filled, in a way analogous to themselves, not only with the first-given knowledge and understanding, but with the first light in respect of the sublimest triadic initiation’.\textsuperscript{58} This means that the angels are granted not only knowledge, but also receive the divine Light of the Holy Trinity. However, ‘Not only do they [the angels] participate in, and contemplate, the glory of


\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Tr. 1,3,21-14-5, 431 (153.26-7), trans. Gendle, 37: τὴν ψυχὴν... μετατάττει πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀγγέλων ἀζιαν...}

\textsuperscript{57} See, e.g., \textit{Tr. 1,3,35,21-4, 446 (187.20-23).}

\textsuperscript{58} \textit{Tr. 1,3,5,14-9, 414 (117.10-5), trans. Gendle, 33: Τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον καὶ αἰ ἀνοικτό τάξεως τῶν υπερκοσμίων νῶν ἀναλόγους θεατάς, κατὰ τὸν οὐρανοφόροντα καὶ ὑποφήτην τῆς κατ᾿ αὐτάς Ἰεραρχίας, οὐ μόνον πρωτοδότου γνώσεως καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρῶτον φωτός πρὸς τῆς ἀνοικτό τριαδικῆς τελεταιρίας ἱεραρχούμενα πληροῦνται...
the Trinity, but they likewise behold the manifestation of the light of Jesus (ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς Ἰησοῦ φωτοφανείας), revealed to His disciples on Thabor’.\(^{59}\) Again the Christological dimension is brought to the fore.

Moreover, once more Palamas seems to have been influenced by Dionysios.\(^{60}\) As has been pointed out, Dionysios, in *De coelesti hierarchia* 7.2-3, ascribes immediate intuition only to the highest ranks of the angels, whereas Palamas ascribes it to the purified human intellect as well. This fact proves again the angelic character of the νοῦς.\(^{61}\) Consequently, it may be supported that Palamas exalts man to a greater extent than Dionysios, regarding the possibility of direct contact with God.\(^{62}\)

Palamas continues adding some details about the angels and their communion with God: ‘Judged worthy of this vision, they are initiated into Him, for He is Himself deifying light: They truly draw near to Him, and enjoy direct [or: first] participation in His divinising rays’.\(^{63}\) Following from this we can conclude that: a) the angels are deemed worthy of the vision of the divine light; b) they are initiated (μυοῦνται) into Christ, ‘for He is Himself deifying light’; c) they enjoy first participation in Christ’s divinizing rays (ἐν πρώτῃ μετουσίᾳ γινόμεναι). Therefore, it could be argued, the angels participate in the divine light in a more ‘direct’ way than humans.

So far, in these subsections the pre-eminence of the vision of God over theology was brought to the fore. Be that as it may, however, there is also another crucial parameter regarding intellectual perception: for the vision of the divine light to be attained, ‘the cessation of all intellectual activity’ is required. But this calls for a deeper examination.

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\(^{59}\) *Tr.* 1,3,5.19-21, 414 (117.15-7), trans. Gendle, 33: ...καὶ οὐχὶ τῆς τριαδικῆς μόνης δόξης μέτοχοι γίνονται καὶ θεοροί, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς Ἰησοῦ φωτοφανείας, ἣ καὶ τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐν Θαβὼρ ἀπεκάλυφθη.


\(^{63}\) Let us remember that in Part I of this thesis (ch. 3) we saw Palamas exalting man over the angels, in terms of the image of God, due to man’s corporeality.
In Tr. 1,3,17 Palamas presents a very important passage of Dionysios the Areopagite: ‘Such a union of those divinised with the light that comes from on high takes place by virtue of a cessation (ἀπόπαυσιν) of all intellectual activity’. Based on this passage St Gregory argues that contemplation (θεωρία) ‘is not the product of a cause or a relationship [or: an analogy], for these are dependent upon the activity of the intellect’; it rather ‘comes to be by abstraction, without itself being that abstraction; if it were simply abstraction, it would depend on us, and this is the Messalian doctrine...’. As already stated, the Messalians argued that man may reach God through his own powers, without needing the mysteries of the Church. Therefore, θεωρία

is not simply abstraction and negation; it is union and divinisation which occurs mystically and ineffably by the grace of God, after the stripping away of everything from here below which imprints itself on the intellect, or rather after the cessation (ἀπόπαυσιν) [of all intellectual activity]; it is something which goes beyond abstraction (which is only the outward mark of cessation).

Again St Gregory underlines the need of detaching oneself from the worldly things, so as to attain θεωρία. As Gendle puts it, ‘there must be a stripping of the mind (which does require human effort), a kind of mental ascesis, in order that God, who transcends all concepts (and their negations), may freely make Himself known’.

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65 Tr. 1,3,17, 427.28-428.4 (147.6-10), trans. Gendle, 34 (modified): ...κατ’ ἀναλογίαν, ...ἐπι ταῦτα κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἐστι τοῦ νοῦ, κατὰ δὲ ἀφαίρεσιν οὔσα, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὔσα ἀφαίρεσις· εἰ γάρ ἀφαίρεσις ἢ μόνον, ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἢν ἢν...

66 Cf. the second section (regarding the ‘historical and theological context’) at the introduction of this thesis.

67 Tr. 1,3,17,6-11, 428 (147.12-7), trans. Gendle, 34-35 (modified): Οὐκοῦν ἀφαίρεσις καὶ ἀπόφασις μόνη ἐστὶν ἡ θεωρία, ἀλλ’ ἔννοιας καὶ ἐκθέσεως, μετὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν πάντων τῶν κάτωθι τυποῦντων τοῦ νοοῦ, μετακόσιτος καὶ ἀπορρήτως χάριτι γενομένη τοῦ Θεοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ μετὰ τὴν ἀπόπαυσιν ἢ καὶ μείζον ἐστί τῆς ἀφαίρεσις τῆς ἀποκόψεως ἐκείνης.

68 Gregory Palamas. The Triads, 122 n. 22.
Based on these facts, Palamas goes on to say that every believer is called ‘to separate off God from all His creatures [or: to conceive of God as separate and radically different from all creatures / to distinguish God from all the creatures]’, for God is the creator. However, only those who have purified their heart and received the divine grace are granted, as ‘an experience and a divinising end’, ‘the cessation of all intellectual activity and the resulting union with the light from on high’.⁶⁹

Here Palamas wants to stress the fact that the vision of the divine Light is something granted only to those who have made great progress in the spiritual life.⁷⁰ Moreover, it is a πάθος, namely it is something that man ‘undergoes’. Even the disciples were granted only a brief vision of the Light, during the Transfiguration of Christ on Mount Tabor. What is important is that the disciples were ‘disengaged by ecstasy from all perception of the senses or intellect, admitted to the true vision because they have ceased to see, and, by their submission to unknowing, endowed with sensing the supernatural realities’. However, ‘they have indeed seen’, but ‘their organ of vision was, properly speaking, neither the senses nor the intellect’.⁷¹ As he writes in Tr. 2,3,36, the vision of the divine light is accomplished through the Holy Spirit, ‘for it is performed after the cessation (ἀπόπασωσιν) of the intellectual activities’.⁷²

Indeed Palamas argues that the saints, who see the divine light, ‘in place of the intellect, the eyes and ears ...acquire the incomprehensible Spirit and by Him hear, see and comprehend’. Moreover, the angels and the angelic humans see God through the

⁶⁹ Tr. 1,3,17.11-5, 428 (147.18-22), trans. Gendle, 35 (modified): Διό καὶ τὸ χωρίζειν πάντων τῶν κτισμάτων τὸν Θεόν πινότας ἐστι πιστοῦ· ἢ δὲ πάσης νοερᾶς ἐνεργείας ἀπόπασωσι καὶ ἢ μετ’ αὐτήν πρῶς τὸ ὑπερθέν φῶς ἑνώσεις, οὖν τι πάθος οὖσα καὶ τέλος θεουργόν, μόνον ἐστι τῶν κεκαθαρμένων καὶ κεχαριτωμένων τὴν καρδίαν.

⁷⁰ Palamas speaks very often about the need of purifying one’s inner self, through obedience to the Lord’s commands. This is indeed a most central notion in his theology. See, e.g., Tr. 1,3,19.17-20, 430 (152.30-153.3).

⁷¹ Tr. 1,3,17.15-21, 428 (147.22-9), trans. Gendle, 35 (modified): Καὶ τί λέγω τὴν ἑνωσίν, ὅτε καὶ ἢ πρὸς βραχύ θέα τῶν ἐκκρίτων τέως ἐδείτο μαθητῶν, καὶ τούτων κατ’ ἐκκλαίως γεγονότος πάσης αἰσθήσεως καὶ νοέως ἀντιλήψεως καὶ τοῦ μηδένς ὑπότοι φώς ἑνώσεις καὶ τῶν πάσχειν ἀγνώστος τῶν ὑπὲρ φώς τὴν αἰσθήσασιν προσιεμένον; Ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὲν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐλάτοι καὶ σύχνα κατ’ ἀισθήσασιν ὑπὸ τοῦ κυρίου άλλον, σὺν Θεῷ προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου δείξεως (emphasis added).

The phrase τῶν ὑπὲρ φώς τὴν αἰσθήσασιν προσιεμένον is translated by Gendle (p. 35) as ‘endowed with supernatural senses’. However, it seems to me more accurate to render it as ‘endowed with sensing the supernatural realities’: Palamas does not speak here about the ‘supernatural senses’ (though this is where he implicitly refers to), but rather about ‘the feeling/sensing of the realities beyond nature’. Most probably Gendle is misguided here from Meyendorff’s (p. 146) relevant translation as ‘revêtus de sens surnaturels’.

⁷² Tr. 2,3,36.5-7, 570 (459.21-3): Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ μετὰ τὴν τῶν νοερῶν ἐνεργείων ἀπόπασωσι τελείται, πῶς ἄν τελεσθῇ, ἐμὴ δέι τὸ Πνεῦμα.
power of the Holy Spirit, ‘if all their intellectual activity has stopped’. Therefore this vision is not a sensation, namely the result of sense perception, for the saints do not apprehend it through the relative sense organs, i.e. the physical senses. Moreover, this vision is not intellection (νόησις), namely the result of human reason (διάνοια), ‘since they do not find it through thought or the knowledge that comes thereby, but after the cessation of all intellectual activity’ (κατὰ ἀπόπαυσιν πάσης νοερᾶς ἐνεργείας). Thus, this vision ‘is not the product of either imagination (φαντασία) or reasoning (διάνοια); it is neither an opinion nor a conclusion reached by syllogistic argument (οὐθ’ οἷον συμπέρασμα συλλογισμῶν’). Moreover, the intellect ‘does not acquire it simply by elevating itself through negation’. Elsewhere Palamas refers to a passage of Neilos the Ascetic, which in fact is attributed to Ilias the Prebyter (and Ekdikos), a late eleventh or early twelfth century ascetic writer, whose work is found in The Philokalia, under the title of A Gnomic Anthology: ‘When the intellect is self-concentrated, it contemplates neither the objects of sense-perception nor those of the rational faculty; on the contrary, it contemplates pure intellects and the rays of divine light flowing with peace and joy’. Let us note some important points of this passage: a) during contemplation the intellect is self-concentrated, that is, gathered into itself; b) then, it contemplates neither the sensible nor the intelligible things; c) finally, it sees the divine light. These remarks resemble what Palamas says about the ‘cessation of all activity’, so that the intellect is able to see the divine light.

73 Tr. 1,3,18.22-6, 428 (149,1-5), trans. Gendle, 35: Νῦν δ’ ἃρα συνορᾶς ὅτι τὸ ἀκατάληπτον ἀντὶ νοῦ καὶ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ ὅτων εὕμορφοις Πνεῦμα, δι’ οὐ ὀρόσι καὶ ἀκούσι καὶ συνάσι; Νοερᾶς γὰρ πάσης καταπαυσαμένης ἐνεργείας, τίνι ὀρόσιν ἐγγελοί τε καὶ ἄνθρωποι ἱσάγγελοι Θεῶν, εἰ μὴ τῇ τοῦ Πνεύματος δύναμει; 74 Tr. 1,3,18, 428.26-429.2 (149.5-12), trans. Gendle, 35: Διὸ καὶ ἡ ὀράσις αὐτοῖς αὕτη ἀισθησις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ μὴ διὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων αὐτῆς ἀντιλαμβάνονται, νόησις δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπεὶ μὴ διὰ λογισμῶν ἢ τῆς δι’ αὐτῶν γνώσεως, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἀπόπαυσιν πάσης νοερᾶς ἐνεργείας εὑρίσκουσιν αὕτην ὠόκου, οὐδὲ φαντασία ἔστιν, οὐδὲ διάνοια, οὐδὲ δόξα, οὐθ’ οἴον συμπέρασμα συλλογισμῶν. Οὐδὲ διὰ τῆς κατὰ ἀπόφασιν ἀνόδου μόνης ὁ νοῦς ἐπιτυγχάνει ταύτης. 75 Part III, 4. For the English translation of the passage, see The Philokalia, vol. 3, trans. Palmer, Sherrard and Ware, 47. 76 Tr. 1,3,40.23-5, 451 (199.2-6): «Εἰς ἑαυτὸν» γὰρ, φησίν, ὁ νοῦς συναγόμενος, οὐδὲν οὕτε τῶν κατ’ ἀισθήσιν οὕτε τῶν κατὰ λογισμόν θεωρεῖ, γνώμονας δὲ νός καὶ θείας αὐτάς, βλεφάσματος εἰρήνην τε καὶ χαράν». 
Based on the aforementioned quote from Ilias the Presbyter, Palamas maintains that ‘contemplation goes beyond all action, way of being (ἦθους), and reasoning’. Finally, St Gregory refers to an important passage of St Maximos: ‘He who has made his heart pure will not only know the inner essences of what is sequent to God and dependent on Him but, after passing through all of them, he will in some measure see God Himself’. Worth noting is that this passage, among some others too, shows that Palamas did know the logoi theology, though he does not seem to exploit it significantly in his oeuvre.

