Waterfront, Revitalization Projects: A comparative study of London Docklands and Yokohama Minato Mirai 21

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ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on two specific waterfront revitalization projects: The Docklands (London, Great Britain) and Minato Mirai 21 (Yokohama, Japan). The paper examines the projects from two vantage points: (1) the contributions and achievements of the private sector towards waterfront revitalization projects, and (2) public participation in the development of the new waterfront plans. The schema of the paper is developed according to a ‘sand-glass’ structure. First, we broadly analyze the two aspects of public participation and private sector involvement in the urban planning process. From this analysis, by way of an inference argument, we have concentrated upon the specific cases of The Docklands and Minato Mirai 21. The study of these two examples of waterfront revitalization has next allowed us to develop the third part, where we have described a possible policy approach towards waterfront projects.
Riverfront and waterfront development have, in recent years, become new focal points of urban revitalization policy. It is noteworthy that the history of urbanization shows that riverfronts and waterfronts have exerted a prominent influence upon the location of human economic activities. Since the early forms of urban organization, the relationship between the city and its water has been characterized by a complex interaction of various elements. The functional aspects of transport, fishing, and commercial activities, developed by using the water system, represent the extrinsic elements of the relationship between city and water. Intrinsic elements of this relationship are the influences and synergistic effects of the water with the urban environment, which have generated a social, economic and political framework where people live and operate. These different levels of perception of the urban system relative to water have shaped the form of the city, its port and its local economic base.

An indication of the complexity of the topic can be gleaned from various proposals and objectives incorporated in waterfront projects in different cities. Even if we can easily recognize a world-wide tendency towards a standard approach for waterfront revitalization, the locus element simultaneously represents a decisive factor which often determines success or failure of the waterfront project. Thus, there is a need to investigate both generality and specificity in waterfront development initiatives. With this background in mind, the attention of this paper will be focused on two specific waterfront projects: The Docklands (London, Great Britain) and Minato Mirai 21 (Yokohama, Japan).

In seeking to achieve a deeper understanding of these two projects, we need to analyze elements that are characteristic of Japanese and English developments. In the analysis of the two above mentioned waterfront projects, it becomes evident that the correspondence between causes and effects of the elements examined is not straightforward nor logical. The concise framework of this paper does certainly not permit an exhaustive analysis of the subject. The main aim of this paper is to examine the projects of Minato Mirai 21 and The Docklands from two perspectives. First, we will identify critical success factors by considering the contributions and achievements of the private sector regarding waterfront revitalization projects. Secondly, we will investigate the local support basis by examining public participation in the development of new waterfront plans.

The choice of these two ‘lenses’ through which we look at the present state of waterfront revitalization arises from the current trend, particularly in waterfront planning, to consider the public and private sector no longer as only a recipient of the planning action.

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We can identify these two notions of the relationship city-water in the Japanese word minato, which in English means port. The three phonetic syllables that compose the word minato have the meaning of ‘door at water’ and with this definition, the functional aspect of the port is emphasized. But if we consider the Kanji ideograph which depicts the word minato, this means ‘own aside the water’.
but also—and rather—as fundamental actors in the decision-making process and in the
definition of objectives and plans of the city.

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first part, we will broadly analyze the two aspects of public participation and private
sector involvement in the urban planning process. From this analysis, by way of an
inference argument, we will focus attention upon the specific cases of The Docklands and
Minato Mirai 21. The study of these examples of waterfront revitalization will then allow
us to develop a third part where we describe a possible policy approach towards
waterfront development projects.

2. PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE URBAN SYSTEM

Over the past decade waterfront revitalization projects have been considered to be one of
the major challenges in the urban planning system. In our paper we focus in particular on
key elements which characterize this new urban planning approach regarding water-fronts.

One of the main characteristics inherent in many projects is the focus upon economy-led
solutions. This implies that intervention choices are often made according to
economically-efficient choice parameters and criteria, while there is a main concentration
in defining the objectives -- on the supply side rather than on the demand one.

