SUMMARY

Introduction

Directing policy change is very much desired, yet very hard to achieve. Indeed, the vast majority of authors studying the policymaking process suggest that, except for marginal or incremental changes, the margins for policy change are rather small (Schneider et al. 1995; Ingram and Fraser 2006; Huitema and Meijerink 2009). At the same time, as evidenced by the (looming) economic, financial, food, and energy crises, water scarcity, and challenges related to safety and climate change, among other things, the need for policy change is unabated (Hanjra and Qureshi 2010; EUROSTAT 2011; Johnson and Jacobs 2012; World Economic Forum 2013). And even when we narrow our scope drastically, and solely focus on a relatively tiny aspect of a small prosperous European country, or more specifically, water management in the Netherlands, the challenges and need for policy changes are vast (Roth and Warner 2007; Huitema and Meijerink 2009; Kuks 2009; Van Leussen and Lulofs 2009).

This study focuses on the role of so-called policy entrepreneurs in policy change trajectories. Building on Kingdon’s (1984) and Mintrom’s (2000) conceptualisations, Chapter 1 of this study defines policy entrepreneurs as exceptional bureaucrats, who, just like their private counterparts, are constantly on the alert for new opportunities (for policy change) and have the capacity to “sell” and “market” new ideas. This does not, however, make everyone with new ideas or contributing to policy change a policy entrepreneur. What distinguishes policy entrepreneurs from other participants in the policymaking process is their above-average willingness to take risks, as well as their involvement throughout the entire policy change process. This study assumes that if there are individuals capable of directing policy change at all, it must be these actors. Interestingly, until relatively recently, the contribution of these individual agents in promoting policy change was largely neglected or underappreciated in the policy science literature. Only since the early 1980s have various political and policy scientists (for example, Cobb and Elder 1983; Kingdon 1984; King and Roberts 1987; Weissert 1991; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Schneider et al. 1995; Mintrom and Vergari 1996, 1998; Mintrom 1997, 2000; Huitema and Meijerink 2009, 2010; Taylor et al. 2011) directly or indirectly acknowledged room for these individual actors. Nonetheless, there remain important gaps in our knowledge on who these policy entrepreneurs are, and how act to achieve their goals. The purpose of this study is to give a face to the hitherto rather abstract and underappreciated figure of the policy entrepreneur, and even more importantly, to deepen our understanding of their strategic modus operandi. By doing
so, this study aims to contribute to a better understanding of the strategies that policy entrepreneurs employ in their efforts to change policy, as well as to examine when certain strategies are combined with what effect. To elucidate the modus operandi of policy entrepreneurs in pursuing policy change the following four research questions are formulated:

1. *How many policy entrepreneurs are there in local water management in the Netherlands and what are their profiles?*
2. *What strategies do policy entrepreneurs employ in their efforts to change policy?*
3. *Which conditions affect the policy entrepreneur’s selection of strategies?*
4. *Under what conditions and circumstances are which entrepreneurial policy change strategies most effective?*

