CHAPTER 9 – UNSOLVED HISTORY: FRELIMO, COREMO AND OTHER MOVEMENTS UNTIL 1975

In this chapter I shall deal with the development of the most salient anticolonial organizations, as well as with how Frelimo evolved into an embodiment of only a section of its initial membership, leading to a situation at independence in which Frelimo was not only unwilling to cohabit with other movements or parties, but also unwilling to encompass different currents within itself. It was this narrow political attitude that formed one aspect, besides the aspect of the hostility of the “white” minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa, of the subsequent Frelimo-Renamo war. How that attitude could evolve is a contested issue, and it is necessary to formulate a position. Because Frelimo has played such a decisive rôle in Mozambique’s history of the last half-century, some background must be given on the organization’s development. Mozambique’s history of the last half-century cannot be understood without a description of Frelimo’s eventful trajectory. Conceptions of “democracy” will be discussed and the crucial presidential vote during Frelimo’s Second Congress will be analysed. Description of Frelimo’s early history will also provide an opportunity to assess (once more) Anderson’s (2006) theory about “imagined communities”. Due to considerations of word count, I cannot discuss all details of the thorny issue of Frelimo’s early history in this thesis.

Early Frelimo history

A problem with earlier literature, much of it of Euro-American origin, is that it was often written from an ideological rather than a historical-critical stance (see De Bragança and Depelchin 1986; Igreja 2010: 790; cf. Dinerman 2006: 15, 17). My own reconstruction below is based on a re-reading of original material of the 1960s and incorporation of new publications, particularly since 2003. I will propose solutions for certain chronological problems that affect the interpretation of Frelimo’s political history and the analysis of conceptions of “democracy” within Mozambican politics.

Early activities

After the Barue revolt it was difficult to conceive of any successful method to end Portuguese colonialism (Mondlane 1972: 395-396). African resistance consisted of localized protests,
such as strikes. Rural defiance was rather limited (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983: 69-72). Mondlane (1965b: 30) speaks of “nationalist sentiments” expressed through “para-political” associations (cf. Simango 1966: 53-54). The Associação dos Naturais de Moçambique and the Mozambique African Voluntary Cotton Society of Lázaro Nkavandame (~ Kavandame), established in 1957, may be mentioned. It was in this context that eventually anticolonial movements would arise. In 1954 some Makonde Mozambicans in Tanganyika founded the Tanganyika Mozambique Makonde Union, an ethnic-cultural self-help organization. Other organizations were the Makonde African Association (MAA) and the Makonde African National Union (MANU). In Rhodesia EAPA (East African Portuguese Association) was set up in 1959 by Uria Timóteo Simango, a Presbyterian pastor.82

The Mueda massacre

On 16 June 1960, a meeting was called in Mueda to discuss work issues pending between the population around Mueda and the colonial government (Chipande in Mondlane 1969: 117-118). The colonial government made no concessions and Faustino Vanomba and Kibirite Diwane were arrested in front of 5,000 people. Shots were fired in the ensuing tumult, killing between nine and about 500-600 people (Cahen 1999: 31; Mondlane 1969: 117-118, 124; exact numbers unclear). The Mueda Massacre tragedy is recognized as “a symbol, a catalyst, for armed struggle” (Henriksen 1983: 19).

MANU, UDENAMO and UNAMI and the Frelimo merger

In October 1960, UDENAMO (União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (Mozambique National Democratic Union) was founded in Bulawayo, Rhodesia, led by Adelino Gwambe, soon involving Uria Simango.83 In Nyasaland (now Malawi) the União Nacional Africana de Moçambique Independente (UNAMI – National African Union of Independent Mozambique) was formed under José Baltazar da Costa Chagong’a’s leadership in 1960. UDENAMO and UNAMI moved their headquarters to Dar-es-Salaam in February 1961 (Marcum 1969: 196, 198). MANU had meanwhile changed the word « Makonde » in its name to « Mozambique »

81 Or « Mozambique » (Cahen 1999: 34).
Marcelino dos Santos and Gwambe met in Casablanca in April 1961, after which Gwambe appointed Dos Santos as deputy secretary-general of UDENAMO (Cabrita 2000: 6-7; Marcum 1969: 197; Mondlane 1966: 203; 1969: 119; cf. 1963: 19). Eventually UDENAMO and MANU were to merge into Frelimo but it is still not entirely clear how this happened. Dos Santos reportedly came up with the suggestion and actual planning started in March 1962 (Henriksen 1978: 169; 1983: 20). The united organization’s name was proposed by Fanuel Mahluza (Cabrita 2000: 9; Moyana [N] 2000): « Frente de Libertação de Moçambique » (Mozambique Liberation Front; abbreviated FRELIMO or Frelimo). At that time, Frelimo appeared a rather loosely organized cooperation programme between UDENAMO and MANU (without UNAMI), probably under Gwambe’s leadership. After interference by Tanzania’s interior minister Oskar Kambona, UDENAMO and MANU publicly announced on 24 May 1962 to form a common front. Frelimo’s name was made public in Ghana on 25 May, confirmed by PIDE/DGS (1962). Eventually, on 25 June the merger between UDENAMO and MANU (not UNAMI) would know a “consolidation” (Henriksen 1978: 170) in a meeting with the election of Eduardo Mondlane as president (Cabrita 2000: 11; Frelimo [H] 1962). Thus, Frelimo as a coalition may be considered to have been founded under Gwambe’s leadership in a period up to end May 1962, but Frelimo as an entity that envisioned being a unique anticolonial organization on its own in Mozambique emerged under Mondlane’s leadership on 25 June. In that sense “25 June” indeed signifies a new beginning.

Mondlane’s rise as Frelimo leader

Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane was born in the (then) district of Gaza in 1920 (Cabrita 2000:

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84 The name change would imply a Mozambique-wide nationalist stance rather than a focus on one ethnic group only. Confusion abounds around MANU’s history; see different versions by Cabrita (2000: 8), Cahen (1999), Mondlane (1969: 119), and Ncomo (2009: 84).
85 The acronym is officially « FRELIMO » (e.g. Frelimo [H] 2006: art. 4), but it is wide-spread practice to write « Frelimo ».
87 For archival references, see the [A] section in bibliography. PIDE: Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (International and State Defence Police; later DGS: Direcção-Geral de Segurança (Executive-General for Security), the Portuguese secret political police in the time of Salazar and Caetano. The two abbreviations are usually mentioned together as they concern the same institution.
14). He came to study at the Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg. In 1949, however, the South African government refused to prolong his study residential permit, after the racist National Party had won the May 1948 elections. Back in Mozambique, Mondlane and others set up the Nucleus of Mozambican Secondary Students (NESAM). Thereafter he studied at the University of Lisbon (in 1950) and at Oberlin College in Ohio, obtaining a BA degree in letters in 1953. Subsequently he obtained an MA and eventually in 1960 a PhD degree in sociology at Northwestern University in Evanston (IL), and lectured at several universities. He also worked at the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations from 1957 to 1961. He represented that entity during the referendum about the future of South Cameroon on 11 February 1961 (Notícias 1961). Thereafter, he visited Mozambique to assess the situation there (USA 1961). Mondlane preferred “a non-violent solution in Mozambique” (USA ibid.: 1-2). He wanted to educate Africans so as to prepare for the situation after independence. Mondlane visited Tanganyika in June 1962 (USA 1962a; 1962b). Meanwhile, a fusion committee had been set up between UDENAMO and MANU headed by Simango to prepare for a formal meeting.