Private sector involvement in waterfront revitalization projects has in recent years
occurred in different countries as an effect of a reorientation of conservative philosophy.
Dunleavy and O’Leary [12.] summarized the specific view of the New-Right on
economics and politics as follows: " 1) market unintentionally produces beneficial
consequences via the ‘invisible hand’, whereas state activity unintentionally produces
costly consequences, 2) minimize the interventions of the government policy-making.
State regulation should preserve the pre-existing structure of market interactions, and
concentrate on trying to reinstate market controls or to produce desired behaviour by
adjustments of the relevant costs and benefits experienced by individual decision-makers,
3) bureaucratic provision is to over-supply the outputs as would be produced by private
firms operating in a perfectly competitive market. Bureaucracy maximizes its total
budget”.

The intervention of the private sector in waterfront (re)development has generally been
based on the concept of leverage principles. The leverage is measured by the ratio of
private investment to public money spent in the project. For example, in the British case
of the Docklands, Hall [3.] observed that the leverage ratio was of 1.5: 1. This facet is
usually considered as a measure to value the effectiveness or achievement of the private
intervention.

Private sector intervention in the planning process has provoked queries about the impact
and effectiveness of the enterprise strategy in waterfront development. As we will
observe in our case studies, waterfront redevelopment is defined in response to factors that do not rely solely upon the revitalization of the physical aspects of the area. Important issues such as urban deprivation of the waterfront areas -- to be tackled by the logic of the enterprise solution -- have often not achieved prespecified objectives, such as a decrease in unemployment or an improvement of the living standard. Other private sector intervention policies, such as the supply of public goods have however, achieved efficiency in their results.

With regard to the problem of a potential discrepancy between private and public interests, it is important to emphasize the role of partnership between the private and public sector and of alliances in the planning process. We can define two main types of partnership arrangement including the private sector, one involving the central government, and another one involving local government.

On the one hand, the private-public sector nexus is set to facilitate and attract private investments in the urban development process. For instance, the element of risk in major waterfront development schemes may be high to both financiers and developers; in this context, the intervention of the public sector cushions the financial risk. On the other hand, it is necessary that the government--central or local--intervenes in the private sector for the purpose of controlling, regulating or policing private sector activity and its consequences. The public sector needs to set up a policy framework and to provide the infrastructure to contribute to the activity of the private sector.

According to several observers, local governments have now the ability to assume a pivotal role in this partnership. In fact, local authorities have already built up much experience in many countries, especially in addressing social and economic objectives from various policy angles. In the analysis of our case studies we will show in more detail how the Japanese and British governments have defined the relationship between public-private sector in waterfront revitalization processes.

3. **PLANNING PARTICIPATION AND INTEREST GROUPS**

The past few years have witnessed an intense debate on democracy. Modern society is undergoing rapid changes; current decisions about economic and natural resources will affect the future. This has led to the development of a system of social and economic ramifications which is progressively more complex. In this situation, people may feel distrust regarding the political and representative democracy that is unable to solve their specific problems, and may engage in ad hoc civic action groups that use methods different from the traditional ones such as lobbying.

Public participation is more evident in the policy agenda of several industrial countries. Citizens’ participation in government affairs is not only influenced by the reasons mentioned above, but also by their more powerful influence at the local government level. In various countries, an institutional reorganization of local government bodies and of the
relationship between central-local governments is in progress. This often entails a re-
consideration of the interests and opinions of the people affected by urban planning
actions.

Public participation in planning can assume forms which may vary according to the
nature of the issues concerned, the phase in the planning process at which it occurs, and
the types of interests involved. In this context, Langton [1.] distinguishes two approaches:
‘top-down’ forms of public participation and ‘bottom-up’ forms. In the former case,
participation is initiated by planners or decision makers; in the latter, it is instigated by
interest groups.

In both cases, it is important to consider the relationship between planners and the public
and particularly how, during the planning process, planners are able to exert control in
order to elicit a public response. Alterman [1.] observes several ways planners may
influence public participation during the planning process; a notable element is the stage
in which participation occurs during the planning process. Alterman also emphasizes, by
using various examples, that if participation occurs after the completed draft plan stage,
the planners’ view is generally so crystallized that only marginal changes are to be
expected.

In the past, public participation was primarily concerned with informing people and
interest groups about decisions and plans undertaken by planners. In the 1980s however,
spontaneous actions of community groups rather than formal public participation
characterized the planning process. Barlow [1.] observes that this situation is not
surprising in relation to the period “where changes to plans took place, it was usually the
result of an authority’s reaction to public pressure, rather than public involvement in the
formative stages of a plan”.

