Divergent framing: The public debate on migration in the Dutch parliament and media, 1995-2004

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CONNY ROGGEBAND and RENS VLIEGENTHART

In this article we reconstruct how the issues of migration and integration have been framed in the Dutch public debate over the last decade. We examine the patterns in both the parliamentary arena and the media and look at similarities and differences between them. On the basis of two contradictory theories, we formulate hypotheses about overlap and differences between the two arenas and diversity within them. Our results reveal incongruence in framing between them. After 9/11, however, the framing in which Islam is perceived as a threat to Western society becomes dominant in both arenas. Furthermore, we do not find any proof of the idea that the media act as a civic forum, with a high diversity of framing. Framing in parliament, instead, is far more diverse. In contrast to the hegemonic framing in the media, the Islam-as-threat frame is actively contested in the political realm.

In 1991, Dutch politician Frits Bolkenstein caused controversy through his claims about the negative impact of immigrants on Dutch society. The Conservative leader emphasised the incompatibility between Islamic and Western values and argued for stronger policies to pressure immigrants to integrate into Dutch society and accept its norms and values (de Volkskrant, 12 September 1991). Bolkenstein’s statements caused some shock since until then such views had been exclusively associated with the radical right. It was also the first time that a leader of a major political party criticised what was widely regarded as a successful policy approach.

Now, 15 years later, Bolkenstein’s views have become part of the Dutch mainstream. Many politicians, both right and left wing, have publicly declared that Dutch integration policies have failed and that urgent policy change is therefore required. The ideal of multiculturalism as a policy goal appears to have been abandoned, and the multicultural society is perceived as a failure (Entzinger 2003; see also van der Leun 2006). Moreover, this negative vision is accompanied by a shift in public opinion on migrants. As a recent survey has
revealed, Islam is increasingly perceived as a threat to Dutch values (survey *de Volkskrant*, June 2004). These changes in the public discourse are not unique to the Netherlands. The last decade could be labelled a ‘decade of change’ (Luedtke 2005) in relation to immigration and integration issues. Across Europe a retreat of multiculturalism and a turn to civic integration is visible (Joppke 2004; Kofman 2005). In the past few years more pressure has been put on immigrants to conform and integrate. This in particular affects the Muslim population, which after 9/11 and other events, is viewed as a group reluctant to integrate and accept national values (Modood 2003).

In the Netherlands a number of recent events, like the rise of right-wing politician Pim Fortuyn, the provocative claims of MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and the murder of film director Theo van Gogh, sparked off an active debate about the integration of minorities (Buruma 2006). Opinion makers and politicians appear to agree that a dramatic change in the public debate has occurred, but no research has yet been undertaken to trace exactly when and how this change happened. We will try to fill this lacuna by reconstructing how the issues of migration and integration have been framed in the public debate over the last decade.

Public debate is carried out in different forums: in the mass media, in parliament, in public gatherings, in the streets and other places. We focus here on the two most central forums: the political arena and the media arena. Within these arenas, the different actors involved articulate particular ways of understanding issues. They define not only what issues and problems need our attention, but also how we should look at them. The question as to whether framing in the two arenas largely overlaps or differs is central in this paper. Here we look at whether a similar shift or reversal occurred in both arenas. Furthermore, we compare more substantial characteristics of the debate in the arenas, in terms of diversity and consistency. From different views on the relation between media and politics, we derive contradictory hypotheses about the correlation between media framing and parliamentary framing, about the diversity of the framing in both arenas and about the congruence of ideologically different newspapers, and use our data to test these hypotheses both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The outline of the analysis is as follows. We start with a theoretical discussion about the framing characteristics of, and possible relationships between, the two arenas. Second, we introduce our methods and data sets. Third, we reconstruct the frames on migration and integration presented in the political and media arenas between 1995 and 2005. Finally, we discuss our findings on the differences and similarities between the two debates and examine possible explanations for these outcomes.

**Media and Policy Framing**

In our analysis, we compare how the integration of minorities is framed in the political and in the media arenas. The relationship between the two is a
much-debated issue in the social sciences. In another article (Vliegenthart and Roggeband 2007), we have demonstrated that a mutual influence between framing in the media and in the political arena exists, but that this influence is rather weak and dependent upon previous use of a frame: an increase in the use of a frame in one arena leads to an increase in the other arena only if this frame has already been used regularly in that arena before. In this article, we look in more depth at the nature of the differences and similarities between the two arenas and try to explain these differences and similarities. Additionally, we look at framing changes over time in both arenas and what can account for these changes.

One of the main questions when discussing the relationship between the media and politics is a normative one: to what extent the media should reflect the political debate in a democratic society (e.g. Gunther and Mughan 2000). Drawing upon Schumpeterian notions of democracy and closely associated with the Habermas’ ideal notion of the public sphere, political scientist Norris (2000) promotes the idea of media as a civic forum. The media should allow for pluralistic competition among parties and individuals for all positions in power. This specific conception of the role of the media leads to the requirement of availability and balance of the news in terms of both the amount of coverage of issues and the way these issues are covered. This diversity can be reached in different ways, either by treating external diversity between various media outlets that have strong political leanings or internal diversity, in which case the outlet does not take a stance, but presents multiple and contrasting perspectives on a certain issue. Norris presents a sequential model of political communication in which a source communicates its message to the public through a channel (the media). The media act as instrumental intermediaries between politics and public, and media content, in its relationship to politics, is viewed as information. Though her theory of the media as a civic forum is largely informed by normative notions, in her empirical cases Norris finds considerable evidence for this view.