**The consolidation meeting**

UDENAMO, MANU and UNAMI convened from 20 to 25 June, but only UDENAMO and MANU would formally merge. On 25 June the leadership of Frelimo was voted for. Mondlane is reported to have obtained 116, Simango 13, and Chagong’a 6 votes. Simango became vice-president. Groups associated with MAA and MANU still existed after 25 June (Cahen 1999: 42), and UNAMI did not formally merge at all. There was no national unity in the sense that there would be only one organization that organized Mozambicans. Mondlane does not seem to have had a firm grip on Frelimo at the time, although Gwambe’s

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90 The referendum was about the choice between becoming part of Nigeria or of the Republic of Cameroon (Konings 2008: 80).
94 See Gwambe, Mmole and Sigauke [H] (1972: 475); Chilcote (1972 [ed.]: 458); Frelimo (1963: 9).
influence drastically diminished.95

Frelimo’s First Congress

Frelimo “First Annual Conference” or Congress was held from 23 until 28 September 1962 (Chilcote 1965: 85; USA 1962i). Mondlane stated that each Mozambican was to subject himself “completely (to the party’s direction) without questioning [...]” (USA ibid.: 3).96 Congress elected a National Council, which elected a Central Committee, including the president. According to Blacken, an 11-member Central Committee was established, of which three members were appointed directly by Mondlane, bypassing the statutes97 (USA ibid.: 5-6).

The statutes contained two noteworthy articles (though rarely discussed together):

To attain its goals, FRELIMO: / a – Proclaims the necessity of union of all of the Mozambican people. / b – Organizes, unites and mobilizes all Mozambicans. (Frelimo 1963: art. V; this article cf. Alpers 1979: 271, who however, focuses on parallels with UDENAMO statutes.)

Concerning Frelimo-membership, the statutes stipulate later:

Members of the FRONT can be all Mozambicans who agree with the Statutes and the programme of FRELIMO and who commit themselves to carrying out daily the policy of FRELIMO. (Frelimo 1963: art. VII)

Art. V targets “all Mozambicans” but art. VII implies that there may be Mozambicans not within Frelimo. The statutes do not explicitly say or logically imply that Mozambicans who are not Frelimo-members would be obliged to carry out Frelimo’s policies. This idea would nevertheless be made public later, as we shall see below. For future reference, it must be mentioned here that Lázaro Nkavandame became provincial chairman (or secretary) of Cabo Delgado in December 1962 and acted as Frelimo’s director of the Department of Commerce in Cabo Delgado.98

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95 See data in USA (1962d: 1, 3; 1962e; 1962f; 1962g: 2, 4; 1962h: 2); cf. Gwambe (1962).
96 The printed version of Mondlane’s speech [H] (1977) does not mention this.
97 For the adopted statutes: USA (1962i: 5); Frelimo (1963). Another version of the statutes is given by PIDE/DGS (1963b.)
Some notes on “definitions of the enemy”

It is convenient to make a few remarks here on whom Frelimo considered its enemy. A distinction can be made between formulations of the “enemy” as an abstraction and as people. Abstract types of enemy were “colonialism” and “imperialism” (Frelimo 1963: art. IV-a). Enemy people were “Portuguese colonialists” (Frelimo 1966a) or “Portuguese” also identified as “Whites” (Frelimo in De Bragança and Wallerstein [eds.] 1982a). The Second Congress considered deserters from the struggle as enemies. From 1969 on Frelimo still considered Portuguese colonialism as enemy, but the formula to fight “exploitation of man by man”, mentioned in a resolution of the Second Congress, was interpreted by Mondlane’s successor Machel as “class struggle” (as opposed to “racial struggle”). In Machel’s interpretation, “blacks” could be enemies while “whites” would not necessarily be. Finally, “enemy” might just mean “the Portuguese colonial army or government”.99

Developments within Frelimo 1962-1966

Several individuals got expelled from Frelimo, such as Mmole and Millinga100 and Leo Milas, secretary for information and publicity, later secretary for defence and information, and initially loyal to Mondlane. However, Milas appeared reckless, and Mondlane had Milas expelled from Frelimo on 25 August 1964. Milas was accused of “not [being] a Mozambican”.101

In 1963, the Mozambique Institute was set up in Dar-es-Salaam to educate Mozambicans, specifically secondary school students. It was led by the Mondlane couple (Eduardo and his US American wife Janet).102 1964 marks the beginning of Mozambican anticolonial armed struggle. The first shot was apparently fired by Gwambe-associates in Zambézia in July (Cahen 1999:45n26; 2010). MANU, with Lucas Fernandes, fired its “first shot” on 24 August 1964, killing Dutch missionary Daniel Boormans.103 Mondlane

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101 Cabrita (2000: 12, 28); Frelimo (≤ 1963: 2); Manghezi (1999: 227); Ncomo (2009: 116-120, 123); Vines (1991: 11). On Milas’s name, Frelimo (1964), but see USA (1962b: 2); for contrast with USA’s (ibid.) version of Milas’s entry into Frelimo, see Chissano (2010: 331).
103 Cahen (1999: 45); Henriksen (1978: 186-187). Not « Boorman » as sometimes written (cf. <www.graftombe.nl>). MANU was possibly “tired of waiting for Frelimo’s initiative” (Cabrita 2000:
condemned the latter action but promised Mozambique would be free within five years (Africa Report 1964b). Frelimo undertook several operations on or around 25 September 1964, which is the date of Frelimo’s proverbial “first shot” (Cahen 1999: 45n26).

Meanwhile (presumably after the expulsion of Milas), Magaia had become Frelimo’s security and defence secretary (Christie 1989: 34). On 10 October 1966, Magaia died after an incident during a mission in Niassa, shot by Frelimo soldier Lourenço Matola (Ncomo 2009: 154; Opello 1975: 73n21).

Machel became Magaia’s successor as top military commander, giving him a position on the Central Committee (Munslow 1985: xiv; cf. Matsinha in Sampaio 2012: 27). Christie writes that Machel was appointed only in November (ibid.: 42; cf. Frelimo n.d.-a) but this dating a relatively long time after the death of Magaia is problematic. In the one-and-a-half year after Magaia’s death, relationships within Frelimo would seriously sour, as it will now be my task to analyse.

The October 1966 meeting of the Central Committee

The literature is unclear about the dating of an important Central Committee “meeting (or session) of October 1966”, around Magaia’s death. The very vagueness of the formulation « October 1966 » without specific dates signals difficulties as to its exact proceedings. Yet crucial decisions were made regarding the reorganization of the army and the involvement of students in the armed struggle (Christie 1989: 44; Janet Mondlane in Panzer 2009: 815). Christie clearly supposes the meeting was before Magaia death. Hanlon (1984: 30) and Munslow (1985: xiv) imply the meeting was after Magaia’s death and with Machel’s participation (cf. Machel in Muiuane [ed.] 2006: 247).

The dating problem is relevant for the question which policy changes in October 1966 were (partly) due to Machel. Christie’s chronology implies that Machel just “put [...] into operation” earlier decisions (1989: 44). However, if the meeting and its decisions were after Magaia’s death, some policy changes may be specifically attributable to Machel. Armando Guebuza (2004: 38) states unequivocally that the meeting did start before Magaia’s “murder”

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104 The start of the war would trigger movements of Mozambican refugees into Tanzania; see Panzer (2013).

105 On the suspicious incident, see Cabrita (2000: 47); Christie (1989: 43); Frelimo (1966d); Manghezi (1999: 270-271); Muianga (2005); Ncomo (2009: 151-152); Pachinuapa (2009: 27, 48) and Matsinha in Sampaio (2012: 37-40). The “accident” hypothesis has the difficult task to explain not only the shot’s triggering, but also its direction towards Magaia.

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(assassinato), but ended after his death, contradicting Christie.

The report of the “October 1966” meeting mentions “deficiencies in the coordination of general action” and “insufficiencies in general orientation”, which had “impeded the adequate development of the struggle” (Frelimo 1977b: 37). Education was no longer to form cadre for an independent Mozambique, but to realize “the tasks imposed by the revolution” (ibid.: 38). The Central Committee appointed Armando Guebuza as secretary of the Department of Education and Culture. The military was criticized as well. The alleged tendency of the military to consider themselves better than the civilians was condemned (ibid.: 41; cf. Cabrita 2000: 46-47). The two-sided criticism indicates tension between the military and the civilian leadership. Criticism concerning general action and general orientation indicates dissatisfaction with Mondlane. This leads to questioning to what degree Mondlane’s political association with Machel (and Dos Santos) was entirely according to Mondlane’s own ideals – and vice versa. Ronguane (2010: 172; cf. 155) has argued that Mondlane’s days as leader were “counted” because he represented a bourgeois ideology. A practical result of the October meeting was that the Department of Defence and Security was split into one department for defence under Machel and one for security under Chissano (Christie 1989: 44). A Politico-Military Committee was established; one reason was to end the situation that Defence seemed “just another department” (Borges Coelho 1989: 47).