A wide range of particularities influences the formation of a community group. These
elements vary from socio-economic position and education to practical reasons such as
mobility. According to Smith [1.], there are two primary types of community groups.
“Interest or sectional groups”, which are usually composed of socially homogeneous
members whose aim is often to maintain and defend the status quo. “Promotional or cause
groups” are socially heterogeneous and advocate policy change. Boaden [1.] suggests
another classification of interest groups: “major elites” and “minor elites”. The former are
groups whose cooperation and agreement plays an important role in adopting and
implementing plans. The latter include voluntary organizations active in the area. It seems
however, that these two classifications refer to the same situation but from two different
perspectives. In fact, Smith’s classification is defined according to the interest group point
of view, where it is important to recognize the type of members, goals and interests. From
a governmental perspective, one may emphasize the relevance of Boaden’s classification,
where negotiation and influence of each group involved in the planning process is
highlighted.
Finally, we will consider a direct or indirect form of involvement of interest groups in the planning process (See Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process form</th>
<th>Potential political/administrative</th>
<th>Criteria as to who is involved on what terms</th>
<th>Criteria as to the relations between those</th>
<th>Criteria as to what constitutes a good decision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CLIENTELIST</td>
<td>Direct political support</td>
<td>Individuals with specific demands: in return for specific or general support</td>
<td>Patron-client dependency: populist politics</td>
<td>Maintenance of dependency relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITICO-RATIONAL</td>
<td>Direct political</td>
<td>Politicians: politically-selected policy analysts; conformity with political ideology</td>
<td>Conformity with party ideology and politics</td>
<td>Conformity with political ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLURALIST POLITICS</td>
<td>Legitimacy of state action</td>
<td>Politically-active groups</td>
<td>Competition between position</td>
<td>Agreement of all parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEN DEMOCRATIC</td>
<td>Legitimacy and effectiveness of state action</td>
<td>Politically-determined via political ideology and voice terms of entry negotiated</td>
<td>Open debate - fair hearing: discursive and/or oppositional resolution by vote</td>
<td>Informed by knowledge and values of those affected by an issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARGAINING</td>
<td>Efficiency and effectiveness of state action</td>
<td>Mutually dependent parties in occasional relation; invoked to resolve a blockage, to allow each other to proceed</td>
<td>Negotiation around individual positions</td>
<td>Agreement of all parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIAL COMMITTEES</td>
<td>Legitimacy and effectiveness of state action</td>
<td>Expert personnel selected politically/administratively: agenda limited but open within these limits</td>
<td>Discursive debating mode</td>
<td>Informed by specialist knowledge and values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORPORATIST</td>
<td>Efficiency and effectiveness of state action</td>
<td>Mutually dependent parties in continued relation; to maintain dominance by excluding other interests</td>
<td>Negotiation around a stream of present and future positions</td>
<td>Agreement of all parties and maintenance of continued working relations among those involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUREAUCRATIC LEGAL</td>
<td>Legitimacy of state action</td>
<td>Legally/administratively defined interests; administrative process</td>
<td>Correct use of formal procedures</td>
<td>Correct use of pre-determined rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUDICIAL SEMIDICTAL</td>
<td>Legitimacy of state action</td>
<td>Legally/administratively defined interests, around a legally/administratively filtered agenda of issues</td>
<td>Open debate, in investigative/adversarial form</td>
<td>Fairness, reasonableness in UK; conformity with legal rules elsewhere in Europe?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECHNO-RATIONAL</td>
<td>Legitimacy and effectiveness of state action</td>
<td>Technical experts define issues and interests, using expert knowledge and values</td>
<td>Scientific rationale of the issue in hand</td>
<td>Ends and means are related in a systematic way, informed by available knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARKET-RATIONAL</td>
<td>Efficiency of state action</td>
<td>Those with direct functional role</td>
<td>Functional rationale of the issues in hand</td>
<td>Efficiency = maximizing return on invested, or minimum input/output costs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Healey in Barlow, 1995)

Table 1. Process forms and decision rules.

A direct form of participation belongs to the corporatist system. In this case, the participatory structure is based upon a formal negotiation between state agencies and
specific interest groups. The bargain approach is an indirect form of public participation, because here neither procedures nor formal systems are established. The groups usually do not have common ideologies, but are mutually dependent upon the subject which concerns their action.

