Efficient insurance in a market theory of payroll and self-employment

5.1 Introduction

Over the last two decades, the majority of the developed economies have experienced a shift in the composition of employment towards more own-account work and freelancing. For example, about half of the new jobs taken up in the United Kingdom in the last decade were self-employment jobs. As a result of the shift in the composition of employment, the self-employed now constitute a group larger than the unemployed in many countries. Furthermore, there is significant variation of the self-employment rate between developed economies. These facts, illustrated in Table 12, are difficult to reconcile with existing theories of self-employment that emphasize individual heterogeneity of skills, preferences, or cognitive biases (Parker, 2012), which we don’t expect to vary much over time and across countries.

In this paper we propose a theory of the composition of employment that focuses on the key distinction between self- and payroll employment: exposure to the risk of not selling output versus exposure to the risk of not finding a job. The self-employed are the sole claimants of the fruits of their labor, but bear the risk of not selling their products.

54 This chapter is based on Denderski and Snikers (2016)
or services fully on their own. The wage contract limits this risk for the employee, but requires sharing any surplus of a match with the firm. Moreover, not all of those looking for a wage contract are able to find one, so that some become unemployed. In order to highlight these differences between payroll and self-employment, we explicitly and jointly model the problems of finding a job in the labor market and selling output in the goods market.

All developed countries offer some form of unemployment insurance for those that do not find a job. Denmark and Sweden have recently also introduced unemployment insurance schemes that are designed specifically for the self-employed. However, in the majority of developed countries this type of insurance is still absent. On the one hand, it is widely believed that being self-employed is riskier than being an employee. On the other hand, if self-employment is driven by the desire to be one’s own boss or by higher tolerance for risks, insurance for the self-employed is hard to justify.

We aim to make two contributions. First, we propose a novel parsimonious theory of self-employment that does not rely on individual-level differences between people but focuses on trade-offs between labor and goods market frictions. Changes in these markets, possibly resulting from the spread of modern communication technologies, provide a natural explanation for the long run behavior of self-employment rates.

Second, we show that there should be insurance benefits for the self-employed that fail to sell, solely for the purpose of maximizing the volume of goods traded with customers. Insurance for the self-employed eliminates business stealing by risk averse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>2013</th>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>9.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>6.9</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
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Table 12: Share of own account workers in total employment. Source: Key Indicators of the Labor Market, ILO.
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self-employed who have an incentive to set their prices too low from the societal point of view, in order to reduce the risk of not selling their output. This paper therefore provides a rationale for the UI policies of Denmark and Sweden that is not only based on risk sharing, but also on efficiency.

We consider an economy represented in Figure 22. It is inhabited by homogenous individuals producing an indivisible good. The good cannot be consumed by these individuals but can be exchanged with buyers for a divisible endowment from which the individuals do derive utility. The individuals face a one-shot career choice problem. They can either become self-employed, which implies producing and trying to sell their output by themselves, or seek a job at a firm, which tries to sell the goods produced by the individual it employs.

Individuals entering the labor market cannot coordinate their job applications to firms that post wages, which results in involuntary unemployment. Similarly, buyers cannot coordinate their visits to firms and self-employed that post prices, resulting in unsold inventories. An employee is guaranteed the wage even if the firm fails to sell the goods. However, an employee has to share the expected surplus with the firm. The self-employed face the risk of not selling, but they forego the risk of unemployment.

Unlike in the standard Mortensen-Pissarides framework, in our model a match with a firm is thus not necessary to generate income. Our model endogenously determines a vacancy and self-employment rate depending on, among others, search technology and the existence of some advantageous business conditions for firms. One can think of these advantageous business conditions as productivity or quality gains to firm formation, resulting from additional capital, training or knowledge that the firm has at its disposal after the investment of an entry cost \( k \). In a richer framework with intermediate inputs, such gains may result from economizing on internal transaction costs as in Coase (1937). Alternatively, advantageous business conditions for firms can result from a superior visibility in the goods market after the investment of cost \( k \). This is the interpretation used in this chapter. Firms in our model are both an intermediary between the employee and the buyers, and a vehicle of production and marketing that cannot exist without any form of competitive advantage over independent production by the self-employed. Yet, the trade-off between the frictions in the goods and labor market leads to the coexistence of firm employment and self-employment in equilibrium.

The presence of firms and self-employed implies the goods market consists of two different types of sellers. If individuals are risk averse, these two different types of
sellers have different objectives, creating inefficiencies that can be potentially corrected by policy. Risk averse self-employed, unlike risk neutral firms, have an incentive to self-insure via their pricing decision. By decreasing prices they attract on average more buyers so that their selling probability increases. However, the lowering of prices by the self-employed steals business away from firms. Other things equal, firms’ expected profits fall. Consequently, fewer firms enter and the economy benefits to a lesser extent from their advantageous business conditions. As a result, the volume of the goods traded drops.

The ability to self-insure makes a career in self-employment relatively more attractive than entering the labor market. This effect is countered by the conventional effect that firms post lower wages to increase the job finding rate of risk averse job seekers. The latter, however, comes at the cost of excessive vacancy creation. Generally, the employment composition is different than the composition that would maximize the volume of goods traded net of firm entry costs. For some parameter values, the ability to self-insure in self-employment can dominate the market insurance offered by firms. As a result, the self-employment rate may increase in risk aversion.
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We find that the combination of type-of-employment dependent lump-sum taxes and income support benefits under a balanced budget can maximize the output sold net of entry costs, while offering insurance to risk averse individuals. This optimal policy mix consists of differentiated taxes and unemployment insurance benefits for both workers and self-employed. Optimal UI benefits for the self-employed eliminate business stealing, while optimal UI benefits for job seekers raise wages and stop excessive firm entry. Differentiated taxes then balance the budget while ensuring an optimal employment allocation via the career choice of individuals. We show that whenever the job finding probability exceeds the selling probability (so that the self-employment income can be considered riskier), the UI benefits for the self-employed should be more generous than the UI benefits for employees.

Related literature. Our paper is related to three strands of the literature: on the drivers of self-employment, on frictional goods markets and intermediation, and on optimal unemployment insurance. Below we describe our contribution to those papers.

There is a variety of theories explaining self-selection into self-employment. A large fraction of this literature puts individual characteristics and heterogeneity as a reason for self-employment. We list a limited selection of those papers, whereas Parker (2004) offers an extensive survey. Lucas (1978), Jovanovic (1982) and Poschke (2013) assume that being an entrepreneur/self-employed requires a separate skill, potentially different than a skill needed to be an employee. Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) postulate differences in risk aversion that lead to undertaking entrepreneurial activities. De Meza and Southey (1996) find that self-employed entrepreneurs are significantly more optimistic than employees. Lindquist et al. (2015) document the importance of family background. We complement this literature, because in our model self-employment is an equilibrium outcome that does not require any ex ante individual heterogeneity. Besides, Rissman (2003, 2007) assumes returns to self-employment are drawn from an exogenous distribution riskier than the wage distribution. We offer a model that endogenously generates those risk differentials. Finally, our model is complementary to papers that explain self-employment from financing frictions (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Buera, 2009), because a frictional financial market could be introduced as an additional stage in the career choice game for those who choose self-employment.

To the best of our knowledge, self-employment has not been introduced into models with frictions in the goods market. Existing papers study the macroeconomic
consequences of goods market frictions (See e.g. Michaillat and Saez (2015); Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2015); Kaplan and Menzio (2016)), or characteristics of firms that operate in a frictional goods market. Most closely related are Shi (2002), who explains the size-wage differential in the labor market by a sufficiently large size-revenue differential in the goods market, and Godenhielm and Kultti (2015), who allow for endogenous capacity choice and study the resulting firm size distribution.

Our model can also be framed as a choice of producers to trade with buyers via a middleman (firm) or to trade with buyers directly. The papers in the literature on intermediation that are most closely related are Watanabe (2010, 2013). Unlike in those papers, the choice that producers (individuals) face in our model is exclusive. Also, the meetings with the middlemen are subject to a friction. Wright and Wong (2014) offer a general model of middlemen with search and bargaining problems. We employ posting, allow for bypassing of the middlemen, and discuss labor policy implications.

Papers on efficient unemployment insurance for risk averse individuals either do not take self-employment (e.g. Acemoglu and Shimer (1999)) or market frictions into account (e.g. Parker (1999)). Our paper shows that the interaction of risk averse self-employed and goods market frictions is crucial for understanding efficient unemployment insurance.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 we outline the structure of the model. Then, in Section 5.3 we characterize the market equilibrium. In Section 5.4 we present and characterize the conditions under which a unique mixed strategy equilibrium exists, and prove that it maximizes net output sold for risk neutral preferences. In Section 5.5 we show that the decentralized allocation is not efficient for risk averse preferences, but that introducing a type-of-employment dependent tax and unemployment insurance policy can restore efficiency. Section 5.6 presents the steady state of a dynamic version of the model in which jobs in expectation last for multiple periods, and shows how the composition of employment depends on the key parameters of the model. The final section concludes.

5.2 Model

We consider a one-shot game of an economy populated by firms, buyers, and individuals interacting in two markets. Individuals face a career choice between self-employment and entering the labor market. In the goods market, firms and the self-employed
exchange with buyers an indivisible produced consumption good (a coconut) for a
divisible endowment (money). In the labor market, individuals exchange with firms
indivisible labor for money. There are coordination frictions in both markets.

The measure of individuals is normalized to one. Individuals value consumption
according to a weakly concave utility function $u(c)$, suffer no disutility from labor, but
cannot consume coconuts. Instead, they derive utility from money. For convenience,
we also postulate that $u(0) = 0$. There is a unit mass of buyers $B$ in the goods market that
can consume money and exactly one coconut. They enjoy a utility $v$ from consuming the
coconut, and a smaller, linear utility from their endowment of money, which individuals
can also consume. We normalize buyers’ utility from not buying to zero and the utility
from consuming the coconut to one. We consider a partial equilibrium setup with
buyers and individuals living in separate households. Finally, there is an endogenously
determined mass $V$ of vacancies opened by profit-maximizing firms upon paying a cost
$k > 0$.

