APPENDIX A – THE EMERGENCE OF MULTIPARTY SYSTEMS WITH BROAD SUFFRAGE

Huntington’s (1991) much-discussed theory of “democracy” as being adopted in “waves” during the 19th and 20th centuries entails that there have been rather circumscribed periods within these centuries with many transitions from “non-democracy” to “democracy” and few vice versa (1991: 15). Doorenspleet (2005) has re-examined Huntington’s arguments and data. She codes “non-democracy” with « N » and “democracy” with « D ». Huntington concluded there was a “third wave of democratization” starting with the 1974 revolution in Portugal (1991: 3). Doorenspleet maintains the existence of this “third wave”. However, this conclusion is not warranted if the effect of decolonization is taken into account. Using Doorenspleet’s data, it can be shown that there existed in the world a trend towards multiparty political systems since the end of the Second World War.

Doorenspleet assigns to a “transition” of a country from “N” to “D” a value “+1”, while “-1” is assigned to a reverse “transition”. If in a year five countries have “+1” and three “-1”, the total score for that year is “+2” (cf. 2005: 43). A “wave of democratization” can then be defined as a period stretching over several years with substantially higher scores than some other periods (cf. Huntington 1991: 15). (Data in Doorenspleet 2005: Figures 3.3, 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7, Table 3.1 and Appendix 2.)

I have established scores for 10 more countries which can be added to Doorenspleet’s data.240 Small states with a population less than 250,000 are left out of consideration.241 Doorenspleet’s third code « I », standing for unsettled situations (2005: 22-23, 177), I read mostly as « N ».242

Doorenspleet considers former colonies scored “D” at independence as not contributing to “democratization” for the year of independence. Thus India never contributed to “democratic transition”, while Pakistan did, according to Doorenspleet. Her motivation for this is that “[p]rocesses of state building should be separated from processes of [democratic] transition” (2005: 43, 52n1). This is a remarkable choice from the viewpoint that “democracy” amounts to the idea that “the people rule” rather than are ruled by others. Diamond (2008: 54) does count newly independent states as possibly contributing to the “momentum” of “third wave democracy”.

239 With “democracy” interpreted as “minimal democracy” satisfying competition and inclusiveness much as in definition (1) above, items (1)-(4); cf. Doorenspleet (2005: 177).
241 Also left out are areas such as Palestine, Western Sahara, Kosovo and Somaliland.
After scoring 162 countries as given by Doorenspleet, adding 10, omitting 17 which no longer exist, and applying the indicated modifications, yearly net sums of “transitions” to and from “democracy” in the period 1893-2000 (included) can be identified. The cumulative net amount of “transitions to democracy” over time during the period 1940-2000 can then be represented as in Figure A-1:

![Graph showing cumulative net “transitions” to and from “democracy”, 1940-2000.](image)

*Figure A-1: Cumulative net “transitions” to and from “democracy”, 1940-2000, based on Doorenspleet (2005) with a few adjustments as indicated, ten countries added and with initial “D” scores interpreted as “transitions to democracy”*

The graph in Figure A-1 shows a trend of steady “democratization” after the end of the Second World War.\(^{243}\)

A conclusion to be made from Figure A-1 is that there was no “third wave of democratization” as Huntington conceived it. Instead, there was a slow but steady process in the period from about 1950 until 1989. Doorenspleet (2005) does not check for the effect of becoming independent on “transition to democracy”, but it is evident that this effect is significant. The inclusion of newly independent countries affects the shape of the graph in Figure A-1 far more than adding ten moderately-sized countries.

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\(^{243}\) Calculation of Pearson’s correlation coefficient \(\rho\) for the cumulative net value of “transitions” correlated with the years for the period 1950-1989 (included) gives a value of 0.987 (Hays 1988: 588-593). Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient \(r_s\) is 0.996; \(z = 6.22; p < 0.0001\) (one-tailed) (Hays 1988: 834-836; Noether 1991: 236-237).
APPENDIX B: NOTES ON THE BARUE KINGDOM AND THE MAKOMBE FAMILY

Some problems of historical interpretation as occurring in the existing literature are too complex to be dealt with in the main text but nonetheless require some elaboration. Occasionally I encountered data in my own fieldwork that appear to have connection with information in existing literature but where the nature of such connection is far from obvious. Another problem during the writing of this thesis has been that existing literature cannot always be quoted or referred to without studying anew underlying sources or assumptions of such literature. The content of this Appendix is grouped into ten sections as follows:

§ 1: A hypothesis concerning the identity of one Katsvaganyidze
§ 2: Water that binds (madzi amanga), delivered by Portuguese to Barue
§ 3: The death of Chipapata and subsequent events
§ 4: The identity “Chipapata = Kabudu Kagoro”
§ 5: Genealogy of Makosa
§ 6: Mbuya, one of the leaders of the Barue Revolt of 1917-1918
§ 7: Barue and Gorongosa
§ 8: Mbombona as capital of Barue
§ 9: Local remembrance about the Makombe family and the Barue Revolt
§ 10: Macombe Day celebrations

§ 1: A hypothesis concerning the identity of one Katsvaganyidze

A person “Katsvaganyidze” was mentioned a few times during my field work, either associated with Samanyanga (Melo MN); or with “Makombe” (Luís NCM) i.e. Kabudu Kagoro; specifically as the latter’s father (Oniasse BS); or grandfather, i.e. FF (Ioanes CN). In 1929, Wieschhoff recorded a “Kapsakanesi” with number 22 in the “knotted string” list of Makombe kings mentioned in the main text (Von Sicard 1954). With no other candidates on the Wieschhoff list it is likely that Katsvaganyidze ~ Kapsakanesi. Von Sicard (1954) suggests that Kapsakanesi would have been in power after about 1765. Because he is still remembered in Barue, it may be hypothesized that he had some impressive achievements. In the main text I use Newitt who refers to a turbulent period for the Barue Kingdom in the 1760s. If Katsvaganyidze was in power after about 1765 (when Citumbu, number 19 on the said list, was killed – Von Sicard 1954), he may have been a Makombe who brought order in Barue after the period of turbulence (see also information obtained by the Col. Arnold expedition in Bourne, Watt and Throup [H] (eds.) 1995: 244: “It appears that Gonguru was the great Makombe who first made the Barue a united and powerful people.”). The hypothesis may be formulated that Katsvaganyidze was this Gunguro (who is mentioned in the main text). Gunguro is mentioned as active in 1768 (AHM in Moçambique 1956: 126). A consequence of the hypothesis in
combination with the said list leaves two Makombes between Citumbu and Katsvaganyidze in about three years. This is short but not impossible, since the list also gives two Makombes who led the 1917-1918 revolt, with consequently an average of less than a year.

With Kabudu Kagoro having number 30 on the list, the hypothesis that Katsvaganyidze was of an earlier generation gains in likelihood. This is consistent with the information that the number 28 in the Wieschhoff list is Kapanga, who may be hypothesized to be the one Alpers (1970: 212) and Isaacman (1976: 204) mention as having reigned in the early 1820s. The identification of Wieschhoff’s number 26 “Ganye” with “Gange” (Rita-Ferreira 1982: 144) who was Makombe up to 1794/1795 further corroborates this interpretation. This would mean an average of seven years per Makombe in the 1765-1820 period. This figure is less than the average of maximally 13 years per Makombe over the whole existence of the Barue Kingdom, but it is far from impossible, as we have seen.

Whether Katsvaganyidze was Kabudu Kagoro’s ancestor in a direct line is difficult to say from written evidence, but it does fit in with Oniasse BS and Ioanes CN’s information. As said, ICN stated that Katsvaganyidze was Kabudu Kagoro’s grandfather (FF). This yields exactly the identity Katsvaganyidze = Gunguro using the information of the Arnold expedition in Bourne, Watt and Throup (ibid.). ICN, however, did not mention a name « Gunguro », but stated that Katsvaganyidze = Cidana, an ancestor of Kabudu Kagoro, and that he at some time arrived at the Nhacangale river (central Barue District). Unfortunately it is impossible to link this with any information in the written literature I have seen so far. The oral data do indicate that there was Barue history before Kabudu Kagoro, which fits in better with placing Kabudu Kagoro in the 19th century rather than as the first king in the 16th (Isaacman 1973), a topic taken up below. I repeat the identity “Katsvaganyidze = Gunguro” is only hypothetical; hopefully future research can shed more light on this matter.

§ 2: Water that binds (madzi amanga), delivered by Portuguese to Barue

At a time, madzi amanga was water brought by a Portuguese of Sena to Barue, used to confirm the inauguration of a new Makombe by pouring the water over the new Makombe’s head. Isaacman (1973: 401) maintains that the term « madzi-manga » (sic) literally denoted a sort of beer and symbolically water that ties. This is difficult to understand, as « water » and « rain » are the common literal English translations of Barwe « madzi » and « to bind (tie) » of « kumanga » (my assistant also proposed « to construct »), where « amanga » is the third person singular form of a tense in Barwe grammar that resembles a sort of perfect tense (difficult to mimic in English). If the water brought from Sena was an ingredient of any ceremonial beer, we should expect a separate term for such beer. From Santana (1967: 346) it is clear that the Makombe to be inaugurated in 1830, Inhamaguada, requested the “mazia-manga”, which can only mean that such a request (and thus the term) was about water, not beer, since it was water that was brought from Sena. Moreover, that the central part of the ceremony
would be the consumption of beer instead of a discharge of water would require more explanation than Isaacman gives by simply dismissing the Portuguese sources. Surely the Portuguese would know what the water was for as they took the effort to bring it with them on a long journey.

Isaacman states that “all foreign officials at the capital [of Makombe] were expressly forbidden from attending the sacred rites of investiture” (1973: 408). This conclusion may have been true for rituals before the arrival of the Sena representative, but not for the ceremonies revolving around the pouring, since Gamitto (1857-1858) unequivocally mentions twice that the Portuguese representative did the pouring. There was a very good reason for this: the envoy from Sena had to be sure that the correct king was inaugurated with the water and not some usurper, in order to secure political stability necessary for trade activities (Gamitto ibid.). Thus the involvement had to be hands-on. Alves Barboza does not describe the 1811 ritual, but does indicate that he directed the procedures (“I had Makombe crowned within three days”\(^{244}\)). He was in a hurry because he feared that others might become a threat to the new Makombe. This hurry apparently led to a little conflict (in Montez 1941: 126).

We may agree with Isaacman (1973: 408) that the ceremony was not a Catholic baptism, but this is also not what Gamitto claimed for the 1830 ritual. Gamitto claimed that it was a “residual” (restos) of an old custom in which a church man “brought the water of the baptism to the king” and then he indeed mentions the word «sacramento», but without giving much detail about what any baptism would have looked like (1857-1858: 29). The Baruese did consider the water important, as Gamitto mentioned (cf. quote in main text), but also Isaacman is not able to determine what constituted the special character of the water (see 1973: 401 on “inconclusive” traditions). Furthermore, it cannot be asserted that the actual ritual “clearly antedated the arrival of the Portuguese” (Isaacman 1973: 408); this partly hinges on Isaacman’s (1973: 396) identification of Kabudu Kagoro as the first king of Barue. This identification will be criticized below (cf. Isaacman’s own less distorted treatment in his earlier publication 1972a: 111-112).

I see two possible hypotheses, not necessarily unrelated, to interpret the “binding”. One is that the ceremony “bound” the Barue king with the Portuguese authorities as an expression of cooperation and political friendship, even if an uneasy one. The second is that it “bound” the recently instituted Macombe to his royal position. With the Portuguese being a neighbour who had not always been friendly to Barue in the past, this was a political necessity both internally and externally. Isaacman (1973: 395n2) states that the earliest reference to the ritual is from 1794. If the ritual was linked to earlier events, we may hypothesize that its establishment as an institution had something to do with the consolidation of relatively stable relations between the Portuguese and Barue from the time of Gunguro onwards as referred to in the previous section and the main text.

\(^{244}\) Alves Barboza: “…fiz em tres dias coroar o Macome [sic]”.

301
§ 3: The origin of Chipapata, his death and subsequent events

Oral history collected by Artur (1996: 16-17) and the present author (cf. Luís NCM) states that “Makombe” came with his younger brother (identified as Samanyanga or Civembe), to Barue from Mbire in present-day Zimbabwe. There is some difficulty squaring this with what we know from the literature. It is not clear why Makombe Chipapata would have to come “from Mbire” if the Makombe family had already been kings in Barue for centuries. If there is any historical reliability in the information about Mbire, one possibility is that Chipapata came from a place called Mbire around the end of Nguni domination of Barue in the 1840s discussed above. Oral tradition collected by Gelfand (1974: 77) in Nyamaropa (Zimbabwe) is consistent with this. But the Barue oral tradition may also be a residual of older information, projected onto the more recent Chipapata, that the Barue ruling family as a whole originated from an eastern or north-eastern direction. As Tracey (1968: 20) mentions, the name « Mbiri » is not unique, and he puts forward the possibility that one “Mbiri” may have been associated with Mwene Mutapa (see also Beach 1994b: 115). This could then couple the Makombe family in some general way to the Mutapa state. Yet another possibility is that the aspect of conflation of father Chipapata with son Hanga may play a rôle in the concerned oral tradition (more on this in Appendix E).