Healey [1.1] counter-points the above distinction by stating that “both corporatist and bargaining approaches to public involvement in policy-making are deliberately exclusionary in terms of public participation. Negotiation is usually only between selected interests”. There are several cases however, that show the possibility of overcoming the problem highlighted by Healey. For example, in the 1960s in Britain, a system to solve major regional land location disputes was implemented in which the decision-making processes were controlled by experts. But as Barlow [1.1] notices, “this fell into disuse partly because of politicians’ fears they would lose control of policy ends to experts”.

After the above introductory observation on various types of planning modes, we will now use these as a frame of reference for describing and analysing our case studies.

4. LONDON DOCKLANDS

The London Docklands extends from the Tower Bridge eastwards along the Thames for 12 km and covers an area of 2,226 hectares. The dock economy not only shaped the physical aspects of this area, but also influenced the life of its inhabitants. For instance, most people working in The Docklands either worked in the docks or in related industries (See Figure 1.).

Figure 1. The London Docklands
The historical roots of the area date back to the Roman period, but in the early nineteenth century the area was transformed by the construction of the docks. The London Dock at Wapping opened in 1805 with a 21-year monopoly on all ships coming to London with tobacco, rice, wine and brandy, except those from the East and West Indies. In contrast to the wealth of the docks, the area was synonymous with poverty and the very poor conditions of local inhabitants.

The period of irreversible decline of the docks economy began in the 1960s. The causes of this change have much in common with several waterfronts in industrialized countries. From 1966 to 1976, 10,000 dock-related jobs disappeared, and a further 8,000 of such jobs were lost in the period of 1976-81. The level of unemployment reached 24% by the middle of 1981.

The London Docklands Strategic Plan (LDSP), published in 1976, was produced by the joint committee set up by the Greater London Council and the five Docklands boroughs. The main targets of the plan focussed on employment and transport infrastructure. In order to increase the level of employment in the area, it was necessary to retain or replace industrial jobs which could have used the skills of The Docklands inhabitants. As a result, office and service employment were considered as a secondary target in their policy. The public transport provision was the second main element in the LDSP, the major objective being the extension of the Jubilee underground line from north-west and central London. The plan was never fully implemented because of a lack of significant public funding.

In 1979, when the Conservative Party entered into central government, McIntosh [15] observed that “both the analysis of the problem, and the range of available solutions changed dramatically”. With the aim to create a “single minded” agency in charge of the Inner City Problem, the Secretary of State for the Environment established the Urban Development Corporation and the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC) in 1981.

After having assumed planning powers previously administered by three local planning authorities, the LDDC defined the physical revitalization of the area as its main objective. This was done in order to attract private investors and to facilitate a partnership between public and private sectors. In economic terms, the objectives of the Urban Development Corporation (UDC) were clearly designated by Section 136 of the Planning and Land Act 1980 “to secure the regeneration of its area, by bringing land and buildings into effective use, encouraging the development of existing and new industry and commerce”.

On the basis of past experience during the development by The Docklands Joint Committee at St. Katherine’s Dock, the original idea of LDDC was to attract high-tech industries and media-related activities. In the mid-1980s an additional aim was added to the planning objective. The potentialities of expansion relative to the deregulation of the Stock Exchange pushed new investors to consider the Docklands as a suitable area for new development. There were several reasons for this action. Further development in the City of London would have been complicated. The Docklands was geographically close
to the City. It is important to notice that the Enterprise Zone (EZ) in the Isle of Dogs had in the meantime been established. In order to analyze in detail the relationship between the private and the public sector, we have to examine the structure of the EZ system, particularly the benefits available for the private sector in such designated areas.

The incentives offered within EZs are wide-ranging and include the following: exemption from rates on industrial and commercial property, exemption from Development Land Tax before its abolition in April 1985, 100% allowances for corporation and income tax purposes for capital expenditure on new and unused industrial and commercial buildings, employers’ exemption from industrial training levies and from the requirement to provide information to Industrial Training Boards under the Employment and Training Act 1981. But above all, EZs are administered by a greatly simplified planning regime; in essence, those developments falling within the criteria of the published scheme for each zone do not require individual planning permission and benefit by speedy handling of minor administrative details and relaxations in processing procedures, thus providing greater speed in dealing with customs matters for firms in EZs and reduced government requests for statistical information. Major investors in EZs can be subdivided into categories: private individuals, the corporate sector and financial organizations.

