CHAPTER 7 – BARUE HISTORY UNTIL 1918

In this chapter general information about indigenous economic aspects, ideas concerning cosmology and spirits, and political life of the Shona is offered that will be helpful in understanding Barue history. Then some chronological facts are expounded, and finally conclusions are drawn about Barue as an independent kingdom.

General information about Shona economic, spiritual and political life

The population of Central Mozambique was partly Shona (in earlier times known as Karanga) in origin, but comprised also people indicated as being of “Tonga” descent (Dos Santos 1989: 107; bk. 2, ch. 10; Florêncio 2002; see below on the difficulties of identifying “Tonga”). It is useful to represent what has been written in the literature about Shona political life, since this information is largely applicable to Barue, even if not all inhabitants were Shona.

Economy

The precolonial Shona economy was diverse and comprised agriculture, hunting and gathering, pastoralism, mining, manufacturing and trade. For relatively mild periods of droughts certain types of drought-resistant tubers, bulbs etc. were available to survive such periods (Mudenge 1988: 7-8). Beach (1994a: 59) mentions the use of large mambure nets used in hunting (stretching for kilometers). The operation of such nets was coordinated in a rather decentralized way across many communities. Trade with intercontinental links existed with Muslims associated with coastal communities, such as Angoche and Sofala (Mudenge 1988: 38-39, 43; Rita-Ferreira 1982: 50-53). After the probable visit of Pero da Covilhão in Sofala in 1490 and the touch-down of Vasco da Gama at the Mozambican coast in 1498, the Portuguese established trade relations (Azevedo 1991: 70; Mudenge 1988: 43ff; Newitt 1995: 15).

Religion

It is useful to introduce (partially) some Shona religious ideas. The Shona have known monotheism with a Supreme Being. More relevant for daily life are spirits, usually of deceased humans. A mhondoro (lion) spirit is the spirit of a deceased ruler and is relevant for
entire political communities. Living people can host spirits; some spirits can speak through their hosts, or *mediums* (sg. *svikiro*). That someone hosts a spirit is usually determined after the onset of an affliction, after which the spirit (if any) is identified. *Mhondoro* spirits are important because they can interfere in political life, specifically in the indication of new rulers. When not hosted by humans they may reside in lions. A *mhondoro* spirit can make its opinions public during trance sessions of its *svikiro* when the latter speaks in an altered voice, “possessed” by the spirit. In the academic literature the expressions of the *mhondoro* spirits are often interpreted as *communis opinio*. *Mhondoro* spirits are also understood to control rain. Recognition of a spirit medium as genuine is not automatic and depends on experts’ opinions as well as popularity amongst the general population. mediums may lose status amongst the general population after having been respected earlier. In this thesis, the ethnographic treatment of beliefs in, so to speak, metaphysical or invisible phenomena will mostly be limited to spirits and spirit mediums. It is known that beliefs like those in witchcraft and sorcery can play rôles in power relations between people (West 2005; Meier and Steinforth [eds.] 2013; for a review of the latter book, see Van Dokkum forthcoming). In Barue witchcraft beliefs may concern personal relations (Chekwa [N] 2014). Hereditary leaders in Barue can deal with such issues as part of their portfolio, but – except for references to spirits – metaphysical beliefs did not play a rôle, as far as I could ascertain, in the selection or functioning of leaders.

*Dynastic politics*

Political organization existed (and partially still exists) roughly in a tiered system consisting of family (*imba*), village (*musha*), ward or number of villages (*dunhu*), and chiefdom (*nyika*). According to Hannan (2000), the word « *nyika* » can be translated into English as « country » apart from « chiefdom ». Each level had its own leaders, usually selected amongst men within patrilineally ordered families. As a rule villages were headed by the family of which the ancestor had founded a certain village (Mudenge 1988: 8–20); should someone wish not to stay under the leadership of someone else he might emigrate and look for an uninhabited location (Latham 1974: 98). Villages had a *dare*, a gathering that functioned as an assembly and a court. “Every mature man had a right to sit at the *dare*”; women only when they were invited (Mudenge 1988: 14). The *dare* of a higher level political unit was more restricted.

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25 This section up to here compiled from: Acquina (1973); Fry (1976: ch. 5); Garbett (1966, 1969); Lan (1985: ch. 4); Latham (1974); Mudenge (1988: 28); Spierenburg (2000); fieldwork.
(1988: 15, 18). Other types of mass gatherings do not seem to have excluded women (e.g. Lan 1985: 46-47).

Except for the founder leader of a dynasty, Shona politics is known for its system of rotation of leadership across the sons of the founder and their descendants, known as \textit{adelphic collateral succession} ("adelphic succession" for short) in which "brother succeed[s] brother [...] and then [after all brothers] the first son of the first brother [and then] the first son of the next brother and so forth" (Mudenge 1988: 81-83; cf. Garbett 1966: 152-155; Meneses, Fumo, Mbilana and Gomes 2003: 372). This is the theory. In practice, over time age and generation differences complicate the eligibility of individuals, making it difficult to determine a specific person as "the correct" successor to an earlier leader. At times it is also simply not applied at all. Succession disputes may provide possibilities for others to intervene in the matter of succession.\footnote{Some publications in \textit{The Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department Annual (NADA)} provide intriguing examples of succession disputes: Fowle (1973: 31); Fynes-Clinton (1972: 61); Howman (1966); Jenkinson (1959: 46); see also Gelfand (1966).} Such processes are a matter for study in other parts of this thesis. Top leaders could be dethroned; an 18th-century example is provided by Inácio Caetano Xavier in (Andrade 1955: 155). A historical dethronement in Barue will be dealt with below.

\textbf{Background of Barue: early inhabitants of Mozambique, immigration and trade}

Mozambique’s earliest known inhabitants were San (Newitt 1995: 63). Bantu people are known to have immigrated into Southern Africa in a period of some centuries before and after the beginning of the AD year count (Curtine e.a. 1995: 15-20; Van Bakel 1981). Little if anything is known of the people of that time in what is now Barue District. The Bantu expansion went along with a probably related process, the spread of agriculture and the use of iron. Since about the middle of the first millennium AD Asians from Indonesia, Arabia, Persia and India came to East Africa and Madagascar, also to settle. In the thirteenth century related trading populations were also known along the Zambezi River and on the Zimbabwe Plateau. Amongst other things Indian and Persian cloth was exchanged against gold and other metals (Duarte 2012; Rita-Ferreira 1982: 34-37, 50-53; Serra 2000 [ed.]: 12, 24-27).

In 1498, Vasco da Gama reached the coast of Mozambique and the Portuguese established posts in Sofala in 1505 and on Mozambique Island in 1507. Mozambique Island was to become the administrative centre of Portuguese-occupied East-Africa. This area was itself part of the (so-called) State of India, governed by a Portuguese viceroy in Goa in India.

\footnote{Some publications in \textit{The Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department Annual (NADA)} provide intriguing examples of succession disputes: Fowle (1973: 31); Fynes-Clinton (1972: 61); Howman (1966); Jenkinson (1959: 46); see also Gelfand (1966).}

As indicated, the Mozambican interior had been known to Asians at the time the Portuguese arrived, and some of their descendants lived in Barue (Rita-Ferreira 1999: 2, 34; Liesegang in ibid.: 62). Contrary to the Asians the Portuguese were not just interested in trade, but also in occupying substantive tracts of territory and subduing African political entities in the hinterland. The area alongside the Zambezi River, known as Zambezia, was a major focal point for this centuries-long enterprise (the Zambezi itself was also known as Cuama). Not only the Portuguese, however, but several other invading or encroaching forces from the continental interior as well have exercised their influence over time in what can be viewed as a “struggle for Zambezia” (Meneses, pers. comm.). The Barue Kingdom lay partly in the Zambezi basin and was to feel the effects of this struggle, but was with some ups and downs able to survive as an independent country up to 1902. Below I shall devote some reflections on the background of this relative historical success which shows there was an idea of Barue as a state.

