CHAPTER 2

What can NPE tell about the EU as an international security actor?13

2.1 Introduction

The character of the EU’s role in the world has long been the object of critical reflection. Already in the 1970’s Duchêne (1972) sought to capture the EU’s international actorness by the term “civilian power.” The absence of military means was one of its typical characteristics and seen as a strength that brought the EU to use “creative methods” to shape the world (Leonard 2005; see also Sangiovanni 2003). It contributed to thinking about the EU’s international actorness as a distinctive power; distinct from the dominant realist notion of power focusing on military power. In line with the notion of civilian power, European political actors often could not resist presenting the EU’s lack of military power as a strength rather than a weakness.

We must aim to become a global civil power at the service of sustainable global development. After all, only by ensuring sustainable global development can Europe guarantee its own strategic security (Prodi 2000)

Following up on this way of labelling the EU’s international power the notion Normative Power Europe (NPE), as it was introduced more than ten years ago by Ian Manners (2002), has left a major mark on the academic debate on the EU’s role as an international security actor. It highlighted the difference between the civilian nature of the EU before the launch of the European Security and Defence Policy in the early 2000’s and the normative justification of the use of military power since then (Diez and Manners 2007). Although Normative Power Europe has by no means become generally accepted, it nevertheless has become the starting point for a large number of studies on the EU’s international actorness.

What is Normative Power and what is it not? As Manners’ (2002: 239) often quoted definition puts it: “it is the ability to shape conceptions of what is normal.” Against notions of power that focus on empirical capabilities, like economic and military power, normative power draws the attention to a more subtle form of power, namely the power of ideas.14 When successfully applied, it is argued, this may be the greatest power of all.

The emphasis of normative power on the power of ideas opens up the possibility that other factors than material structures/incentives play a role in the position that an international actor takes, i.e. the incentives resulting from an anarchical system are not all-determining. Hence, actors have a choice to act on the basis of certain normative principles, which is a different kind of motivation than material self-interest and economic incentives.

The concept of normative power has a particular understanding of the power of ideas. It emphasizes universal values and procedural norms. As such, normative power may not only be a very effective form of power, it also suggests that it is a “good”, or at least a better, form of power. A power that is both “good” in terms of the principles it promotes, as well as in the way it acts; i.e. normative behavior that rests on legitimacy, coherence and consistency (cf. Manners 2009b).

This brings me to another aspect of normative power. The adoption of the concept of Normative Power has a clear normative, or even, critical dimension to it. If there is a possibility to be a force for good, then there is a strong moral imperative to adopt and promote such an approach. This idea is appealing to both policy-makers and academics. Hence, NPE as an analytical concept has been influential in shaping the EU’s international identity in real-life. This can be nicely illustrated by various quotes from Javier Solana during his time in office as the EU’s High Representative:

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13 Earlier drafts of this chapter were presented at ECPR Joint Sessions (2013), Politicologenetmaal (2013) and the Doctoral workshop at Sciences Po/CEE-IRSEM (2013).

14 See also: Galtung’s (1973) ‘ideological power’ and Aggestam’s (2008) ‘ethical power’
The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law (Article 21-1, ToL; further specified in 21-2).

The central aim of this chapter is to review, almost fifteen years after the notion of NPE was launched, the impact NPE has had on our understanding of the EU as an actor in the world and the contribution it has made to our understanding of the EU as an international security actor in particular. Indeed, these two contributions are easily mixed up, something which is further complicated by the fact that the term NPE was launched at a time when the EU came to identify a role for itself in the security realm. However, it is important to delineate the two as the EU as a "normative" security actor has been a contentious issue. Several NPE theorists feared that the EU would get "sucked into US norms" when it would set off down the military road (Howorth 2007).

Hence, the chapter aims to answer the following questions: 1) how has NPE contributed to our understanding of the EU as an actor in the world? 2) what can NPE tell us about the EU as an international security actor? Whereas the EU as an actor in the world covers the full range of the EU's external affairs, the second part zooms in on a particular policy domain, the EU as an actor in its Security and Defence Policy.

To this end, this literature review consists of two parts. In the next, theoretical section I suggest that the contribution of Normative Power Europe to our understanding of the EU as a (security) actor in the world has come in three distinct knowledge aims: as a normative philosophy, as an empirical claim and as a recursive intervention. In the second part of the chapter I will apply these three contributions to the development of the EU as an international security actor, and its military capabilities in particular, as it has fundamentally challenged our understanding of NPE.