Frelimo’s difficulties with students in 1967 and 1968

Tension between being educated and serving in the struggle would emerge in conflicts between Frelimo and students in Dar-es-Salaam and between Frelimo and students of UNEMO (União Nacional de Estudantes de Moçambique – National Union of Mozambican Students) in the USA (cf. Mondlane 1969: 179-180) in the period 1967-1968. These two conflicts may be dealt with simultaneously. I shall argue that the tension was largely a product of Frelimo’s own shift in emphases after October 1966.

Students prepared for “top jobs” while soldiers bore the dangers of the struggle, writes Christie (1989: 49-50). This ignores that aspiring a “career” was encouraged by the Mondlanes themselves (PIDE/DGS 1963a; cf. SCCI 1963: “tif” file 3; cf. Janet Mondlane 1967: 3; Pachinuapa and Manguedye 2009: 71). Janet Mondlane reported in 1968 that Frelimo’s Central Committee had decided in October 1966 that students should devote time and energy to the liberation struggle during school holidays (Panzer 2009: 815). Later it was
held that students should devote a whole year (Cabrita 2000: 51). The students resented the increased demands for participation in the struggle, which apparently had not been formulated to them when they entered the school. Their resentment would be made manifest by Father Mateus Gwenjere, who came to the school in September 1967, initially welcomed by Mondlane. Gwenjere purportedly demanded that lessons should be in English, as against Portuguese. The Mozambique Institute had earlier been educating for a Cambridge Certificate – i.e. an English-oriented diploma (Angola Comité 1965a). Several authors write or imply that Gwenjere maintained that students’ lives should not be put at risk. Apparently the ensuing conflict became explicit during Frelimo’s Christmas party end 1967 (Meisler [N] 1968).

Students abroad had set up UNEMO in 1961, later cooperating with Frelimo. By January 1966 UNEMO had established that “a minimum of fifteen students must return every year during their holidays to work inside Mozambique” (Munslow 1974: 158). A new leadership however “refused to be subordinated to [...] FRELIMO” (Serapião 2004: 379). Frelimo produced a document reprimanding UNEMO (translated in Wheeler 1969).

Cabrita (2000: 52) questions Mondlane’s authorship of the reprimand. This thesis also doubts at least the sole authorship of Mondlane. One reason is a dating error, apparently unnoticed so far, giving Mondlane’s PhD graduation in “1956” instead of “1960”. This is a common error, but Mondlane would not have made it. Another reason is the treatment of

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109 Below I will be concerned with the USA branch only.


111 Formulation: “[...] he received a Doctorate in 1956 (Ph.D.)” in Wheeler (1969: 323). See e.g. Pachinuapa and Manguedye (2009: 19). The error possibly originates from Mondlane’s formulation

The reprimand tried to convince UNEMO students, also when unrelated to Frelimo, to comply with Frelimo’s requirements, arguing that

FRELIMO [...] appears as the incarnation of the will and aspirations of the Mozambican masses [...] // Thus, to obey FRELIMO is to obey the Fatherland (in Wheeler 1969: 328, capitalizations omitted).

From these premises, the conclusion then follows “logically”:

*It is not necessary to be a member of FRELIMO for there to be a duty to obey the decisions of FRELIMO* (in Wheeler 1969: 328, capitalizations omitted, emphasis original; “logical”: 1970: 169).

The 1962 statutes did not require non-members to obey Frelimo, but now this principle is explicitly established.

UNEMO reacted with a coherent vision on Frelimo:

[D]oes he [the author] want to identify himself with Mozambique in the sense that whoever is not a Frelimo member [...] is not a Mozambican? (in Wheeler 1970: 175).

[W]hat we object to is that FRELIMO in its present condition poses as “the incarnation of Mozambican will and aspirations” (in Wheeler 1970: 176).

Meanwhile in Dar-es-Salaam, Gwenjere had been removed as teacher in February 1968. Some students led by amongst others Daniel Chatama, demanded four “white Portuguese” teachers to be removed. To cut a complicated story short, the result was that virtually all elsewhere to have “studied from 1951 until 1956” (e.g. in Angola Comité 1967: 6).
students left the secondary school and Frelimo had to close it in or around April 1968. The failure of Anderson’s (2006) theory about “imagined communities” becomes manifest here: first, the Portuguese language could not create national solidarity if its use was itself under dispute (even if, paradoxically, [part of] the dispute may have been performed in Portuguese); second, whatever means of communications the people had at the school, they shared it, but this also did not by itself forge national solidarity.

The assaults on Frelimo’s office in May 1968

In March 1968 Frelimo successfully re-opened a front in the Tete area front (Borges Coelho 1989: 21-22). However, problems back in Dar-es-Salaam would continue. In May 1968 Frelimo’s office was assaulted by a group of people about whom the literature has no agreement who they were. The group was able to close the office. A few days later another or the same (unclear) group invaded the reopened office with much violence, eventually costing Mateus Muthemba his life. The Neue Zürcher Zeitung reported that Simango blamed Gwenjere for the disturbances (in Angola Comité 1968). If this is true then this indicates that until about mid-May 1968 Simango could not yet be viewed as the odd man out within Frelimo as he was to become later (cf. Pollet 1970). In any case, the events concerning the students and the office indicate great dissatisfaction with Frelimo. I conclude that in the earlier years Frelimo had had disputes with individuals but by 1968 had arrived at antagonizing entire sections of the population. A Congress was to be convened from 20 to 25 July to address the problems.

Frelimo’s Second Congress

I shall now analyse both antecedents and results of the Second Congress and argue that it failed to solve the existing problems but laid the foundation for the future supremacy of Machel.


Planning for the Second Congress

Either Nkavandame or Simango urged for a Congress (Christie (1989[1988]: 49 resp. Ncomo 2009[2003]: 158). With Simango hesitating (Cabrita 2000: 55), it was probably Nkavandame who pressed for the Congress, and convinced Simango to cooperate with him. Mondlane announced the “reunion” in a press conference on 25 May 1968, thus after the troublesome office events (Frelimo 1968a: 6). Afterwards Frelimo also mentioned the May assault, suggesting it did play a rôle in triggering the Second Congress (1968b: 1). The literature echoes Mondlane’s reluctance.\(^{114}\)

A dispute arose as to where the Congress was to be held. Mondlane decided to have it held in Niassa (Cabrita 2000: 56), within Mozambique, which was to Nkavandame’s (and Simango’s) disadvantage as Nkavandame would be better able to mobilize support when the venue would have been in Tanzania (Hanlon 1984: 32). Nkavandame and several others boycotted the congress, fearing to be killed (Cabrita 2000: 56; Ncomo 2009: 188).

Procedural aspects and results of the Second Congress

The Second Congress has been described as an event where “a ‘revolutionary line’ prevailed” (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983: 97; cf. Kruks 1987: 245). This analysis is difficult to maintain. The Congress emphasized the organization of the Mozambican population along military principles, which strengthened Machel’s position as army commander (cf. Henriksen 1983: 149). It affirmed the value of “socialism”, but did not abandon a racialist interpretation of the struggle, as I shall argue below (Frelimo 1977d: 105; cf. Munslow 1983: 108).

At the Second Congress the president was elected by the Congress itself, not by a National Council (Mondlane won the presidential vote; more on this below). The Central Committee was expanded from 22 to 42 members (Africa Report 1968: 42). For executive matters a specific Executive Committee was formed consisting of the president, the vice-president and secretaries of departments (Mondlane 1969: 171, 192). Every four years there was to be a Congress.\(^{115}\)

Mondlane called the Second Congress “far more democratic than the first” (1969: 171; cf. 1966: 206), applying two criteria. First, he invoked representativeness, delegates being elected through local party networks in liberated and non-liberated areas. Second, he used a


\(^{115}\) Mondlane (1969: 171, 188); curiously not mentioned in Muuiane (ed.) 2006: 104-111.)
structural criterion and wrote that the decisions by the Congress “were in keeping with its composition [signifying] a move towards a more democratic structure” (1969: 171).