Isaacman (1976: 50-52) gives 1887 as the year of Chipapata’s death (using a source of 1892), while Newitt (1973: 317; 1995: 338) and Ranger (1963: 59) give 1880 and Axelson (1967: 140-141) implies 1880 or 1881, leading Pélissier (1994 vol. 1: 466) to complain about the “confused chronology”. (Newitt and Axelson use a source from 1881 also mentioned by Isaacman; cf. Isaacman’s earlier publication 1972a: 149.) Information obtained by the 1900 expedition of Col. Arnold maintained that Chipapata’s death was “as far as can be ascertained, about 1886 or 1888” (Bourne, Watt and Throup [eds.] 1995: 244). Nevertheless, I shall argue for 1880-1881 against 1887. Isaacman’s 1892 source (also used by Bhila 1982: 224-225) cannot be taken for granted concerning 1887, because Paiva de Andrada wrote in (1885) about the “late” (fallecido) Makombe, which can only indicate Chipapata. Obviously the same objection holds for the uncertain expedition data. The years 1880-1881 also fit better than 1887-1888 with the information that De Sousa and Adriana’s eldest son João Francisco was around six years old when he was made the formal leader of Barue, squaring well with a wedding in or around 1874 (Newitt 1973: 317; cf. Axelson 1967: 141). Coutinho (1936) writes that the old and sick Chipapata died “soon” (pouco depois) after his submission to De Sousa and the wedding, that Mucaka tried to get hold of the throne after Chipapata’s death but was defeated by De Sousa, and that Chipapata’s sons were in exile. Now “soon” may not entirely be the same as five or six years, but it still fits better than around twelve or thirteen years, as Isaacman’s

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245 This Nyamaropa tradition tells of a “Nyanguru” coming from Mbire near Wedza during the time of the Nguni. *Nyanguru* (pig) is the totem animal of the Makombe family (Artur 1996: 24; Isaacman 1976: 180n51).
Chronology requires.

Coutinho's other data indicate that De Sousa's usurpation of power was not as smooth an affair as his testimony in Isaacman (1976: 51) would try to maintain, necessitating active conquest which was completed in Humbe (South Barue) not later than 1883 (Beach 1999: 41n41, 47; cf. Newitt 1973: 317). Concerning this, Isaacman mentions but does not analyse an important discrepancy of his sources in (1976: 50-51). In one source a tribute imposed by De Sousa was a result of his fatal quarrel with Makombe, in the other source (De Sousa's) the tribute anticipates the quarrel. Assuming De Sousa was right, the said tribute was imposed “fifteen years ago”, which would mean in or around 1875 if the statement was made in 1890 during De Sousa’s custody. This would date the initiation of the tribute around, if not coinciding with, De Sousa’s wedding with Adriana or the caravan incident mentioned in the main text, rather than being connected with Chipapata’s death.

The assumption that Chipapata was still alive up to 1887 leads to two more problems in Isaacman’s own reconstruction. First, it would have to be concluded that Hanga, who according to Isaacman attempted a coup d’état against De Sousa (Isaacman 1976: 50), would have done so while his own father was still trying to maintain a precarious power balance with Gouveia. Second, it is not clear, from De Sousa’s perspective, why he would take the initiative to appoint Hanga king (as the source maintains) after the latter had already tried, but failed, to dispose of him. In a kingly position Hanga could still have opportunity to dispose of De Sousa through an internal coup and have the top leadership for himself. In fact, this is more or less what Hanga tried according to a version of the events obtained by the expedition of Col. Arnold in 1900. In this version, it was Hanga who took the initiative to acknowledge De Sousa as overlord of Barue if the latter would get rid of Chipitura. When De Sousa expected Hanga to fulfil his side of this alleged agreement Hanga did not acknowledge De Sousa but unsuccessfully tried to convince Chipitura to repel De Sousa instead (Bourne, Watt and Throup [eds.] 1995: 244). Although the version of the Arnold expedition is not omniscient (the difference between Chipitura and Cassiche seems to be unknown, the activities of Mucaka are not highlighted, and Chipitura’s rôle during De Sousa’s life seems to be overstressed), information from the same source indicates that Hanga’s earlier attacks against De Sousa had been after Chipapata’s death and not before as Isaacman’s (1976: 50-51) narrative seems to imply. It may be highlighted that Hanga’s “deal” with De Sousa is probably not to be interpreted as an act of betrayal of Barue but rather as a trick to show to Chipitura that De Sousa could not be trusted.

After Chipapata’s death De Sousa had no need to rely on Hanga for tribute collection since he set up his own network of local chiefs (indunas). Paiva de Andrada (1886) mentions a network of captains (capitães) and chiefs (inhacuavas) in Barue, adding that De Sousa did not yet receive any tribute or mussôco, but that it would be easy to do if it were so resolved. This remark may be cryptic but in any case it does not indicate any rôle, actual or potential, for Chipapata or Hanga at that time. Isaacman’s (1976: 51) phrase that Gouveia/De Sousa “recognized his archenemy Hanga as future ruler” is inaccurate because De Sousa, as would appear from Isaacman’s source, appointed Hanga as
king under his own contemporary supervision, not as ruler in some future. That “Sousa’s rule of Barue was far from popular” (Axelson 1967: 141) is a different matter; “unpopularity” does not necessarily imply “politically weak”.

De Sousa’s drastic political usurpation of Barue was well underway by 1884-1885 (cf. Paiva de Andrada 1886 who speaks of the “former [antigo] kingdom of Barue”) and therefore it seems strange that a dispute in 1887 between “Makombe” (unspecified) and De Sousa was a trade or a tribute issue (Isaacman 1976: 51). If Gouveia made Hanga king, this may not have been much more than a symbolic gesture and been part of a strategy to attempt to co-opt at least one of the two royal branches rather than to have to fight both of them. According to Peters (1900: 64), the Makombe he met in Missongue (i.e. Hanga) was 48 years old in 1899, implying Hanga was born in or around 1851. A “young Macombe” was reported in 1888 to be mobilizing support to expel the Portuguese from Barue and other areas (Axelson 1967: 132). If this “young Macombe” was Hanga (cf. Isaacman in his earlier work 1972a: 144) at an age of about 37, the strategy of co-optation had failed. This also points to the invalidity of the year 1887 as time of Chipapata’s death, because Gouveia reported in a statement contained in the 1892 document that “after that [i.e. Hanga’s ‘appointment’ together with new more local leaders] there was peace”. Hanga’s dissatisfaction with the situation in Barue would then have been rather rapid, but it is better understood as a result from the fact that he had apparently little influence by 1884 (cf. Paiva de Andrada’s 1885 and 1886 reports).

Naturally, there is the need for an explanation why Isaacman’s 1892 source gives “1887”, but it is more likely that that document gives a wrong date than that Paiva de Andrada was mistaken in assuming in 1885 that Makombe (i.e. Chipapata) was already dead. Paiva de Andrada was on the spot and had an interest in knowing facts like this one. What is more, Isaacman (1976: 50) mentions Hanga’s attacks on De Sousa after having “spent [in Massangano] a number of years acquiring modern arms”. For this he refers (see his note 12) to a document dated 30 July 1888, which may be hypothesized to indicate that some noteworthy attacks were undertaken around that date. Indeed Axelson (1967: 144) reports a “rising” in or around July 1888 which was joined by “numbers of the elders of Barue” when De Sousa was in Lisbon (cf. again the earlier Isaacman 1972a: 144 but without exact chronology; also Coutinho 1936). It is likely that Isaacman’s note 12 (in 1976) on Hanga’s attacks and Axelson’s comment on a rising joined by Barue elders refer to overlapping events. At least it cannot be said that all was peaceful between 1887 and 1890 as Isaacman (1976: 51) implies. Even when supposing that Hanga would have accepted any “appointment” by De Sousa and been king under De Sousa in 1888, he would have been in a difficult position to continue in that situation when fellow Barue leaders are participating in a rising against De Sousa. It also does not fit in with what we otherwise know of Hanga as being a staunch opponent of De Sousa. Isaacman (1976: 128) himself writes that by 1904 Hanga “had been engaged in anti-European activities for more than two decades”, with squares better with continued anti-Portuguese agitation after Chipapata’s death in 1880-1881 than with a deal with De Sousa in 1887 that resulted in peace. If he was not already in the overt
anti-De Sousa camp before July 1888, he likely became then, again contradicting the idea that there was peace between 1887 and De Sousa’s testimony quoted by Isaacman.

In conclusion, in 1888 (or even in 1890) Hanga cannot have been preparing and executing attacks from Massangano on De Sousa for “a number of years” and also having been appointed as king by De Sousa in 1887 with peace as a result. As for the « 1887 », this may have been a simple writing error with the « 7 » in the concerned document; further research might test this hypothesis. Isaacman’s relevant document is dated 19 January 1892 and almost certainly does not contain fresh statements by De Sousa to the British (he was busy fighting before he died around that time – Pélissier 1994 vol. 2: 71) but probably incorporates older, already existing material which I suggest is from the time of his arrest in 1890. If we take 1880 or 1881 as the year of Chipapata’s death instead of 1887, Isaacman’s De Sousa reference actually makes quite good sense. My reconstruction of the events then goes as follows:

Not later than 1853  Chipapata becomes Makombe.
1863     Manuel António de Sousa appointed captain-major.
± 1868-1869 Chipapata contains but fails to defeat De Sousa.
1873     De Sousa and Manyika king Tendai conclude a treaty.
± 1874-1875 Chipapata attacks Tendai but De Sousa helps Tendai; Chipapata and De Sousa conclude a treaty; De Sousa marries Chipapata’s daughter; Caravan incident and Chipapata submits to De Sousa; De Sousa imposes tribute obligations on Barue.
1880-1881 Chipapata dies in a fight following a quarrel between him and De Sousa about tribute; De Sousa becomes leader of Barue; Hanga starts political career when he is about 30 years of age.
1888     Rising against De Sousa when he is in Lisbon.
1890     De Sousa arrested.
1891-1892 Hanga defeats De Sousa but has an unstable Makombeship.
1902     Coutinho defeats Hanga and Barue loses independence.

§ 4: The identity “Chipapata = Kabudu Kagoro”

The identity “Chipapata = Kabudu Kagoro” follows from the following considerations:

(1) Fieldwork data of the present author. Makombe emerged as an important personality who was often known only by the expression « Makombe » which from the literature we know was a dynastic title. If informants were able to mention a personal name, this was ubiquitously « Kabudu Kagoro ». He was Makombe who traded with “the Portuguese”, fought them as well, and whose daughter married “the Portuguese”. The trading and marriage fit in with arrangements between Chipapata and M.A. de Sousa/Gouveia. Genealogical information about Kabudu Kagoro’s sons also signals that he was identical with Chipapata.

246 Cf. note 43 above.
(2) Portugal (1967: 141) mentions “Nhampale” as son of “Cabudocagolo”. Taking Nhampale ~ Nyaupare ~ Nyapaure, where the latter’s name appears in Ranger (1963: 60) in the compound « Nyapaure-Hanga », we can take Nyaupare = Hanga (~ Canga, Nkanga). Taking Cabudocagolo ~ Kabudu Kagoro, these observations yield the identity Chipapata = Kabudu Kagoro.

(3) Wieschhoff’s list in Von Sicard (1954: 53), mentioned already. I give the last six names of the list here:
   30. Kabudu Kagore
   31. Samakande
   32. Nyamaringa
   33. Nyipare Langa
   34. Nongwe-Nogwe
   35. Kasado.

   Obviously, Samakande ~ Samacande (as in Coutinho 1904: 17; Isaacman 1976: 52-53). Now Isaacman (ibid.) mentions a succession dispute between Samakande and Hanga after Chipapata’s death. Taking Nyipare Langa ~ Nyaupare Hanga, Samakande in the list may be interpreted as the successor of Kabudu Kagore, leading to the conclusion that Wieschhoff’s Kabudu Kagore (~ Kabudu Kagoro) is identical with Isaacman’s Chipapata, who was according to the list succeeded by Samakande.

   With the above a problem alluded to by Alpers is solved:

   Chipapata […] appears to have come to power in 1853. [He was not] recorded by Wieschhoff [sic], but Coutinho [mentions] Xipapata […] An unpublished manuscript by Jason Maciwanika [mentions] Kabudu Kagore, who is number 30 on the Wieschhoff [sic] tally (Alpers 1970: 213).

   We can say that Chipapata was indeed recorded by Wieschhoff, but under another name.

   In the literature the following are also called “Kabudu Kagoro” (or a variant): a mhondoro spirit medium in Mungari (Artur 1996: 21); “the first Barue king” (Isaacman 1976: 17n44); “Barue national ancestor spirit” (Isaacman 1976: 163); a “mhondoro” spirit (Isaacman 1976: 53); a divine spirit (“Gott”) living on or in the Earth – Peters 1902: 73-74). It is sometimes difficult to square these identifications with other data. For instance Isaacman (1973: 396) states that “Kabudu Kagoro is also remembered in the traditions by the name of Chipapata”, but in that article’s context he understands that as referring to a “first king of Barue” before the mid-16th century without discussing in this context Pacheco’s information from the 1860s, Wieschhoff’s from the 1920s, and Abraham’s from the 1950s-1960s, who do not identify Kabudu Kagoro as such. It may be that at least some, if not all, of “the traditions” Isaacman referred to in this quote were in fact about the 19th-century Kabudu Kagoro. At least certain references in the same traditions to the spirit of Kabudu Kagoro as residing in mediums can be understood as related to that same person, because Coutinho writes about “the
m’pondoro [mhondoro spirit medium] [...] in whose body they [the Baruese] say is the spirit of the father of Macombe” (1904: 38), while on the same page Coutinho identifies Hanga as “Macombe” and thus the spirit would have been of Hanga’s father. This means the spirit could have become manifest in about two decades or so. (In 1976 Isaacman does not mention the identity “Chipapata = Kabudu Kagoro” anymore, but nevertheless still sticks to his 1973 interpretation of Kabudu Kagoro.)