Mozambique has been subject to intercontinental slave trading for many centuries, since at least the tenth century AD to Oman. Europeans (Dutch, French, Portuguese, English) would take the trade to new levels in the 18th century. In 1836 Sá de Bandeira issued a decree forbidding the exportation of slaves in all Portuguese territory, but the trade went on unabated, often with the cooperation of Portuguese government officials. Though certain local leaders were involved in the trade, there are also reports of resistance against the trading practice.27

Slave trading and internal slavery appear not to have played a significant rôle in Shona societies, at least on the Zimbabwe Plateau (Beach 1994a: 74, 212n19; Newitt 1981: 10). Judging from the literature, the same seems to have held for Barue; Isaacman (1972a: 91) reports that Barue was able to withstand slave-raiding attacks from the Zambezi area. Isaacman and Isaacman (2005: 131) write that slaves for the Portuguese Zambezia estates (prazos; cf. below) were obtained more from areas north of the Zambezi than south of it. Nevertheless some Baruese did become slaves amongst the Portuguese. Da Conceição (2009: 16-17) reports “some” slaves from Barue at the end of the 17th century. Capela (2010: 45) mentions 11 slaves of Barue origin at the 19th-century estate of Francisco Maria De Azevedo in Quelimane, and Isaacman and Isaacman (2005: 130) report eight slaves (from Barue and

Quiteve together) in the district of Tete Town in 1856. It is unclear how these individuals got at these places.

**Background of Barue: origin of the Mutapa state**

To understand the emergence of Barue as a kingdom we need to discuss the origin of the Mwene Mutapa state (~ Monomotapa, Munhumutapa, « Mutapa » for short). For this, in its turn, we need to consider the Great Zimbabwe stone complex near Masvingo in present-day Zimbabwe erected about 1250-1300 (Beach 1994a: 82-88). The kingdom that built the complex is said to have given rise to the famous Mutapa Empire. One version of this history goes more or less as follows (Abraham 1959, 1962). Around the mid-15th century, one Mutota, son of King Chibatamatosi (~ Chimubatamatosi), went northwards near present-day Tete after having obtained intelligence about the great availability of salt there. He successfully initiated to conquer land along the Zambezi River. Chibatamatosi died and Mutota became king with the newly acquired territories added to the existing kingdom. Mutota was given the praise name Mwene Mutapa, usually interpreted as “Master Pillager” (Abraham ibid.) or slightly less dramatic as “Master of vassals subdued through war” (Randles 1975: 17, 25). There is no certainty as to these interpretations. 28 Rita-Ferreira (1999: 41) maintains that rather than salt, it was control of trade, gold and cattle that motivated the northward movement. The Great Zimbabwe connection seems to be supported by the observation that the complex was largely abandoned in the period 1450-1550, while the Mutapa expansion is believed to have occurred around 1440-1450 (Serra [ed.] 2000: 34).

At Mutota’s death, according to Abraham’s information, his chief wife informed his sons that only he who would have sexual intercourse with Mutota’s daughter Nyamhita (thus their [half-]sister) was entitled by Mutota to inherit the throne. Nyanhehwe Matope took up the challenge and became Mutota’s successor to the throne. He made Nyamhita queen of Handa, whence she is called Nehanda. In 1896 Charwe was the medium of Nehanda. Known after her spirit as Mbuya (Grandmother) Nehanda she was one of the leaders of the anticolonial rising in Zimbabwe at that time (Lan 1985: 6, photo before 119). A female spirit medium with a somewhat similar role in Barue in 1917 will be mentioned below.

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28 Randles (1975: 17) points out that one might better speak of « Mwenemutapwa » (with « mutapwa » in the Shona passive form. For more discussions about the uncertain name, see F. de Sousa in Randles (ibid.), Bhila (1974), Beach (1975) and Mudenge (1988: 37-41). With a few exceptions, the ups and downs of Mutapa-Portuguese relations across the centuries are not within the scope of this thesis; see Mudenge (1988).
Historical facts about Zambezia

The Mutapa Empire was not capable of maintaining the geographical extension first obtained, and Dos Santos (1989: 118) mentions that the states of Quiteve, Chicanga and Sedanda had by his time already separated from the original Mutapa state. Barue split off in 1608 (more details below), and from that time on both the remaining Mutapa state and the independent Barue state do not seem to have had any political control over the stretch of land south of the lower Zambezi.

Along the Zambezi the Marave people have been active since at least the early 16th century, coming from around Tete apparently in defiance of the Mutapa state. They established states north of the Zambezi which by the mid-19th century had lost their significance, according to Newitt due to the loss of their economic hegemony to the Portuguese, Portuguese military action and attacks of the Nguni people coming from the south (Dos Santos 1989: 122-131; bk. 2, ch. 17-19; Newitt 1973: 28-30, 235; Serra [ed.] 2000: 46-52).

In 1531 the Portuguese captain of Sofala, Vicente Pegado, authorized the setting up of Portuguese settlements along the Zambezi, in order to facilitate the acquisition of gold from the interior. Gold-production occurred in the Manica area and south of the Zambezi. The Portuguese needed African gold and also ivory in order to obtain Asian spices. The Zambezi River also functioned as an access route for the Portuguese to be able to penetrate the interior of Africa (Meneses, pers. comm.). Muslim influence was also diminished. Dos Santos reports that by the early 17th century both population and leaders of eleven African settlements were under complete control of the captain of Tete. In 1629 Mutapa King Mavura (~ Mavhura) formally surrendered the whole kingdom to the Tete captaincy, signaling a serious weakening of the internal cohesion of the state (Mavura had himself become king with Portuguese aid during a civil war). Granting of tracts of land had meanwhile also occurred to individuals rather than only to the Portuguese state. It was this individually oriented form of granting that was to become characteristic in Zambezia during the following centuries.29

The decisive step to be taken was that the granting of land was not done by Africans to the Portuguese but by the Portuguese authorities to other Portuguese. Once established, these landholders developed habits of building private armies, raiding, killing and taking Mutapa

29 This paragraph, except where indicated otherwise: Abraham (1962: 72); Dos Santos (1989: 122-123; bk. 2 ch. 17); Mudenge (1988: 256-258); Newitt (1973: 13, 22, 32, 34, 46, 52, 56-59; 1995: 217-218); text of surrender: Manuza (sic, i.e. Mavura) (1881).
inhabitants as slaves. The *modus operandi* had nothing to do with “modern” state bureaucracy (see discussion above). Mavura complained about the situation in a communication to the Portuguese viceroy in Goa, India, in 1645 but little could be done about it. By the end of the 17th century the entire south bank of the lower Zambezi was under Portuguese jurisdiction, and the heartland of the Mutapa state was largely deserted (Mudenge 1988: 270-272; Newitt 1973: 60-69; Serra [ed.] 2000: 55-59). Barretto regretted Portuguese occupation was not thorough enough, and that gold production was low. He gave the following example of colonial attitude:

[T]he encozes [local chiefs] [...] will allow no digging [of gold] in their lands, that the Portuguese may not covet them. This obstacle might be avoided if all the lands containing gold belonged to the Portuguese, for then the Kaffirs, being their vassals, would labour to extract as much as their masters wished (Barretto 1964: 490-491).

The estates in Zambezia but also elsewhere in what is now central Mozambique were known as prazos. « *Prazo* » denotes “term” or “period” and a *prazo* was legally a tract of land formally issued by the Portuguese government to a usually female titleholder for three lives (from a woman to daughter to granddaughter). After those three lives the family could apply for renewal of the arrangement. This way of inheritance across women was meant to stimulate immigration from Portugal to Mozambique by men, who would then marry the women (Almeida 1920: 270; Newitt 1973: ch. 6; 1995: 223). Husbands and fathers of the women were often in charge, but just as often the women themselves were the undisputed boss of their prazos. These women are known as *donas* (Newitt 1995: 228-229; for a photograph, see Eça 1953: opp. p. 72). The prazos themselves were supposed to be cultivated and yield tax income for the government. All of these objectives had rather limited success in practice. Slavery was inherent to the *prazo* system. Slaves were not necessarily deferential, and some of them obtained a separate and notorious collective identity as achikunda (sg. *chikunda* – Isaacman 1972b; Serra [ed.] 2000: 59). The people of this Zambezian society are known as “Afro-Portuguese” in the literature (Isaacman 1976: 5); the *prazo* phenomenon in Zambezia itself is difficult to describe as specifically originating in African or Portuguese historical antecedents. The *prazo* holders were given nominal titles like « captain » and were supposed to represent the presence of Portugal in the Zambezia area (Meneses pers. comm.; cf. Serra [ed.] 2000: 252).
Historical facts about Barue

If there ever was a state organization in the area of Barue before the rise of the Mutapa state around 1450 is not clear from the literature, and the known Barue Kingdom is never indicated, as far as I know, in written and oral history as having been connected with any specific pre-Mutapa state. Thus all that follows in this thesis interprets “Barue Kingdom” as the state that was earlier a sort of province of Mutapa. For a general understanding of historical developments concerning Barue as placed within the region of central Mozambique, it is useful to point out here that the gradual collapse of the initially large Mutapa state into smaller units overlapped, more or less, with the arrival of the Portuguese. This overlap of collapse and arrival was coincidental, but once the Portuguese had become permanently involved in Mozambique, their behaviour became a causal factor within the politics of the African political entities. The Portuguese tried to interfere in the dynastic politics of states (though in Barue their success in this was limited). As will be discussed, during its history Barue has been victim of attacks by Portuguese individuals and the Portuguese state, but also by African agents, specifically the Nguni in the 19th century. My judgement is that Barue suffered attacks more than that it inflicted aggression onto others (although this was not absent), but in general it showed great resilience as an independent state for about three centuries.