A contrasting vision is presented by Meyer (2002), who focuses rather on the media as an active political player. Meyer (2002: 108) argues that ‘the media diminish the opportunities that civil society might have to exert influence on political inputs’. Politics and media are two separate realms with different logics. The media logic, according to Meyer, is contained in two filters. The first involves the selection of the news (what counts as newsworthy) and the second the presentation (the means to trigger the audience). As a result of the logic of the media, politics is increasingly ‘colonised’ by the media. According to Meyer (2002: 57), ‘politics becomes dependent on the media’s rules, but without completely losing its separate identity’. Koopmans (2004) advances a similar idea and focuses on the selection mechanisms of the media. Contrary to Meyer, Koopmans does not focus on the media as player, but rather sees the media as a bounded space for political communication. The available communication space is limited,
while the number of potential actors that want to occupy this space is disproportionately high. It is not only formal political actors such as governments and political parties that insert messages in the public sphere; a large number of other speakers such as interest groups, social movements and opinion makers also try to get their messages across. This results in a high level of competition between actors. The selection mechanisms that media use, according to Koopmans, are similar to Meyer’s filters: novelty, prominence and prestige of speaker, level of conflict and possibilities for dramatisation. These filters, according to Koopmans et al. (2005: 262), do not vary greatly within a country: ‘news values (e.g. which actors are considered prominent and which issues relevant) are strongly affected by the institutional and discursive opportunity structures in a country on a given issue’. Newspapers, however, express their views and make their own contribution to political agenda-setting and opinion formation through their editorials (Koopmans et al. 2005).

Hypotheses

From these competing theoretical approaches to the relationship between the political arena and the media arena, we can deduce different expectations about the relationship between parliamentary framing and media framing of the issue of the integration of minorities.

Norris’ idea of media as civic forum informs the following three hypotheses:

1. Media reflect pluralist framing in the political realm and we expect a considerable overlap between parliamentary framing and media framing of the issue.
2. The difference between framing in the two arenas is constituted of more diverse media framing because, as a civic forum, it provides space for other actors with diverging views on the issue.
3. In view of the differences in political leaning of the different newspapers, we will find some external diversity and differences between the various newspapers in the framing of the issue according to their political position, with more right-wing newspapers framing the issue more in accordance with right-wing politicians’ framing of the issue, whereas more left-wing newspapers will frame the issue more in the way left-wing parties frame the issue.

Meyer and Koopmans’ idea that the media act as filters or selectors informs our next three hypotheses:

4. Politics and the media are two separate spheres, each with its own logic, and will therefore significantly differ in their framing of the issue. The media will present the issue more in terms of frames that have
newsworthy characteristics (e.g. conflict and dramatisation), whereas in the political arena, where decisions about ‘what needs to be done’ have to be made, frames with an emphasis on policy will be used.

5. Because media framing is characterised by more competition due to a larger number of competing actors and limited space, only frames that resonate and are used by a wide variety of actors will be covered in the media. This results in less variety in media framing compared to parliamentary framing.

6. In view of the active function of the media as political actors (Meyer) and the freedom of the media to come up with their own position in political issues, we expect considerable variation between newspapers. We expect that variation between newspapers is greater than internal diversity and that dominant framing in the different newspapers does not necessarily coincide with the framing of political parties that have a similar leaning.

Data

Our research findings are based on two datasets, one consisting of parliamentary data and the other of media data. These are gathered through both qualitative and computer-assisted quantitative content analysis.

For the reconstruction of the political debate, we analysed all documents presented to and discussed in parliament between January 1995 and the end of 2004. In this period, four different coalitions governed. From 1995 to 1998 the first ‘Purple’ cabinet took office, consisting of the socialist party (PvdA), the liberal-right party (VVD) and the progressive liberal party (D66). This was the first Dutch cabinet since World War II that did not include the Christian Democrats (CDA). The Purple coalition continued for a second period from 1998 to 2002. In 2002, a new right-wing populist party (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF, named after its charismatic, murdered leader) entered the Dutch electoral arena and had a major victory in the parliamentary elections. This party formed a coalition with the CDA and the VVD, headed by Prime Minister Balkenende. This coalition lasted only 87 days (van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003). In the ensuing elections, the LPF lost votes and a new centre-right coalition of CDA, VVD and D66 took office in May 2003.

The policy texts that these governments presented to parliament can be found through the search engine Parlando, which gives access to all documents presented to, and discussed in, parliament and the Senate.

To obtain data on the media debate on migration and integration, we analysed news reporting of the five most-read Dutch national newspapers throughout the research period (Bakker and Scholten 2003): NRC Handelsblad, Algemeen Dagblad, Volkskrant, Trouw and De Telegraaf. Although completely independent of political parties, these newspapers do have some different political leanings. De Telegraaf and Algemeen Dagblad
are both regarded as right of centre, popular newspapers that are read by a less educated section of the population than the other newspapers (Bakker and Scholten 2003). *NRC Handelsblad* is a conservative, neo-liberal right-leaning quality paper, and *de Volkskrant*, originally having a Catholic background, now has a more left-leaning, quality signature. *Trouw* is a newspaper that can be regarded as Protestant-progressive, paying special attention to Christian-religious and Third World issues (Van der Eijk 2000). In the result section, we make a distinction between popular (*De Telegraaf, Algemeen Dagblad*) and quality (*Trouw, Volkskrant, NRC Handelsblad*) and between right-leaning (*De Telegraaf, Algemeen Dagblad, NRC Handelsblad*) and centre/left-leaning (*Trouw, Volkskrant*) newspapers.

All these newspapers are available electronically via LexisNexis for the period we have studied, except for *De Telegraaf*, which is only available digitally from 1999 onwards. Using framing in later years compared with the framing by the other newspapers in this period and the data available for these other newspapers before 1998, we controlled for the absence of *De Telegraaf* between 1995 and 1998.