2.2 Three knowledge aims of NPE

From its start the concept of NPE has had many connotations (see also Manners 2002: 252). In this chapter I discuss three different knowledge aims. First, NPE as a normative philosophy, which addresses the underlying legitimization of NPE and its foundation in specific philosophical principles. Second, NPE as an empirical
2.2.1 NPE as a normative philosophy

NPE as a normative philosophy conceives of NPE as a normatively superior type of international actorness compared to traditional conceptions of power that are closely linked to the nation-state. As such, NPE would seem to express a cosmopolitan philosophy more generally. Rather than what the EU does in terms of actual policy, philosophical accounts of NPE address the nature of the EU as a unique hybrid polity (Manners 2006d; Maull 2005).15 This strand of research thus has tended to issue in normative precepts that should guide the EU’s international policy (e.g., Manners 2009a). Specifically, if the EU’s actorness is based on human rights and democracy, this requires a security policy that is based on these values, consistently adheres to them and promotes them (Matlary 2008b).

Manners (2006c: 168) explicitly refers to this normative dimension of NPE: it “is a statement about what is believed to be good about the EU.”16 As such the concept is positioned against more positivistic and objectified understandings of the EU’s international actorness that refrain from normative assessments of what the EU should do in international affairs.17 With this normative stance, Manners not only positions himself in opposition to positivistic approaches, also within the more constructivist, interpretivist and critical school, NPE has often been criticized as well for its pronounced normativity. For example, Diez (2013) argues that what NPE calls “shaping conceptions of what is normal” may actually act as a hegemonic discourse (see also Diez and Pace 2012). Similarly, Merlingen (2007: 443) formulates a Foucauldian critique that “any claim to know what it takes to promote the good life abroad and to act on this knowledge claim is not only an act of other-regarding ethical conduct, but also a claim to subordination.”

If NPE is to function as a normative guide, the question logically following is: what is the distinctive foundation that inspires the EU to operate differently? (see also Bickerton 2011; 2012).

Philosophically the most appealing perspective is to position the EU as the defender of universal values in the world; the EU as the vanguard of cosmopolitanism. Noutcheva (2009: 1069) claims that for the EU to be a normative power, it has to pass the “universal legitimacy test.” However, to equate EU values with universal values is problematic (see Aggestam 2008; 2009). It may very well be a form of hidden colonialism or eurocentrism. To alleviate these suspicions, Sjursen (2006: 249) argues that a NPE aims at transforming the parameters of power politics through a focus on strengthening cosmopolitan international law and a willingness to bind itself to these legal principles.

Two alternative philosophical variants of NPE have emerged as a response to this criticism. A first alternative is to legitimize NPE on the basis of European social preferences. Similar to the previous position, this point of view has a substantive legitimization framework, i.e. human rights, democracy, sustainability etc. However, rather than relying on a philosophical grounding in the external legitimation and objective of international cosmopolitan law, in this view NPE has an internal legitimation, i.e. the preference for universal norms results from the EU’s own particular values which are a product of its specific history, and an interest in preventing that the EU has a comparative disadvantage when others have lower standards (Laiidi 2008).

The second alternative differs from both the universal-based and European-based legitimation in that it is not so much focusing on the substantive legitimation of NPE, particular human values and rights, but proceeds from a procedural reasoning. So, the legitimation of the EU’s normative power does not follow from the content it promotes, but is derived from how the EU goes about in pursuing particular objectives. Manners’ (2008; 2009a) emphasis on normative ethics is in line with this approach.18 In this type of legitimation NPE refers to

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15 Maull uses the concept ‘Civilian Force Europe’ but emphasizes, similarly to Manners, what the EU is rather than what it does. Another similarity between Normative Power and Civilian Force is that both include elements of an analytical tool and a normative yardstick.

16 Interestingly, in the same article Manners (2006c: 180) states that “anyone arguing that the EU does good in the world should cause us to engage in socially contextual consideration and contestation of this argument.”

17 De Zutter (2010) aimed at redefining Normative Power into a power that diffuses norms, arguing that neither universal norms nor a particular set of instruments define normative power as such; it only fits a “cosmopolitan” normative power, which is to be distinguished from a “despotic” and a “soft imperialistic” normative power. However, as Janusch (2016: 4) argues this way one gets rid of the “novelty of Manners’ distinction between normative and classical powers.”

18 In his earlier work Manners (2002; 2006d) refers to a substantive legitimization framework. However, since his 2008-article he has increasingly put the emphasis on the procedural grounding of NPE. For example, his tripartite analysis (discussed below) also follows a procedural rather than a substantial logic.
principles of living by example (coherence and consistency), being reasonable in the application of means and doing least harm in terms of the consequences of its impact (Manners 2008). Similarly, Kaldor (2012) claims that the distinctiveness of the EU’s international power lies in the nature of its political authority. Also, Janusch’ (2016) emphasis on the “logic of arguing” fits with this approach and highlights the ability to persuade others.

