CHAPTER 10 – END OF COLONIAL RULE AND FRELIMO’S STRUGGLE FOR PARTY-POLITICAL HEGEMONY IN POSTCOLONIAL TIMES

In this chapter I shall investigate the effects of the end of the Estado Novo in Portugal in 1974 on Mozambique’s political situation, and how decolonization put Frelimo in a position in which it could dominate the state for four decades. The chapter’s main theme is Frelimo’s evolution from anticolonial movement to a political party in a one-party system and then, after and due to the war with Renamo, to a party in a multiparty system. Frelimo has, however, shown difficulty and/or unwillingness to accommodate other political parties and non-party organizations (including hereditary leaders) within Mozambican political life up to this day (writing mid-2014). The chapter views political parties in a way different from the view that political parties seek authorization from the public (Lawson 1976: 3; cf. chapter 6 above), namely as organizations that may also try to subsume the public under their political authority. I shall argue that the peace process, which put an end to the Mozambican civil war, did not change Frelimo’s characteristic self-definition of being the default leading political entity in Mozambique. The approaches towards collective choice developed by Rousseau and Arrow that are incorporated in Mozambique’s multiparty system reinforce this idea of intrinsically justified hegemony and thus fail to provide most non-Frelimo Mozambicans with adequate means to challenge that party’s influence on their lives.

It will be seen that such hegemony is independent from Marxist-Leninist ideology, which Frelimo formally endorsed in the 1977-1989 period. Ncomo (2009) has asserted that ethnic solidarity (mostly of Frelimo leaders from the south of Mozambique) is essential for understanding Frelimo’s present hegemony. This I also do not see as decisive in explaining Frelimo’s continued hegemony. Rather, I shall show that apart from certain events occurring around the time of Mozambique’s independence, the current hegemony of Frelimo also derives from the circumstance that certain leaders (i.e. the leading faction within Frelimo) have continued to group themselves together in one political alternative within the multiparty system, while that multiparty system is not capable of apportioning political influence to other alternatives (c.q. political parties). As in earlier chapters, I cannot mention all details.

The end of the Estado Novo and related events

Marcello Caetano was Salazar’s successor as leader of Portugal after the latter suffered a stroke in September 1968. Little changed relative to the Salazar era (Macqueen 1997: 64-72;
Nevertheless, “[w]ith hindsight it is clear that already by 1971 the colonies were living on borrowed time (Newitt 1981: 242), and some events can be identified that would have seemed impossible under Salazar. In September 1973 Jorge Jardim conceptualized his “Lusaka Plan” in consultation with Zambia’s President Kaunda, a scheme that comprised a multiparty system that would include Frelimo, though also with the intention to safeguard existing capitalist interests. Serious negotiations about the plan never existed. Some very modest political organization by Africans became possible. People such as Máximo Dias and Joana Simeão (~ Semião, Simião) were active before the coup through the Grupo Unido de Moçambique (GUMO, ~ GUM – United Group of Mozambique) founded early 1974.\footnote{Cabrita (2000: 72); Hanlon (1984: 44); Jardim (1976); Leonard (1974: 41); Neves de Souto (2007: 124); PIDE/DGS (1974); cf. Opello (1975: 82n 45). As Cabrita (2006) points out, Simeão’s 1974 ideas were not dissimilar to those of Mondlane in 1965; see Cabrita (2000: 43). See also Howe (1969: 161).}

PIDE/DGS (1974: 6 December 1973; “tif” file 91) maintained that Simeão’s “grand ambition” was “a free and independent Mozambique”. The establishment of GUMO fits within this pattern, and the party should not be seen as an extension of the Caetano government. PIDE/DGS (1974) files show that this organization saw GUMO as an independently constituted institution. Meanwhile, the military situation had grown bad for the Portuguese colonial order. By January 1974 Frelimo was able to threaten the colonial population in Central Mozambique, killing the wife of a commercial agriculturalist. This raised doubt about the colonial army’s capability to protect the colonial population and fear increased of uncontrollable insurrections by that population (Neves de Souto 2007: 276-279).

After the coup in Portugal on 25 April 1974 it was clear that Mozambique would change political direction, but it was not immediately clear what the new direction would be (Macqueen 1997: ch. 5). For Mozambique two main questions had to be resolved. One was whether or not a referendum would be held, in which people would be able to express themselves on total political independence or a continuation of bonds with Portugal within some sort of federal construction. The latter was the default option of General Spínola, Portugal’s president after the coup. The group of army officers known as the MFA (\textit{Movimento de Forças Armadas} – Movement of Armed Forces), the main protagonists of the coup, favoured an independence for Mozambique without any such intermediate process.

The second question was whether Frelimo would be the only party in Mozambique’s political process or other political organizations would be involved as well. The two
questions are not logically coupled but at the time they were related in practice. COREMO and Frelimo were both against any federal solution, but where COREMO wished to be included in negotiation talks with Portugal, Frelimo claimed such negotiation activities only for itself. Frelimo did not want a referendum as this would imply public political discussion. Portugal’s Mário Soares confirmed this, saying “it is only Frelimo which is fighting [...] and we will talk only to them” (Macqueen 1997: 133). Portugal’s Constitutional Law 7/74 of 27 July 1974 removed all talk about a possible referendum (Macqueen 1997: 135, 136; for text see Parlamento 1974b), because it recognized by default the “right to self-determination”, including as a consequence independence, of the hitherto overseas territories. Law 7/74 stated that it sought to clarify the scope of article 8 of section B of the Programme of the MFA, which was included in the earlier Law 3/74 of 14 May 1974 (Parlamento 1974a). Now this is problematic because that article 8 had stated that the overseas policy of the Provisional Government (of Portugal) would be guided, amongst others, by the principle of “creating the conditions for a free and open debate” at national level of the “overseas problem”. Macqueen (1997: 79-80) reconstructs this as a compromise “dilution of the commitment to decolonization” of an earlier version of the MFA Programme to satisfy Spinola and other more conservative members of Portugal’s post-revolutionary government. In any case, the text of the later Law 7/74 wants to give the impression that the Law “clarifies” the said earlier article 8 but its effect was that it cancelled the debate clause of that article.

For Frelimo the cancellation of a referendum meant it did not have to compete in an election process (Macqueen 1997: 136). Although Frelimo would only formally declare itself a “party” with a Marxist-Leninist character at its Third Congress in 1977 (Meneses 2007: 24), for all intents and purposes it can be considered to have been a political party which represents sectional interests (cf. chapter 5) in 1974, since Machel had announced in 1970 that only “revolutionaries” could join the organization (cf. chapter 9).

Couto (1974) describes Frelimo’s principled rejection of a “multiparty system after a west European standard” thus: Frelimo would have to make compromises with political competitors, which could “betray a great part of the population concerning the fruits of its liberation struggle – under the protection of the appearance of a democratic choice” (1974: 74). In Couto’s formulation the political functioning of a multiparty system (leading to “betrayal”) is conflated with its supposed geographical origin (Europe) (above I have made similar comments concerning Hansen and Stepputat 2001: 10). We shall now see that this was not the outlook of all Mozambicans, but those promoting a multiparty political system experienced difficulty in putting their point of view forward in public (see New York
“Conservative white settlers” formed Fico (“I stay”), while on the other hand pro-Frelimo “radical white liberals” organized themselves in the Mozambican Democrats.134 Simango, Simeão and others established the Partido de Coligação Nacional (PCN – National Coalition Party) on 23 August 1974 (Cabrita [N] 2006). PCN stated that “[n]o organization should claim the right to be the sole and legitimate representative of the Mozambican people without being put to the test of democratic process” (Cabrita 2000: 73-74). However, Frelimo reached an agreement with the post-coup MFA-dominated Portuguese government on 7 September 1974 in Lusaka (Lusaka Agreement – text in Frelimo 1974b). This agreement delivered power over Mozambique into Frelimo hands without any need for a referendum or elections (Macqueen 1997: 146-147). Protests ensued, but had no effect except for the death of more than 100 people by October (Cabrita 2000: 80; Hanlon 1984: 45).