**Theoretical embedding**

Chapter 2 of this study demonstrates that the four most influential explanations of policy change, i.e. the multiple-stream model of Kingdon (1984), the punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner and Jones 1991, 1993; Jones et al. 1998; Baumgartner et al. 2009), the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier 1988, 1998; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier et al. 2005; Sabatier and Weible 2007), and the network management approach (for example, of De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 1995, 2000, 2008), directly or indirectly, all make the point that there is room for individual actors to help stimulate or redirect debate about policy issues. This room for policy entrepreneurs is most evident in Kingdon’s (1984) stream model. According to him, policy entrepreneurs play an essential role in policymaking processes as they are responsible for the exploitation of windows of opportunity and for coupling solutions (policy stream) to problems (problem stream) and for coupling both problems and solutions to politics (political stream). Baumgartner and Jones (1993) in their punctuated equilibrium theory, also suggest that there is room for individual actors, especially related to the manipulation of policy images, i.e. the fashioning of new perceptions or frames of the issues at stake, and the shopping for institutional venues most favourable for realising policy change. The advocacy coalition framework of Sabatier (1988) and its ongoing refinements in conjunction with a number of co-authors (see, for example, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier et al. 2005; Sabatier and Weible 2007; Weible et al. 2011) also provides room for policy entrepreneurs, albeit indirectly. After all, to have effect, the endogenous and exogenous shocks – that the framework identifies as potential sources of policy change – need to be picked up, framed, and interpreted; activities typically belonging to the competences of policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom and Vergari 1996; Dudley and Richardson 1999; Nohrstedt 2011). Finally, and despite the fact that the focus on either a specific
individual or the network seems, at least at first sight, completely opposite to one another, I argue that even in the network approach (De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 1991, 1995, 2000, 2008) room for policy entrepreneurs is present. More precisely, I argue that an individual policy entrepreneur, at the same time, can very well be part of multiple intra- and inter-organisational networks, be part of the hierarchical structure of his organisation, and still maintain his identity as an individual.

To provide a theoretical answer to the second research question, this study, after an elaborate discussion of these four theories on policy change and the observation that they all provide room for policy entrepreneurs, systematically analyses what kind of strategies are actually present in these theories. This analysis is also carried out for the most prominent works on policy entrepreneurship itself, the other body of literature on which this study builds, namely Roberts and King (1991), Mintrom (1997, 2000), Huitema and Meijerink (2009) and Taylor et al. (2011). Based on this theoretical exploration, Chapter 2 presents a typology of ten logical and mutually distinguishable change strategies, whereby the use of each individual strategy can be considered as a hypothesis. These strategies can be grouped into four logical categories: (1) attention- and support-seeking strategies, to demonstrate the significance of a problem and to convince a wide range of participants about their preferred policy; (2) linking strategies, to link with other parties in coalitions, projects, ideas, and policy games; (3) relational management strategies, to manage the relational factor in policy change trajectories; and, finally, (4) arena strategies, to influence the time and place in which policy entrepreneurs act. All ten of these theoretically derived strategies are extensively discussed in Chapter 6-9.

A unique and large-scale design

The environment informing this study, i.e. the water management system in the Netherlands, and an elaborate explanation of its research design are presented in the third and the fourth chapter, respectively. It is debated that both the history of the Netherlands and its culture are very much tied up with water management. In addition, the organisation of the Netherlands’ current water management system, and especially the importance and role of its water boards, is extensively discussed. In addition, the nature and magnitude of the problems facing Dutch water managers are considered; an (expected) rising sea level and more extreme river discharges, the continuous subsidence of soil, and the ever-increasing demands on space for housing, industry, infrastructure, and agriculture have the effect that water management projects no longer only require technical solutions, but also complex spatial solutions (Van der Brugge et al. 2005; Roth and Warner 2007; Van Leussen and Lulofs 2009). At the same time, and partly in connection with this, for the realisations of their goals, water
managers increasingly need the support from a wide range of organisations, policy programs, and policy domains. In short, the problems and challenges Dutch water managers are facing become ever more complex (Van der Brugge et al. 2005). This makes Dutch water management an excellent case for studying the modus operandi of policy entrepreneurs. The fourth chapter of this study elaborates on the (rationale behind the) research design of this empirical study, a description that proceeds chronologically. The first phase of this research consisted of ten marathon interviews and a focus group with a limited number of policy entrepreneurs. The purpose of this highly open and explorative phase was to learn about the actual strategic actions employed by policy entrepreneurs, as well as to elicit their thoughts, opinions, and experiences concerning possible related strategic choices and dilemmas. The middle phase of this research had a quantitative and large-scale character and consisted of an online questionnaire, sent to all water policy entrepreneurs at local governmental bodies in the Netherlands (census). At this point, it becomes clear how much this study diverts from its predecessors (see among others, Schneider et al. 1995; Mintrom 1997, 2000; Huitema and Meijerink 2009, 2010; Taylor et al. 2011). Whereas most studies on policy entrepreneurs primarily seek to explain certain changes in policy or transitions, and look at the role of individuals in them, in this study the actual unit of analysis is the individual policy entrepreneur himself. In addition, this is the first study involving such a large number of policy entrepreneurs. In total, 239 policy entrepreneurs filled out the questionnaire, a response rate of 70.5%. The last phase of this study again had an in-depth and qualitative character, and encompassed a large set of additional individual interviews with 50 randomly selected policy entrepreneurs from a group of 133 policy entrepreneurs (55.6%) that answered positively on the survey question whether they would be willing to collaborate for further research. The key purpose of this last research phase was to gain a deeper understanding of the survey results, and more importantly, to acquire a deeper knowledge of the contextual effectiveness of the different entrepreneurial policy change strategies.

