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Migrant Mobilisation and Political Opportunities: Variation Among German Cities and a Comparison with the United Kingdom and the Netherlands

Ruud Koopmans

This paper offers a comparative, cross-local and cross-national analysis of the involvement of migrants and ethnic minorities in public debates and mobilisation (claims-making) in their countries of residence. Local and national integration and citizenship regimes are seen as political opportunity structures that may stimulate, constrain, or channel the degrees and types of migrants’ political involvement. Empirically, the paper draws on media content data for Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, as well as on extra-medial indicators of opportunity structures such as naturalisation rates and the relative strength of conservative parties. In a first round of analysis, 16 German regions and cities are compared. This analysis reveals important intra-local differences that are in line with the expectations drawn from the opportunity structure model. The results show a strong and consistent positive relation between the inclusiveness of local incorporation regimes and the degree to which immigrants participate proactively in public debates on issues concerning them. By contrast, we find political orientations on the countries of origin of immigrants to be most prevalent in localities that offer immigrants few channels of access to the decision-making process and grant them little legitimacy in the public domain. In a second step, this analysis is extended to the Netherlands and the UK, showing that the magnitude of cross-national differences is much more important than that of local variation within each of the countries. Thus, the results contradict recently popular views that the nation-state has become largely irrelevant for the incorporation of immigrants and that postnational and local contexts have become decisive.
Introduction

Nation-state bashing has become a favourite pastime in the social sciences, not least among students of migration and ethnic relations. National modes of migrant integration and national notions of citizenship are seen as obsolete and of marginal consequence for the relationship between migrants and the receiving society. This assault on the nation-state comes from two sides. On the one hand, a number of authors (e.g. Bauböck 1994; Jacobson 1996; Sassen 1998; Soysal 1994) have argued that the capacities of nation-states for developing distinct policies of migration regulation and nationally-specific modes of migrant incorporation are nowadays seriously narrowed by the increased importance of international human rights discourses and supranational treaties, conventions and jurisdictions. Moreover, the argument continues, as a result of the globalisation of transport and communication networks migrants are nowadays able to maintain strong ties to their homelands and have therefore become more resistant to the integration attempts of the receiving nation-states (e.g. Lie 1995; Rex 1998; Shain and Sherman 1998; Van Hear 1998). Together with Paul Statham I have dealt with these ‘postnational’ and ‘transnational’ arguments elsewhere (Koopmans and Statham 1999a, 2001) and shown that thus far the political mobilisation and claims-making of migrants have remained strongly focused on, and shaped by, the context of the receiving nation-states and are not significantly oriented toward, and influenced by supranational institutions, or transnational discourses and identities.

Here, I want to critically examine a second form of relativisation of the nation-state, which emphasises the local level as of decisive importance for migrant integration (e.g. Garbaye 2000; to some extent also Ireland 1994). The postnational and local arguments are often combined, as in Sassen’s (1991) focus on the ‘global city’. The local level, in this view, is where migrants and the host society interact concretely, and local policies can much more adequately respond to the problems of specific migrant groups and resolve ethnic conflicts than the distant and inflexible national state. Moreover, precisely because the national state is often still seen (and presents itself) as the representative of a specific ethnic group or national culture, migrants often find it difficult to identify with their host society on the national level and it is much easier for them to develop a locally-defined sense of belonging. Indeed, many Turkish immigrants in Berlin find it difficult to see themselves as Germans, but unproblematically define themselves as Berliners.

There can be no disagreement about the existence of variation in migrant incorporation approaches between cities and regions within the same country. In Germany, for instance, there is a clear difference, both in the rhetoric and in the practice of ‘foreigner politics’, between more liberal cities such as Berlin and Frankfurt and conservative Southern states such as Bavaria. Patrick Ireland (1994) has found similar differences between French and Swiss localities. The question
which seems to be at issue is rather the extent of such local differences and the
degree to which they override the impact of national differences in incorporation
regimes. One position, which has become increasingly popular, is to see national
differences as little more than artefacts created by the aggregation of widely diverging
local experiences. In such a view, it does not make much sense to talk about ‘the
German model’ of migrant integration since this would obscure local variations
within Germany that are much more important than cross-national differences. A
liberal German metropolis like Berlin might then be more similar to, say, Amster-
dam, Paris or London than to more conservative German cities such as Munich or
Stuttgart. At the other extreme one may conceive of local differences as relatively
marginal variations on a national theme. In that view, even the most liberal,
self-proclaimed multicultural of German regions or cities would still look unmistak-
ably ‘German’ when compared to any city or region in another European country
with different national integration policies and traditions of citizenship.