Finally, it is worth noting that when Palamas speaks about the ἀπόσπασις πάσης νοερᾶς ἐνεργείας, he does not mean that man comes to a passive situation where he does nothing at all: what a contemporary reader would call something like nirvana. This is why Palamas blames the antihesychasts who ‘in their ignorance imagine that, after the abstraction from beings, there remains only an absolute inaction (ἀργίαν)’. On the contrary, Palamas explains that this is ‘an inaction surpassing all action’. The reason is that through this ἄργία (inaction), man attains union with God, which is undoubtedly the most important goal of man; and surely, the greatest ‘action’.

It is worth noting that elsewhere Palamas calls union with God the ‘supra-intellectual vision’ (ἡ ὑπέρ νοον ὑματία), namely in Tr. 2,3,48. In doing so, he intends to give an answer to Barlaam, who argued that ‘there is not any vision superior to the natural intellectual activities’. In his response, first, St Gregory maintains that ‘if our intellect was not able to surpass itself, then there would not be any vision and intellection beyond intellectual activities’. However, the intellect ‘does possess this

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77 Tr. 1,3,40,26-7, 451 (199.6-8): Ἐδοξες τὴν ὑπεραναφικησμένην ἔργον τε καὶ ἱθοὺς καὶ λογισμὸν παντὸς θεωρίαν;
78 Maximos the Confessor, Cap. Th., 2, 80, PG 90, 1161D, trans. Palmer, Sherrard and Ware, The Philokalia, vol. 2, 158: Ο τὴν καρδίαν καθαρὰν ἐργασάμενος, οὐ μόνον τῶν ὑποβεβηκότων καὶ μετὰ Θεον γνώστεται τοὺς λόγους, ἄλλα καὶ αὐτῷ ποσὶς μετά τὴν τῶν ὅλων διάβασιν ἐνορ. Palamas changes the last sentence of this passage, by mentioning ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν ἐνόρᾳ τὸν Θεόν; see Tr. 1,3,40,6-8, 452 (199.16-20).
79 For a brief analysis on whether Palamas uses the logoi theology in his corpus, see ch. 2.1 of the current thesis.
80 This is also underlined by Meyendorff, Introduction, 237-9 (=A Study, 169-70).
81 Tr. 1,3,19, 429.31-430.2 (151.12-4), trans. Gendle, 36: ...πάνυν ἀφαίρεσιν τῶν μετὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν τῶν ὄντων ἄργην εἶναι τελείως ἀμητίως οἰομένων, ἄλλα ὑπὲρ ἐνέργειαν ἄργην.
82 I draw this remark from Sinkiewicz, ‘The Concept’, 381.
83 Tr. 2,3,47,9-10, 580 (483.4-5): Ἡμεῖς δὲ σκεφώμεθα πόθεν ὁ φιλόσοφος κατασκευάζει ώς ὑπὲρ πάσας τὰς νοερὰς ἐνέργειας ὑματίας ὡς ὑπὲρ ἑαυτόν τῶν ὄντων ἄργην καὶ τελείως καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τὰς νοερὰς ἐνέργειας ὑματίας καὶ νόησις.
capacity (δύναμιν) which God sets in operation (εἰς ἑνέργειαν) during prayer and thereby the intellect is united to God, only through it [i.e. this capacity]’. This allows him to conclude there is indeed ‘vision beyond intellection’.  

To support his argument he refers to a key Dionysian passage, mentioned above. Subsequently, he concludes ‘that this faculty of henosis is beyond the natural intellectual operations and that it constitutes a link (σύνδεσμος) between the intellect and God, which is superior to the faculty which links the intellect to creatures, namely knowledge’. It is interesting that again Palamas underlines the fact that it is God who activates the power of the intellect to surpass itself; and this is achieved through prayer. Once more, the crucial notion of synergy between man and God is brought to the fore.

f. Drawing the Intellect Into the Heart: ‘ἡ πρός έαυτόν στροφή καὶ τήρησις’

In Tr. 1,3,45, apart from citing the very important Dionysian passage mentioned above, Palamas also refers to St Maximos’ relevant scholion. Based on these points, Palamas offers some important thoughts as far as the human intellect is concerned. First, the nous is ‘the highest of our faculties, the sole perfect, unifying substance, entirely without division among our faculties’ (or: the only perfect and simple and totally inseparable from all the other human elements essence). Second, the nous ‘defines and unifies the convolutions in thought by which science possesses certainty’. Therefore, it could be said that it is ‘the form of forms’ (άτε εἴδος οὐσία τῶν εἰδῶν).

87 In Tr. 1,3,45, 456.27-457.2 (209.14-6).
89 Dionysios, On the Divine Names, VII.1, ed. Suchla, 194.10-2 (PG 3, 865C). Cf. the previous sub-section (ch. 7.1.e) of this thesis.
90 Maximos, Scholia, PG 4, 344A.
91 Tr. 1,3,45.3-4, 457 (209.17-8), trans. Sinkewicz, ‘The Concept’, 381: ...τὸ ἀκρότατον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, τὴν μόνην τελείαν καὶ ἐνιαίαν καὶ πάντῃ ἀμερῆ τῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς οὐσίαν...
Palamas probably wants to stress with this rather difficult phrase that the intellect is the highest human faculty.\(^{92}\)

Furthermore, through the convolutions of thought the intellect ‘descends into diversified life’, for ‘it communicates its activities to all the other faculties’.\(^{93}\) However, the nous has also another, major, activity (ἐνέργειαν). It has the capability to activate this activity through itself (ἐνεργοθέλη καὶ καθ’ ἐαυτόν), ‘for the intellect is able to stay in itself; this (activity) is attained when the nous is detached from the matters related to man’s life’, the earthly and inferior things.\(^{94}\) Then, the nous resembles an equestrian (ἐφυστικος): the latter has a special power to charioteer (ηυηνεχειν). However, he does not activate this power in two cases: a) when he is not on horseback, but also, b) when guiding a horse, ‘he does not abandon his whole self to the necessary diligence to guide it’.\(^{95}\)

In a similar manner, continues Palamas, our intellect may ‘undergo (γένοιτ’ ἐν) the greater and higher activity’, ‘if it is not totally and always turned towards the inferior things’. However, ‘this is much more difficult than what an equestrian has to do, for the intellect naturally has its connection with the body and is strongly united to corporeal knowledge, as well as to the relationships of this life, which are intricate (πολυτρόποις) and difficult to discard’.\(^{96}\)

But what exactly is ‘the activity that the intellect attains in itself’? St Gregory writes that it is ‘the turning towards itself and vigilance’. It should be noted that this is

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\(^{92}\) Tr. 1,3,45.4-8, 457 (209.18-22), trans. Sinkewicz, ‘The Concept’, 381: ...ἡ καὶ τοῦς κατὰ διάνοιαν ἀνελιγμοὺς, ἐν οἷς καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἔχει τὴν ἀσφάλειαν, σχεδὸν κατὰ τὰ ἐρμοπολτικὰ τῶν ζῴων ἐν συνεργώθη καὶ διαμέρεσθαι προϊόντας, καὶ ὀρίζει καὶ ἑνοποιεῖ, ἀτε εἰδὸς οὕσα τῶν εἰδῶν. Sinkewicz (‘The Concept’, 381), quite justifiably, regards the description of the intellect mentioned in Tr. 1,3,45 as ‘strongly Platonist’.

\(^{93}\) Tr. 1,3,45.8-10, 457 (209.22-4): Εἰ γὰρ καὶ πρὸς αυτοῦ καὶ δι’ αὐτῶν πρὸς τῆν πολυμερὴ κάτειςι τοῦ νοῦ προσχόμονος τὰς ἐνεργείας πάσιν...

\(^{94}\) Tr. 1,3,45.10-3, 457 (209.24-8): ...ἀλλ’ ἔχει δὴ δὴ καὶ τινα ἐπίκτησιν ἐνεργείαν, ἧν αὐτοῦ ἐν ἐνεργοθελείᾳ καὶ καθ’ ἐαυτόν, ἢτε μὲνειν καὶ καθ’ ἐαυτόν δυνάμενος, ἐπειδὴ ἔργησιν τῆς ποικιλοτρόπου ταύτης καὶ πολυμεροῦς καὶ χαμηρποῦς διαίτης...

\(^{95}\) Tr. 1,3,45.13-7, 457 (209.28-211.3): ...ὁσπερ δήδη καὶ ὁ ἐφυστικὸς ἔχει τινὰ ἐνεργείαν τῆς ἠνεκεῖν διαφεροντός κρείττος, καὶ οὐχ ἤνεκ’ ἀλλὰ ἄνεκ’ ἐν τούτῳ ἐν τούτῳ καὶ ἐρμοτοπούσαν ἐν ερμοτοπούσαιν καὶ καθ’ ἐαυτὸν εὑρίσκειν, εἰ μὴ ἔσκυν ἐαυτῷ ἐκών ποιοῦντ’ τῆς τούτος ἠνεκεῖν ἐπιμελείας.

\(^{96}\) Tr. 1,3,45.17-22, 457 (211.3-9): Καὶ νοῦς τοίνυν, εἰ μὴ ὅλος καὶ ἕλε περὶ τὰ κάτω περιφέρεις, γένοιτ’ ἐν καὶ τῆς κρείττονός τε καὶ ψυχοτερέας ἐνεργείας, εἰ καὶ μακρὰ δυσχερέστερον ἐφύστημον, ἢτοι φούσε τὴν μετὰ σῶματος ἐχον συμπλοκῆν καὶ ταῖς σωματοειδεῖς γνώσεις συμπεφυμένος καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ τῆν βίου πολυμεροῦς καὶ δυσαποβλήτους σχέσεις.
what the hesychasts call ‘drawing the intellect into the heart’. Through it, Palamas continues, ‘the intellect transcends itself, and may be united with God’. Of note is that Palamas uses a strong word to describe the potentiality of man’s union with God: καὶ Θεῷ συγγένοιτ’ ἂν. As known, the verb συγγίγνομαι is used to describe a very close connection between two persons.

**g. Case study: St Stephen’s vision**

Hitherto, the most important points concerning intellectual perception were mentioned. But one would now wonder: is there any specific text of Palamas, where one could see the most characteristic of them gathered together? The answer is affirmative: one only has to read St Gregory’s commentary of St Stephen’s vision. One can read this commentary even as a kind of case study of Palamas’ theology of the spiritual senses illustrating in particular the theology already outlined above.

Palamas presents this very interesting commentary in *Tr. 1,3,30*. The relevant passage (Acts 7:55-6) reads as following: “But he, full of the Holy Spirit, gazed into heaven and saw the glory of God, and Jesus standing at the right hand of God; and he said, “Behold, I see the heavens opened, and the Son of man standing at the right

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97 Palamas refers to this also in some other points of his *oeuvre*. See, e.g., *Tr. 1,2,3-8*. On ‘drawing the intellect into the heart’, see Bradshaw, ‘The Mind and the Heart in the Christian East and West’ (2009). It is very interesting that this situation is observed to take place in the lives of many saints. One of them is St Maximos of Kapsokalyvia. For his life and teaching, see the interesting article of Kallistos Ware, ‘St. Maximos of Kapsokalyvia and Fourteenth-Century Athonite Hesychasm’, in Julian Chrysostomides (ed.), *ΚΑΘΗΓΗΤΡΙΑ: Essays Presented to Joan Hussey for her 80th Birthday* (Camberley, Surrey: Porphyrogenitus, 1988), 409-30. See particularly p. 425: ‘Theophanes also states, “He [i.e. St Maximos] had prayer always moving uninterruptedly and speaking in the mouth of his heart together with his intellect (νοῦς).” This suggests that, to use the accepted Hesychast terminology, Maximos had made his intellect descend into his heart, thus uniting the two and turning his prayer into “prayer of the intellect in the heart”’.

98 *Tr. 1,3,45,22-5, 457 (211.9-11):* Τῇς οὖν καθ’ ἐαυτὸν ἐνεργείας γενόμενος ὁ νοῦς, ἦτις ἐστὶν ἡ πρὸς ἐαυτὸν στροφή καὶ τήρησις, δι’ αὐτῆς ὑπεραναβαίνων ἐαυτὸν, καὶ Θεῷ συγγένοιτ’ ἂν. Cf. *Tr. 1,2,5*. It is worth noting that the aforementioned arguments, namely those in *Tr. 1,3,45*, are found, in almost exactly the same words, in *Hom. 53, 58, ΠΣ 6, 581-2* (ΠΑΕ 11, 336-8). As Sinkewicz (‘Gregory Palamas’, 153 and 138 respectively) notes, *Homily 53 (On the Entry of the Theotokos into the Holy of Holies II)* was written in 1333, whereas *Triad I* in the spring of 1338, namely five years later.

99 See Liddel-Scott, *Lexicon*, 1660 (s.v. συγγίγνομαι).
hand of God”. Initially Palamas wonders: ‘Is it possible for the [human] sensing power to arrive at the supra-celestial realities?’

That is, how was it possible for St Stephen to have seen this divine vision through his physical faculties? Because, what is most important, although he was seeing from below on the earth, ‘he saw not only Christ, but even His Father’. ‘For how is it possible to have seen at the right of Him the Son, unless he was also seeing Him [i.e. God the Father]?’ And Palamas continues: ‘Do you see that the invisible [i.e. God] may be seen from the purified in heart?’ However, ‘[this is] not [done] in a sensible, nor in an intelligible, manner, nor through the negative way, but through an ineffable power’.