The emphasis on the property-led approach taken in The Docklands development has nevertheless generated several debates and criticisms. Turok [6.] concluded that “property based measures ignore some of the crucial dimensions of city revitalization, such as education and training, investment in basic infrastructure and underlying competitiveness of industry”. One of the major criticisms in the LDDC approach is the exclusion of the local authorities and local residents from the planning process.

Public participation in The Docklands redevelopment process can be distinguished according to three phases. In the 1980s, the conservative central government regarded participation as a barrier to effective planning and development. The Local Government Planning and Land Act of 1980 replaced the requirement for consultation on matters to be included in plans with a requirement for publicity and participation only at the draft plan stage. In the early phase of The Docklands development, this led to an illusory idea of public participation in the planning process. Local campaigns were formed however, to oppose luxury housing development at Cherry Garden Pier. These activities aroused negative publicity concerning LDDC’s activities. In the period 1985-89, we may identify a second phase of public participation in The Docklands area. An earlier change had been the establishment of area offices with the objective to develop a closer relationship with the local community. From 1986 on, people were allowed to participate in the LDDC’s planning committee, but they had no speaking rights. At present in the third phase, a specific system of public participation has not been established within the LDDC structure; it is a major concern, however, for the local residents to develop and influence the plans. In addition, a change occurred in the central government attitude towards public participation. This change was a result of the increase of nimbyism² in the country and the recognition that the planning process is a powerful tool for managing

² NIMBY: Not In My Back Yard
environmental change and promoting a more ‘sustainable society’. The agenda behind this increase in public participation is related to the focus of the British government upon ‘customer power’. Recently, as a re-emphasis of the Planning and Compensation Act of 1991, the use of simplified planning zones by local authorities—on which public participation and local inquiries are optional—has shifted the system towards a semi-judicial system of public participation.

5. YOKOHAMA MINATO MIRAI 21

Yokohama, which is located 30 km from Tokyo, is a major city of Japan. As a result of being a subaltern link with the Japanese capital, Yokohama developed an incoherent urban structure lacking a strong autonomous identity. Yokohama has developed a bipolar structure: its central business district (CBD) in the Kannai district and its CBD around the Yokohama station developed during the 1960s-1970s as a consequence of a dramatic population increase. These two areas were separated by a ship yard and freight yard located along the coastlines.

At the end of 1970s the Third Master Plan for the National Capital Region proposed a multi-core network of cities as a solution to the high population density and the multitude of political and business activities in the Tokyo Metropolitan area. According to the plan, Yokohama had the opportunity to define a new structural role as a metropolitan area in competition with Tokyo.

After ten years of negotiation, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd. relocated along the waterfront. This area played the pivotal role in the new Yokohama plan as the focal point between the two CBDs. In 1981, the Master Plan for Yokohama and the Minato Mirai 21 (MM21) waterfront was announced.

The area encompassed by the project MM21 includes 156 hectares of land of which 76 hectares are reclaimed. Three features constituted the fundamental framework from which the project was to be implemented: “the new core of Yokohama was to be developed principally into (1) a cultural cosmopolitan area operating around the clock, (2) an information city of the 21st century and (3) a city with a superior environment, surrounded by water, greenery and historic monuments, in an effort to create a viable international cultural city”.

The primary actors in the MM21 project are the public sector, responsible for the plan’s definition, coordination and main infrastructural development, and the private sector, in charge of the construction of office and commercial facilities. The emergence of a third agency results from the partnership between private and public sectors and establishes operations of public facilities such as railways, district heating services, and a convention center (See Figure 2.)
The role of the private sector in the revitalization project has been emphasized since 1990 as a result of the policy document *Toward an Enriched Waterfront*, published by the Ministry of Transport. This document represents a turning point in planning and development of waterfronts in Japan.