Above, (Nyanhehwe) Matope was identified as a son of Mutota and an early ruler of the Mutapa Empire. Existing literature contains stories linking Matope to Barue. Matope sent his daughter Mureche (~ Murexe) and her husband to occupy Barue. Mureche’s eldest son, Makombe, has given his name to the Makombe dynasty, according to oral tradition in Abraham (1962: 63-66, 82n38). Pacheco, a government official active in the 1860s, identified Mureche as sister of Matope and the husband as a son of the king of Quiteve, and he added that Mureche had been given Barue as a dowry when she married (see Randles 1975: 26). The husband’s name is given as Chimupore (Abraham ibid.). Barue as an area with a king was identified around 1512 by António Fernandes. Mudenge (1988: 41) and Randles (1975: 9) suggest that Barue extended to the Indian Ocean at that time, but Abraham (1962: 65, 30 Unfortunately, Pacheco’s and Abraham’s data together yield an unclear chronological picture. However, the information that a certain woman stands at the beginning of the Barue Kingdom is still remembered today, cf. below.

31 In Veloso (1964: 183); cf. Newitt (1995: 41-42); Tracey (1968). Before the 18th century the use of the title « Makombe » does not seem to have been common in Portuguese documents, though Bocarro (1876: 537; ch. 123) does mention a “Macobe”. Alcáçova (1962) mentions a Monomotapa “Mocomba” but I see no reason to identify that person as “Makombe”.

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would rather suggest not, indicating that at least Cheringoma was a separate entity between Barue and the ocean. Newitt (1973: 53, 164) provides information on Cheringoma originally being part of Quiteve before the mid-17th century, and stretching from the Pungue River to the Zambezi, so Abraham’s interpretation has the best chances of being correct, although a difficulty remains concerning Dos Santos’s information on the border between Quiteve and Mutapa lying at the Tendanculo River (1989: 86; ch. 2, bk. 1). (More on Barue’s extension follows below.)

Garbett (1969: 107) mentions Mutota (as a spirit), writing that “Mutota’s spirit-realm [...] extends [from Rhodesia/Zimbabwe] into Portuguese East-Africa”. In present-day traditions of Barue that I have been able to record, this Mutota is not explicitly associated with the Mutota of Mutapa. Mutota’s spirit was said to be the most important one in Barue, although there was currently no medium (Ioanes CN; cf. Sueta AC). The spirit medium Ioanes CN stated he had heard the name « Mwene Mutapa », adding he could not elaborate. However, Ioanes CN did mention a woman Nyamudzororo, who was a female relative (samukazi32) of Mutota. Ioanes CN further said that Nyamudzororo and Mutota came from Chidima, to be the first persons to arrive in Barue.33 Nyamudzororo was a great queen who ruled Mpataguenha (in the north-east of Barue District, where ICN lives). ICN’s story has resemblances with Abraham’s and Pacheco’s information about Mureche, although Mutota’s rôle is different (in ICN’s version he was migrating himself rather than only being the woman’s grandfather). Chidima is indeed within the Mutapa heartland sphere (Serra [ed.] 2000: 36).34

Von Sicard (1954) gives a list of 35 Makombe kings as related to H. Wieschhoff in 1929 with the mnemonic aid of a knotted string. The list is important because it still preserves the idea that the Barue kings formed a long-lasting dynasty, which is not a commonly held view in Barue today. The first king is given as “Nyabumudu”, the second as “Daughter of the King Nyadepa”. Von Sicard (1954) hypothesizes this “daughter” may be identified with Mureche. Who Nyabumudu was and how his (her?) kingship before Mureche is to be understood remains unclear. If Matope died around 1480 (Abraham 1962; cf. Beach 1976 for critical

32 My assistant translated this word (in a Barwe context) with « sister » (irmā). The Shona « samukadzi » would suggest « paternal aunt » (FZ – Hannan 2000: 591). During the fieldwork I did notice a tendency to “upgrade” genealogical terms when reference was made to older people, so indeed “aunt” may then be used for “a grown-up person’s grown-up sister”.

33 ICN: Nyamudzororo akhali mukuru ndiachatanga kuwira munyika ine yaBalke muno, […] Nyamudzororo naMutota. […] Wadabuda […] kuXidima.

34 Thus the assumption that “Kabudu Kagoro and his followers were the first to inhabit the Barue homelands” before the mid-16th century (Isaacman 1973: 402, cf. 396n8) is problematic and depends on what appears to be a misinterpretation of the identity of Kabudu Kagoro by Isaacman, cf. below and Appendix B.
evaluation), the founding of the Barue/Makombe dynasty is about as old and using the Wieschhoff list we may count, starting from the “daughter”, 34 Makombe kings in the period from ± 1480 until 1918, the year when the dynasty ceased to exist as a royal family, giving a maximum average of 438 / 34 or about 13 years of reign per king. The earliest unambiguous mentioning of a personal name of a Makombe I could find so far in the Portuguese literature is « Gunguro » (~ Gonguru) in 1768 (AHM in Moçambique 1956: 126; cf. Bhila 1982: 124-126); this name is not in the Wieschhoff list (although another name may have been used to refer to that individual, a hypothesis I discuss in Appendix B, § 1).

Barue split off from the Mutapa kingdom when it refused to pay tribute to the latter. Mutapa king Gatsi Rusere (~ Gasse Lucere) was unable to undo this refusal and so Barue obtained its independence. The event may be dated in 1608 (Bocarro 1876: 548, 554; ch. 127, 129; Mudenge 1988: 76, 229-230, 243, 245). Unfortunately Bocarro gives few details, but it is intriguing that the tribute strike is not described as an act of the Barue king but of “the kingdom” and that “the Baruese defended themselves courageously” (Bocarro ibid.: 554-555), suggesting at least some popular involvement. Structurally the situation in 1608 comprises a common action against domination by the Mutapa state. I have argued above already that this would imply applicability of Anderson’s (2006) definition of “nation”, were it not for the fact that it had nothing to do with printed languages or Enlightenment ideas. Barue lost its independence shortly in about 1659 when António Lobo da Silva overran the country. This person was a powerful individual within the sphere of the Zambezia landholdings discussed above. However, the Portuguese captain of Sena, Francisco Pires, supported the Barue king and Da Silva withdrew from Barue. Pires feared Lobo da Silva would become too powerful with the kingdom incorporated in his jurisdictions (Barretto 1964: 487-488; Lobato 1989: 160). Around that time the maximum diameter of Barue seems to have been 50 leagues, or about 250 km, between Sena and the remaining Mutapa state, “inclining towards the north” (Barretto 1964: 482, 487; the 370 km of Coutinho 1904: 9 seems to me far too much). Since Barue must have been extending south of the Zambezi rather than north, the south border was probably at or near the Pungue River, which is Barue District’s southern border today. It can also be inferred that Barue was north-west of Gorongosa. The western border can be put approximately at the Luenha River and Manyika’s eastern border (Abraham 1962: 91).

The period after Lobo da Silva’s actions is little known in the literature. Rita-Ferreira (1982: 144, 148) seems to indicate that Barue temporarily lost some territory near the Luenha

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to the Rozvi of Changamire Dombo, who came from the south-west in present-day Zimbabwe, but with a clause like “maybe” this interpretation is not solid. The precolonial stone architecture in Barue mentioned in chapter 1 appears to date from this period and architectural features suggest at least partial Rozvi cultural influence (Gerharz in Macamo 2006: 145).