Support for the hypothesis that Kabudu Kagoro was a 19th-century individual may also be found in information provided by Peters (1902). As already alluded to, he reports that in 1899 there existed an important divine spirit, “Kabulu Kagoro”, whose widow had the title Quaraquate. Although she was said to be 6000 years old (perhaps proverbially, but certainly meaning “very old”), she was alive then and acted as this Kabulu Kagoro’s “high priestess” (Peters 1902: 74).247 We may set Peters’s Kabulu Kagoro ~ Kabudu Kagoro and infer that if the widow was alive in 1899 her husband’s spirit was of the 19th-century Kabudu Kagoro.

§ 5: Genealogy of Makosa

Let us recall the Wieschhoff list as partly given in § 4 above. We can assume Nongwe-Nogwe ~ Nongwe-Nongwe (Ranger 1963). We can also set Kasado = Makosa, from information that Makosa was considered the last to whom the title « Makombe » was ever applied (1963: 78). With the identities of Wieschhoff’s numbers 30-31 and 33-35 solved, there remains the uncertainty of who Nyamaringa was. The narrative of Isaacman (1976: 52-55) gives three candidates, all descendents of Chibudu, cousin of Chipapata (cf. Bourne, Watt and Throup [eds.]: 244). In chronological order of political prominence, these were Chipitura, Cassiche and Cavunda (~ Chavunda). Chipitura appears to have been the strongest of the three, so possibly Nyamaringa = Chipitura. This squares with descriptions of Coutinho (1904) who applies the title « Macombe » to Chipitura (p. 22, 44) but not to Cassiche or Cavunda. Coutinho (1904: 17, 22) named the group of Chibudu’s descendents “Chipitura” even if not all of its members descended from Chipitura. Coutinho mentions “the two Makombes” when referring to Hanga and Chipitura before Cassiche or Cavunda were politically prominent (1904: 22, cf. 44). The Chipitura group resided in Mungari (Coutinho 1904: 22, 44; cf. Arnold 1901: 464, 516). However, another possibility that cannot be excluded beforehand is that Wieschhoff’s Nyamaringa ~ Inhamecinga (cf. Coutinho 1904: 17). In that case the Wieschhoff list would show bias towards the Chipapata branch, mentioning no persons of the Chibudu branch after Chipapata, considering that not only Nongwe-Nongwe but also Makosa was a son of Chipapata/Kabudu Kagoro, as I shall argue now.

Both Ranger (1963) and Isaacman (1976) maintain that Makosa belonged to the Chibudu branch

(or more narrowly the Chipitura house – Ranger 1963) of the Makombe family. I argue against this family identification. At the time of the Barue revolt of 1917 Makosa would be in competition with Nongwe-Nongwe for the paramount leadership of Barue and consequently these authors interpret this competition as a struggle between the two houses of Chibudu (c.q. Chipitura) and Chipapata (~ Chipatata – Ranger 1963; Newitt 1973: 317) respectively. I shall show first that Ranger’s and Isaacman’s interpretations of family relations between Makosa and Nongwe-Nongwe are mutually inconsistent when their English depictions of family relations are to be taken strictly, and then argue that Makosa did not belong to the Chibudu (c.q. Chipitura) house at all but to the Chipapata house, having the same father as Nongwe-Nongwe.

Ranger (1963: 65) states that Makosa was a “nephew” of “Chipatura”, giving no source. Interpreting the English strictly (assuming patrilineal reckoning), this would mean that Makosa was Chipitura’s BS. Isaacman (1976: 159, 179n18) maintains that Makosa was a “cousin” of Nongwe-Nongwe. Taking the English strictly this would mean that the two individuals were each other’s FBS. Now these authors’ interpretations are mutually inconsistent because if Makosa would have been Nongwe-Nongwe’s FBS (cf. Isaacman) he was of the same generation as Chipitura (implying B), which is denied by Ranger (implying BS). Moreover, neither author gives direct information about who would have been Makosa’s father. Isaacman (1976: 159) states Makosa “traced his lineage through the Chibudu branch of the royal house”, but if he was Nongwe-Nongwe’s FBS he could as well have been described more succinctly as Chibudu’s son (under the hypothesis that Chipapata and Chibudu were brothers). Isaacman’s round-about description indicates uncertainty as to the genealogical information. The hiatus can be solved if it is accepted that Makosa was a son of Chipapata/Kabudu Kagoro, implying he was Nongwe-Nongwe’s brother.

There exist at least four sources that support this interpretation:

1. A straightforward one is given by Isaacman himself when he quotes Tangwena (probably Dzeka) in a Rhodesian file of 1917:

   Nongwe-Nongwe [...] Makosa [...] are brothers of the late Hanga [Makombe] and are claimants for the chieftainship (Isaacman 1976: 159, bracketed phrase « [Makombe] » as in Isaacman’s text).

Taking the English strictly, this would mean that Nongwe-Nongwe and Makosa are brothers not only of Hanga but also of each other. Tangwena’s wider formulation seems to support the interpretation of a close relationship of the two. Even if allowing for broader relationships that can be subsumed under Shona or Barwe kinship terminology than in English, it would make little sense to name the deceased Hanga explicitly when Tangwena intended to explain that the two were somewhat distant relatives from distinct houses. The testimony stresses closeness. (Isaacman gives no explanation for the discrepancy between datum and analysis.)
(2) Makosa is identified by Conde da Ponte in Coutinho (1904: 231) as “Macombe”. Now Coutinho (1904: 22) identifies “Macombe” as Hanga (cf. previous point) so that Makosa can be understood as belonging to the family group of Makombes Hanga, Samakande and Chipapata, not the Chibudu/Chipitura group.248

(3) Portugal (1967) reports information about Makosa as son of the “father Makombe” in a passage that contains more relevant information:

The great chief Kabudu Kagoro – the father Makombe – lived in Pombona [...] where he built a buna (small fortification with loose rock and openings with thorns around) and placed his four sons in the following manner: Makosa in Macossa, Nyaundondo in Mungari, Cuezane in Gorongosa and Chicune in Vila Gouveia.

O grande chefe Cabudocagolo – o pai Macombe – vivia em Pombona [...] onde construiu uma buna (pequena fortificação com pedra solta e buracos com espinhos a volta) e colocou os seus quatro filhos da seguinta maneira: Macossa na Macossa, Nhaundondo em Mungári, Cuezane na Gorongosa e Chicune em Vila Gouveia. (Portugal 1967: 2)

The list of four sons does not mention Inhamecinga, Nongwe-Nongwe and T’chinhenha who are mentioned as “grandes” (great ones, leaders) by Coutinho (1904: 17), while three of the four mentioned sons are difficult to identify, although the quote has a clear position about Makosa’s genealogy.

That Makosa did have jurisdiction over a certain area is clear from Coutinho’s book, although the Macossa area was apparently shared with Cassiche who had sought asylum there after his deposition (compare 1904: 23, 50, 54 and 260). Now like the quote above, régulo Melo Mpanze associated Makosa with the place Macossa, so there is justification to say that Makosa administered the Macossa area. So far I have not been able to identify Nhaundondo in other sources. « Cuezane » sounds like « Kwedzani », name of a son of Makosa in 1917-1918 (1976: 171). On the other hand Isaacman mentions a Kwedzani who is associated with Nongwe-Nongwe (1976: 166). It is not clear whether or not there was one Kwedzani whose relationship with Makosa is unclear or, if there were more Kwedzanis, one of them has to be identified with the mentioned Cuezane. Moreover, that the Gorongosa area was ever a firmly integrated part of the Barue kingdom is unlikely as I explain in § 7 below, and the mentioning of Gorongosa here may only indicate a very temporary situation after Hanga’s defeat of De Sousa. The “Vila Gouveia” associated with Chicune may indicate the one near Gorongosa (Ferreri in Tivane 1999: 7) or the place that is now Catandica, capital of Barue District. Since Gorongosa is already mentioned separately, the latter possibility is more likely. But then it is not clear how an appointment of Chicune squares with the leadership of Katandika in that area (see chapter 12 under “Sabão”), if it was not the case that Chicune = Katandika. So unfortunately no

248 Cf. note 40 above. Unfortunately Coutinho does not mention Makosa’s father by name.
conclusion on this item can be given yet. Nevertheless, the uncertainties with the other mentioned sons do not influence the father-son association between Kabudu Kagoro and Makosa as reported in 1967. This association, together with points (1) and (2), also supports the hypothesis that the Makosa of 1902 and of 1917 are one and the same person, already of age at the time Kabudu Kagoro died. The fact that Makosa's son Kwedzani co-organized military operations in the 1917-1918 war indicates that the son was an adult then, suggesting a more advanced age for the father.

A consequence is, however, that though the quote clearly associates the genealogical relationships of the four sons with Kabudu Kagoro, the actions of putting them in certain places may be a conflation with decisions made by Makombe Hanga after his defeat of Gouveia. I argue in the main text that such a conflation of Kabudu Kagoro and Hanga into one single “Makombe” is likely. Even when allowing for some flexibility in Makosa’s birth year, Makosa would have been too young when Kabudu Kagoro assumed power in around 1853. Hanga, who came to prominence earlier and had the lead earlier than Makosa and Nongwe-Nongwe, was probably somewhat older than Makosa. After the revolt of 1917-1918, Makosa was to flee to the Rhodesian side (Portugal 1967: 16) where he became a chief. There he was apparently reported to be still alive in 1929 (Von Sicard 1954: 54). A birth date of Makosa say around 1860 is consistent with all observations mentioned here, and with Makosa having an age of about 20 at the time of Chipapata’s death in 1880-1881. With the reconstruction given above, there is no necessity to assume (as Pélissier 1994 vol. 2: 347 gives as a possibility) that the Makosa of 1917 was a “successor” of a Makosa visited by W.H. Robins in 1899.

On the other hand, if Makosa got the governorship over Macossa from Kabudu Kagoro, it must have been at the end of the latter’s life; it is however very well possible that we are dealing, as said, with an instance of the conflation of father Kabudu Kagoro and son Hanga. In that case we should rather think of Hanga placing his brothers at the mentioned places, who were themselves also sons of Kabudu Kagoro. This interpretation of conflation is supported by the fact that Portugal (1967: 2) continues the description quoted above with declaring that after “father Makombe’s death” the 1917 revolt occurred, jumping from the beginning of the 1880s to 1917. An advantage of this interpretation is that Nhaundondo’s obscurity might be explained by the fact that Mungari was at some time to be taken over by the Chipitura group of the Barue royal dynasty. The case of Cuezane at Gorongosa is more difficult. Although it fits better with the year 1892 (defeat of Gouveia) than any time before that year, it is not clear that the Makombe family had ever any effective rule in Gorongosa (see § 7 below). It may be that Cuezane’s appointment as reported was remembered as a way to stress the importance of the Makombe family.

(4) My own informants unambiguously identified Makosa as son of Makombe Kabudu Kagoro: Régulo Melo Mpanze; Martinho CC [FN° 31/07/2010], Ioanes CN; Caibossi SG.

Isaacman draws on interviews for the information of Nongwe-Nongwe and Makosa being “cousins”
but this information is not necessarily 100% reliable. Isaacman also states that the former got the praise name « Nongwe-Nongwe » from Hanga “[s]hortly before his [Hanga’s] death”, which was in Southern Rhodesia in 1910 (Isaacman 1976: 158, 178n16), but this is very unlikely because Nongwe-Nongwe is already mentioned by Coutinho (1904: 17) with the name « Inhongue-n’hongue ». This is given by Isaacman himself as « Nongwe » (1976: 53). Isaacman’s informants apparently also stated that Nongwe-Nongwe was Hanga’s son (1976: 158), which is contradicted by the Tangwena quote above (cf. also scheme in Isaacman 1976: 53). This stated relationship also does not square with the combination of Nongwe-Nongwe and Makosa being “cousins” (strictly interpreted as FBS) and Makosa being of the Chibudu branch because if they would be FBS of each other, Makosa would be the son of a brother of Hanga and thus belong to the Chibapata branch instead of the Chibudu branch. Isaacman (1976) does nothing to help his readers out of the predicaments. During my own fieldwork I did hear the tradition that Nongwe-Nongwe was a son of Nyaupare (= Hanga), as expressed by one of my informants (Martinho Creva Chapfinwa [FN 31/07/2010]), but others held the view that he was a son of Makombe Kabudu Kagoro (Melo MN; Ioanes CN). That Nongwe-Nongwe may have been considered Hanga/Nyaupare’s son may be explained by the fact that Hanga/Nyaupare is at times conflated in the oral traditions with “Makombe” who is otherwise identified as Kabudu Kagoro. Nongwe-Nongwe as son of Kabudu Kagoro can then become son of Hanga/Nyaupare via the conflation of Kabudu Kagoro and Hanga/Nyaupare into one single “Makombe” as I have argued in the main text.