In sum, the underlying legitimation of NPE can be discussed along two dimensions. On the one hand the question is whether the norms underlying NPE have a universal basis or whether they are particular to the EU. On the other hand, the question is whether NPE refers to a substantive legitimation, i.e., particular norms and values, or whether its normative basis is rather procedural in nature.

The underlying normative framework is not merely of philosophical interest, but also feeds into NPE as an empirical claim. When NPE is grounded in a universal base one would expect references to UN-treaties to legitimize its actions, while an NPE based on European preferences attaches more value to support from, for example, the European Parliament. Moreover, when taking a procedural approach, rather than looking at the aims and objectives of EU policy, the focus is on the way in which these policies are pursued, i.e. there is a stronger emphasis on the means the EU deploys.

### 2.2.2 NPE as an empirical claim

NPE as an empirical claim has a positivistic character. It deals with the confirmation or falsification of NPE based on the actual, observable behaviour of the EU. While there has been an “oversupply” of conceptual definitions of NPE, concrete and operationalizable definitions in terms of EU actions are lacking (Whitman 2012: 3). Hence, adoption of the NPE-concept has often been more a matter of conviction than a testable claim (cf. Forsberg 2011).

This section does not go into the detail of the different case studies on NPE, but rather aims to discuss how to proceed with an empirical assessment of NPE. It suffices to say that over the years the EU’s normative power has been empirically studied in a wide variety of policy areas.19

Central to NPE is that a pure instrumental use of norms is not possible (Whitman 2012). In this view norms are constitutive of actors’ views and as such may “determine” their very perception of “interests” (Sjursen 2002; Lucarelli and Manners 2006; Orbie 2009). Börzel and Risse (2009), Aggestam (2008) and Raik (2012) point out that norms and interests are often both present and intertwined. Disentangling them is not an easy task, but it is where the “real explanatory purchase of NPE lies” (Birchfield 2013: 916). We would expect that, for a normative power, when interests and norms collide, interests do not take precedence over normative concerns.20

In addition to the issue of norms versus interests, another main issue for NPE as an empirical claim is whether NPE is a categorical or a scalar variable? The most straightforward position is that NPE is a matter of “to be or not to be”, i.e. either you are or you are not a Normative Power. In this case NPE is a dichotomy, which fits with Manners’ (2008: 45) claim that “the EU has been, is and always will be a normative power.” The alternative is a Realist power, i.e. an actor that focuses on its material and geopolitical interests (Hyde Price 2006; 2008; 2013). For a realist power norms can only be instruments of realpolitik and do not have a constitutive effect (Janusch 2016: 11). Taken as categorical variables, NPE and a Realist Power

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19 A an illustrative, but by no means encompassing, list of case studies that assess the EU’s normative power include international fisheries (Beischnner 2015), free trade agreements (Orbie and Khorana 2015), climate change and environmental policy (Afionis and Stringer 2014; Braun 2014; Falkner 2007; Scheipers and Sicurelli 2007; Van Schaik and Schunz 2012), financial data security (De Goede 2012), non-proliferation (Kierzlé 2014; Pardo 2012), religion (Larsen 2014), the neighbourhood policy (Celata and Colefi 2016; Haukkala 2008; Noutcheva 2015), judicial politics (Coman 2014), R2P (De Franco et al. 2015), multilateralism (Barbe 2015 et al.), crisis management (Giuliani and Cusumano 2014), border management (Martin-Mazé 2015), women, peace and security (Guerrina and Wright 2016), death penalty (Manners 2002), the International Labour Organisation (Riddervold 2010), regionalism (Lenz 2013), arms transfer (Erickson 2013), energy security (Wood 2008) sustainable development (Lightfood and Burchell 2005), and human rights and minority rights (Mos 2013; Lenz and Schwellnus 2006). Other studies have examined the EU’s normative power in relation to particular countries or regions, including Asia (Shen 2015; Vadura 2015; Lee 2012), the Middle-East (Pace 2007; Gordon and Pardo 2015; Rufa 2011; Harpaz and Shamir 2010), the Mediterranean (Pace 2009; Bicchi 2006), the Gulf-region (Demmelhuber and Kaufert 2014), the Caucasus (Vasiliyan 2014; Sierra 2011), Latin-America (Afionis and Stringer 2014), the Balkans (Noutcheva 2009), ACP-countries (Langan 2012), Ukraine (Vifikus 2015), Moldova (Niemann and De Wkker 2010), former colonies (Broberg 2013) and Africa (Scheipers and Sicurelli 2008). Also, there is research on the external perception of the EU’s normative power (Ha Hai Hoang 2016; Headley 2015; Laid 2008b; Romanova 2016; Sicurelli 2015; Larsen 2014).