The career choice of individuals results in an endogenous measure $SE$ of self-
employed and $LM = 1 - SE$ of agents entering the labor market. A match of a single
worker and vacancy results in an active firm. The measure of active firms is denoted by
$F$. Because of search frictions in the labor market we have $F \leq V$. Both a self-employed
and an active firm produce one coconut. Each opens one outlet to sell its coconut in the
goods market and posts a price with commitment. However, an active firm’s outlet and
price is visible in the goods market with probability $A \in (0, 1]$, whereas a self-employed
individual’s outlet and price is visible with probability $a \in (0, 1]$.

Buyers observe prices of visible outlets, can only visit one of these, but cannot
coordinate which one to visit. For that reason, the goods market is subject to urn-ball
frictions. As a result, some visible sellers face more customers than they can serve and
others are not able to sell, while some buyers fail to buy the good. If there is a mass of
buyers $B_{SE}$ at the visible outlets opened by the self-employed, then the average queue
length at each outlet is $x_{SE} = B_{SE} / (aSE)$. The average queue length of buyers at a visible

\footnote{For instance, because money can be exchanged in a perfectly competitive third market for another
divisible consumption good (which is thus not a coconut).}

\footnote{Here we allow for differences in the visibility of self-employed and active firms. This formulation is
not restrictive. A model in which $a$ and $A$ denote the number of coconuts produced by the self-employed
and active firms, respectively, is almost identical (exactly identical under risk neutral preferences) as long
as every coconut is sold in a separate outlet. If multiple coconuts are sold at one outlet, there exists a
selling advantage to larger inventories, see Watanabe (2010). Alternatively, one can write a very similar
model with differences in qualities of coconuts, which scale up the utility of buyers.}
active firm \( x_F \) is defined analogously. The corresponding service probabilities for a buyer are denoted by \( \eta (x_{SE}) \) and \( \eta (x_F) \), at self-employed and active firms respectively. The selling probabilities of visible outlets \( \lambda (x_{SE}) = x_{SE} \eta (x_{SE}) \) and \( \lambda (x_F) = x_F \eta (x_F) \) are the complementary probabilities of having no buyers visiting a visible outlet at all. Using the large market assumption to characterize these probabilities, \( \lambda (x) = 1 - e^{-x} \).

Upon paying an entry cost to open a vacancy, a firm posts a wage and commits to it. Workers observe all wages but can apply to one vacancy only, while a vacancy can be filled by only one worker. As standard in the literature, to capture the coordination frictions we restrict our attention to symmetric and anonymous strategies. We denote the average queue length by \( x_{LM} = LM/V \) where \( V \) is the measure of open vacancies.

Due to coordination frictions, some firms fail to fill their vacancy and do not become active, while some workers remain unemployed. The probability of filling a vacancy is denoted by \( q (x_{LM}) \), and by the large market assumption \( q (x_{LM}) = 1 - e^{-x_{LM}} \). The job finding probability is simply \( \mu (x_{LM}) = q (x_{LM}) / x_{LM} \). Finally, we assume that the firms can insure in a competitive market against the risk of not being able to pay the wage, so that the worker is guaranteed a wage once matched. The shares of firms are traded by financial investors (not modeled explicitly) who can buy a market portfolio of those shares so that the firms maximize expected profits upon entry.

The timing of the game is displayed in Figure 23. First, a measure of firms enter the labor market by opening vacancies. In the career choice stage the unit mass of individuals parts into self-employed and prospective workers. In the third stage, the frictional labor market matches vacancies and prospective workers, resulting in a measure \( F = q (x_{LM}) V \) of active firms and a measure \( U = (1 - \mu (x_{LM})) LM \) of unemployed workers. In the fourth stage, all active firms and self-employed individuals produce and become sellers in the goods market. In the fifth stage, a fraction of the sellers become visible and buyers direct their search to them such that the following accounting identity is satisfied:

\[
a x_{SE} SE + A x_F F = 1, \tag{5.1}
\]

which means that no buyers stay at home not trying to visit any seller. Now we are in position to define the market equilibrium of this economy in the following section.
5.3 Equilibrium definition

We decompose the one-shot game into two stages: the career choice and the labor market as the first stage, and the goods market as the second stage. We solve the game backwards, starting from the goods market. We focus on equilibria that feature both self-employment and payroll employment. The existence conditions for such a mixed strategy equilibrium of the career choice game are presented in the next section.

5.3.1 Goods market

As is standard in competitive search models, separate submarkets open and buyers choose between visiting each of the submarkets such that in equilibrium they are indifferent between all active submarkets and obtain value $V_B$. Given the specification of buyers preferences, this value reads

$$V_B = \eta(x_F)(1-p_F) = \eta(x_{SE})(1-p_{SE}). \quad (5.2)$$

Given that the wage is sunk, active firms maximize expected revenue: $A\lambda(x_F) p_F$. The self-employed maximize expected utility. The expected value of self-employed sellers, dropping zero utility of not receiving any income, is then

$$V^{SE} = a\lambda(x_{SE}) u(p_{SE}). \quad (5.3)$$

The goods market outcomes and payoffs are depicted in Figure 24.

Sellers post prices to maximize their expected payoffs subject to the constraint that buyers must receive their market utility $V^B$. The optimal prices and an associated goods market sub-equilibrium characterization are presented below.
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**Self-Employed, SE**

SE submarket
- **price** $p_{SE}$
- queue length: $x_{SE} = \frac{B_{SE}}{a_{SE}}$
- selling probability: $a_{SE} = a \left(1 - \exp(-x_{SE})\right)$
- buying probability: $\eta_{SE} = \frac{A(x_{SE})}{x_{SE}}$

$V_{SE}^B = \eta_{SE} (1 - p_{SE})$

**Active Firms, F**

F submarket
- **price** $p_{F}$
- queue length: $x_{F} = \frac{B_{F}}{A_{F}}$
- selling probability: $A_{F} = A \left(1 - \exp(-x_{F})\right)$
- buying probability: $\eta_{F} = \frac{A(x_{F})}{x_{F}}$

$V_{F}^B = \eta_{F} (1 - p_{F})$

** Buyers, B **

$1 = B_{F} + B_{SE}$

Equilibrium: $V_{SE}^B = V_{F}^B$

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**Figure 24:** The goods market.

**Lemma 5.1.** Assume $SE > 0$, $F > 0$, $B_F > 0$, $B_{SE} > 0$ fixed. Let $\phi(x) = -\frac{x \partial \eta(x)}{\eta(x) \partial x}$ be the elasticity of the buying probability with respect to the queue length $x$. Given queue lengths $x_{SE} = \frac{B_{SE}}{a_{SE}}$, $x_{F} = \frac{B_{F}}{A_{F}}$ the optimal price posting conditions are:

\[
\frac{\phi(x_{SE}) (1 - p_{SE})}{1 - \phi(x_{SE})} = \frac{u(p_{SE})}{u'(p_{SE})}, \tag{5.4}
\]

\[p_{F} = \phi(x_{F}). \tag{5.5}\]

**Proof.** See Appendix 5.8.A.

**Definition 5.2.** Let $SE > 0$, $F > 0$ be fixed. A goods market sub-equilibrium is a tuple $\{x_{SE}, x_{F}, p_{SE}, p_{F}\}$ such that given $x_{SE}, x_{F}$ the sellers optimally post prices according to (5.4) and (5.5), and the buyers’ indifference condition (5.2) and accounting identity (5.1) hold.
5.3.2 Labor market

Now we consider a non-zero mass of prospective workers $LM > 0$ and analyze labor market outcomes. We do that in two steps. First, we fix the measure of vacancies $V > 0$; then we allow for free entry in posting vacancies by prospective firms. Given that the entry cost $k$ is sunk, potential firms post a wage in the labor market to maximize expected profits, taking into account equilibrium outcomes in the goods market. They compete with other potential firms for workers, under the constraint that they must at least offer the market utility level of workers searching for jobs:

$$V^{LM} = \mu(x_{LM}) u(w).$$

(5.6)

Lemma 5.3. Assume $LM > 0$ and $V > 0$ fixed. Given queue length $x_{LM} = LM/V$, the optimal wage $w$ that maximizes firms profits subject to workers’ market utility (5.6) solves the following equation:

$$\phi(x_{LM}) \left[ A \lambda(x_F) p_F - w \right] \frac{1 - \phi(x_{LM})}{u'(w)} = u(w),$$

(5.7)

where $p_F$ and $x_F$ come from the goods market sub-equilibrium $\{x_{SE}, x_F, p_{SE}, p_F\}$ induced by $SE = 1 - LM$ and $F = q(x_{LM})V$ and where $\phi(x_{LM}) = \frac{x_{LM} \partial q(x_{LM})}{q(x_{LM}) \partial x_{LM}}$ is the elasticity of the job filling probability with respect to the queue length.

Proof. See Appendix 5.8.A.

Expected profits are therefore shared with workers according to the elasticity of the matching function in the labor market, and are decreasing in risk aversion. By posting lower wages when workers are risk averse, firms offer market insurance in the form of higher job finding probabilities from larger firm entry. The free-entry condition drives the value of posting a vacancy net of the entry cost $k$ down to zero. Firms’ entry takes into account the resulting goods-market sub-equilibrium where $SE = 1 - LM$. Formally, we can define the labor market sub-equilibrium as follows.