As for the first criterion, there appear to have been 143 delegates (PIDE/DGS 1968c). PIDE/DGS gives a breakdown of the origin of delegates. Not all delegates were enumerated according to their provincial origin, but where provincial origins are mentioned the numbers of delegates are not always congruent with population data, with Niassa overrepresented, raising questions about the criteria for determining the numbers of delegates per province. Moreover, Mondlane does not mention that, as indicated, a number of Cabo Delgado delegates were not present. Since Mondlane (1969) does not elaborate on these points, it is not possible to follow him here.

The second criterion was that decisions would have reflected structure. Here again we cannot follow Mondlane, because the only aspect of “structure” he (minimally) elaborates is geographical representativeness. But the Congress did not apply procedures for reaching decisions according to geographical considerations. If no “unanimity” could be reached, decisions were reached through a “majority” vote, irrespective of geographical considerations (Frelimo 1968b: 2). Furthermore, with the overrepresentation of Niassa in the number of delegates, Mondlane’s second criterion fails to be convincing. We will see below why this matters.

Davidson implied that the congress went without discussions of grave problems, an impression he would gradually change later, without giving details (see 1968a, 1968b, 1970: 341, 1972: 225-230, 1979: 129). That deadly violence within Frelimo may have been discussed at the Second Congress is, however, suggested by Frelimo commander and later Lieutenant-General José Moiane, who was not present at the Congress but was informed concerning it about the problems that were discussed in relation to the contradictions that existed within Frelimo, how these disputes were overcome […] [Still after the Congress] the chairman [Frelimo leaders in the Cabo Delgado area usually associated with Nkavandame] and some militiamen were “poisoned” with these contradictions and because of that there were … os problemas que se debateram com relação às contradições que havia no seio da FRELIMO, como foram superadas essas querelas. […] [Ainda] os chairmans [sic] e alguns milicianos estavam “envenenados” com essas contradições e por isso havia constantes matanças e

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116 See PIDE/DGS (1968c: “tif” files 361-366). Population data for “Non-Civilized” people (the greater part of Mozambique’s inhabitants) per province (“district” in colonial parlance) for 1960 can be found in Spence (1963: 26). Moçambique (now Nampula), the most populous province was drastically underrepresented with only seven delegates, while Niassa (the least populous province where the Congress was controversially held) was drastically overrepresented with 16 delegates (not counting Kadewelete).
constant massacres and persecutions. persecuições (Moiane 2009: 88).

Though we are not informed what these “contradictions” were and who were perpetrators and victims of the “massacres”, three things can be concluded: first, at least some discussions at the Second Congress were rather severe and somehow associated with intra-Frelimo murder; second, some used the discussions to define Nkavandame and associates as separate from Frelimo, a separation that failed to become official policy at the Congress; third, the Second Congress did not resolve the problems. Remains a difficulty in the chronology of the “massacres”; Moiane’s formulation is such that these would have occurred after the Second Congress rather than before. Muianga (2005), however, would suggest Lino Abraão, Rui Vilanamuiali and Barnabé Tawe were earlier murder victims.

**The presidential vote at the Second Congress**

In this section, history and technicalities coincide. As said, Congress would choose the Frelimo president. This was done by means of a vote between Mondlane and Simango. This vote is one of the greatest mysteries in Frelimo’s (and therefore Mozambique’s) history. I hope to shed more light on the subject by investigating technicalities. I know of no source that has a confirmed exact outcome of the vote. Ncomo (2009: 188) states that the difference in favour of Mondlane was only two votes, but gives no source. Davidson gives no clue whatsoever (1968a; 1968b; 1970; 1972; 1979). However, Cabrita implies that the absence of the Cabo Delgado delegates associated with Nkavandame would have cost Simango the presidency (2000: 56), which would confirm that the vote was very close. Unclear from the sources is also why only Mondlane and Simango were presidential candidates. Matsinha (in Sampaio 2012: 45) remains vague on this issue. I propose the following explanation of the binary character of the presidential vote. This hinges basically on the phenomenon, mentioned by Mackie (2003: 5), that plurality contests tend to reduce the number of candidates to two. At the Second Congress the election was formally independent of any discussions about matters of content (Z. Maurício in Ncomo 2009: 191-192). More specifically, the election result is reported as being solely depending on a counting procedure with votes as input; in other words, Frelimo used a choice set method to determine who would be president. Mondlane and Simango’s own candidacies can be understood by considering that each of them, as incumbent president and vice-president, genuinely desired to be president. It was therefore to be expected that they wanted to stand for election. The fact
that there were only two candidates may then be explained by pointing out that two other main antagonists, Machel and Nkavandame, had at the time of the Congress allied themselves with Mondlane and Simango respectively. Standing as candidates too would have split the votes of their supporters. The strongly antagonistic situation makes this voting different from that in June 1962. Now if the outcome was very close, the relatively high number of Niassa delegates raises questions (recall that Frelimo was supposed to be “the incarnation of the will and aspirations of the Mozambican masses”, not just its own members, so one might expect some numerical congruence between delegates and population). It was not the Simango/Nkavandame faction but the Mondlane/Machel faction which had, to Nkavandame’s regret, control over Niassa during the preparations of the Congress. As apparently there were no criteria for the provincial numbers of delegates, it is not inconceivable that the high number of Niassa delegates is due to invitations by the Mondlane/Machel faction in the field during the preparations. Wide differences in the number of delegates across provinces, the absence of Nkavandame’s group and the apparent closeness of the vote give this crucial vote a highly arbitrary character.

Aftermath of the Second Congress

The Second Session of the Central Committee

After the Second Congress, the Second Session of the Central Committee\(^{117}\) was held from 24 August until 1 September 1968 (Frelimo 1977e). Here also there was still no resounding victory for some “revolutionary line”. As Machel would admit in 1970:

[W]e try to define our line, or better to redefine the line laid down by the Second Congress [sic] of the FRELIMO Central Committee. (Machel 1970: 8, emphasis added)

Machel would not have to redefine a line if Mondlane and he himself had already formulated a satisfactory line (cf. Frelimo [ed.] 1977: 181).

My interpretation of the Second Session is that it represented a long overdue formalization of Mondlane as army commander, while in return Machel got an increased influence over non-combatants by pulling them into military training structures. These

\(^{117}\) The First Session (after the Second Congress) was held immediately following that Congress (Pachinuapa 2009: 97). I know no minutes of it.
decisions are symptomatic of a power balance between Mondlane and Machel and are not necessarily a spontaneously shared common policy.\textsuperscript{118}

\textit{Nkavandame’s expulsion from Frelimo}

In August 1968 Mondlane met Nkavanadame, but no agreement was reached. Eventually Paulo Kankhomba was killed on 22 December 1968, although Nkavandame’s own involvement remains unclear. Machel accused Nkavandame of profiteering in his economic activities, while Mondlane had mentioned Nkavandame’s work positively.\textsuperscript{119} Mondlane expelled Nkavandame from Frelimo on 10 January.\textsuperscript{120} Once again Frelimo removed someone whom Mondlane had specifically trusted earlier. Nkavandame defected to the Portuguese authorities (Ncomo 2009: 197).