On 20 September 1974 a Frelimo-dominated Transitional Government took office, and on 25 June 1975 Mozambique’s independence was declared (Muiuane 2006: 233, 460). Eventually Frelimo and Machel thus obtained governmental and presidential power without any sort of plebiscite or even a party congress. That Frelimo wanted a one-party system is not surprising given its earlier history. However, Frelimo still violated Mondlane’s promise “that the personnel of the executive and Central Committee [of Frelimo in an independent Mozambique] are freely elected and may therefore change” (Mondlane 1969: 221).

Suspension of habeas corpus and the Nachingwea proceedings

It did not take long before the Transitional Government formulated legislation to have a free hand in the execution of its interpretation of “decolonization”. Under Salazar and Caetano Portugal had known, at least on paper, habeas corpus provisions.135 This legislation was suspended by the Transitional Government on 2 November 1974, when Portuguese High-Commissioner Victor Crespo signed (Mozambican, still colonial) Decree-law 12/74 that stipulated that habeas corpus would not be applicable to those detained on the suspicion of practicing so-called “crimes against decolonization” (Portugal 1974b; Muiuane [ed.] 2006: 557; cf. Trindade 2003: 102-103). Curiously, a representative of the Portuguese state in

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Mozambique signed legislation that suspended Portuguese national law-giving. However, with the backing of Decree-law 12/74, and of Decree-law 11/74 (on the custody of “suspects” of “crimes against decolonization” – Portugal 1974a), Frelimo could hold prisoner anyone whom it deemed against its objectives in decolonization as specified in the Lusaka Agreement (Decree-law 11/74; i.e. including that Frelimo is the sole Mozambican actor in the decolonization process).

In the first half of 1975 more than two hundred prisoners, many of them associated with COREMO or other non-Frelimo organizations, were shown to thousands of spectators in Nachingwea, the former Frelimo training location in Tanzania. Available information indicates there were several such events in the period March-May. Simango and others had to read out before the spectators a “confession” concocted or extracted under duress by Sérgio Vieira and his staff. Simeão was also amongst the prisoners (Cabrita 2000: 82). Machel assured the prisoners that they would not be killed (Africa Research Bulletin 1975).

However, it is generally accepted that many of them, specifically well-known persons like Simango and Simeão, were in fact killed later, although exactly when remains unclear (Africa Watch 1992: 158; Cabrita 2000: 100-101). There were also prisoners at the Nachingwea proceedings who had no political prominence whatsoever. One of them was José Eugénio Zitha, whose fate is now not publicly known. His case was brought before the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) in 2008-2011 (for details, see ACHPR 2011; cf. Canal de Moçambique 2012a; 2012b).

Euro-American reactions on the Nachingwea proceedings

The reaction of two solidarity organizations on the Nachingwea proceedings is revealing. The Angola Comité (1975: 6) quotes Jorge Rebelo as saying that “we should not think that our enemies have a white skin” (implying: the “blacks” shown here in Nachingwea today can be enemies) and concludes:

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137 Cabrita (2000: 82); Ncomo (2009: 312-313); New York Southern Africa Committee (1975).
After having listened to these testimonies it was absolutely clear that these prisoners were directly responsible for a large number of deaths […] But Samora Machel said: “We shall never contemplate to kill any one of them” […] It was as if he wanted to say “Today we have used you, but you have used the suffering of the people of Mozambique for years for your own egoistic plans. But nevertheless we still put trust in you […]” (ibid.: 7).

In this way Angola Comité (1975) depicted people as “egoistic” who had devoted a large part of their lives to the freedom of Mozambique (Ncomo 2009: 25).

The New York Southern Africa Committee (1975) judged:

As can be expected in the process of every political metamorphosis Mozambique has its traitors, defectors and murderers, people who have lived their entire lives in poverty, and betray their own people for something small and ephemeral.

Concerning Gumane it was alleged that “[t]he CIA was deeply involved” (ibid.). This was ironic to hold against him, since Frelimo under Mondlane had itself received money from the CIA (cf. ch. 8). Angola Comité (1975) and New York Southern Africa Committee (1975) do not indicate the slightest awareness on their side that the Nachingwea proceedings had nothing to do with anything that looks like “due process”, that the allegations and the “confessions” obtained in a situation of captivity might possibly have been fabricated, and that the more than two hundred individuals exposed could not so uniformly be branded as “criminals” without further evidence, if any one of them had done any “criminal” acts at all. Certainly, solidarity movements in the Netherlands, or individuals within them, could be critical about their Southern African counterparts (e.g. Paulussen [H] 1983: 60-62), but criticism was ineffectual and loyalty of a party-political character remained dominant (cf. Van Beurden and Huinder 1996: 152-153, 156, 192; de Wit 2008: 56-57.)

Events shortly after independence

As stipulated in the Lusaka Agreement, Mozambique became independent on 25 June 1975, Frelimo’s 13th formal anniversary. Around that time, many left Mozambique by their own initiative, but those who chose to stay were not necessarily viewed as “part of Mozambique”. The violence alluded to above stimulated further emigration (Hanlon 1984: 45). On 18 August 1975 Guebuza formulated a policy that enabled Frelimo to define anyone as “foreigner”. Known as “20/24” (~ 24/20), the measure entailed that unwanted people got 24 hours to leave Mozambique with 20 kg luggage. This was not done in one shot but applied in
any case as was deemed necessary (Guebuza 2004: 74-75). Though not the only ones, “Portuguese” were specifically targeted (Cahen 2009: 48n145). Ana CFD[^1] explained there were no written indications. “They got to people’s home with weapons” with the demand the family should leave.

This is not to say all people of Portuguese descent were required to leave. Ana CFD’s husband José JD [U] saw his private company terminated at independence, but he was also invited to sit on the Municipal Assembly of Nampula. He reported he was himself involved in the establishment of communal villages. Such development of communal villages was under the guidance of two people participating in Grupos Dinamizadores (Dynamizing Groups) established after independence. In one specific case people were forced (and did not want) to cultivate a large area of sunflowers (JJD). Grupos Dinamizadores were somewhat loosely structured teams that had multiple functions: mobilize the population to support the policies of the new government; act as tribunal; perform governmental functions and manage industries (Meneses 2007; 2011; Isaacman and Isaacman 1983: 116-120, 124-125).

A characteristic phenomenon of Mozambican politics in the first years after independence is its dual character concerning the interaction between citizens and the Frelimo-state. On the one hand people cooperated in large projects such as vaccination and education campaigns (Trindade 2003: 110). On the other hand there was the system of “re-education” camps. People imprisoned here included Jehovah’s Witnesses, political dissidents and people indicated as involved in “prostitution and banditry” (ICJ 1981). Most of them were detained without being charged or put to trial. Some camps had a mild regime, but in others hard labour, abuse, illness and death by bad conditions and execution were common (Africa Watch 1992: 19-20; cf. Cabrita 2000: 95-99; Hall and Young 1997: 47-48).

Frelimo and hereditary leaders in rural areas

The official Frelimo policy was to remove the hereditary leaders (régulos [chiefs], chefes de grupo [headmen] etc.) from office. This policy seems to have been carried out to a large extent, though not entirely, in the first years after independence. After a few years cooperation between Frelimo and (former) régulos resumed again in certain places even if

[^1]: Later, in 1990, one member of the Popular Assembly defended the principle that the year 1498 was to be considered the reference point for discussions on nationality, an idea never proposed, as far as I know, by any of the alleged “racist reactionaries”. Van den Hoogen (1990) states it was Guebuza; Cistac (2009: 34n70) describes the incident but gives no name.

[^2]: After independence, ACFD’s own family does not seem to have experienced political problems.
not officially endorsed, according to Dinerman (2006). According to Geffray, discontent about the removal of the régulos and Frelimo’s alleged negative attitude towards people’s ritual beliefs and habits were reasons for the success of Renamo at certain places (1990: ch. 3). I shall elaborate on this topic on the basis of my own fieldwork below. It will be seen that in Barue régulos, where existing at the time of independence, were not so much deposed, but rather restricted in their political and judicial functions. Spirit mediums simply continued and those I spoke with actually had some connection with Frelimo.