Policy entrepreneurs

To identify all, to the outside world, mostly invisible remaining policy entrepreneurs in Dutch local water management, this study, prior to the large-scale survey, contacted by phone all 491 Dutch local governmental bodies working with water: 443 municipalities; 12 provinces; 26 water boards; and 10 regional services of RWS.\(^{143}\) Depending on the type and size of the organisation, either the city manager (in municipalities with fewer

\(^{143}\) The identification of policy entrepreneurs took place at the end of 2008. Since that time, due to a number of divisions and mergers, both the number of water boards and municipalities has decreased.
than 20,000 inhabitants) or the head of the department concerned with water management was contacted. In sum, nearly 500 key informants (with a response rate of 95.3%) were contacted and asked if they could identify one or more individuals matching the above described criteria among their water management officials. Different from expectations, based on the heroic biographies and case studies (see, for example Kanter 1983; Doig and Hargrove 1987), and opposed to the widespread idea of a cumbersome and heavily bureaucratic government, this study's Chapter 5 establishes that entrepreneurship at the local level is, in fact, relatively common (hitherto only one other study, namely Schneider et al. 1995, which was carried out in the U.S., concluded the same). In absolute numbers, this study identifies 339 policy entrepreneurs: at least one in more than half of all involved organisations. Although policy entrepreneurs can be found amongst all four governmental organisations involved, their occurrence is not equally distributed. Relatively most policy entrepreneurs were identified within relatively large and high-level organisations. In addition, this study shows that policy entrepreneurship is not bounded to certain places or hierarchical positions within organisations; rather, it is shown that policy entrepreneurs are involved in a great variety of innovative projects, ranging from (integrated) water management, to sewage, and to spatial planning, and their formal positions vary from policy officer to project leader, and to department head. Their actual role, however, displays a much more coherent picture: policy entrepreneurs repeatedly described themselves as a spider in the web, a lobbyist, and an initiator.

The overwhelming majority (89%) of all Dutch water policy entrepreneurs are male and between 36 and 55 years old (67%). Policy entrepreneurs, almost without exception, are highly educated (about half of them have a university degree) and have a rather technical disciplinary background, such as engineering (53%), agricultural engineering (22%), hydrology or physical geography (11%). Accordingly, the ‘typical’ entrepreneur is male, works as a senior policy officer in the sector of (integrated) water management, has a degree in engineering, and is between 36 and 55 years old.

144 To counteract a potential positive bias, in this selection procedure it was always communicated that the presence of a policy entrepreneur is by no means self-evident, and more importantly, that their possible presence or absence would never be published on an organisational level. Moreover, to enhance the reliability of the identification process, the questionnaire included several control questions to assess if the identified policy entrepreneurs really proved to be policy entrepreneurs.