And St Gregory adds something crucial: ‘For the sublime majesty and the glory of the Father are in no way accessible to the physical senses’. As if Palamas wants to stress that something else is required: the activation of the spiritual senses, man’s intellectual perception. Moreover, Palamas argues that the position of Christ at the right hand of the Father, that St Stephen saw, was something symbolic. Nevertheless, his vision was not symbolic. Let us remember that Palamas accepts that some visions in the Old Testament were indeed symbolic. But this is not the case with St Stephen’s vision. Moreover, Christ ‘condescended to reveal His own glory to him [i.e. Stephen] who was still in his body, but who had abandoned also his soul for the glory of His [i.e. God]’.

Furthermore, Palamas clarifies that ‘Through abstraction (Ἀφαιρεματικός) man cannot see or conceive anything; [however,] he [i.e. Stephen] did indeed see the glory of God’.

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100 Tr. 1,3,30.21-3, 440 (175.7-8): Ἐστι τοίνυν αἰσθητικὴν δύναμιν μέχρις αὐτῶν φθάνειν τῶν ὑπερουρανίων;
101 Tr. 1,3,30.23-4, 440 (175.8-10): Αλλὰ μὴν οὗτος κάτωθεν ἐκέισε ἀπὸ γῆς ἑώρα, καὶ τὸ μεῖζον, ὡς ὁ πάντα ὁ Χριστός μόνον, ἄλλα καὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ Πατέρα.
102 Tr. 1,3,30.23-8, 440 (175.8-14): Πῶς γὰρ ἂν ἐκ δεξιῶν αὐτοῦ ἑώρα τὸν υἱόν, εἰ μὴ καὶ αὐτὸν ἔβλεπεν; Ὁρᾷς ὅτι ὁρᾶται ὁ ἀόρατος ὑπὸ τῶν κεκαθαρμένων τὴν καρδίαν, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αἰσθητῶς, οὐδέ νοητῶς, οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεματικῶς, ἀλλ’ ἀρρήτῳ τινὶ δυνάμει;
103 Tr. 1,3,30, 440.28-441.1 (175.14-6): Τὸ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ὑψίου ὑπερβάλλον καὶ ἡ δόξα τοῦ Πατρὸς ὡδαμῶς προσίεται τὴν αἰσθησιν.
104 Tr. 1,3,30.2, 441 (175.16): Συμβολική δ’ ὡς στάσις ἤ, ἄλλ’ ὡς φησίν∙ ἀρρήτῳ δὲ οὐκ ἔνια ἡ ὀρασις.
105 See, relevantly, ch. 6.2.d of this thesis.
106 Tr. 1,3,30.7-9, 441 (175.22-3): ...τὴν ὑπερβάλλει ἀποκαλύψας ἐπικαλύπτει ἤτοι ἐν σαρκί, τῷ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἑκείνου δόξης προεμένος.
107 Tr. 1,3,30.9-10, 441 (175.24-5): Ἀφαιρεματικός δὲ οὐκ ἐνι τὶ ὄραν, οὐδὲ νοεῖν· ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἑώρα δόξαν Θεοῦ.
either through cause or analogy’. But this would mean that we could also think over (ἀναλογιζόμεθα) Christ’s glorified position at the right hand of God the Father. Yet this is not how Stephen saw his vision. In Palamas’ words, ‘Why would it be necessary for him to look up steadfastly into heaven, and the heavens be opened, if this vision were only knowledge which is intelligibly (νοητῶς) acquired?’

Hence the question remains: ‘In which manner, then, did Stephen the Protomartyr see this vision, if he did not see intelligibly or sensibly or by negation, and if he did not conceive of the divine things either by deduction or by analogy?’ And St Gregory replies: ‘I shall clearly tell you: spiritually (πνευματικῶς), as I have said for those who see the pure light through revelation, and as, besides, many of the Fathers have said before’. In this way, Palamas shows the close connection between the vision of Stephen, and that of the hesychasts who see the divine light as a gift from God. In Palamas’ mind St Stephen is a forerunner of the hesychasts.

To support his position about Stephen seeing spiritually (πνευματικῶς), Palamas refers again to St Luke’s Acts 7:55, mentioning that ‘Stephen was full of faith and Holy Spirit’. And Palamas concludes: ‘You also, if you render yourself full of faith and the Holy Spirit, will be able to see spiritually those things that are invisible even to the intellect’. However, he continues by making an allusion to the antihesychasts, ‘if you are totally empty of faith, you will not even believe in them who confess that they have seen [i.e. the light]’. Nevertheless, ‘if you have a mediocre faith [or: even a moderate amount of faith], you will hear with piety those who recount to you, by experience, the mysteries, as far as this could be possible...’

This last point, about the ‘μετρίαν πίστιν’, shows that Palamas acknowledges that the majority of the Christians of his era belong to this group—as also happens to be the case nowadays—, and tries to address them too: on the one hand he presents the
height to which they could be elevated, but on the other hand, he helps them not be frustrated by their low faith, or by the fact that the divine light has not yet been made accessible to them.

In the sections above it was often shown that both the soul and the body play a role in the νοερὰ αἰσθήσεις. However, the place of the body in intellectual perception was not fully analysed; is it true that it has a central role? This is what we shall try to demonstrate in the following, and last, section.

2. The Road from the Soul to the Body

a. The Spiritual Dispositions Imprinted (ἐνσημαινομένας) on the Body

A very crucial argument of Palamas presented hitherto is that ‘both the human body itself participates in the grace that operates through the intellect’. This was mentioned as one of the reasons to explain why he uses the word αἰσθήσεις (perception) in his key notion of αἰσθήσεις νοεράς. To support his position he presents a very crucial argument at the Hagioretic Tome. He maintains that the spiritual dispositions (πνευματικάς διαθέσεις) which come from the charisms of the Spirit ‘in the souls of those who are making progress in God’ (ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ... χαρισμάτων τοῦ πνεύματος), ‘show their effects [or: are imprinted] (ἐνσημαινομένας) on the body as the result of the charisms of the Spirit’. Moreover, Palamas knows that the antihesychasts did not accept this reality, and for him this denial leads to heresy. The basic word here is ἐνσημαινομένας, a rather rare word. What exactly does it mean? In addition, does Palamas use it again in his corpus?

According to the Liddel-Scott Lexicon the verb ἐνσημαίνω (which, among others, had been used by Aristotle in his De Anima) has mainly the following

114 Tr. 1,3,31.7-8, 442 (179,1-2): ...καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ὅτι καὶ τὸ σῶμα μεταλαμβάνει πως τῆς κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργομυμένης χάριτος...
115 See ch. 6.1.d in this Part.
116 Tomos, 6.1-3, ΠΣ 2, 575, trans. Sinkewicz, 186-7 (modified): Ὅστις τὰς ἐνσημαινομένας τῶν σῶματι πνευματικάς διαθέσεις ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τῶν κατὰ Θεόν προκοπτόντων χαρισμάτων τοῦ Πνεύματος οὐ παραδέχεται...
connotations: a) contain a signification, imply; b) report, signal (Pass., to be indicated or expressed); c) give notice of, intimate; d) give signs one to another; e) impress or stamp upon (Pass., to be imprinted).

The word ἐνσημαίνεται (or its derivative forms) appears nine times in the Palamite corpus: six of those instances in the Triads (four times in Tr. 1,3 [sections 33, 41 (twice), 42], once in Tr. 2,2 and once in Tr. 2,3), while the other occurrences are a) in the Hagioretic Tome, 6; b) in the Fourth Antirrhetic Treatise against Akindynos, 14, 36; and c) in the Epistle to the most holy hieromonk Paul Asanes, 2. Thus this word appears initially in the Triads, and then comes up again in three other texts.

Palamas provides a justification, and an answer to objections, about the ἐνσημαίνομενα τῷ σώματι πνευματικὰς διαθέσεις in different places of his corpus. So, in Tr. 1,3,33 he argues that the effects of the spiritual realities are manifested not only in the soul, but also in the body. In particular he there stresses the fact that ‘the purifying mourning’, which is lived through the grace of God, is not manifested only in the human soul, but through the soul it is also transmitted to the body and the bodily sensations.

And a clear proof for this ‘are the tears full of pain of those who mourn for their sins’. Palamas wants to argue here that repentance and mourning for one’s sins, is not something that takes part only in the human soul or spirit. It may begin there, but is also transmitted to the body; and thus also lived by the body and the bodily sensations. Therefore, Palamas wonders, ‘why shouldn’t we also accept with reverence the proofs [or: signs] of spiritual pleasure, for these signs are [also] manifested (ἐνσημαινόμενα) in (and through) the bodily sensations’?

117 Liddell-Scott, Lexicon, 573 (s.v. ἐνσημαίνω).
118 Data retrieved from the TLG; online accessed July 2016.
119 ΠΣ 5, 248.1. In this Epistle to Asanes the verb ἐνσημαίνεται seems to mean ‘imply’, ‘indicate’, ‘signify’, ‘declare’ or ‘symbolize’. Moreover, it is not placed in the context of the spiritual senses, but has to do with the calling (κλῆσις) to the Christian life (and, in particular, to the monastic ‘schema’ [σχῆμα], which is the subject of this epistle). It should be noted that this text is difficult to be dated. A suggestion has been made by Christou, placing it in the years 1347-8 (cf. ΠΣ 5, 146). Sinkewicz gives the date 1334, but also adds a question mark (without further details): see Sinkewicz, ‘Gregory Palamas’, 147).
120 Tr. 1,3,33, 443.28-444.1 (181.24-7): Ἐἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ κατὰ Θεόν καθάρσιον πένθος οὐκ ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν μόνον τελεῖται τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ ταύτης καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν κατὰ σῶμα διαβαίνει αἴσθησιν...
121 Tr. 1,3,33.1-3, 444 (181.27-8): ...—καὶ δέλγμα τούτου ἐναργές τὸ κατῶδυνον τοῖς ἐφ’ ἐναρτήματι πενθοῦσι δάκρυνον—...
122 Tr. 1,3,33.3-5, 444 (181.28-30): ...διατί μή καὶ τὰ τῆς κατὰ Πνεῦμα θείας ἡδονῆς τεκμήρια, ταῖς χωρούσαις τοῦ σώματος αἰσθηθείσεν ἐνσημαινόμενα, εὐλαβής παραδεξαμέθα;
St Gregory invokes here the words of Christ, ‘Blessed are those who mourn, for they shall be comforted’. Christ blesses those who mourn, because they will receive joy (χαρά), ‘the fruit of the Spirit’. But in this consolation (παράκλησις) the body takes part too, in many ways. These ways are known to them who have ‘experienced these facts’ (οἱ ἐν πέιρα γεγονότες). Moreover, they are also revealed (and made known) to those persons who meet them, through various external signs, such as ‘their gentle (soft) ethos, sweet tear[s], grace-filled meetings of those who come to them’. Taking all the above into consideration, it seems to me that Sinkewicz is correct when arguing that ‘Gregory’s concern is to show the progression of grace from internal activity to exterior manifestation’.

b. Participation of the Body in Theosis: Now and in the Age to Come

Now Palamas makes an important remark: it is not only the soul that takes part in the ‘pledge of the goods to come in the future’, but also the body, which walks together (συνδιανύον) with the soul along the road of the Gospel, which leads to the blessings of eternity. This is a crucial point in Palamas’ teaching. Man, during his effort here on earth to attain union with God, has a foretaste of some of the beauties that he will experience in his life in Paradise. But this effort for union with God is not made only by the soul. Man is not only ‘spirit’, he is also ‘body’, and this body participates in man’s spiritual struggle. This is shown through a special word that Palamas chooses to use: τὸ συνδιανύον. Here one traces the complementarity and cooperation that exists ...
between soul and body. In Palamas’ mind there is no room for hostility between body and soul. It could even be maintained that the human body ‘has the right and privilege’ to also foretaste in this life some of the blessings of the age to come.\textsuperscript{127}

But Palamas goes even further: if one rejects this fact, ‘then one is also rejecting the participation of the body in the future age’.\textsuperscript{128} His argument is simple: if we believe that the body is really going to participate then in those mysterious blessings, it follows therefore that it will also take part, καταλλήλως έαυτῷ, in the divine grace which is given to the intellect in this life.\textsuperscript{129} Some important points should be highlighted here. First, the human body, according to Palamas, participates in the goods of the age to come; it takes part in the eternal communion with God. Consequently, it must also participate in union with God during this earthly life as well. It is not possible for theology to reject either of these two facts; if this happens, one produces a problematic theology.

Second, Palamas uses the phrase ‘καταλλήλως έαυτῷ’. What exactly does this mean? One would suggest the following: the καταλλήλως έαυτῷ refers to man’s synergy with God, to the extent that man cooperates with God, that is, how much each human person permits God to act upon him. This is of course closely related with ascesis. Therefore the καταλλήλως έαυτῷ may also mean ‘as much as man has progressed in his spiritual life’. However, there may be also another, very interesting, dimension. The human body, as it is now created, has some restrictions in perceiving God. For this reason it will be ‘transformed’ at the Resurrection of Christ, so as to have full communion with God. Most probably the καταλλήλως έαυτῷ refers to this deficient reality of the current world, of fallen human nature. This seems to be the reason why Fr John Meyendorff translates this phrase as conformément à sa nature (‘in accordance with/compatibly with its nature’).\textsuperscript{130}

The same parallelism, namely between the participation of the body in the ‘ineffable goods’ now and at that time is also found in the Hagioretic Tome, utilising

\textsuperscript{127} For a relevant recent article, see Demetrios Harper, ‘Becoming Homotheos: St Gregory Palamas’ Eschatology of Body’, in Athanasopoulos (ed.), Triune God, 232-47.