Definition 5.4. Assume $LM, SE > 0$. The labor market sub-equilibrium is a pair $\{x_{LM}, w\}$ such that given $x_{LM}$, firms optimally post wages according to (5.7) and the following free-entry condition holds:

$$q(x_{LM}) \left[ A \lambda(x_F) p_F - w \right] - k = 0,$$

(5.8)

with $p_F$ and $x_F$ from the goods market sub-equilibrium $\{x_{SE}, x_F, p_{SE}, p_F\}$ induced by $SE$ and $F = q(x_{LM})V$ with $V = LM/x_{LM}$.
The labor market equilibrium is represented in Figure 25. Now we are in the position to define a mixed strategy equilibrium for our career choice game.

![Figure 25: The labor market](image)

**Definition 5.5.** A mixed strategy career choice equilibrium is a tuple \( \{SE^*, LM^*, x^*_{LM}, w^*, x^*_{SE}, x^*_F, p^*_F, p^*_SE\} \) such that:

1. all individuals either become self-employed or enter the labor market: \( SE^* + LM^* = 1 \);
2. given \( SE^* \) and \( LM^* \), \( \{x^*_{LM}, w^*\} \) is a labor market sub-equilibrium, and \( \{x^*_{SE}, x^*_F, p^*_F, p^*_SE\} \) is a corresponding goods market sub-equilibrium;
3. individuals are indifferent between self-employment and entering the labor market, i.e. \( V^{SE^*} = V^{LM^*} \) as defined in (5.3) and (5.6), respectively.

Observe that the indifference condition requires that whenever the job finding probability \( \mu \) exceeds the selling probability \( \lambda \) the income from self-employment is higher, conditional on selling, than the wage (and the opposite holds when \( \lambda > \mu \)).

An interesting special case of the mixed strategy equilibrium is the case of risk neutral individuals. If the self-employed are risk neutral, they maximize expected
revenue $a \lambda (x_{SE}) p_{SE}$. As follows from Lemma 5.1, risk neutral self-employed post prices according to $p_{SE} = \phi (x_{SE})$. Substituting this price in the buyers’ indifference condition (5.2), it follows that firm and self-employed sellers can expect the same queue length and set the same prices.

If workers are risk neutral, the wage posting decision of firms as given in (5.7) implies $w = \phi (x_{LM}) A \lambda (x_F) p_F$. Substituting this wage in (5.8) results in the following free entry condition:

$$q (x_{LM}) \left[ 1 - \phi (x_{LM}) \right] A \lambda (x_F) p_F = k. \tag{5.9}$$

Besides, as $\mu (x_{LM}) \phi (x_{LM}) = q' (x_{LM})$, the value of being a worker can in this case be written as

$$V_{LM} = q' (x_{LM}) A \lambda (x_F) p_F. \tag{5.10}$$

As a result, indifference in the career choice game simply requires

$$V^{SE} = a \lambda (x_{SE}) p_{SE} = q' (x_{LM}) A \lambda (x_F) p_F = V^{LM}. \tag{5.11}$$

Because self-employed and firms post the same prices, indifference in career choice implies

$$a / A = q' (x_{LM}) = e^{-x_{LM}} \rightarrow x_{LM} = \log \left( \frac{A}{a} \right) \tag{5.12}$$

Thus, if the mixed strategy equilibrium exists, the queue length of prospective workers is independent of the vacancy posting cost $k$ and only depends on $a$ and $A$. The next section shows that the mixed strategy equilibrium can exist, both for risk neutral and for risk averse preferences.

### 5.4 Existence and efficiency of equilibrium

In this section we state the conditions and explain the reasons for the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium. Afterwards, we prove that it maximizes net output sold if and only if individuals are risk neutral.

#### 5.4.1 Existence

The equilibrium can be shown to exist, to be unique, and to involve mixing of careers if the exogenous parameters $(a, A, k)$ are appropriately chosen. Outside of a certain set of
the equilibrium still exists and is unique but features no mixing of careers. The proof is an application of the Implicit Function Theorem.

As a first step, using the accounting identities in the goods and in the labor market, we arrive at the following mixing condition:

\[ \frac{LM}{AxSE} = 1 - \frac{AxSE}{AxLM} - \frac{AxSE}{AxSE}, \quad 0 < LM < 1. \] (5.13)

Then, we need to solve for the queue lengths \( \{x_{SE}, x_F, x_{LM}\} \) and corresponding prices of goods and labor \( \{p_{SE}, p_F, w\} \) using the remaining six equilibrium conditions. A necessary condition for this set of equations to have a solution is that the ratio \( u(c)/u'(c) \) is increasing in \( c \), which holds for any utility function with \( u'(c) > 0 \) and \( u''(c) < 0 \). For analytical convenience we make the proof operational under CRRA preferences. However, as the previous remark implies, this is without loss of generality.

**Proposition 5.6.** Let \( A, a \in (0, 1) \) fixed and \( u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} \) with \( \gamma \in [0, 1] \). Then there exist numbers \( k(A, a, \gamma), \tilde{k}(A, a, \gamma) \) such that the mixed strategy equilibrium described in Definition 5.5 exists and is unique if and only if the following inequalities hold:

\[ A > a, \] (5.14)
\[ k(A, a, \gamma) < k < \tilde{k}(A, a, \gamma). \] (5.15)

Furthermore, if \( k > \tilde{k}(A, a, \gamma) \) then \( SE^* = 1 \) and if \( k < \tilde{k}(A, a, \gamma) \) then \( SE^* = 0 \).

**Proof.** See Appendix 5.8.A.

A direct result of the working of the proof under risk neutral preferences is the set of comparative statics encapsulated in Corollary 5.7. Intuitively, the net gain of setting up a vacancy can be neither too small, nor too big for agents to play a mixed strategy in the career choice game.

**Corollary 5.7.** Consider risk neutral individuals and \( A, a \) and \( k \) such that the conditions (5.14) and (5.15) hold, and let \( \{SE^*, LM^*, x_{LM}^*, w^*, x_{SE}^*, x_F^*, p_F^*, p_{SE}^*\} \) be the corresponding mixed strategy career choice game equilibrium. Then, the following inequalities hold:

\[ \frac{\partial SE^*}{\partial k} > 0, \]
\[ \frac{\partial \tilde{k}}{\partial A} > 0, \quad \frac{\partial \tilde{k}}{\partial A} > 0, \]
\[ \frac{\partial \overline{k}}{\partial a} < 0, \quad \frac{\partial \overline{k}}{\partial a} < 0. \]
There are two reasons a corner solution in the career choice game could occur. First, there may be no firms willing to enter, so that there is no chance of finding a job on a payroll. This may happen, for example, when the vacancy posting cost $k$ is prohibitively large. Second, the business conditions of firms may be too advantageous to sustain self-employment as a valid alternative to seeking a payroll job.

Hence, the key driving force of the composition of employment in the model is the relative size of the probabilities of becoming visible in the goods market, adjusted for entry costs, which can be loosely described by comparing $A/k$ to $a$. One can argue that the spread of modern communication technologies has contributed to a relative increase in the visibility of the outlets of the self-employed, $a$. The theory then predicts a rise in self-employment rates, roughly in line with the recent increases in self-employment rates as documented in Table 12.

More generally, the ratio between $A/k$ and $a$ captures the improvement in business conditions on top of producing on one’s own that comes with setting up a firm. Correcting expected utility with binomial probabilities, one can interpret $A$ and $a$ as the number of units produced by active firms and self-employed, respectively, as long as each unit is sold at a separate outlet. One can then think of the ratio of $A/k$ over $a$ as a statistic for substitutability between the “self-employment technology” and “payroll employment technology”, or the additional returns to innovation from firm formation. For example, a large-scale production industry like an automotive industry is a sector with a very high $A/k$ and low $a$. In contrast, one can expect the difference between $A/k$ and $a$ to be low in service industries like hairdressing or taxi-driving. A prediction of the model is therefore that self-employment rates are higher in hairdressing than in the automotive industry. Another prediction is that when the share of low capital intensity services in the economy increases, the share of self-employment goes up as well. Finally, the model can shed some light on cross-country differentials in economic development and the composition of employment. In underdeveloped countries the technologies that are used in firms offer very little gains, or no gains at all, from organizing workers and capital into a firm. As our model predicts, those countries exhibit high self-employment rates.

5.4.2 Efficiency

We move onto investigating the efficiency of the decentralized equilibrium. We use output sold net of entry costs as our measure of efficiency and allow the social planner to
choose the measure of vacancies to be opened and the measure of households to enter self-employment (and thus the measure to enter the labor market). Thus, the reference point is the optimal use of available individuals. However, this is not equivalent to maximizing the utility of individuals or buyers.

The social planner faces the same visibility probabilities and coordination frictions within every (sub)market as present in the decentralized equilibrium, but can decide the measure of buyers to go shopping at the visible self-employed (and thus the measure of buyers that visits visible active firms). Finally, note that choosing the latter, given \( SE \) and \( V \), amounts to choosing \( x_{SE} \). The problem of the social planner is then to maximize:

\[
V^{SP}(V, x_{SE}, SE) = A\lambda(x_F)q(x_{LM})V + a\lambda(x_{SE})SE - Vk,
\]

where \( x_{LM} = (1 - SE)/V \) and \( x_F = (1 - x_{SE}aSE)/(Aq(x_{LM})V) \) from the unit mass of individuals and the accounting identity in (5.1), respectively. Similar to Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), for this measure of efficiency the following result can be shown.

**Proposition 5.8.** The decentralized allocation is constrained efficient if and only if individuals are risk neutral.

**Proof.** See Appendix 5.8.A.

Consequently, the equilibrium allocation that is implicitly given by (5.2), (5.9), and (5.11), with \( p_F = \phi(x_F) \) and \( p_{SE} = \phi(x_{SE}) \), maximizes output sold net of entry costs.

