Debates about family migration policies are shaped in fundamental ways by conceptions of what the roles of men and women ought to be, what marriage ought to be …’

(Bonjour & De Hart, 2013: 2)

‘Public attitudes towards immigration and immigrant-related issues are perhaps more important for shaping migration policies than factual information…’

(Card et al., 2005: 37)
Summary
Despite the harmonizing efforts of the European Union [EU] member states, family reunification policies remain diverse across Europe. This study examines whether the changes in family migration policies stem from persistently divergent public opinion about gender roles and/or immigration/immigrants. Using data from the European Social Survey (2002-2012), the European Values Study (1990-2008) and the Migrant Integration Policy Index database (2007 and 2010), this study examines whether changes in policies in 25 European countries are influenced by these two types of public opinion previously suggested as influencing family migration policies. The study also looks at whether public opinion is influenced by changes in these policies, using a (cross-lagged) panel model. The results do not give any indication that policies influence public opinion, nor that differences in family migration policies across Europe are influenced by changes in public opinion about immigration or immigrants. In contrast, public opinion about roles in the family—namely support for shared-caring—is found to significantly influence family migration policies. More specifically, public support for more gender egalitarian roles in sharing care in the home are found to lead to more restrictive family migration policies. This finding is in line with the arguments in previous studies, that as gender egalitarianism increases, traditional gender role norms of dependency are projected on the migrant other, manifesting in the form of restrictive family migration policies, for example strict income requirements for the sponsor.

Introduction
The extension of European Union [EU] competencies into the field of family reunification for third-country nationals was first suggested in the Conclusions of the European Council in Tampere in 1999 (Kraler, 2010). The aim of the European institutions was to model the family reunification rights for third-country nationals (i.e. non-EU citizens) after the liberal rights granted to mobile EU citizens (i.e. second-country nationals), consolidated in the Free Movement Directive 2004/38 (Kraler, 2010). But throughout the negotiations of the Family Reunification Directive 2003/86 (Council of the European Union, 2003), some member states argued for the possibility of states to institute stricter conditions for third-country nationals than for mobile EU citizens. This opposition meant that when the Family Reunification Directive came into effect in 2005, it was a merely an ‘instrument of minimum harmonization’ (Boeles et al., 2009: 182), including many optional clauses, leaving much discretion to the member states about the family reunification rights granted to third-country nationals (Block & Bonjour, 2013; Boeles et al., 2009). For example, Article 4 of Directive 2003/86 states that only a sponsor’s spouse and minor children are eligible for family reunification; for other family members such as parents, adult children and unmarried partners, member states are free to set
conditions. Additionally, Article 4(5) of the Directive states that member states may set an age limit for sponsors and migrant spouses up to 21 and in Article 7(1)(c) that member states may require a stable income.

The lack of a strict EU Directive means that family reunification policies across member states remain diverse, e.g. in levels of income requirement. Previous authors even suggest that family migration policies are becoming increasingly diverse across the EU (Koopmans et al., 2012; Søndergaard, 2014a). Koopmans et al. (2012) in their quantitative study of ten Western-European countries between 1980 and 2008, show that despite the harmonizing influences of the EU such as the Family Reunification Directive, marriage migration policies went from being very similar in 1980 to diverging more at every time point until 2008 (when the study ended). Additionally, family migration policies have been shown to be diverging between 2007 and 2010 (Søndergaard, 2014a).¹

The reasons given for this lack of harmonization of family migration policies often lie in traditional explanations of migration policymaking, namely ‘in terms of a rational balancing of economic interests, electoral pushes, and judicial constraints’ (Bonjour & De Hart, 2013: 61). But researchers have pointed out that these traditional theories often cannot explain final policymaking decisions and therefore turn to alternative explanations. One alternative explanation for family migration policymaking is the influence of public opinion. The differences across the EU in family migration policies would thus be explained by differences in public opinion across EU countries. Indeed, some authors suggest that a lack of EU harmonization of immigration policies may be rooted in divergent attitudes about immigration (Luedtke, 2005). This hypothesis is supported by previous studies showing that attitudes toward immigration are diverging in the same period as family migration policies have been found to be diverging (Søndergaard, 2014a, 2014b).²

Other authors suggest looking not just at opinions about immigration, but also at whether other opinions influence immigration policymaking. For family migration policies, Bonjour and De Hart (2013: 62) suggest that ‘[d]ebates about family migration policies are shaped in fundamental ways by conceptions of what the roles of men and women ought to be, what marriage ought to be, what parenting ought to be, and what family ought to be… Such gender and family norms play a crucial role in the production of collective identities, i.e. in defining who “we” are and what distinguishes “us” from “the others.” This argument is presented especially about family migration policies, because this type of migration poses a threat to integration and national identities (Block, 2014; Bonjour & Kraler, 2014). The relationship between gender norms and family migration policies is supported by previous findings that show a divergence of support for sharing

¹ See Study I of this thesis for a version of this study.
² See Study I and Study III of this thesis for versions of these studies.
care roles in the home (Søndergaard & Ganzeboom, 2013). This study builds on the findings discussed above in looking at whether these different public opinions directly influence family migration policies across Europe. This study asks: *Can divergent public opinion about immigration/immigrants and/or gender roles explain changes in family migration policies across European countries?*

### Theoretical framework

Attitudes are defined here in line with other authors, as individuals’ preferences in specific situations, e.g. whether an individual thinks that women should work (Lück, 2005). As attitudes are analyzed here at the average country-level, they are generally referred to as public opinion. Policies are defined in two ways, in line with the seminal work by Hammar (1985), on the difference between immigration and immigrant policies. Immigration policies are defined as ‘the rules and procedures governing the selection and admission of foreign citizens’ (Hammar, 1985: 52), while an immigrant policy ‘refers to the conditions provided to resident immigrants…’ (Hammar, 1985: 53). Family migration policies include both of these policy areas, as they refer to the rights of the already present immigrant (sponsors) by regulating the entry (immigration) of their family members (Bonjour & Kraler, 2014). Simply stated, immigration policies are directed at people who are not yet ‘here’, while immigrant policies are directed at people who are already ‘here’. This paper looks at whether an opinion-policy nexus and/or a policy-opinion nexus exist for two types of attitudes suggested to be related to family migration policymaking, namely gender-egalitarian attitudes and/or immigration/immigrant attitudes. The focus of the study is mainly the opinion-policy nexus and this relationship is therefore elaborated more thoroughly.