One could interpret Isaacman’s “cousins” loosely, but then we remain with the fact that we do not know Makosa’s father, which would be necessary to understand his claim to the Makombe throne. The theory that Makosa was Kabudu Kagoro’s son solves this problem. The idea that Nongwe-Nongwe and Makosa were materializing a struggle between two royal houses (Ranger 1963: 65; Isaacman 1976: 159) must then be abandoned. As explained in the main text, in adelphic collateral succession, one represents one’s father or a more distant ancestor along a direct line. If Makosa was of the Chibudu branch he would have to claim his father’s position, which following Ranger (1963: 65) would be of a brother of Chipitura: Mucaka, Cassiche or another whose name is unknown. The first option yields in Coutinho’s data the circumstance that Cavunda and Makosa were brothers, something which is strange not to have been mentioned in the context of their cooperation while Makosa is identified as “Macombe”; the second would yield a weak claim because of Cassiche’s history; and the third brings back the odd situation that we would not know on what genealogical basis Makosa could have made his claim. About Makosa the following is reported by commander Conde da Ponte (Coutinho 1904: 231): in Domba Makosa told the commander that neither he nor “Chipitura” (probably Cassiche is meant) had wanted war, but that he did not surrender himself earlier out of fear.

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249 Isaacman (1976: 55) also considers C(h)avunda a son of Chipitura, invoking Coutinho, but that source states that Chavunda was a son of Mucaka. As indicated, the family in Mungari was generally referred to as “Chipitura” (Coutinho 1904: 22-23).
for Hanga who would have people to watch him (I suppose to avoid giving up fighting the Portuguese). The comment shows that Makosa felt himself under supervision of Hanga and not Cavunda. Makosa had his own territory to rule, but Hanga still exerted his paramount influence over him as head of the kingdom.

§ 6: Mbuya, one of the leaders of the Barue Revolt of 1917-1918

For us living about a century later, “Mbuya” is a rather elusive person and nowadays she does not have the same stature as the medium Mbuya Nehanda (Charwe) has in Zimbabwe, although such equal stature might have been expected on the basis of the events. « Mbuya » is almost certainly a nickname (literally: « grandmother », generally a courtesy title for older women). Neither Ranger (1963) nor Isaacman (1976) gives suggestions for a regular name. Makambe (1980: 560) mentions one mhondoro medium Nemhuru whom he identifies with “Mbuya”. During my fieldwork Mbuya mostly seemed to be all but forgotten officially and unofficially. Only Suzana Calhancambo, estimatedly born in 1902, was able to give me more or less clear-cut statements about this person. She said Mbuya’s regular name was « Nyamaluodzo » (~ Nyamariodzo, Nyamarihwodzo). Nyamariodzo is associated with the Tangwena family (Régulo Seguma [R]), having been a chief (Christian Action Publications 1972: 1-2, 44). A sister of Nyamariodzo married an unspecified Makombe (1972: 2). According to Martinho CC (FN 31/07/2010) Nyamariodzo was a male curandeiro (healer). These conflicting gender identifications could be reconciled by assuming that Nyamariodzo was Mbuya’s forefather. Such an interpretation is backed by a comment of Rekayi Tangwena (summarized by Clutton-Brock, in Moore 2005: 194):

The mother of Makombe who rebelled against the Portuguese in 1917 had been the daughter of Nyamariodzo, a Tangwena chief.

Thus Dona Suzana’s datum on an association of Mbuya with Nyamariodzo squares well with Rekayi Tangwena’s, provided the referred “mother of” was a distortion from an earlier “spirit medium associated with” (possibly induced by the nickname « grandmother »). Thus “Mbuya” may be identified as “Nemhuru descendant of Nyamariodzo, mhondoro medium of the spirit of Kabudu Kagoro”.

Dona Suzana said Mbuya had as descendants Canhanhi and Rofina. I had an advertisement broadcast through the community radio of Barue to find possible descendants of Mbuya but this did not yield responses. Those whom I asked in 2012 about « Nemhuru » did not seem to know this name; Ioanes/Nyamukucu said she was at least not from the Samanhanga area. This would still leave the possibility that she was from the Tangwena area, if Nhemuru = Nyamaluodzo as identified by Suzana Calhancambo. According to Suzana Calhancambo Mbuya was already an adult (mukuru), thus not a
“little girl” as a source of Ranger (1963: 67) had it at the time, and a chiremba (healer). The nickname « Grandmother » she got because “she was the big one with the work”, presumably because of being in a supervisory/commanding position during the war (discussion at interview). Relative to Mbuya, Nongwe-Nongwe was higher in hierarchy however. Dona Suzana indicated that it was “the very person” Mbuya, not so much her spirit, who called for the war. People agreed with the call to start the war, but also (at the end) to terminate it. Mbuya herself died in Barue shortly after the end of the war. We may hypothesize that the spirit of Mbuya was not of a centuries-old Kabudu Kagoro but of the 19th-century Makombe with that name, as discussed above. The exchange my assistant and I had with Suzana C indicates that she did not interpret the situation otherwise.

§ 7: Barue and Gorongosa

Jacobs’s (2010: 39) statement that “Makombe’s territory included Gorongosa” is problematic. Jacobs (2010) does not mention that Gorongosa was under the jurisdiction of such persons as Sisnando Dias Bayão and Dona Inês Gracias Cardoso (Newitt 1973: 156, 160, 161, 163-165, cf. 77, 88, 156, 177; 1995: 225, cf. 229, 236; Rita-Ferreira 1999: 35; see also Administração Distrital de Gorongosa 2006: 26 on “Luso-afro-indianized families” in Gorongosa). Jacobs seems to refer to Gorongosa as a prazo before the time of Gouveia (2010: 42) but she does not explain the discrepancy with the statement on Gorongosa being in Makombe’s territory. The prazo itself had been “carved out of the old Kiteve kingdom” (Newitt 1995: 226), which shows it was not part of Barue. The atrocities and slavery that Jacobs’s informants mentioned seem better compatible with prazo life (Newitt 1995: 201, 235-237; Isaacman 1972b: 455, 457; see Isaacman and Isaacman 2005: 131n16 specifically on slaves on prazo Gorongosa), and I hypothesize that oral history may attribute atrocities to “Makombe” which were in fact committed by or under former prazo holders who are no longer remembered as such. The oral history as interpreted by Jacobs places the beginning of colonialism “at the end of the 19th century”, which is obviously incorrect for Gorongosa – see Jacobs (2010: 40, 43n16); the military data given on p. 40 possibly refer to events during the Hanga-Gouveia war, since the Portuguese are depicted as on the losing side (cf. Administração Distrital de Gorongosa 2006: 30). Schuetze’s (2010) comments on the issue are oblique; on p. 94 it is held that Gorongosans were at least at some time “subordinated to […] the Kingdom of Barue” but with no source given, while on p. 97 it is stated that “[i]n the region of Gorongosa, prazos coexisted in an uneasy relationship with the Barue Kingdom”, suggesting Gorongosa and Barue were separate territories if it is recalled that Gorongosa was one prazo of

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251 Akari mukuru Nongwe-Nongwe.
253 Vakada kuti iyitiwe; ngaipere panadzapera iyo.
254 This forgetting is not unique to Gorongosa: Mozambique (2005b: 7-8, 44) associates the history of Massangano with “Macombe” without devoting a single word to the notorious Da Cruz family.
“immense size” (Newitt 1973: 88).

Capela (2007) gives names of donas of prazo Gorongosa in the 19th century. In the 1820s the foreira (prazo-holder) was Joana da Cruz Lacé Pedrosa, married to M. de Carvalho Pedrosa who is associated with a slave transport to Brazil in 1826 (2007: 127; whether the slaves were from Gorongosa, this source does not say, but the possibility is there; cf. Isaacman 1972b: 458). On 21 April 1830 a request was registered at the government for a certificate relative to Gorongosa by one António José Pedrosa (Santana 1967: 1003). His wife Dona Joana da Cruz e Almeida was title holder of the prazo, and he himself was known as a trafficker in slaves (Capela 2007: 132, 177). This is a strong indication that the information provided by Jacobs’s (2010) informants was in fact referring to people like the mentioned Pedrosas instead of “Makombe” concerning the slavery. Interestingly, in November of the same year 1830 it was recorded that the newly crowned Makombe Inhamaguada was planning to chase rival family members from several prazos, amongst which Gorongosa, where these family members were hiding (Santana 1967: 346, 903). I interpret this information as implying that Gorongosa around 1830 was not centrally ruled in any practical sense but rather an area where people like the two male Pedrosas could “legally” capture slaves, having little further interest in the area. In 1833 it was proposed (but not effectuated) that the feira (Portuguese trading post) of Manyika be transferred to a place Sungue in the Gorongosa area,255 which would facilitate the trade itself but furthermore because it “would also improve the prazo called Gorongosa” (Liesegang 1970: 330-331; also Bhila 1982: 178, 193n24 with “Gorongoza boundary”). End 1835 or beginning 1836 Gorongosa was a refuge for Quiteve soldiers who had fought in a Nguni army (1970: 331-332). What happened in Gorongosa in the years after 1836 is not clear in the sources I have available.

Portugal (1967: 63) does include the circunscrições of Gorongosa, Chemba, Sena and part of Chimoio within a large region that the Makombes “dominated”, but for these circunscrições this seems to be better understood as indicating a sphere of influence rather than such regions being actually within the Barue Kingdom (e.g. the Chimoio area, south of the Pungue River, was under Tewe – Artur 1999: 12). Isaacman (1976: 9) writes that Chipapata suffered a “humiliating” event by losing the “province of Gorongosa” to the invading Nguni. He does not explain how this squares with his own information that Gorongosa had been a prazo (1976: xii), and it is not clear whether the 1860 references in his note 53 refer to the Gorongosa case, which follows that note rather than precedes it (p. 9). Elsewhere Isaacman (1972b: 446) includes Gorongosa in a map of “principal Zambezi prazos” for the period “1750-1900”. Isaacman (1976) also does not indicate when the “loss” of the area to the Nguni would have happened. If Barue lost Gorongosa, the country must first have annexed it in or after 1836. As far as my knowledge goes, such an annexation does not seem to be mentioned in the literature. Since the Nguni were still active in what is now central Mozambique the following decade,

255 This must be another Sungue than the Sungue that was north of Barue (cf. note 36 above). There are a Sungue wetland and a Sungue River in what is now Gorongosa National Park (USA 1964b; <www.gorongosa.org>, accessed 24 April 2014.
an annexation by Barue does not seem likely, since Barue was itself on the defensive, and unsuccessfully so (Newitt 1995: 287). The remarkable thing about Chipapata is not that he “lost Gorongosa”, but that under him Barue re-emerged as a relatively stable state again. As for the Portuguese, they must still have considered Gongorosa their territory, since they “granted” Gorongosa to De Sousa precisely because they hoped, correctly, that he could withstand the Nguni (Newitt 1973: 121-122). This apparently happened in 1854 or 1855 (Coutinho 1936). (Note that Newitt implies that the Portuguese wanted a safeguard against Nguni and not Barue.)

Concerning the situation after De Sousa’s defeat and death, as mentioned above, Portugal (1967: 2) would suggest one Cuezane was appointed as administrator of Gorongosa for the Makombe family, and I have argued that if this was ever the case it was probably in or around 1892 (when Gouveia was defeated). However, judging from Jacobs (2010: 47-49), Barue’s capability to control Gorongosa in the 1892-1902 period was limited. Moreover, Newitt (1973: 338-339) writes that Gouveia’s erstwhile captain Luís Santiago ruled the area (rather than someone from the Makombe family), in a precarious balance with the Gorongosa company, a sub-contractor of the Mozambique Company (cf. Coutinho 1904: 29-30; Galli 2003: 56-57). Peters (1902: 131) seemed to consider Gorongosa as distinct from “Makombe’s country” during his 1899-1901 travel.

§ 8: Mbombona as capital of Barue

That Kabudu Kagoro/Chipapata lived in Mbombona (~ Pombona, Bombona) is confirmed by régulo Melo Mpanze and Coutinho (1904: 17) who mentions an aringa of “notable size” rather than a small one; Mauch (1969: 242) states its enclosure was “colossal”. The remains of the place may still be visited near the road from Cruzamento Macossa to Macossa. The hypothesis is likely that the place is identical with, or very close to, the location of Serra Demera visited by Alves Barboza to bring the special water from Sena for Makombe Chimbatata’s investiture-closing ceremony in 1811. Montez (1941: 120) furthermore points out that a map of 1889 still mentions a place called “Macombe” at 34° east longitude and 17°50’ south latitude. Compare map 1 in Mauch (1969) and maps in Randles (1975), which give the place Macombe at about the same latitude south as Quelimane or even more south. From Demera, Montez’s coordinates would be a bit too far to the north-east (cf. USA 1964a), but they are close enough to agree with Montez (1941: 120) that the capital of Barue has at least sometimes been more to the south than Missongue and Mungari (for these two places see map in Arnold 1901; cf. Coutinho 1904: 22). Mauch’s trajectory from the Katerere/Caerezi area also suggests a south-east rather than an east direction, incompatible with Missongue being the Makombe’s residence at that time (1969: 238-241). Whether Mbombona was exactly the same as the Makombe

256 Information obtained from the Barue district government. Future researchers will have to arrange this with the district government of Macossa. The present author planned to visit the place with a government official but unfortunately this did not materialize.
residence mentioned by Alves Barboza is difficult to say, and the quote on “building” a fortification given above suggests Kabudu Kagoro may have made a new residency for himself. The two places were, however, not very far from each other. Isaacman (1973) does not mention Mbombona or Demera at all and seems to suggest that Missongue has all the time been the kingdom’s capital. We see that the latter was not the case, at least not for all of the 19th century. Missongue was, however, the capital of Hanga (Coutinho 1904: 22). The matter is further complicated in Isaacman’s (1976) book, where one map gives Missongue in a quadrant to the south-west of Sena (p. xvi) and another in a quadrant to the north-west of Sena (p. xvii). The maps cannot be both correct concerning Missongue, but the first map is more compatible with Mbombona’s location, the second with that of Hanga’s capital. Isaacman gives no explanation.