From Proposition 5.8 it follows that the outcome of the market interactions under risk aversion does not maximize output sold net of entry costs. The drivers of this result are the price and wage posting decisions. When agents are risk averse, the price \( p_{SE} \) that the self-employed charge is lower than the efficient \( p^{SP}_{SE} \) for a given queue length \( x^{SP}_{SE} \). The self-employed self-insure by decreasing their price to improve the odds of selling their output. By doing so they generate an inefficient distribution of queues which decreases the total output sold. Furthermore, firms offer market insurance as well. They increase the job finding rate of workers by increasing entry at the expense of lower wages. This distorts the allocation by an inefficient increase in entry costs. On top of that, the underpricing by the self-employed forces the firms to lower their prices as well, which exerts another downward pressure on wages. Consequently, wages and both prices are lower than in the efficient allocation.
Risk aversion tilts the career choice decision towards the safer alternative, so that the composition of employment is distorted as well. The two other sources of inefficiency also affect the career choice decision, however, so that the self-employment rate can be either lower or higher than in the planner equilibrium. Thus, the self-employment rate may increase when we make all agents identically risk averse, a prediction of the model that goes against the conventional wisdom that postulates less risk averse individuals to self-select into self-employment.

As demonstrated in Figure 26, the composition of employment in the market equilibrium can even coincide with the planner equilibrium. Generically, however, the decentralized allocation features too little or too much self-employment, depending on entry cost $k$. When $k$ is large, firms are reluctant to enter and the scope for labor market insurance is narrow, so that there is too much self-employment. This is in strong contrast to the conventional wisdom that risk aversion decreases self-employment. In fact, when firm entry costs are high and there can be large unemployment, the risk averse agents prefer to self-insure. For lower values of $k$ the firm entry margin dominates and self-employment is below the efficient level. Needless to say, a market equilibrium that features the right composition of employment is still inefficient, since the price and wage posting decisions continue to be distorted by inefficiently long queues at the self-employed.

The next section studies optimal insurance policies under risk averse preferences, when the market is not efficient. We investigate policies that make use of type-dependent insurance and taxes to maximize output net of recruitment costs.

### 5.5 Efficient insurance policy

Having discussed the inefficiency of a market equilibrium under risk averse preferences, we now move towards an analysis of an efficient insurance policy. We consider type-of-employment-dependent policies that satisfy the following definition:

**Definition 5.9.** A balanced budget policy is a tuple of taxes and unemployment benefits $\mathcal{P} = (\tau_{SE}, \tau_{LM}, b_{SE}, b_{LM})$ that satisfy the following condition:

$$b_{E}\left(1 - \mu(x_{LM})\right)LM + b_{SE}\left(1 - a\lambda(x_{SE})\right)SE = \tau_{LM}LM + \tau_{SE}SE.$$  \hspace{1cm} (5.16)
For analytical tractability, we illustrate the features of the policy under CARA preferences with a risk aversion parameter $\theta$:

$$u(c) = \frac{1 - \exp(-\theta c)}{\theta}.$$ 

Observe that the introduction of the policy instruments affects the price posting by self-employed, wage posting by firms, and values of workers and self-employed, respectively. These equations now read:

$$\frac{\phi(x_{LM})}{1 - \phi(x_{LM})} \left[ A \lambda(x_F) p_F - w \right] = \frac{u(w - \tau_{LM}) - u(b_{LM} - \tau_{LM})}{u'(w - \tau_{LM})},$$

$$\frac{\phi(x_{SE})(1 - p_{SE})}{1 - \phi(x_{SE})} = \frac{u(p_{SE} - \tau_{SE}) - u(b_{SE} - \tau_{SE})}{u'(p_{SE} - \tau_{SE})},$$

$$V_{LM}(\mathcal{P}) = \mu(x_{LM}) u(w - \tau_{LM}) + (1 - \mu(x_{LM})) u(b_{LM} - \tau_{LM}),$$

$$V^{SE}(\mathcal{P}) = a \lambda(x_{SE}) u(p_{SE} - \tau_{SE}) + (1 - a \lambda(x_{SE})) u(b_{SE} - \tau_{SE}).$$
A natural question unfolds: is it possible to decentralize the planner equilibrium using a balanced budget policy of type-of-employment-dependent taxes and unemployment benefits? The answer, as provided in the following proposition, is positive. More interestingly, there is a clear pattern on how the unemployment benefits and otherwise lump-sum taxes should be conditioned on the type of employment.

**Proposition 5.10.** Let agents’ preferences be described by a CARA utility function with a risk aversion parameter \( \theta \), and let \( \{x_{LM}^*, w^*, x_{SE}^*, p_{SE}^*, x_F^*, p_F^*\} \) denote the respective equilibrium variables under risk neutral preferences. Then there exists a balanced budget policy \( \mathcal{P}^* \) that for every \( \theta \) decentralizes a planner equilibrium such that:

\[
\begin{align*}
b_{LM} &= w^* - \frac{1}{\theta} \log(1 + \theta w^*), \\
b_{SE} &= p_{SE}^* - \frac{1}{\theta} \log(1 + \theta p_{SE}^*), \\
V^{LM}(\mathcal{P}^*) &= V^{SE}(\mathcal{P}^*). 
\end{align*}
\]

Moreover, the taxes are characterized by the following inequality:

\[
\tau_{LM} \leq \tau_{SE} \iff \log(1 + \mu(x_{LM}^*)) - \theta w^* \geq \log(1 + a\lambda(x_{SE}^*)) - \theta p_{SE}^*.
\]

(5.17)

**Proof.** See Appendix 5.8.A.

It follows from the proof that the policy instruments separately target the three margins of inefficiency. The unemployment insurance for the self-employed corrects their pricing decision. The unemployment benefits for workers corrects the wage posting decision. Finally, the mix of taxes ensures the correct composition of employment and balances the budget.

Observe that whenever the price that prevails in the decentralized equilibrium under risk neutrality is larger than the wage, the unemployment insurance for the self-employed should be more generous. From the career choice indifference condition that implements the efficient allocation we know that this happens if and only if the selling probability is lower than the job finding probability. Thus, whenever the income from self-employment is riskier, the benefits targeting the self-employed should be higher. This has nothing to do, however, with risk sharing considerations and is solely driven by efficiency.
If $\theta$ is small, the ranking of the taxes in (5.17) can be approximated by

$$\tau_{LM} \leq \tau_{SE} \iff \mu(x_{LM}^*) \theta w^* \leq a\lambda(x_{SE}^*) \theta p_{SE}^*,$$

so that self-employment should be taxed more heavily than labor market participation whenever risk neutral individuals would prefer self-employment over entering the labor market in an environment without taxation, given the unemployment benefits. Whenever we find that $b_{SE} > b_{LM}$, which always happens if $\mu(x_{LM}^*) > \lambda(x_{SE}^*)$, we may expect to have $\tau_{SE} > \tau_{LM}$.

5.6 A dynamic model

In this section we describe the steady state of a dynamic version of the model, and perform some comparative statics exercises. The dynamic model captures the idea that employment at a firm is a long-term relationship. In particular, jobs last in expectation for multiple periods and are destructed exogenously with a constant probability $\delta$. Time is discrete, individuals and buyers live forever, and they discount future periods at a factor $\beta$. Self-employment’s and buyers’ outcomes are assumed independent across periods. Therefore, the dynamic version of the model has consequences neither for modeling self-employment and buyers, nor for the firms’ pricing decision. The value of being a buyer is thus given by:

$$(1 - \beta) V^B = \eta(x_F)(1 - p_F) = \eta(x_{SE})(1 - p_{SE}),$$

while the value of the self-employed is given by

$$(1 - \beta) V^{SE} = a\lambda(x_{SE}) u(p_{SE}).$$

To minimize the differences with the static model, the timing of the model is such that (1) existing jobs are destroyed, (2) vacancies enter, (3) individuals make their career choice, (4) matches form, (5) buyers visit, and (6) individuals consume. To highlight the
time spent in unemployment within the model, we allow for an unemployment benefit. As a result, the value of entering the labor market is equal to

\[ V^{LM} = \mu (x_{LM}) u(w) + (1 - \mu (x_{LM})) u(b) + \beta \left[ (1 - \mu (x_{LM}) (1 - \delta)) V^{LM} + \mu (x_{LM}) (1 - \delta) V^{E} \right], \]

with the value of employment \( V^{E} \) being:

\[ V^{E} = u(w) + \beta \left[ \delta V^{LM} + (1 - \delta) V^{E} \right]. \]

Solving for \( V^{E} \) and substituting the result in (5.18), it can be seen that the value of entering the labor market is still a weighted average of the expected time spent in employment and in unemployment. As a result, the career choice is not so much different in the dynamic version of the model, and individuals are indifferent between self-employment and entering the labor market if and only if

\[ a \lambda (x_{SE}) u(p_{SE}) = \frac{\mu (x_{LM}) u(w) + (1 - \mu (x_{LM})) (1 - \beta (1 - \delta)) u(b)}{\mu (x_{LM}) + (1 - \mu (x_{LM})) (1 - \beta (1 - \delta))}. \]

The assumption that jobs in expectation last for multiple periods also affects firm entry. The value of opening a vacancy is now

\[ V^{V} = -k + q (x_{LM}) V^{J}, \]

where \( V^{J} \) is the value of a filled vacancy (the value of a job to the firm):

\[ V^{J} = A \lambda (x_{F}) p_{F} - w + \beta (1 - \delta) V^{J}. \]

Solving for \( V^{J} \), substituting the result in (5.19), and closing the model by free entry implies:

\[ q (x_{LM}) \frac{A \lambda (x_{F}) p_{F} - w}{1 - \beta (1 - \delta)} = k \]