20 This view has been questioned by Martin-Mazé (2015: 1286) who argues, based on Bourdieu’s structural constructivism, that norms and interests are two faces of the same coin. He proposes “a different conceptualization of interest” in which interests are not conceived as utility-maximizing behavior.
exclude each other: a realist power can never at the same time be a normative power.

Different authors have differentiated between dimensions of Normative Power. Manners (2009b) presents a tripartite analytical framework, which distinguishes between principles (e.g. legitimacy, coherence and consistency), actions (e.g. institutionalization and dialogue) and impact (e.g. ownership and socialization).\(^2\) Similarly, Niemann and De Wekker (2010) use the analytical framework of intent, process and impact. Compared to Manners’ framework they emphasize reflexivity rather than the means of engagement, and impact is defined as norm development rather than as ownership and socialization. Both authors, however, are silent on how to weigh the different dimensions, i.e. whether they are all necessary for an actor to qualify as a normative power.

A good example of an approach that takes NPE more as a scale is Forsberg (2011) who distinguishes between five aspects of Normative Power: normative identity, normative interests, normative behaviour, normative means of power and normative outcomes. The ideal–typical NPE would meet all five criteria. Based on this ideal-type, conclusions can be drawn on the EU as coming (less) closer to the ideal–typical normative power. Forsberg (2011) even goes a step further and claims that material interests can be recognised despite a normative identity; indeed, that they can be fostered in a normative way. This would imply that Normative Power and Realist Power can mix.

A dichotomous understanding of NPE is too rigid. The EU’s international character consists of too many elements to be forced into an understanding of normative power being “present” or “absent.” Rather, in line with Forsberg (2011) NPE can be better understood as an ideal-type which deviates from what is “normal” in international affairs. In that sense, realists are right: international actors are realists by default. But this does not preclude the possibility of a Normative Power to emerge.

Indicators to assess whether the EU’s foreign policy in general, and the use of military force in particular, is in line with a “normative power” are both substantial and procedural.

Below I shortly discuss three main indicators, which are by no means exhausting. In chapter 3 I will further expand on operationalizing the character of the EU’s international power by looking at the EU’s military operations. Whereas the first one

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\(^2\) The actions in Manners’ framework resemble the mechanisms of diffusion Manners (2002) used to study the EU’s attempts to abolish the death penalty. While the mechanisms of diffusion in Manners’ initial work missed the particular characteristics of a normative power (e.g. what is “normative” in “overt presence”?), this is more specific in his later tripartite analytical framework.

is a general indicator that is key to assessing Normative Power in all foreign policy domains, the latter two are more specific and well-suited for assessing the EU’s use of military force.

First, normative justification of foreign policy can be both value- and utility-based (see Lerch and Schwellnus 2006). Whereas the latter emphasizes immediate stability and security concerns, thereby dealing with the symptoms of a conflict, the former, which is in line with Normative Power, aims at sustainable peace and human security. Hence, a value-based concern would also be visible in an attempt to solve the causes, rather than just the symptoms of a conflict (Manners 2006a).

Second, policy embeddedness, i.e. the extent to which the military operation is embedded within the EU’s existing overall foreign policy. Specifically, this examines the compatibility of the military instruments with economic instruments (i.e. trade agreements and development aid) and diplomatic instruments (i.e. political dialogues, high-level visits, making peace proposals, sending cease-fire monitors and offering EU membership) (cf. Smith 2008: 62/63). While an embedded military operation is not necessarily more “normative”, when a military operation is not well embedded this may be an important indication of militarization.

Third, political authorization of the use of military force. This first of all includes the external authorization by a UN mandate. As Diez and Manners (2007) argue, it is the willingness to bind oneself to international treaties that distinguishes a normative power from a communitarian exceptionalism that imposes norms on others (see also Sjursen 2006). Since the UN has often been criticized for its failure to act (e.g. Barnett 2003; Buchanan and Keohane 2011; Critchlow 2008) by prioritizing state security over human security, a normative power that upholds human security concerns over concerns of state sovereignty may come to rely predominantly on internal authorization. In the case of the EU that involves authorization by the European Parliament and by its member states.