**Opinion-policy nexus**

In a bottom-up perspective on policymaking, social attitudes inform voting, with a majority opinion being reflected in majority voting. This majority voting in turn indirectly influences policies (Raven et al., 2011; Risse-Kappen, 1991). This is referred to by Raven et al. (2011) as the opinion-policy nexus. As expressed by Jacobs and Herman (2009: 114), ‘[o]bviously, there is by definition some link between public opinion and policymaking in democracies. Politicians and political parties cannot systematically act against public opinion and hope to get re-elected.’ Indeed, classical studies such as the work by Page and Shapiro (1983) describe how public opinion is a major influence on policy changes in the US. When opinions change, so too do policies after a 1-4 year time lag (Page & Shapiro, 1983).

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3 See Study I of this thesis for a version of this study.
Opinionated Family Migration Policies?

Some authors have previously made the case that immigration policies are a special type of policy not influenced by public opinion because decision-making here remains within the domain of elites (Freeman, 1995). This has since been disputed, with authors claiming that immigration has become such a highly salient issue in the public and political debates and that decision-making is no longer taking place behind closed doors. According to Lahav (2004: 1158), the public sets the ‘rules of the game’ around which elites structure their discourse on immigration. In this vein, the work of Benhabib (1996) suggests a relationship between majority voting and immigration policies. According to the opinion-policy nexus, immigration policies would reflect public opinion if immigration policymakers work in polities characterized by democratic accountability. An example of this increased public scrutiny of immigration policies at EU level is the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, moving immigration out from behind the closed doors of the intergovernmental decision-making sphere (Guiraudon, 2001; Kostakopoulou, 2000).

**Gender role attitudes – family migration policy nexus**

It could be expected that the opinions influencing immigration policies would be those related to immigration and immigrants, but an increasing number of authors stress the influence of opinions about cultural norms. This is likely related to the findings that attitudes toward immigrants are rooted more in concerns about differences in culture than in economic concerns. For example, in their experimental study, Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior (2004: 43) find that opposition to immigration stems more from immigrants not fitting in culturally rather than not integrating economically. Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014:235) in their review of studies about immigration/immigrant attitudes, state that ‘[s]ome conceptions of the national community and its boundaries can easily accommodate newcomers whereas others cannot.’ Aspects of national community and group boundaries that have been suggested recently to be key in family migration policies are gender role norms and marriage norms (Bonjour, 2011; Bonjour & De Hart, 2013; Van Walsum, 2008).

Gender role attitudes refer to attitudes about what roles men and women *should* adopt within the family. These roles refer to how the earning of the family income should be arranged (i.e. single, shared-earning or 1.5 model) and how childcare should be arranged (i.e. one parent or shared between partners, with other family members, and/or with state/market institutions). These views have changed greatly since the 1970s, when women entered the workforce *en masse*, creating a vacuum of childcare in European homes (Pfau-Effinger & Rostgaard, 2011). Van Walsum (2008) is one author who examined these changes in family norms in the Netherlands, but she made a novel comparison, namely linking changes in family norms to changes in family migration policies.
Van Walsum (2008) traced Dutch family migration policies from 1945 to 2000 and suggested that family norms were used to distinguish the ‘national’ from the ‘foreign’. Interestingly, she observed that while family norms became more egalitarian, these egalitarian family norms were *not* transferred to family migration policies. In fact, an increasingly non-gender-egalitarian view of the family was projected on migrants in the Netherlands. She discussed, for example, the appearance of the gendered notion of ‘dependency’ in family migration policies, referring to the income and housing requirements for sponsors. These requirements necessitate the sponsor to *provide* for the incoming family member, which is very much in line with the traditional view of the dependency of one (female) spouse on the other (male). Van Walsum (2008:239) points out that the aim of these policies was to prevent the welfare state supporting entire immigrant families, but that another way to prevent migrants from relying on welfare would be to allow for the earnings of the incoming family member to count towards the income requirement. This would mean that neither partner would be expected to provide for the other, but that both can contribute to the family earnings. Such an alternative policy approach would portray very different family norms, namely shared-earning (shared between partners) rather than the breadwinner norm implied by a single income requirement.

Bonjour and De Hart (2013) argue that family norms have played an important role in policymaking on fraudulent and forced marriages since the 1970s in the Netherlands. They trace how the view of a ‘proper’ Dutch family was a way of ‘othering’ migrant families and marriages. Also, Bonjour (2011) in her analysis of pre-departure language tests in the Netherlands (Civic Integration Examination Abroad or: *het basisexamen inburgering in het buitenland*) adopted in 2005, argues that migrant women are portrayed as ‘weak’ and ‘vulnerable’ dependents. She shows that this policy was framed specifically as aiding the emancipation of migrant women by enabling migrant women to speak Dutch upon arrival, thus enabling them to free themselves from dependency on their supposedly oppressive Muslim husbands. Similarly, Roggeband (2007) argues that a link is made in the Netherlands between women’s emancipation and family migration. Elsewhere, Eggebø (2010) shows how gender norms are specifically referred to in the Norwegian political debates on family migration, and Borevi (2014) shows how the legacy of Sweden’s gender norms in welfare policies are prevalent in the Swedish family migration debate. The reasoning that the authors give for this relationship between family norms and family migration law is that the ‘family’ is an important way for the native population to distinguish themselves from the migrant ‘other’. As mentioned above, family migration is especially construed as ‘a problem of culture, identity, and belonging’ (Bonjour & Kraler, 2014: 4), with the national identity being ‘construed in opposition to the perceived culture and identity of migrants, epitomized by the “migrant”—especially “Muslim”—
family. Whereas the “Western” family is imagined as modern, emancipated, and egalitarian, the “migrant” family is associated with tradition, patriarchy, oppression, and even violence’ (Bonjour & Kraler, 2014: 4). Family migration is thus part of defining belongingness to a polity (Block, 2014). As egalitarian gender role attitudes develop within a country, they are used as a marker between insiders and outsiders. In line with this argument, gender norms are used specifically because gender role norms are part of the foundation of culture (Bonjour & De Hart, 2013), with women at the center of ethnic and national reproduction (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992). As more egalitarian norms develop, they are used to distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’ with one manifestation being within family migration policies.

The works of Van Walsum, Bonjour and De Hart all look at changes in family norms within one country over time. Another way to look at the influence of gender norms on family migration policies would be to see whether changes in prevalent norms in different countries over time are reflected in different countries’ family migration policies across time. Such an analysis would see whether countries with more egalitarian gender norms such as Denmark have restrictive family migration policies, whereas those with less egalitarian norms such as Italy would have more permissive family migration policies. It could also look at whether as norms become more egalitarian, policies become more restrictive. Such a country comparison can be done using large cross-national surveys and quantitative policy measures. The link between family norms and family migration may indeed be a plausible hypothesis considering the previous findings that family migration policies are diverging (Søndergaard, 2014a) and so too are ideas about sharing care in the home across Europe (Søndergaard & Ganzeboom, 2013). But the possible influence of migration attitudes should also be considered, as these opinions have also been suggested to be diverging (Søndergaard, 2014b).