145 For instance, this study establishes that in 73.9% of the biggest municipalities (>100,000 inhabitants) at least one policy entrepreneur is present, whereas in municipalities with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants, the same figure is only 40.4%.
Policy change strategies
The attention- and support-seeking-, linking-, relational management-, and arena strategies are extensively discussed in Chapters 6-9. In each of these chapters new in-depth empirical data are presented as to better understand whether the theoretically derived strategies are used in practice (2nd research question), and if so, on what grounds they are selected (3rd research question), and under what circumstances these strategies are effective (4rd research question). In attempting to answer this last research question, all these chapters start with a theoretical exploration on the effectiveness of the strategy in question. In these discussions, insights from both the policy science literature and associated literature, including the project management literature, political science literature, and the network management literature are considered.

Chapter 6 presents evidence that policy entrepreneurs make use of three different attention- and support-seeking strategies: the demonstration strategy, the strategy of rhetorical persuasion, and the related strategy of the exploitation of focusing events, all in their unique way allowing policy entrepreneurs to demonstrate the significance of specific problems, and ultimately to acquire support for their preferred policy change ideas. Especially in situations in which trust is fragile, or where support for specific projects is low, it can be effective to first focus on relatively easy-to-tackle sub-projects so as to demonstrate the value and feasibility of the overall project (Imperial 2005). Policy entrepreneurs not only make efforts to 'sell' solutions (read: their preferred ideas), but spend at least as much time gaining attention for the problems that their solutions are supposed to be addressing. This study suggests that, by making use of the demonstration strategy (among others, based on Roberts and King 1991; Sabatier 1998; Mintrom 2000; Taylor et al. 2011), policy entrepreneurs work hard to buttress claims on certain problems, and subsequently or even simultaneously, convince others of the value of their idea for policy change by showing that it offers the most appropriate solution for the very same problem. To realise such a coupling (correlation) between problems and solutions, policy entrepreneurs not only use the demonstration strategy, but also the strategy of rhetorical persuasion (among others, based on Roberts and King 1991; Schneider et al. 1995; Huitema and Meijerink 2009, 2010; Taylor et al. 2011). By exercising this last mentioned strategy, policy entrepreneurs try to get support for their preferred policy innovation through argumentation and playing with language. For instance, this study shows that policy entrepreneurs are skilled in emphasizing or downplaying specific elements of both problems and policy ideas and the framing of issues differently, depending on the positions and preoccupations of the specific audience. The use of rhetorical persuasion is effective throughout all stages of the policymaking process, and especially so when ideas ought to be sold and coalitions need
be formed. The third attention- and support-seeking strategy that policy entrepreneurs use, albeit to a lesser extent, is the strategy of the exploitation of focusing events (among others, based on Kingdon 1984; Sabatier 1988; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Birkland 1998; Albright 2011). In short, this strategy relates to efforts of getting attention for specific problems through the utilisation of relatively short-lived, mostly sudden, unexpected, and harmful events. The effectiveness of this strategy is more context-dependent than all other entrepreneurial policy change strategies. Indeed, this study establishes that the use of this strategy is regarded effective only after the occurrence of an actual safety disaster or calamity, an exceptional occurrence in the context of Dutch water management. A related and more abstract conclusion of this study is that all entrepreneurial strategies are indeed context-dependent (put forward before by various studies, including Fisher et al. 1983; Scharpf 1997; Mintrom 2000; Taylor et al. 2011), though not all to the same extent. Unlike most other studies, however, this study does not stop with this rather generic observation, but instead, for each individual strategy, aims to better understand when and under which conditions it is most effective.