\textsuperscript{128} Tr. 1,33,15-6, 444 (183.8-10): ὁ δὲ μὴ τοῦτο λέγων, καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ μὴ μᾶλλοντι αἰώνι μετὰ σώματος ἄπαννεται διαγωγήν.

\textsuperscript{129} Tr. 1,33,16-9, 444 (183.10-3): Εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ σῶμα συμμεθέξει τὸτε τῶν ἀποστήμων ἐκείνων ἁγάθων, καὶ νῦν δήπου συμμεθέξει καταλλήλως έαυτῷ τῆς ἐνδιδομένης πρὸς θεοῦ χάριτος τὸ νῦ.

\textsuperscript{130} Ed. Meyendorff, 182. Panagiotis Christou seems to give a similar rendering in his modern Greek translation (i.e. in ΠΑΕ 2, 221)
even certain identical expressions. However, the καταλλήλως ἑαυτῷ is there replaced by the word τὸ ἐγχωροῦν. This most probably means 'according to the body’s potentiality, or to the extent that the body is capable of συμμετέχειν Θεῷ, of participating in God’. The text reads as following: ‘the body... will doubtless participate even now as far as possible (κατὰ τὸ ἐγχωροῦν) in the grace communicated mystically and ineffably by God to the purified intellect and it will experience the divine realities in a manner appropriate to it’.131 Behind the phrase ‘τὰ θεῖα πείσεται’ Dionysios the Areopagite is hidden: to the latter is attributed the famous dictum οὐ μόνον μαθῶν ἄλλα καὶ παθῶν τὰ θεῖα.132 It should be noted that, as already seen, this is a phrase that Palamas uses frequently.133

Now St Gregory refers to a noteworthy passage of Diadochos of Photiki: ‘In those who have detached themselves from the goods of this life for the sake of the goods to come, the intellect, because of its freedom from worldly care, acts with vigour and perceives (ἐπαισθάνεται) the ineffable divine goodness and, according to the measure of its advancement, it also communicates to the body its own goodness. Such joy that then arises in the soul and in the body is an infallible reminder of the incorruptible life’.134

The important point here is that the intellect, ‘according to its own progress’, transmits also to the body this goodness that it perceives.135 This is a clear indication of how communion with God is also transmitted to the body. In other words, how the body has a crucial role in the operation of the spiritual senses. Of note is the usage from Diadochos of the word ἐπαισθάνεται. This likely influenced Palamas in his own usage of the term αἴσθησις νοερά. Besides, as stated above, Diadochos uses the phrase

131 Tomos, 6.9-14, ΠΣ 2, 575, trans. Sinkewicz, 187: Εἰ γὰρ συμμεθέξη τότε τῇ ψυχῆ τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἀπορρήτων ἁγιάθων, καὶ νῦν δῆποι συμμεθέξη κατὰ τὸ ἐγχωροῦν τῆς χαρισματικῆς μυστικῆς καὶ ἀπορρήτως ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ χάριτος τῆς εἰκοσάκημον νῦ καὶ αὐτὸ τὰ θεῖα πείσεται καταλλήλως ἑαυτῷ, μετασκευασθέντος καὶ ἐγασθέντος...
132 De divinis nominibus 2, 9, ed. Suchla, PTS 33, 134.1-2.
133 See, e.g., Tr. 1, 3,34, 445.21-7 (185.17-24).
134 See Tomos, 6, ΠΣ 2, 575.19-25, trans. Sinkewicz, 187 (slightly changed): «ο νοῦς εὐφῶς διὰ τὴν ἀμεριμνίαν κινούμενος τῆς θείας ἁρμόδιας ἀρχιστότητος αὐτὸς ἐπαισθάνεται καὶ τὸ σώματι, κατὰ τὸ μέτρον τῆς ἄστυν προκοπῆς, τῆς οἰκείας χρηστότητος μεταδίδουσιν· ἢ δὲ τοιαύτη ἐγκινομένη χαρὰ τότε τῇ ψυχῆ καὶ τῷ σώματι, ὑπόμνησις ἐστὶν ἀπάνθησις τῆς ἁρμόδιας βοήθειας». The passage that Palamas provides is slightly different from what the critical ed. gives [= Diadochos, Capita 25, ed. des Places, 97]. However, the meaning is not altered. Diadochos argues something similar also in his Capita 79 (p. 137).
135 Tomos, 6.21-3, ΠΣ 2, 575.
αἰσθησίς τοῦ πνεύματος. Consequently, for the above reasons, Sinkewicz seems to be correct when he maintains that, for Palamas, in this present life ‘the body and its natural senses have no direct perception of God. The body’s perception of the divine is mediated through the soul or the intellect’.

c. Moses, St Stephen, and St Mary of Egypt

Up to now it was maintained that the body participates in the spiritual realities. To support his relevant arguments Palamas brings three testimonies to bear on the issue: Moses, St Stephen, and St Mary of Egypt. First, as is well-known, when Moses returned from his encounter with God on Mount Sinai, his face shined to such a great extent, that those who were looking at him with their physical eyes were not able to bear ‘the abundance of this light’. Moreover, Palamas states that this light occurred because ‘the inner brilliancy of the intellect was outpoured also to the body’. Second, ‘in a similar way did the physical face of St Stephen appear like the face of an angel’. Palamas clarifies this further: from inside, Stephen’s intellect acquired an angelic aspect, for it was united to the divine light, ‘in a mysterious participation’, ‘either directly or by consent’ (ἐίτε κατ’ ἐπιβολήν ἐίτε κατὰ παραδοχὴν). And this union took place in a way ‘similar and proper to the angelic life’ (ἀγγελομιμήτως τε καὶ ἀγγελοπρεπῶς).

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136 Diadochos, Capita 15, ed. des Places, 92.
137 Sinkewicz, ‘The Concept’, 386 (slightly modified; Sinkewicz writes ‘mind’ instead of ‘intellect’). For the transformation of the body in the age to come, so that it may partake in the vision of the divine light, see ch. 7.2.b.
138 Cf. Ex. 34:29-35: Moses came down from Mount Sinai. As he came down from the mountain with the two tablets of the covenant in his hand, Moses did not know that the skin of his face shone because he had been talking with God. When Aaron and all the Israelites saw Moses, the skin of his face was shining, and they were afraid to come near him...
139 Tr. 1,3,31.15-20, 442 (179.11-5): Οὕτω Μωσέως ἔλαμψε τὸ πρόσωπον, τῆς ἐντὸς λαμπρότητος τοῦ νοῦ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα περικεχυμένης, καὶ τοσοῦτον ἠλαμμένην ὡς μηδὲ τοὺς αἰσθητοὺς προσβλέποντας αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν περιουσίαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἐκείνης ἀτενίζειν ἔχειν. And this union took place in a way ‘similar and proper to the angelic life’ (ἀγγελομιμήτως τε καὶ ἀγγελοπρεπῶς, εἴτε κατ’ ἐπιβολὴν εἴτε κατὰ παραδοχὴν ἐννομένος τῷ ὑπερανωκισμένω τοῦ παντὸς φωτὶ κατὰ μέθεξιν ἀπόρρητον, ἀγγελοειδὴς ἐγένετο).
140 Tr. 1,3,15-20, 442 (179.7-10): Οὕτως δόξη τοῦ αἰσθητῶν πρόσωπον Ἐραλίου ὡσεὶ πρόσωπον ἀγάλματος, καὶ γὰρ ἠνδοθεὶς αὐτῷ ὃ νοῦς ἀγγελομιμήτως τε καὶ ἀγγελοπρεπῶς, ἐίτε κατ’ ἐπιβολήν εἴτε κατὰ παραδοχὴν ἐννομένος τῷ ὑπερανωκισμένῳ τοῦ παντὸς φωτὶ κατὰ μέθεξιν ἀπόρρητον, ἀγγελοειδὴς ἐγένετο.
141 Tr. 1,3,31.12-5, 442 (179.7-10): Οὕτως δόξη τοῦ αἰσθητῶν πρόσωπον Ἐραλίου ὡσεὶ πρόσωπον ἀγάλματος, καὶ γὰρ ἠνδοθεὶς αὐτῷ ὃ νοῦς ἀγγελομιμήτως τε καὶ ἀγγελοπρεπῶς, εἴτε κατ’ ἐπιβολήν εἴτε κατὰ παραδοχὴν ἐννομένος τῷ ὑπερανωκισμένῳ τοῦ παντὸς φωτὶ κατὰ μέθεξιν ἀπόρρητον, ἀγγελοειδὴς ἐγένετο.
Third, Palamas refers to the life of St Mary of Egypt (ca. fourth-fifth centuries [?]). In her *Life* it is mentioned that, during her prayer, she ‘was elevated above the ground, sensibly and as really being moved’. According to Palamas this happened for the following reason: ‘because of the fact that her intellect was elevated, both her body was also elevated, and having abandoned the earth, it was seen as if it were aerial’.

All these three examples show, according to Palamas, that the human body is very much influenced by the progress and movement of the intellect and, moreover, it participates in the divine grace. But now, an interesting Christological argument regarding the human heart and the spiritual senses must be presented.

d. A Christological Dimension

In his effort to stress the great affinity and connection between the human soul and heart, St Gregory writes the following: when ‘the soul is warmed by and rather put into motion [or: excited] from the irresistible love of the only Desirable, also the heart is put into motion [or: excited]’. Then, the heart experiences some ‘spiritual leaps’, which ‘prove the communion of grace’, namely the fact that the grace of God is communicated from the soul to the heart. Palamas argues that this is something like a preparation—or, rather, anticipation—of the soul for the second coming of Christ, in the *eschata*; He ‘who will come on the clouds in His Body, as promised’. Of note is that Palamas

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143 Cf. Kouli (‘3. Life of St. Mary of Egypt’, 79), where the testimony of Abbas Zosimas is presented: ‘He swore <to us>, calling upon God as the witness of his words, that when he saw that she was prolonging her prayers, he raised his head up a bit from the ground and saw her elevated about one cubit above the earth, hanging in the air and praying in this way’.

144 Tr. 1,3,31.20-3, 442 (179.15-9): Οὗτος ἡ Αἰγυπτία, μᾶλλον δ᾽ οὐρανία, Μαρία μετέωρος γέγονε καὶ τὸ σώμα εὐχομένη τοπικός καὶ αἰσθητός, καὶ γὰρ, υψωμένου τοῦ νοῦ, συνανυψώθη καὶ τὸ σώμα καὶ τῆς γῆς ἁπαναστάτη ὀρθῇ ἐναέριον.

145 Tr. 1,3,32.24-8, 442 (179.20-5): Οὕτω τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνθουσιώδης καὶ οἰονείς συγκινομένης τῷ ἀσχέτῳ ἐρωτικῷ πρὸς τὸν κινεῖται, σκιρτήμασι πνευματικοῖς τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς χάριτος ἐνδεικνύμενη καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐνθέντη ὄρμωμένη πρὸς τὴν μετὰ σώματος ἐν αἰρέσεις κατὰ τὸ εὐφημεῦσον τοῦ Κυρίου ὑπαντήν. Cf. Mt. 24:30: ‘Then the sign of the Son of Man will appear in heaven, and then all the tribes of the earth will mourn, and they will see
relates the participation of the human body—here, the human heart—in the spiritual senses with Christ’s second coming in his Body—and therefore, Christ’s now being in His body, in the heavens. Thus, in the mind of Palamas the human body is somehow related to the body of Christ.

In a similar way, when man prays intensely, and ‘when the intelligible fire appears, and the intelligible flambeau is ignited, and, through spiritual contemplation, the intellect elevates the love [for God] in a flame reaching high into the air’, then ‘also the body is made light and warm’. In this case, those who see this person believe ‘that he has come out of the fire of a sensible furnace’.146 In this last point, Palamas explicitly refers to St John Climacus.147 Worth noting is that St Gregory uses some important keywords, which clearly place the whole discussion in the context of his doctrine concerning the spiritual senses: a) ἀναφανέντος, b) ἀναφθείσης, c) καὶ τὸ σῶμα κουφίζεται τε καὶ διαθερμαίνεται, and d) τοῖς ὀρθῶσι.

At this moment Palamas presents a very important argument: he gives a clearly Christological dimension to his theology of intellectual perception. In particular he refers to the prayer of Jesus to the Father in Gethsemane.148 As mentioned in Lk. 22:44, ‘In his anguish he prayed more earnestly, and his sweat became like great drops of blood falling down on the ground’. Palamas believes that Christ’s sweat is a clear sign of the warmth that one feels only when one is intensely praying; and this warmth is sensibly perceived in one’s body.149

“the Son of Man coming on the clouds of heaven” with power and great glory’. Mk. 13:26. Lk. 21:27. 1 Thess. 4:17.

146 Tr. 1,3,32, 442.28-443.6 (179.25-31): Ὑδεις ἐν τῇ συντόνῳ προσευχῇ, τοῦ ναοτοῦ πυρὸς ἀναφανέντος καὶ τῆς νοητῆς λαμπάδος ἀναφθείσης καὶ εἰς μετέωρον φλόγα διὰ πνευματικῆς θεωρίας τοῦ ναοῦ τὸν πόθον ἀνεγείραντος, καὶ τὸ σῶμα παραδόξως κουφίζεται τε καὶ διαθερμαίνεται, ὡς ἀπὸ πυρὸς αἰσθητῆς καμίνου τοῖς ὀρθῶσι εξίεναι δοκεῖν, κατὰ τὸν συγγραφέα τῆς πνευματικῆς ἀναβάσεως.

147 Cf. Ladder 28, PG 88, 1137C.

148 The interpretation of the Gethsemane prayer caused many doctrinal disputes during the Monothelite controversy (seventh c.). For an important analysis of how this prayer was approached both prior, as well as during, the Monothelite controversy, see Demetrios Bathrellos, The Byzantine Christ. Person, Nature, and Will in the Christology of Saint Maximus the Confessor, Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 140-7.