**Methods**

To analyse the different frames that prevail in both arenas, we draw from social movement theory (particularly Ferree *et al.* 2002; Snow and Benford 1988) and policy (frame) analysis (Rein and Schön 1996; Van de Graaf and Hoppe 1992; Verloo 2005).

We start from the assumption that in both policy and media debates different representations of the problem are articulated. These representations include a diagnosis (what is the problem, where is it located and what/who causes this problem?), connected to a prognosis (how should the problem be resolved, what ends and what means should be used?) and a rationale or call for action (what courses of action are suggested, and who is responsible for this?) (Snow and Benford 1988). We added the element of standing (Ferree *et al.* 2002) to this basic structure to locate the actor associated with the frame. Ferree *et al.* (2002: 86) borrow this concept from legal discourse, ‘where it refers to the right of a person or group to challenge in a judicial forum the conduct of another’. Standing, or having a voice, is a contested terrain and in both the media arena and the political arena different actors compete to bring forward their interpretations and visions. Standing refers to agency; who is given space to speak. Within policy analysis, Van de Graaf and Hoppe’s (1992) breakdown of policy texts into their respective causal chains, final chains and normative chains is particularly useful. Causal chains are the connections between what is seen as a cause and what is seen as an effect of a certain policy problem. Final chains are the connections between what is defined as goal and what the means are to reach that goal. Normative chains are the connections between various levels of what is seen as right and what is seen as wrong. For the
reconstruction of all these chains, both explicit and implicit interpretations are important.

The above-mentioned elements of diagnosis, prognosis, roles, causality, normativity and finality have been translated into an analytic framework that consists of a coding scheme with a set of sensitising questions for each element (see Appendix 1). The first category is about voice or standing and asks which actor speaks, on which occasion, to what audience or forum, and in what form (interview, policy document, letter, essay, etc.). The second category of diagnosis asks what is represented as the problem, why it is seen as a problem, and what are mentioned as causes of the problem. It also analyses the attribution of roles in the diagnosis, such as who is seen to have caused the problem, and who is the problem holder, who are possible victims and perpetrators. The third category concerns the prognosis that contains what is represented as the solution to the problem, what goals are formulated, how these goals should be achieved. It also analyses the relationship between ends and means. The fourth category is the call for action (or non-action), asking who has a voice in suggesting the course of actions, who should be acting and who is acted upon.

These sensitising questions are used to code the different positions of the dimensions mentioned above in both arenas, starting from the assumption that different frames may be presented within one policy document or newspaper article. This analytic tool helps us to group ideas into frames that typically differ in what is presented as the central problem or as the solution to this problem. This instrument was used, in a first inductive phase, for a qualitative analysis on the major policy documents in the field of migration and integration (see Appendix 2). We identified five major frames used within the political realm between 1995 and 2005.

**Multicultural Frame**

This frame, which is often presented as the prototypical Dutch cultural frame, sees (cultural) diversity as an asset that enhances the quality of society. Policy interventions to reduce inequalities in participation in education, labour and politics should respect and foster diversity. Dialogue and civil participation are viewed as a central means to create more understanding and respect towards cultural diversity. In this frame, the diagnosis is little elaborated, it is mainly argued that there is insufficient space for diversity and that discrimination and ‘glass ceilings’ may prevent migrants from entering the higher echelons. Most emphasis is on the prognosis, promoting respect for cultural diversity and creating more space for difference.

**Emancipation Frame**

In the emancipation frame, the position and orientation of migrants is problematised: they are viewed as backward in participation, customs and views. The prognosis views participation in the labour market and
in decision making as key to the process of emancipation. Obstacles to participation should be removed by the government, and state policies and arrangements should help migrants in their integration and emancipation process. Migrants are expected to actively shape their own emancipation process.

Restriction Frame
This frame sees the entrance of new immigrants as a problem, especially when they are not economically independent. Implicitly, the emphasis is on new immigrants who come to the Netherlands because of marriage with non-native Dutch residents. These migrants are labelled as ‘newcomers’ or ‘import brides’. They constitute a problem not only because of their economic dependence, but also because they often have a traditional, non-emancipated orientation. It is an implicitly gendered frame, as in the political debate politicians principally speak about female immigrants. Solutions presented are restrictions on incoming migrants, and not granting independent permits to these new immigrants.

Victimisation Frame
This frame is mainly applied in relation to women. Women are presented as victims of a misogynous religious culture that forces them to be obedient and cover themselves to be respected. The headscarf is presented as either a symbol of subordination or something women can be, directly or indirectly, forced to wear. Violence against women is the central mechanism used to reinforce gender inequality, and examples mentioned as ‘cultural violence’ are domestic violence, honour killings and genital mutilation. The solution to this problem is mainly protection and more secondary emancipation of the women (which is perceived as a way to reduce their vulnerability).

Islam-as-Threat Frame
In this definition of the problem, the culture and religion of migrants, particularly Islam, is seen as a problem. Islam is presented as a threat to the values of Western civilization, such as church–state relations, freedom of expression, equal gender relations and tolerance towards homosexuality. Proponents of this frame fear the ‘Islamisation’ of Dutch society, which according to them is manifested by the growing number of civil servants wearing headscarves. The proposed solution is to stress the neutrality of the state and to ban religion from the public sphere. Also, the residues of Dutch pillarisation,\(^1\) especially in the school system, are questioned. The creation of Islamic schools is seen as reinforcing segregation in society.