Two indicators that I have considered, but are not included in this dissertation are: the empowerment of local actors and normative coherence. While a normative foreign policy would be expected to put great weight on empowering local actors, against notions of neocolonialism, they would seem of minor, and mere instrumental, relevance from a realist perspective. Moreover, in the particular context of military operations empowerment of local actors means that a normative power refrains from making protectorates from the countries it intervenes, while for a realist power strategic concerns will prevail. Moreover, normative coherence, i.e. the connectedness of policies through shared principles (Niemann and De Wekker 2010; see also Juncos 2013) is often invoked as a dimension of Normative Power. However, coherence as such is not a distinctive element of a normative power. It rather refers to an overarching requirement that other dimensions that are distinctive
to get back to the question what actually is the core of Normative Power Europe. Hence, in the subsequent part of this chapter I will apply the three knowledge aims of NPE that I have distinguished above (i.e. NPE as a normative philosophy, as an empirical claim and as a recursive intervention) to the development of the EU as an international security actor.

2.3 NPE and the development of the EU as international security actor

Against the background of the EU’s failure to act in the 1990’s to stop the violence and grave human rights abuses in the Balkans, military capabilities became an issue on the EU’s political agenda (e.g. Gross 2007). In the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Petersberg-tasks were included that opened-up the possibility to conduct “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making” under EU-flag. Moreover, in the European Security Strategy (2003) military force was no longer presented as an eventual possibility, but as an essential element of “a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention.” In the same year, the EU’s first military operation was launched in FYR Macedonia, operation Concordia. Since then ten other operations followed, with a concentration in the Balkans and Central Africa.

The development of military capabilities called for a clearer position on the relationship between means and ends in EU foreign policy (see also Orbie 2009; Bickerton 2011). Whereas philosophical accounts of NPE had to address the question how NPE relates to the use of violence, empirical approaches needed to study the EU’s actual deployment of military force. Moreover, in terms of NPE as a recursive intervention, the issue of military capabilities has raised questions about the relationship between policy-makers and the academic discourse.

2.3.1 NPE and the compatibility with military force

Whereas power, and military power in particular, is associated with coercion, “normative” denotes a certain legitimacy. How does NPE with its cosmopolitan outlook relate to the use of violence?

There is no easy answer. The dilemma of coercive force is particularly challenging for NPE. On the one hand, the use of force “puts significant pressure on the peaceful resolution of international conflicts” (Lucarelli and Menotti 2006: 159). On the other hand, at some point the only way to uphold shared norms may be through the use of force.
The prevalent view among academics holds that military means are necessary (Orbie 2009). When the legitimization of NPE is derived from universal cosmopolitan law, violence can be justified with reference to the concept of human security. Glasius and Kaldor (2006: 15) argue that human security is closely related to Normative Power Europe, as it can be seen as the “extension of the internal methods of integration”, referring to Europe as a peace project. On the basis of “human security”, civilians become the reference point, rather than states. As such it relates to concepts like the Responsibility to Protect which makes state sovereignty conditional on the ability of a state to live up to its responsibility to ensure the security of its citizens (Bellamy 2013). The Responsibility to Protect can provide the legitimation for a value-based military intervention (Björkdahl 2012).

While some are critical of the potential of “human security” as a guiding narrative of NPE (Matlary 2008a), others argue that it has the potential to “bridge power and principles” (Martin 2012). In line with this reasoning, military means are seen as actually strengthening the EU’s normative power, as it finally gets the full range of tools to uphold its values (Stavridis 2001; Sjursen 2004; 2006; Glasius and Kaldor 2006; Börzel and Risse 2000; Juncos 2012a; Björkdahl 2012). As Toje (2009: 48) put it: “Normative Power without hard power to back it up is a velvet glove without an iron fist inside it.”

Accepting the logic of the conditional use of coercion in support of values and political objectives presupposes a continuum of policy instruments (Lucarelli and Menotti 2006; Stavridis 2001), ranging from diplomatic instruments (i.e. political dialogues, high-level visits, making peace proposals, sending cease-fire monitors and offering EU membership) to economic instruments (i.e. trade agreements and development aid) and military force (cf. Smith 2008: 62/63). In such a view, military force is not fundamentally different from other policy instruments. Similar to other policy instruments it is to be judged on the ends it serves.

Such a continuum of policy-instruments is denied by Smith (2000; 2005). She argues, in contrast, that normative power and military means are incompatible:

> “For an overview of the debates on and various conceptions of human security, see Osler Hampson (2013).”

The European Union could have offered an alternative vision of international relations. By folding to the supposedly superior hand of military force, the EU discredits and discards its post-modern cards (the most powerful instrument of soft power it had) (Smith 2005: 76). From this perspective, the very fact of having military capabilities diminishes the normative power; wrongly, it sends the signal that military force is useful and necessary (Smith 2000: 28). The EU receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 has been criticized for similar reasons: “the EU and member states condone security based on military force and have waged wars rather than insisting on the need for alternative approaches” (IPB 2012). Moreover, the mere presence of military means may increase the temptation for the EU to resort to military force, rather than to focus on desecuritisation (Orbie 2009). The actual use of military force by the EU puts pressure on the norm of peaceful conflict-resolution (Lucarelli and Menotti 2006: 159). Indeed, the ability to use military force bears the risk of a neglect of the EU’s greatest and unique strength: non-military conflict management (Sangiovanni : 2003).