149 Tr. 1,3,32.6-8, 443 (179.31-181.2): Ἐμὲ δὲ καὶ ὃ κατὰ τὴν προσευχὴν ἱδῷος Χριστοῦ τὴν ἐγγενομένην αἰσθητὴν τὴν σῶματι διὰσκει θέρμην ἐκ μόνης τῆς ἐκτενοῦς πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν δεήσεως. Here Palamas seems to be influenced from Diadochos: see, e.g., his Capita 25 and 79, ed. des Places, 97 and 137 respectively, where the latter speaks about the transmission of grace from the intellect to the body.
And now St Gregory refers to the opponents of the hesychasts: ‘What will they now respond to this, those who argue that the warmth produced from prayer is demonic? Or rather, will they teach that one ought not to pray vehemently or intensively, so that the body—according to the soul’s combat—not receive the warmth which for them is forbidden?’ For this reason, he claims that the antihesychasts teach a totally wrong method of praying, one that does not transform man or render him ‘close or similar to God’ (θεομίμητον).\(^{150}\)

Here, the acquisition of a spiritual gift, warmth, is clearly given an ascetical dimension. This is why Palamas now adds something important. First, he reminds the reader that man, in the fall, violated God’s commandment and deserted Him in the pursuit of pleasure (ἡδονήν). He then argues that when man ‘expels pleasure through the pain of ascetics that one voluntarily’ chooses to follow, ‘then man tastes divine pleasure—which is free from pain—through intellectual perception (νοερῇ αἰσθήσει)’. Furthermore, this pleasure ‘transforms the body also to render it compatible with divine and impassible love’.\(^{151}\) But a very crucial question arises here: what exactly is this ‘transformation of the body’?

e. The Transformation of the Body

A very important notion in Palamas’ spiritual senses is the so-called ‘transformation’ of the human body, so that it may participate in spiritual realities. In his Tr. 1,3,36 Palamas offers many useful insights on it. Initially, he wonders: ‘How can bodily sensation [i.e. the faculty of sense perception] become aware of this light which is not properly sensible?’\(^{152}\) He answers that this may be attained through the power of the Holy Spirit. Besides, it is through this power that the Apostles saw the light on Tabor.

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\(^{150}\) Tr. 1,3,32.9-15, 443 (181.2-10): Τί δή πρὸς ταύτην φήσουσιν οἱ διαμονιώδη τὴν ἐκ προσευχῆς ἀποφαινόμενον θέρμην; Ἡ καί τὸ τούτο διδάξουσι μὴ ἐνεγχυονίας, μηδὲ ἐκτενῶς προσεύχεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ, κατὰ λόγον τοῦ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἀγώνος, καὶ τὸ σῶμα τὴν ἀπηγορευμένην αὐτοῖς ἐπιδέξηται θέρμην; Αλλ᾿ οὗτοι μὲν εἶστοιν διάδασκαλοὶ τῆς μὴ πρὸς Θεὸν ἢ τὸ θεομίμητον φερούσῃς, μηδὲ μετασκευασμένης πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον τὸν ἄνθρωπον εὐχῆς.

\(^{151}\) Tr. 1,3,32.15-20, 443 (181.10-5): Ἦμεις δ᾿ οἰς ὡς καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, πρὸς ἣν φεῦ ἐπίτιμοι διάγραμμεν τις ἐντολῆς ἀφηγορισμένος, δῶς τῆς ἐκουσίου κατὰ τὴν εγκράτειαν ὄδυνης ἀπολογομονοῦντον, κατὰ τὴν προσευχὴν αἰσθῆται νοερῇ γευμαθῇ τῆς θείας καὶ ἀμῖνος ὑδροῦς ἡδονῆς, ἄς θαυμασιῶς καὶ τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὸν ἀπαθῆ καὶ θείον ἔρωτα μετασκευασμένης...

\(^{152}\) Tr. 1,3,36.9-10, 447 (189.10-11): Αλλὰ πῶς αἰσθητής σωματική φωτὸς ἀντλήθηται μὴ κυρίως αἰσθητοῦ?
This light ‘was shining not only from the flesh that carried in itself the Son, but also from the cloud which carried in itself the Father’. Palamas wants to stress here that the glory of Christ shone both from His body and His divinity.

Now St Gregory quotes the words of the Apostle Paul (1 Cor. 15:44): ‘It is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body. If there is a physical body, there is also a spiritual body’.

This passage points the difference that will occur between this life and life in the eschaton, as far as the human body is concerned. At present the body is physical (ψυχικὸν), but at that time it will be spiritual (πνευματικὸν). Therefore, Palamas refers to the transformation of the body. And he adds that in Paradise man will be able to see the divine light because his body ‘will be spiritual, and it will see spiritually’. In other words, through its transformation, the body will be able to sense the spiritual realities spiritually, in a spiritual manner.

But here a question arises: is it easy for humans to understand in this life their capacity for union with God? Palamas would have a negative answer to this matter. He believes that our bodily situation renders it difficult to realize the existence of the νοερᾷ αἴσθησις. To prove this, he mentions something similar: he argues that it is difficult for us to even realize that we have an intellectual soul, because of the fact that the power of the ‘flesh’ is so strong in humans. On the other hand, however, in Paradise, the

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153 Tr. 1,3,36.10-4, 447 (189.11-5): ...οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν ἑαυτῇ φεροῦσης τὸν Ὕιον σαρκὸς μόνον ἁπαστράπτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν ἑαυτῇ φεροῦσης τὸν Πατέρα τοῦ Χριστοῦ νοελής.
154 σπείρεται σῶμα ψυχικόν, ἐγείρεται σῶμα πνευματικόν. ἃστι σῶμα ψυχικόν, καὶ ἃστι σῶμα πνευματικόν.
155 Tr. 1,3,36.14-8, 447 (189.15-9): ...πνευματικόν δ’ ὁν καὶ πνευματικὸς ὅρον τῆς θείας εἰκότος ἀντιλήψεται αὐγής.
156 Tr. 1,3,36.18-22, 447 (189.20-5): Καὶ ὄσπερ νῦν ἔργον ἐστίν ἰδεῖν ὡς ἔχομεν νοεῖν ψυχήν, καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ὑπερτάναι δυναμένην διὰ τὴν παχεῖαν ταύτην σάρκα καὶ θυτήν καὶ ἀντίτυπον ἐπιληφόμενον καὶ καταστάσαν, σοματειώθη τε καὶ φανταστικὴν μάλιστα καθιστώσαν τὴν ψυχήν, διὸ καὶ τὴν κατὰ νῦν νοεῖν ἐγνοοῦμεν αἰσθήσῃν... It seems to me that Meyendorff gives an incorrect translation as far as the phrase ‘Καὶ ὄσπερ νῦν ἔργον ἐστίν ἰδεῖν ὡς ἔχομεν νοεῖν’ is concerned. In particular, he translates it as following: ‘Aujourd’hui nous pouvons réellement voir que nous avons une âme intellectuelle qui possède une existence propre dans...’ In other words, he regards that the phrase ἔργον ἐστίν should be translated as ‘we can indeed [or: really] (see)...’ However, according to the Liddell-Scott Lexicon (p. 683, s.v. ἔργον) the phrase ἔργον ἐστίν followed by an infinitive (as here: ἰδεῖν) has the meaning of ‘it is hard work, difficult to do’. For this reason, Christou seems to give the correct rendering in his modern Greek translation (ΠΑΕ 2, 227): ‘And as now it is difficult for us to see that we have a rational soul...’ (emphasis added). Moreover, Kontostergiou (in Romanides (ed.), Ρωμαίοι ἢ Ρωμηοί Πατέρες τῆς Ἑκκλησίας, I, p. 425) gives the same modern Greek rendering.
body ‘will be hidden, as it were, because humans will acquire [or: will be transformed to] the angelic dignity’. 157

Furthermore, St Gregory continues, the body ‘will become [very] thin, to such an extent that it will no longer appear material at all’. In such a state the body ‘will not obscure the intellectual activities’. This will happen due to a total ‘victory of the intellect’. ‘For this reason’, Palamas concludes, ‘humans will delight in the divine light also with their bodily sensations’. 158 In other words, the body will be, as it were, absorbed by the intellect. It will become spiritual, and thus, at that time, man will see the divine light through his body too.

St Gregory refers explicitly to a passage of St Maximos, which seems to play an important role in Palamas’ own theology of the spiritual senses. In particular, in his Theological Chapters Maximos argues that, in the divine Kingdom, in Paradise, the soul will become

god by participation in divine grace, ceasing from all activity of intellect and sense, and at the same time suspending all the natural operations of the body. For the body is deified along with the soul through its own corresponding participation in the process of deification. Thus God alone is made manifest through the soul and the body, since their natural properties have been overcome by the superabundance of His glory. 159

Based on this passage, Palamas makes the following significant comments: First, ‘God is invisible to creatures, but is not invisible in Himself’. 160 In Paradise, however, man will see God, but in fact God will be ‘the One who sees’ (ὁ Θεός ὁ βλέπων ἔσται).

158 Tr. 1,3,36.25-8, 447 (189.28-31): ...διαλεπτυνθήσεται γάρ, ὡς μηδ’ ὡλὴν ὡλὸς εἶναι δοκεῖν, μηδ’ ἔπιπροσθεῖν τὰς νοερὰς ἐνεργείας, ἐκκυκήσαντος τοῦ νοῦ. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ σωματικῶς αἰσθήσασιν ἀπολαύσονται τοῦ θείου φωτός.
159 Maximos, Cap. Th., 2, 88, PG 90, 1168A, trans. Palmer, Sherrard and Ware, The Philokalia, vol. 2, 160. Palamas gives the passage in this form [Tr. 1,3,37.2-8, 448 (191.2-9)]: ἡ ψυχὴ... γίνεται Θεός τῇ μεθέξει τῆς θεϊκῆς χάριτος, πασῶν τῶν κατὰ νοῦν τε καὶ αἰσθῆσιν αὐτῆς τῇ παυσαμένη καὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος συναποπαύσασα φυσικὰς ἐνεργείας, συνθεωθέντος αὐτῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογούσαν αὐτῷ μεθέξιν τῆς θεϊκῆς, ὡστε μόνον τῶν Θεόν διὰ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος τότε φαίνεσθαι, νικηθέντων αὐτῶν, τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς δόξης τῶν φυσικῶν γνωρισμάτων.
160 Tr. 1,3,37.8-10, 448 (191.9-11): Ἐπεὶ τοῖς... τοῖς κτιστοῖς ἁόρατος ὁ Θεός, ἐαυτῷ δὲ σύκ ἁόρατος...
Furthermore, this will take place not only through our human soul, but also through our body. ‘For this reason, we shall see the divine and inaccessible light, in a most clear way, also through our bodily organs’.\(^{161}\)

St Gregory argues that in the *eschata* man will be totally united with God, and thus be able to see Him. Moreover, in this vision of God the whole human person will participate, both soul and body. This will be done through what St Maximos described in the aforementioned passage, namely a cessation of ‘all activity of intellect and sense, and at the same time suspending all the natural operations of the body’.\(^{162}\) This entails an ‘overcoming of the natural properties [or: activities]’. Then, the divinization of the body occurs (συνθεωθέντος αὐτῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀνάλογοῦσαν αὐτῷ μεθέξιν τῆς θεώσεως). Undoubtedly, these points show how great a value Palamas attributes to the human body.\(^{163}\)

Furthermore, St Gregory points out two significant passages of St Macarios which are relevant to our topic.\(^{164}\) According to Palamas, the first reads: ‘The deiform image of the Spirit, which is now imprinted on us (νῦν ἐνδον ὥσπερ ἐντυπωθείσα), will make (ἀπεργάσεται) then [in Paradise] also the body—which is external (ἐξω) [in relation to the soul]—deiform (θεοειδὲς) and celestial’.\(^{165}\) And the second: ‘God, reconciled with humans, restores (ἀποκαθίστησι) the soul which has truly believed—although it is still in the body (ἐν σαρκὶ οὖσαν ἔτι)—to the pleasure of the celestial lights, and gives sight again to its intellectual senses (καὶ τὰ νοερὰ αὐτῆς αἰσθητήρια... ὀμματοῖ) through the divine light of grace; after that [i.e. in the Resurrection] He will

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\(^{161}\) Tr. 1,3,37,10-3, 448 (191.11-4): ...τότε δὲ οὐ μόνον διὰ τῆς καθ’ ἡμᾶς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦ σῶματος, ὃ τοῦ θαύματος, ὃ Θεός ὃ βλέπων ἔσται, διὰ τούτο καὶ διὰ σωματικῶν ὁργάνων τότε τὸ θεϊκόν καὶ ἀπρόστιτον φῶς τὴν αὐτήν ψυχήν...\(^{162}\) πασῶν τὸν κατὰ νοῦν τε καὶ αἰσθηθήναι αὐτὴ τε παυσαμένη καὶ τὰς τοῦ σῶματος συναποπαύσασα φυσικὰς ἐνέργειας.

\(^{163}\) About Palamas’ approach to the ‘cessation of all intellectual activity’, see ch. 7.1.e of this Part. For the stance of St Maximos the Confessor on the human body, see the important book of Adam Cooper, *The Body in St Maximus. Holly Flesh, Wholly Delfied* (2005).