Immigration/immigrant opinion – immigration/immigrant policy nexus

The above literature on the link between gender norms and family migration policies stands apart from the literature exploring the relationship between immigration/immigrant policies and another type of public opinion, namely opinions about immigration/immigrants. Beutin et al. (2007: 390) provide the following explanation of this proposed relationship: ‘suppose that the public perceives migration predominately as a phenomenon associated with dead bodies in the Mediterranean, human trafficking, and unemployment. Calls for tighter border controls are often the consequence.’

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4 See Study I of this thesis for a version of this study.
5 See Study II of this thesis for a version of this study.
6 See Study III of this thesis for a version of this study.
In her review of eighteen studies looking at the relationship between integration policies and public opinion, Callens (2015: 16) states that a ‘consistent and positive relationship emerged in several studies between countries with more inclusive integration policies (i.e. higher MIPEX overall scores) and lower levels of perceived threat and, to some extent, lower levels of negative attitudes towards immigrants’. But authors such as Simon and Lynch (1999) do not find a direct relationship between the attitudes toward immigration and immigrants and countries’ immigration policies. Similar to others, they claim that there is no influence of general public opinion, but rather claim that lobbying or pressure groups influence immigration policies (Facchini & Mayda, 2008; Freeman, 1995). Several measurements of immigration/immigrant attitudes are included in this study to further explore the disputed link between these attitudes and policies.

**Policy-opinion nexus**

The opinion-policy nexus discussed above, where opinions influence policies has been suggested previously only to exist for newer social policies (Raven et al., 2011). Only for policies that are not yet institutionally well-established, are politicians open to public opinion. Well-established social policies are not suggested to be open to change from public opinion because policies are locked in ‘path-dependency’ (Pierson, 2001). For well-established welfare policies, previous studies rather have found a policy-opinion nexus, in other words that policies influence opinions (Raven et al., 2011).

That policy influences opinion perspective is also illustrated by normative theories of law. As expressed by Schlueter et al. (2013: 672), ‘majority group members adapt their pre-existing attitudes in response to legislative measures, presumably because they recognize that deviations from a social norm produce negative sanctions’. According to normative theories of law, law can influence conduct and beliefs not just through sanctions, but also through conveying a consensus about a topic (Albiston et al., 2011). If a legal system is legitimate, then a law will be perceived as expressing a consensus. This consensus may be an actual consensus of public opinion or it can be driven by a small elite. In line with social psychological hypotheses, a majority opinion conveyed by laws will influence individual beliefs because people’s attitudes change toward the perceived consensus to avoid cognitive dissonance (Albiston et al., 2011; Schmidt, 2008).

The perceived consensus conveyed by open immigration/immigrant policies can lead to two different types of reactions in public opinion, according to theories about group conflict and intergroup norms (cf. Callens, 2015; cf. Schlueter et al., 2013). Research on group conflict suggests that permissive integration policies promote group conflict, as majority group members will perceive an extension of rights to a minority group as a threat to the majority’s resources. These resources can be economic, but they can also be
cultural, with the majority group seeing a threat to their cultural dominance. The literature on intergroup norms suggests an opposite relationship between public opinion and policies. This literature suggests that policies promote social norms for adequate intergroup relationships, meaning that as integration policies become more open, intergroup relationships will also become more open. In their comprehensive study, Schlueter, Meuleman and Davidov (2013) find a negative association between the permissiveness of a country’s integration policies and citizens’ perceived group threat, supporting this literature on intergroup norms.

It has been discussed by previous authors that policy-opinion nexus and opinion-policy nexus could reinforce each other (Callens, 2015; Jacobs & Herman, 2009; Meuleman & Reeskens, 2008; Schlueter et al., 2013). For example, positive attitudes toward immigrants may influence inclusive immigrant policies, which then positively influence further attitudes toward immigrants. For gender role attitudes, if there is a negative relationship between gender role attitudes and family migration policies, these restrictive family migration policies might then be used to further distinguish the native population from the migrant ‘other’. Including both public opinion and two measurements of integration policies in a cross-lagged model, Schlueter et al. (2013) do not find this reciprocal relationship for general integration policies. The present study builds on such previous studies, but focuses on one type of integration policies, namely family migration policies, and uses a different measurement index for these policies, one that is more sensitive to actual policy changes. It also includes different and additional measurements of public opinion to establish what types of public opinion can influence policies.

Data
This paper asks whether differences in family migration policies can be explained by differences in public opinion on immigration/immigrants and gender roles. The research design relates changes in aggregate public opinion in 25 European countries since 1990 (for gender role attitudes) and since 2002 (for attitudes toward immigration/immigrants), to changes in family migration policies between 2007 and 2010.

To answer this study’s research question, it is important to use repeated measurements of family migration policies, as well as repeated measurements of public opinion. Key to establishing causality in the relationship between public opinion and policy formation is having measurements distributed over time so that public opinion items are included before and after policy measurements, and policy measurements are included before and after public opinion items. Additionally, a model must be used that controls for all other differences across countries and over time, other than the studied relationship of public opinion on policies. This can be done using a random-
effects panel regression, which pools cross-sectional between-country and across-time within-country effects to establish the causal relationship between changes in policy measurements and prior (lagged) public opinion. A structural equation cross-lagged panel model is also run, which allows for controlling for several additional prior measurements of public opinion. A cross-lagged panel model also allows for examining a possible reciprocal (cross-lagged) relationship between family migration policies and public opinion and makes it possible to include countries that do not have complete information on all public opinion measurements over time. Both types of panel models allow for including measurements of immigration/immigrant attitudes and gender role attitudes in the same model to be able to test the effects of the different types of public opinion against each other.

All data are at the aggregated level, instead of mixing individual level effects with contextual effects in a multi-level model. Schlueter et al. (2013: 676) find that 54% of the between-country variance in individuals’ perceived group threat (measured with items similar to the pro-immigrant attitudes used here) are attributed to differences in immigrant integration policies. Schlueter et al. (2013) still argue for including individual data, but it is also possible to look at these relationships with aggregated data. The macro-level approach in this study follows the recent caution against using multi-level modeling with small samples and the suggestion rather to return to meta-analyses to obtain more reliable standard errors (Bryan & Jenkins, 2015; Hox & Maas, 2005).