Against these concerns it could be argued that while the use of military force may indeed put pressure on the EU’s normative power, it may be a necessary “evil” in the pursuit of universal human rights, i.e. the absence of military force may be just as questionable as an unreflexive use of it. Moreover, without military capabilities the EU is easily being accused of being an NPE by default, i.e. the absence of military force leaves the EU no choice but to be a normative power. Yet, a NPE with military force is an NPE by design, i.e. by deploying normative force in a “normative” way, it can live by example as well, showing a distinctive way to use military force. This fits with Janusch” (2016: 8) argument that one can only assess whether a power is normative when it is powerful, but deliberately refrains from action like a great power. As such, he concludes, normative power is not a rationalization of weakness, but the relinquishment of strength (Janusch 2006: 9). Finally, the fear by some NPE theorists that the EU would “get sucked into US norms” once the EU would go down the military road, is an untested assumption (Howorth 2007). A more empirical approach would assess the EU’s actual deployment of military means to conclude on the degree of compatibility of the use of military means with the EU’s presumed normative power character.

### 2.3.2 NPE and the actual use of military capabilities

If military means and normative power are not necessarily incompatible, *what then is a normative use of force?* First, military power is compatible with NPE when normative power is prioritized and guides the use of physical force (Manners 2009b). Hence, the *prioritization* of military aims and means over normative concerns is a militarization at odds with NPE (Manners 2008a/b). Second, grounding the use of military force in international law by means of UN mandate authorizing the use of military force (Manners 2006a/b; Matlary 2008a; Börzel and Risse 2009; Juncos 2012a) and/or democratic control (Wagner 2006) is in line with a normative use...
of force. Third, a normative use of military force is used to pacify rather than to punish (Laïdi 2008). Finally, a normative use of military force is a primary concern to address the causes of conflict, rather than attacking only the symptoms (Manners 2006a/b; Björkdahl 2012).

This section deals with assessments of the EU’s normative power in light of its actual employment of military operations. Empirical assessments of the EU’s military operations in relation to the concept of Normative Power give a mixed picture of their normative character, depending on the operation that is studied and the dimensions of normative power that is looked into (e.g. the impact of the operation or its justification and objectives). Classifications of the EU’s military operations range from “unreflexive” (Manners 2006a: 194) and in line with a normal power (Pardo 2011), to “human security in action” (Martin 2012).

Starting point of assessing the character of the EU’s military operations is the assumption that prior to 2003 the EU’s conflict prevention was characterized by an emphasis on addressing causes rather than just the symptoms of conflict and violence (Manners 2006a/b).

Whereas Manners’ (2006a: 183) more philosophical accounts of NPE suggest that the “militarization of the EU need not necessarily lead to the diminution of the EU’s normative power”, empirically he is more critical; “the EU’s normative power is being undermined by the unreflexive militarization” (ibid.: 194). His assessment of the EU’s actual use of material incentives and/or physical force is negative: the EU has “tended to follow the patterns and practices of Great Powers instead of think about and using normative power in a more justifiable way” (Manners 2009a: 15).

Central to a “normative” use of force is that the military dimension of the EU’s involvement with a particular country is not prioritized over other foreign policy instruments. Militarization, in contrast, denotes the crowding out, in terms of both finance and discourse, of other foreign policy areas by the military force.

What “evidence” is given for this general trend of militarization? First, there is a discursive prioritization of the military instrument. By highlighting the need for “robust intervention” and presenting “security as a precondition of development”, the European Security Strategy subverts civilian activities to military efforts (Manners 2006a: 190; Manners 2006b: 412). Second, there is an apparent institutional prioritization of military structures within the realm of CSDP, which is demonstrated by achieving military capabilities ahead of civilian capabilities and ignoring attempts to develop civilian organizations parallel to those military structures, like a European Peacebuilding Agency and a European Civil Peace Corps (Manners 2006a: 189). Moreover, Manners (2006a: 191) points at the fact that civilian crisis management was moved from the Commission (which would have ensured democratic oversight from the European Parliament) to the Council, arguing that this way it has become subordinated to strategic security concerns.