\(^{164}\) Tr. 1,3,43, 454.26-455.5 (205.15-22): «ἡ θεοειδὴς τοῦ Πνεύματος εἰκὼν νῦν ἐνδον ὥσπερ ἐντυπωθείσα, καὶ τὸ σῶμα θεοειδὲς ἐξω τότε καὶ οὐράνιον ἀπεργάσεται». Καὶ πάλιν ‘τῇ ἀνθροποστίτῃ καταλλαγῆς ὁ Θεός, ἀποκαθίστησε τὴν πιστεύσασαν ἐν ἀληθείᾳ ψυχήν, ἐν σαρκὶ οὖσαν ἔτι, εἰς τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων φῶτων ἀπόλαυσιν καὶ τὰ νοερὰ αὐτῆς αἰσθητήρια τῷ θαύμῳ πάλιν φορὶ τῆς χάριτος ὀμματοῖ, ύπερον δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ τὸ σῶμα περιβαλεῖ τῇ δόξῃ». Palamas mentions both of these passages in a different form than what appears in the critical edition available nowadays. However, he does not seem to alter their meaning. See relevantly below for the references to the critical edition.

enclose with glory even the body itself\textsuperscript{166}. It is worth noting that, in this context, Palamas seizes the opportunity to argue that ‘the spiritual person consists of three elements: grace of the heavenly Spirit, rational soul, and earthly body’.\textsuperscript{167} In addition, as already mentioned, he again describes the vision of Tabor as a ‘preamble and pledge of the age to come.\textsuperscript{168}

\textit{f. The Role of the Heart}

Finally, there remains a last issue to be examined: what is the role of the human heart in the activation of the spiritual senses? As already exhibited, St Gregory is opposed to those who believe that ‘knowledge of beings and ascent to God may be attained through profane wisdom’.\textsuperscript{169} For him, these two are attained only through the grace of God. He refers again to an important text of St Maximos: ‘When God comes to dwell in such a heart, He honors it by engraving His own letters on it through the Holy Spirit, just as He did on the Mosaic tablets’ (cf. Exod. 31:18).\textsuperscript{170} Then Palamas refers to the words of St Paul in 2 Cor. 3:3: ‘And you show that you are a letter from Christ delivered by us, written not with ink but with the Spirit of the living God, not on tablets of stone but on tablets of human [or: fleshly] hearts’.\textsuperscript{171} Citing this passage St Gregory wonders: ‘Where are those who regard the inner heart insusceptible of God?’\textsuperscript{172} In other words, the heart is where the grace of God is received.

\textsuperscript{166} Cf. Macarios, Homily 58, 3, 3, ed. Berthold, II, 185.20-186.6: ...καὶ τὰ νοερὰ αὐτῆς αἰσθητήρια πάλιν ἀποκαθίστησι... καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῇ ἀναστάσει ἀποκατασταθῆσεται τὸ σῶμα εἰς τὴν ὀδόνατον καὶ ἀφθαρτὸν δόξαν...

\textsuperscript{167} Tr. 1,3,43.24-6, 454 (205.12-4): Ἀλλὰς τε καὶ ὁ πνευματικὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐκ τριῶν ὑφέστηκε, χάριτος Πνεύματος ἐπουρανίου, ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ γηνοῦ σώματος. Christou (ΠΣ 1, 454 n. 4) notes that this trichotomic division of man goes back to the Apologists (mainly Tatianos) and Irenaeus.

\textsuperscript{168} Tr. 1,3,37.13-5, 448 (191.14-7).

\textsuperscript{169} Tr. 1,3,41.9-10, 452 (199.21-3): Ποῦ εἰσὶν οἱ διὰ τῆς ἔξω καὶ μορφοθείσης σοφίας τὴν γνώσιν τῶν ὄντων καὶ τὴν πρὸς Θεὸν ἀνοδὸν δογματίζοντες;

\textsuperscript{170} Cap. Th., 2, 80, PG 90, 1161D-1164A, trans. Palmer, Sherrard and Ware, The Philokalia, vol. 2, 158: ἐν ἡ γενόμενος ὁ Θεός, ἀξιοὶ τὰ ἵδια γράμματα διὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος ἐγχαράττειν, καθάπερ τισὶ πλαξίας Μοσαϊκαίς... Palamas writes ἐγχαράττεσθαι instead of ἐγχαράττειν. See Tr. 1,3,41.10-13, 452 (199.23-5).

\textsuperscript{171} οὐκ ἐν πλαξίας λυθίναις, ἀλλ’ ἐν πλαξίας καρδίᾳς σαρκίναις. Palamas writes καρδίας, instead of καρδίαις.

\textsuperscript{172} Tr. 1,3,41.13-6, 452 (199.25-9): Ποῦ εἰσὶν οἱ τὴν ἐντός καρδίαν ἀνεπίδεκτον Θεοῦ λογιζόμενοι...;
To support his position St Gregory refers to a key text of St Macarios: ‘...the heart directs and governs all the other organs of the body. And when grace pastures the heart, it rules over all the members and the thoughts. For there, in the heart, the intellect (νοῦς) abides as well as all the thoughts of the soul and all its hopes. This is how grace penetrates throughout all parts of the body’.\textsuperscript{173}

Moreover, St Gregory presents another important text of St Maximos, which perhaps influenced the former in his own use of the words ἔνσημαινομένας\textsuperscript{174}: ‘A pure heart is one which offers the intellect (νοῦς) to God free of all images and form, and ready to be imprinted only with His own archetypes, by which God Himself is made manifest’.\textsuperscript{175} Based on this, Palamas argues that knowledge which comes by means of divine illumination is superior to profane knowledge: ‘How can the intellect, which is free of all images, and which is imprinted with God’s archetypes, not be superior to the knowledge which is derived from beings?’\textsuperscript{176} Perhaps St Gregory here again has in mind the theology of the logoi.\textsuperscript{177}

Furthermore, Palamas argues that ‘imprinting the intellect with the divine and secret signs of the Holy Spirit’ is far superior to ‘the ascent of the reasoning (διανοίας) towards God through negation’.\textsuperscript{178} Again St Gregory here emphasises the superiority of theopitia over theologia, because the former is attained through the light of God:

\textsuperscript{173} Macarios, Homilies, 15, 20.283-7, ed. Dörries, 139, PTS 4, trans. Maloney, 116: ἡ γὰρ καρδία ἐνεμονεύει καὶ βασιλεύει ὅλου τοῦ σωματικοῦ ὀργάνου, καὶ ἐπάνω κατάσχεται τῶν νομίμων τῆς καρδίας ἡ χάρις, βασιλεύει ὅλων τῶν μέλων καὶ τῶν λογισμῶν· ἐκεί γὰρ ἐστιν ὁ νοῦς καὶ ὅλοι οἱ λογισμοὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ η προσδοκία αὐτῆς, διὸ καὶ διέρχεται εἰς ὅλα τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος. Palamas instead of the last phrase (i.e. from καὶ η προσδοκία...) writes εἰς τοινὲς δὲ σκοπεῖν, εἰ ἐνέγραφεν ἡ χάρις τούτης τοῦ Πνεύματος νόμους. See Tr. 1,3,41.16-21, 452 (199.29-201.3).

\textsuperscript{174} For this word (ἔνσημαινομένας) see the relevant sub-section of this chapter (i.e. ch.7.2.a).

\textsuperscript{175} Maximos, Cap. Th. 2, 82, PG 90, 1164A, trans. Palmer, Sherrard and Ware, The Philokalia, vol. 2, 158 (slightly modified): Καρδία ἐστὶ καθαρά, ἡ παντάπασιν ἀνείδεις τῷ Θεῷ καὶ ἀμόρφους παραστήσασα τὴν μνήμην καὶ μόνοις τις αὐτῷ ἐτοιμον ἐνσημανήθην τόπως, δὴ ὁ ἐμφανὴς πέρωκε γίνεσθαι. Palamas gives the passage in a slightly different form: Καρδία καθαρά ἐστιν ἡ παντάπασιν ἀνείδεις παραστήσασα τὸν νοῦν τῷ Θεῷ καὶ μόνοις τις αὐτῷ ἐτοιμον ἐνσημανέσθαι τόπως, δὴ ὁ ἐμφανής πέρωκε γίνεσθαι. See Tr. 1,3,41.21-5, 452 (201.3-8). As Meyendorff (p. 200 n. 3) and Christou point out (ΠΣ 1, 452 n. 6), Maximos takes this text directly from Mark the Ascetic, Cap. de temperantia, 24, PG 65, 1064B.

\textsuperscript{176} Tr. 1,3,41.4-5, 453 (201.14-6): Πῶς γὰρ ὁ ἀνείδεις νοῦς ὁ καὶ τοῖς θείοις ἐνσημανήμενος τόπως, οὐχ ὑπεράνω τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀντικ αἰγόσεως; By a discussion of this issue, see ch. 2.1 of the current thesis.

\textsuperscript{177} Tr. 1,3,42.6-8, 453 (201.17-9): Αὖλλα καὶ τῆς δὴ ἀποφάσεων πρὸς Θεον ἀνόδου τῆς διανοίας τὸ θείας καὶ ἀπορρήτος τὸν νοῦν ἐνσημαίνεσθαι τοῦ Πνεύματος τόπως κατὰ πολύ διενήργει.
‘talking about God and meeting God are not the same thing’. Palamas is clear that theosis is something impossible, if seen only in the context of common human measures: ‘To possess God in one’s self, and be purely related to God, and be commingled with the pure and unadulterated light, as far as it is attainable for human nature, belongs to the sphere of the impossible’.

However, in order for theosis to be achieved, it is essential that: a) man be purified through virtue; b) ‘man go out of himself or better, beyond himself”; c) ‘man abandon sensation, as well as every sensible thing’; d) and ‘man be elevated above thoughts and intellation and knowledge derived from these’. Then ‘we are totally given over to the immaterial and intellectual activity of the prayer, and receive the ignorance which surpasses all knowledge, and are filled in it [i.e. ignorance] with the superior splendour of the Spirit.’ In this state, ‘we will be invisibly seeing the prizes of the nature of the immortal world’, of Paradise. The goal of spiritual contemplation is ‘the mysterious communion and inexpressible vision (ὄρασις) of the Mystery, the mystical and ineffable contemplation and taste (γεύσις) of the eternal light’. Of note is the usage of such strong words as ὄρασις and γεύσις, which show the importance that Palamas lays on the activation of man’s spiritual senses, so that one may see God.

3. Concluding Remarks: Is the Participation of the Body a ‘Created Effect of Grace’? An Assessment of some Arguments of Sinkewicz

In this chapter the vision of the divine light through ecstasis and the role of the body were examined. It was shown that the vision of the light is attained through self

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179 Tr. 1,3,42-8-12, 453 (201.19-23): ...περὶ Θεοῦ γὰρ τί λέγειν καὶ Θεῷ συντυγχάνειν οὐχὶ ταῦταν. Cf. ch. 7.1.b.
180 Tr. 1,3,42.20-2, 453 (203.2-4): Θεὸν δ’ ἐν ἑαυτῷ κτίσασθαι καὶ Θεῷ καθαρῶς συγγενέσθαι καὶ τῷ ἀκραιφνεστάτῳ φωτὶ κραθῆναι, καθ’ ὅσον ἑκείνων ἀγριωτικὴ φύσις, τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶν...
181 Tr. 1,3,42.23-6, 453 (203.4-8): ...εἰ μὴ πρὸς τῇ δι’ ἁρπῆς καθάρσει καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐξῆω, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπέρανον, γενοίμεθα, καταλιπόντες μὲν πάν ὁ τῶν αἰσθητῶν μετὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως, υπεραρθέντες λογισμῶν καὶ διανοιῶν καὶ τῆς διὰ τούτων γνώσεως...
182 Tr. 1,3,42.26-30, 453 (203.8-12): ...ὅλως δὲ γενόμενοι τῆς ἄδουλον καὶ νοερὰς κατὰ τὴν προσευχὴν ἐνεργείας, καὶ τιγάντες τῆς ὑπὲρ τὴν γνώσιν ἄγνοιας, καὶ πλησθέντες ἐν αὐτῇ τῆς τοῦ Πνεύματος ὑπερφαύλου αἴγλαιας, ὡς ἀθανάτου κόσμου γέρα φύσεως ἀδοκίμως καθορᾶν.
183 Tr. 1,3,42.9-11, 454 (203.23-25): ...ἡ κρυφία τὸν κρυφίου μετουσία καὶ ὄρασις ἀνέκφραστος, ἡ μυστικὴ καὶ ἀπόρρητος τοῦ αἰονίου φοτὸς θεωρία τε καὶ γεύσις.
transcendence, which is superior to abstraction or negation (apophasis). In other words, the superiority of theoptia to theologia was stressed. Moreover, in intellectual perception (αἴσθησις νοερὰ) the body does have an important role. Thus, in Palamas’ mind, the theology of the spiritual dispositions imprinted (ἐνσημαινομένας) on the body has a central place in how divine grace shows its effects on the human body. These include, e.g., the peace that a hesychast feels, joy, bodily warmth, heart palpitations etc. Nevertheless, the body has to be transformed, both in this life and in the eschaton, so as to participate in the divine realities.

On the basis of what has been mentioned so far, two claims of Sinkewicz need to be scrutinized. Both of them are expressed in his article on Palamas’ Concept of Spiritual Perception (1999), and refer to the eschatological dimension of the αἴσθησις νοερὰ. First, speaking about ‘the absorption of the flesh by the Spirit in the future age’, Sinkewicz supports that ‘Because sensible experiences are involved, the body’s transformation in the present age can be ascribed to a created effect of grace’. Second, he maintains that

the eschatological spiritual perception of the body, according to Palamas, is primarily concerned with the vision of the divine Light. Since the divine Light is non-sensible, the body must undergo a transformation or divinization. This is the same transformation that takes place in the soul during the present life. However, even now the body receives a foretaste or pledge of these future goods in the sensible experiences of grace and the transformation effected thereby. The eschatological and present transformation of the body are different in kind. The latter is a created effect of grace, whereas the former involves divinization.