**Policy variables**

For comparing family migration policies over time, this paper uses the Migrant Integration Policy Index [MIPEX] database. As discussed at length elsewhere (Søndergaard, 2014a), this database is created by the Migration Policy Group [MPG], a non-profit Brussels-based European organization, with previously the British Council and now the Barcelona Centre for International Affairs [CIDOB]. It continues to be the database that includes the most comprehensive migration policy indicators. The MIPEX database contains 148 indicators measuring national policies on integration for migrants, including 37 family reunification policy indicators. The first complete MIPEX data were collected for policies in 2007 in EU-25, Canada, Norway and Switzerland. For the 2010 data, the database was expanded to include Australia, Bulgaria, Japan, Romania and the USA, bringing the

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7 See Study II of this thesis for a version of this study.
8 Data accessed 20 February 2013 via http://www.MIPEX.eu/.
total number of countries to 33. The present study is confined to the 27 European Economic Area countries that are repeated over the two waves and confined further to the countries with public opinion data (see more information below).

Note that five of these countries are not bound by the EU Family Reunification Directive mentioned above, namely CH, DK, IE, NO and UK. The MIPEX data are collected in every country by informants who are researchers or practitioners of migration law, education and anti-discrimination. These informants score policies based on publicly available data, which are then anonymously peer-reviewed by a second informant or national expert. The informants write comments on all of their evaluations and these comments are freely available (Migration Policy Group, 2011), along with the raw data. Informants have three answer categories for each policy—indicating the level of permissiveness of the policies, coded 0, 50 or 100. These levels are benchmarked against the standards set by EU Directives or Council of Europe Conventions (Huddleston, 2011; Niessen, 2009). A score of 100 means that the country’s policy meets the highest level of permissiveness and openness of migration policies. Not all of the 37 MIPEX indicators on family reunification policies are used here. The Migrant Integration Policy Implicative scale (MIPi) selection discussed elsewhere is used instead (Søndergaard, 2014a). Unlike the scale calculated by the creators of the MIPEX database, all the indicators included in the MIPi scale are examined for homogeneity and dimensionality. The MIPi is then calculated from 22 selected indicators of family migration policies. The overall homogeneity measurement for this scale is 0.528, which

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9 The latest version of the MIPEX data has recently been released, so the results of the study here are preliminary, pending further analyses with the new data. Data release date: 30 June 2015. See press release: http://www.mipex.eu/ changes-government-and-far-right-emergence-hard-times-integration-policies, accessed 15 July 2015.

10 All country codes are in line with Eurostat guidelines on country abbreviations, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:Country_codes, accessed 22 April 2015. Countries from the Migrant Integration Policy Index database: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (EL), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Malta (MT), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), United Kingdom (UK).

11 An example of the coding for these policy indicators is as follows: for indicator 24a on the right to an autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching the age of majority, the most permissive category (100) gives this right automatically. The half-way category (50) grants this right only on limited grounds or under certain conditions (e.g. a fixed period of residence), while the most restrictive category (0) does not grant this right.

12 See Study I of this thesis for a version of this study.
indicates a strong scale (Van Schuur, 2011). This final selection includes policy items from all the original MIPEX subcategories - 2.1 eligibility, 2.2 conditions for acquisition of status, 2.3 security of status and 2.4 rights associated with status. The selection includes items that could be construed as being about gender norms such as the economic resources requirement and the right to autonomous residence permits for partners. For more information and a list of MIPi scores for the countries included in this study, see Søndergaard (2014a).

Public opinion variables
The data used here on support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes are taken from the European Social Survey [ESS] for 2002-2012. ESS is fielded every two years and over the six survey waves, the number of participating countries ranges from 22 in 2002 to 27 in 2008, with approximately 280,000 respondents across all waves. In total, 34 European countries have taken part in the ESS in at least one wave, but only 16 have participated in all six waves. There are six questions on immigration and immigrants in the standard survey (ESS, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012). According to Ceobanu and Escandell (2010: 313), opinions about immigrants and immigration should be studied separately because they reflect different notions, ‘one as reactions toward people and the other as reactions about the phenomenon of immigration’. The six questions included in the ESS have been shown previously to separately measure attitudes toward

13  21c Eligibility for minor children
21d Eligibility for dependent relatives in the ascending line
21e Eligibility for dependent adult children
22a1 Form of pre-departure language measure for family member abroad
22a3 Form of pre-departure integration measure for family member abroad
22a4 Pre-departure requirement exemptions
22a5 Conductor of pre-departure requirement
22a6 Cost of pre-departure requirement
22a7 Support to pass pre-departure requirement
22a8 Cost of support for family member abroad
22b1 Form of language requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory
22b2 Level of language requirement after arrival on territory
22b3 Form of integration requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory
22b4 Language/integration requirement exemptions after arrival on territory
22b5 Conductor of language/integration requirement after arrival on territory
22b6 Cost of language/integration requirement after arrival on territory
22b7 Support to pass language/integration requirement after arrival on territory
22b8 Cost of support after arrival on territory
22d Economic resources requirement
23a Duration of validity of permit
23b Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status
24a Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority
14 See Study I of this thesis for a version of this study.
immigration and immigrants (Søndergaard, 2014b). The first scale including the three questions on support for immigration ranges from 0-3, with a mean of 1.599 and a standard deviation of 0.328. A second un-weighted mean scale created from the three items on pro-immigrant attitudes has a mean of 5.102 and a standard deviation of 0.907. Both scales are calculated for each individual where at least one item was available. The three standardized items on immigration form a single scale with high internal reliability (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.874$), as do the three items on pro-immigrant attitudes (Cronbach’s $\alpha = 0.836$), which do not increase if any items are excluded. The number of missing values on the two scales was very low, 2.7% for support for immigration and 2.1% for pro-immigrant attitudes and should therefore not influence the results. See previous work for the wording of the items and the aggregated means ranked by country from most to least positive toward immigration/immigrants (Søndergaard, 2014b).

Several studies suggest that egalitarian gender role attitudes should be studied by separating attitudes related to female employment from attitudes about women’s caring role, because they are often different and sometimes contradictory (Lück & Hofäcker, 2003; Sjöberg, 2010; Voicu & Voicu, 2002). Since the two questions on gender roles included in the ESS are not ideal for making the distinction, data from the European Values Study [EVS] will be used from three waves of the survey, 1990-1993, 1999-2001 and 2008-2010. In the pooled sample of the 33 countries used for the three waves, there are 122,962 respondents. A factor analysis on these items standardized by time and country shows two dimensions of attitudes: items 1-3 on support for shared-earning (both partners earn) and support for shared-caring (caring role is shared between partners, with the state or with other actors). Two un-weighted mean scales were created by averaging the abovementioned three and two unstandardized items respectively, where there was a value for at least two items for each scale. The shared-earning scale has a mean of 2.069 and a standard deviation of 0.649 and the shared-caring scale has a mean of 1.318 and a standard deviation of 0.662. The individual level reliability was 0.500 for the shared-earning scale and 0.562 for the shared-caring scale. The number of missing values on the two scales was under 5% for both scales: 4.9% for support for shared-earning and 4.5% for support for shared-caring and should therefore not influence the results. See previous work for the wording of the items and the aggregated means ranked by country from most to least support for shared-caring and shared-earning (Søndergaard & Ganzeboom, 2013).
Table 4.1 shows the aggregate level Pearson correlations (below the diagonal) and the covariances (above the diagonal) between the two policy indicators (zMIP refers to MIPi, the family migration policy index) and two\(^{18}\) of the public opinion scales over the available time periods (zIMM refers to support for immigration scale, zCARE refers to support for shared-caring scale). Note that the macro-level variables were standardized by the mean and standard deviations of the first time point to better capture the changes over time. This standardized version of the variables is the form in which the variables are used in the random-effects panel regression and the SEM cross-lagged panel model. This method of standardization can clearly be seen in the pairwise means and standard deviations. The pairwise means show that family migration policies become more restrictive from one time point to the next (MIPi 2010 mean: -0.141) and that they become more diverse from one time point to the next (MIPi 2010 SD: 1.175). It is more difficult to make these clear comparisons over time for the shared-caring and support for immigration indices, because the N of these scales changes between time points. The table therefore also includes the means and standard deviations using listwise deletion. These numbers show that support for shared-caring and support for immigration generally increase over time. The standard deviation also increases for support for immigration, while it is more difficult to see a clear pattern in the standard deviations for support for shared-caring.