In the 1760s, the political situation in Barue appears to have been rather chaotic, due to Portuguese encroachment:

In the late 1760s the whole border region between the Sena captaincy, Barue and Kiteve was in a state of anarchy. Portuguese prazo-owners seized land in Barue and the Barue chiefs responded by raiding Sungue and closing the roads to Manica. Both sides accused the other of harbouring fugitives and supporting dissidents, and peace was only restored in 1769 after an official exchange of ambassadors and gifts. (Newitt 1995: 213)

Apparently the Portuguese had also tried to put a ruler of their choice, Mutuconha, on the Barue throne (Forquilha 2010: 45n2 would indicate this was in or around 1758). Somehow this Mutuconha died and Gunguro, Makombe in October 1768 if not earlier, had been able to establish himself after yet two other opponents, Zinheme and Cuvava, were no longer threatening. Bhila (1982: 124) indicates that Gunguro ruled in the period 1767-1770 and tried to subjugate militarily the Sungue area in the north that had fallen into Portuguese hands. From the available information it appears that Mutuconha had had some (though apparently no total) support amongst Barue subordinates. However, Gunguro’s anti-Portuguese military actions enjoyed a wide popularity amongst Baruese and slaves who had run away from Portuguese masters. In 1768 the Portuguese defeated Gunguro, but due to internal administrative weakness were not able to press too many demands on the Barue Kingdom. From this episode, we know the names of several leaders subordinate to Gunguro: Mucomovache, Manamuchenge, Sarvange, Manamafobo and Satambara (this paragraph: AHM in Moçambique 1956: 124, 126; Bhila 1982: 124-126).

In 1788 Manuel Galvão da Silva (1954: 324) crossed what is now southern Barue District, which was apparently in peaceful circumstances. Rita-Ferreira (1982: 144) mentions a Makombe Gange who fits in time with “Ganye”, number 26 of the Wieschhoff list (Von Sicard 1954: 53). According to Rita-Ferreira (ibid.), Gange was succeeded by Sazua in 1794.

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36 Manuel Galvão da Silva (1954: 323-324n*) indicates Sungue as separating Barue from prazos along the Zambezi River under jurisdiction of Sena.

37 It is unclear to me whether or not there is any relation with the m’comaatche (~ Mukomowasha) mentioned by Coutinho (1904: 38, 40), an advisor to the Makombe (cf. Isaacman 1973: 399-402).
or 1795. From this period we know that in order to have permission to transit Barue (towards Manyika); the Portuguese from Sena had to negotiate with the kingdom the payment of tribute. This fact alone shows that precolonial Barue had a concept of territory; hence Hansen and Stepputat’s (2005: 25) assertion that “[t]he definition of states and sovereignty in terms of territorial unity evolved in the late colonial period” is unsatisfactory. Lower-level leaders of Barue got shares of the tribute in the form of cloth; mentioned chiefs are: Savengo, Guerema, Bondo, Sanha, Samsaera, Sanhaganza, Sanhamutamba and Inhagope (Bhila 1982: 145; Bhila 1982: 149-150).

Also around this time, an intriguing aspect of the inauguration of a new Makombe became the final ceremony of Makombe’s investiture through the involvement of a Portuguese representative bringing water from Sena in a flask. In 1811 Chimbatata underwent such a ceremony, with the accompaniment of political agreements (e.g. transit possibilities) between the Barue and Portuguese states (Alves Barboza [~ Barbosa] in Montez 1941; cf. Alpers 1970: 212; Santana 1967: 445-447). For 1830 such a procedure is mentioned concerning Inhamaguada (Santana 1967: 346, cf. 903; cf. Alpers 1970: 212). Gamitto (1857-1858) provides more details, some of which I shall mention here. After the indigenous ceremonies, the Portuguese representative emptied over the head of the new king a flask of water, which he brought with him, and which they [the Baruese] believed to be blessed, and with the latter ceremony he [the new king] was recognized [and] thus acclaimed king […].

This happened after the king had been fasting three days, in order to experience what hardship is. After the pouring the king was presented a bow and arrow and a hoe. He was supposed to pick up the hoe, signifying he would promote peace and prosperity rather than war. Usually the kings did pick the hoe (Gamitto ibid.: 29). The poured water was known as (in this thesis’s spelling convention) madzi amanga, the literal meaning of which may be rendered as “water that binds” or “ties” (cf. Montez 1941: 119). The symbolic meaning of what it was that was bound/tied is less easily determined, and Isaacman’s (1973) interpretation of the ceremony is problematic to no small degree (as explained in Appendix B, § 2). In general, however, the ritual indicates that the states of Portugal and Barue had some

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38 Isaacman (1976: 204) mentions a Sazua in 1822; it is not clear whether there was any relationship between the two Sazuas, or whether the same individual is concerned.

39 Probably = Sanhantamba; cf. below.
modus vivendi without mutually directed hostilities in this historical period.

The accession of the said Chimbatata apparently signified a lineage change within the Makombe rulership away from Gunguro’s descendants, because individuals of the “descent group [geração] of the Gonguros” are indicated as Chimbatata’s enemies who should not be helped by Portugal (Santana 1967: 446-447). After Chimbatata, Isaacman (1976: 204) mentions three Makombes until 1826. In the period 1826-1830 Barue appears to have experienced a sine regno for four years (Alpers 1970: 212; Santana 1967: 329). The period was characterized by the effects of locusts, drought, famine and disease (Newitt 1995: 254-255). Groups of Baruese and others, with ad hoc leaders, marauded the surroundings of the country in search for sustenance. One of these leaders was Chidana (~ Chidanna) who had left Barue as a child and now led groups of escaped slaves who ravaged the area around Sena. The Portuguese cooperated with Inhamaguada to defeat Chidana in November 1829 (Santana 1964: 338, 788-792, 883, 963, 1082). Next March Barue itself was still in disorder, however. The Portuguese decided to back Inhamaguada as prospective king, which apparently was approved by the latter’s family members. Preparations were then made for the confirmation ritual described above (Santana 1967: 166, 329).

In 1833 there was a dispute between Makombe (unspecified) and the Portuguese government about the feira (Portuguese trading post) in Masekesa in the Manyika kingdom. Traders passing through Barue to the feira had stopped paying Makombe transit fees and Makombe had blocked transit. A treaty resolved the dispute. Meanwhile, Nguni had started to attack the feira, one of the first signs that Nguni, originally coming from the south, would soon play a dominant role in what is now central Mozambique (Bhila 1982: 177). The diverse Nguni groups also occupied prazos and frightened the Portuguese government in the Zambezi region (Serra [ed.] 2000: 101).

An invasion of Barue by the Maseko people (one of the several Nguni groups) in 1838 is reported (Liesegang 1970: 321, 334-335), and somewhat later, “by the 1840s” Barue was under control of the Gaza Nguni of Soshangane (Newitt 1995: 287; cf. Rita-Ferreira 1999: 52). This situation apparently did not persist long – it does not become clear from Newitt exactly why; in (1973: 316) he states that the Nguni “left the region”. In any case, the mobile character of the Nguni, who often operated through raids rather than fixed occupation of territory (Meneses pers. comm.) may complicate reconstructions. Polities subject to Gaza rule retained their identities and their own ruling dynasties, but they had to accept the presence of the representatives of the Gaza state at their capital. Armed parties would periodically come by for tax-collecting (1995: 287; cf. Bhila 1982: 185).
Somewhat later, Barue’s independence appears to have been firmly established under the reign of Makombe Chipapata (~ Chipatata, Xipapata) who came to power in 1853 at the latest. For this he had to defeat his cousin (FBS) Chibudu, who was backed by Portuguese settlers and as late as 1854 by the Gaza Nguni governor (later king) Mzila (~ Umzila). Meanwhile, in 1849, the Portuguese had established Joaquim José da Cruz as leaseholder in prazo Massangano (in the south corner of the Luenha and Zambezi Rivers) to withstand Nguni. But Da Cruz and his son António Vicente became a nuisance for the Portuguese government when Massangano interfered with the trade along the Zambezi River and engaged in raids.