The emergence and development of Renamo, 1976-1986

After Frelimo had rendered political opponents harmless through the Nachingwea proceedings and by other means, it had to suppress a coup attempt on 17 December 1975 by a group of Frelimo soldiers (Cabrita 2000: 105). Thereafter opposition was limited to such organizations as FUMO of Domingos Arouca and MONAMO of Máximo Dias, which had little concrete activity (Cabrita 2000: 142; Darch ≤ 2013; cf. Fauvet 1984: 113). This situation without opposition did not last long. In June 1976 Amós Sumane (of MORECO and UNAR) founded the oppositional Partido Revolucionário de Moçambique (PRM – Mozambique Revolutionary Party, also called África Livre [Free Africa]), which was militarily operative within Mozambique from 1978 until 1982, when it merged with Renamo (Cabrita 2000: 128-130, 202; Fauvet 1984: 116; cf. Africa Watch 1992: 19, 21).

The anti-Frelimo organization that was to provoke the infamous “war of sixteen years” (1976/1977-1992) was the Mozambique [-~ Mozambican] National Resistance (MNR), later more commonly known as Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo [-~ RENAMO]).

Renamo had two origins as well as two outcomes. Its coming into being resulted from an overlap in interests to oppose Frelimo between the Rhodesian racist government and Mozambicans who had grievances against Frelimo’s political behaviour (Cabrita 2000). Its outcomes were on the one hand to introduce a grisly climate of violence in a general sense intended to weaken Frelimo, and on the other hand to provide a political home for people dissatisfied with Frelimo, often because of the latter’s own violence (Africa Watch 1992).

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141 As with « Frelimo », the writing in capitals only is the organization’s prescribed way (<www.renamo.org.mz>, accessed 17 June 2014), but the form using the minuscules is the commonly accepted way.
142 For an overview of the complexities involved, see Seibert (2003). Nordstrom (1997: 47) reminds us that Frelimo and Renamo were not the only entities engaged in violence. Nevertheless the war is best characterized as one between two entities, as is clear from the peace process which ended the war.
It was Geffray’s (1990) book which drew broad attention to the fact that entire populations sought the cooperation of Renamo because of Frelimo policies, although this point had already been made by White (1985). Exact numbers of victims of the war are not known, but as the effects included hunger and disease due to the disruption of regular life apart from direct killings, the death toll has been substantial and is given by Africa Watch (1992: 41) as 600,000, while a number of one million has also been mentioned (Hanlon in Dinerman 2006: 155). More than four million people were uprooted (Dinerman ibid.).

As with Frelimo, the chronology of events in Renamo’s early history is not always clear. The rôle of André Matsangaíce (~ Matsangaissa) can be seen as being the person around whom the movement was able to consolidate itself and gain momentum. Elígio MB [U], a Renamo security officer during the war, called Matsangaíce the “pioneer” (pioneiro) of the “war against Frelimo”. Matsangaíce was interned by Frelimo in Sacudzo “re-education” camp in September 1975. He escaped in 1976 and not later than in October 1976 he went to Rhodesia (Africa Watch 1992: 20; Cabrita 2000: 144; Ncomo 2005) and discussed the possibilities for an armed insurrection against Frelimo with the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) (Cabrita 2000: 133).

Later the Rhodesians facilitated the setting up of the radio broadcaster Voz da África Livre (Voice of Free Africa – not to be confused with África Livre), initiated by the disaffected Portuguese-Mozambican Orlando Cristina and former Frelimo fighters Jacob Chinhara and Janota Luís. The station broadcast anti-Frelimo propaganda to Mozambique, starting from 5 July 1976 (Cabrita 2000: 133-134, 139-143). An exact date for Renamo’s founding seems difficult to establish; Minter (1994: 156) gives “1977”, but events in 1976 could just as well be considered relevant, and probably Renamo’s establishment (like Frelimo’s) is better seen as a process rather than a single action in a day.


Matsangaíce’s initiative notwithstanding, there would have been no Renamo without the

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This was between Frelimo and Renamo only.

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(Southern) Rhodesian regime. Facing its own armed struggle from the side of ZANU, this regime had an interest in opposing Frelimo. The Rhodesians carried out military operations on Mozambican soil against Zimbabweans, such as in Barue near the Nhazónia (~ Nyadzonia) River on 9 August 1976. The remains of the fallen are enshrined in a monument at the place now called Massacre de Nhazónia (field observation, 3 April 2010).

In August 1976, the CIO set up a training camp at Odzi, near Mutare (Africa Watch 1992: 21), suggesting the CIO did not passively wait for Matsangaíce’s success in operations to start hostilities. On the other hand the movement must be seen as Mozambican as its initial personnel consisted of volunteers from Mozambique. There was no necessity for the Rhodesians to have a Mozambican proxy since they were perfectly capable of carrying out military operations by themselves, as the example of Nhazónia shows. Mozambicans were fleeing “to Rhodesia” from Frelimo’s own “re-education” camps, as Machel himself admitted in a speech early 1980 (1985: 76; pointed out by Igreja 2010: 788-789). Matsangaíce was killed near Gorongosa on 17 October 1979 (Cabrita 2000: 160-161). Afonso Dhlakama would become his successor; it is not clear exactly how (compare Cabrita 2000: 161-163; Vines 1991: 16-17; Hanlon 1984: 222). In any case, Dhlakama’s leadership does not seem to have been subject to some congressional meeting of any kind.

In the period 1977-1979, Renamo operated mainly in the centre of Mozambique, attacking Frelimo garrisons but also civilian targets such as roads and towns (Cabrita 2000: 154-155). Meanwhile, developments in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe changed Renamo’s operational environment. In February 1980 ZANU won the elections which meant Renamo could no longer count on Rhodesian support. Apartheid South Africa would now take over sponsorship of Renamo (Minter 1994: 34, 40). It was particularly since 1980 that Renamo would develop its ghastly behavioural repertoire of cruelly killing and mutilating civilians indiscriminately (Africa Watch 1992: 27-28). These cruelties are well documented. There seems, however, to have been some regional differentiation in Renamo’s mode of operation, Renamo’s conduct being crueler in the south of the country than in the north (1992: 50; cf. Wilson 1992: 530, 534). The biggest massacre generally attributed to Renamo occurred in Homoine town, Inhambane Province, on 18 July 1987, when 424 people were killed (Africa Watch 1992: 50). South Africa itself was also directly militarily involved, such as in January 1981 and in October 1986. Zimbabwe became involved in the war on Frelimo’s side, and on Mozambican soil, in 1982; Tanzania in or around 1986 (Minter 1994: 40, 44, 47, 137). As for Renamo’s motives to fight, Elígio MB [U] maintained that Frelimo had been against “the white Portuguese” at the time of independence, ordering them to leave in 24 hours (cf. above). This
was bad according to Elígio MB because no longer could the know-how of the Portuguese be utilized.

Other developments 1977-1987

Frelimo’s Third Congress was held in 1977, when it formally declared itself a Marxist-Leninist party, after the Eighth Session of the Central Committee had in 1976 called for the destruction of the “colonial-capitalist machinery” and its concomitants (Meneses 2011: 159-160). The party was to control the state, while party membership was not open to anyone but guided by the idea of vanguardism; not just anybody could become a member but candidate members were subjected to specific scrutiny of their behaviour. Party cells would gradually take on more and dynamizing groups less prominence (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983: 121-125). Cahen (1993) points out that the Marxist character of Frelimo was equivocal. It did comprise such items like a “discourse against exploitation directed equally at colonialism and capitalism” (1993: 48). On the other hand banks were nationalized quite late (in 1978) and major private companies could continue to operate, while small entrepreneurs were suppressed (1993: 51-52).

In 1977 an electoral law was promulgated and elections held that same year.\footnote{Law 1/77 of 1 September; Mozambique (1977); Egerö (1987: 120-130); Meneses (2007: 23); Trindade (2003: 108).} Popular assemblies were defined at different geographical levels in a tiered system from local to national. The general population could elect individuals for local assemblies out of candidates defined by the Frelimo party or Dynamizing Groups (art. 15). Lower-level assemblies elected people for higher-level assemblies (art. 21). The assemblies had as tasks, amongst others, to reinforce state power, make known the decisions of the Third Congress, fight against “saboteurs and agitators”, and “solve concrete problems of the people” (art. 4). The electoral law only provided for the election of personnel, policies were not to be defined by lower-level assemblies and higher-level assemblies had the power to overrule or even dissolve lower-level ones (art. 5-6), making complete agreement with definition (17) on “democratic centralism” (ch. 3) difficult to ascertain (cf. Hall and Young 1997: 77-79). As mentioned above, in practice members of the National Assembly were selected by the Frelimo Central Committee rather than freely chosen by provincial assemblies (Egerö 1987: 123). Other rounds of elections were held in 1980 and 1986 (ibid.: 124-126).