\textbf{Mondlane’s assassination and subsequent developments within Frelimo}

On 3 February 1969 Mondlane was killed by a bomb hidden in a mailed book,\textsuperscript{121} in circumstances not publicly known (Cabrita 2000: 58). Nowadays the party blames the PIDE/DGS for the assassination (Frelimo n.d.-b). A specific individual, Casimiro Monteiro, is sometimes mentioned in this context (Neves de Souto 2007: 213n40).\textsuperscript{122} Simango would substitute for Mondlane as interim-president according to article 40 of the Internal General Regulation (Ncomo 2009: 208; Frelimo in PIDE/DGS 1968b). The establishment of a Council of the Presidency consisting of a triumvirate of Machel, Dos Santos and Simango (as coordinator) was decided at the Third Session of the Central Committee of 11 until 21 April 1969 (Frelimo 1977f: 134). This gave Machel and Dos Santos a presidential position without ever having been appointed as such by a Frelimo Congress (cf. Z. Maurício in Ncomo 2009: 224). Election of the president by Congress upon \textit{proposal} by the Central Committee was at that moment the constitutional procedure (Mondlane 1969: 171). In case of death, a Central Committee appointment would have to be subject to ratification by another congress (Muiuane [ed.] 2006: 107, 109-110). However, Frelimo’s Third Congress was held only in

\textsuperscript{118} Frelimo (1977b: 42); Frelimo (1977e: 111-112); Manghezi (1999: 336); Mondlane (1969: 152).
\textsuperscript{119} On these disputes and events: Cabrita (2000: 56-57, 61); Christie (1989: 56); Hall and Young (1997: 17); Hanlon (1984: 32-33); Ncomo (2009: 194); Vail and White (1980: 395).
\textsuperscript{120} Cabrita (2000: 57); Houser and Shore (1975: 45); Ncomo (2009: 196-197).
\textsuperscript{122} For Janet Mondlane’s inscrutable position concerning potentially culpable people, see Manghezi (1999: 304); \textit{Metical in Allafrica} (1999).
1977. The Statutes adopted then no longer mentioned the requirement of congressional ratification, so that Machel was never formally approved as party and country president by more people than the number of members of the Central Committee (art. 21-e of Statutes in Frelimo 1977a: 49).

After the Third Session, Frelimo announced the “elimination of erroneous conceptions”. Frelimo now put the goal of quick independence as secondary to the Mozambican people’s being “politically mature” (Frelimo 1977f: 129; 1969b: 2). Thus the idea of “protracted war” became official Frelimo ideology and was strongly associated with Machel and the group around him (Manning 2002: 45-46). The Third Session had decided that Machel himself got direct control over many civilian policy areas which came under the Department of Defence (Frelimo 1977f: 134-135, 141). More than 40 individuals were expelled (Frelimo 1969c: 26-27; cf. Ncomo 2009: 216) and LIFEMO was merged with the Women’s Detachment, Frelimo’s women’s combat group (Frelimo 1977f: 145).

Early November 1969 Simango made public his pamphlet *Gloomy Situation in Frelimo* (Simango 1969; cf. Ncomo 2009: 229, 385-401). Of particular historical interest is the claim that there had been conspiratory meetings of people originating from the south of Mozambique in Janet Mondlane’s house in February/March 1969 (cf. ibid.: 393, 398). When asked about them recently, Janet Mondlane did not deny the existence of such meetings (Gonçalves 2011). Simango gained no concrete advantages by his pamphlet and the Executive Committee suspended Simango from the Council of the Presidency (Frelimo 1969e). Tanzania expelled him, according to Moisés (2012c) because the Tanzanian government did not like his erratic behaviour (first denying Gwenjere’s information about “killing fields” of “the Mondlane group” while now confirming this in *Gloomy Situation*). Simango was formally expelled from Frelimo at the Fourth Session of the Central Committee in May 1970 (Frelimo 1977g: 158-159). The Fourth Session elected Machel and Dos Santos as President and Vice-President “until the next Congress” (ibid.: 159), which, as indicated, did not occur until 1977.

“Race”, ethnicity and nationality with Frelimo and Mondlane

Since there is no *a priori* way of determining who is a Mozambican, as discussed in the theory above, this topic became an issue within Frelimo. The problem of “who is a

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123 LIFEMO: Mozambique Women’s League; cf. Frelimo (1966b); Manghezi (1999: 221); Josina Machel (1969). LIFEMO had been under the leadership of Selina Simango, Uria Simango’s wife.
Mozambican” was initially related to “race” issues and Mondlane’s interpretation of the struggle. I shall show that Mondlane remained attached to a predominantly racialist interpretation of the struggle.

On 25 June 1962, Frelimo did not reach a decision on “race” issues. Nevertheless, the US American Embassy interpreted the situation as Frelimo fighting “against colonialism, not against the white community” (USA 1962i: 5). In September 1963, Frelimo stated in Why We Fight that “[a]lmost all the commerce [...] is in the hands of Whites and Indians” and that “Mozambique is only for the Mozambicans and we do not accept the intervention of any outsider. [...] We are going to expel the Portuguese!””, suggesting that “Blacks”, “Portuguese” and “Indians” are “outsiders” (De Bragança and Wallerstein [eds.] 1982a: 12-13). Such racialist interpretations of “Whites” as opponents were not strange to Mondlane. Only recently authors have picked up what Mondlane’s PhD thesis was about: “race” relations. Ncomo (2009: 165) and Ronguane (2010) briefly deal with the thesis, and here I wish to press the point a bit further.

In his PhD thesis, Mondlane showed with admirable clarity a racialist bias with some of his respondents in being lenient or punitive towards hypothetical exam cheaters (Mondlane 1960: 58-59). Mondlane reached the following conclusions:

[T]he racial or caste membership of a cheater provides a reference point in relation to which a given proctor [i.e. Mondlane’s respondent] is able to formulate his values [...] The regional origin of the proctor, like the school which he attends, provides a cultural setting in which the racial identity takes meaning. (1960: 96)

[T]here is a significant relationship between low academic standards [perceived by respondents] and racial bias, [but] race or caste is important only when it is set against the background of [...] the collective experiences of the groups tested. (1960: 96-97)

Mondlane went on to write that the South of the United States knows “negative relations between the two racial groups” which “solidify themselves into antagonistic camps whose individual members resent each other” (1960: 97-98). This anticipates a comment by Mondlane about eight years later:

[T]here is a class system which clearly runs along racial/cultural lines [...] in Mozambique [leading to] conflicts between groups also following the same racial grooves. When finally the explosion takes place it will necessarily be mainly between the members of those communities which have the most antagonistic and contradictory interests [namely] those of the settler class [...] and those of [...] the African people. (Mondlane [N] 1968: 18124)

124 Probably a variant of a paper presented at a United Nations seminar in Lusaka in 1967; see
If one should accept that students at the Mozambique Institute secondary school were “anti-white racists”, Mondlane’s theorizing provides a virtually perfect explanation: trouble apparently only arose concerning the use of the Portuguese language and participating in the struggle, which lessened students’ identification with the leadership and lowered their evaluation of the academic standards of the school, leading to racist bias. This does not prove that the students were necessarily racists; Mondlane’s theory also works when we substitute « nationality » for « race » and treat “Africans” and “Portuguese” as “antagonistic camps” within the Mozambican context.\(^{125}\) A comment by Simango would suggest this:

To them [the students] it was not a problem of race but a group of people who could be in the organization on the Portuguese government mission. (Simango 1969; cf. Ncomo 2009: 386)

I argue here that it is doubtful that the students had specifically the Portuguese government in mind, but some students may have identified Portuguese-Mozambican teachers as opponents in the way Mondlane’s theory explains. In fact, the students may have had some difficulty squaring what was said to them in the school with Frelimo’s own propaganda, which disseminated in 1966 the wish that all Portuguese colonialists be blown up into pieces.\(^{126}\) On the other hand, while attacks on Dos Santos and Simango also occurred, the stance against the Portuguese-Mozambican teachers came to be singled out as point of criticism (by later analysts in the literature) against the students, Gwenjere, and Simango. However, the literature has been rather silent on Mondlane’s own racist interpretation of the struggle that is clear from the quote above.

True, in (1969: 182) Mondlane mentions “white Mozambican doctors working with Frelimo”. Whether they are to be seen as representative or exemptions is to be examined now. In 1964 Mondlane mentioned “a Moçambican nationalism that unites all [...] regardless of their [...] races” (1972: 399) but in the same essay he stresses the suffering of the “masses of the black people” (p. 396) who serve “white interests” (p. 399). In 1967 Mondlane stated that “we are not fighting against the Portuguese people [but] the Portuguese Government” and that “Portuguese whites [...] are welcome”,\(^{127}\) but a week before his death he said:

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\(^{125}\) Henriksen (1973: 42n12), who does not elaborate on the “race” issue.