A second phase in our analysis was to translate these frames into search-strings to make possible an electronic analysis of all parliamentary
documents and newspaper articles between 1995 and the end of 2004. Frames are distinguished using extensive search-strings to indicate the presence of a given frame. This approach is based on one of the devices suggested by Gamson and Mogdiliani (1989) that signify the presence of a frame, namely, *catchphrases*, which Pan and Kosicki (1993) mention as an element of the rhetorical structure of a text. The search-strings were composed on the basis of the coding of the documents included in our qualitative analysis, complemented with a random sample of both parliamentary documents and newspaper articles. For each of these documents and articles, the coder established which frames were present and which word combinations were indicative of these frames. Although a complete frame contains diagnostic, prognostic and motivational components, we did not take that as an absolute requirement for the presence of a frame. Especially in newspaper articles, framing is often incomplete for several reasons, amongst others due to the limited length of the text.

We used our search-strings to search for all official documents presented to parliament between 1995 and 2005 that included one or more of our frames. A total of 5,376 frames were found in the sample. Our use of the same search-strings to analyse the media debate on migration and integration resulted in a total of 14,850 articles that contained a mean of 1.09 frames per article.

To check the reliability of the search-strings, a coder coded a sample of 30 articles manually. Reliability between computer and coder was established by calculating Hostli’s Intercoder Reliability Formula (1969):

$$ IR = \frac{\Sigma 2M}{\Sigma (N1 + N2)} $$

where $M$ signifies the total number of agreements between the computer and coder, $N1$ the total of the coding decisions made by the computer and $N2$ the total of the coding decisions made by the coder. Overall reliability was .91, which is more than acceptable.

**Results**

**Framing in Two Arenas**

When we compare the overall attention given to the issues of immigration and integration in Dutch newspapers and parliament, we can see that attention given to these issues fluctuates strongly over time. Figure 1 presents the total yearly number of newspaper articles and parliamentary documents using the five frames.

Media framing seems especially vulnerable to specific events and shows clear peaks during 2001 and 2002, probably caused by the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York. After a decrease in 2003, the murder of film director Van Gogh (November 2004) leads to increased attention to the
issues of immigration and integration in 2004. In parliament we can see a gradual increase in the attention paid to immigration and integration issues, with two slight declines in 1998 and 2004. In general, on a monthly level, for both media ($r = 0.55$) and parliament ($r = 0.44$) a positive correlation exists between the point of measurement and the number of documents. A general increase in overall attention to the issue is also visible in Figure 1.

**Framing in the Political Realm**

Our findings demonstrate some important shifts in policy framing during the period 1995–2004. As Figure 2 shows, different frames have dominated the political realm over time.

During the beginning of our research period (1995–97), emancipation and multicultural framing dominated in parliament, and both multiculturalism and emancipation through participation were the official policy goals. The multicultural frame dropped after the right-wing coalition of Balkenende I took office in 2002. The emancipation frame was the dominant Dutch policy frame until 2002, and, although it lost its dominance, it remains very important. In 1997, the restriction frame gained ground in parliamentary documents. Discussions about the limited integration of considerable parts of the migrant population led to new legislation for gaining citizenship. Finally, the victimisation frame fluctuated greatly in the political debate throughout the whole period, with peaks in 1996, 1999, 2001 and a continuous ascent since 2003. After 2002, Islam-as-threat, which emerged in the political debate after the 9/11 attacks, became the dominant frame in policy documents and parliamentary debates.
These different frames are promoted by different actors. In the mid-1990s, there was significant political consensus about the policy goals of emancipation and multiculturalism. In 1996, the Minister responsible for Minority Policies, Dijkstal (VVD), even noted that presumably ‘We all agree that minorities should be given the perspective of full participation in society and that pluriformity, mutual respect and maintenance of cultural identity, solidarity, tolerance and integration should be the core concepts of our policy’ (Dutch Parliamentary Records, HTK 1995–96, 24401, No. 15: 7).

From 1997 onwards, a growing left–right divide became visible over the issues of migration and integration. The second Purple cabinet decided to change the direction of its integration policies and appointed a special Minister for Integration Policies. Although new Minister Van Boxtel (D66) defended the policy logic of multiculturalism, he also criticised earlier policies for not sufficiently shaping the ‘active citizenship’ of migrants (Dutch Parliamentary Records, HTK 1999–2002, 26333, No. 2). One important new instrument was the law on the integration of newcomers (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers), which aimed to actively integrate new migrants as citizens. Whereas the Liberal coalition partner, VVD, promoted a more restrictive immigrant and integration policy, the other two coalition partners, the Social Democrats and the Democrats 66, opted for a less stringent policy. The Liberal restriction frame was supported by the Christian Democrats and some other more right-wing parties.

The right-wing coalitions headed by Prime Minister Balkenende dismissed the multicultural frame and instead promoted a more assimilatory emancipation frame (Entzinger 2003; Kofman 2005). Also, a new
Coordinating Directorate for the Integration of Minorities was created inside the Ministry of Justice, and this resulted in a more legal framing in integration issues (Pakes 2004).

Table 1 shows which frames dominate in formal questions posed by members of parliament to the government and reveals a clear left–right divide in the framing of political parties. Emancipation and multiculturalism are frames mainly used by left-wing parties, whereas Islam-as-threat predominates among right-wing parties. The framing of the political parties in the middle is less clear-cut, the emancipation frame slightly predominates, but other frames such as the restriction frame and the Islam-as-threat frame are frequently used as well.2

Although the Islam-as-threat frame has become dominant in the political realm since 2001, it is a highly contested frame. Since 2002, all frames have been rising in absolute terms in the political realm. Emancipation, in particular, competes with Islam-as-threat. Also, the multicultural frame is rising but has not reached its pre-9/11 peak.