It could be said that at least two main assertions can be uncovered here: the first having to do with a ‘created effect of grace’, and the second with the two forms, or types, of bodily transformation. It seems that the second argument contains, and presupposes, the first. To my mind Sinkewicz’s approach is not without certain problems. First of

186 I am grateful to Fr Maximos Constas for discussing this topic with me and helping me with his instructive observations.
all, a problem may be found in the phrase ‘the body’s transformation in the present age can be ascribed to a created effect of grace’. On the one hand, as laid out in the current Part of this thesis, there are indeed some effects of divine grace which are shown or manifested (‘imprinted’) in the body. These can be acknowledged as created effects of grace. In other words, whereas the divine activity is uncreated, some of its effects on man are created. But why is that? Because man, both soul and body, is created, namely he is a creature of God. Besides, Palamas himself speaks about the warmth that the body feels during prayer, or the joy, peace etc., the bodily levitation of St Mary the Egyptian, or even about the sweat of Christ in Gethsemane. All these may be recognized as created effects of grace.

In general, it is not false to say that creation, the world, is a created effect, or product, of an uncreated divine activity. However, this would be problematic, if it were understood in such a way as to diminish the idea of uncreated grace, and ultimately make this grace itself created. This would, of course, be in no way acceptable to Palamas. Moreover, a problem is found in the fact that Palamas, as far as I know, does not specifically mention anywhere that the body’s transformation in the present age is a created effect of grace. If this were the case, wouldn’t he have mentioned it? Perhaps he avoids this, for he sees the danger of reducing the divine activities to something created.

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187 This is an indispensable qualification, because there are also other effects which are not created, e.g. theosis, which is, besides, an effect of the divine activity. Meyendorff handles with the topic of ‘created grace and uncreated grace’ in his Introduction, 230-2 (=Study, 162-4).

188 In the synaxaria (the lives of the saints), one may find other similar situations. For instance, in the Life of St Maximos Kapsokalyvites (fourteenth c.), the saint was seen flying somewhere over the Holy Mountain. For a very interesting account of his life, and the theological and historical context of his era, see Kallistos Ware, ‘St. Maximos of Kapsokalyvia and Fourteenth-Century Athonite Hesychasm’.

189 It seems that, according to Palamas, Christ’s human sweat is indeed a created effect of the uncreated grace, for it is related with, and manifested on, Christ’s human body, which was created (despite totally connected with the Divinity). See relevantly, ch. 7.2.d of this thesis.

190 This would be similar to the way that some western theologians interpret the divine θελήματα not as divine ‘wills’, but as the ‘products of the divine will’. For instance, Blowers and Wilken (On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ. Selected Writings from St Maximus the Confessor [Crestwood, NY: SVSP, 2003], 61) translate theia thelemata as ‘products of the divine will’. However, Bradshaw (Aristotle East and West, 205 n. 64) is correct in noticing that ‘This would make them creatures, whereas in fact they are principles of creation, preexisting collectively in the Logos’. I draw these remarks from Fr Maximos Constas, The Ambigua, vol. 1, 481-2 n.30, and I am grateful to him for calling them into my attention.
In order to support his thesis, which he deems definitive\textsuperscript{191}, Sinkewicz refers to Tr. 1,3,28 where Palamas argues that all sensible things are created.\textsuperscript{192} However, the reason why Palamas mentions this is to explain that the light of God is not sensible. This is obvious when one reads this chapter of the \textit{Triads}. The same could be also maintained for the second passage that Sinkewicz provides (i.e., in Tr. 1,3,27). In particular, Palamas says there that ‘nothing sensible is eternal’.\textsuperscript{193} However, again Palamas refers to the fact that the divine light is timeless, therefore non sensible. And here lies a mystery: whereas it is not sensible, the divine light can be sensibly perceived by man. This is accomplished through man’s spiritual senses.

In addition, in order to sustain his argument, Sinkewicz states that ‘The hesychast prayer experiences are definitively sense perceptible since they can be perceived by others who see οὐκ ἀισθητῶς’. To support this he mentions two examples. First, that of Moses, namely the fact that the light that shone from his face was seen from those who were close to him, and, as shown above,\textsuperscript{195} Palamas maintains that this light occurred because ‘the inner brilliancy of the intellect was outpoured also to the body’.\textsuperscript{196} Second, an aforementioned\textsuperscript{197} passage from St John of the Ladder, who argues that when the ‘intelligible fire’ appears, during intense prayer, then ‘also the body is made light and warm’. Moreover, those who see this person regard ‘that he has come out of the fire of a sensible furnace’.\textsuperscript{198}

However, it should be underlined here that those people ‘who see οὐκ ἀισθητῶς’ do not perceive the ‘hesychast prayer experiences’—that which in the first example only Moses perceives—, but simply some external signs, or effects, of this prayer. As Sinkewicz himself clarifies elsewhere in his article, this means that ‘there is something which can be perceived externally through the senses by those who have seen the saints

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{191} In his ‘The Concept’, 388 n. 68, he writes: ‘This is clear from what Palamas says in...’, and he then cites \textit{Tr.} 1,3,27-28.
\textsuperscript{192} \textit{Tr.} 1,3,28.19-20, 439 (171.29-30): Τί δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐ κτίσμα;
\textsuperscript{193} \textit{Tr.} 1,3,27.22, 438 (169.20): Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲν αἰσθητόν ἄδιδον.
\textsuperscript{194} Sinkewicz, ’The Concept’, 388 n. 68.
\textsuperscript{195} In ch. 7.2.e of this Part.
\textsuperscript{196} \textit{Tr.} 1,3,31.12-5, 442 (179.7-10): ...τῆς ἐντὸς λαμπρότητος τοῦ νοῦ κάτι τὸ σῶμα περικεχυμένης...
\textsuperscript{197} In ch. 7.2.d of this Part.
\textsuperscript{198} \textit{Tr.} 1,3,32, 443.28-444.6 (179.25-31): Οὕτως ἐν τῇ συντόνῳ προσευχῇ, τοῦ νοητοῦ πυρὸς ἀναφανέντος καὶ τῆς νοητῆς λαμπάδος ἀναφθείσης καὶ εἰς μετέωρον φλόγα διὰ πνευματικῆς θεωρίας τοῦ νοῦ τῶν πόθων ἀνεγείραντος, καὶ τὸ σῶμα παραδόξως κοψιζέται τε καὶ διαθερμαίνεται, ὡς ἀπὸ πυρὸς αἰσθητῆς καμίνου τοῖς ὄροσιν ἐξεύθει δόκειν...}
who possess this grace’.\footnote{Sinkewicz, ‘The Concept’, 385.} The examples of Moses, St Stephen, and St Mary of Egypt all affirm this reality.

As far as the second statement of Sinkewicz is concerned, there is indeed a difference regarding the transformation of the body now and in the future age. Palamas is clear on this, when he says that the absorption of the body will happen only in the age to come, and not in the present, and that the body will be divinized only in Paradise. However, it seems to me that it is not correct to totally exclude theosis from this current life. To speak the truth, the transformation which the body undergoes in this life is strongly connected with theosis. In other words, whereas it is somehow different from divinization in Paradise, it is indeed communion with the divine activities, and thus participation in theosis. Consequently, it could be argued that it is a ‘first stage, or first step, of theosis’, what one could call an anticipation of theosis’, namely a preparation for theosis in the eschaton.

To put it in another way, it is a foretaste of theosis in this present life. Besides, theosis is not a static state or condition. On the contrary, it is a process, even if one refers to the future, eschatological state: even in the age to come, there is growth. Therefore, the process or experience of theosis unfolds along a much larger continuum. Although the topic in general is a mystery, and, thus, may be not fully understood by our mind, it seems to me that this interpretation is not inconsistent with the thought of Palamas. Besides, this is what he refers to when he speaks about the ‘pledge’ of future goods.

Furthermore, Sinkewicz writes that ‘the eschatological spiritual perception of the body, according to Palamas, is primarily concerned with the vision of the divine Light’.\footnote{Sinkewicz, ‘The Concept’, 389.} However, one may ask, why does Sinkewicz ‘narrow’ the vision of the light only to the eschatological sphere? Isn’t intellectual perception closely related to the divine light even in this life? The goal of the hesychast is to perceive God; and this is attained through seeing the light.

To sum up, there does not seem to be any real need to make this kind of distinction between a ‘created effect of grace’ and ‘divinization’, as far as the transformation of the body is concerned.\footnote{It is worth noting that Sinkewicz does not seem to repeat these arguments in his later, brief and synoptic, but perhaps more mature, account of Palamas’ intellectual perception, namely his...} Moreover, and, not least, this introduces a
dichotomy between the two that does not seem to be accurate. The grace that affects the body of the saint in this life is not a different grace than the grace of divinization, in either this life or the next one. Consequently, this seems to be mistaken, and not consistent with what Palamas wants to argue.

Conclusion. The Palamite αἰσθησις νουερά: Palamas’ Dynamic of Thinking of Man as a Being which may ‘Taste’ God

In scholarship, it is usually noticed that the notion of the spiritual senses is widely used by the Fathers. However, as it seems, there is an aspect of this issue that has not been much explored: the fact that this concept is very often found also in the liturgical texts of the Eastern Orthodox Church. For instance, in the Prayer of the Gospel, the priest reads: ‘Master, Lover of mankind, make the pure light of your divine knowledge shine in our hearts and open the eyes of our mind to understand the message of your Gospel.... For you are the illumination of our souls and bodies...’¹ It is noteworthy that this prayer has some important phrases—such as the eyes of the mind (διάνοια), the shining of the light of God’s knowledge, the illumination of both soul and body—, which clearly point to the activation of man’s spiritual senses from God, and which remind us of Palamas’ own approach.

The same could be said for, e.g., the Third Prayer of the Matins: ‘Enlighten the eyes of our understanding, lest we ever sleep unto death in sins...’² Or, also, the Twelfth Prayer of the same office: ‘Make the true sun of justice shine in our hearts; enlighten our intellect and guard all our senses, so that, walking uprightly by day in the way of

¹ ‘Gregory Palamas’, in La théologie byzantine et sa tradition, 131-88 (see, mainly, p. 155-161), which appeared three years after his aforementioned article, i.e. in 2002.
² φώτισον τοῦ ὃθεμοῦ τῶν διανοιῶν ἡμῶν, μήποτε ὑπνώσωμεν ἐν ἁμαρτίαις εἰς θάνατον..., trans. Lash, The Divine Liturgy, 30 (italics added).
your commandments, we may reach eternal life... Moreover, in the first Prayer of the Ablution, in Baptism, the priest says: ‘Master and Lord... be well pleased for the illumination of your face to shine for ever in his/her heart...’ Many other relevant occurrences could be mentioned, both liturgical and hymnographical, but a fuller presentation goes beyond the scope of the present thesis.

St Gregory Palamas was, initially, a priest-monk, and then became a bishop. He celebrated very often the Divine Liturgy and the other offices of the Church. Therefore, he surely knew the above references in the offices well, regarding the great importance of man’s spiritual senses. Undoubtedly, he also knew the relevant texts and passages from the Fathers, which he time and again quotes. All these references, both patristic and liturgical, surely influenced him to a great extent in the articulation of his relevant theology. Besides, as shown in this Part, the αἰσθησις νοερὰ is indeed a central idea in his thought, and vital to his effort to provide a theological defence of the hesychasts.

As demonstrated, intellectual perception refers both to the soul and the human body. It is undoubtedly a powerful notion, which describes the great potentiality of man for union with God. In my view, it would not be false to argue that it provides the cornerstone and basis for the whole of Palamas’ theological anthropology, since, for St Gregory, the main goal of man is to attain union with God, to participate in theosis.

In the current Part, first, the historical and theological context of this notion was briefly presented, as well as the stance of the opponents of the hesychasts. Then, some special issues were examined, such as the relationship between human knowledge and divine light, the inner illumination and its meaning, the vision of the light and its presuppositions, the important place of ecstasis, and, finally, the major role that the body plays in the vision of spiritual realities.

Indeed, through its participation in the νοερὰ αἰσθησις the human body obtains great value. The body is not just a passive spectator in man’s spiritual struggle. On the

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contrary, it has a very crucial role to play: if the body is used well, in a way that is God-pleasing, it is a great assistant to man in his efforts toward union with God. Moreover, through this union, the body participates in man’s communion with divine grace, both now and in the future age. While every human being has the potentiality for this νοερα αἰσθησις, only those who purify their inner self, and follow the commandments of Christ, may experience its activation.

This notion (αἰσθησις νοερα) was used by previous Fathers, even in the first centuries of the Christian era. However, Palamas, by placing it in the context of the hesychast controversy, gives it a fresh new content and meaning.\(^5\) It seems that this is justified through the above analysis. Furthermore, it is impressive that these experiences of the hesychasts, as Palamas describes them, are to be found also in our own time, in the lives of certain holy persons. For instance, similar accounts from the lives of St Seraphim of Sarov, St Paisios of Mount Athos, St Porphryios of Kapsokalyvia, Elder Joseph the Hesychast, St Silouan the Athonite, Elder Sophrony Sakharov and others, could be easily found and presented.

Finally, it would be of great scholarly interest to compare the Palamite spiritual senses with other relevant approaches of medieval or, even, modern theologians. For instance, in his text on John Wesley’s\(^6\) doctrine of the spiritual senses, Mark Mealey has argued that ‘As an example, Gregory Palamas’s account of spiritual senses is remarkably similar to Wesley’s, though it is very unlikely that Wesley had read Palamas’.\(^7\) Therefore, it would be worth investigating whether this remark and other similar are correct, and to what extent.\(^8\)

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\(^6\) John Wesley (1703-91) was an Anglican cleric who founded the Methodist movement in the Church of England, along with his brother Charles.

\(^7\) Mark T. Mealey, ‘John Wesley’, in Gavrilyuk and Coakley (eds), The Spiritual Senses, 241-56 (here p. 256).