Since 1986, the Japanese law opens possibilities of promoting private intervention in waterfront developments. “The Provisional Measures Law for Promotion of the Construction of Specific Facility through the Participation of Private Enterprises, stipulates that tax reduction/exemption or 5% incentive subsidy for construction facility be provided for specific facilities related to ports and harbours. These include
international conference halls, passenger terminals, office buildings related to business and other projects. The Special Measures Law for Promoting Urban Development by Private Sector, stipulates that long-term low-interest rate loans be provided through the private Urban Development Promotion Organization to an enterprise aimed at constructing buildings with public facilities such as greenery zones or port roads, which are deemed to contribute to the advancement of the port function. In addition to these laws, The Law for Development of Comprehensive Resort Area and the Multipolar Pattern of National Formation Promotion Law, ensure tax incentive measures for private port-related facilities. In conforming with these laws in the construction of facilities and off-shore man-made islands, moreover, some supporting measures including no-interest loans (through NTT share sale profits and long-term and low-interest loans by the Japan Development Bank) are also available” [25].

Another important actor in the definition of the plan of the Minato Mirai 21 waterfront is people. In article 5 of the Basic Agreement on Town Development under Minato Mirai 21, one of the central themes is the “creation of a lively town through development of superior urban infrastructure, with emphasis on the provision of continuous space where people--the most important element of the town--can enjoy walking and relaxing” [23].

According to the ministry by whom the development is undertaken, public participation in the Japanese planning system, particularly in the case of waterfront revitalization projects, can be subdivided into two measures. For projects related to the Ministry of Construction, both in the case of prefecture governor and municipality, the system stipulates that in the draft plan there must be consideration of the conclusions drawn from public hearings and information meetings. Once prepared, the draft plan must, by law, be publicly announced and circulated for two weeks, so that people may intervene in the planning process. As we noticed previously however, this process is more often a symbolic gesture; usually the situation of the draft plan remains unchanged due to the above mentioned problem of the planners’ crystallized opinions.

In the case of the Ministry of Transport, especially for the waterfront project, the Port Management Body has the main responsibility of drawing up the plan. Its definition takes shape according to the National Comprehensive Development Plan, the planning standards and the Basic Policy determined by the Minister of Transport, and in consideration of the opinions of interest groups, agencies, and the Local Port and Harbour Council. A more corporatist approach exists in the harbour planning process.

In the specific case of Minato Mirai 21, public participation did not have a powerful role. Available data confirms the absence of a public audience in the planning process. Several explanations may reveal the reasons for this lack. First, few residents lived in the area and the owners of the site were corporations or national and the local governments. But we can observe that, contrary to London, where LDDC members are appointed by the Secretary of State, in the case of Minato Mirai 21 the local authorities as elected officials are responsible for defining the plan and coordinating its parts. Local authorities are then able to meet directly with local residents and can therefore measure their needs,
sometimes without formal inquiries. Formal public participation may seem unnecessary for this reason.

And, as Minor-u O’uchi [22] observes, “it appears that people were not chiefs though they were driven to dance in the scene. They did not spontaneously participate, rather they were compelled to follow due to the compulsion of the circumstances. Generally, people are moderate to and fully aware of the undeclared intentions of rulers who advocate administrative reorganization reform. Some people protest, but some become indifferent or cynical about whatever government says.”

It is important nonetheless to notice that recently in Japan, more spontaneous groups or ‘non-traditional’ ones, such as environmental groups, have tried to develop and assume a more active role in the planning process through campaigns and media intervention.

6. ELEPHANTS AND SLEDGE-DOGS

In light of our initial reflections on planning and of the experiences with real-world cases, it can easily be seen that existing theories describe only partly a complex reality. There are several factors that cause a distortion between theory and reality. The political factor is one such important consideration.

Within both the British and Japanese waterfront revitalization projects, a common structure which manages the private activities and somehow directs public participation, has been defined. The presence of “New-Right” central government in Britain and Japan in the 1980s appears as a plausible explanation for similar attitudes and political agenda. The locus element, too, has outlined similarities and differences, not only between the two countries, but also when we observe how the application of the political criteria and theoretical goals has actually taken place.