As before, firms maximize expected profits by posting a wage, taking into account its effect on \( x_{LM} \), constrained by the requirement to offer at least \( V^{LM} \) to workers. As shown in Appendix 5.8.B, this results in the following wage condition:

\[ \frac{\phi (x_{LM})}{1 - \phi (x_{LM})} [A \lambda (x_{F}) p_{F} - w] = \frac{1 - \beta (1 - \delta)}{1 - \beta (1 - \delta) (1 - \mu (x_{LM}))} \frac{u(w) - u(b)}{u'(w)}. \]
Finally, we consider the stocks and flows of the dynamic model. Let $F_t$ now denote the measure of active firms at time $t$, and $V_t$ the measure of vacancies opened in period $t$. The flows are such that

$$F_t = q(x_{LM,t}) V_t + (1 - \delta) F_{t-1},$$
$$U_t = (1 - \mu(x_{LM,t})) (1 - SE_t - (1 - \delta)E_{t-1}),$$
$$E_t = \mu(x_{LM,t}) (1 - SE_t - (1 - \delta)E_{t-1}) + (1 - \delta) E_{t-1},$$

with the measure of active jobs $E_t = F_t$, the measure of workers in period $t$ equal to $1 - SE_t - (1 - \delta)E_{t-1}$, the queue length $x_{LM,t} = (1 - SE_t - (1 - \delta)E_{t-1})/V_t$, and the measure of labor market matches $\mu(x_{LM,t}) (1 - SE_t - (1 - \delta)E_{t-1}) = q(x_{LM,t}) V_t$. In steady state the measure of self-employed is constant, and by definition $1 - SE - (1 - \delta)E = U + \delta E$, so that the steady state satisfies:

$$q(x_{LM}) V = \delta F = \delta E = \mu(x_{LM}) (U + \delta E).$$

In Appendix 5.8.B, we show that for risk neutral preferences, the decentralized steady state allocation of the dynamic model coincides with the steady state allocation that a social planner would choose, if the planner maximizes the present discounted number of goods sold net of recruiting costs. The social planner then solves the following problem:

$$\max_{\{x_{SE,t}, V_t, E_t, SE_t\}} \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t [x_{F,t} \eta(x_{F,t}) AE_t + x_{SE,t} \eta(x_{SE,t}) aSE_t - V_t k],$$

subject to

$$E_t = q(x_{LM,t}) V_t + (1 - \delta)E_{t-1},$$

and an initial condition $E_0$, where $x_{LM,t} = (1 - SE_t - (1 - \delta)E_{t-1})/V_t$ from the unit mass of households, the career choice, and job survival, and where $x_{F,t} = (1 - x_{SE,t} aSE_t)/(AE_t)$ from the accounting identity in the goods market. In every period we again allow the social planner to choose the measure of vacancies to be opened and the measure of households to enter self-employment (and thus the measure to enter the labor market). The social planner still faces the same visibility probabilities and coordination frictions within every (sub)market as present in the decentralized equilibrium, but can still decide upon the measure of buyers to go shopping at the self-employed (and thus the measure of buyers that visits firms). Finally, note that choosing the latter, given $SE_t$ and
5.6. A dynamic model

$V_t$, still amounts to choosing $x_{SE,t}$, because the only state variable $E_t$ is also determined by $SE_t$ and $V_t$ (and $E_{t-1}$). Since the decentralized and the planner’s allocation coincide, the equilibrium of the dynamic model is efficient when individuals are risk neutral, just as the static model.

On the one hand, the steady state of a dynamic version of the model is not so much different from the static model, because the value of entering the labor market is still a weighted average of the expected time spent in employment and in unemployment. On the other hand, the dynamic model captures the idea that jobs last for multiple periods and introduces two additional parameters: patience, and the expected duration of the wage contract. In Figure 27 we show the response of the equilibrium self-employment rate to changes in the discount factor $\beta$ and the job destruction probability $\delta$. Not surprisingly, a higher discount factor and lower job separation probability make the long-term nature of a wage contract more valuable to individuals, which decreases the self-employment rate.

Figure 27: Equilibrium self-employment rate as a function of $\beta$ and $\delta$. 
5.7 Conclusion

We propose a new theory of self-employment that emphasizes the trade-off between the frictions in the goods and in the labor market. Our theory, unlike a vast body of earlier research, does not rely on individual heterogeneity. It also offers microfoundations for the differences in the riskiness of payroll and self-employment incomes. In our model the self-employed forego coordination frictions in the labor market and the sharing of the match surplus with the firm. They are exposed, however, to coordination frictions in the goods market.

We also show that the decentralized equilibrium is inefficient if individuals are risk averse. In this case explicitly modeling trade in the goods market is crucial, as risk averse self-employed steal business from risk neutral firms by charging low prices. This under-pricing is a form of self-insurance, which reduces output sold net of recruiting costs. Interestingly, we show that in this environment unemployment insurance for self-employed individuals can improve efficiency, because it decreases the incentives to self-insure. As a result, firm entry increases and prospects in the labor market improve. Such insurance can therefore increase output sold net of recruiting costs, while simultaneously sharing risks.

5.8 Appendix

5.8.A Proofs for the static model

Proof of Lemma 5.1.

The self-employed post prices to maximize their expected utility as given in (5.3), offering buyers at least their value $V^B$ as given in (5.2). Using the latter, the price that the self-employed post can be written as a function of $V^B$ and $x_{SE}$:

$$p_{SE} = 1 - \frac{V^B}{\eta(x_{SE})}.$$

Substituting out $p_{SE}$, the self-employed problem can then be written as a choice of the optimal queue length:

$$\max_{s_{SE}} ax_{SE} \eta(x_{SE}) u \left(1 - \frac{V^B}{\eta(x_{SE})}\right).$$
The first-order condition yields:

\[ a\eta(x_{SE})u(p_{SE}) + ax_{SE}\eta'(x_{SE})u'(p_{SE}) + ax_{SE}\eta(x_{SE})u'(p_{SE}) \frac{\partial p_{SE}}{\partial \eta(x_{SE})} \eta'(x_{SE}) = 0. \]

Dividing by \( a\eta(x_{SE}) \) gives:

\[ (1 - \phi(x_{SE}))u(p_{SE}) - \eta(x_{SE})\phi(x_{SE})u'(p_{SE}) \frac{\partial p_{SE}}{\partial \eta(x_{SE})} = 0 \]

Using that \( \frac{\partial p_{SE}}{\partial \eta(x_{SE})} = \frac{V^B}{\eta(x_{SE})^2} \), and substituting out \( V^B \), we get:

\[ (1 - \phi(x_{SE}))u(p_{SE}) = \phi(x_{SE})u'(p_{SE})(1 - p_{SE}), \] (5.21)

which is equal to (5.4). The price-posting problem of firms is the same, except that firms maximize expected revenue instead of utility. Replacing \( u(p_{SE}) \) by \( p_F \) and \( u'(p_{SE}) \) by 1 results in (5.5).

**Proof of Lemma 5.3.**

After paying an entry cost \( k \), the firm optimally chooses the queue length to maximize profits

\[ \Pi = q(x_{LM})\left(A\lambda(x_F)p_F - w\right), \]

subject to the market utility of workers \( V^{LM} \) as given in (5.6). Via this outside option, the wage to be paid also depends on \( x_{LM} \), so that the first-order condition is

\[ q'(x_{LM})\left(A\lambda(x_F)p_F - w\right) - q(x_{LM})\frac{dw}{dx_{LM}} = 0. \]

The derivative of the wage is obtained from totally differentiating \( V^{LM} \), which is fixed:

\[ 0 = \mu'(x_{LM})u(w) + \mu(x_{LM})u'(w)\frac{dw}{dx_{LM}}, \]

so that the optimality condition reads

\[ q'(x_{LM})\left(A\lambda(x_F)p_F - w\right) = -q(x_{LM})\frac{\mu'(x_{LM})u(w)}{\mu(x_{LM})u'(w)}. \]

Finally, note that \( \frac{x_{LM}\mu'(x_{LM})}{\mu(x_{LM})} = 1 - \phi(x_{LM}) \), and (5.7) results.
Proof of Proposition 5.6 and Corollary 5.7.

The mixing condition in (5.13) can be obtained by combining (5.1) with the first condition of Definition 5.5. It follows that \( \lim_{AxSE\to 1^-} LM = 0^+ \) and \( \lim_{AxF\mu(xLM)\to 1^-} LM = 1^- \) as long as the denominator of (5.13) is not approaching zero and is positive. Then, we can substitute out prices and the wage out of the remaining six equilibrium conditions, so that - together with the mixing condition - we are left with the following three equations in three unknowns \( \{xSE, xF, xLM\} \):

\[
\frac{\phi(xLM)}{1 - \phi(xLM)} = \frac{u\left(A\lambda(xF)\phi(xF) - \frac{k}{q(xLM)}\right)}{u'\left(A\lambda(xF)\phi(xF) - \frac{k}{q(xLM)}\right)},
\]

\[
\mu(xLM)u\left(A\lambda(xF)\phi(xF) - \frac{k}{q(xLM)}\right) = a\lambda(xSE)u\left(1 - \eta(xF)\left(1 - \phi(xF)\right)\right) / \eta(xSE),
\]

\[
\frac{\phi(xSE)\left(\eta(xF)(1 - \phi(xF))\right)}{1 - \phi(xSE)} = \frac{u\left(1 - \eta(xF)(1 - \phi(xF))\right)}{u'\left(1 - \eta(xF)(1 - \phi(xF))\right)}. \tag{5.24}
\]

Existence and uniqueness follow from invoking the Implicit Function Theorem on this system of equations. To demonstrate the logic of the proof, we prove the risk neutral case first. Afterwards we show that the same argument applies for CRRA preferences.