The correlations of the scales across time points show that the measurements of public opinion are very stable over time (e.g. a correlation of 0.926 between support for immigration in 2006 and 2008). It is also easy to see that the data on support for immigration from 2004 onwards conform rather strongly to the simplex (or ‘markov’) assumption that requires correlations to go down as the time points are further apart (Alwin, 2007). The correlations between these scales are very unlikely to be significant because of the small sample size, but the directions of these correlations are still interesting to examine. They show, for example, that there is a very small negative relationship between family migration policies with support for immigration (ranging from -0.007 to -0.205). This means that countries with more negative views on immigration tend to be countries with more open family migration policies. This is in line with the group conflict theory outlined above. A moderately strong and even significantly negative relationship is found for family migration policies with support for shared-caring (-0.246 to -0.541). This negative relationship is in line with the theoretical expectations that countries with egalitarian gender views have more restrictive family migration policies. The moderately strong relationship between the shared-caring index and the family migration policy measurements (MIPi) is shown further in Figure 4.1 by illustrating the between- and within-country pattern. Figure 4.1a plots changes in MIPi against changes

\(^ {18}\) These selected descriptive data are shown here for illustrative purposes. The full matrix is available on request.
Table 4.1. Pearson correlation below the diagonal, covariances above the diagonal (pairwise)

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<td>-</td>
<td>1.129</td>
<td>-0.444</td>
<td>-0.364</td>
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<tr>
<td>zMIP 2010</td>
<td>0.961**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.606</td>
<td>-0.556</td>
<td>-0.455</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td>-0.146</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
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<tr>
<td>zCARE 1990</td>
<td>-0.441*</td>
<td>-0.499*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.618</td>
<td>0.694</td>
<td>0.157</td>
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<tr>
<td>zCARE 1999</td>
<td>-0.439</td>
<td>-0.541**</td>
<td>0.722**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.605</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0.328</td>
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<td>zCARE 2008</td>
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<td>-0.396</td>
<td>0.741**</td>
<td>0.856**</td>
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<td>-0.064</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>0.454</td>
<td>0.589**</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>1.152</td>
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<td>zIMM 2004</td>
<td>-0.089</td>
<td>-0.114</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>0.383</td>
<td>0.551**</td>
<td>0.938**</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.129</td>
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<td>0.028</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>0.527**</td>
<td>0.920**</td>
<td>0.953**</td>
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<td>1.172</td>
<td>1.179</td>
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<td>-0.205</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.369</td>
<td>0.613**</td>
<td>0.891**</td>
<td>0.899**</td>
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<td>zIMM 2010</td>
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<td>-0.164</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td>0.626**</td>
<td>0.867**</td>
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<tr>
<td>zIMM 2012</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>-0.155</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.346</td>
<td>0.514**</td>
<td>0.816**</td>
<td>0.771**</td>
<td>0.847**</td>
<td>0.893**</td>
<td>0.939**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.141</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.797</td>
<td>1.217</td>
<td>0.000</td>
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<td>-0.002</td>
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<td>0.793</td>
<td>0.942</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.145</td>
<td>1.578</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.129</td>
<td>-0.083</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.161</td>
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<tr>
<td>SD</td>
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<td>0.835</td>
<td>0.885</td>
<td>0.963</td>
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<td>1.222</td>
<td>1.212</td>
<td>1.293</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). zMIP refers to family migration policy index, zIMM refers to support for immigration scale, zCARE refers to support for shared-caring scale.
in public support for shared-caring, for those eight countries that saw changes in their family migration policies. This plot only shows the seven countries where policies changed over the three-year time period. Figure 4.1b plots the mean levels of MIPi against mean levels of support for shared-caring, showing the cross-sectional relationship. Note that the historical relationship is stronger than the cross-sectional relationship. Note also that the cross-sectional relationship may be stronger if exceptional countries are omitted from the small sample; all the final analyses are thus also run with bootstrapped standard errors.

**Methodology and results**

As explained above, two types of analyses were conducted to evaluate the influence of public opinions on family migration policies, namely random-effects panel regression in Stata 13 (\texttt{xtreg} model) and a cross-lagged panel model estimated with SEM in Mplus 7.

**Random-effects panel regression**

For the panel regression analysis, separate datasets were created for 2007 and 2010 and then combined into one (‘long’) dataset. In each of these datasets, the public opinion data were included for the preceding period closest to either 2007 or 2010. This was done based on the hypothesis that public opinion influences family migration policy. In the 2007 dataset, the public opinion data point varied depending on the availability of the data. In this dataset, pro-immigrant attitudes and support for immigration were from the 2006 data (the mean of the 2004 and 2006 time points were taken to retain more cases), while support for shared-earning and shared-caring were from the 1999 data. In the 2010 dataset, all public opinion data were from 2008. Only in this second dataset were all of the data in line with the expectation mentioned above, namely that public opinion should influence policies with a 1-4 year lag (Page & Shapiro, 1983). Panel regression models include ‘between-effects’ as differences between countries and ‘within-effects’ as differences across time within countries. The analyses have 26 observations, representing the 13 countries with complete data for 2007 and 2010. Separate models (Models 1-4) were run including the different measurements of gender role attitudes from the EVS—support for shared-caring and support for shared-earning, and the two measurements of public opinion toward immigration/immigrants separately. A final model (Model 5) was also run, including public opinion toward immigration and public opinion toward gender roles. The models were all run including robust standard errors and bootstrapped standard errors (draw = 400) to take into account the small sample size.