Framing in the Media

The evolution of frames in the media arena presents a different picture compared with that in political debate. Overall, the attention in the media to issues of immigration and integration has increased dramatically during past decade, reaching a peak in 2002 (see Figure 3).

Remarkably, and in contrast to the image of the Netherlands as a country that cherishes the ideal of multiculturalism, our findings demonstrate that the frame that focuses on Islam as a threat has been dominant in the media debate throughout the whole period under study, except for the period between 1998 and 2000.

The media frame the issues of integration and migration mainly as issues concerning Islam and Muslim migrants. It is important to note that this is not a new trend, but rather a tendency that has been present since the early 1990s (Baumann 1998; Snel 2003). According to Baumann, the European media framed the Rushdie controversy in the early 1990s as a polarisation
between Islam and the Western world. In these representations, Muslims were forced to choose between Islam or freedom of expression, which was defined as a central value of the Western world (Baumann 1998). This disjunction between Islam and the Western world has also been actively constructed within the specific Dutch media debate since the early 1990s (Prins 2005; Snel 2003). VVD leader Frits Bolkenstein and publicist Pim Fortuyn, who later became a key figure in the Dutch political landscape, used the media to express their discontent with the Dutch multicultural policy model. Both claimed that the values of Islam are largely incompatible with the values promoted by the Western Enlightenment. According to Bolkenstein and Fortuyn, the Dutch policy model that promoted the preservation of cultural identity and values threatened the integration process of migrants in order to conserve their own cultures. Muslims living in the Netherlands should be forced to assimilate Dutch norms and values (Prins 2005).

The second most frequently used frame is the multicultural one. This frame dominated in the newspapers between 1998 and 2000. Remarkably, in this period several well-known PvdA (social-democratic) members such as Paul Scheffer, Arie van der Zwan and Ayaan Hirsi started to criticise the multicultural model in the press. In 2000, Paul Scheffer, a publicist and prominent PvdA member, became a core figure in the media because of his article ‘The Multicultural Drama’ (NRC Handelsblad, 29 January 2000). Scheffer argued that the policy ideal of multiculturalism had failed. Politicians had ignored the formation of an underclass of migrants with little prospect of integration. Immigrants themselves had been too passive in
their efforts to integrate into Dutch society. Contrary to Bolkenstein and Fortuyn, Scheffer did not stress Islam as a central factor. Scheffer’s essay had a direct impact on the political debate. In April 2000, a plenary debate in parliament was held to discuss Scheffer’s statement that integration policies had failed (Dutch Parliamentary Records, HTK 70, 18 April 2000). This debate was requested by PvdA leader Melkert after VVD leader Dijkstal had criticised coalition partner PvdA for not backing certain policy measures to improve the position of minorities. In the plenary debate, the leaders of most political parties praised Scheffer for pushing the issue of integration higher up the political agenda. However, PvdA leader Melkert also criticised Scheffer’s negative vision. Rather than calling integration a drama or failure, he preferred to speak of a ‘serial full of struggle’ (NRC Handelsblad, 19 April 2000).

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 caused an enormous peak in newspaper reports that focused on Islam as a threat to the Western world. In trying to determine the causes of these attacks, the media often attributed the blame to radical Islamists and their spiritual leadership. On the one hand it was stressed that radicalism should be seen as a deviation by a small group; on the other hand Islam was presented as a monolithic culture incompatible with Western cultural values. This presentation of a cultural gap reinforced the image of the Muslim as a potentially dangerous ‘other’. In this debate, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a young Dutch Somali woman, played a central role. She was first a member of the Social Democratic Party, but switched to the Liberal Party because she no longer agreed with the Social Democratic stance on immigration issues. She castigated Islam for being an authoritarian religion and especially backward when it came to the position of women (Ghorashi 2003; Prins 2005; Roggeband and Verloo 2007).

Other frames important in the political realm, such as the restriction frame that dominated in 1997, remained very marginal in the media. The victimisation frame, which strongly fluctuated in the political debate throughout the whole period, with peaks in 1996, 1999, 2001 and a continuous ascent since 2003, has been very gradually rising in the media. Since 2003, this frame has become the second most dominant after the Islam-as-threat frame.

It is important to note that the actors that gain standing in the media are not necessarily formal political actors. Newspapers appear to provide a forum for some critical outsiders. However, these are closely related to the formal political arena (party members or new candidate politicians). So where in the political realm the consensus on multiculturalism as a policy ideal still prevailed between 1995 and 1998, some right-wing politicians and publicists used the media to criticise this dominant policy frame. For critical outsiders who seek to contest the dominant news frame, it appears to be far more difficult to gain standing. According to some, it has become almost impossible to present more moderate viewpoints (PvdA MP Albayrak in de Volkskrant, 3 April 2004).
More Pluriformity in the Civic Forum or Media as Selector of Frames?

According to our first hypothesis, the media reflect the pluralist framing in the political realm, and therefore a considerable overlap exists between parliamentary framing and media framing of the issue. As has become clear from Figures 2 and 3, the frames used in both arenas differ to a large extent. However, do they follow the trends? In other words, if one frame is going up in one arena, does it also go up in the other? Table 2 shows the correlation of the total attention to the issue and the proportional use of each of the frames between the media arena and the political arena. Since the institutionalised character of the parliamentary arena might make it slower in reacting to all kinds of external developments causing framing change than the media arena, we allow the media a maximum lag of six months; this is in line with outcomes of classical agenda-setting research indicating influences up to a couple of months between various agendas (Dearing and Rogers 1996). The largest coefficients for each frame within this time span are reported. In contrast to our first hypothesis, we do not find evidence here either for a large overlap between the two arenas. Only the total attention and the proportional use of the Islam-as-threat frame are correlated to a considerable extent at the same time lag. This correlation is likely to be caused by external events such as 9/11 and, in general, there does not seem to be that much overlap between the two arenas. Other frames show smaller correlations on longer lags or even no significant correlations at all (emancipation frame). If we take into account the fact that both arenas are subject to the same external events and might influence each other as well (Vliegenthart and Roggeband 2007), it is legitimate to call the overlap fairly small.