§ 9: Local remembrance about the Makombe family and the Barue Revolt

The high status which “Makombe”, known as Kabudu Kagoro, has in Barue nowadays may be understood if it is considered that he had a stable reign in contrast with a series of succession disputes in earlier decades of the 19th century and that he was able to keep De Sousa at some distance and maintain Barue independence, although this aspect could no longer be sustained in 1880-1881. In general Kabudu Kagoro’s reign appears to have been one of stability and internal peace. There are nevertheless reports of dissatisfaction with Barue rule. At least some leaders of “Tonga” (northern Barue) background appear to have been dissatisfied with Barue rule during the 18th and 19th centuries (Isaacman 1972a: 21; cf. Alexander 1994: 63, but with little detail). Virtanen writes that “some […] lineages in the Chôa area resisted Makombe’s conquest of the area and […] had to find refuge in […] Zimbabwe” (2005: 235-236). Here it is difficult to comment because Virtanen neither indicates which lineages would have been involved, nor which Makombe. Peters (1902: 89) states that in 1899 a mountainous area of what must be interpreted as a mountain chain in and/or slightly north of the Chôa area was called the “Chipatula highland”. Taking Chipatula ~ Chipitura, this fits in with Chipitura’s dominance of the west of Barue during the time of his struggle with Hanga, and suggests the possibility that activities of Chipitura rather than Kabudu Kagoro or Hanga influenced political history in that area.

I have argued that Isaacman’s interpretation of Kabudu Kagoro’s being “the first king of Barue” is unlikely when such “first king” is to be taken as living before the mid-16th century. From data as early as the 1920s it is certain that the name « Kabudu Kagoro » has been used for an individual known in the academic literature as “Chipapata”, i.e. a Makombe who reigned from about 1853 until 1880-1881. It is likely that Isaacman’s (1973: 396n6) informants of 1972 also had this understanding. Present-day (and perhaps earlier) oral tradition moreover conflates sometimes the personalities and actions of Kabudu Kagoro and Hanga/Nyaupare, as said earlier in this thesis. Unfortunately matters have got even more confused in academic literature since Newitt has referred to a “Kaguru [sic]
spirit” (1995: 33, 41), apparently contracting the two parts of the Makombe’s name into one word. I argue that Kabudu Kagoro’s stature when alive was rather quickly translated into a high spiritual regard quite soon after his death, erasing much of Barue’s earlier history from collective memory, to such an extent that Kabudu Kagoro is now seen as the one and only Makombe.

There is some difficulty connecting Barue inhabitants’ recollections of the time of Makombe Chipapata and the 1917 revolt with those given by Ranger and Isaacman as dealt with above. At least three sorts of differences between the existing literature and orally remembered information exist: (a) overlapping factual material may be interpreted differently; (b) data recoverable from the literature may have gone lost in oral traditions in Barue by 2009; (c) the oral data may, on the other hand, correct or supplement aspects of the literature. Above I have already dealt with the last situation concerning the identity of Kabudu Kagoro with Chipapata.

Concerning interpretations: most of my interlocutors did not see « Makombe » as a dynastic title used across four centuries but as a reference to one single individual, namely Kabudu Kagoro (e.g. Régulo Mpanze). An exception is Suzana Calhancambo who said that « Makombe » was Kabudu Kagoro’s senem (–Sh, from En: « surname »). « Kabudu Kagoro » was his “war name” (nome de guerra – Régulo Seguma). At times people would only know to speak about “Makombe” without being able to produce a personal name. As for « Chipapata », Régulo Seguma had heard of the name (cf. John Bongwe in Artur 1996: 17), not attaching much significance to this. Ciputura, whose name resembles that of the Chipitura of Isaacman, was remembered, just like Kabudu Kagoro, as a descendent of one Cidana/Katsvaganyidze by Ioanes CN. Hanga/Nyaupare was still remembered by some in Barue (e.g. Régulo Seguma), but rarely with stories about what he did, and Dona Suzana, though born around 1902, inverted the father-son relationship between him and Kabudu Kagoro. Nongwe-Nongwe and Makosa are not considered to have been Makombe. Neither was Hanga/Nyaupare where he was explicitly identified as different from Kabudu Kagoro. The name « Makombe » was etymologically derived from « kukomba », “to make a circle”, according to Régulo Mpanze by making a trip around his entire country, according to Adjunct-régulo Chapanga in order to block the Portuguese from entering the country during the Barue Revolt. Given the fact that « Makombe » existed as a title for centuries but was used here to describe a 19th-century individual, such etymology is almost certainly to be considered a recent reconstruction.

Adjunct-régulo Chapanga stated that

[Makombe] was transformed into a partridge; he did not die, when he was fighting. Thus, [...] he flew to [...] [the] border with Zimbabwe, where they came from, because they are from Zimbabwe. They are not from here. They are sons of Mwene Mutapa. This Makombe is son of [...] Matope, together with [...] Samanyanga.  

(“They” is more to be taken as “Makombe and his family, e.g. with Samanyanga” than as “the family of the Makombes.”) Artur (1996: 16-18) presents similar traditions. The information about Makombe being son (or descendant) of Matope represents a case of telescoping; a similar situation was provided by Caibossi SG who stated that “Monomotapa and Makombe Kabudu Kagoro were the same people”.257 That CSG refers to a recent Kabudu Kagoro is evident when he associates him with the struggle against Gouveia. Whether the Adjunct-régulo Chapanga and others’ connection between Makombe and Samanyanga is also telescoped or actually of more recent origin is difficult to say. If it is a telescoped tradition, it possibly indicates that the Samanyanga family is of equal, or almost equal, antiquity as the historical Makombe family. The possibility of an identification of Samanyanga with the “Chibudu branch” of the literature is discussed in Appendix E below.

In Barue the wars between Kabudu Kagoro and Gouveia in 1868 and Hanga and Gouveia in 1890-1892 are generally not seen as events markedly distinct from Hanga’s war of 1902 and Nongwe-Nongwe and Makosa’s revolt of 1917-1918 (e.g. Régulo Melo Mpanze). Thus different episodes across half a century are usually conflated into one big struggle of “Makombe” against the Portuguese. The conflation does make sense politically as well as spiritually (in view of Makombe Kabudu Kagoro’s existence as a spirit), but for a reconstruction of the history of Barue chiefdoms it poses difficulties because in most cases the different episodes cannot be used as chronological anchor points. This conflation of different war episodes may have been common practice in the 1960s already. The colonial government spoke of the “uprising of the Makombes [plural]” (levantamento dos Macombes – Portugal 1967: 2). However, the Chefe de Posto of Mungari wrote to an apparently hitherto incompletely informed Administrator of Barue that

According to the Chefe de Posto of Mungari, about 80 or more years ago, there was a leader named MAKOMBE. He was a highly esteemed individual. In those times, there were various tribal revolts that kept the populations always at war, from which also comes the phrase “war of the Makombes”.

Thus several “revolts” (dissidências) were summarized as one “war”. The plural “macombes” may have signified just the family members of that one “highly esteemed individual”, known as “Kabudu Kagoro – the father Makombe” (Cabudocagolo – o pai Macombe – Portugal 1967: 2). According to Régulo Mpanze, Nongwe-Nongwe and Makosa fought with Kabudu Kagoro against the Portuguese, but not to assert their own leadership (Hanga/Nyaupe is unknown with the Régulo). Although it is possible that Makosa was militarily active at some final violent conflict between Kabudu Kagoro and De Sousa, it is more likely that the Régulo’s interpretation is a variant of the tradition that the war efforts of Kabudu Kagoro, Hanga and Nongwe-Nongwe and Makosa constitute one ongoing

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257 *Munhu Mutapa nemakombe Kabudu Kagoro vaiva vamwe chete.*
anti-Portuguese struggle.

A person neglected in most stories as well as the 28 March commemoration of the Barue Revolt I witnessed is Mbuya, medium of Kabudu Kagoro. (In fact, more women may have participated in the revolt who were not mediums; Dona Suzana C mentioned some persons of her own family who participated in the war efforts, including one woman.) There was no medium of Makombe at the time of my fieldwork periods. Henriques QC reported he had accompanied a person for some time who claimed he was host to the spirit of Makombe. This person (about 19-20 years of age; HQC could not recall his original name) had come from Mutoko in Zimbabwe around 2002. The alleged medium died in 2003 because, HQC explained, he did things the spirit did not like, particularly having amorous relationships with young woman. According to HQC the medium was consulted for matters of personal well-being, but did not play any political rôle in Barue.

§ 10: Macombe Day celebrations

The yearly commemoration on 28 March to celebrate the Barue Revolt is referred to as Dia de Macombe (Makombe Day). The date refers to 28 March 1917, not so much the beginning of the entire Revolt, but the day when hostilities started in the Barue area (Dr. Foloware in FN's 28/03/2010). Another explanation for the date was that on 28 March 1917 there was a battle where the insurgents dominated the Portuguese (Sr. Mutapa in FN's 28/03/2010). In any case, Makombe Kabudu Kagoro was long dead by then, however.

The ceremony of Makombe Day has experienced evolution. Apparently it has been held at least since 1996 (Fry 1997: 14). Spirit medium Herbert SG informed that one goal of the first ceremony was “to give the first brewed doro beer there [at the ceremony] to grandfather Makombe because of the end of the war [between Frelimo and Renamo]”. Two cattle were slaughtered also. HSG furthermore informed that several régulos from Barue and outside, he himself, the spirit medium of Nyakudzuka (probably the medium now living in Macossa District) and “Costa” (probably former District Administrator Costa Charles) were present. He told that a spirit (unspecified, presumably his own) explained that Mozambicans at the time of Makombe had experienced war when the Portuguese came, but that Makombe had not died and had fled to the Zambezi (cf. Artur 1996: 17-18).

More recently the location of the ceremony was transferred from Régulo Mpanze’s house to Catandica to be held in the central park there (Luís A Chimoio), although Ioanes CN added that it has been held at Sanhatunze’s place as well. The transfer to the park apparently happened in 2008 (Melo MN), when T-shirts were produced to accompany the event. Different reasons (not necessarily contradictory) are given for the transfer. One is that women would by such transfer be enabled to participate; there had problems earlier, it was explained, not so much because of the women’s gender

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... pakaitswa doro rakatanga kuti tipe sekuru Makombe kuti hondo yapera.
but because some of them would wear clothing in red, a forbidden colour at the ceremony (LAC). Another reason was that the Nhazónia River can flood drastically at the end of March, producing problems for other participants to reach Régulo Mpanze’s house (MMN). The ceremony was modeled after “the 3 February ceremony for all our Mozambican heroes”, but Luís A Chimoio denied this was the government’s initiative. Further evolution existed in 2012; my assistant told that then the ceremony was accompanied by the distribution of food and drinks (FN 03/07/2012).
APPENDIX C: ELECTION OF THE MOZAMBICAN PRESIDENT AS CHOICE SET DETERMINATION

The Electoral Law of Mozambique of 1993 (cf. 1990 Constitution, art. 119) stipulated the election of the Mozambican national president (President of the Republic) as the sole member of a choice set in a voting procedure (Mozambique 1994a). Voters would reveal their first (top) strict preference for a candidate only in a first voting round, and a strict preference for one of two candidates in a second round. Strict, because a voter’s explicit indication to be indifferent between two or more candidates would amount to an invalid ballot (here blank votes can be considered subsumed under invalid votes). Either one candidate would win by having more than half the valid votes cast, or if no candidate would have more than half of the validly cast votes, there would have to be a second round of voting with the two candidates having the highest number of votes in the first round (art. 181-2-4). Voters would then reveal their preference concerning these two candidates. Assuming – as the 1993 Electoral Law does – that voters reveal strict preferences in their valid ballots and there would be no ties concerning the second place in a first round and the first place in a second round, the prescription for determining the winner of voting can be formulated in a choice set manner as follows.

Symbols:

∀ universal quantifier (“for all”)
∃ existential quantifier (“there exists at least one”)
| (in this appendix) such that
≠ is not identical with
≡ def is defined as
∑_{i=1}^{n} summation for all i from 1 to n included
⇒ implication
& and
∨ and/or
> (in this appendix) greater than
≥ greater than or equal to

Candidates in election contests are indicated using variables x, y, z and w. Assume a total number of n voters, or more precisely, validly cast votes.