\(^{126}\) This would not apply to Janet Mondlane, but her position as a director was a unique case.

\(^{127}\) Conclusion of Frelimo (1966a).

The real problem is how to integrate white Mozambican-born nationalists [, because] the settler class is overwhelmingly against us. [...] Even if [...] there are one or two younger people who are for us, [...] we have to be cautious [...]. [As for] whites; we accept them to work in technical jobs [...]. They can be members of FRELIMO, [...] but they cannot be members of the Central Committee, and so on. [...] (Mondlane in Tricontinental 1971: 229-230)

Mondlane was not prepared to accept any “white” as welcome in Mozambique. When “whites” are taken as “Portuguese”, it is clear that Mondlane did not anticipate a future reconciliation with them. To Cornwall he said in 1968:

[T]he Portuguese must be out, except for those who are part of Mozambique (Mondlane in Cornwall 1972: 101; emphasis original).  

Thus Mondlane never abandoned a racialist interpretation of the liberation struggle, which is not to say he was a racist. This idea of “the Portuguese” as enemy was a Frelimo-wide understanding (Mondlane in Tricontinental 1971: 237; see also Serapião 1985: 3-4).

The report of the Central Committee to the Second Congress confirms that Frelimo had no official view then on “whites” as “Mozambicans”. The report analyses “the Mozambican population” into three groups (Frelimo 1977c: 62):

- the peasants, the overwhelming majority;
- the migrant workers, 15% of the “Mozambican black” population, who originate from the same population as the peasants (so that, the present author concludes, the peasants were also “Mozambican black”);
- urban proletariat, the greater part of whom work in private homes of “white and Asian settlers [colonos] of Mozambique”, and stevedores.

“Whites”, and “Asians”, are mentioned as “settlers”, not as part of the “Mozambican population”. The division in three overlaps with the socio-economic condition of the groups, corresponding well with Mondlane’s (1968) analysis of “race” relations, suggesting he wrote this paragraph of the report (see also Mondlane in Pachinuapa 2009: 91). After the Congress Frelimo (1968b: 3) still used “whiteman” (sic) and “white” as valid analytical categories. It is thus not true, at least up to 1968 included, that “Frelimo […] stressed [its] opposition to the criterion of race as such” (Minter 1994: 65).

The issue of “whites” within Frelimo being unresolved, the Central Committee debated it at its session of 24 August-1 September 1968. Simango reported:

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128 This comment probably dates from October 1968, compare Cornwall (1972: 70) with INDE (2009: 24-25), and Cornwall (1972: 86) with Frelimo (1969a: 7).
The meeting [...] discussed [...] employing foreigners [...] for technical tasks. [...] Nobody was against having white people help in the organization [...] They (Portuguese) wanted to be members of the Central Committee. To say that there is racism in FRELIMO is not true, but there is the spirit of vigilance in order to prevent imperialist infiltration and interference [...]. (Simango 1969; cf. Ncomo 2009: 386-387)

Some of Simango’s phrasings resemble some by Mondlane in the Tricontinental interview (e.g. on “technical” jobs/tasks), suggesting a common origin in Central Committee discussions which is less clear in Frelimo (1968c: 6; cf. Frelimo 1977e: 120).

Simango reported that Dos Santos tried to break the ban on “Portuguese” as members of Frelimo’s Central Committee (in Isaacman and Isaacman 1983: 97). With Mondlane dead and Simango expelled, the ban could be lifted. Just before independence, Machel explained:

They [those with reactionary ideas] wanted to make our struggle a racial struggle, between black and white. But our struggle is a class struggle. (In Muiuane [ed.] 2006: 377)

Thus where Mondlane (1968) had conflated antagonisms between “races” and between “classes”, Machel presented these interpretations as mutually exclusive and the first wrong. This stance had consequences for who could be an “enemy”. Later in June 1975 Machel said:

[An] enemy does not have colour. It is your brother, reactionary [...] [T]he black [person] places himself close to you with the pistol behind his back. (In Muiuane [ed.] 2006: 404; cf. 338)

Businessman Jorge Jardim, initially involved in anti-Frelimo military operations (Neves de Souto 2007: 287, 292) later came to affirm the existence of “white Mozambicans” (moçambicanos brancos – Jardim 1976: 231; on Jardim cf. Cabrita 2000: 75ff). However, Mondlane’s doctrine that most “Portuguese” should be “out” was not necessarily suspended. It was just augmented by an unfavourable attitude towards non-“Portuguese” who did not comply with Frelimo. This will be elaborated in the next chapter.

Ncomo (2009) puts forward the suggestion that the winning protagonists in the Frelimo crisis won on the basis of ethnic solidarity, or more generally on the basis of regionalism (“south” versus “central” and “northern” Mozambique) – see also Simango (1969). Such discussions involve “ethnicities [...] as cockpits of debate” (Lonsdale 1994: 140; cf. Brinkman 2001: 137). (On the diversity of the topic of ethnicity and the state in Africa, see

129 Cf. also Second Congress on technicians (Mondlane 1969: 193; Frelimo 1977d: 97) and medical personnel (Frelimo 1977e: 124).

130 In Mozambique a version of Gloomy Situation seems to circulate that is damaged at this spot (cf. Simango 1969; Ncomo 2009: 386). I rely on Isaacman and Isaacman’s version here.
the collection of Abbink and Van Dokkum [eds.] 2008.) However, this thesis does not endorse Ncomo on the said point, which does not explain the political biography of a person like Fanuel Mahluza, for example. But perhaps more importantly, focusing on ethnic solidarity as a prime explanation for the eventual success of the so-called “revolutionaries” in gaining control of Frelimo (and Mozambique) misses the point that Mondlane had an odd positioning within the winning group, as I discuss below. Ncomo’s ethnic framework glosses over this issue just like authors interpreting the crisis in terms of ideology did. After independence, Machel (1985: 77) declared that “[w]e killed the tribe to give birth to the nation” (cf. Berman, Eyoh and Kymlicka 2004: 8), but aspects of regionalism, a reference framework more general than ethnicity, kept cropping up, such as recently when Renamo-leader Dhlakama announced he would establish a “Republic of Central and Northern Mozambique” (Allafrica [N] 2015; see also Macamo and Neubert 2003/2004: 65-66). Voting data from 1994 onwards do show geographical differences across parties (indeed, I discuss these in Appendix G), and some people may describe their own party-adherence in ethnic terms (EMS 1995: 64), but the actual statistical distribution of party affiliation is more dispersed than a straightforward one-to-one correspondence of ethnicity and party affiliation would suggest (Pereira 2008). As for Barue District, I have no indications that its inhabitants engage in political mobilization on the basis of Barue ethnicity; indeed, it is extremely difficult to see why they would as the biggest political issue is of a party-political nature: the desired or rejected dominance of Frelimo.

**Machel, Mondlane and ideology**

An influence from the Machel-Dos Santos duo on Mondlane seems to have been his willingness to declare shortly after the Second Congress that

> FRELIMO has a political line that is much clearer than previously. [...] [T]here were some elements within FRELIMO who brought these ideas with them to the struggle. [...] [I]t [is] possible for me to say, and I do believe it, that FRELIMO [...] now tends more and more in the direction of socialism of the Marxist-Leninist variety. [...] Without compromising the Party which has not yet made an official declaration asserting it is Marxist-Leninist, I think FRELIMO can be said to be inclining more and more in this direction (De Bragança and Wallerstein [eds.] 1982b: 121-122).

