Summary

Since 2003, the EU has launched 11 military operations as part of its Common Security and Defence Policy. While the EU’s use of force has often been presented as part of promoting the EU’s peace project beyond its borders, this idea of the EU as a “force for good” has been fiercely criticized as well. The character of the EU as international security actor is essentially contested. Hence, this dissertation aims to answer the question: How has the character of the EU as an international power evolved ever since it started to launch military operations?

The main findings of this dissertation are twofold. First, the EU has evolved from a normative power to a more liberal power. Second, the EU’s decision-making on military operations can be characterized as cooperative bargaining.

The first two chapters set the stage for the rest of the dissertation. In chapter 1 I introduce the history and decision-making of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. Moreover, I discuss the main methodological choices of this dissertation. In chapter 2, I start with a discussion of the normative power debate that was initiated by Ian Manners in 2002 to highlight the EU’s “distinctiveness” in international affairs. I distinguish between Normative Power Europe (NPE) as a normative philosophy, an empirical claim and as a recursive intervention. As a normative philosophy, NPE is to function as a normative guide. The philosophical legitimation, however, may differ. NPE can be based on European social preferences or universal vales. Moreover, NPE can be conceived as referring to substantive legitimation or rather be procedural in nature. NPE as an empirical claim deals with the confirmation or falsification of NPE based on the actual behavior of the EU. Different operationalizations are discussed and the main indicators that are further discussed in chapter 3 are highlighted. Finally, NPE as a recursive intervention refers to the way in which NPE affects the EU’s self-understanding and policies, and how NPE has been affected by the actual development of the EU as an international security actor.

In chapter 3, I further build upon NPE as empirical claim by developing a framework that distinguishes between different types of military operations that correspond to different types of international power. To this end, I conceptualize three dimensions on which to assess the character of the EU’s international power: policy-embeddedness, justification and UN-authorization. Based on variation in the three dimensions, I develop a typology of four international power conceptions: Realist Power, Liberal Power, and interventionist and comprehensive Normative Power. The main difference between comprehensive and interventionist Normative Power relates to the degree of policy-embeddedness. Both Normative Power-conceptions justify the use of military force with reference to value-based concerns (i.e. protecting civilians). Also, they strongly adhere to UN-authorization but may for reasons of human security feel obliged to act without. In contrast, for a Liberal Power and a Realist Power the common denominator is a justification of the military instrument in utility-based terms. Whereas a Liberal Power combines this with high policy-embeddedness (i.e. the military instrument is not crowding out civilian efforts) and a legalistic take on the role of UN-authorization, a Realist Power scores low on policy-embeddedness and has an instrumental view of UN-authorization.

Chapter 4 consists of a comprehensive analysis of the EU’s eleven military operations in terms of their justification and policy embeddedness. I claim that there has been a shift from value-based justification to utility-based justification yet at the same time military operations have become more embedded in the EU’s overall foreign policies (i.e. higher policy-embeddedness). Moreover, as I show in chapter 7, the role of UN-authorization in CSDP decision-making has become more ambiguous. Despite the EU’s emphasis on “effective multilateralism”, UN-authorization does not oblige the EU to act, nor does its absence prevent the EU from pushing for military action in the Mediterranean, notwithstanding value-based concerns of UN institutions.

In addition to conceptualizing the EU’s international power, in chapter 3 I theorize the role of advocacy coalitions in CSDP and mechanisms of policy change. I distinguish between four advocacy coalitions: Global Power EU, Euro-Atlanticists, Human Security and the Bystanders. Whereas the first two coalitions hold different positions on the degree to which the EU should be an ambitious security actor, the latter two coalitions stand out for their greater reluctance to use military force in general. The Human Security coalition limits the use of military force to value-based concerns, while the Bystanders’ reluctance primarily has to be understood as risk-averseness. I use these advocacy coalitions as a heuristic device to analyse the decision-making dynamics on military CSDP operations. I assess whether the development of the EU’s military operations can be characterized as a process of “learning”, the outcome a process of “hard bargaining”, or rather “cooperative bargaining.” Moreover, I also consider the notion of “entrapment” to take into account the absence of change.

Subsequently, I examine in three case studies the relative strength of these decision-making mechanisms. In chapter 5, on the EU’s involvement with EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina (since 2004), I focus on the scope and nature of the military mandate (whether or not to include the fight against organized crime and/or non-executive tasks), the “distinctive” character of EUFOR, the relationship between the Operation Commander and the EU Special Representative and the justification of troop withdrawals. In chapter 6, I study the decision-making on
EUNAVFOR Atalanta in relation to a non-case (Congo 2008). In particular, I focus on the coalition dynamics that led to an increasing importance of utility-based concerns and the increasing embeddedness of the anti-piracy operation in the EU’s overall approach to the Horn of Africa. Chapter 7 assesses the contestation over the justification of the EU’s military operation in the Mediterranean in 2015, EUNAVFOR Sophia. Moreover, complementing the case of EUNAVFOR Sophia with the non-cases Congo 2008 and Libya 2011, this chapter addresses the changing role of UN-authorization in the EU’s foreign policy.

Based on these three case studies, I conclude that cooperative bargaining is predominant. In contrast to learning, cooperative bargaining does not entail a change in preferences or ideas of the actors involved. However, it does refer to a strong willingness to compromise and go beyond the lowest common denominator — which sets it apart from hard bargaining. The increasing policy-embeddedness and strong emphasis on utility-based justification are the outcome of a process of cooperative bargaining. While the different coalitions kept their distinct profiles on the use of military force, they allowed the inclusion into the operations’ mandate of aspects that were of particular importance to other coalitions. Moreover, despite a continuing contestation on the actual balance between civilian and military instruments at the level of particular cases, the EU’s “comprehensive approach” of foreign policy instruments has been increasingly institutionalized. The predominance of cooperative bargaining shows that, while collective learning at the level of the justification of military force and the hierarchy among policy instruments (and hence the convergence to a common strategic culture) is limited, this neither entails a deadlock or decision-making that does not go beyond the lowest common denominator. I show that cooperative bargaining is the mechanism that connects the persistent differences on the use of military force to common EU level outcomes.

In chapter 8, I reflect upon the main findings and limitations of this dissertation. Moreover, I consider the implications of this dissertation for the EU’s power in a changing environment in the context of the recently launched “Global Strategy” and of Brexit.