A final way to look at the congruency of both arenas is to test whether earlier-mentioned events and persons, which from our qualitative analysis turned out to be important in shaping the debate, changed the framing of the issue in both arenas in similar ways. More specifically, we look at how the debate changed after Scheffer’s newspaper article on the ‘multicultural fiasco’ (January 2000), after 9/11 (September 2001), after the entrance of Fortuyn (February 2002) and his assassination (May 2002), and the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2</th>
<th>CORRELATION BETWEEN TOTAL ATTENTION AND PROPORTIONAL USE OF EACH FRAME IN PARLIAMENT AND MEDIA (MONTHLY VALUES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total attention (no lags)</td>
<td>.287***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multicultural Frame (media lagged 4 months)</td>
<td>.204**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emancipation (media lagged 1 month)</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restriction (media lagged 1 month)</td>
<td>.145*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victimisation (media lagged 1 month)</td>
<td>.179**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam-as-threat (no lags)</td>
<td>.358***</td>
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N = 120; ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (one tailed test).
election of Hirsi Ali to parliament (January 2003). To do this, we split our research period in six sub-periods:

(1) Purple era (January 1995–January 2000);
(2) post-Scheffer (February 2000–August 2001);
(3) post-9/11 (September 2001–January 2002);
(4) Fortuyn (February 2002–May 2002);
(5) post-Fortuyn with his party LPF in government (June 2002–December 2002);

Although we acknowledge that these events and actors were far from the only ones determining the framing during a certain period in time, they are regarded as crucial and, if parliament and media overlap in their framing trends, they should have caused at least some similar changes in both arenas. Table 3 presents the framing in both arenas during each of the six periods.

The F-scores in Table 3, comparing means across periods, show that all frames, except for victimisation in the media and restriction in parliament, differed significantly across the various periods under study. Also, we find

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Scheffer</th>
<th>Post-Scheffer</th>
<th>Post-9/11</th>
<th>Fortuyn</th>
<th>Post-Fortuyn</th>
<th>Hirsi Ali</th>
<th>F-score (one way Anova)</th>
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<td>.22</td>
<td>.29</td>
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<td>.29</td>
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<td>Attention (mean number of frames per month)</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>18</td>
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<td>31</td>
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<td>101</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>33.238***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 120; ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05.
that the eventual changes in framing in each period are not similar in both realms (with the exception of the post-9/11 period).

- In period 1 (January 1995–January 2000), there is a predominance of the emancipation and multicultural frame in parliament, whereas in the media the Islam-as-threat frame is the most frequently used, followed by the multicultural frame.
- In period 2, after the publication of Scheffer’s essay on the ‘multicultural fiasco’ (February 2000–August 2001), we see few changes in parliamentary framing (the restriction frame is going up slightly), whereas some changes in media framing can be observed. Scheffer’s essay appears to have had some effects on the media framing as we can see an increase in the number of articles discussing the multicultural frame. Also, there is a slight increase of the victimisation frame. The Islam-as-threat frame is less prevalent during this period.
- In period 3, after the events of 9/11 (September 2001–January 2002), there is an increase of the Islam-as-threat frame in both the media and parliament, although this change is considerably larger in the media.
- Period 4 is when Pim Fortuyn launched his election campaign (February 2002–May 2002). The framing in both parliament and media in this period is very similar to the pre-9/11 period, with exception of the Islam-as-threat frame being more prevalent than prior to 9/11.
- Period 5 is the time after Fortuyn was murdered and his party, LPF, formed part of the new right-wing government Balkenende I (June 2002–December 2002). In this period, we can see a decline of the multicultural frame in the political realm. In the media, the emancipation frame is slightly increasing, as is the Islam-as-threat frame (probably due to the retrospection on 9/11).
- In period 6 (January 2003–December 2004), Ayaan Hirsi Ali became a member of parliament for the Liberal party (VVD). Her voice appears to have affected the framing in the political realm. Our findings show an increase in the frames promoted by Hirsi Ali (victimisation and Islam-as-threat) in parliament (Roggeband and Verloo forthcoming), but this increase is only faintly reflected in the media framing.

Our findings thus suggest few similarities in framing trends in both realms. Some events or persons have had more impact on the framing in the political realm, as is the case with Hirsi Ali and the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (these are mainly political events). The publication of Scheffer’s essay, which can be considered a media event, appears to have caused more discussions in the media than in the political realm. We therefore refute the first hypothesis.

The fourth hypothesis, on the contrary, is largely confirmed by our findings: the incongruence between framing in both arenas (in number of frames and in timing) supports Meyer’s idea that politics and the media are
two separate realms, each operating according to its own logic. Indeed we found that in the media arena newsworthy frames dominated most of the time, whereas in the political arena more policy-related frames circulated. This, however, changed after the 9/11 attacks. From 2002 onwards, the debate in the political arena also focuses principally on Islam as a threat to Dutch identity and values.

We now turn to our second and fifth hypotheses. The second hypothesis predicted more diversity in the media framing compared with the political arena, because, as a civic forum, it provides space for other actors with diverging views on the issue. We did not find support for this thesis either. The framing in the political realm is more diverse, whereas the framing in the media appears to have an almost hegemonic character. Table 4 shows, for the parliamentary and the media arena, the mean of the monthly frames necessary to encompass 50 per cent and 75 per cent of the monthly total coverage of the issue. Furthermore, it presents the same statistics for the five separate newspapers.