Chapter 7 demonstrates that policy entrepreneurs, besides the three attention- and support-seeking strategies, also use various linking strategies. Given that policy entrepreneurs can hardly accomplish their objectives in isolation, they mostly try to realise their plans and ideas in collaboration with others, making use of the coalition building strategy (among others, based on Sabatier et al. 2005; De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2000, 2008; Mintrom 2000; Huitema and Meijerink 2009, 2010; Taylor et al. 2011). The strategic challenge turns out to be not so much deciding whether or not to build a coalition, but rather determining the most effective size and composition of the coalition. Given that both a too narrow and a too broad coalition can cause delays and thus frustrate processes of policy change, for each individual project, policy entrepreneurs very carefully weigh the pros and cons and search for the right balance or optimum. Policy entrepreneurs certainly do not always aim for the broadest coalition; where it concerns proposals for radical policy change, projects whereby confidentiality is essential, or when there is very little time for the project realisation, broad coalitions should be even avoided. In addition, this study provides conclusive empirical evidence that in their efforts to direct change, they not only link actors in coalitions, but also make use of the strategy of issue linking, entailing both the linking of dimensions to a problem and the combination of two or more solutions (among others, based on Kingdon 1984; Sabatier et al. 2005; Sabatier and Weible 2007; De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2000, 2008). Policy entrepreneurs use this strategy both to facilitate processes (to develop and select solutions that are satisfying for all relevant coalition partners) as well as for substantive reasons (to enrich/realise better solutions). Once more, the key effectiveness question of this strategy is about finding the optimal level,
i.e., is a balancing act between realising optimal added value while simultaneously minimising delay, needless added complexity, and costs, whereby one has to take into account that the non-recognition of the actual complexity can also lead to serious risks in terms of delay, conflict, and stagnation. This study establishes that the linking between problems and solutions should be prevented when this implies collaboration with partners with highly diverging interests, at the very start as well as the final phase of a project, or – once again – when (due to the threat of a disaster) there is very little time for the realisation of a project. The third linking strategy policy that entrepreneurs use is the strategy of game linking, a strategy whereby, in order to acquire the necessary support, concessions are made to parallel or future projects (among others, based on Kingdon 1984; De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2000, 2008; Sabatier et al. 2005; Sabatier and Weible 2007). The use of this strategy – even more clearly than is the case for the other strategies – is generally not an end in itself, but rather a means. An inductive analysis of the research data shows that it is possible to differentiate between ‘parallel game linking’, whereby an actor makes sacrifices on some issues in project A, in order to gain more on project B taking place at the same time, and ‘game linking in time’ whereby one gives ‘something’ away in project A, aiming to get ‘something’ back in project B taking place in the future. The use of the game linking strategy can be especially effective when essential coalitions cannot be created without some form of compensation and issue linking is unfeasible and/or undesirable. The use of this strategy is, however, advised against when this implies interaction with partners that are not well trusted.

Furthermore, this study establishes that the overall success of policy change trajectories greatly depends on the relational aspect. Accordingly, policy entrepreneurs make substantial efforts in this area. This is an important insight, and an confirmation that policy entrepreneurs, despite the fact that they are the masters of strategic playing par excellence and certainly do not correspond to the stereotype of the neutral bureaucrat, characterised by routine behaviours, lack of initiative, and risk avoidance should not be seen as masters of ruse, guile, and nasty tricks. Chapter 8 describes how policy entrepreneurs, in order to create and foster good relations, primarily use two relational management strategies: the strategy of networking (among others, based on Roberts and King 1991; De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2000; Mintrom 2000; Huitema and Meijerink 2010; Taylor et al. 2011) and the strategy of trust building (among others, based on Schneider et al. 1995; De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2000, 2008; Taylor et al. 2011). Policy entrepreneurs invest much time in networking with all sorts of actors, but especially with bureaucrats from the different governmental bodies, members of water boards in particular. Policy entrepreneurs, however, consider networking with the ‘home’ organisation the most important networking relationship. However, networking with national bureaucrats, national politicians, and non-governmental organisations is
considered relatively less important. Networking is not only essential for building and maintaining good relations, but also for obtaining knowledge and a better understanding in the preferences, plans, resources, and worries of the other participants. For policy entrepreneurs, this knowledge is of crucial importance for discovering new ideas and linking opportunities, and to the progress of their overall strategic game. Trust is also an important prerequisite for policy change; this study shows that the use of the trust-building strategy is effective throughout the entire policy change process: in advance of a project (as to acquire attention and support, and to make collaboration possible), throughout the project (without trust and communication progress is hardly possible), and afterwards (the relational outcomes are important for parallel and future games). The building of trust is of vital importance, both within and outside the internal organisation. An important related conclusion of this study is that policy entrepreneurs not only play a strategic game externally as to find support for their policy ideas, but that for policy change processes to succeed, the internal strategic game is at least as vital (Soeterbroek 1998; Westley 2002).