For the research question in this study, a random-effects panel regression model has several limitations by design. Firstly, such a model cannot include all the data available (i.e. all earlier and later public opinion data). Secondly, it cannot look at the possible reciprocal relationship between policy and public opinion mentioned above. Lastly, this method
Opinionated Family Migration Policies?

Study IV

\( b. \text{ BETWEEN-COUNTRY EFFECT, } Y = 0.858 - 0.705 \times X, \ p = 0.132, \ \text{adj.R}^2=0.120 \)

Figure 4.1. Within and between-country effects between the MIPi family migration index 2007-2010 and public support for shared-caring between 1990 and 2008

\( a. \text{ WITHIN-COUNTRY EFFECT, } Y = -0.176 + -0.774 \times X, \ p = 0.084, \ \text{adj.R}^2=0.378 \)
uses listwise deletion for missing data, which is problematic in analyses with small samples (13 clusters) of complete information for countries. Table 4.2 shows the results of random-effects panel regression. The first entry is the B, asymptotic standard errors are shown in parentheses, robust standard errors in double parentheses, and bootstrapped standard errors in square brackets. Models 1-4 include each public opinion measurement separately. These results show that support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes have a negative influence on changes in family migration policies. This suggests that the more positive the public opinion is toward immigration/immigrants, the more restrictive family migration policies become. This is in line with the group conflict theory outlined above. Similarly, support for shared-caring and shared-earning also negatively affect family migration policies. This means that the more egalitarian public opinion is about the gender division of care and earning in the family, the more restrictive family migration policies become. Only support for immigration and support for shared-caring are significant in these separate models. These two scales are therefore included in one model (Model 5). The results show that the negative effect of support for shared-caring remains significant in this model (B=−0.469), while support for immigration does not (B=−0.104). It should be noted that the shared-caring attitudes are measured at an earlier time point than support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes.

**Structural equation modeling**

Structural equation modeling [SEM] was conducted using Mplus 7 with Full Information Maximum Likelihood estimation. A SEM approach has the several advantages over panel regression analysis. Firstly, it allows for considering reciprocal relationships between public opinion formation and policymaking, using a cross-lagged panel design. Secondly, it can incorporate multiple measurement instances of public opinion before the policy measurement, operating as instrumental variables and aiding identification of the causal effects. Thirdly, it can separate measurement error from true change in public opinion using a simplex (or ‘markov’) assumption, discussed briefly above and elsewhere (Søndergaard & Ganzeboom, 2013), thereby separating measurement reliability from true change. Fourthly, it can take into account data from incompletely observed countries using Full Information Maximum Likelihood estimation. This method, which retains more information, has shown to be superior to listwise deletion (Enders, 2001). The N of these models was 25, compared to the 13 clusters in the previous models. This N refers

---

19 Asymptotic standard errors assume independent observations that are identically distributed (have homogeneous variance). Robust standard errors drop the homogeneity assumption. Bootstrapped standard errors are derived from an empirically generated sampling distribution, with no further assumption than independence (StataCorp, 2015: 2760).

20 See Study II of this thesis for a version of this study.
Table 4.2. Random-effects panel regression, predicting family migration policies (MIPi) from four different public opinions, N=13 complete countries, 26 observations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public support for immigration</td>
<td>-0.322</td>
<td>-0.104</td>
<td>-0.202</td>
<td>-0.518</td>
<td>-0.469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.195)</td>
<td>(0.202)</td>
<td>(0.266)</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>((0.207))</td>
<td>((0.235))</td>
<td>((0.273))</td>
<td>((0.247))</td>
<td>((0.268))</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.201]</td>
<td>[0.252]</td>
<td>[0.236]</td>
<td>[0.245]</td>
<td>[0.270]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-immigrant attitudes</td>
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<td>-0.202</td>
<td>-0.518</td>
<td>-0.469</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.265)</td>
<td>(0.188)</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>((0.268))</td>
<td>((0.273))</td>
<td>((0.247))</td>
<td>((0.268))</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.266]</td>
<td>[0.236]</td>
<td>[0.245]</td>
<td>[0.270]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public support for shared-earning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Public support for shared-caring</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

First entry is B. () asymptotic standard error, (()) robust standard error, [] bootstrapped standard error. Statistically significant results in bold (p < .10, two tailed). Models estimated with Stata 13.0 xtreg.

to the European Economic Area countries with repeated data on MIPi, as well as data for at least one time point for both the ESS and EVS. Analyses were run without and with bootstrapped standard errors to take into account the small N of the samples (draw number=200); bootstrapped standard errors are shown in the final figure in square brackets and asymptotic standard errors are shown in parentheses. The small N of the data remained a problem, however, and all public opinion data were therefore not included simultaneously in one model. Instead, four different analyses were run, namely for the two measurements of gender role attitudes, with the separate scales on support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes. All models therefore looked at the between-country effects of the different public opinions, as well as the within-country effects across the full span of the public opinion data.

21 The following countries were thus excluded because they had only public opinion data, but not both MIPi scores: AL, BG, HR, IL, IS, RU, TR, UA, XK. Additionally, the following countries were excluded because they did not have public opinion data for ESS and EVS for at least one time point: CH and MT. The final 25 countries are included in the SEM analyses: AT, BE, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, NL, NO, PO, PT, SE, SI, SK, UK.
Study IV

The analyses were conducted by first considering the time series of public opinion separately. These analyses of the four public opinion scales were conducted in five steps (Table 4.3), in order to separate measurement error from true change. This is not possible for the two variables measuring family migration policies in 2007 and 2010, as there are only two time points available. As can be seen in Table 4.1, the two time points are correlated 0.961 and the covariance is 1.129, suggesting extremely high reliability of measurement and a divergence of policies across countries in the three-year period. The measurement of the policies is assumed here to be perfect and changes over time are assumed to be only due to true change in policies.

Models A1-A5/B1-B5 include public opinion on support for immigration-immigrants, derived from the ESS. Models A1/B1 constrain the measurement coefficient to be equal, but do not constrain the over-time change coefficients. In Models A2/B2 and A3/B3, constraints are introduced through equalizing both the change and the residual variances across all six time points, implying constant change and constant measurement quality. Models A3/B3 fit equally well as the unconstrained model and have much smaller standard errors. For support for immigration and pro-immigrant attitudes, the stationarity assumption is thus maintained. Then, because the residual variances of the latent variables are very close to 0, in Models A4/B4 the residual variance is constrained to be 0, implying perfect measurement. In Models A5/B5, cross-lagged panel models are estimated looking at the influence of public opinion toward immigration-immigrants on family migration policies and vice versa. These models were estimated constraining the effects between opinions and policies to be equal, for example, Public Opinion 2008 = Public Opinion 2006. Alternative approaches were also tried to take into account the different time lags between the effects. This was done firstly by using mathematical constraints on the effects, e.g. making Public Opinion 2008 constrained to be the square of Public Opinion 2006 (1 year). Secondly, the inclusion of phantom variables (e.g. Public Opinion 2009) was also attempted (Rindskorp, 1984), in one version, making all effects over one year and another making a two-year time lag the standard, after some experimentation. However, because the underlying time series of public opinion is arguably not measured sharply enough to warrant a rigorous conclusion about time lags using these alternative approaches, equalizing the differently lagged effects was maintained.