\(^8\) To this end, one should take into consideration the following PhD dissertation, which explores the place of the sanctifying experience of God in the work of these two theologians: George Peter Bailey, Growing into God: a consideration of the relation between the experience and theology of sanctification, in dialogue with John Wesley’s theology of perfection and Gregory Palamas’ theology of deification, PhD thesis (University of Cambridge, 2011).
Epilogue. From the Image of God to the αἰσθησις νοεράς

This thesis dealt with two central ideas in the anthropology of St Gregory Palamas: the image of God and the spiritual senses. Finally, three conclusive thoughts are worthy of noting here: First, as shown, in his treatment of the spiritual senses Palamas undoubtedly has in mind the fact that man is made in the imago Dei. This is evident from some of his central arguments.9 For instance, we first saw Palamas’ reference that God reveals himself to the purified intellect ‘as in a mirror’ (ἐν ἑσόπτρῳ) (Tr. 1,3,9).10 Second, the intellect is ‘an immaterial nature’, and ‘a light relative’ to God, the superior light. The intellect may become in itself, through communion with God, what the archetype is by cause (Tr. 1,3,39).11 Third, in the age to come a transformation to the bodily organs will occur, and, thus, man will see the divine, non-sensible light even through his body (Tr. 1,3,37).12

This last point entails that even the body will acquire then a kind of likeness to God. But, it could be argued that such a likeness is inherent in the body even through its very creation, for the body participates in the vision of the light even in this life. In addition, we should keep in mind that in the relevant sections of this thesis, namely in Part I, we presented man’s superiority over the angels in terms of the image of God due to the human body. Therefore, the following idea may lie in Palamas’ mind: the image of God is inherent in man, both soul and body, but man’s final goal is to achieve likeness to God. In this road he passes through the νοεράς αἰσθησις, either now, or in Paradise.

Second, this notion, i.e. of intellectual perception, refers both to the soul and the body. However, at that time, in Paradise, the body will be absorbed by the spirit, and acquire a totally spiritual consistency. But this does not mean at all that the body is devalued. On the contrary, in this thesis, it was clearly shown that Palamas attributes a great value to the human body.

Third, as has been stated, and as shown throughout this thesis, Palamas, through his oeuvre, distinguishes two ways of knowing: ‘a natural mode of intellection and a further mode superior to the latter’. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that ‘The

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10 In ch. 5.4.b.
11 See ch. 6.1.d.
12 See ch. 7.
opponents are wrong in thinking there is only one’.\textsuperscript{13} Obviously, the second way is intellectual perception, the potentiality of man to be united with God. What now comes to our mind is that some central attributes of our own intellectual climate, which are often called post-modern, resemble the stance of the antihesychasts. Nowadays, there is often an effort (from political parties, movements, independent thinkers etc.) to persuade us that the most important power of man is his ability to think.\textsuperscript{14} It seems that Descartes lives on; \textit{cogito ergo sum} is still a central motto in the life of post-modern man.\textsuperscript{15}

However, Palamas would totally disagree with such a one-sided and unqualified approach, and herein lies his importance as a contributor to the anthropological discussions of our epoch. His most important gift for us today is his strong insistence on the potentiality of man’s union with God, namely theosis: of the transition from the image of God, to the \textit{kath’ omoiosin}, the acquisition of the likeness, and the activation of his νοερὰ ἀἱσθησις. This thesis is only a small and initial effort in our endeavour to carefully study Palamas’ relevant line of thought, and its importance for today.

\textsuperscript{13} For these two quotations, see Sinkewicz, ‘The Concept’, 380.
\textsuperscript{14} Cf. the epistemological view in Philosophy called ‘rationalism’, which sees reason as the main source and test of knowledge.
\textsuperscript{15} Cf. the relevant comments in the Introduction of this thesis.
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Notes about the translations used, and the references:

1. For the translation of New Testament passages we usually follow the Revised Standard Version (RSV). As far as passages from the LXX are concerned, we use (sometimes, with some modifications) that of Albert Pietersma and Benjamin G. Wright (eds), A New English Translation of the Septuagint and the Other Greek Translations Traditionally Included Under that Title (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

2. For Palamas’ Chapters (Capita 150) we use the edition of Robert E. Sinkewicz, The One Hundred and Fifty Chapters: A Critical Edition, Translation and Study, Studies and Texts 83 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1988), referring to the relevant chapter, lines and pages. For instance, Ch. 56.2-9, 148-150 means: Chapter 56, lines 2-9, p. 148-150 in the ed. of Sinkewicz. We also use Sinkewicz’s translation of the Greek text. Moreover, when we write Ch. 32, 114-6, we refer to ch. 32, which one can find in pages 114-6 of the aforementioned edition.

3. As far as the Triads (Ὑπὲρ τῶν ἱερῶν ἡσυχαζόντων) are concerned, we first refer to P. Christou’s ed. (i.e. in ΠΣ 1, Thessaloniki, 2010 [1962]) and then, in parentheses, to Meyendorff’s one (Louvain, 1973 [1959]); e.g. Tr. 1,3,27.22-4, 438 (169.20-22). It should be here noted that the 1973 edition is an anastatic reprint of the 1959 one. For the translation of the Triads we use the editions of Meyendorff (French) and Christou (Modern Greek; ΠΑΕ 2, ΕΠΕ 54). Moreover, for Triad I, the modern Greek translation of Despoina D. Kontostergiou is sometimes very useful [it is found in John S. Romanides (ed.), Ρωμαϊδος ή ΡωμιοΙ Πατέρες τῆς Ἐκκλησίας. Τόμος Ι. Γρηγορίου Παλαμᾶ  ἐργα 1: Ὑπὲρ τῶν ἱερῶν ἡσυχαζόντων Τριάς Α΄ (Thessaloniki: Pournaras, 1991), 196-467].

4. For Palamas’ Homilies, we first cite the recent critical edition of Pseftogas (2015; see below, vol. 6 in the series Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ Συγγράμματα [ΠΣ]), and then that of Christou (i.e. ΠΑΕ 9-11). The English translation of the Homilies is usually drawn from the recent edition of Veniamin (see below), unless otherwise stated.
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**I. Gregory Palamas**

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v. 3 (1970 and 2010), ed. L. Kontogiannis, V. Phanourgakis, introduction by Panagiotis K. Christou: Πρὸς Ἀκίνδυνον Ἀντιρρητικοὶ (Α΄-Ζ΄) [Contra Acindynum]

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1 Fortunately, almost all the works of Palamas have been digitalized and can be accessed online through the TLG ([http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/index.php](http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/index.php)). This is indeed very important, because it gives the opportunity to a wide public to become aware of the Palamite corpus. Moreover, it helps significantly the scholarly work. It seems that, there is only one text of Palamas not found yet at the TLG: the Διάλεξις πρὸς Χιόνας (=ΠΣ 4, 148-65). Furthermore, as far as Palamas’ *Homilies* is concerned, it should be noted that the TLG does not use the recent critical ed. of Pseftogas (in ΠΣ 6), but rather that of Christou in ΠΑΕ 9-11 (Online TLG accessed April 20, 2016).
Δογματικαὶ Πραγματείαι καὶ Ἐπιστολαι γραφεῖσαι κατὰ τὰ ἔτη 1348-1358 
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v. 6 (2015), ed. Vasileios St. Pseftogas: Ὅμιλαι [Homilies] (critical ed.) [For the Homilies I also refer to vols. 9-11 of ΠΑΕ: this edition, although not a critical one, was regarded the more appropriate, until the recent critical edition of Pseftogas appeared). For an older edition of these sermons, as well as for a recent English translation, see below the works of Oikonomos and Veniamin respectively].

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Abstract

The current thesis studies the anthropology of St Gregory Palamas, and tries to prove two main points: a) man is, according to Palamas, greater than the angels, as far as the image of God is concerned. Moreover, this is due to human corporeality, to the human body; b) man has the potentiality to ‘sense’ God; in this experience the human body has a very important place. This refers to the spiritual senses, wherein the basic notion is the ‘intellectual perception’ (νοερὰ αἴσθησις). In trying to prove the aforementioned two points, this thesis also examines some other related topics of Palamite anthropology in its various chapters. In each chapter—and part—there is a brief introduction to set up the questions that are addressed. After the relevant analysis, the main findings are summarized in the conclusions—at the end of each chapter, and part respectively.

In the Introduction, the emergence of the question of the human person in the context of the hesychast debates is traced, as well as some key anthropological notions. These sections define the context in which the thesis moves, and help the reader better understand the subsequent chapters. In particular, Part I examines the image of God in man. After providing an overview of St Gregory’s relevant teaching, it moves on to an analysis of two major issues: a) why is man believed to bear some reflections of the Holy Trinity in himself, and b) in what sense is he regarded superior to the angels, in terms of the imago Dei. Then Part II explores a most interesting topic: the Palamite αἴσθησις νοερὰ (intellectual perception), namely man’s spiritual senses. Is man able to gain knowledge of God? How is this possible? What is the role of the divine light and of the ‘eyes of the soul’? What is the place of ‘ecstasis’ and in what sense does the body have an important role in the spiritual senses? These are some of the main research questions pursued here.

Amongst the contributions of this thesis are these three basic conclusions. First, according to Palamas, the image of God is inherent in man, both soul and body, but man’s final goal is to attain likeness to God. In this road, he passes through the νοερὰ αἴσθησις, either now, or in Paradise. Besides, the fact that man is made kat’ eikona, enables him to perceive and, even, sense God. Moreover, man is superior to the angels in terms of the image of God for some specific reasons, all based in his corporeality. However, the angels have preserved the perfection of the καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν and for this
reason they have a greater dignity than us; they are much closer to the divine illumination that comes from God.

Second, intellectual perception refers both to the soul and the body. However, in Paradise the body will be absorbed by the spirit, and acquire a totally spiritual aspect. But this does not mean at all a devaluing of the body. On the contrary, in this thesis, it is clearly shown that Palamas attributes extremely great value to the human body. Finally, Palamas’ most central theological position is his strong insistence on the potentiality of man’s union with God, namely theosis: that is, of the transition from the image of God, to the *kath’ omoiosin*, and the activation of his νοερὰ ἁίσθησις. And herein lies, perhaps, his most important gift to the anthropological discussions of our epoch.
Samenvatting

Dit proefschrift behandelt de antropologie (leer over de mens) van St. Gregorios Palamas en tracht twee zaken aan te tonen: a) de mens is volgens Palamas groter dan de engelen, voor zover het Gods beeld in de mens betreft. Dit hangt nauw samen met de lichamelijkheid van de mens, met het menselijk lichaam; b) de mens heeft de potentie om God te ‘waar te nemen’; in deze ervaring heeft het menselijk lichaam een zeer belangrijke plaats. Dit verwijst naar de spirituele zintuigen, waarin het basisbegrip de ‘noetische perceptie’ is (νοερὰ αἴσθησις). Tijdens de behandeling van deze twee punten onderzoekt dit proefschrift ook een aantal andere verwante onderwerpen van Palamas’ antropologie in de verschillende hoofdstukken. In elk hoofdstuk - en deel - wordt een korte inleiding gegeven over de te behandelen vragen. Na de relevante analyse worden de belangrijkste bevindingen samengevat in de conclusies - aan het einde van elk hoofdstuk en respectievelijk deel.

In de Introduction wordt de opkomst van de kwestie van de menselijke persoon in de context van de hesychastische debatten nagegaan, evenals enkele belangrijke antropologische begrippen. Deze secties bepalen de context waarin het proefschrift zich beweegt, en helpen de lezer de volgende hoofdstukken beter te begrijpen. In het bijzonder onderzoekt Deel I het beeld Gods in de mens. Na een overzicht van wat St. Gregory’s hierover leert gaat het verder met een analyse van twee belangrijke kwesties: a) waarom wordt geloofd dat de mens in zekere mate de Heilige Drie-Eenheid weerspiegelt, en b) in welke zin wordt hij beschouwd als superieur aan de engelen, in termen van het beeld Gods. Vervolgens onderzoekt deel II een cruciaal onderwerp: de ‘noetische perceptie’ (νοερὰ αἴσθησις), de geestelijke zintuigen van de mens. Kan de mens kennis van God verwerven? Hoe is dit mogelijk? Wat is de rol van het goddelijk licht en van de ‘ogen van de ziel’? Wat is de plaats van ‘ekstasis’ en in welke zin heeft het lichaam een belangrijke rol in de noetische perceptie? Dit zijn enkele van de belangrijkste onderzoeksvragen die hier worden behandeld.

Dit proefschrift heeft drie basisconclusies. Ten eerst is volgens Palamas het beeld Gods inherent aan de mens, zowel aan de ziel als aan het lichaam, maar het uiteindelijke doel van de mens is gelijkenis met God te bereiken (zie Gen 1:26: naar het beeld en de gelijkenis van God). Op weg naar dit doel is hij in staat tot noetische
perceptie, nu of in het paradijs. Trouwens, het feit dat de mens volgens het beeld Gods is gemaakt, stelt hem in staat om God waar te nemen en zelfs te voelen. Bovendien is de mens om een aantal specifieke redenen superieur aan de engelen in termen van het beeld van God, allen gebaseerd op zijn lichamelijkheid. De engelen hebben echter de perfectie van de gelijkenis met God bewaard en om deze reden hebben ze een grotere waardigheid dan wij; ze staan veel dichter bij de verlichting die van God komt.


Tenslotte, Palamas’ meest centrale theologische positie is zijn sterke nadruk op de mogelijkheid van de vereniging van de mens met God, namelijk theosis: dat wil zeggen, van de overgang van het beeld van God naar de gelijkenis en de activering van zijn noetische perceptie. Hierin ligt misschien zijn belangrijkste bijdrage aan de antropologische discussies van ons tijdperk.