The most resonant frame is Islam-as-threat, which is adopted across a wide range of different newspapers. For all newspapers, it takes on average less than 1.5 frames to reach 50 per cent of the coverage and around two frames to reach 75 per cent. There are, however, significant differences between quality newspapers on the one hand and popular ones on the other, with the quality newspapers being more diverse in their framing. In particular, de Volkskrant scores considerably higher than, for example, De Telegraaf (1.48 and 2.34 compared to 1.21 and 1.87). Although the media show some frame variation, selection mechanisms indeed appear to be at work.

If we compare the total of the media arena to the parliament, we see that the framing in parliament is considerably more diverse: t-tests show that the difference in means between both arenas is highly significant. This difference is even more striking if we compare individual newspapers with parliamentary framing. The results confirm the view of the media arena as being highly competitive and selective in the use of (hegemonic) frames.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>No. of frames 50% of coverage</th>
<th>No. of frames 75% of coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
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<td>Media total</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>2.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-test for equality of means</td>
<td>8.277***</td>
<td>12.729***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC Handelsblad</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algemeen Dagblad</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>2.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volkskrant</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Telegraaf</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trouw</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>2.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-test (one way Anova)</td>
<td>6.692***</td>
<td>8.963***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 120, except De Telegraaf (N = 72); ***p < 0.01 (two tailed test).
(hypothesis 5). This suggests that not all actors have equal access to the media to express their views, but that actors that promote or support the hegemonic frame have more standing.

Our third hypothesis predicts external diversity and differences between the various newspapers in framing of the issue according to their political position, with more right-wing newspapers (mainly NRC Handelsblad and De Telegraaf) framing the issue more in accordance with right-wing politicians (e.g. more use of the Islam-as-threat frame), whereas more left-wing newspapers (mainly de Volkskrant) will frame the issue more in the way left-wing parties do (e.g. multicultural framing and emancipation framing). Table 5 presents the proportional use of each of the five frames by each of the five newspapers, while Table 4 indicates the frame diversity of each newspaper.

The results of this analysis offer some support for the third hypothesis: there is indeed a difference between the more right-wing newspapers (NRC Handelsblad, Algemeen Dagblad and De Telegraaf) compared with the mainstream and left-leaning newspapers (de Volkskrant and Trouw). The more right-wing newspapers make in general more use of restriction and Islam-as-threat, framings more often associated with right-wing politics: Algemeen Dagblad scores highest on both: 0.07 and 0.51 respectively, while NRC Handelsblad scores 0.05 and 0.47. Both Trouw and de Volkskrant score lower, especially on the latter: 0.43 and 0.42. They make more use of the multicultural and emancipation framing. De Telegraaf is an exception and shows relatively high multicultural coverage and low Islam-as-threat coverage. This is largely due to the fact that De Telegraaf is only included from 1999 onwards. If we conduct an analysis for the various newspapers since 1999, we find that the differences between Islam-as-threat are not significant – De Telegraaf at the same level as NRC and Volkskrant (.43), Trouw lower (.38), Algemeen Dagblad higher (.47) – and the differences in multicultural framing decrease, with De Telegraaf becoming the lowest multicultural framer after Algemeen Dagblad. For four of the five frames, the differences between newspapers are significant. However, if we correlate the proportional use of each of the frames by each of the newspapers (not presented here), we find high correlations, especially for the frames that are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Multicultural</th>
<th>Emancipation</th>
<th>Restriction</th>
<th>Victimisation</th>
<th>Islam-as-threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
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<td>.47</td>
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<td>Algemeen Dagblad</td>
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<td>.03</td>
<td>.07</td>
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<td>Volkskrant</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>De Telegraaf</td>
<td>.30</td>
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<td>.07</td>
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<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trouw</td>
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<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-value</td>
<td>5.32***</td>
<td>2.16*</td>
<td>3.60***</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>3.96***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 120, except De Telegraaf (N = 72); ***p < 0.01; *p < 0.10 (two tailed test).
used regularly; this means that the various newspapers largely follow the same patterns in frame use over time.

Another interesting difference between the various newspapers is in frame diversity. Table 4 shows that the popular newspapers (Algemeen Dagblad and De Telegraaf) are less diverse than the quality newspapers (NRC Handelsblad, de Volkskrant and Trouw). So quality newspapers appear to come closer to the ideal of a civic forum than more popular newspapers. The total media arena is slightly more diverse than the separate newspapers; this, again, indicates some level of variation across these newspapers as well.

Thus we find some support for our third hypothesis and for the idea that newspaper differences should not be neglected. However, we cannot confirm our sixth hypothesis: newspapers follow largely the same framing trends and the differences between the various newspapers seem to be rather small, compared to the differences that exist within newspapers. Furthermore, differences in newspapers’ framing are in line with their political leanings.

Conclusions

In this paper we have reconstructed the framing of the issues of migration and integration in the Dutch political arena and the media during the last decade. We have found quantitative (issue salience) and qualitative (framing) shifts in both realms. While the attention to the issues of migration and integration in parliament has gradually increased throughout the whole period, the attention in the media has risen enormously since 2001. In both domains, since 2001 there has been an emphasis on immigrant religious culture, equated with Islam, that is perceived as a threat to Dutch culture and values and as a principal obstacle to the integration of Muslim migrants.