**Risk neutral preferences.** For risk neutral preferences, (5.24) boils down to \( e^{-xSE} = e^{-xF} \), so that \( xF = xSE \), which echoes the fact that risk neutral self-employed and firms set the same prices. Then, (5.23) implies \( xLM = \log(A/a) \), as in (5.12). The mixing condition can now be restated as

\[
0 < \frac{1 - axSE}{\left(\frac{A-a}{\log\left(\frac{A}{a}\right)} - a\right)xSE} < 1,
\]

which places bounds on \( xSE \). In particular, for \( 1 > LM > 0 \), it must hold that \( 1/a > xSE > \frac{\log\left(\frac{A}{a}\right)}{A-a} \), which can only be true if

\[
\frac{A}{a} > 1 + \log\left(\frac{A}{a}\right). \tag{5.25}
\]

Observe that this condition - the first inequality constraint on the exogenous parameters to have a mixed strategy equilibrium - also guarantees that the share of prospective
workers $LM$ is non-negative and finite. Besides, note that condition (5.25) is always satisfied if $A > a$.

Equation 5.22 - the only equilibrium condition that is left - can after manipulation and evaluation at $x_{LM} = \log(A/a)$ be defined as

$$h(x_{SE}, a, A, k) \equiv \frac{A-a-a\log\left(\frac{A}{a}\right)}{A}(1-x_{SE}e^{-x_{SE}}-e^{-x_{SE}}) - k = 0. \tag{5.26}$$

Differentiating (5.26), we find the following relationships:

$$\frac{\partial h}{\partial x_{SE}} = \frac{A-a-a\log\left(\frac{A}{a}\right)}{A}x_{SE}e^{-x_{SE}} > 0,$$

$$\frac{\partial h}{\partial k} = -1 < 0,$$

$$\frac{\partial h}{\partial A} = \frac{a}{A^2}\log\left(\frac{A}{a}\right)(1-x_{SE}e^{-x_{SE}}-e^{-x_{SE}}) > 0,$$

$$\frac{\partial h}{\partial a} = -\frac{1}{A}\log\left(\frac{A}{a}\right)(1-x_{SE}e^{-x_{SE}}-e^{-x_{SE}}) < 0.$$

Thus, from the Implicit Function Theorem we get, in particular, that $\frac{dx_{SE}}{dk} > 0$. Then, the bounds for the mixed strategy equilibrium to exist follow from evaluating (5.26) at $x_{SE} \to \frac{1}{a}$ to get $\bar{k}(A, a)$ and $x_{SE} \to \frac{\log\left(\frac{A}{a}\right)}{A-a}$ to get $\underline{k}(A, a)$.

The comparative statics of the self-employment rate follow from total differentiation of the accounting identity on individuals:

$$\frac{\partial SE^*}{\partial k} = -\frac{\partial LM^*}{\partial k}.$$

To find the latter, we make use of chain rule: $\frac{\partial LM^*}{\partial k} = \frac{\partial LM^*}{\partial x_{SE}}\frac{\partial x_{SE}}{\partial k}$. From the Implicit Function Theorem applied to (5.26), we have that $\frac{\partial x_{SE}}{\partial k} > 0$. The derivative of $LM^*$ with respect to $x_{SE}$ reads

$$-\left(\frac{A-a}{\log\left(\frac{A}{a}\right)} - a\right) \left(\frac{A-a}{\log\left(\frac{A}{a}\right)} - a\right)x_{SE} < 0,$$

which implies that

$$\frac{\partial SE^*}{\partial k} = -\frac{\partial LM^*}{\partial x_{SE}}\frac{\partial x_{SE}}{\partial k} > 0.$$
The derivatives of bounds on \( k, k(A, a) \) and \( \bar{k}(A, a) \), with respect to \( A \) and \( a \) also follow from the Implicit Function Theorem:

\[
\frac{\partial k}{\partial A} = -\frac{\partial h}{\partial k} \frac{\partial k}{\partial A} > 0,
\]

\[
\frac{\partial k}{\partial a} = -\frac{\partial h}{\partial k} \frac{\partial h}{\partial a} < 0.
\]

**Preferences with risk aversion.** We show that the argument above applies to the more general case case of \( u(c) = c^{1-\gamma} \) with \( \gamma \in [0, 1] \), so that now \( \frac{d}{u(c)} = \frac{c}{1-\gamma} \). From (5.24), the price posting by the self-employed then leads to the following relationship between queue lengths in the mixed strategy equilibrium:

\[
x_F = x_SE + \log\left(1 - \gamma\phi(x_SE)\right).
\]

Observe that this implies \( x_F = x_SE \) if and only if \( \gamma = 0 \). Otherwise, we have that \( x_F < x_SE \) whenever the mixed strategy equilibrium exists, and this ratio is decreasing in risk aversion parameter \( \gamma \). Reformulating (5.24) and (5.24), we then have two equations with two unknowns \( x_{LM} \) and \( x_SE \):

\[
\frac{(1-\gamma)\phi(x_{LM})}{1-\phi(x_{LM})} \left[\frac{k}{q(x_{LM})}\right] = A\lambda(x_F)\phi(x_F) - \frac{k}{q(x_{LM})} \quad \text{(5.27)}
\]

\[
\mu(x_{LM}) \left( A\lambda(x_F)\phi(x_F) - \frac{k}{q(x_{LM})} \right)^{1-\gamma} = a\lambda(x_SE) \left[1 - \frac{\eta(x_F)(1-\phi(x_F))}{\eta(x_SE)}\right]^{1-\gamma} \quad \text{(5.28)}
\]

We can further simplify (5.27) to

\[
\frac{k}{q(x_{LM})} = A\lambda(x_F)\phi(x_F) \left[\frac{1-\phi(x_{LM})}{1-\gamma\phi(x_{LM})}\right],
\]

so that (5.28) becomes

\[
\mu(x_{LM}) \left( A\lambda(x_F)\phi(x_F) \left[\frac{1-\gamma}{1-\gamma\phi(x_{LM})}\right]\right)^{1-\gamma} = a\lambda(x_SE) \left[1 - \frac{\eta(x_F)(1-\phi(x_F))}{\eta(x_SE)}\right]^{1-\gamma}.
\]

Now we set this equation to zero and define it as \( z(x_{LM}, x_SE) = 0 \). Collecting terms, taking logs and differentiating, results in:

\[
\frac{\partial z}{\partial x_{LM}} = \mu'(x_{LM}) + (1-\gamma)\frac{\phi'(x_{LM})}{\phi(x_{LM})\left[1-\gamma\phi(x_{LM})\right]} < 0 \quad \text{whenever } x_{LM} \neq 0.
\]
The part of \( z(x_{LM}, x_{SE}) \) that is relevant for computing \( \frac{\partial z}{\partial x_{SE}} \) reads:

\[
\tilde{z}(x_{LM}, x_{SE}) = \log \left( \frac{\lambda(x_F)}{\lambda(x_{SE})} \right) - \gamma \log(\lambda(x_F)) + (1 - \gamma) \log \left( \frac{p_F}{p_{SE}} \right).
\]

Under risk neutrality, \( \gamma = 0 \) and we have that the derivative of \( z \) with respect to \( x_{SE} \) is zero which also implies that \( x_{LM} \) does not respond to \( x_{SE} \). After some tedious algebra one can show that

\[
\frac{\partial z}{\partial x_{SE}} < 0,
\]

which also implies that there exists a function \( x_{LM}(x_{SE}) \), decreasing in its argument. From here we can already establish the existence of equilibrium bounds on \( k \), as the right hand side of identity:

\[
k = q(x_{LM}) A \lambda(x_F) \phi(x_F) \left[ \frac{1 - \phi(x_{LM})}{1 - \gamma \phi(x_{LM})} \right],
\]

is strictly increasing in \( x_{SE} \) so that the logic of the existence proof for the risk neutral preferences carries over.

**Proof of Proposition 5.8.**

Using the accounting identity in (5.1), the planner’s objective can be written as:

\[
V^{SP}(V, x_{SE}, SE) = x_{SE} a_{SE} \left( \eta(x_{SE}) - \eta(x_F) \right) + \eta(x_F) - V k. \tag{5.29}
\]

For future reference, note that the partial derivatives of \( x_F \) with respect to the choice variables of the social planner are given by:

\[
\frac{\partial x_F}{\partial V} = \frac{x_F}{V} (\phi(x_{LM}) - 1),
\]

\[
\frac{\partial x_F}{\partial x_{SE}} = -\frac{a_{SE}}{A q(x_{LM}) V'},
\]

\[
\frac{\partial x_F}{\partial SE} = \frac{x_F A q'(x_{LM}) - a x_{SE}}{A q(x_{LM}) V}.
\]

Taking the first order condition with respect to the measure of firms:

\[
\frac{\partial V^{SP}}{\partial V} = \eta'(x_F) \frac{\partial x_F}{\partial V} (1 - x_{SE} a_{SE}) - k = 0,
\]

\[
= \eta'(x_F) (x_F)^2 A q(x_{LM}) (\phi(x_{LM}) - 1) - k = 0,
\]

\[
= \left( 1 - \phi(x_{LM}) \right) A q(x_{LM}) \lambda(x_F) \phi(x_F) - k = 0,
\]

which is exactly the free entry condition in the decentralized equilibrium if workers are risk neutral as given in (5.9), since firms always post \( p_F = \phi(x_F) \).
Let $\Delta \eta \equiv \eta(x_{SE}) - \eta(x_F)$. Taking the first order condition with respect to the queue length at the self-employed:

$$
\frac{\partial V^{SP}}{\partial x_{SE}} = SE a \Delta \eta + x_{SE} a SE \eta'(x_{SE}) + (1 - x_{SE} a SE) \eta'(x_F) \frac{\partial x_F}{\partial x_{SE}} = 0,
$$

which (only) for risk neutral self-employed is exactly the buyer indifference condition in the goods market as in (5.2), since they post $p_{SE} = \phi(x_{SE})$ (and firms post $p_F = \phi(x_F)$).