A political opportunity structure approach to collective action and social move-
ments suggests a more differentiated answer to the question of which is more
important, local or national variation. Much depends, in this view, on the nature of
a country’s political system, and particularly on the degree of centralisation or
federalisation of the decision-making and policy-implementation processes
(Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995). In federal states such as Germany, we can expect
important differences between regions and cities that may well be equally or more
important than overall differences between countries. In more centralised states such
as the Netherlands and Britain, on the contrary, we would expect a much narrower
range of local variation that never really approaches the magnitude of cross-national
differences.

The central tenet of the political opportunity approach to collective action is that
mobilisation is not a direct reflection of social structural tensions, problems and
grievances, but is mediated by the available opportunities and constraints set by the
political environments in which mobilising groups, in the case at hand migrants,
operate. By offering favourable access to the policy process, and public resonance
and discursive legitimacy to some forms of claims-making, while creating negative
stimuli for other forms of claims-making, the political opportunity structure favours
some collective actors, some expressions of collective identities, and some types of
demands over others. The political opportunity structure consists of an institutional
side, which includes the structure of the political system and the composition of
power in the party system, and a discursive side, which includes established notions
of who and what are considered reasonable, sensible, and legitimate (for the
distinction between institutional and discursive opportunity structures, see Koop-
mans 1999). Obviously, opportunity structures, whether institutional or discursive,
vary to some extent from one policy arena to another, and from the point of view
of one collective actor to that of another.

In the present context, I will therefore emphasise aspects of the political oppor-
tunity structure relevant to the field of immigration and ethnic relations politics, and
for the mobilisation of migrants in particular. Citizenship and integration regimes
play a crucial role in shaping political contention, debates, and outcomes in the field of immigration and ethnic relations (see Koopmans and Statham 2000). Citizenship and integration regimes act as a field-specific political opportunity structure that shapes migrant identities and their patterns of organisation and political participation.

The different policy approaches can be conceptualised in a two-dimensional space (Koopmans and Statham 2000). The first dimension concerns the degree to which full and equal citizenship is accessible to individual migrants. In Western Europe, one extreme is exemplified by Switzerland and until recently Germany, countries which put up high barriers to granting migrants citizenship rights, with the result that most migrants—including second and third generations—have remained ‘foreigners’ excluded from full equal rights, most importantly the right to vote. At the other extreme we find countries such as the Netherlands or Sweden, where naturalisation is easy and frequent, as well as Britain and France, which automatically grant citizenship to the second and further generations according to the principle of jus soli.

The second dimension concerns the granting of cultural group rights to migrants. Here we can distinguish a monist or assimilationist position, which can be found in France and—with substantial regional variation—in Switzerland and Germany, from a more pluralist or multicultural approach, which we find for instance in Britain and, more overtly, in the Netherlands. The question here is to what extent migrants should have the right to retain their cultural traditions and whether the state should take measures to accommodate or even stimulate such cultural differences, e.g. by allowing the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in public institutions, subsidising minority organisations on the basis of ethnicity and religion, or creating provisions for religious education in the school system. As the French example indicates, an assimilationist approach can be combined with a very open citizenship regime on the individual level: the expectation here is that naturalisation acts as an instrument of assimilation. Conversely, some multicultural elements may be combined with a restrictive approach towards granting citizenship to migrant individuals. For instance, the German state of Bavaria is the state with both the lowest naturalisation rate, and a relatively strong facilitation of mother-tongue and Islam instruction in state schools (in co-operation with homeland authorities). The philosophy here is still that of the guestworker era: the retention of the homeland culture is seen as facilitating migrants’ eventual return to the country of origin.

As the Bavarian example indicates, the talk of national models of citizenship and migrant integration obscures sometimes considerable local and regional differences. Therefore, it is important to consider both political levels in assessing how citizenship and integration policies in both their national and local manifestations affect patterns of migrant political participation. To take both levels into account, I will supplement the comparison of German regions and cities that forms the core of this paper with a subsequent section in which German cities are compared to cities in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Combined, these two perspectives—cross-local and cross-national—will allow us to answer our initial question about the
relative importance of local and national integration policies in explaining patterns of migrant mobilisation.