In London, the presence of severe social and ethnic conflicts and the dereliction of the area were fundamental problems not incorporated within the plan. The LDDC has preferred a short-term perspective rather than the assessment of the present externalities developed into a long-term view. This has sometimes caused extremely negative results. Some data may illustrate the situation in The Docklands. Housing prices in the area have risen at a faster rate than most other areas of London. For example, in Wapping at Gun Wharf, a one-bedroom flat would cost £73,000 in July 1984; by March 1987, the price had risen to £185,000. Until the end of 1987, 12,000 new dwellings have been built, over 10,000 (84%) of these were for sale. In 1986-87, the three Docklands boroughs Newham, Southwark and Tower Hamlets accepted 4,394 homeless families compared with 1,600 in 1891-82. According to the Department of the Environment (DoE), between 1981 and 1987, 20,317 jobs were attracted to the LDDC area. But according to Parliamentary Answers, 15,724 of these were direct transfers. Therefore, 4,593 were new jobs. “But even using DoE figures, over 13,000 jobs were lost in the Docklands area during this period. According to DoE, this leaves a net loss of between 8-9,000 jobs” [11].
The Japanese project of Minato Mirai 21 shows the result, as we have noted above, of a ‘era’ of reforms. The RINCHO period represents the decade beginning in 1981 that was characterized by the administrative reform under prime ministers Susuki and Nakasone.

A gap between idea and reality is, however, still evident between the political agenda and the objectives listed in the documents: Ports and Harbors Toward the 21st Century and Toward an Enriched Waterfront, both published by the Ministry of Transport, which call for a new view on port development. Generally, a physical redevelopment has been the focus of the waterfront project with scarce attention to the document’s recommendations.

For instance, the high costs of the facilities in Minato Mirai 21 have created an elite area; after work, few people walk along the waterfront as was stated as one of the project’s goals. Minoru O’uchi [22.] identifies five factors which can shed light on the gap between the declared objectives of general reform in Japan and the reality of actual implementation: "(1) lack of political commitment, (2) inherent contradictions within the reform policy itself, (3) weakness in the capability of the implementing organization, (4) lack of maturity in self-management by people who otherwise could take advantage of the opportunity for administrative reorientation, and (5) unfavorable environmental conditions”. These conclusions are thus important in the case of waterfront revitalization in Japan.

The structure of policy intervention in waterfronts is critical for the success of the projects. We may refer here to a metaphor of Richard Bender [3.] created to explain different approaches to waterfront revitalization. ‘For today’s planners and builders, the tension is most often between the organizational simplicity of a few large elements and the ‘messiness’ and the complexity of dealing with a variety of overlapping, and conflicting people, institutions and uses. Rather than elephants, today’s waterfronts need an equivalent of an Eskimo and its sledge-dogs. Here the motive power is spread among the team of dogs, among dozens of legs. Each dog often snaps at the others and they may tangle their leads, but together they provide a dependable pull. If some are hurt, or sick or even die, the team can continue. If circumstances require it, the team can split up, each group going on a different route. On cold nights or during storms, the driver can even curl up with the dogs for warmth. Over time, the dogs reproduce, maintaining or increasing the size of the team and renewing its energy. In the worst case scenario, one of the dogs can be fed to the others. On the other hand, imagine what would happen if the Eskimo tied an elephant to his sledge. If its concentrated weight did not break through the ice immediately, the massive legs would falter as they struggled over the slippery surface. Only one route at a time may be pursued with such a monolith. A large part of the load on the sledge would be food to feed the elephant. If the elephant were injured or sick, the sledge would be stopped. And it’s hard to picture the Eskimo curling up with his elephant on a cold night.”

This of the sledge-dogs and the elephant need not deceive urban planners, if they look at the physical aspects of the many waterfronts: world-trade centers, big hotels, towers and aquariums. But this image is particularly useful to stress the attention for the type of

3 RINCHO (Rinji-Gyosei Chosa-Kai) the Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform.
public-private nexus and, above all, for a structure to tackle the problem. By this is meant
the necessity to understand and ‘dismember’ the problem in its many constituent aspects
and elements. Like the different dogs of the Eskimo’ sledge, all these elements and
perspectives, particularly the private sector, but also the public sector, should clearly
define the objectives of the plan in a cohesive way and cooperate with other actors to
achieve the best results.

In the actual panorama of waterfront revitalization policies, there are a few examples that
follow this structural/”sledge-dog” approach. It is therefore necessary to reflect and
redirect efforts applied in waterfronts to achieve better results. As a French general is said
to have responded to his head gardener when told his plans for creating an oak forest
would take hundreds of years, “Quick then, we have not a moment to lose”.

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