First we stipulate that a voter i can have a strict preference for candidate x relative to candidate y (pref_i(x, y)), and assign to this the value 1 if that is the case; the value 0 if it is not:

\[
\text{pref}_i(x, y) = 1 \text{ if and only if } i \text{ strictly prefers } x \text{ to } y, \text{ else } 0 \text{ (where } y \neq x) .
\]

The difference or prevalence (p) in strict preferences between candidates x and y can be defined as:

\[
p(x, y) = \text{def} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{pref}_i(x, y) - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{pref}_i(y, x) \quad (y \neq x).
\]
We stipulate that a candidate \( x \) can have attributed a value with a voter \( i \) \((v_i(x))\); 1 if that candidate is the top strict preference of that voter, and 0 if not:

\[ v_i(x) = 1 \text{ if and only if } \forall y (y \neq x \supset (\text{pref}_i(x, y) = 1)), \text{ else } v_i(x) = 0. \]

The total number of votes for a candidate \( x \) (number of top strict preferences \( v(x) \)) can then be given as:

\[ v(x) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} v_i(x). \]

Consider first the possibility that there may be a need for a run-off between two candidates. The set \( R_2 \) of the candidates with the two highest numbers of strict top preferences within a set \( S \) of two or more candidates after a first round of voting, more specifically \( R_2(S) \), can be given as

\[ R_2(S) = \{ x \mid \exists y \exists z ([x = y \lor x = z] \land y \neq z \land \forall w ([v(w) \geq v(y) \lor v(w) \geq v(z)] \supset [w = y \lor w = z]) \}. \]

Adding the possibility that a candidate can win immediately if more than half of the top preference votes are secured in a first round of voting, the choice set \( (C(S)) \) defined by the mentioned Mozambican Electoral Law can be interpreted as:

\[ C(S) = \{ x \mid v(x) > n/2 \lor (x \in R_2(S) \land \exists y (y \in R_2(S) \land x \neq y \land p(x, y) > 0)) \}, \]

where it is assumed that in a second round voters are the same as in the first round and would either repeat the revelation of the first strict top preferences they had in the first round in case they had voted for one of the two highest scoring candidates, or else now reveal their strict preferences \( \text{pref}(x, y) \) concerning these candidates that had remained invisible in the first round since only the revelation of top preferences was requested and these voters had revealed a top preference for a third candidate.\(^{259}\)

Here, the individuals’ preference orderings are treated as unchanging and mathematically as one-off,\(^{260}\) even if the revelation of different components of such preference orderings may occur at

\(^{259}\) Assuming voters reveal genuine preferences and not vote strategically, a possibility taken up for Mozambique below.

\(^{260}\) This does not concern the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives here, because that principle applies to the sensitivity (or not) of collective outcomes of changes in preferences on individual level (Arrow 1963: 26-28), which is not the same as a change in preferences between two alternatives \textit{on individual level} due to another change, forced or not by circumstances, concerning yet other alternatives. A problem may remain concerning strategic voting in the first round (cf. below), but obviously the vote in the second round reveals a genuine preference ordering (in contrast with a strategic one) concerning the two alternatives, and can for all intents and purposes be considered to
slightly different times in a practical sense.

The assumption that voters in the two rounds of a two-round situation are exactly the same is an idealization. If, however, the two groups of voters would be very different, the voters in a first round would constitute not much more than a sort of committee, which rather arbitrarily narrows down the number of candidates to two, from whom the voters in the second round then determine a choice set with a voting procedure $v'(x)$, similar to $v(x)$ except for the identity and possibly the number of voters concerning the two final candidates. The choice set $(C(R_2))$ for cases where there is a second round could then be given as

$$C(R_2) = \{ x \mid x \in R_2(S) \& v'(x) > m/2 \},$$

where $m$ is the number of validly cast votes in the second round. In fact, the two interpretations may be said to coincide in cases where a certain vote with all the original first-round candidates, hypothetically voted for by the second-round $m$ voters, would yield the same $R_2$ as with the actual first-round $n$ voters. So far there is no reason to doubt this assumption concerning Mozambique. Indeed, we can in general assume that the two $R_2$s are identical because we expect specifically those voters who have the two candidates of the second round as first choice to come to the voting stations. But the two candidates were selected already in the first round where we did not have such expectation. Hence it is very unlikely that the two $R_2$s are not identical.

In either of the two interpretations, it is established that the Mozambican electoral system for the President of the Republic applies the choice set principle. This makes that system subject to considerations of Arrow (1963). This is more evident in the idealized form $C(S)$ but the comments that follow are certainly relevant for $C(R_2)$.

A possible practical problem is that the stipulations in the Mozambican Electoral Law of 1993 can be subject to manipulation. People may vote strategically in the first round so as to eliminate an undesired alternative from contest in a possible second round. Consider the following table, showing candidates A, B and C and 12 voters:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Here C would be the winner in the Condorcet count, but this would not show because there would be a run-off (second round vote) between A and B. (In fact, this implies that according to the Condorcet
count the applied electoral system may not be an instance of a majority vote – cf. 1990 Constitution, art. 118-2. What counts as “majority vote” is itself not unambiguous.) Those who had voted for C (those in the right-most column) would now reveal that they preferred A to B and A would win the second and final round (assuming the same voters vote again in the second round). However, if one adherent of B (in the second column from the right), who prefers C to A, would vote strategically in the first round and cast a ballot for C instead of B in the first round, the run-off would then be between A and C, and C would win the second round instead of A if the same voters vote again (cf. Gilbert and Hatcher 2000: 13-14). This means that the Mozambican system is subject to the possibility of violation of the principle of independence of irrelevant alternatives (initially A was above C in the end result, but now this candidate ends below C, if the one strategic voter changes only the ordering between B and C).

For Mozambique the question now is whether people have ever voted strategically in first rounds in Mozambique, so as to influence the composition of a possible second round. There are no indications for this, given the electoral strength of Frelimo (even if less than 50% in the polls). The situation is only relevant concerning competition between Renamo and third party presidential candidates. It would be unwise for their adherents to vote strategically for Frelimo. Extra non-genuine votes for a Frelimo candidate in the first round only increase the possibility that Frelimo’s candidate wins immediately in the first round and other parties have no second chance whatsoever. So cases to consider are voters of one non-Frelimo party voting for the candidate of another non-Frelimo party. With Renamo consistently having been the largest opposition party, the only case to consider is third party adherents voting for the Renamo candidate in the first round. Comparison of results of presidential elections and elections for the National Assembly in 1994, 2004 and 2009 do not give great discrepancies (in 1994 and 2009 Dhlakama even had a smaller share in the votes than his party), so I see no reason to conclude that Mozambican voters have so far indicated non-genuine preferences in first rounds of presidential elections in significant numbers (assuming counting problems were not as severe as in 1999 – MPPB 2000a: 1; 2004; 2009a; cf. Appendix G below). Hence it is established that Mozambican electoral law is also in practice an instance of a “choice set” electoral method.

The main point here is not that Mozambique’s election law is in conflict with a condition of Arrow’s theory (the possible violation of the principle of irrelevant alternatives) but that it complies with Arrow’s choice set approach. Note that both variants C(S) and C(R_2) of choice sets do not incorporate any consideration external to the given preferences that voters submit in one or two rounds. This excludes, for example, approaches that try to balance the political influence of sections of the electorate across time.
APPENDIX D: VISIT TO RAIN RITUAL LOCATION; DESCRIPTION OF RAIN FEAST

Visit to rain ritual location

26 April 2010

At 06:00 in the morning we get to Régulo-to-be José Sabão to get to the Ntsuanda Mountain to visit the place of the rain rituals. I have brought with me five Knock Out whisky and gin bottles, two cigarette packages and a set of little Taiwanese cups. José Sabão says the Knock Out items cannot be used (and implicitly neither the others); it must be traditionally produced nipa. I pay MZN 50 for this. After I pack the items back in my backpack they are requested nevertheless, presumably for personal use. The nipa will be prepared at 09:00, and we will be ready to go at 10:00. Thus I get back home to return at that time.

We meet in the roofed kitchen. José Sabão’s mother Dona Julieta explains parts of the ritual. Usually a goat will be slaughtered for the meal after the rain ritual, but as it does not concern such a ritual now, this need not be done. I am asked for MZN 1. This one metical is placed on a stone next to a low tree trunk as presentation to the spirit. Marcelino says I can join with the allocution of the spirit that takes place there. So I sit down on the floor around the trunk with José Sabão, Dona Julieta and António. The first two do most of the allocution.

Then José Sabão, Marcelino, António, Alberto and I go to the mountain area over the asphalt road. We turn to the right at some point and pass a compound where José Sabão asks a woman to participate in the trip, who does not do that, however. At a small distance of the mountain we stop at one spot where we sit down and some bater palmas (clapping hands) is done. José Sabão pours some alcoholic substance on the floor out of a Knock Out bottle (not containing Knock Out but nipa). Then we pass some fields to get closer to the foot of the mountain itself, where we struggle through bush and eventually climb over some rock structures. We arrive at a rock floor facing two trees which form an opening that gives a view on another space where the actual ritual place is (all surrounded by bush). We take off our shoes and José Sabão puts on his ritual attire: white above and dark-blue down. We get to the other place (Marcelino does not follow) and José Sabão and António sit down to bater palmas. José Sabão does some allocutions, while Alberto and I sit a bit behind. After the allocutions José Sabão explains to me which animals live in or come at the trees (bees, cobra, lion). One should not go at night to the place because one will get killed by the animals (especially the lion). In the rock next to the trees some six or seven holes are visible. Sabão and António emptied these holes from rainwater after arriving at the site; during the rituals they will be filled with cabanga (“beer” – grain flour, bran, water + sugar – see “Rain rituals” in chapter 12) so that participants will drink this out of the holes. José Sabão physically mimics the drinking movements when explaining this to me right there (the existence of these movements in actual rain ritual visits to the mountain is later confirmed
We get back to the other side again and I get permission to take some photos. José Sabão requests to be photographed with the ritual attire at both sides of the site. We put on our shoes and walk further up the mountain (drinking the nipa along the way) where we cross some agricultural fields and stone quarry sites. Apparently there is a second ritual site to the east. We get down off the mountain and are lucky to get a lift in an open car back to bairro Sabão.

We rest at the compound of José Sabão. Alberto tells that actually there are not so many people who go there during the ritual. I had been thinking that all 150 or so participants in the beer-drinking would go to the mountain area. However, most people just stay in the village while the régulo and some others (only about 12 in total) go to perform the ceremony. When they return the beer-drinking will start on the régulo’s compound. The substance in the Knock Out bottle near the mountain was not Knock Out itself but nipa. This is so because the spirit does not like “Portuguese” things; therefore offerings must be traditional substance, such as nipa or cabanga. («Cabanga» is a word of Mozambican Portuguese that refers to a kind of beer made from flour of maize (or another grain), bran, water and sugar [Lopes, Sitoe and Nhamuende in Lindegaard 2009]. Ioanes CN also associated cabanga with a spiritual ceremony, namely the Makombe Day ceremony at Régulo Mpanze’s place.)

José Sabão and António return a bit after us. Together with them I go to the trunk where more bater palmas and allocutions are done (Dona Julieta is preparing the lunch). This ends the ritual part of the day. We circle around a table to wait for the lunch. Then the Knock Out whiskey and gin are being served in one of the Taiwanese cups I gave earlier this day.

Description of rain feast

To prepare for the grand gathering at the Régulo’s house, Sovria S informed, people sent by the Régulo (“his police”) go along houses in the neighbourhood to collect small amounts of sorghum (mahere). Anyone will give because they need water for their fields and the quantity of the contribution does not provide an obstacle. This mahere may be given in a ntani (basket) or on a plate. Collected sorghum is soaked for a day. This soaking is done by old people. The mafuhwe (dance at a chief’s place) is performed. Then the mahere is taken out of the water to let it germinate (the product of which is called “cimera”), after which it is pounded. From the next day it is cooked in a container for some days. The resulting product is doro (beer) or more specifically doro rakare (beer of the olden days, i.e. traditional beer). Sovria S helps with fetching water and firewood but she does not cook herself, watching other people doing it because, she said, people of her church (the Salmos [Psalms] David Church) do not participate in this part of the process. On the day proper of the matiriro, the select group goes to the mountain in the early morning while the larger group stays at the régulo’s place dancing mafuhwe (Sovria S; PSM). Pedzai SM, however, did participate in the ritual on the mountain, although he indicated he was a member of the Salmos David (de Zion) Church. Sovria S
stated the select group takes a flask of *doro* with them to the mountain, (she was not sure whether it is for drinking or not), but it seems more likely that *cabanga* is taken along. When the select group returns to the *régulo’s* place from the mountain, the gathered population starts drinking the greater part of the *doro*. Baltazar G and Érnia J [U] estimated the number of people *gathering* at the *régulo’s* place on a *matiriro* day greater than at the inauguration of the present *Régulo* Sabão (which was about 150); Sovria S said it was about the same number. Although not drinking the beer, Sovria S reported that she sings songs from her church with others at the event.
Portugal (1967: 17, 146) and Artur (1996: 16, 20, cf. 17) mention that the original Samanyanga, Civembe (~ Chivembe), migrated from Mbire (~ M’bire) with his elder brother Kabudu Kagoro (Cabudocagolo) or Chipapata, also known as Makombe. Portugal (1967: 146) goes on to link Civembe with descendants of the first half of the twentieth century with only a few generations in between (Figure 9 in main text), a historical depth also implied by Ioanes/Nyamukucu (Figure 10). (Consider that Nhamacocho ~ Nyamukucu and that the colonial investigator(s) probably mistook « Mbunze » for « M’Panze ».) The events described here below, like Artur’s (1996) data, suggest a historical depth of only a few generations. We may, however, be dealing with an instance of telescoping and the descriptions offered by my informants may then be remnants of very old material placed in more recent times. Ioanes CN held that Civembe was a son of Mutota. Another possibility, discussed below, is that we are (again) dealing with a conflation of Kabudu Kagoro and his son Hanga, combined with a telescoped genealogical relation with Mutota.