Last but not least, this study’s Chapter 9 shows that policy entrepreneurs also strategically play with the arena wherein policymaking processes take place, referring to both the locus and time. The search for the most promising venue or locus where policy entrepreneurs can affect policy change, i.e. the use of the strategy of venue shopping (among others, based on Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Richardson 2000; Pralle 2003) proves important in this respect. An interesting finding of the current study is that if policy entrepreneurs search for alternative existing venues at all, they generally do so as a last resort, and only in circumstances in which there is very little support for their ideas; in general they consider it more effective to respect the established procedures and not to risk their relations with their regular partners. When, as a result of venue shopping, there is a threat that important relations worsen, this form of venue shopping should even be prevented. Then again, this study shows that policy entrepreneurs are active in the creation of all sorts of new venues, including project-based organisations, task forces, advisory committees, and sounding boards (Huijtema and Meijerink 2009, 2010). The creation of new venues is particularly effective in relation to relatively large-scale projects that involve relatively broad coalitions. The second arena strategy, that of timing, is about affecting the time-pressure in policymaking processes (among others, based on Koppenjan 1993; Soeterbroek 1998; De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 2000, 2008). Policy entrepreneurs are constantly on the lookout for opportunities for change, and well aware that timing is crucial in this respect. In anticipating such opportunities, including upcoming elections and the arrival of new executives, policy entrepreneurs make deliberate efforts to both slow down and speed up policymaking processes. However, an important conclusion of this study is that timing does not only function in terms of affecting the time-pressure.
Indeed, when conceptualising the strategy of timing as selecting the best moments for strategic action in order to achieve desired outcomes, this study establishes that timing plays a critical role in the overall strategic process and is important for all entrepreneurial policy change strategies, and accordingly not only functions as an independent strategy, but also can be seen as an overarching strategy or as a meta-strategy. Even though the importance of time and timing is cited in various studies (see, for example, Roberts and King 1991; Schneider et al. 1995; Mintrom and Vergari 1996, 1998; Mintrom 1997, 2000; Huitema and Meijerink 2009, 2010; Taylor 2008; Taylor et al. 2011), the insight, recognition and demonstration that timing functions both as independent and as an overarching strategy or meta-strategy is new. As with the timing strategy the use of the last theoretically derived strategy has also been established, and no indications have been found for the use of additional strategies, an important conclusion is that this study's typology consisting of the ten theoretically derived change strategies described above is both complete and robust, and with this, deviating from (attempts at) typologies in preceding studies (see, for example, Roberts and King 1991; Mintrom 2000; Huitema and Meijerink 2009, 2010; Taylor et al. 2011).