In 1982 Mozambique applied for membership of the IMF, eventually resulting in an
agreement with that institution in 1987 (Newitt 1995: 566; Trindade 2003: 113). The year 1983 may be noted for the organization of Frelimo’s Fourth Congress. Peasant families were to produce more, but such exhortation could be accompanied by corporal punishment (Egerö 1987: 164-165). Also the so-called “Operation Production”, widely considered useless, was set up in 1983, led by Guebuza. City people who could not show they were employed were displaced to remote rural areas for agricultural work (Egerö 1987: 188; Hall and Young 1997: 104-105; Trindade 2003: 111n32; Quembo 2012).

The war of Renamo and its South African ally against the Frelimo-government got its own dynamics. South Africa used Renamo to “destabilize” Mozambique, not so much to replace the Frelimo-regime but to keep it weak (Newitt 1995: 560-563, 574). On 16 March 1984 the Nkomati Accord was signed, which comprised that Mozambique and South Africa would stop supporting armed insurrection in each other’s countries. Tanzania and Zimbabwe sent troops to support Frelimo. However, from documents found in the Renamo base in Gorongosa in 1985 it became clear that South African support for Renamo still continued (Newitt 1995: 565, 567-568). On 19 October 1986 Machel was killed in an air crash in unclear circumstances. Joaquim Chissano took office as president without conflict within Frelimo (Newitt 1995: 569).

As for Renamo, Cabrita reports that the movement first released a formal programme of action in February 1979. Frelimo’s “oppressive regime”, centrally planned economy, communal villages, and “re-education” camps had to be ended and “multiparty democracy” and economic free enterprise be introduced (2000: 169). In 1981, with the assistance of André Thomashausen, Renamo formulated the idea of establishing a “government of national concord with Frelimo” and “the reinstatement of traditional rulers” (2000: 186, 188). Militarily, neither Frelimo nor Renamo could gain the upper hand, resulting in a rather patchy occupation of territory by Renamo at the end of the hostilities in 1992 (see map in MPPB 1995c).

The peace process

The first attempts to come to a politically negotiated end of the Frelimo-Renamo war seem to

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144 The hypothesis now mostly entertained is that the South African apartheid regime indeed led the plane astray by a false signal – Sowetan Sunday World/Cape Times in Mozambique History Net [N] (2013).


date from 1984 (in a meeting in Frankfurt between Frelimo’s Honwana and Renamo’s Fernandes). Jacinto Veloso met Fernandes and the South African general Van der Westhuizen in Pretoria in July 1984. Early October, a meeting was held in Pretoria and a declaration formulated, which had no practical impact (Accord 1998: 37; Veloso 2011: 188-192; cf. Hall and Young 1997: 148-159). At the end of 1987 the US Americans passed on to Frelimo a document sent by Renamo which contained five conditions for negotiation, amongst which “democratic, free and transparent elections” without a requirement of a government of national unity (Veloso 2011: 243-246).

Around the time of its Fifth Congress (July 1989), Frelimo produced a document which was delivered to Renamo through a delegation of Mozambican church representatives in Nairobi in August 1989, facilitated by the Kenyan government. Renamo answered, also through the church representatives, with a document containing 16 points (see Accord 1998: 39). The sequel of the negotiations was to take place in Rome, aided by the Sant’Egidio religious community, the Italian government and Archbishop of Beira Jaime Gonçalves (Veloso ibid.: 252-257). The USA government presented a “Seven Point Proposal” to Dhlakama in December 1989 which mentioned “democracy”, describing it as based on “freedom of expression, association and economic opportunity”. Elections were not mentioned, although people had “the right to make decisions involving their governance” (Accord 1998: 39). The presidents of Zimbabwe and Botswana also contributed towards the peace process e.g. through a meeting with Dhlakama on 4 July 1992 (cf. “Joint Declaration” of 7 August 1992). The UK businessman “Tiny” Rowland of the Lonrho Company was also involved (Vines 1998).

Eventually the General Peace Agreement (GPA) between Frelimo and Renamo was concluded on 4 October 1992. Some points may be specifically highlighted. First, political parties were to “provide for democratic participation” based on “electoral processes at all levels of State organization” (GPA, Protocol II, 1-a; emphasis added). The GPA did not specify whether these electoral processes should be held for the executive, the legislative, or both, of all the levels. In any case, we shall see below that this aspect of the GPA has never been carried out in full for either. Second, freedom of residence for the citizens was to be guaranteed (Protocol III, III), something that has become qualified, as we shall see below.

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Third, decisions of the Supervisory and Monitoring Commission (CSC), which was to overlook the GPA, were to be taken by consensus between the (Frelimo and Renamo) parties (Protocol V, II-3, cf. Protocol I, 5), a method for reaching collective decisions that has been largely abandoned since the first multiparty elections of 1994. Fourth, the government (i.e. the Frelimo government) was not to hold lower-level elections before the general elections, i.e. those eventually held in 1994 (Protocol V, III-9[f]). This clause may have been meant to prevent Frelimo from consolidating itself in the larger part of the country, but later developments were to foster just that. This is connected with a fifth point, namely that Renamo was to be allowed to continue to exercise administration of areas under its control until the time the new government would take office (Protocol V, III-9[d]). Sixth, the (Frelimo) government was to “respect […] the traditional structures and authorities” (Protocol V, III-9[e]), a prelude to the “recognition of traditional authorities” later culminating in Decree 15/2000. Seventh, the GPA did not define “democracy” but simply referred to “the internationally recognised principles of democracy” (Joint Declaration, commitment (i)) without elaboration what these are. In the preamble of Protocol II, it is declared that Frelimo and Renamo agreed on the necessity of guaranteeing the workings of a multi-party democracy in which the parties would freely co-operate […] and in promoting democratic participation by the citizens in the Government of the country.

It is difficult to pin down what concrete effects this quote was supposed to have. It might be interpreted as a call for a “government of national concord”, as Renamo had wished. But this is not what happened, and I know of no commentator who has maintained that the eventual result in 1994 with a Frelimo-only government was in violation of the GPA. This leads to conclusion that the GPA’s understanding of “democracy” is probably one that allows for the choice set method, where a numerical difference in an election solely determines who may govern, with the exclusion of all others. But it does not say so. That this was indeed a main issue is shown by the discussions in 1993 and 1994 between political parties about the electoral process, where “[a]l[the core […] was again the question of political power, and guarantees of participation in power” (Mazula 1996: 38).

Thus while the GPA and subsequent events were themselves based on reaching consensus between Frelimo and Renamo (Mazula 1996: 27, 30, 47-50), the resulting political structure of Mozambique was not so to be conceived, as is clear from a discussion by ONUMOZ Executive Director Dirk Salomons who commented in 1993 (thus after the GPA

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but before the first multiparty elections):

We are talking about electorate [sic] […], which has a decision making process […] where people simply sit and remain until the consensus is formed. The idea that a majority can overrule a minority is not a very commonly accepted one. […] In the Western democracy you can have elections on the basis of winner-takes-all. […] One party wins, the other party moves into opposition and waits patiently till its turn comes. […] But in the Mozambican situation this concept of loyal opposition […] does not exist. […] A situation may occur in Mozambique where the winner takes all and the loser is pushed into a corner. […] Is there going to be […] some formula for power sharing? […] That is some way to keep the concept of consensus […] in order to avoid a polarisation of society (in Hansma and Roskam [eds.] 1993: 37-38).