When I mentioned the Chibudu and Chipitura (~ Shupatora) of the literature to Sueta AC, he associated Samanyanga with them. There is no direct information to confirm this association. However, there are arguments in favour of it. Ambrósio DC made the intriguing suggestion that a chiefdom under the Sahatsiro family complex would have been established in the Chôa area under the auspices of Samanyanga. This would square better with Chipitura’s rule over West Barue (cf. Appendix B, § 9) than with the fate of Chibudu. “Makombe” and “Chivembe” would have to be understood as more distant relatives than “brothers”, assuming Hanga lies at the actual origin of the story rather than Chipapata/Kabudu Kagoro who is intended; a conflation I have remarked upon earlier. What supports this interpretation is that Pangaia in Artur (1996: 16) mentions that “Makombe” is associated with war and Samanyanga with avoidance of war. This fits in with Hanga’s and Chipitura’s stance vis-à-vis the Portuguese (cf. main text; see also Arnold in Bourne, Watt and Throup [eds.] 1995: 244). With the “Hanga” interpretation the Civembe/Samanyanga lineage started ruling the area during or after the war with De Sousa. Hanga is known to have entered Barue (after De Sousa’s arrest by the BSAC) from Rupire in present-day Zimbabwe (Newitt 1973: 330; Pélissier 1994 vol. 2: 72-73). Now Rupire is also known as “Bire” (Pélissier 1994 vol. 1: 487), the name of which resembles « Mbire », and the hypothesis that the names have been conflated might be contemplated. As for Chipitura, he is reported to have resided outside Barue as well (Isaacman 1976: 55; Arnold in Bourne, Watt and Throup ibid.). It must be admitted, however, that the event of Hanga and Chipitura entering Barue together as indicated (in this interpretation) by oral tradition is difficult to reconstruct. The name « Samanyanga » may have been a nickname or the real name of a descendant of Chipitura active during the Barue Revolt of 1917-1918, projected back onto his ancestor.

I shall now give a detailed version of a story about the first Samanyanga. Adjunct-régulo Luís Nhamugodzo Cruzamento Macossa confirmed that Makombe and Samanyanga came from Mbire.
They split at Tumbula. Samanyanga, or Civembe, was to stay around that area while Makombe would settle in Mbombona (different versions exist of this episode; Luís NCM’s narration will be given below.

In the story, Makombe and Civembe come together from Mbire in present-day Zimbabwe to Barue, and Makombe attempts to control all of the country. However, Civembe is controlling part of Barue and Makombe cannot get hold of Civembe due to a magic cloth belt that prevents Makombe and/or his soldiers to enter Civembe’s area because of the formation of clouds (mist). Makombe sends his wife to the wife of Civembe and the first tricks the latter into telling the secret of the magic cloth belt. Makombe’s wife then exchanges the magic cloth belt for one of her own. Makombe and/or his soldiers then are able to seize Civembe. As a punishment for Civembe’s intransigence towards Makombe, the latter cuts off one of Civembe’s fingers, but spares his life. Katsvaganyidze, the Kapsakanesi of Wieschhoff (see Appendix B, § 1), is mentioned by Luís NCS, but does not act in any significant way in the story, and his mentioning together with “Makombe” seems anachronistic. This seems to indicate a past importance of Katsvaganyidze, the exact nature of which is no longer articulated in contemporary Barue as the focus of memory is overwhelmingly on ”Makombe”, understood as Kabudu Kagoro.

Makombe and Samanyanga [were] family members; they came from Mbire, a country in [present-day] Zimbabwe, Mbire. Well then, as they went they separated at that mountain there at Tumbula. It was at the separation here [that] he was called our grandfather, of all of us here; Civembe is made here.

This grandfather Civembe was the one who came on the road, after which he stayed here; it was he who acted as the progenitor, who begot other children of [the] Samanyanga [family]. Well then, it was [so] that there existed Katsvaganyidze; Katsvaganyidze, and also the one called Makombe, he Makombe. They succeeded to enter [Barue, i.e. eastward] going up to Mbombona, opening a path there until they turned around to come here, to Catandica here [i.e. back westward].

Therefore they fought a war between them; he [unspecified, probably Civembe] stayed thus there right at Samanyanga’[s place]. Therefore they separated there from each other, so that this Makombe, by way of which he got the name of «Makombe», […] made a circuit around the country, because Samanyanga remained there. It’s where they separated from each other, […] this Makombe and this Samanyanga.

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261 This, of course, was Chipapata’s capital, not Hanga’s, see Appendix B, § 8.
Now the war that they waged amongst them, they did that because nothing got [there?] at Samanyanga’s, for he got his old magic; he knew about that. Up to now it is still there. Now that he [Makombe] stayed here in Catandica, in Catandica Town there, it is he who left from here, that elder one, going to where the younger one was, where he [however] did not arrive. They [Makombe and another/others] wanted to go to get hold on him [Civembe], for he was performing magic so that they would not succeed to arrive to take the entire country of Makombe.

Eventually they were not succeeding to get out [of the predicament]. They dealt with the problem through the good relationship between the women [spouses], ordering his [Makombe's] wife to go there so [as to see how] clouds formed there. In those times they [Civembe Samanyanga family] had a muceka [cloth belt]. That muceka was within the house; when they entered they had a conversation, the wife of the elder with the wife of the younger.

They talked like this: [Makombe’s wife speaking] “Well, what’s preventing [Makombe and his companion(s)] to come here at the compound, here in town [Samanyanga’s place]?” [Civembe’s wife responded:] “My husband has [a] muceka, he picked the muceka, [when] they saw them coming, he picked the muceka [and] mixed up the muceka, you see nothing but mist; really nothing is going to get here. […]”

She [Makombe’s wife] went on to take her own muceka, she also had a muceka […], she wanted to make it similar, in order to change it with this [first] muceka, […] [so she] went on taking the muceka, going there, giving it to her husband, [saying] that “what prevented you from arriving is that muceka”. He also did [something, unspecified] and saw [what to] do then to be chief [mambo]. [He said,] “Aah! Finally!”

[Makombe] ordered a soldier of his to pick the one [muceka] which was there at Samanyanga. [He] went there […]. Upon arrival there, he [Civembe] thought that when he would lift the muceka more would happen [i.e. the muceka would still be effective].

When he [Civembe] lifted that muceka, he saw that they [sic – Makombe and/or soldiers of his]
already there, while he saw that nothing more happened and that they had arrived to get hold of him [...], [but] as they were brothers [i.e. Makombe and Civembe] they were really not to kill him [Civembe].

They [Samanyanga family] were informed that it was really not possible to kill him. [They] took him, going with him to there, to this town [unspecified, Mbombona or Catandica] [...]. On arrival at that place, [he, probably Makombe said] that, “[you are] very annoying. Now, from today into the future, [because] I cut you a finger, you shall [go as] [...] ‘Mbimbicala’”. Until today he has gone around being called “Mbimbicala”.


APPENDIX F: TRANCE SESSION OF IOANES/NYAMUKUCU

2 August 2012

We are at the medium Ioanes CN’s place and the séance seems to go ahead. We sit in a separate *palhota* [roundhouse] waiting for the séance to happen. Joaquim and the *Réguulo* talk a lot. Then the *Réguulo* gets to the medium’s *palhota* to prepare for the séance. When Joaquim and I are eventually invited in we take off shoes and socks. The medium is already in trance. Inside the *palhota* it is half-dark and it is difficult to see the facial expression of the medium. The medium sits on a mat and wears a white cloth. I decide not to press for recording permission because it might disturb the séance itself. The spirit (Nyamukucu) talks first about the introduction of their [Portuguese] weapons in the area of Makombe and how Makombe was pleased to have these too. The name of Gouveia is mentioned, as is the episode of the gift of a daughter of Makombe to the Portuguese. Makombe exchanged ivory against cloth with the Portuguese. Then I start asking the spirit questions about the genealogy of Samanhanga. These questions are answered splendidly. About Kavunda/Chavunda he says that his spirit does not come out anymore. Nemhuru does not seem to be known; the spirit declares that this person was not of the Samanhanga area. When I ask whether the spirit considers the reign of the Samanhanga/Civembe family *mutendere* he answers that this has always been their area. Occasionally some rhythmic chirruping sounds, not to be heard in usual conversation, emerge from the medium’s mouth. At one spot the distinction between spirit and medium seems broken when the spirit rebukes me for bringing much work while I have him interviewed already. These earlier interviews were with the medium ICN, however, not the spirit. There is also the complaint of failure to compensate for the services. This is now resolved by handing over the prepared gift of the white cloth we brought from Catandica, plus a donation of MZN 500. These contributions have to be made into a somewhat flat bowl. Outside, Joaquim explains that the spirit spoke as if it was really the time right before the Portuguese colonization; the spirit thought that I was on a sort of espionage mission. We then leave for the *Réguulo*’s house. The spirit has demanded that Joaquim should come back in a few days (without me) to explain more about my mission. We arrange that Joaquim will get back alone Tuesday. We pay MZN 200 to a woman who is an aide of the medium (*mutete*), the fee to be prepaid for invoking the spirit.
APPENDIX G: UNCERTAINTIES IN THE 1999 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULT

In this appendix the uncertainties concerning the voting result of the 1999 presidential election are analysed, leading to the conclusion that it is not possible to determine positively that the officially announced result (Chissano won) represented the intention of the majority of the voters of that election. I shall start analysing the nulos (ballots declared invalid). As of 26 April 2013, the STAE website (<www.stae.org.mz>) did not give the results for the presidential election of 1999, but the IESE website (<www.iese.ac.mz>) does give results per district, making statistical analysis possible. Unfortunately a column containing 52,716 “revalidated votes” (votos validados), votes accepted that had been rejected earlier, is not split into votes for Dhlakama and Chissano, but nevertheless the data are revealing for statistical tendencies concerning the invalidation of votes. The IESE summary gives Chissano 2,314,165 votes (52.34%) and Dhlakama 2,107,222 votes (47.66%) countrywide, a difference of 206,943 votes, while Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin (MPPB – 2000a: 2) gives Chissano 2,338,333 (52.29%) and Dhlakama 2,133,655 (47.71%), a difference of 204,678, suggesting that MPPB’s 50,601 apparent total votes difference with IESE were 24,168 (47.76%) for Chissano and 26,433 (52.24%) for Dhlakama. Although on itself this is a not a very big advantage for Dhlakama, it does signal that there existed an arithmetically discernable bias against him in discarded votes. As for the statistical analysis below, it is exactly the situation before the validation of part of the discarded votes that reveal trends of how votes were dealt with. Thus the following is mostly based on the IESE data without the “revalidated votes”.

We can calculate the ratio between the nulos and the sum of the valid votes (válidos) and the nulos, ignoring the blank votes (brancos). This ratio, nulos/(válidos + nulos), can be set along the Y-axis of a scatter plot against the percentage of válidos for Dhlakama per district along the X-axis. Then we can let Excel draw first- and second-degree (polynomial) regression lines, as shown in Figure G-1:

262 Accessed 16 May 2012. IESE is the Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (Institute of Social and Economic Studies in Maputo). Note that the IESE figure for Chókwê “Votos na Urna” of « 120,540 » should be read as « 63,049 ».

263 Consider: 47.66% × 50,601 = 24,116; a difference with 26,433 of 2,317 countrywide. It is not clear why IESE’s data considering revalidated votes differ from MPPB (2000a: 6), which has higher numbers of revalidated votes and an eventual advantage for Dhlakama of 2,436.
It can be seen that there is a first-degree tendency for districts that have more válidos for Dhlakama to have more votes discarded as nulos. That would suggest that, on average, districts that vote more for Dhlakama suffer from some process of having their ballots discarded more often than districts that vote less for Dhlakama, and vice versa for Chissano (before correcting for additions of “revalidated” ballots). The information about “revalidated” votes above would suggest that it was Dhlakama who was adversely affected by such a process. The second-degree regression line, however, suggest a more subtle process; the share of nulos is generally greater in districts where Chissano and Dhlakama were closer. This suggests a pro-Chissano and anti-Dhlakama skewness in the discarding of votes which was less in districts where Chissano was already strong, while in districts with a strong Dhlakama support this candidate would suffer less from the bias against him. The question emerges whether such a trend could have been deliberate, a topic I shall return to below after dealing first more with statistics.