Initially also relations between Barue and Da Cruz were cordial, but Da Cruz conquered land that had pertained to Barue, and Chipapata combined with the Pereira family, rulers of Macanga (north of Tete), to attack Massangano in 1853. They were unsuccessful and had to give up the effort when the rains started (Eça 1953: 279-287; Isaacman 1972a: 144; Newitt 1973: 238, 316). From the episode we know that in 1853 Chipapata had relations with the Portuguese, and in such a way that he was able to bully them. During the Massangano siege some Portuguese officials passed by over the Zambezi and Chipapata demanded a piece of artillery from them. When they refused, saying it was government property, Chipapata said he had a treaty with the Portuguese government to help him, and that if it would not be given he would take it by force and moreover would do with government enterprises as he wished. Eventually the artillery piece, some other material and two soldiers to accompany the military equipment were handed over to the Makombe, who duly signed a receipt (Eça 1953: 285-286; Macombe [Chipapata] 1953; Vasconcelos e Sá 1953). The text of the treaty Chipapata referred to does not seem available in published works. However, the fact that Chipapata acted like he had the upper hand indicates that such a treaty was concluded after he had neutralized his cousin Chibudu, who was supported by Portuguese settlers as mentioned above. Probably for having no other option, the Portuguese government decided to cooperate with the winner of the Chipapata/Chibudu conflict.

This firm position of Chipapata would gradually erode. Despite its initial assertiveness and subsequent stability, the reign of Chipapata signaled the beginning of the end for Barue’s independence due to the Portuguese. The activities of Manuel António de Sousa, who was born into a Goan family in Portuguese India in about 1835, formed the prelude to the

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40 Coutinho (1904) considered Chipapata and Chibudu brothers, but here I follow the information obtained by the 1900 expedition of Col. Arnold (see Bourne, Watt and Throup [H] [eds.] 1995: 244).
41 This paragraph: Alpers (1970: 213); Coutinho (1904: 17); Eça (1953: 48-51, 58, 62-63); Newitt (1973: 254-257, 316, 402n268); Serra ([ed.] 2000: 102). Note that succession within the Da Cruz family was along male lines; this signals a change away from the standard model of a prazo.
Portuguese colonization of Barue. De Sousa, also known as Gouveia, was sent to eastern Africa to administer the estate of an uncle, became a trader based in Sena and later built himself a base at Gorongosa, a vast old prazo “granted” to him in 1854 or 1855. In 1863 the Portuguese government appointed him capitão-mor.\(^\text{42}\) His usefulness for the Portuguese government became evident in the period 1867-1869 when he assisted the Portuguese to suppress the then independently operating Da Cruz of Massangano (Coutinho 1936; Newitt 1973: 313-322).

De Sousa’s power and intrigues were a threat to Barue and Makombe Chipapata now cooperated with the Da Cruz family to try to render De Sousa harmless in or around 1868. They failed to defeat De Sousa, but succeeded in keeping Barue free, at least for the next decade or so. In or around 1874, De Sousa married a daughter of Makombe, Adriana. Trade agreements were also established. These events are probably related to a shifting power balance in favour of De Sousa.\(^\text{43}\) “Very shortly afterwards” De Sousa tricked a caravan of his to be looted in Barue, giving him a pretext to “persuade” Makombe to submit to De Sousa – done symbolically by sending a tusk filled with earth to De Sousa (Maugham 1910: 140-141).

Chipapata died in 1880 or 1881\(^\text{44}\) and De Sousa, intending to have his and Adriana’s son João Francisco Xavier de Sousa (then six years old) declared leader of Barue, occupied the defunct kingdom, acted as regent for his son, regrouped the population and appointed his own local chiefs (Newitt 1973: 317).

Isaacman (1976: 51) states that “Gouveia’s power was not nearly as complete as either his contemporaries or current historians have thought”. This thesis disagrees and posits that De Sousa’s usurpation of power was crucial in destroying most of the original political fabric of Barue. Chipapata’s son Hanga apparently had little (probably none) concrete political

\(^{42}\) “Captain-major” – this should not be understood as De Sousa being a formal official of Portuguese governmental administration, and he operated according to his own will. Again, it had nothing to do with “modern” bureaucracy.

\(^{43}\) Coutinho (1904: 17-18; 1936); Isaacman (1976: 49); Newitt (1973: 316-317); ICN [U]; MMN. I reconstruct the shift in the power balance as follows. In 1874, Chipapata together with Muruko of Maungwe attacked Tendai of Manyika. Tendai was relieved by forces of De Sousa (Abraham 1951: 72; Newitt 1973: 315). Possibly this episode was decisive in Chipapata’s accepting Sousa as a partner, realizing military resistance would not work. It is not entirely clear what motivated (for Chipapata) the attack on Tendai, but De Almeida (1979: 186) reports that the Manyika king had concluded a treaty with De Sousa in 1873 (see also Beach 1999: 81, 85). If Chipapata’s attack was indeed in the year 1874 and related to the treaty, the events point to increased regional political tension in which De Sousa was involved.

\(^{44}\) Oral tradition has it that Chipapata/Kabudu Kagoro “disappeared” (Artur 1996: 31), i.e. “did not die” (HSG; MJC) and “went to the Zambezi” (HSG) or “transformed himself into a partridge and flew across the border of Zimbabwe” (MJC). De Sousa (in Isaacman 1976: 51) indicated that Chipapata was killed in a fight that followed a quarrel between them; more on this in Appendix B, § 3.
weight during De Sousa’s reign. He would have to build a resistance apparatus almost entirely anew and succeeded only in 1892 to defeat De Sousa. After that Barue was independent for a decade but the royal succession was indeterminate and Barue itself was eventually defeated by the Portuguese in 1902. De Sousa’s “legacy” is that none of the current chiefly lineages in Barue District can unequivocally trace their origin (as chiefly lineages) before the period 1890-1892 and probably came into being in or after these years, as I shall discuss in the empirical parts below. Isaacman’s underestimation of De Sousa’s power hinges on his dating of Chipapata’s death in 1887, which is unreliable. Consequently, the length of De Sousa’s absolute reign over Barue until his arrest in 1890 by officials of the British South African Company (BSAC) was not about three but about nine to ten years. (See Appendix B, § 3 for a more detailed discussion of chronological matters.)

Background material about Chipapata and his family

Because at the time of my fieldwork the person known as “Makombe” was seen as a very important historical figure and informed local ideas about politics it is prudent to give some background about Chipapata and his family. Actually this helps to solve a problem of identification that is mentioned in the literature (Alpers 1970: 212). With some qualifications to be discussed, “Makombe” as known in present-day Barue can in general be identified with the Chipapata known from the literature. Bourne, Watt and Throup [H] ([eds.] 1995: 244) and Coutinho (1904) provide useful genealogical information about part of the Makombe family, specifically the two houses competing for the Makombeship around 1900, the descendants of Chibudu and those of Chipapata. A reconstruction is given in Figure 2.

Apart from “Makombe”, the person identified by Coutinho as Xipapata was also identified as “Kabudu Kagoro” in Barue during my fieldwork. The identity “Chipapata = Kabudu Kagoro”, applicable to the person who was Makombe from (approximately) 1853 until 1880, has thus far not been recognized in the literature about Barue (see e.g. Alpers 1970: 212). This means that Isaacman’s (1973: 396) identification of Kabudu Kagoro as a person living before the mid-16th century is problematic (and rejected in this thesis). The given identity follows from straightforward considerations provided in Appendix B, § 4.
It is likely that my interlocutors in Barue conflated at least two different historical individuals into the single person of “Makombe”, namely Kabudu Kagoro and his son Hanga, even if they only recognize Kabudu Kagoro as “Makombe”. This conflation aspect is relevant for a good understanding of the history and legitimation of certain chiefdoms in Barue District, and of the importance of “Makombe” in general. An indication for the existence of the conflation is that Régulo Sanhantamba [R] indicated a flight path of “Makombe” via Macossa and Ntsuanda (Sabão, near Catandica) to Zimbabwe. Though not exactly identical with Coutinho’s (1904: 55, 261) data on Hanga’s escape route after Coutinho had defeated him in 1902, Régulo Sanhantamba’s information is similar enough to Coutinho’s and different enough from that on the flight path that two of Kabudu Kagoro’s other sons, Nongwe-Nongwe and Makosa, would take in 1918 to warrant the conclusion that when Baruese of today talk about actions of “Makombe” they may sometimes refer to Hanga/Nyaupare as known from the literature, not Kabudu Kagoro.45 SAC even said that Makombe’s name was « Kabudu Kagoro Nyaupare », thus giving direct proof of the conflation (FN° 29/07/2010). Also references to “Makombe” by Régulo Sanhatunze and

45 The identification of Nongwe-Nongwe and Makosa as brothers is not common in the literature. For a motivation, see Appendix B, § 5. The 1918 path was near the Nhamitomboé (~ Nhabitomboé, Nyakutombwi, Nyamatombgwi) area in Samanhanga (Isaacman 1976: 172; Ranger 1963: 78-79).
Sabhuku (–Sh, headman hierarchically under a chief; Bw: mpfumu) Musosonora seem more applicable to Hanga than to Kabudu Kagoro. Their ancestors got the areas to rule as a reward for their contribution in anti-Portuguese warfare and this squares better with the situation after De Sousa’s defeat when a power vacuum could be filled up than with the actions of Chipapata who fought against but never defeated the Portuguese in a war.