Just how prophetic Salomons’s words were is to be studied in the sequel, but here it can be pointed out that if Salomons had any doubts about the political trajectory that Mozambique was to take, it was far too late for these to be expressed, as both the new Constitution (discussed below) and the GPA were already defined. The Electoral Law of 1993 would formally adopt a variant of the choice set method for electing the national president (Mozambique 1994a), and since the president would be entitled to appoint all government members, the national government was to be expected (as Salomons did expect) to be a one-party affair. That Mozambique’s post-1992 presidential election procedure is of the choice set type I show in Appendix C.

Somewhat in line with Salomons, Cistac (2009: 95-100) makes a contrast between the “European-western” majoritarian set-up of the Mozambican republic and “traditional customs”. I would agree with the contrast at a very general level, but propose to formulate it differently. Precolonial Mozambique did know some idea of majority versus minority; the decision to initiate the Barue Revolt was not unanimous. The “majoritarian set-up” Cistac refers to is a specific form of decision making which uses the “choice set” idea, where the difference of one single vote can be decisive. Such a small difference would not be relevant in methods in which an inexactly conceived majority comes into being through discussions. One is reminded of Habermas’s (1996) deliberative politics. Below in this thesis I will give an example of such an evolution in the selection of a chief from several candidates. I would say that the contrast Cistac hints at is between applying the choice set idea and not applying it. The latter option is not so much a matter of performing “traditional customs” but of expressing a genuine alternative vision on how “democracy” could be interpreted.

Salomons’s ethnographic depiction of Mozambique seems to rule out the idea of rotation. However, I have already indicated the existence of adelphic succession and below we shall encounter practical instances of this principle, at least on the lineage level. An
evaluation as to how and why party-political rotation on the national level has so far failed in Mozambique is better postponed to the conclusion of thesis when all the empirical data have been dealt with. It should be commented that although the idea of the choice set can be viewed as the culmination of a certain body of western theorizing, it cannot be viewed as something that the Western world introduced to postcolonial Mozambique, because Frelimo itself used the principle in its own presidential elections of 1962 and 1968.

**Constitutional change**

It was obvious that there would have to be a constitutional change in Mozambique if Renamo was to be recognized as a political force, because Frelimo’s ideas pervaded the 1975 Constitution as directing Mozambican society and government. A major problem now became whether or not Frelimo and Renamo could be simultaneously in one government of national unity. Constitutional change would have to accommodate the answer to this problem.\(^ {148}\) In any case, Frelimo went on with a process of transforming itself from a political party claiming a monopoly, towards one amongst others. At its Fifth Congress in July 1989, Frelimo abandoned Marxism-Leninism as its ideology. The road towards constitutional change was now also open (Minter 1994: 53).

The Municipalities Law 3/94, adopted just before the 1994 multiparty elections, had provided for local elections to be held before 1 October 1996 (art. 71.1).\(^ {149}\) In November 1995 three bills introduced by the Frelimo government to arrange for such elections were, however, unanimously declared unconstitutional by the parliamentary affairs committee (MPPB 1995d, 1995e). This implied the original Law 3/94 was also to be seen as unconstitutional. One major problem seems to have been the stipulation in the 1990 Constitution that mayors were to be “appointed” (designados) and this was interpreted in the sense that they could not be elected according to the Constitution (Mozambique 1990, art. 186.3; discussion by Cistac 2009: 56-59). Renamo also objected to the gradual nature of the introduction of municipalities foreseen in the law (Lachartre 1999: 164; see art. 69-2 of Law 3/94). The legal stalemate indicated that local elections could not be held very soon (cf. Hanlon’s (2005: 277, no source) statement that “Frelimo had wanted a national unity government” against the wishes of the USA does not seem likely. The report by Gersony (1990) was a public relations disaster for Renamo, as it almost totally blamed Renamo, in contrast with Frelimo, for the war’s atrocities (Chabal 2002a: 77n97; Minter 1994: 158, 206-207). Also, “the West never construed the FRELIMO regime as ideological foe, an ally of the Cold War enemy” (Chabal 2002b: 118). Mozambique (1994b). Thanks to Salvador Cadete Forquilha for this and related references.

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\(^ {149}\) Mozambique (1994b). Thanks to Salvador Cadete Forquilha for this and related references.
In 1996 the Constitution was changed. The new formulation changed the goal or function of the “local organs of the State” from “participation of the citizens” (art. 185.1 [1990]) to “the representation of the State at local level” (art. 185 [1996]). However, the idea of “Local Power” (Poder Local) was introduced, which now comprised citizen participation (new art. 188.1). Local self-governing entities (autarquias) were to be set up, coming in two types: “municipalities”, a categorization applicable to cities and towns, and “settlements”, which were defined as the “territorial circumscription of the head community of the administrative post” (new art. 188-190; more on this below). The latter description would suggest that the Constitution would not require that there should be “local power” in all of Mozambique’s territory. The “local power” was to comprise the possibility for citizens to elect mayors and representative assemblies (new art. 192). At the moment of writing no settlement has known such elections, and the 2013 local elections only knew 53 municipalities. Thus the majority of the adult Mozambican population has no possibility of electing its local representatives and mayors and is for a large part under appointed District Administrators. Moreover, the new constitutional set-up for local government was not submitted to public debate and a referendum, as required by the 1990 Constitution:

If a proposed amendment implies fundamental changes in the rights of citizens or in the organization of public powers, the proposal, after adoption by the Assembly of the Republic, shall be submitted to public debate and to a referendum. (1990 Constitution, art. 199.1; translation as in published version)

Quando as propostas de revisão impliquem alteração fundamental dos direitos dos cidadãos e da organização dos poderes públicos, a proposta de revisão adoptada pela Assembleia da República é submetida a debate público e levada a referendo. (1990 Constitution, art. 199.1)

Thus the current situation is against the GPA (because conflicting with Protocol II, 1-a) and unconstitutional (because not submitted to a referendum as stipulated in the then prevailing 1990 Constitution). If Law 3/94 was in contradiction with the 1990 Constitution, then the GPA was so likewise if the elections on “all levels” were to be understood as comprising the election of district executives. This seems little commented upon in the literature, although Orre (2010: 11) does allude to Law 3/94 as “reflecting the peace accord”.

After the constitutional change of 1996, Law 2/97 was adopted in 1997 by the Frelimo and União Democrática parties against a Renamo boycott of the parliamentary vote concerning this law. It reasserted much of the power of the central government relative to

\footnote{Cf. law 9/96; Mozambique (1996).}
Law 3/94 (Mozambique 1997; Trindade 2003: 120-121). De Brito (2010: 12) mentions that the abolition of the district municipalities was advantageous for Frelimo because of Renamo’s success in many districts in the 1994 elections and he highlights Renamo’s support for the constitutional change. Two events must be separated, however: Renamo’s support for the abolition of the original formulations and its rejection of Law 2/97. The latter it could not block due to the (simple) majority principle, as Law 2/97 was not a constitutional stipulation (requiring a two-thirds majority) but a regular law. It was not necessarily entirely irrational for Renamo to agree with the earlier changes (even if it did not insist on carrying out the GPA as might be expected), but as matters stand the party apparently did not realize beforehand that the influence it could have concerning the Constitution it could not have concerning regular laws. We see here how “mere” technical definitions of “majority” can and do have great impact on a political process. See also De Brito (2013).

Thus government was to remain, for the greater part of Mozambique’s territory and population, a centrally coordinated affair, formalized in 2003 in the Law of the Local Organs of the State, with its tiered system of provinces, districts, administrative posts and localities and appointed executives. Since Frelimo controls the national government, this effectively blocks Renamo or other third parties from occupying executive functions where no elections exist. Structurally, the administrative situation is very much like the situation in colonial times, described above, which accentuated the difference between urban and rural environments. In 2004 a new Constitution was adopted, which largely confirmed the already existing legal architecture concerning local government (Mozambique 2004), although Renamo had brought up the idea of popularly elected provincial governors (Cistac 2009: 88).