Models C1-C5/D1-D5 refer to models with measurements of support for shared-caring and shared-earning, derived from the EVS. These opinions have been observed three times, with nine-year intervals since 1990. With only three over-time observations, it is still possible to separate true change from measurement unreliability, although with much less statistical power than for the migration attitudes. Similar to the immigration-immigrant models, when constraints are introduced in Models C2/D2, the models show
Table 4.3. Model descriptions and model fit. Italicized models are those with a significantly worse fit than the previous model, using the threshold for one-sided Chi2 difference testing (for one degree of freedom: 2.706). The highlighted model is shown in Figure 4.2.

<table>
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<th>Model</th>
<th>Model description</th>
<th>Chi²</th>
<th>Number degrees of freedom</th>
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<td>A3.IMMI</td>
<td>A2 + Stationarity assumption</td>
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<td>A4.IMMI</td>
<td>A3 + Perfect measurement</td>
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<td>B3.MIG</td>
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<td>B4.MIG</td>
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<td>D1.EARN</td>
<td>Unconstrained simplex model + equal measurement</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D2.EARN</td>
<td>D1 + Equal residual variances of latent</td>
<td>1.954</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3.EARN</td>
<td>D2 + Stationarity assumption</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D4.EARN</td>
<td>D3 + Perfect measurement</td>
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<tr>
<td>D5.EARN-MIP</td>
<td>Cross-lagged panel model (D4+MIPi)</td>
<td>17.292</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support for immigration with support for shared-caring</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E1.IMCA</td>
<td>A5 + C5</td>
<td>86.108</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E2.IMCA</td>
<td>A5 + C4 without panel effects shared-caring</td>
<td>96.989</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3.IMCA</td>
<td>A4 + C5 without panel effects immigration</td>
<td>88.469</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Support for immigration with support for shared-earning</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F1.IMEA</td>
<td>A5 + D5</td>
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<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2.IMEA</td>
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<tr>
<td>F3.IMEA</td>
<td>A5 + D5 without panel effects immigration</td>
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<td>56</td>
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<td><strong>Pro-immigrant attitudes with support for shared-caring</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>G1.MICA</td>
<td>B5 + C5</td>
<td>83.378</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2.MICA</td>
<td>B5 + C4 without panel effects shared-caring</td>
<td>95.071</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3.MICA</td>
<td>B4 + C5 without panel effects pro-immigrants</td>
<td>83.710</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pro-immigrant attitudes with support for shared-earning</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>H1.MIEA</td>
<td>B5 + D5</td>
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<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>H2.MIEA</td>
<td>B5 + D4 without panel effects shared-earning</td>
<td>98.540</td>
<td>56</td>
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<tr>
<td>H3.MIEA</td>
<td>B4 + D5 without panel effects pro-immigrants</td>
<td>97.837</td>
<td>56</td>
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</table>
that measurement quality can be assumed to be constant across time. This is different from Model C3.CARE, where the change coefficient (stationary assumption) for support for shared-caring shows that the stationarity assumption does not hold across time points (a change of 2.976 in \( \chi^2 \) with one degree of freedom is over the threshold for one-sided \( \chi^2 \) testing 2.706). As the stationarity assumption for the complete period is not crucial for the subsequent steps, different change coefficients are allowed in Models C4/D4. Models C5/D5 are similarly related to the policy measurements as outlined for immigration/immigrant attitudes, but note that these models are slightly different, since the shared caring/earning opinions are not observed after the last measurement of family migration policies. Consequently there are two instances of effects of lagged public opinion on policymaking to be constrained, but only one instance of the reverse effect, so no additional constraint.

In Models E1-E3 to H1-H3, public opinion toward immigration/immigrants is combined with public opinion toward shared-earning and shared-caring, making it possible to decide which types of public opinion condition family migration policies. Note that in Models E/F/G/H1, the effects between opinions and policies were constrained to be equal, both for opinions toward immigration/immigrant and support for shared-earning and shared-caring (i.e. \( \text{opinion1999} \times \text{policy2007} = \text{opinion2008} \times \text{policy2010} \) and \( \text{opinion2006} \times \text{policy2007} = \text{opinion2008} \times \text{policy2010} \) and \( \text{policy2007} \times \text{opinion2008} = \text{policy2010} \times \text{opinion2012} \)). In Models E/F/G/H2, only the panel effects for support for immigration/immigrants on family migration policies are maintained (i.e. the panel effects of shared-caring/earning on policies are removed) and in Models E/F/G/H3, only the panel effects for support for shared-caring/earning on family migration policies are maintained (i.e. the panel effects of support for immigration/immigrants are removed). This approach makes it possible to test models with the two different types of public opinion against each other. The results show that removing the effect of support for shared-caring on family migration policies significantly worsens the models. In Model E1.IMCA, with support for immigration and support for shared-caring, removing the effects of shared-caring meant a 10.881 change in \( \chi^2 \) (96.989- 86.108). Similarly, in Model G1.MICA, with pro-immigrant attitudes and support for shared-caring, removing the effect of shared-caring meant an 11.693 change in \( \chi^2 \) (95.071 - 83.378). Both of these are widely over the threshold for one-sided \( \chi^2 \) difference testing for one degree of freedom, namely 2.706. This is not the case with the models removing pro-immigrant attitudes or support for immigration, or indeed for those models removing supporting shared-earning. These results thus show the greater importance of attitudes toward gender roles in explaining family migration policies rather than support for immigration/immigrants and that it is specifically public opinion about shared-caring that matters.
The two models with shared-caring (E1.IMCA and G1.MICA) were the only ones that fit significantly better with the inclusion of the cross-lagged opinion-policy effects, yielding significant effects with asymptotic and bootstrapped standard errors and where these effects remained in the different model specifications mentioned above (e.g. phantom variables and time-lagged constraints). The results for SEM model E1.IMCA with support for immigration and shared-caring are shown in Figure 4.2. The results, including pro-immigrant attitudes, were very similar to the model with support for shared-caring, and are therefore not shown. The results for all models are available on request.