Specifically, I will look at three central features of migrant claims-making:

• the degree to which migrants and their organisations participate in public debates and mobilisation around issues of immigration and ethnic relations;
• the degree to which migrants’ claims-making refers to the politics of their countries of origin (homelands) as against their situation in the country of residence; and
• the degree of proactive claims by migrants for integration, participation and rights in the country of residence.

These three features can be regarded as indicators of the political integration of migrants into the polities of their countries or localities of residence. Participation in public debates that concern them, a political orientation towards the country of residence rather than the homeland, and a proactive stance for rights and participation as against a reactive pre-occupation with anti-racism and issues of entry and expulsion—all indicate a stronger participation and influence in, and a stronger identification of migrants with, the polities of the country or city of residence. ‘Integrative’ outcomes in this respect are generally positively evaluated by representatives of migrants and the receiving country alike. Both generally regard a situation in which migrants hardly participate in public debates and are strongly oriented towards political conflicts in their countries of origin as something to be avoided or remedied. This is moreover true for the authorities of the receiving countries largely irrespective of their political colour and integration approach. Conservative Bavarians and liberal Berliners generally agree that the aim of migrant integration policies should be to stimulate migrants’ participation and to avoid high levels of homeland-oriented conflicts. Controversies rage, of course, about how such outcomes can best be achieved.

Data, Method and Hypotheses

The data I use for the analysis of regional and local differences in Germany are drawn from a content coding of instances of claims-making reported in quality newspapers during the 1990s. The comparison with cities in other countries is based on similar data gathered in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The sample is based on every second issue (Monday, Wednesday, Friday) of one national quality newspaper in each of the three countries: the Frankfurter Rundschau, Guardian, and NRC Handelsblad. Catering to an educated public politically situated at the centre to centre-left of the political spectrum, these newspapers are broadly comparable in terms of reporting style and political colour. Moreover, comparisons with other available newspapers that fulfil these criteria showed that the sources chosen paid relatively more attention to immigration and ethnic relations issues.

Reliability and validity checks were conducted by way of comparisons for selected periods with other newspapers—national, local as well as ethnic. Although there
were important differences in the quantity of claims reported, all of these sources displayed remarkably similar patterns on the variables that are of interest here, with the main sources, however, nearly always appearing as the richest sources. The reasons for these qualitative similarities between newspaper sources lie partly in the fact that all print media share common standards of what is considered newsworthy, so-called ‘news values’ (see e.g. Galtung and Homboe Ruge 1965; Hocke 1998; McCarthy et al. 1996). Furthermore, a focus on national quality newspapers has the advantage that these are often considered as reference sources by other media, particularly by those with a regional scope. Taken together, the results of these comparisons among sources suggest that by using national quality newspapers as our source, we obtain a valid and reliable picture of the patterns of public claims-making in our field of interest. This assessment receives further support from comparisons with non-media sources, which are possible for certain types of event, such as xenophobic violence in Germany (see Koopmans 2001).

Claims-making is defined as the collective and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors. Acts of claims-making were included in the sample if they referred to the issue fields of immigration, minority integration, and xenophobia, irrespective of the actor or the form of action. Thus, the data include claims-making as varied as government decisions or politicians’ public statements on asylum legislation, court rulings on migrants’ residence rights, minority organisation statements on cultural rights, as well as demonstrations and acts of violence by xenophobes, minorities and anti-racists. Additionally, we coded all claims-making by migrants and ethnic minorities, even if these did not refer to the above-mentioned issues. In particular, this allows us to include migrant mobilisation that referred to political issues and conflicts in their countries of origin (homeland politics). All in all, the data-set for Germany includes 11,204 instances of claims-making, the Dutch and British datasets cover 2,750 and 2,050 cases respectively.

Two potential objections to the use of this kind of data should briefly be addressed. First, one may argue that newspapers do not represent the universe of political actions and statements, but only a small and potentially biased selection from that universe. This is certainly true, but not a problem—perhaps even a blessing—from the perspective of the questions addressed in this paper. What I am interested in here are the public claims of migrants, not the failed attempts to mobilise public attention. The selection process by the mass media is precisely one of the central mechanisms by which citizenship regimes impinge on patterns of public claims-making. In countries where migrant organisations command few resources and are not regarded as part of the political community, migrants will find it much more difficult to penetrate the selection barriers of the news media—which privilege resourceful actors with high status and legitimacy—than in countries where different conditions prevail. Data on migrant claims-making from the news media therefore show us which kinds of claims can successfully and legitimately be made in a certain political context. This may well be different from the kind of claims that
migrants initially attempt to make. One may, however, expect that in the somewhat longer run migrants will adapt their tactical repertoires, the framing of their demands, and even their collective identities to the opportunities and constraints they face.7