European support for the consolidation of the multiparty system

The Association of Western European Parliamentarians for Action against Apartheid (AWEPAA) supported Mozambique’s transition towards a multiparty state. Mr. Tamme


152 Later Association of European Parliamentarians for/with (Southern) Africa (AWEPA – I stick to « AWEPAA »). The Association was founded in 1984; its members were not only involved with South Africa, but also with South Africa’s neighbouring recently independent states (“Front Line States”) which suffered from the South African regime’s aggression because of these countries’ resistance against apartheid. After the GPA, AWEPAA was approached by the Mozambican government and civil society organizations to assist with the peace and “democratization” processes before and after the 1994 elections. AWEPAA created a team amongst others with AWEPAA
Hansma was one of the AWEPAA-employees involved. AWEPAA’s rôle in the transition was facilitating rather than steering. Mr. Hansma insisted that concerning the formulation of the Constitution there had been no specific influence from AWEPAA. With the electoral law this was slightly different, because there had been a stalemate in the discussions between Frelimo, Renamo and the UN. Hansma, Loes van den Bergh and Guido Van Hecken then submitted around twenty pages of comments on the draft electoral law to the Minister of Justice. This eased matters because Renamo accepted the AWEPAA-employees as independent. The changes, however, did not concern central aspects but matters of clarifying formulations and resolving inconsistencies.

The UN operation in Mozambique ONUMOZ (~ UNOMOZ, though not officially so) was led by Ajello, a former AWEPAA member (TH). On the road towards the elections AWEPAA helped with civic education (explaining people the coming multiparty system and voting process – Van den Bergh 2009: ch. 7). Mr. Hansma reported no specific difficulties in explaining such items connected with ballot box voting like “secret vote”. In his experience “traditional authorities” were not much talked about. After the installation of the multiparty parliament on 8 December 1994 (MPPB 1995a: 1), AWEPAA was still involved. Frelimo and Renamo parliamentarians were invited to Europe for a study trip (together) to the Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal; according to Mr. Hansma this was a great success.

Legislation on “traditional authorities” and “community authorities”

As for hereditary leaders (as most “traditional authorities” are), the following may be summarized. The 1975 Constitution stated that one of the goals of the People’s Republic of Mozambique was to eliminate “colonial and traditional structures of oppression and exploitation and the mentality that lies beneath them” (Mozambique 1975: art. 4-a). Technically the text does not say that hereditary leaders should disappear altogether, but this would for a large part be the case in practice in the first years after independence. As

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153 Belgian linguist, amongst other things AWEPAA employee and chef de cabinet of Secretary of State for Development Cooperation Eddy Boutmans from 1999 until 2003, and more recently president of Oxfam-Solidariteit in Belgium (<www.oxfamsol.be>, accessed 17 November 2014). He was also active within ANC’s armed wing (interview in <https://janstevens.wordpress.com>, accessed 17 November 2014).
mentioned already, the GPA (Protocol V, III-9[e]) provided for a recognition of “traditional authorities”; this was formalized first in the abortive Law 3/94 (art. 8) which envisaged such authorities to work in the framework of the district municipalities.

Art. 28 of Law 2/97 mentions “traditional authorities” within the framework of the autarquiais locais (Carrilho 2009 [ed.]: 509-510), but only in so far the autarquias “may hear” the “traditional authorities”. Policy frameworks came some years later in the form of Decree 15/2000 and its accompanying regulation,\(^{154}\) which were applicable to the local organs of the state, i.e. the centrally coordinated state entities. Four years later the cooperation between autarquias and community authorities including “traditional authorities” was formally defined in another regulation.\(^{155}\) The 2004 regulation recycles much of the content of the one of 2000 without, however, addressing this very aspect of the overlapping between the two regulations, which both deal with local leaders. These would now be subject simultaneously to “articulation” by Local Organs of the State and autarquias locais. In a multiparty framework, these may not be headed by the same political party and thus such articulations may be divergent in a party-political way. Indeed this situation was more or less what emerged in Angoche (Nampula Province) even before 2004, after Renamo had won the local elections there, as analysed by Meneses and Santos (2008). They describe how the Renamo municipal government “decided to create its own neighbourhood delegates with the same functions as the secretaries” of Frelimo who continued to function (2008: 20). In Angoche Renamo showed a similar wish to control the population as Frelimo had done earlier: one interviewee reported how the party forbade a woman to sing in a local ritual because she was of Frelimo (2008: 21-22). As such institutions like local courts and police got also organized along party lines, the paradoxical result of the multiparty system in Angoche has been that “the institutions in charge of settling disputes become a source of conflict themselves, in disputes created by them to be settled elsewhere” (p. 28). Thus a dual state emerged in Angoche (p. 21 – cf. West and Kloeck-Jenson 1999: 479n80).

Decree 15/2000 formalized the recognition of “traditional authorities” but it did so recategorizing them as “traditional chiefs” and recognizing them alongside an equivalent recognition of “neighbourhood or village secretaries”, together with a rest category all subsumed under the heading of “community authorities” (autoridades comunitárias). This meant that the national Frelimo government “recognized” its own party secretaries within a supposed framework of administrative decentralization. This development seriously qualifies


the impact of the “revitalization of traditional authorities”.


Relevant to mention are also collective bodies for coordinating collective action such as local councils (existing at least since 2000\textsuperscript{156}), community committees, consultative councils, and local forums defined in 2005 (Decree 11/2005, art. 100-2, 103-1, 110-113),\textsuperscript{157} cf. Orre (2010: 302-303). “Traditional authorities” are entitled to participate in local councils (Arizcurinaga Zeballos 2008: 59; Carrilho [ed.] 2009: 555), but this aspect was far from prominent in hereditary leaders’ self-description in my interviews.

General, presidential and local elections, 1994-2011

*The 1994 general and presidential elections*

The first multiparty elections for parliament and presidency in independent Mozambique were held on 27-29 October 1994. Voter turnout was 88% of registered voters, with reportedly many invalid ballots (together 8.5% and 11.7% for the presidential and legislative elections respectively – EMS 1995: 80). A disturbing event was Dhlakama’s sudden announcement to boycott the elections the night before the first polling day, referring to “widespread irregularities”. International pressure on Dhlakama made him reverse the boycott (*MPPB* 1995b). Renamo came out with a “surprisingly strong showing” (Sumich and Honwana 2007: 16n16), a result not expected by Frelimo or indeed virtually anybody else (T Hansma [R]).

The election results may be summarized as follows (EMS 1995: 79):


\textsuperscript{157} Regulation of the Law of Local Organs of the State (8/2003); Carrilho ([ed.] 2009: 411-458).
Frelimo 44.33%
Renamo 37.78%
União Democrática 5.15%
Others 12.74%

Chissano 53.30%
Dhlakama 33.73%
Others 12.97%

The result for the União Democrática (UD) is usually explained by the fact that they were at the bottom of the ballot papers for the parliamentary elections, while Chissano was at the bottom of the presidential elections, confusing many voters. Should the UD votes be interpreted as intended for Frelimo, we obtain the result that maximally 49.48% of the valid votes were for Frelimo, signifying that less than one-half of the votes were for the party that had claimed to embody the political aspirations of the Mozambicans.

The 1998 local elections

The 1998 local elections in 33 municipalities knew a turnout of 14.58% (CNE [Comissão Nacional de Eleições or National Elections Commission] in MPPB 1998: annex p. 15). Renamo and many other parties boycotted the elections, so that Frelimo gained a majority in all contested municipalities. Reasons for the boycott were “lack of confidence in the impartiality and competence of the [STAE]”, an attitude that “was nurtured by reports, accepted by government representatives, of faults in the voter registration process and in other electoral preparations” coupled to claims by Renamo of being unsatisfactorily represented in the STAE (Braathen and Jørgensen 1998: 33, 36).

The 1999 general and presidential elections

The results of the 1999 elections, specifically for the presidency, are shrouded in mystery. According to Luís de Brito,

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158 STAE: Secretariado Técnico da Administração Eleitoral or Technical Secretariat for Electoral Management.
[a] strong sign of losing hegemony for Frelimo were the results of the 1999 general elections. [...] The official result was of 52% for Chissano and 48% for Dhlakama. In fact these figures do not correspond to the real results of the election. Among other indications of fraud it should be noted that the Supreme Court refused the opposition call to recount c. 370,000 votes (mainly from Zambèzia province, a stronghold of Renamo) not considered due to technical problems with the tally sheets. In fact Chissano had most probably lost the election (de Brito n.d.: 1).