Finally, the first order condition with respect to the measure of self-employed:

$$
\frac{\partial V^{SP}}{\partial SE} = x_{SE} a \Delta \eta + x_F \eta'(x_F) \left( x_F A q'(x_{LM}) - x_{SE} a \right) = 0,
$$

This equation is equal to the buyer indifference condition in the goods market if

$$
\phi(x_{SE}) = \frac{A \lambda(x_F) q'(x_{LM}) \phi(x_F)}{a \lambda(x_{SE})},
$$

which is exactly the condition that makes risk neutral households indifferent between entering the goods market as self-employed on the one hand and entering the labor market on the other. Indeed, it makes $V^{LM}$ as given in (5.10) equal to (5.3) when self-employed post $p_{SE} = \phi(x_{SE})$. Hence, risk neutrality is sufficient for constrained efficiency.

Now, let us assume that in the decentralized allocation we have the measure of firms, the composition of employment, and the queues in the goods market that coincide with the planner solution. In other words, we assume that the decentralized allocation $\{V^*, SE^*, x^*_{SE}\}$ exactly matches its planner counterpart $\{V^{SP}, SE^{SP}, x^{SP}_{SE}\}$. Then, let us assume that individuals are risk averse. Given that $x^{SP}_{SE} = x^*_{SE}$, we can directly compare $p^*_{SE}$ and the $p^{SP}_{SE} = \phi(x_{SE})$ that decentralizes the planner’s solution. From the optimal price posting condition we get that under risk aversion $p_{SE}^{SP} \neq p^*_{SE}$, which implies that the buyers’ indifference condition is violated: the buying probabilities equal their counterparts from the planner’s solution, but the buyers have an incentive to choose
visits at the self-employed more often. Thus, one of the planner’s solution conditions is violated. This demonstrates the necessity of the risk neutrality assumption.

Consequently, the decentralized allocation is maximizing net output sold if and only if individuals are risk neutral.

**Proof of Proposition 5.10.**

Formally, we consider policies that have to satisfy the balanced-budget identity:

$$b_{LM}(1 - \mu(x_{LM}))LM + b_{SE}(1 - a\lambda(x_{SE}))SE = \tau_{LM}LM + SE\tau_{SE}. \quad (5.30)$$

The introduction of taxes and insurance changes the wage posting by firms and the price posting by the self-employed. These equations now read:

$$\frac{\phi(x_{LM})[A\lambda(x_F)p_F - w]}{1 - \phi(x_{LM})} = \frac{u(w - \tau_{LM}) - u(b_{LM} - \tau_{LM})}{u'(w - \tau_{LM})},$$

$$\frac{\phi(x_{SE})[1 - p_{SE}]}{1 - \phi(x_{SE})} = \frac{u(p_{SE} - \tau_{SE}) - u(b_{SE} - \tau_{SE})}{u'(p_{SE} - \tau_{SE})}.$$ 

Observe that the taxes themselves are not relevant in the pricing/wage posting decision, as they affect agents’ wealth in all states (employed/unemployed/selling/not selling). Because CARA preferences feature no wealth effect, \(\tau_i\) drop out. They do matter, however, in making the relative comparison of the career choices available.

Starting with pricing by the self-employed:

$$\frac{\phi(x_{SE})[1 - p_{SE}]}{1 - \phi(x_{SE})} = \frac{1}{\theta} \log \left( \frac{e^{-\theta(b_{SE} - \tau_{SE})} - e^{-\theta(p_{SE} - \tau_{SE})}}{e^{-\theta(p_{SE} - \tau_{SE})}} \right) = \frac{1}{\theta} \left( e^{-\theta(b_{SE} - p_{SE})} - 1 \right).$$

Now, suppose we wish to find \(b_{SE}\) that implements \(p_{SE} = \phi(x_{SE}^*)\) with the queue length as in the (efficient) allocation under risk neutral preferences. Then, it has to satisfy the following condition:

$$b_{SE} = \phi(x_{SE}^*) - \frac{1}{\theta} \log \left( 1 + \theta \phi(x_{SE}^*) \right).$$

The wage posting works in an analogous way, namely:

$$\frac{\phi(x_{LM})[A\lambda(x_F)p_F - w]}{1 - \phi(x_{LM})} = \frac{1}{\theta} \left( e^{-\theta(b_{LM} - w)} - 1 \right).$$
Let’s do the same for \( b_{LM} \). The efficient wage satisfies \( w = \phi(x_{LM}^*) A \lambda(x_F^*) p_F^* \) so that:

\[
\phi(x_{LM}^*) A \lambda(x_F^*) p_F^* = \frac{1}{\theta} \left( e^{-\theta(b_{LM}^* - w^*)} - 1 \right)
\]

\[
b_{LM} = \phi(x_{LM}^*) A \lambda(x_F^*) p_F^* - \frac{1}{\theta} \log(1 + \theta \phi(x_{LM}^*) A \lambda(x_F^*) p_F^*)
\]

Observe, that these conditions have an easy interpretation, namely:

\[
b_{LM} = w^* - \frac{1}{\theta} \log(1 + \theta w^*) \]

\[
b_{SE} = p_{SE}^* - \frac{1}{\theta} \log(1 + \theta p_{SE}^*)
\]

The worker indifference condition reads:

\[
V^{LM} = V^{SE}
\]

\[
V^{LM} = \mu(x_{LM}) u(w - \tau_{LM}) + \left( 1 - \mu(x_{LM}) \right) u(b_{LM} - \tau_{LM})
\]

\[
V^{SE} = a \lambda(x_{SE}) u(p_{SE} - \tau_{SE}) + \left( 1 - a \lambda(x_{SE}) \right) u(b_{SE} - \tau_{SE})
\]

so that:

\[
\mu(x_{LM}) u(w - \tau_{LM}) + \left( 1 - \mu(x_{LM}) \right) u(b_{LM} - \tau_{LM}) =
\]

\[
a \lambda(x_{SE}) u(p_{SE} - \tau_{SE}) + \left( 1 - a \lambda(x_{SE}) \right) u(b_{SE} - \tau_{SE}).
\]

With \( u(c) = \frac{1 - e^{-\theta c}}{\theta} \), we arrive at the following:

\[
\mu(x_{LM}) e^{-\theta(w - \tau_{LM})} + \left( 1 - \mu(x_{LM}) \right) e^{-\theta(b_{LM} - \tau_{LM})} =
\]

\[
a \lambda(x_{SE}) e^{-\theta(p_{SE} - \tau_{SE})} + \left( 1 - a \lambda(x_{SE}) \right) e^{-\theta(b_{SE} - \tau_{SE})}
\]

so that:

\[
e^{\theta \tau_{LM}} \left( \mu(x_{LM}) e^{-\theta w} + \left( 1 - \mu(x_{LM}) \right) e^{-\theta b_{LM}} \right) = e^{\theta \tau_{SE}} \left( a \lambda(x_{SE}) e^{-\theta p_{SE}} + \left( 1 - a \lambda(x_{SE}) \right) e^{-\theta b_{SE}} \right)
\]

Using the analytical expressions for \( b_{LM} \) and \( b_{SE} \) we can rewrite the career choice equation as:

\[
\theta \tau_{LM} - \theta w^* + \log(1 + \left( 1 - \mu(x_{LM}^*) \right) \theta w^*) = \theta \tau_{SE} - \theta p_{SE}^* + \log(1 + \left( 1 - a \lambda(x_{SE}^*) \right) \theta p_{SE}^*).
\]

The taxes can therefore be ranked such that

\[
\tau_{LM} < \tau_{SE} \iff \log(1 + \left( 1 - \mu(x_{LM}^*) \right) \theta w^*) - \theta w^* > \log(1 + \left( 1 - a \lambda(x_{SE}^*) \right) \theta p_{SE}^*) - \theta p_{SE}^*.
\]
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5.8.B Derivations of the dynamic model

Optimal wage posting under general preferences

To derive the wage condition under general preferences, let firms maximize the left-hand side of the free-entry condition:

\[
\frac{\phi(x_{LM})}{1 - \phi(x_{LM})} [A\lambda(x_F) p_F - w] = \frac{u(w) - (1 - \beta (1 - \delta)) u(b) - \beta (1 - \delta) (1 - \beta) V^{LM}}{u'(w)},
\]

\[
= \left( 1 - \frac{\beta (1 - \delta) \mu(x_{LM})}{\mu(x_{LM}) + (1 - \mu(x_{LM})) (1 - \beta (1 - \delta))} \right) \frac{u(w) - u(b)}{u'(w)},
\]

\[
= \frac{1 - \beta (1 - \delta)}{1 - \beta (1 - \delta) (1 - \mu(x_{LM}))} \frac{u(w) - u(b)}{u'(w)}.
\]

Risk neutral individuals

If workers are risk neutral and \( b_{SE} = 0 \), then the optimal wage posting simplifies to

\[
\frac{\phi(x_{LM})}{1 - \phi(x_{LM})} [A\lambda(x_F) p_F - w] = \frac{1 - \beta (1 - \delta)}{1 - \beta (1 - \delta) (1 - \mu(x_{LM}))} w,
\]

\[
\phi(x_{LM}) A\lambda(x_F) p_F \left[ 1 - \beta (1 - \delta) (1 - \mu(x_{LM})) \right] = \left[ 1 - \beta (1 - \delta) (1 - \mu(x_{LM}) \phi(x_{LM})) \right] w,
\]

\[
w = \frac{\phi(x_{LM}) A\lambda(x_F) p_F \left[ 1 - \beta (1 - \delta) (1 - \mu(x_{LM})) \right]}{1 - \beta (1 - \delta) (1 - \mu(x_{LM}) \phi(x_{LM}))}.
\] (5.31)