From the quote, if not already from the Congress reports themselves, this is clear: shortly after Frelimo’s Second Congress, Frelimo had not officially declared itself Marxist-Leninist. Poppe (2009: 295) points out that Mondlane’s reference to “some elements within Frelimo”
does not seem to include himself. Ronguane (2010: 148-149) argues Mondlane simply wished to please his interviewer (De Bragança). That Mondlane did not wholeheartedly share the “direction” is also evident from the following fragment of an interview by Nesbitt and Edmunds with Bill Sutherland in 2003 (Minter [ed.] 2004):

SUTHERLAND: Mondlane. He told me one time, [...] I [Mondlane] know they’re going to try to push me aside as this thing goes on. I don’t represent the true Marxist position, he [Mondlane] said. [...] He said [...] that he realized that they would probably do that to him.
NESBITT: “They” would be? Meaning the rest of FRELIMO?
SUTHERLAND: Well, the Marxists, the Marxist element there. And that they thought he was useful at the stage that the revolution was, but they would not consider him the most reliable person to be head of the state.131

Elsewhere Mondlane stated he was “against a strict ideological line for its own sake” and that “[t]he question is not one of socialism or capitalism” (Cornwall 1972: 100-101). Such statements indicate Mondlane and Machel and other Marxists within Frelimo did not have the same political agenda. Contrary to Mondlane, Machel identified with Marxism, saying it was something that had grown naturally in himself from childhood onwards (Christie 1989: 123).

Another difference between Mondlane and Machel concerned Frelimo membership. Mondlane (1969: 168) maintained that membership was “open to every adult Mozambican”. Machel (1970: 8), already in the time of the triumvirate, declared that “those who do not want to define our struggle as a revolutionary struggle [...] cannot be members of Frelimo”.

Conclusions concerning Frelimo’s internal crisis

“The crisis within Frelimo” may be viewed as a complex of verbal and physical confrontations that only gradually gained some degree of coherence. Simango for instance changed tack rather lately, in May 1968. But even more intriguing is the position of Eduardo Mondlane. With hindsight he has been mentioned in a trinity with Samora Machel and Marcelino dos Santos (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983: 97). Also a book like Ncomo (2009) does not problematize the differences between Mondlane and the other two. That such differences were not trivial is shown when Mondlane’s ideas on certain key issues are compared with those of Machel, as mentioned above and summed up in Table 1:

131 Thanks to William Minter for correspondence concerning this interview.
Table 1: Differences between Mondlane and Machel on certain key issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Mondlane</th>
<th>Machel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academic education</td>
<td>serves the struggle by itself</td>
<td>is second to practical activity in the struggle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frelimo membership</td>
<td>open to all adult Mozambicans</td>
<td>restricted to those with revolutionary ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Struggle necessitated by</td>
<td>racial antagonism</td>
<td>class antagonism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>Portuguese settlers, except some</td>
<td>class opponents and reactionaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protracted struggle</td>
<td>useful but not essential for social transformation</td>
<td>essential for social transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxism</td>
<td>brought in by some elements; not yet officially declared</td>
<td>developed from childhood experience</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above makes problematic the often repeated analysis that Mondlane represented a “radical” or “revolutionary” approach together with Machel and Dos Santos, in contrast with a “reformist”, “narrow nationalist”, “racialist”, or “tribalist” agenda of a group containing Simango, Nkavandame and Gwenjere (Isacman and Isacman 1983; 83, 97; Christie 1989: 54). It has been shown extensively above that Mondlane had a “racialist” view of the struggle, a few sympathetic “white Mozambicans” being only exceptions confirming the rule. Mondlane (1968) equated “classes” with “racial groups”, maintaining Africans were victimized through certain historical political events (not class struggles in the Marxist sense).

Also initially Mondlane certainly had no foresight, nor desire, of any “protracted struggle”. He had thought that Mozambique would be independent soon through negotiation combined perhaps with short military provocation, and that after such quick independence he could populate the Mozambican government offices with graduates of his educational programme. Only after the “October 1966” meeting of the Central Committee, when Machel entered that organ, Mondlane’s students became subject to accusations of undermining the armed struggle. Mondlane was unable to solve the resulting contradiction between the views on studying as serving the struggle in its own right or being secondary to military activity, making him reactive rather than taking the lead in matters.

In May 1968, Mondlane’s position as president still derived from elections before the start of the armed struggle and was buttressed by money flows specifically through the Mozambique Institute. As long as he remained president before actual independence, the group around Machel could use him to pursue certain policy objectives, as I have argued is visible with the anti-UNEMO document. This explains why Mondlane on the one hand and
the group around Machel on the other were reluctant to have a congress: it could bring with it the possibility of defeat. Nonetheless their cooperation was more a result of coinciding positional strategies than of sharing ideological convictions.

The events known as “the crisis within Frelimo” can be interpreted as a struggle for Frelimo by the so-called “revolutionary” group. It is quite probable that without Mondlane’s winning the presidential vote at the Second Congress they would not have been able to secure a victory. The Second Congress was no doubt foundational for the later historical development of Frelimo and with that of Mozambique. The “revolutionaries” would win the struggle for Frelimo, but their revolution was a palace revolution rather than the inevitable result of a default ideological development within Frelimo and/or Mozambican communities generally. The effects became clear in 1970: Frelimo did reformulate its definition of the enemy in ideological rather than racialist/nationalist terms, but it also reformulated its definition of who is a friend in ideological terms, and there was no longer even the pretence that Frelimo was an organization for all Mozambicans, while it also still denied the legitimacy of other Mozambican organizations. This deliberately exclusionist factionalism laid the basis for a troubled independence, as we shall see below.

**Euro-American reactions to the 1966-1970 crisis within Frelimo**

The troubles within Frelimo could not stay hidden from view by the outside world. The Swedish government, which had funded the Mozambique Institute during the period 1965-1968, suspended this funding after and because of the school incidents (Sellström 1999: 455-456). A 1971 memo by SIDA (the Swedish governmental international aid institution) official Anders Forsse describes Frelimo as “evolving from Danton to Robespierre”. Nevertheless the Swedish government decided to resume aid to Frelimo that year (Sellström 2002: 75, 83-84, 86).

Euro-American authors have in most cases downplayed Frelimo’s internal crisis and/or treated the eventually losing individuals as aberrant persons. One example is that of the Angola Comité in the Netherlands (Van Beurden and Huinder 1996). The Comité had earlier communicated that the Mozambique Institute was the Frelimo-school “that is to educate the administrative cadre of the independent Mozambique” (Angola Comité 1965b). This evaluation was drastically changed after the events of March 1968. Now the Comité stated that
a much more important cause [of the March disturbances; than “tribal antagonisms”] is the phenomenon that people who have learnt something apparently have the tendency to become freeloaders instead of the avant garde of the struggle for renewal.

... een veel belangrijker oorzaak is het verschijnsel dat mensen die wat geleerd hebben, blijkbaar de neiging hebben profiteurs te worden in plaats van de voorhoede van de strijd voor vernieuwing. (Angola Comité 1968: 5)

The Angola Comité (1968) gives no explanation for the change in its evaluation since 1965 and no proof that the students would have been “freeloaders”. The Angola Comité did not hide internal difficulties within Frelimo, but it capitulated when it implied that the liberation movement could not unite “the wishes of all currents” (Angola Comité 1969). Euro-American journalistic and academic literature has rarely been investigative concerning the crisis within Frelimo. For criticism of academic work, see Igreja (2010: 782, 790, 795) and White (1985: 321 on “apologist literature”).

COREMO and other non-Frelimo anticolonial organizations

It has already been indicated that apart from Frelimo other anticolonial organizations existed before the Portuguese coup on 25 April 1974. There were quite a few of them, and those most frequently mentioned in the literature may best be represented in a table; see Table 2 below.