Figure 4.2 shows the unstandardized model results for the SEM model of support for shared-caring with support for immigration. The E1.IMCA model results show no effect of support for immigration on family migration policies (B= 0.023 SE= 0.044 Bootstrapped SE= 0.047). Nor does the model show any influence of family migration policies on support for immigration (B= -0.083 SE= 0.054 Bootstrapped SE= 0.052). The model also does not show any influence of family migration policies on support for shared-caring (B= 0.087 SE= 0.127 Bootstrapped SE= 0.153). However, the model does show a significantly negative effect of public opinion toward shared-care in the family on family migration policies (B= -0.228 SE= 0.052 Bootstrapped SE= 0.108). This is significant both with asymptotic and bootstrapped standard errors. This result indicates that the more a country supports women's care role being shared with other parties, the more restrictive family migration policies are. This is the case, controlling for support for immigration (as well as in the model with pro-immigrant attitudes).

Like the random effects model, the results of the SEM model thus indicate that where there is any influence of public opinion on family migration policies in 2007 and 2010, this is not related to public opinion about immigration (or immigrants, although these results are not shown) but rather to opinions about gender roles, with egalitarian attitudes causing more restrictive family migration policies. Note that the effect is ‘more significant’ than in the panel regression model. This is due to the inclusion of additional-incompletely-observed countries, as well as first instance measurements of public opinion in the model.

**Conclusion and discussion**

This paper asked whether divergent public opinion about immigration/immigrants and/or gender roles can explain changes in family migration policies in European countries. The results of the study are preliminary, pending further analyses with the latest version of the MIPEX database. The additional data will help to stabilize the estimated models and also allow for a better discussion of changes in policies over time. The preliminary results do indicate two findings about the relationship between public opinion and family migration policies.
Figure 4.2. Unstandardized model results for Model E1.IMCA on support for shared-caring, support for immigration and family migration policies (N=25). Asymptotic standard errors are shown in parentheses, bootstrapped standard errors in square brackets. Two-sided p<.05 are indicated in bold.
Firstly, no evidence was found for the policy-opinion nexus. This finding contests the literature on intergroup norms and group conflict theory. Schlueter et al. (2013) found evidence of a policy-opinion nexus, showing that integration policies are negatively associated with perceived group threat, more in line with the literature on intergroup norms than group conflict theory. This may be because of the different measurements used in this study, e.g. a modified MIPEX and the focus on family migration policies, or because of the additional inclusion of public opinion toward gender roles.

Secondly, evidence was found for the opinion-policy nexus, but only relating to public opinion about gender roles rather than opinions about immigration or immigrants. The results of the analyses gave no indication that public opinion about immigration and immigrants influenced countries’ family migration policies in 2007 and 2010. This finding contests the quote at the beginning of the paper by Card et al. (2005): public attitudes toward immigration and immigrant-related issues do not appear to be important for shaping family migration policies. The results here showed rather that public opinion about family norms influences family migration policies, namely that there is a negative influence of support for shared-caring on the openness of family migration policies. These results provide evidence that if public opinion influences family migration policies, it is opinions about gender roles in the family rather than opinions about immigration or immigrants that influence these policies. This finding contests those of Schlueter et al. (2013), who did not find evidence of an opinion-policy nexus when looking at immigration policies, however these authors did not look at family migration nor include public opinion about gender norms. The finding does provide support for the quote at above by Bonjour and De Hart (2013): family migration policies do appear to be partly shaped by gender roles in earning and caring in the home.

The negative relationship between egalitarian gender norms and permissive family migration policies is in line with the observation by Van Walsum (2008) that more egalitarian gender norms develop alongside more restrictive family migration policies. This may be because more traditional gender roles are projected on the migrant ‘other’. In family migration policies, these traditional gender norms are manifested in the form of income requirements and language requirements, making sponsors ‘breadwinners’ and making ‘dependents’ of incoming family members (Bonjour & Kraler, 2014; Eggebø, 2010). An example of this finding is Denmark, a country with very egalitarian gender norms and very restrictive family migration policies in the form of, for example, an income requirement. The overall negative effect of shared-caring on family migration policies was found despite the country differences in the relationship between gender norms and family migration policies. For example, both Denmark and Sweden have egalitarian gender norms, but Denmark has very closed family migration policies, while
Sweden has very open family migration policies. Including a wide range of countries in the analyses shows that there is still an overall negative effect across countries, despite exceptions.

This study was a first attempt at a cross-national study across time of the hypothesis put forward by Van Walsum (2008) on the relationship between public opinion toward gender roles and family migration policies. The study showed the value of including different types of public opinion when looking at this opinion-policy nexus. It also showed the usefulness of controlling for a possible opinion-policy nexus. As with any study, however, there are several limitations.

Firstly, the findings here are preliminary, pending further analyses including the latest MIPEX data. This additional data point would also allow for comparing the quality of the MIPI against the MIPex using a simplex model, a procedure which can only be done using three data points. Secondly, the measurement of public opinion should ideally be supplemented with a measurement of people’s opinions about the gender norms of migrants and their ideas about family migration policies specifically. None of these measurements is yet available in cross-national surveys across time, however. Thirdly, it should also be noted that working with country-level mean attitudes assumes that there is such a thing as the attitude of the ‘majority’ and that this is what influences policies. It is of course possible that only certain elements of society influence policies, e.g. the elite, or that politicians only appeal to one section of the population. This could be the subject of further study. Lastly, although this study can be seen as an improvement compared to looking only at single case studies, it still only has a limited sample, which affects the reliability of the estimates of models run. It would be worthwhile to improve all these limitations in further studies.

As well as addressing the above limitations, there are other possibilities for extending this study. One extension would be to look not just at countries’ official policies, but also at the application of these policies. Policies may stay the same, while the application of the policies changes (Hammar, 1985) or there may be differences in how these policies are applied by street-level bureaucrats (Ellermann, 2006; Van der Leun, 2003). None of these possibilities is measured here and it would be interesting to see whether the application of these policies, rather than the policies themselves, is influenced differently by public opinion. Another extension would be to look not just at the direct influences of public opinion on policies, but also at more indirect measures. Some authors show that public opinion can indirectly influence immigration policies through lobbying or pressure groups (Facchini & Mayda, 2008; Freeman, 1995). This potential mediating role of pressure groups and the media would be an interesting addition to the study, but difficult to do for the number of countries included in the study. Additionally, the potential mechanisms for how public opinion about gender is used in othering migrants could also be examined.
Looking at the direct relationship of opinion-policy, this study does not recognize the fact that even if policymakers aimed to make policies completely in line with public opinion, they would still have to abide by several legal obligations, both European and International Law. This could also be included in a further study. In further cross-national studies, it would also be interesting to include measurements of political systems—does public opinion affect policies in some political systems, but not in others? A final extension would be conducting a similar analysis using other policies and opinions—is it only family migration policies that are not influenced by opinions about immigration/immigrants, while being partly influenced by other seemingly unrelated opinions or are other policies similarly opinionated?
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References


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