The data for blank votes (brancos) per voting district give an even starker effect than the data for the nulos, as becomes clear from Figure G-2:

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264 This polynomial is of the form: predicted ratio \( \text{nulos}/(\text{válidos} + \text{nulos}) = -0.055 \times ([\text{fraction válidos Dhlakama}] - 0.54)^2 + 0.047 \). Thus, the peak of the polynomial is in fact slightly to Dhlakama’s side of the 50% divide of the votes.
Again there may be distinguished a straight regression line and a second-degree polynomial, both showing a greater tilt than the corresponding graphs with the nulos, where districts that vote more for Dhlakama in the IESE data tend to suffer more from having brancos.

Since the dataset is not a sample from a larger population, it is not opportune to test any hypothesis for correlation coefficients concerning samples, but we may apply a statistical test for rank correlation. Consider nulos first. Taking the district with the least difference between Chissano and Dhlakama (difference in válidos, ignoring sign) as the first in rank (ascending order), and taking the district with the highest ratio of nulos/(válidos + nulos) as the first in rank (descending order), we can test for rank correlation between these orderings. Indeed this yields a statistically significant correlation as predicted. Since the overall tendency in the nulos is to be more frequent when Dhlakama has a greater share in the votes (the second-degree regression line still ends higher at the right than it starts at the left), there is on the basis of the data, together with the known result that more

\[ \text{This polynomial is of the form: predicted ratio} \ \frac{\text{brancos}}{\text{válidos} + \text{nulos} + \text{brancos}} = \]
\[ = -0.13 \times (\text{fraction válidos Dhlakama} - 0.59)^2 + 0.077. \]

\[ \text{Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient} \ r_S; \ cf. \ note \ 243 \ above. \]

\[ N = 146 \text{ voting districts, } \sum D_i^2 = 397,250, \ r_S = 0.234091, \ z = 2.81883, \ p < 0.0025 \text{ (one-tailed).} \]

\[ \text{Rank correlation (on district level) between Dhlakama’s results only and the incidence of nulos gives} \]
\[ \sum D_i^2 = 453,070, \ r_S = 0.126469, \ z = 1.522887, \ p < 0.07 \text{ (one-tailed).} \]

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Note: The regression equations and statistical tests are based on the data provided in the graph and the text, which includes the calculation of correlation coefficients and the testing of hypotheses for correlation. The data points are plotted on a scatter plot with linear and second-degree regression lines to illustrate the relationship between valid Dhlakama votes and the percentage of brancos. The graph shows a trend where districts with higher percentages of valid Dhlakama votes tend to have a higher percentage of brancos, indicating a correlation that can be statistically tested and analyzed for its significance.
actually revalidated *nulos* were for Dhlakama than for Chissano, no reason to reject the hypothesis that the discarding of these ballots was the result of counting processes biased against Dhlakama. In other words, the data suggest that counting processes biased against Dhlakama would be more capable of manifesting themselves in areas where Renamo had only moderate overweight, while on the other hand such biased processes apparently had less “hazard” to manifest themselves in areas where Chissano was already very strong. It is then likely that the *nulos* contained more votes intended for Dhlakama than would be expected from a projection of the official score for the *válidos* onto the *nulos.* The first- and second-degree effects are even starker for the blank votes (*brancos*), counted relative to the total number of votes reportedly encountered in ballot boxes (i.e. $brancos/(válidos + nulos + brancos)$), with an even stronger rank correlation.\(^{268}\) For both *nulos* and *brancos,* a similar effect is visible on province level for the difference scores between Chissano and Dhlakama.\(^{269}\)

We now need descriptive information on the counting and related subsequent processes concerning the 1999 presidential ballots. Issue 24 of *MPPB,* already referred to, does give revealing information. To begin with, counting at polling stations started at night while polling staff were already tired, leading to errors.

Ballots went into the wrong piles or people lost count. After midnight, the temptation to cut corners became overwhelming. […] [M]istakes were made […] Up to 20% of *editais* [polling station tally sheets] had errors, and this caused serious delays in the provincial and national counts. […] Where the totals [of *editais*] did not add up, the number of votes for president or parliamentary parties was normally taken as correct, and the number of blank votes adjusted to make the sums correct. (*MPPB* 2000a: 4)

In the graph of Figure G-2 I treated all reported *brancos* as genuine, i.e. actual ballot papers that were put into ballot boxes unaffected by the respective voters. From the quote it appears, however, that many of the *brancos* in the final official results may refer to ballots that did not physically exist at all and possibly also to ballots that were properly speaking *nulos* to be studied, or even unequivocally valid ballots that were not counted as such. Consequently, the incidence of *brancos* (more than the incidence of *nulos*) is an indicator for a higher chance of problems having occurred. Also, the comment by *MPPB* (2000a: 1) that “the excluded votes [i.e. *nulos*] could not have changed the

\(^{268}\) \(N = 146\) voting districts, \(\sum D_i^2 = 331,376, r_S = 0.361098, z = 4.348198, p < 0.0001\) (one-tailed). Rank correlation (on district level) between Dhlakama’s results only and the incidence of *brancos* gives \(\sum D_i^2 = 327,058, r_S = 0.369423, z = 4.448447, p < 0.0001\) (one-tailed).

\(^{269}\) \(N = 11\) voting provinces. For ascending absolute differences between *válidos* Chissano and Dhlakama, *nulos:* \(\sum D_i^2 = 92, r_S = 0.58;\) *brancos:* \(\sum D_i^2 = 88, r_S = 0.60.\) The normal \(z\) approximation is unfit here, but see Guilford (1956: 288, 549) to establish that with both, \(p < 0.05\) (one-tailed). The second-degree polynomial regression for the *brancos* across the provinces is of the form: predicted ratio $brancos/(válidos + nulos + brancos) = -0.21 \times ([fraction \ válidos\ Dhlakama] – 0.50)^2 + 0.071.$ On the provincial level Spearman’s rank correlation is not statistically significant for Dhlakama’s results only and the incidence of *brancos.*
outcome” is premature when only the officially reported nulos are taken into account and we do not know to what sorts of ballots the arithmetic about brancos refers. Overall the percentage of the 1999 presidential brancos (6.5% in the IESE data and MPPB 2000a: 2) was already high compared with 1994 (5.8% – MPPB 2000a: 2) and 2004 (2.9% of all ballots – <www.iese.ac.mz>, accessed 3 May 2013).

But this is not all. Not only individual ballots were rejected, but hundreds of entire editais (polling station tally sheets) did not make it into the final results because of problems.

The Supreme Court [...] cited “unexplained erasures and corrections” in some editais. In an interview in Notícias (10 January [2000]), Carrasco [STAE Director General] said “some editais show evidence that something happened outside the polling station, and that someone tried to change the results.”

For unexplained reasons, the Supreme Court did not initiate an analysis of the collection of 550 excluded presidential election editais (MPPB 2000a: 5). These quotes from the Supreme Court and STAE do indicate that foul play occurred concerning the editais. Also, Renamo in particular seems to have been victim of its own unassertiveness during the processing of the count:

In Tete the observers were allowed to watch the process of checking the incoming documentation by the provincial election commission, and they confirm that Renamo made no objections to any of the results submitted from Changara, even when there were obvious anomalies. (MPPB 2000d: 13)

The 24th issue of MPPB cites more problems, such as with computers (MPPB 2000c). Cahen (2009: 40n117) quotes an anonymous foreign observer (assesseur) “close to the CNE” who claimed there existed a computer that was able to duplicate results favourable for Frelimo (cf. Marc Tonnelaere [sic, probably de Tollenaere] in Cahen 2009: 40n121). It is difficult for the present author to judge this claim and the analysis here does not depend on any “duplications” for Frelimo.

Now in its review of the Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo) decisions about complaints made by Renamo concerning polling and counting problems, MPPB (2000b: 6) reports that the Supreme Court reasoned that excluded were 550 [presidential editais] and the irregularities really were irresolvable. Nevertheless, none had been protested by party agents in the polling stations. Taking the average turnout at other polling stations, the Tribunal estimates that at most 377,773 voters were excluded.

Then MPPB analyses:

The Tribunal does not do the rest of the calculation, but to win the presidency, Dhlakama would have needed 77% of those [377,773] votes, and he only did that well in Sofala province. An
estimate based on projecting official provincial results suggests that including rejected editais would lower Chissano’s percentage from 52.3% to 51.3%.

*MPPB* agrees that the editais would have been in Dhlakama’s advantage, but assumes that the rejected editais are statistically neutral relative to the accepted results. Manning (2002: 195) deems it “statistically unlikely” that the result for the presidency could have changed. (This probabilistic vision on winning the presidency is remarkable because the objective of the used counting procedure, in line with the Arrow theory on voting, was to give a *certain* outcome, not a “likely” one.) I have shown above that it is not necessarily the case that the rejection of individual ballots was statistically neutral, and by extension it does not have to be so with editais either. Moreover, *MPPB* compares the necessary 77% with results on province level. However, statistically the editais concern a very local level of sampling, where more extreme outcomes may be expected. For 1994 it was reported that “there were great variations, with individual polling stations voting totally differently from nearby ones” (Hanlon in EMS 1995: 27), and this may have applied to 1999 as well. Sofala was the sole province with more than 77% for Dhlakama, but already on district level the picture is more diverse: 19 voting districts (13% of all voting districts) had a share for Dhlakama equal to or greater than 77% in the IESE data, of which 10 outside Sofala (Manica, Niassa, Tete and Zambézia). If the excluded editais form a statistically non-neutral section of Mozambican voters’ intentions, official provincial results are not necessarily good predictors of Dhlakama’s share in those excluded editais. To use the accepted provincial results as predictors for the excluded editais is using as an argument what has to be proved, namely the share of Dhlakama in the totality of voters’ intentions. The excluded editais might, after all, change the provincial results should they be included after a review process.

Let us observe the scatter plot for provinces concerning the percentage of *brancos* as against the percentage valid votes for Dhlakama in the IESE data in Figure G-3:
We see that of the three provinces indicated by Renamo and De Brito (2008: 6n13) as having suffered specifically from the exclusion of *editais* (*MPPB* 2000b: 7) Sofala (SF) has a realized value of *brancos* more or less as predicted by the second-degree polynomial, but Nampula (NM) and Zambézia (ZM) have far more *brancos* than would be predicted by the second-degree polynomial, in the order of 1.8-1.9 percentage point. They are, apart from Cabo Delgado, the top scoring provinces concerning the incidence of *brancos*. This corroborates the hypothesis that there were serious problems with ballots and *editais* in those provinces. If Dhlakama would need 77.1% of 377.773 excluded voters (following *MPPB* on the difference needed, for the IESE difference the percentage would be only slightly higher, 77.4%), this might be distributed across Nampula, Zambézia and Sofala provinces (cf. De Brito n.d. 1 and 2008: 6n13; Manning 2002: 196) as follows. With the IESE data on inscribed electors, the relative weights amongst the three can be determined and the extra number of

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270 Cabo Delgado scores high on *brancos*, but it does not have more than average problems with *nulos*, while Nampula and Zambézia do, confirming the latter provinces’ problematic character.
voters allocated. Then 77.1% of the allocated voters per province can be added to Dhlakama and Chissano’s results in the three provinces, leading to new percentages for the two candidates for these provinces. For Dhlakama, these results are given in Table G-1:

Table G-1: Hypothetical allocation of excluded editais in Nampula, Zambézia and Sofala

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Weight (%)</th>
<th>Voters</th>
<th>77.1%</th>
<th>New Result</th>
<th>New Result (%)</th>
<th>Old Result (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nampula</td>
<td>42.0349</td>
<td>158,797</td>
<td>122,432</td>
<td>589,526</td>
<td>59.24</td>
<td>55.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambézia</td>
<td>40.5660</td>
<td>153,247</td>
<td>118,153</td>
<td>678,040</td>
<td>71.52</td>
<td>70.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sofala</td>
<td>17.3991</td>
<td>65,729</td>
<td>50.677</td>
<td>323,070</td>
<td>79.46</td>
<td>79.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>377,773</td>
<td>291,262</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The percentage for Dhlakama in Sofala hardly changes (here diminishing a bit because Sofala’s official result is above 77.1%), but one can also see that in the case of non-neutral elimination of 550 editais from the total count it is not necessary for the Nampula and Zambézia provinces to have 77% for Dhlakama. Keeping the 77.1% constant across three provinces, it is enough for Nampula to have its estimated percentage for Dhlakama corrected with 3.40 percentage points to 59.24% and for Zambézia 1.07 percentage point to 71.52%. Spreading of the 550 editais across more than three provinces would, of course, make the changes per province even less.

271 Naturally, should we adjust for say 10% unusable ballots (nulos and brancos) within the 377,773 votes, Dhlakama would need 80.1% plus two votes to reach the necessary difference with Chissano (still following MPPB on this difference). This, however, would hardly change the picture for the resulting Dhlakama percentages in the three provinces. On the other hand one might argue that in the counted brancos there is a higher vote for Dhlakama which is not accounted for, which would lower the percentage Dhlakama would need in the uncounted editais. Taking a threshold per district of 3.25% genuine brancos, any surplus branco might be weighted according to the scores of Dhlakama and Chissano respectively as in the accepted results (as indicated these may be skewed towards Chissano, but let us keep matters conservative here). This yields an extra advantage for Dhlakama of 21,281 votes. He would then need 183,398 votes difference in the rejected editais which he could obtain if he gets 77% of 90% of the votes in those editais (still taking a total of 377,773 ballots) with 10% unusable ballots.