Under these conditions, the value of entering the labor market is given by

\[
(1 - \beta)V^{LM} = \frac{\mu(x_{LM}) w}{1 - \beta (1 - \delta) (1 - \mu(x_{LM}))},
\]

so that individuals are indifferent between careers if and only if

\[
\left[ 1 - \beta (1 - \delta) (1 - \mu(x_{LM})) \right] a\lambda(x_{SE}) p_{SE} = \mu(x_{LM}) w.
\] (5.32)

Substituting the wage of (5.31) in these individuals' indifference condition, yields:

\[
a\lambda(x_{SE}) p_{SE} = \frac{\mu(x_{LM}) \phi(x_{LM}) A\lambda(x_F) p_F}{1 - \beta (1 - \delta) (1 - \mu(x_{LM}) \phi(x_{LM}))}.
\] (5.33)

Finally, substituting the wage of (5.31) in the free entry condition of (5.20), yields:

\[
q(x_{LM}) \left[ A\lambda(x_F) p_F - \frac{\phi(x_{LM}) A\lambda(x_F) p_F \left[ 1 - \beta (1 - \delta) (1 - \mu(x_{LM})) \right]}{1 - \beta (1 - \delta) (1 - \mu(x_{LM}) \phi(x_{LM}))} \right] = k \left[ 1 - \beta (1 - \delta) \right],
\]

\[
q(x_{LM}) A\lambda(x_F) p_F \left[ 1 - \beta (1 - \delta) (1 - \mu(x_{LM}) \phi(x_{LM})) \right] = k \left[ 1 - \beta (1 - \delta) \right],
\]

\[
q(x_{LM}) A\lambda(x_F) p_F \left[ 1 - \beta (1 - \delta) \phi(x_{LM}) \right] = k.
\] (5.34)
Efficiency

Using \( x_{E,t} = \frac{1-x_{SE,t}}{AE_t} \), and defining \( \Delta \eta_t \equiv \eta(x_{SE,t}) - \eta(x_{F,t}) \), simplifies the objective of the social planner to:

\[
\max_{\{x_{SE,t}, V_t, E_t\}_{t=1}^{\infty}} \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ x_{SE,t} aSE_t \Delta \eta_t + \eta(x_{F,t}) - V_t k \right]. \tag{5.35}
\]

Choosing \( x_{SE,t} \) is only an intra-temporal problem, but both \( SE_t \) and \( V_t \) determine future values of employment \( E \). For that reason, we set up a Lagrangian:

\[ \mathcal{L} = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \left\{ \beta^t \left[ x_{SE,t} aSE_t \Delta \eta_t + \eta(x_{F,t}) - V_t k \right] + v_t \left[ q(x_{LM,t}) V_t + (1-\delta)E_{t-1} - E_t \right] \right\}, \]

where \( v_t \) is the Lagrange multiplier on the law of motion for \( E_t \).

The first-order condition with respect to \( x_{SE,t} \) is

\[
\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial x_{SE,t}} = \beta^t \left[ aSE_t \Delta \eta_t + x_{SE,t} aSE_t \left( \eta'(x_{SE,t}) + \eta'(x_{F,t}) \frac{aSE_t}{AE_t} \right) - \eta'(x_{F,t}) \frac{aSE_t}{AE_t} \right] = 0, \tag{5.36}
\]

which is the same intra-temporal condition for the goods market as in the static model. If the self-employed are risk neutral, then \( p_{SE,t} = \phi(x_{SE,t}) \). Together with the price-setting of firms, this condition then coincides with the buyers' indiffERENCE condition of the decentralized allocation as given above. Consequently, the decentralized allocation in the goods market is efficient if individuals are risk neutral.

The first-order condition with respect to \( V_t \) is

\[
\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial V_t} = -\beta^t k + v_t \left[ q(x_{LM,t}) - q'(x_{LM,t}) x_{LM,t} \right] = 0, \tag{5.37}
\]

\[
\frac{\beta^t k}{q(x_{LM,t})(1-\phi(x_{LM,t}))} = v_t. \tag{5.38}
\]

The first-order condition with respect to \( E_t \) is

\[
\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial E_t} = \beta^t \eta'(x_{F,t}) \frac{x_{F,t}}{E_t} \left[ x_{SE,t} aSE_t - 1 \right] - v_t + v_{t+1} \left[ (1-\delta) - q'(x_{LM,t})(1-\delta) \right] = 0, \tag{5.39}
\]

\[
= -\beta^t \eta'(x_{F,t}) Ax_{F,t}^2 - v_t + v_{t+1} (1-\delta) \left( 1 - \phi(x_{LM,t}) \mu(x_{LM,t}) \right) = 0, \tag{5.40}
\]

\[
= \beta^t A \lambda (x_{F,t}) \phi(x_{F,t}) - v_t + v_{t+1} (1-\delta) \left( 1 - \phi(x_{LM,t}) \mu(x_{LM,t}) \right) = 0. \tag{5.41}
\]
Substituting (5.38), yields

\[ \beta^i A (x_{F,t}) \phi (x_{F,t}) = \frac{\beta^i k}{q(x_{LM,t}) (1 - \phi(x_{LM,t}))} - \frac{\beta^{i+1} k (1 - \delta) (1 - \phi(x_{LM,t}) \mu(x_{LM,t}))}{q(x_{LM,t+1}) (1 - \phi(x_{LM,t+1}))}, \]

\[ k = \frac{q(x_{LM,t}) A (x_{F,t}) \phi (x_{F,t})}{1 - \frac{\frac{q(x_{LM,t})(1 - \phi(x_{LM,t}))}{q(x_{LM,t+1})(1 - \phi(x_{LM,t+1)))} \beta (1 - \delta) (1 - \phi(x_{LM,t}) \mu(x_{LM,t}))}{\frac{q(x_{LM,t}) A (x_{F,t}) \phi (x_{F,t})}{q(x_{LM,t+1}) (1 - \phi(x_{LM,t+1)))}}, \]

which is a first-order difference equation for optimal entry. In steady state the ratio of today's and tomorrow's matching rates and elasticities is equal to one, and this equation simplifies to

\[ k = \frac{q(x_{LM}) A (x_{F}) \phi (x_{F}) (1 - \phi(x_{LM}))}{1 - \beta (1 - \delta) (1 - \mu(x_{LM}) \phi(x_{LM}))}, \tag{5.39} \]

which equals the free entry condition in (5.34) given that \( p_F = \phi(x_F) \). Consequently, free entry in the decentralized allocation is optimal if wages are set for the case that workers are risk neutral.

The first-order condition with respect to \( SE_t \) is

\[ \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial SE_t} = \beta^t \left[ x_{SE,t} a \Delta \eta + \frac{x_{SE,t}^2 a S_E \eta' (x_{F,t})}{AE_t} - \frac{\eta' (x_{F,t}) x_{SE,t} a}{AE_t} \right] - \nu_t q_t' (x_{LM,t}) = 0, \]

\[ = \beta^t [x_{SE,t} a \Delta \eta - x_{SE,t} a x_{F,t} \eta' (x_{F,t})] - \nu_t \mu (x_{LM,t}) \phi (x_{LM,t}) = 0, \]

\[ = \beta^t x_{SE,t} a [\eta (x_{SE,t}) - \eta (x_{F,t}) (1 - \phi(x_{F,t}))] - \nu_t \mu (x_{LM,t}) \phi (x_{LM,t}) = 0. \]

Substituting (5.38) and rearranging, results in

\[ \beta^t x_{SE,t} a [\eta (x_{SE,t}) - \eta (x_{F,t}) (1 - \phi(x_{F,t}))] = \frac{\beta^t k \mu (x_{LM,t}) \phi (x_{LM,t})}{q(x_{LM,t}) (1 - \phi(x_{LM,t}))}, \]

\[ \eta (x_{SE,t}) - \eta (x_{F,t}) (1 - \phi(x_{F,t})) = \frac{\eta (x_{SE,t}) k \mu (x_{LM,t}) \phi (x_{LM,t})}{a \lambda (x_{SE,t}) q(x_{LM,t}) (1 - \phi(x_{LM,t}))}, \]

\[ \eta (x_{SE,t}) \left[ 1 - \frac{k \mu (x_{LM,t}) \phi (x_{LM,t})}{a \lambda (x_{SE,t}) q(x_{LM,t}) (1 - \phi(x_{LM,t}))} \right] = \eta (x_{F,t}) (1 - \phi(x_{F,t})), \]

which coincides with the goods market condition in (5.36) if and only if

\[ \phi (x_{SE,t}) = \frac{k \mu (x_{LM,t}) \phi (x_{LM,t})}{a \lambda (x_{SE,t}) q(x_{LM,t}) (1 - \phi(x_{LM,t}))}. \]

Using the steady state optimal firm entry condition in (5.39) to substitute for \( k \),

\[ a \lambda (x_{SE,t}) \phi (x_{SE,t}) = \frac{\mu (x_{LM,t}) \phi (x_{LM,t}) q(x_{LM,t}) A (x_{F,t}) \phi (x_{F,t}) (1 - \phi(x_{LM,t}))}{q(x_{LM,t}) (1 - \phi(x_{LM,t})) [1 - \beta (1 - \delta) (1 - \mu (x_{LM,t}) \phi(x_{LM,t}))]}, \]

\[ = \frac{\mu (x_{LM,t}) \phi (x_{LM,t}) A (x_{F,t}) \phi (x_{F,t})}{1 - \beta (1 - \delta) (1 - \mu (x_{LM,t}) \phi(x_{LM,t}))}. \]
Given that firms set $p_F = \phi(x_{F,t})$ and that risk neutral self-employed set $p_{SE} = \phi(x_{SE,t})$, this is exactly the individuals’ indifference condition in the career choice game if they are risk neutral, as can be seen in (5.33). Consequently, also the career choice of risk neutral individuals maximizes total output sold. We conclude that $\{x_{SE,t}, V_t, E_t, SE_t\}_{t=1}^\infty$ are chosen efficiently by the market.