Third, a financial prioritization becomes visible in the re-allocation of budgets from southern-Africa to Afghanistan and Iraq between 2003 and 2004 in support of security objectives (Manners 2006b: 412). Fourth, there is an operational militarization at the level of particular EU military operations. Examples of this include Operation Artemis in the DR Congo (2003) and EUFOR Chad/CAR (2008/2009) that did not address the root cause of the conflict, but focused on just fighting the symptoms (Manners 2006b; Giegerich 2008; Merlingen 2012; Pohl 2012). Also, other operations did the opposite of empowering local actors (i.e. EUFOR Althea, BiH), weakening the local administration by prioritizing military objectives over capacity building (Manners 2006b). Moreover, in EUNAVFOR Atalanta (Somalia) maximization of (economic) security was privileged over pursuing “milieu” goals, i.e. shaping the environment (Pardo 2011; Merlingen 2012).

In contrast, other scholars point at particular EU military operations as examples of “human security in action.” First, the EU’s first military operation ever, operation Concordia, in FYR Macedonia is referred to as an example of norm diffusion, a model to be imitated (Björkdahl 2012; see also Palm 2014). Second, Artemis has been characterized as the “the most dramatic illustration of the human security imperative at work” (Whitman 2013: 197). Third, EUFOR DRC (2006), the EU’s second military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo is an example of how a military mission is used normatively to promote the long-term well-being of individuals with no ambition to control or defend territory (Martin 2012). Moreover, the practice of human rights specialists accompanying troop patrols also suggests a “normative” way of using military force (ibid.).

Finally, there are scholars who are sceptical of the EU as a normative power, but argue that this does not specifically relate to use of military means. For example, Juncos (2012a) agrees that the EU failed to promote local ownership in Bosnia Herzegovina, but rejects the idea that this had to do with the EU’s military presence in the country, i.e. the EU’s military instruments has appropriately been used as a last resort, in accordance with international law and enjoying broad local and international legitimacy (see also Juncos 2005; Bailes 2008).

In sum, case studies on the EU’s military operations show that they may differ in terms of their objectives and embeddedness. Moreover, there are even different assessments of the same military operation. Also, there is disagreement on whether it is the deployment of military operations that results in a lack of normative power. Hence, there is a need to unpack which military operations come closer to a realist or normative power profile.
A final dimension to the EU’s actual use of military capabilities is the selectivity of its non-use. While a certain modesty that not all conflicts can be solved, let alone by military means, is in line with a Normative Power, the selectivity of the EU’s non-use may be the greatest argument against NPE; that the EU did not act when it should have done something. Bailes (2008) observes that choosing operations that require relatively little force and risk, while ignoring some of the cries for help that ought to mean most for a European sense of values, is not in line with a NPE-identity (see Lucarelli and Menotti 2006; Matlary 2008a). Specifically, in the same year that naval operation Atalanta was launched, 2008, the EU refused to intervene militarily in eastern DRC, despite calls from the UN (Merlingen 2012). Moreover, Björkdahl (2012) points at the EU’s belated response to the Darfur-crisis in 2004 as challenging the EU’s credibility as a Normative Power (see also Menon 2009). The fact that the EU does not always conduct military operations when a violent conflict erupts in the world is not at odds with being a Normative Power. However, the observation that in the operations it chooses to deploy there appears to be cherry-picking is problematic from an NPE-perspective.

2.3.3 The (un)changing nature of NPE
As we have seen in the previous sections, the development of the EU in the field of security and defence particularly challenges the original NPE-concept. The launch of military operations has not only raised questions about NPE at the empirical and philosophical level, but it also reflects a discursive struggle about the desirability of military integration at the EU level (Orbie 2009). The US is always the “big other” in this regard. Implicitly and explicitly, by comparing the security strategies, the EU compares itself and is compared with the US (Bailes, 2008; Berenskoeter 2005; Dannreuther and Peterson 2006; Kagan 2002; Larsen 2005; Leonida; and Menotti 2005; Smith 2011). Habermas and Derrida (2003: 293), in the direct aftermath of the division on Iraq, even call for the EU “to throw its weight on the scale to counterbalance the hegemonic unilateralism of the United States” and “to defend and promote a cosmopolitan order on the basis of international law against competing visions.” Also, Glasius and Kaldor (2006: 16) contrast the EU as a superpower à la the US with the NPE alternative that highlights human security.

We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity (Implementation Report of the European Security Strategy 2008).

So, whereas the ESS highlighted the “interventionist” dimension of the EU as an international security actor, by 2008, its implementation report noted a stronger embeddedness of the military instrument. Moreover, under Solana’s successor, High Representative Ashton (2011) a more pacifist understanding of NPE gained weight (again):

I start with the obvious point that the EU is not a state or a traditional military power. It cannot deploy gunboats or bombers. It cannot invade or colonise. (…) The strength of the EU lies, paradoxically, in its inability to throw its weight around. Its influence flows from the fact that it is disinterested in its support for democracy, development and the rule of law (…) In short, the EU has soft power with a hard edge - more than the power to set a good example and promote our values. But less than the power to impose its will (Ashton 2011).