Barue’s temporarily regained independence and the Portuguese conquest of 1902

The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 had defined the principle of “effective occupation”, meaning European countries had to substantiate territorial claims in Africa by exerting physical presence. This led to some bickering between Portugal and Britain over territorial rights in such areas as Mashonaland in (present-day) Zimbabwe and Southern Malawi. In 1887 Portugal published its “rose-coloured map” which claimed a large part of Central Africa as Portuguese territory, linking present-day Angola and Mozambique. Britain made the diplomatically rash move to present Portugal with an ultimatum on 11 January 1890 demanding practically immediate withdrawal of Portuguese forces from territories Britain considered its own. Portugal complied. Eventually a treaty was formulated, and ratified on 11 June 1891, laying the basis for the geographical shape of Mozambique as it is today.46

Especially for Portugal one practical way to ensure physical presence was using commercial chartered companies to perform the physical presence in the country’s name. One such company was the Mozambique Company (Companhia de Moçambique), established in 1888 by Colonel Joaquim Carlos Paiva de Andrada (Vail 1976: 390-391). Paiva de Andrada cooperated with M.A. de Sousa, but they suffered a setback when trying to consolidate access to the Manyika area, which was in dispute with the British. In an event already alluded to above, they were arrested by the BSAC in 1890, trapped by Tendai (Chief Mutasa ~ Umtasa of Manyika; Nowell 1982: 219-223, Pélissier 1994 vol. 2: 61). After this, the Portuguese government granted in February 1891 the Mozambique Company full sovereign rights over the area that is now (roughly) the Manica and Sofala Provinces. This was intended to keep the BSAC at bay (Vail 1976: 391).

In 1891 the British released De Sousa. On return to Barue he had to fight Massangano and Hanga and his associates who had taken advantage of De Sousa’s absence to try to

46 This paragraph: Axelson (1967: 81, 201-297); Nowell (1982); Pélissier (1994 vol. 2: 67); Serra ([ed. 2000: 161-168, 182-188]; treaty text in Dos Santos (1986: 149-164); for backgrounds of the ultimatum and how it stirred anti-monarchical political sentiment within Portugal, see Teixeira (1987).
recapture their areas. De Sousa was helped by João de Azevedo Coutinho (1865-1944), a Portuguese army officer who played an important part in the military subjugation of Mozambique. At an action near Mafunda in November 1891, Coutinho was severely injured when a container with gunpowder exploded. As Pélissier comments, the catastrophe near Mafunda delayed Portuguese subjugation of Barue for a decade. De Sousa himself was defeated by Hanga and his associates near Missongue in January 1892 and he died soon after in unclear circumstances. There now followed a rather chaotic period in which different individuals vied for the Barue throne. Hanga was ousted by Samakande, who reigned for about two or three years (Azevedo 1991: 50; Newitt 1973: 330-331, 335; Pélissier 1994 vol. 1; vol. 2, specifically pp. 71-80).

The Mozambique Company was to occupy the territory between the Save and Zambezi rivers, bounded in the west by the British occupied territories and the Caerezi and Luenha rivers. This was not successful (Isaacman 1976: 62). Coutinho (1904: 22-25) relates that Georges (~ George) Taylor, a North-American married to a daughter of Samakande, was appointed by the Mozambique Company as capitão-mor for Barue. His alliance with Samakande was supposed to help bring an end to the war between Samakande and Hanga in the former’s advantage and be the basis of his own establishment as Barue administrator. Samakande seems to have been reluctant to counter Taylor’s ascendancy (Isaacman 1976: 54). Taylor, Coutinho (ibid.) explains, had also threatened the chief of Katerere and a certain Sequessa into submission. These chiefdoms, however, did not belong to the Barue area and the Mozambique Company’s authority could not yet be considered fully established in Barue itself, although it was already labelled as a circunscripção (borough). In so far as Taylor was able to collect tax, he did it for himself, and before the Company could take measures against him, he left the scene around 1894. However, Taylor’s successors Barreto, Sherbakoff and Da Silva Neves had even less success in consolidating the Company’s authority (ibid.: 24-26).

Samakande was unpopular due his reported cruel behaviour and European habits and he was ousted by his old rival Hanga around 1894-1895 (Pélissier 1994 vol. 2: 137). Hanga himself was challenged by Chipitura, a son of Chipapata’s cousin Chibudu. Chipitura, who cooperated with the Portuguese, was able to push Hanga to the Muira valley, effectively dividing the Barue kingdom in two (ibid.). After Chipitura’s death in 1898 or 1899 he was succeeded by his brother Cassiche, who tried to make common cause with the Portuguese. In 1900, the Portuguese authorities commissioned Lieutenant Colonel Arnold to explore the Barue environment (Arnold 1901; Coutinho 1904: 26; Isaacman 1976: 55). This had as a
result that Cassiche formally accepted Portuguese authority in his territory (Photos 2a and 2b). For this Cassiche was deposed by his subordinate chiefs and he sought asylum in the area of Makosa, while the subordinates put his nephew Cavunda (~ Chavunda) on the throne with his residence in Mungari (Coutinho 1904: 23, 44, 158; Isaacman 1976: 55). With Hanga still residing in Missongue near the Muira, there was no solution as to the question who was paramount ruler of Barue. The Portuguese tried to lure Cavunda to their side, offering access to arms, but he responded that

the disputes between him and Hanga were internal matters [...] and that anyone who attacks the one had better be prepared to fight the other” (Isaacman 1976: 55).

With this understanding between Cavunda and Hanga, the Mozambique Company thus still had no foothold in Barue (Coutinho 1904: 26n1) and the Portuguese government was forced to intervene directly by itself if the territory was to be secured. Eventually Portugal would attack Barue under the command of Coutinho in 1902. This war is sometimes described as a “rebellion” of the Baruese (e.g. Allina-Pisano 2003: 65n24) but from the Barue side it seems better to describe the event as a defensive war against foreign invasion, although the war was connected to a large complex of rebellions in other areas outside Barue. Hanga had prepared for a Portuguese attack for several years already. Negotiations with the Portuguese to respect Barue independence had failed, as had a request for support from the British. Hanga had cemented relationships with other peoples surrounding Barue so as to resist or even reverse Portuguese military advance, though with the Nguni he was not successful in this respect. Nevertheless Barue was able to ward off the Portuguese during Hanga’s period of influence in the later 1890s. Spirit mediums (masvikiro, sg. svikiro) were also active in mobilizing support for revolts in areas already under European control, such as in the 1896 revolt in Rhodesia. (Isaacman 1976: 56-62).

Coutinho, having large supplies of African warriors, started operations against Barue and its allies, defended by a coalition of Hanga and Cavunda, on 30 July 1902 (Isaacman 1976: 63-65). BSAC reportedly paid half of the costs (The Advertiser 1902). On 28 August Coutinho won the decisive battle at Missongue (Inhachirondo), Hanga’s capital (Pélissier 1994 vol. 2: 146-147). Hanga’s son Cabendere (~ Cabedendere) died in the event but Hanga himself was able to escape to Nyanga in present-day Zimbabwe via Zenlagombie (~

\[47\] It is stated by Gaivão in Coutinho (1904: fold page “Relação ... aprisionados”) that Cavunda dethroned Cassiche by intrigue of Hanga, but Coutinho (1904: 23) clearly indicates that the initiative lay with the subordinates. In any case they were the ones who would have to do the deposition.
Zamula/Ngombe, Artur 1996: 66) and then Chinda (~ T’chinda, Txinda) in the Chôa area (Coutinho 1904: 261, 363; Isaacman 1976: 65). Cavunda was captured in Inhagone on 28 September\(^\text{48}\) and formally capitulated in Macossa on 29 September. He was later taken to Cape Verde. Makosa capitulated in Domba on 15 September and was, like Cassiche, taken to Macossa were he was questioned on 29 September and told he would be free to go back to his area. Nongwe-Nongwe apparently escaped (Coutinho 1904: 17, 23, 157, 231, 257-258, 23, photo opp. 158).