Strategy selection

The policy entrepreneurs’ selection of strategies importantly relates to the context, that is, the set of circumstances and facts that surround policymaking processes. This study shows that three contextual conditions are of particular importance: the policy proposal, the network environment, and the policy entrepreneurs’ organisation. As regards the policy proposal, this study suggests that especially the (desired) scope or interconnectedness of a project – and with that the extent to which the project success is dependent on others’ resources, support, and/or regulatory capacity – is important. Also, the available time to implement particular policy proposals or projects affects strategic behaviour of policy entrepreneurs (Roberts 1992). The substance and the desired confidentiality are relatively less important. A most striking conclusion, at least concerning the influence of the network environment on the selection of strategies, is the importance of the position of relevant actors (ranging from support to fierce resistance) as well as the relation between coalition partners (Fisher et al. 1983; Scharpf 1997; McCown 2004). This study establishes and explicitly acknowledges that not only the position of current coalition partners is important, but that also the stance of potential future coalition partners explains, to some degree, the strategic behaviour of policy entrepreneurs. In line with this, the present research found that the strategic behaviour of policy entrepreneurs, and thus their strategy selection, is not only determined by substantial elements of the desired outcome (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). They rarely focus on solely one project, but generally are constantly on the lookout for new opportunities for policy change. Apart from the policy proposal and the
network environment, this study suggests that the position of their superiors, and the specific preference of the executive assembly in particular, also determines the strategic modus operandi of policy entrepreneurs (Snare 1995). This reminds us of the fact that policy entrepreneurs, despite their talent and outstanding role, at the end of the day also remain public servants dependent on the decisions of their political masters. Finally, and however much policy entrepreneurs are aware of the importance of these contextual conditions, it is important to note that they should not be considered as fully rational actors that, on the basis of accurate observation and a perfect information processing capacity, are perfectly able to always respond to all risks and opportunities by selecting the strategies that will maximise their expected total utility (Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Scharpf 1997; Mintrom 2000; Pralle 2003). Policy entrepreneurs have pre-existing preferences for certain strategic behaviour, manifested, for instance, in an intrinsic strategic orientation towards strategic dilemmas (Scharpf 1997; Pralle 2003). This personal inclination is the fourth variable that determines the policy entrepreneurs’ strategic behaviour. At the same time, however, this study provided extensive evidence that policy entrepreneurs are able to depart from their intrinsic orientation and to adapt their strategic behaviour to the context when, in their view, the context requires them to do so.

Magic key within reach?

This research shows that policy entrepreneurs do not employ the foregoing ten strategies in a chronological order, nor exclusively in specific phases. Instead, this study found that they frequently use various strategies from the same category concurrently, such as the use of the demonstration strategy in combination with the use of rhetorical persuasion, or coalition building in combination with either issue linking or game linking. An even more interesting insight is that policy entrepreneurs simultaneously employ attention- and support-seeking strategies, linking strategies, relational management strategies, and arena strategies. When using Westley’s (2002) conceptualisation and visualising each category as a juggling ball, the conclusion would be that, in order to be effective, policy entrepreneurs must constantly juggle all of the balls, and cannot neglect or drop a single one. Accordingly, Chapter 10 concludes that effective strategic behaviour is not so much about detecting the one single ‘most effective strategy’, but rather about establishing the most effective strategy mix. This study suggests that by an effective use of the various strategies, policy entrepreneurs are, to some degree, but much more than is suggested in most prevailing theories (see among others, Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Sabatier 1988; De Bruijn and Ten Heuvelhof 1995, 2000, 2008), capable of directing policy change. In this connection I do not claim that policy entrepreneurs individually can fully control policy change processes, yet I do argue that policy entrepreneurs can make a difference, and
for this reason, can rightfully be considered as mindful and proactive orchestrators of policy change processes.

On the basis of this fairly optimistic conclusion, one may ask whether the magic key to effectiveness is within reach. Apart from the difficulty that the context in which policy entrepreneurs operate is highly dynamic and surrounded with uncertainty (Klijn et al. 1995; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004), and connected with that, the issue that effectiveness in the short term might be different from effectiveness in the long term (Bovens et al. 2001), the strategic dilemmas that this study has uncovered suggest that this is undoubtedly not the case. If there is one lesson to be learned for this study, it is the fact that strategic behaviour is far from straightforward or unproblematic. However, this study does offer some important ingredients that can generate awareness and insights leading to new directions of how to confront strategic choices and dilemmas. Nonetheless, no easy answers and step-by-step plans are provided; the importance of the contextual circumstances is simply too big. A denial of this importance would not only pass over the influence of the contextual conditions, but also mean a direct underestimation of the qualities of policy entrepreneurs.