De Brito (2008: 6n13) also mentions Sofala and Nampula as provinces with troublesome tally sheets.

Renamo had made a deal with other opposition parties to combine forces in the parliamentary elections, leading to the Renamo-UE (União Eleitoral – Electoral Union) combination. In return for the third parties’ hitch-hiking with Renamo in the parliamentary elections, Dhlakama would be the preferred presidential candidate for these parties. Several presidential candidates from yet other parties did not make it through the registration requirements. This situation led to a presidential contest with only two candidates, Chissano and Dhlakama (MPPB 2000e). The positive effect for Dhlakama is easily explained with Condorcet’s method of voting, as explained in the theory part. In the presidential election system used in Mozambique since 1994, voters are requested to give only their first preference (in the first round of a possible two-round election). In 1994, many of the voters indicating a third candidate (not Chissano or Dhlakama) as first choice may have had Dhlakama as second choice, preferring him more than Chissano, but this would not show because voters were not asked to indicate this. The real difference between Chissano and Dhlakama in 1994 may therefore not have been as large as the first-choice results indicated in that year. The close call between Chissano and Dhlakama in the 1999 result would confirm such an interpretation.

Just how close the call between Chissano and Dhlakama was in 1999 will probably never be known exactly, because a large amount of ballots were declared invalid (Pt: nulos), there existing tendencies in the incidence of nulos on district level being biased against Dhlakama. Also, hundreds of editais (tally sheets; summaries of election results on poll station level) were not counted in the end result. A detailed analysis is given in Appendix G. The statistical uncertainties highlighted in that appendix lead to the conclusion that there is

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159 Assuming most voters’ preference orderings of Frelimo, Renamo and third party and independent candidates did not change over the years. Technically, the argument involves the principle of the independence of irrelevant alternatives that is one of Arrow’s requirements for “democracy”.

160 For this reason, it is also difficult to establish turnout figures. MPPB (2000a: 1) gives a turnout of “about 74%”.
indeed no certainty that Chissano won the elections according to voters’ intentions. As for Renamo, tension remained, culminating in armed fighting in Montepuez. Eventually in Montepuez 83 prisoners died of suffocation in a police cell on 22 November 2000 (MPPB 2001b; for failed negotiations, see MBBP 2001a: 2).

In the 1999 parliamentary elections, Frelimo gained 48.5%, Renamo and Electoral Union 38.8%, and others 12.7% of the valid votes. On the basis of this, Frelimo got 133 and Renamo 117 of the 250 parliamentary seats. Blank votes comprised 9.6% and invalid votes 4.9% of the total votes. However, as in the presidential elections there were a large number of editais not considered: 727 (more than 8.7% of the polling stations – MPPB 2000a). With more than two parties in the election it is far less to be expected than with the presidential elections that the lost votes could have changed the majority position of Frelimo relative to Renamo-UE.

The situation with the 1999 presidential elections in Mozambique can be used to evaluate critically the choice set method. This has led to a situation in which the national president has come from one party only since 1994, because this party happened to have its candidate in the officially recognized choice set at the presidential elections. The choice set method demands an exact calculation of the votes cast, because one vote can make a crucial difference. With all the uncertainties in the counting in 1999, the choice set method has delivered a rather arbitrary result in declaring Chissano winner, where the difference in votes with Dhlakama was smaller than the margin of uncertainty. In a consensus approach it would have made sense to grant Dhlakama the presidency in 1999 and let the presidency rotate across parties. Dhlakama’s share in the votes, even if possibly smaller than that of Chissano, was large enough to warrant the idea that his presidency would have optimized the balance between Frelimo and Renamo. This is unintuitive in a framework that interprets politics as an affair of majority versus minority however small the exact numerical difference, but it fits well in a framework that interprets politics as an affair of individuals versus collectivity and egalitarian distribution of the results of political processes. The point here is not that with two alternatives Arrow’s conditions for social welfare functions could be satisfied (see May 1952), but that with the element of rotation relative to previous elections an argument is introduced external to those conditions, relating a poll to other social and historical items, including earlier polls.161

161 The smoothing out of power differentials between most of Mozambique’s partisans is not necessarily a matter of forming a government of national unity in a sort of “party-political consociationalism”; rotation could also smooth out power differentials across time (cf. consensus
Subsequent elections

I will be brief about elections after 1999. The 2003 local elections in 33 municipalities knew a turnout of 28% (MPPB 2003a). Renamo gained majorities in Ancoche, Beira, Ilha de Moçambique, Marromeu (mayor only) and Nacala Porto (MPPB 2003b). This was the occasion in which Daviz Simango, son of Uria Simango, in 2003 still a Renamo candidate but later founder of the MDM party, became mayor of Beira. For Catandica the results were as follows. Mayor: turnout 40.91% (of data “20 August” in reference); Eusébio Gondiwa (Frelimo): 78.83%; Verediano Manivete (Renamo): 21.17%. Assembly: turnout 39.70%; Frelimo: 78.37%; Renamo 19.60%; PT (Partido Trabalhista) 2.02% (of valid votes) (MPPB 2003b).

The 2004 general elections knew a turnout of 43% (MPPB 2004). President: Guebuza: 63.74%; Dhlakama 31.74%; others 4.51%. National Assembly: Frelimo 62.03%; Renamo-UE 29.73%; others 8.24% (MPPB 2004). Barue District: president: turnout 34.59%; Guebuza 61.02%; Dhlakama 34.17%; others 4.81% (IESE 2004a). National Assembly: turnout 34.58%; Frelimo 57.69%; Renamo-UE 33.68%; others 8.63% (IESE 2004b).

The 2008 local elections in 43 municipalities knew a turnout of 46.4% (MPPB 2008b). Frelimo gained a majority in the assemblies of 42 municipalities; the exception was Beira where no party gained a majority. Daviz Simango was voted mayor in that city (MBBP 2008b), running as an independent after Renamo did not nominate him as the party candidate, apparently because Dhlakama felt threatened by Simango’s success (MPPB 2008a; for background, see Cahen 2009: 65, 72-73). Nacala Porto knew a second round because no candidate obtained an immediate absolute majority of the votes. This second round (in February 2009) was won by the Frelimo candidate (Mozambique News Agency 2009). For Catandica the results were as follows. Mayor: turnout 52.98%; Eusébio Gondiwa (Frelimo): 75.29%; José M’pica (Renamo): 24.71%. Assembly: turnout 53.08%; Frelimo 78.68%, Renamo 20.60%; PDD 0.73% (MPPB 2008b).

The 2009 general elections. President: turnout 44.63%; Guebuza 75.01%; Dhlakama 16.41%; Simango 8.59%. National Assembly: turnout 44.44%; Frelimo 74.7%; Renamo 17.7%; MDM 3.9%; others 3.7% (MPPB 2009a). Barue District: president: turnout 45.71%; Guebuza 81.43%; Dhlakama 13.86%; Simango 4.72% (STAE 2009a). National Assembly:

form (d) in ch. 4). This would still not perfectly serve all partisans (adherents of smaller parties would not soon have their first choice as leader), but certainly the imbalance between the two major parties would be diminished.
turnout 45.66%; Frelimo 80.92%; Renamo 15.64%; others 3.45% (STAE 2009b – Barue not available). In 2009 the Movimento Democrático de Moçambique founded and led by Daviz Simango contested the elections for the National Assembly for the first time. It was excluded from the contest in seven provinces by the National Electoral Commission, which alleged MDM had not submitted enough valid candidates to run in these provinces. The exact documentary proof of this allegation has remained shrouded in secrecy (MPPB 2009a: 3; Manning and Malbrough 2012: 6-8).

By-election with MDM win. On 7 December 2011 MDM’s candidate Manuel de Araujo won the by-election for mayor of the city of Quelimane with 62% of the vote. This made Quelimane the second city under MDM leadership after Beira (Lee [N] 2012).