The interbellum 1902-1917

After the 1902 war Coutinho (1904: 177) maintained that “[t]he administration of Barue will be for the Mozambique Company a low-cost duty, finding itself surrounded by territories already pacified, occupied and administrated”. Though it was true that the Mozambique Company was supposed both to administer the area and reap the fruits of its inhabitants’ exploitation, the idea of its administrating the area was not realized, because the Portuguese government would administer Barue directly as subsumed under Tete District, having born the cost of its subjection, which the Company was unable or unwilling to compensate for. Formally Barue (then bigger than the present-day district) became a Major Captainship (Capitania-Mór) in 1902, while Catandica was under a “military command”. In 1909 Barue is reported as still “temporarily” subsumed under Tete District as a “fiscal borough” (circunscrição fiscal) with a capital (sede) in Mungari. In 1914 Catandica became the capital of the borough, which became itself redefined as a “civil borough”, still under Tete District, in April 1917, when the revolt of 1917 was already underway (and the area was thus not “totally pacified” as legislation required for civil government).\(^\text{49}\)

Commercial production in the Mozambique Company’s vast area using forced labour developed only slowly (Vail 1976: 396). Nevertheless Vasse (1907: 388-389) reported that the Company “wisely regulated” its relation with “the natives”, defining the number of working days “required”, mode of recruitment and the method and rate of pay. He pointed out, however, that the Company had no uniform method of raising taxes, there existing a poll and a hut tax which led to population movements. He also reported that the administration of the

\(^{48}\) Coutinho (1904: 157) would suggest he was already captured in or near Mungari a bit earlier.

\(^{49}\) This paragraph, apart from Coutinho: Andrade (1907: 195, 201); Pélissier (1994 vol. 2: 152); Pires (2006: 28), Portugal [L] (1907: art. 86); Rafael (2001: 19); Warhurst (1970: 32). See Map 6 for the location of Barue relative to the Mozambique Company.
“district” was “well [...] carried out” by “native chiefs”. The latter were mostly “local headmen”,\(^{50}\) because Portuguese authorities had great difficulties in subduing “great chiefs, or kings”. He added:

The breaking-up of the authority of the Kaffir chiefs is a powerful factor in the government of a province, and I should be strongly disposed not to abolish the power of these kings at a stroke, but to abstain from replacing them at their demise, and to divide the territory formerly subject to them into a certain number of districts, assigned to chiefs or headmen appointed by the Governor on the nomination of the District Commandant. (Vasse 1907: 389)

Makambe (1980: 553) quotes Albert Oury of the Company who complained in 1917 that Barue was an area where “civilizing influence” was limited to native tax collection and was becoming a refuge for “recalcitrants and malcontents” who wanted “to escape from the system of work and discipline” in the surrounding areas. Elsewhere the interaction between the Company and the subject population was not easy either, although the Company had of course, with the armed resistance failed, the upper hand. Allina-Pissano (2003: 65, 71, 75) describes how in the borough of Manica most chiefs had refused to be co-opted by the Company and negotiated or protested on the population’s behalf concerning matters of labour recruitment. The nearby border with Rhodesia also allowed increasing people’s options by moving across it. With both British and Portuguese colonial regimes consolidated, these movements were not dependent on the desire for political freedom but on the relative severity of labour and tax requirements (2003: 66).

In Barue itself the Portuguese government seems to have had a regime that grew from less to very oppressive. Little is known about the exact relationship the Barue leaders had with the Portuguese between 1902 and 1917 when the next war broke out. Nongwe-Nongwe and Makosa have been reported to be in Mozambican territory and “control” parts of Barue by early 1917, in the north and south respectively (Tangwena in Isaacman 1976: 159; Ranger 1963: 65-66).\(^{51}\) Ranger (ibid.) mentions that they were not part of the Portuguese colonial administration. This would suggest that the Portuguese in this period had not yet rigorously implemented in Barue the system of employing leaders who would later be called autoridades gentílicas, i.e. “ethnic authorities” or “traditional authorities” (Portugal 1926: art. 8; Meneses et al. 2003: 344), but just tolerated leaders who remained from the period before

\(^{50}\) Inhaqua or inyaka, cf. Bw: nyakwawa).

\(^{51}\) This is confirmed for Nongwe-Nongwe in Mungari by SAC, while Makosa probably had lived in his own area since 1902 since he was allowed to do so by the Portuguese (cf. above). For Nongwe-Nongwe this would mean that he filled the vacuum left by the deported Cavunda.
and during the 1902 war, somewhat like Vasse’s recommendation quoted above (but see ch. 12 for a somewhat different picture). A Portuguese official reported that in Barue people had to pay tax but were not subject (directly, at least) to forced labour (Galli 2003: 58, 74n16), a situation that stimulated migration to the area, as indeed indicated by Oury. According to Rodrigues (1910: 40), the tax collection was a considerable success in “perfectly subjected” Barue.

The Barue Revolt of 1917-1918

With the development of the First World War, however, the situation for the Barue population would worsen drastically. People were recruited to serve the war against the Germans as carriers or soldiers or had to work on the Tete-Macequece (Manica) road. Initially Nongwe-Nongwe and Makosa both seem to have been reluctant to fight the Portuguese, preferring negotiations instead to try to alleviate ill-treatment of the population. The two were also disputing amongst themselves about who was to be inaugurated as the next Makombe. Two events seem to have caused Nongwe-Nongwe’s eventual recognition as Makombe. One is a great assembly that was held to discuss the question whether or not a revolt against the Portuguese should be organized. There Nongwe-Nongwe now argued in favour of and Makosa still against that idea. Since most participants at the assembly were in favour of revolt Nongwe-Nongwe was acclaimed as leader. Second was his cooperation with a new mhondoro spirit medium of Kabudu Kagoro, a young woman known as “Mbuya” (“Grandmother”, almost certainly a nickname), identified by Makambe as “Nemhuru”.

Isaacman’s informants reported that Mbuya’s popularity enabled her to urge the population to rise up. According to Isaacman this was the factor for Nongwe-Nongwe to change his position (initially against rebellion) and become in favour of rebellion, hoping to gain spiritual recognition for his claimed Makombeship (Isaacman 1976: 159-160; see also Ranger 1963: 67 on Mbuya’s mobilizing capability). My informant Dona Suzana Calhancambo, approximately born in 1902, confirmed the close cooperation between Nongwe-Nongwe and Mbuya. Makosa joined the rebellion after all, after realizing virtually everybody was in favour of it (Isaacman 1976: 160; Ranger 1963: 66). Nongwe-Nongwe

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52 An explanation for this contrast between Nongwe-Nongwe and Makosa can be hypothesized to lie in the fact that Makosa had been at the mercy of the Portuguese army at the end of the 1902 war. Since Nongwe-Nongwe had apparently escaped then, he had no such aspect of dependency.

53 This paragraph compiled from: Isaacman (1976: 158-159); Makambe (1980: 552, 559-560); Ranger (1963: 62-63, 65-67); SC. For more background on Mbuya, see Appendix B, § 6.
built a broad inter-ethnic coalition just as Hanga had done (Isaacman 1976: 161-166). There is no agreement in the literature exactly when the actual revolt started. Isaacman (1976: 167) mentions 27 March 1917, but Pélissier (1994 vol. 2: 358) 24 March, concerning an attack on Mungari, while Artur (1996: 67) dates the Mungari attack as the revolt’s beginning on 28 March. The latter date is the one now celebrated as *Makombe Day* in Barue District (see Appendix B, § 9 and 10 for present-day local remembrances of Makombe and the revolt). Initially the revolt was successful and Nongwe-Nongwe could even consider Barue independent for a while, but ten thousand, if not more, Nguni soldiers fought on the Portuguese side, and Nongwe-Nongwe suffered set-backs in mid-1917. Makosa, who thereafter came to be regarded as the (last) Makombe, had to resort to guerilla warfare and eventually fled, like Nongwe-Nongwe earlier, to Rhodesia in October 1918. A small guerilla group remained active until 1920 (Isaacman 1976: 166-177; Pélissier 1994 vol.2: 343-384; Ranger 1963: 56-57, 69, 78).