23 Matlary (2008a: 143) claims that the human security concept is only useful at the rhetorical level; “interventions rarely happen for human security reasons alone.” When reasoning from the standpoint of Manners’ prioritization, “normative” operations do not necessarily have to take place without any other interests at stake, but rather should not be primarily informed by those interests. However, from a NPE-perspective the absence of geopolitical interests should not prevent the EU from intervening when human security reasons are present.

24 The Barcelona Report was drafted by the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, convened by Mary Kaldor.
The way NPE is framed in the policy discourse has diverged from Manners’ understanding of NPE. In that sense Manners has distanced himself from actual developments. As already mentioned above (section 2.3.2), Manners has been very critical of the actual deployment of military force by the EU. He argues that the European Security Strategy marks a “sharp turn away from the normative path of sustainable peace” (Manners 2006a: 189). He particularly blames transnational policy networks like the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU-ISS) for leading “the way towards militarization” (ibid.: 191). More broadly, Manners (2006b: 409) is critical of research that is involved in “writing security into the EU”, by which it become part of the securitisation problématique, rather than a normative solution” (ibid.).

However, in contrast to Manners’ criticism of the applicability of normative power to the EU, other scholars (e.g. Sjursen 2006; Börzel and Risse 2009; Juncos 2012a; Björkdahl 2012) have aimed at redefining NPE in such a way that it includes a legitimate use of military force. Rather than sticking to the initial ideal-typical definition of NPE, as the more “pacifist” NPE scholars do, the more “interventionist” NPE scholars focus on how to “live by example” while employing military force. Although the launch of military operations has led to a split among NPE scholars, it has been the impetus for a renewed debate that has forced NPE scholars to explicate the legitimization and critical characteristics of NPE. The question that remains is whether this renewed debate is able to catch up with the dominant policy frames in Brussels.

2.4. Conclusion

The Normative Power Europe debate shows that NPE has been a fruitful concept for understanding the EU’s international actorness because it speaks to three realities: normative Europe as a normative philosophy, empirical claim and recursive intervention. At the same time this multi-dimensionality also risks mixing of the different elements and, hence, confusion about what NPE “really” means. Normative assessments may be presented as an empirical assessments and, the other way around, empirical studies may be judged in normative terms.

In this review, I have disentangled these three different knowledge aims of NPE and used them to reflect upon our understanding of the EU as an international security actor. Also, I have shown their limitations. First, whereas the normative philosophical accounts of NPE address the underlying legitimization of NPE, these accounts lack an empirical applicability and risk being far removed from actual developments. Moreover, NPE struggles with the problem of euro centrism and neo-colonialism. Second, more empirical research on NPE pays attention to what the EU actually does in foreign affairs, but keeps struggling with the operationalization of NPE. CSDP is a very complex and ambiguous policy area. It is not easy to relate this to the ideal typical qualities of normative power. Moreover, as the third knowledge aim of NPE shows, limiting NPE to a narrow focus on hypothesis-testing, misses the point (Manners 2012: 233); it does not do justice to the influence the concept has had on the development of military capabilities, and vice-versa, i.e. the “militarization” of the EU has caused a renewed debate on NPE. As a recursive intervention, NPE aims at changing “existing structures of power and injustice by opening up the possibilities of different perspectives” (ibid.). However, it risks being instrumentalized and losing its critical distance.

To disentangle the three different knowledge aims of NPE is not to say that they do not relate to each other. For example, your position on the legitimization ground (internally/externally based) of the EU informs a subsequent operationalization of political authorization. Whereas an externally legitimized NPE would emphasize authorization by an UN mandate, in the case of internal legitimization, support from the European Parliament would be of great importance. Moreover, from Manners’ emphasis on the procedural aspects of NPE, it is quite understandable that the development of military force is a greater challenge than when reasoning from a more substantial legitimization framework. Stressing the how of NPE, the use of military force may be rather problematic as it remains a coercive instrument. In contrast, when emphasizing the substantial ideas of NPE, the use of military force may be indispensable.

In the next chapter, I develop a way of measuring the character of the EU’s military operations that builds upon the dimensions that I touched upon in section 2.2.2: justification, policy-embeddedness and authorization. As such this dissertation primarily continues the line of research on NPE as an empirical claim. However, it integrates insights of more philosophical accounts of NPE by assessing the character of EU military operations in terms of both substantial, procedural and instrumental dimensions.