Voter turnout in presidential elections

It can be seen from the above data that voter turnout in the presidential (and parliamentary) elections has declined since 1994 to under 50% of registered voters. Especially the difference between 1999 and 2004 is noticeable. The question poses itself whether perhaps loss of legitimacy due to the wide-spread irregularities of the 1999 elections can have contributed to a decline in voter turnout, as Lehoucq (2003: 249) suggests. This would have affected Renamo adherents more than Frelimo adherents, leading to a relatively higher turnout of Frelimo voters and consequently higher percentages for Frelimo and its presidential candidate in the polls. In order to explain voter abstention in 2004, a study by Mazula ([ed.] 2006) points to technical problems with out of place voter registration books which made it difficult or impossible for people to vote, but subjective reasons pointing to dissatisfaction with the electoral process were also frequently mentioned by respondents, such as “tiredness of seeing Frelimo win all the time” (2006: 13-14, 33-35; cf. 56, 65-70, 95-97), or “I did not vote. Voting is a farce to mislead the people. People did not vote because they are tired, for they want to see their candidate in power” (2006: 94). The turnout problem shows that in practice (leaving aside theoretical issues) there is no immediate connection between “the choice society would make” and the result of any aggregation method in Arrow’s sense. A necessary condition for Arrow’s theory to work is that all members of society (unambiguously defined) would in fact submit their preference orderings. In practice people may abstain from voting for contingent private reasons, or be unable to vote due to bureaucratic problems with registrations (Mazula [ed.] 2006), but if people would abstain because they see no possibility that their candidate will ever win, as the quote above indicates, the method of voting is itself producing a
feedback effect that at least partly contributes to perpetuating the electoral victories of the incumbent. Being formulated entirely in synchronic terms, it is conceptually impossible for Arrow’s theory to evaluate this diachronic aspect of voting. Should we be allowed to speak of the idea of “the choice society would make”, a possible, not necessarily unique, reformulation of it might be to say that society’s choice would be rotation of the options, where the choice of individuals is to prefer a specific option.

Developments in 2012-early 2014

On 8 March 2012 there was a shoot-out between riot police and Renamo supporters in which one police man and one Renamo member were killed. On 29 March 2013 Renamo announced it would “not allow elections”. From April 2013 onwards more hostilities were reported, with several deaths (Hanlon 2013c; 2013d; 2014). Renamo expressed dissatisfaction over its lack of veto power in the National Elections Commission and Renamo’s being “marginalized” in national politics (Hanlon 2013a; 2013b). On 21 October 2013 Renamo declared the GPA annulled (Mucari 2013).

Results of the 2013 municipal elections, without Renamo’s participation, were that Frelimo won for mayor and the majority of the assembly in 49 municipalities and MDM in 4 (the important cities of Beira, Quelimane and Nampula, and Gúruê). Turnout was 46%. Questions existed concerning Frelimo’s wins for mayor in Marromeu (suspiciously high number of invalid votes that could have changed final result) and Gúruê (initially announced as a Frelimo win but alternative counts suggested MDM win). For Gúruê the Constitutional Council indeed rejected the results for both mayor and municipal assembly, necessitating wholly new elections (held 8 February 2014), which MDM won. During campaign time as well as polling day, MDM supporters and delegates were disproportionately affected by arrests by the police, many of them apparently unjustified. Three people were reported killed. (This section: MPPB 2013a; 2013b, with more incidents; 2014a; 2014b.)

Results for Catandica: turnout 45.15%; Mayor: Tomé Maibeque (Frelimo): 74.52%; Rângel Mairoce (MDM): 25.48%. Assembly: Frelimo 76.71%, MDM 23.29% (MPPB 2013b).

Conclusion

Hanlon (2005: 274) remarks that Frelimo “followed the fashion of the late 1970s and adopted
a one-party state”, but I show in my analysis of Doorenspleet’s (2005) data in Appendix A
that the emergence of multiparty systems was already a trend in the world in 1974, and that
especially becoming independent was often the moment for a new country to introduce such a
political system. Thus Frelimo’s establishment of a one-party system was not an automatic
event to be expected from “fashion”. What was fashionable in Mozambique in 1974 was the
establishment of political parties distinct from Frelimo (Fauvet 1984: 110-111). The
hegemony of Frelimo in Mozambican political life since independence was challenged during
the 16-year war with Renamo but made a remarkable come-back after that. Although it can be
said that the peace process transformed Renamo into a political party amongst other political
parties, at least until 2013, Frelimo never really accepted the idea that it too was to be only
one party amongst others. There are strong indications that it manipulated elections so as to
secure its own position to the largest extent possible at least on the national level.

The cancellation of Law 3/94, which would have facilitated administrative
decentralization and the expansion of party-political pluralism in Mozambique, enabled
Frelimo to re-establish its grip on the country. The slow pace of the formation of
municipalities is subject to the will of Frelimo who can define such formation by its
parliamentary majority, and it is difficult not to have the impression that Frelimo wanted to
avoid Renamo to have power in Mozambique’s rural areas, where that party was strong (De
Brito 2010: 12; also Forquilha 2006: ch. 5; Open Society Institute Network 2009: 142). On
the other hand, Renamo showed little cunning in defending the stipulation in the GPA that
there should be elections at all levels of the state. In this sense the GPA has never been carried
out in full. This failure to be fully realized is not a weakness of the GPA itself (although it did
fail to define dates for elections at all levels), but of the impossibility of the majoritarian
political set-up such as exists in Mozambique to resolve the problem of Frelimo’s
contradictory character of being simultaneously sectional and monopolistic, which was one of
the factors in Mozambique’s civil war.
CONCLUSION OF PART II AND INTRODUCTION OF PART III

In Part II it was established that Portuguese colonialism largely destroyed the precolonial political fabric in Mozambique. Within the Barue Kingdom, the associated Makombe royal dynasty showed signs that its internal competition for power partly depended on the issue of national self-determination. This kingdom and dynasty too, however, were vanquished definitively during the events of 1902 and 1917-1918, never to be resurrected again. Despite the idea, disseminated every now and then, that “democracy” is a particularly European achievement, this was not visible from colonial times. Colonial legislation was meticulous in stipulating duties and prohibitions for the African population in Mozambique without defining any concomitant rights with which Africans could have any political control over what happened to them. Eventually armed struggle against Portugal would lead to the collapse of the colonialist empire, by definition solving the problem of colonial domination. However, due to disputes within and between anti-colonialist movements, there existed at the time of independence in 1975 a variety of political organizations in Mozambique. Thus the question emerged whether Mozambique should have a one-party political system or a multiparty system. With the aid of the new government in Portugal, Frelimo solved this question by accomplishing that it alone would head the new Mozambican state. Soon later, with the aid of the Rhodesian and later apartheid South African minority regimes, anti-Frelimo people would start a movement that during the ensuing war was eventually able to control parts of Mozambican territory and also gain popular support, though many remained loyal to Frelimo as well. Hence a situation had emerged in which Frelimo was not the only political organization in Mozambique, and in 1990 a multiparty system was formally introduced after all. The peace process did not make clear what should be understood by “democracy” and did not guarantee power sharing between Frelimo and Renamo, although it did stipulate that elections should be held at all levels of the state, a condition that so far has never been carried out. Meanwhile, the multiparty electoral system came to depend heavily on the choice set method of selecting political leaders, which in combination with the manipulation of election results, the “recognition” of Frelimo party secretaries besides “traditional authorities” as local government officials through Decree 15/2000, and appointed higher-level government officials, has guaranteed that Frelimo has virtually everywhere remained in power in Mozambique, except in a few municipalities.

In Part III it will be studied how political history as elaborated in Part II is realized in contemporary Barue District. Colonial administrative history, actions of Frelimo against the Portuguese power holders, and the war between Frelimo and Renamo will be described. The rôles of régulos and spirit mediums are discussed. Against the background of Barue history, it is shown how the population, at least in certain cases, influences the choice of new hereditary leaders, in this sense confirming the idea that Decree 15/2000 may contribute, in accordance with some definitions, to local
“democracy”. Specifically it is shown that such choice may not depend on a “choice set” method, as in contrast with the choice of the Mozambican national president. Thus the practical applicability of a consensus approach for collective decision making is demonstrated. However, it is also shown that the possibility for action amongst hereditary leaders is rather limited, and that Frelimo’s party officials have far more real impact in people’s lives than hereditary leaders. For people who adhere to other parties than Frelimo, it may be difficult to make use of government services because of reasons of a party-political nature.