For context, a few general facts about other parts of Mozambique may be mentioned. In the last quarter of the 19th century the Portuguese tried to get local African leaders to their side by letting them sign treaties of allegiance (Nowell 1982). Eventually, however, straightforward military force was necessary to subjugate the Mozambican area. The defeat of Ngungunyana, the Nguni king of Gaza, in 1895 and Maguiguane in 1897 made southern Mozambique subject to Portuguese rule (Serra [ed.] 2000: 372-275). North-eastern Mozambique was only wholly subdued by force as late as 1920 (Serra [ed.] 2000: 222-247; Vail 1976: 413).

**Reflections on Barue as a state**

Newitt (1973: 30) stresses the “segment[ary]” character of Shona and Marave societies, in which the existence and political cohesion of villages and clans were quite independent of the fate of larger political units. Such a depiction does not seem to hold for Barue when it was (though with some temporary exceptions) an independent and clearly recognizable state for almost three centuries in the 1608-1902 period. Judging from the available information the geographical extension of the country does not seem to have changed very drastically in those three centuries. Certainly, there were economic and political crises, such as in the 1760s and the first half of the 19th century. There existed political competition between members of the royal family, sometimes more violent, other times less so. But never seems the cohesion of Barue as embodying an *idea of a state* to have been seriously threatened. Also the division of
Barue around the turn of the century (± 1900) was seen by those involved as an intermezzo until a solution for the leadership problem was found, not a permanent split of the country. Having emerged as a split-off from the larger Mutapa state, Barue did not itself experience significant break-ups due to independence movements within its territory. Indeed, the various crises themselves show that Barue was capable of stabilizing again after periods of chaos.

Political crises were often the result of strife within the royal family rather than pre-existing geographical or social divisions of the kingdom’s population. Unfortunately, little is known about most instances of power struggle within the Makombe family. However, that such strife could have more far-reaching political motives than just the lust for power of individuals is clear from the better-known events of the last decades of the kingdom’s existence. Maintaining Barue’s independence vis-à-vis the Portuguese was a major factor in Barue politics. Chibudu and his sons Chipitura and Cassiche were more inclined to submit to Portuguese encroachment than Chipapata and his son Hanga. That such political outlooks were ultimately not wholly dependent on lineage politics is clear from the fact that Samakande was pro-Portuguese while Cavunda was not. The deposition of Cassiche in favour of Cavunda in 1900 must have been dependent on the actions of lower-level leaders. The leadership of Makombe Nongwe-Nongwe and spirit medium Mbuya in 1917 appears to have been dependent on a general popular desire to rise against Portuguese colonialism. This is a strong indication of the durable legitimacy of the Makombes as rulers (Ranger 1963) and by extension of the existence of Barue as a state. It may be recalled that Barue never knew political parties as organizers of the state, an aspect that made it different from most present-day states. However, we can speak of a phenomenon of nationalism during about three centuries, with the population and the Makombe dynasty cooperating to install, preserve or reinstall the independence of their state. In this thesis I am sometimes critical of Isaacman’s historical reconstructions, but I do think that the title of his (1976) book, “tradition of resistance”, is very well chosen. The enduring legacy of “Makombe” in Barue District today reminds us of the importance of the connection between the dynasty and the population. Data from my fieldwork show that both Frelimo and Renamo have referred to “Makombe” as historical symbol of independence and the good life.

How the population could influence the selection and/or deposition of more local chiefs is rather unclear from available information. In their writings, governors and travellers focused more on the royal family than lower-level chiefs. Indeed such more local processes were a focus of the present author’s fieldwork precisely because rather little was known about these (though perhaps future archival research may reveal more historical data). In at least
one period it is clear that after times of chaos chiefs could be installed by a Makombe in a
top-down way. I argue in this thesis that this was often the case with supporters of Hanga
when he had defeated De Sousa in 1891/1892. Popular involvement in the selection of a chief
would then, as a rule, only have been possible with the selection of the successor of an initial
chief when the existence of several brothers (the first chief’s own brothers or, more likely, his
sons) would require the settlement of a competition for the post.

As for matters of ethnicity, Isaacman (1973: 402; 1976: 58) seems to interpret the Barue
state as a combination of “Barue and Tonga” populational elements, where the
Mukomowasha\(^{54}\) as a senior councillor of the Makombe would represent persistent Tonga
political influence vis-à-vis “the Barue”, who had come as invaders in the past. There is some
difficulty in understanding this interpretation. In the context of central Mozambique and East
Zimbabwe, the word « Tonga » can refer to people who lived along the Zambezi River, but
also more generally to speakers of languages other than Shona, according to Beach including
Barwe itself, so the word « Tonga » carries with it confusing references, denoting different
groups and perhaps even some Shona populations after all (Beach 1980: 157-159). Moreover,
the origin of the Makombe dynasty is associated with the Shona Mutapa state. Thus if we
should speak of any ethnic differentiation in the Barue kingdom, we might just as well refer
to Shona versus Barue and possibly other groups rather than only to Barue versus Tonga
groups. Also, the dominance of the Makombe dynasty is hard to interpret as a specifically
ethnic overrule of Shona over Barue populations, since commoner Shona and Barue people
alike would be both subordinates to that dynasty. Overall the Makombe dynasty does not
seem to have been systematically brutal towards the population. Descriptions in Jacobs (2010:
40) seem to imply this for the Gorongosa area, but there the Makombes are associated with
atrocities for which they were almost certainly not at all responsible, as I argue in Appendix
B, § 7. Furthermore the Barue state does not appear to have been engaged in the slave trade
that so impacted on other parts of Mozambique; agreements between the Portuguese and
Makombe were concerned with transit possibilities for the Portuguese through Barue territory
rather than trafficking in people (e.g. Santana 1967: 445-446).

At least at some time a sort of social security system appears to have existed. Senhor
Tapera J Mutamvu mentioned that during the time of Makombe people who had shortage of
food would go to Makombe to ask for a food subsidy.\(^{55}\) Such food originated from the
general population’s cultivation efforts. Régulo Seguma added during this interview session

\(^{54}\) Cf. note 37 above.

\(^{55}\) Kuona enenzara vaenda kwaMakombe vaikumbira kudya.
that such efforts were made on a “communal field”. *Senhor* Tapera confirmed such reserves originated from the population’s efforts. 56 Thus in Barue there was compulsory labour in the form of work on state fields, but the produce thereof at least partly provided for surpluses that could serve as food security for the population and was therefore also in the interest of Baruense themselves, in so far as risk spreading constituted their interest. In this sense the Baruense are better viewed as tax-payers within a pre-existing impersonal state rather than as clients within personalized patron-client relationships. The Barue state emerges from history as a political entity of which the average inhabitant was better off relative to the ever more encroaching *prazos* and in which most of the leadership and the general population had a shared interest in keeping their country independent. Its most serious crises were due to external factors (drought; invasions by Nguni and Portuguese foreigners) rather than civil wars or totalitarian political leaders. We could see the reverence that the memory of “Makombe” enjoys today in Barue as something that makes much sense.

**Summary**

A succinct review of the Kingdom of Barue was provided against wider historical, economic and political backgrounds in central Mozambique. It appeared likely that slavery and the slave trade did not play a significant rôle in Barue, and certainly far less than north of the Zambezi River. Makombe Gunguro actually cooperated with escaped slaves to fight the Portuguese. Barue independence was frequently threatened, but the country and its Makombe dynasty could also reassert themselves after calamities, until the actions of Manuel António de Sousa during Makombe Chipapata’s life signaled the beginning of the end of Barue’s existence. In 1902 Barue was definitively incorporated into the Portuguese colony (“province”) of Mozambique, while the Barue Revolt of 1917-1918 did not succeed to expel the colonizers. As for Barue’s internal organization, this was rather centrally organized in terms of defence, international trade relations, territorial integrity, administrative morphology and social security. Lack of data prevents to ascertain the influence the population could have on its rulers, but the idea of subordinates controlling their own leader was not unknown, as is

56 For the Shona Beach (1994a) mentions that people worked part of their time on rulers’ fields for sustaining the court and its visitors, but Mudenge (1988: 166) suggests the tribute construction in relation to relief reserves (thus in line with *Senhor* Tapera’s food subsidy information). Coutinho (1904: 39) does inform that the Barue people paid tax (*mussoco*) not in kind but in the form of labour on fields (*colimas*) that existed in diverse fertile parts of the territory. Beach (1994a: 103) implies that Shona people may have worked 7 out of 23 working days on rulers’ fields.
testified by the deposition of Makombe Cassiche after he had concluded a treaty surrendering Barue to the Portuguese.