More remarkable are the differences in framing between the political realm and the media. We found that (a) there is relatively little correlation between both spheres, (b) we see divergent shifts in framing in both realms during different periods in time (following important events in society) and (c) there are differences in frame variation between the two arenas. Although the Islam-as-threat frame has dominated the media debate throughout most of the period we have studied, this frame was rather marginal in the political realm before the events of 9/11. In the political realm, there is a larger diversity in the frames used, and different frames dominated over time. During most of the time, the issues of migration and integration were framed in terms of emancipation. In 1996/97 a restriction frame dominated, and since 2002 a frame that points to Islam as a threat and an obstacle to integration has become dominant. However, our findings indicate that this frame is heavily contested in the political realm. It is mainly right-wing parties that promote the Islam-as-threat frame, whereas left-wing parties continue to support emancipation and multicultural frames.

The incongruence between framing in both spheres supports Meyer’s claim (2002) that the political arena and the media are to an important
extent separate spheres, with different agendas. Parliamentary framing overlaps only to a limited extent with media framing. We did not find support for the idea that the media act as a pluralist forum. In contrast, our findings rather indicate that media framing is highly selective, resulting in hegemonic rather than pluralist framing. This suggests that not all actors have equal access to the media to express their view, but that actors that promote or support the hegemonic frame have more standing. It is rather that the selection mechanism of the media prevents deviant actors from taking part in the discussion than that the media are the open arena that Norris (2000) claims them to be. However, we found that some quality newspapers allow for more diversity than more popular newspapers.

Pluriformity in framing in the political arena appears to be greater than in the media, with each of the frames being used on a considerable number of occasions. Our results show that this frame completeness in the political arena is not reflected in the media. This result might lead to an unrepresentative picture in the media that might affect public perceptions of the issue. Also, as Guiraudon (1998: 292) argues, the ‘negative dynamic between the press, public opinion, and the electioneering politician’ may lead to more restrictive policies. Similarly, Givens and Luedtke (2004) demonstrate that an increase in media attention to the issue of immigration is related to more restrictive immigration policies. Our findings demonstrate that the turn to more restrictive policies in the Netherlands occurred well before the boom of media attention on migration issues. The dominant framing in the media of Islam as a threat, however, appears to have diffused to the political realm since 2001. In contrast to the hegemonic position of this frame in the media, the Islam-as-threat frame is highly contested in the political realm.

Meyer’s (2002) claim of separate spheres with different dynamics appears to apply particularly well to the issues of immigration and integration. Whereas there is a continuing international debate about the ‘clash of civilizations’ that Western nation states are facing, the regulation of immigration and integration remains the territory of the state, the level of Europeanisation of immigration policy remains low (Luedtke 2005; Lavenex 2006), and the recent turn to civic integration may even reinforce nation-statism (Kofman 2005). Simultaneously and paradoxically, immigration and integration are becoming more international and national issues.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Dave Snow, Peter Mair and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article. Data on which this article’s analyses are based are available at Rens Vliegenthart’s website: http://www.rensvliegenthart.com. Authors are listed in alphabetical order and contributed equally to this article.
Appendix 1: List of Sensitising Questions to Code Frames

Full title
Issue (main issue, detail if necessary)
Date
Type/status of document
Event/reason/occasion of appearance
Audience

Voice/standing
Voice(s) speaking
Perspective
References: words/concepts (and where they come from)
References: actors
References: documents
Other references: events, etc.
Form (argumentation/style/conviction techniques/dichotomies/metaphors/contrasts)

Diagnosis
What is represented as the problem? Why is it seen as a problem?
Causality (what is seen as a cause of what?)
Who is seen as responsible for causing the problem?
Problem holders (whose problem is it seen to be? Active/passive roles, perpetrators/victims, etc.?)
Normativity (what is a norm group if there is a problem group?)
Legitimisation of non-problem(s)

Prognosis
What to do? Which action is deemed necessary and why?
Hierarchy/priority in goals.
How to achieve goals (strategy/means/instruments)?
Attribution of roles in prognosis

Call for action
Call for action or non-action
Who is acted upon? (target groups)
Boundaries set to action and legitimisation of non-action
APPENDIX 2
PARLIAMENTARY DOCUMENTS USED FOR QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF FRAMES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan</th>
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<tr>
<td>Act integration newcomers, 9 April 1998</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minority policy 1998, Annual report</td>
<td>25601, No. 2</td>
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<td>26333, No. 2</td>
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<td>Report integration policy ethnic minorities 1999</td>
<td>26815, No. 2</td>
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<td>The legal position of women in immigration policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Letter of the State Secretary of Justice, April 2000</td>
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<td>Report of parliamentary debate about the legal position of women in immigration policy (June 2000)</td>
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<td>Report on the integration policy of ethnic minorities 2003.</td>
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<td>Integration policy new style</td>
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<td>Plan for the emancipation and integration of women and girls from ethnic minorities</td>
<td>29203, No. 9, 18, 22</td>
</tr>
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<td>Parliamentary debates of plan for the emancipation and integration of women and girls from ethnic minorities</td>
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<td>Report ethnic minorities 2005</td>
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APPENDIX 3

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<th>D66</th>
<th>CDA</th>
<th>VVD</th>
<th>CU</th>
<th>LPF (since 2002)</th>
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<td>–</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes

1. In the field of politics the country has traditionally been divided into several socio-cultural milieus. The segmentation of the country into these milieus has been called pillarisation.

2. Our left–right division is based on the coding of party manifestos (MRG project, see Budge et al. 2001). For the specific Dutch data see Pennings and Keman (2003) and Pennings (2005). In Appendix 3 we present the frames used by each individual political party.

3. Although Fortuyn became party leader of the new party, Leefbaar Nederland, in November 2001, he started to receive considerable media attention from both politicians and media after an interview with de Volkskrant on 9 February 2002, when he called Islam ‘a backward culture’ (Kleinnijenhuis et al. 2003: 41)

References