The establishment of a new organization by older ones did not necessarily indicate dissolution of those older organizations (e.g. FUNIPAMO 1972: 436, art. 6). Often these non-Frelimo organizations were very small. The most important organization mentioned in Table 2 was COREMO, which was able to execute the only military anticolonial operations of any significance apart from Frelimo. Although certainly smaller than the latter’s, these operations should not be forgotten as they did form part of the anticolonial struggle and disprove the often encountered idea that Frelimo was the “sole” liberation movement in Mozambique (e.g. Van den Bergh 2009: 15). COREMO was a united organization based on earlier movements such as the two UDENAMOs of Gumane and Gwambe (cf. Table 2), resurrections of the UDENAMO that had dissolved into Frelimo. As for Gumane’s UDENAMO, studying its publications is revealing because they put intra-Frelimo discussions in a different light than emerges from a “revolutionaries vs. reactionaries” interpretative framework. Also, reviewing UDENAMO and COREMO enables us to elaborate on the question of multipartyism in Mozambique at the time of independence.
Table 2: Some non-Frelimo anticolonial organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name/abbreviation</th>
<th>Formed</th>
<th>Leader(s)</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNAMI</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Chagong’a</td>
<td>Did not formally merge with Frelimo, reported existing in 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDENAMO-Moçambique</td>
<td>May 1963</td>
<td>Mabunda, Gumane</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique African National Congress (MANC)</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Balamanja, S. Sigauke</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDENAMO-Monomotapa</td>
<td>1962-1963</td>
<td>Gwambe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frente Unida Anti-imperialista Popular Africana de Moçambique (FUNIPAMO)</td>
<td>21 May 1963</td>
<td>Gwambe, Mmole</td>
<td>Front of Gwambe’s UDENAMO-Monomotapa, Mmole’s MANU, and MANC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique Revolutionary Council (MORECO)</td>
<td>25 September 1964</td>
<td>Sumane, Chiteje</td>
<td>Result of expulsion of members of Central Committee of Frelimo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO)</td>
<td>Over a period from 1964 finalized June 1965</td>
<td>Gwambe, later Gumane</td>
<td>Merger of MORECO, UDENAMO-Moçambique, MANU and UDENAMO-Monomotapa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido Popular de Moçambique (PAPOMO)</td>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Gwambe</td>
<td>After Gwambe’s expulsion from COREMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>União Nacional Africana da Rumbézia (UNAR)</td>
<td>January 1968</td>
<td>Sumane</td>
<td>Separatist breakaway group from COREMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique Liberation Movement (MOLIMO)</td>
<td>Mid-1970</td>
<td>Nyankale</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
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Note: When an organization ceased to exist is often difficult to determine, but in any case all of these can be considered to have gone extinct during the transitional period of 1974-1975, certainly at the time of the Nachingwea proceedings early 1975, described below in the main text.

At one time UDENAMO did maintain that “Mozambique is a black-man’s [sic] country” and that “[w]e shall not rest until we have a democratic form of government” which meant that “[t]he Africans who are the majority, must rule” (UDENAMO 1964a: 2). One month later, however, UDENAMO took a more universalist stance on “race”, alluding to Lincoln’s famous definition of “democracy”, and promoting “non-racial democracy” (UDENAMO 1964b: 5). However, “white man/people” kept being used as an analytical category.

The “nucleus of democracy” was to be understood as “socialism”. There was to be a planned economy and industry was to be undertaken by the state. Political “democracy” and economic “socialism” together would “fight exploitation of man by man, class by class or nation by nation” (1965b: 5). With respect to political organization Gumane’s UDENAMO
stuck to a conception of “unity” as “being subsumed under one organization”: it called on Mozambicans to unite, but only under UDENAMO (Gumane 1964: 11). Unsuccessful attempts were made to unite Frelimo, UDENAMO and other groups in 1964 and 1965. However, the attempts did result in the eventual establishment of COREMO, uniting several non-Frelimo organizations (Cabrita 2000: 37-38; cf. UDENAMO 1965a).

At the end of 1964 UDENAMO propagated the following vision on political parties:

[T]o achieve [African unity], it is necessary that the question of having unnecessary oppositions have [sic] to be ruled out […], especially in countries which have achieved their independence. // [O]ppositions [are] products of colonialist and imperialist subversion, aimed to cause confusion among African people […]. // [I]n African history […] there was no opposition […] because, our Kings were ruling according to the will of the people, and that, meant Democracy. // […] The new democracy […] was brought by colonialists and imperialists which [needs] oppositions […] // If ONE PARTY SYSTEM, is for the benefit of […] the African people, it is welcome. (UDENAMO 1964c: 10-11).

Using ethnographic arguments, “democracy” was seen as indigenously African, referring to the “will of the people”. There are at least three problems with UDENAMO’s ethnographic assessment. First, in precolonial Africa opposition could exist between aspirant monarchs or between monarchs and councils and/or religious leaders. Second, Portugal had not brought multiparty systems to her colonies (UDENAMO 1964a: 5 itself complained about this). For Zimbabwe UDENAMO advocated a system of “majority rule through one man one vote” (1965c: 9). This would not necessarily imply a multiparty system, but for the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean situation it is difficult to interpret otherwise. Third, UDENAMO did not foresee the possibility that the existence of more than one party in Mozambique could be the result of Mozambique-internal political developments, and should have to be dealt with. The UDENAMO writings do provide some context for political discussions within Frelimo. Although the post-1962 UDENAMO and its adherents would be later labelled as “reactionary”, it is illustrative that UDENAMO aired principles that would be considered as specific for the “revolutionary” line of Machel c.s., such as references to “class” and “exploitation of man by man”.

UDENAMO’s successor COREMO would show military action, predominantly in the Tete region, with backing of Zambia and China (PRC). Its operational effectiveness peaked in January 1971 in an action near the construction site of the Cahora Bassa dam (Gibson 1972: 287-290; Cabrita 2000: 38-40). COREMO and Frelimo clashed with each other (Cabrita 2000:

132 With « vote » written by hand above a struck « gun » of the UDENAMO slogan « one man one gun ». Cf. UDENAMO (1965b).

COREMO aimed for “democratic government for the African peoples of Moçambique” (1972 [n.d.]: 440, art. 4.1); on the other hand “[a]ll people of Moçambique may become members of COREMO” provided they honour the policies of COREMO (ibid.: art. 6). It is not clear whether or not the “white colonists” could be considered to belong to “all people of Mozambique”. In its Programme, COREMO (1972b: 485, art. XV) stated as an objective:

To liquidate the imperialist officials and the colonialist culture, by expulsion or by their reduction to a normal level, which will not discredit or destroy the customs and the culture of Moçambique.

This would suggest that a reduced number of Portuguese settlers would be allowed to stay in an independent Mozambique. COREMO did not seem to demand to be the only Mozambican organization, referring to a possible “unified alliance” (1972 [n.d.]: 440, art. 5.2) and to “associate members” from other organizations (ibid.: 441, art. 7). Elsewhere, however, COREMO stated that it is “the only and sole body to guide the armed struggle” and “not a united front, but an absolute organization” (1972a: 482). How COREMO envisaged the party-political set-up of an independent Mozambique, however, does not become clear from the three cited documents. It was a problem that Frelimo would solve without COREMO adherents being able to assert influence.

Summary

A summary of Frelimo’s early history was presented. It was shown that disputes about “who is a Mozambican” and “who is the enemy” played a rôle in Frelimo’s notorious internal crisis in a way that contradicts Anderson’s (2006) theory about “imagined communities”. It was denied that Frelimo’s Second Congress in 1968 was a great victory in ideological terms for the group later known as the “revolutionaries”. The Congress was nonetheless foundational in the sense that Mondlane rather than Simango was elected president in a vote that can be called “contingent” at best. This presidential vote was analysed, using information obtained by PIDE/DGS on numbers of provincial delegates, suggesting these numbers were disproportionally high for Niassa, which may have been advantageous for Mondlane against Simango in an artificial way. This may be seen as a weakness of the choice set approach. No debate was necessary to reach a decision for the choice, and afterwards the vote enabled simplification of descriptions of the situation within Frelimo. The conclusion that “Mondlane
won the vote”, even when it is unknown with what difference, made it possible for the “revolutionary” group and later analysts to gloss over the fact that Frelimo was at the moment a deeply divided organization and continued to be so after the Congress. Mondlane was associated with the “revolutionary” group, but ideology cannot explain this association. Some disaffected former Frelimo members eventually came to form COREMO, which managed to execute military operations against the Portuguese, although on a modest scale. During the time period covered by the chapter, neither Frelimo nor COREMO envisioned a multiparty system for independent Mozambique, and Frelimo’s Western sympathizers also do not seem to have pressed this point.