The other objection concerns the use of one national newspaper to assess differences between localities across Germany. An alternative approach would have been to gather data from local news media in each of the cities of interest. Such an approach would perhaps have been preferable, but for the range of localities investigated here also impossible from the point of view of time and resource investment. Certainly, the kind of local claims we find in the national media are only those that are of such intensity or national relevance that they are of interest to a national readership and in that sense the ones analysed here are not more than the tip of the iceberg. We should keep in mind, however, that the kind of questions asked in this paper are comparative in nature. I am not interested in absolute levels of certain types of claims-making, just in differences among localities in the relative share of certain types of claims. For this type of analysis, it does not matter that national newspapers are highly selective in reporting local events. What matters is that the bias is constant across localities. For sure, we would have a problem if the national paper paid more attention to migrant claims from Stuttgart, but to non-migrant claims from Munich, or homeland claims from Cologne, but domestic claims from Hamburg. But there is no reason to suppose that such ‘freaky’ biases play a significant role. Moreover, the true sceptic could have brought the same argument against a study based on dozens of local newspapers, simply claiming that these newspapers may have different biases of the type just described—which actually might be more realistic than the assumption that the bias of a single newspaper is structurally different depending on where an event takes place.

Empirical measures for the dependent variable, migrant claims-making, are straightforwardly drawn from these newspaper data:

• the percentage share of migrant claims among all claims on migration, integration and xenophobia in a particular locality;
• the percentage share of homeland-oriented claims among all migrant claims in a particular locality; and
• the percentage share of proactive claims for rights, integration, and participation among all migrant claims in a particular locality.8

For the independent variable, local opportunity structures, I also use three measures. The first—only available for the 11 West German federal states, not for the five other German cities that are included in the analysis—is the naturalisation rate in the period 1992–95 as a direct measurement of the first, individual, dimension of citizenship discussed above. Although naturalisation legislation is national law in Germany, the implementation of it resides with the individual states. The guidelines for naturalisation that regulate implementation leave quite a bit of leeway to state-level authorities to interpret the law in a more liberal or more restrictive way—e.g. regarding the requirement to give up one’s original nationality, for which
the law allows but does not prescribe several exceptions—resulting in substantial differences in actual naturalisation rates among the federal states. The second measure makes use of the newspaper data and consists of the average valence of the public discourse on migration and ethnic relations on a scale from $-1.00$ (for a purely anti-minority discourse) to $+1.00$ (for a purely pro-minority discourse).\(^9\) Individual claims received a score of $+1$ if they were in favour of retaining or extending the rights of migrants and minorities, of $-1$ if they were in favour of restrictions or against extensions of migrant rights, and 0 if they were ambivalent, or purely technical. The valence score for a particular city or region was obtained by computing the average of all claims made in that locality. In order not to confound dependent and independent variables, claims made by migrants were excluded from these computations.\(^10\) The final measure of political opportunities is the percentage share of the vote in the 1998 federal elections that went to the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), the main conservative party. Like the naturalisation rate, this measure is only available for the 11 federal states.

High naturalisation rates indicate an open political environment for migrant mobilisation, in which we can expect migrants and their organisations to be relatively strongly present in the public sphere, and oriented toward proactive demands for equal participation and rights. This is so because an open naturalisation regime signals that migrants are regarded as legitimate (potential) members of the political community. Moreover, in localities where such conditions prevail, more migrants will have obtained the nationality of the country of residence and thereby the right to vote (in Germany there are no local voting rights for non-EU foreigners), which gives them important institutional leverage compared to a situation where most migrants lack political rights. A favourable public discourse climate likewise signals acceptance of migrants and their demands and will make it easier for them to mobilise and to publicly formulate proactive demands related to their position in the country of residence.

Since left-wing parties are generally more supportive of migrant rights than conservative parties, migrants and their organisations will more easily find strong allies in regions and localities where left-wing parties are strong.\(^11\) Therefore, we may expect strong and proactive migrant mobilisation for equal rights and participation in localities where the share of the vote of the conservative Christian Democrats is low.

By contrast, in localities where naturalisation rates are low, an unfavourable public discourse climate prevails and conservative parties are strong, migrant organisations and their demands on the receiving country will have less institutional leverage because of the exclusion of most migrants from political rights. Moreover, they will have a lower level of public legitimacy, and will have more difficulty in finding powerful allies. The expectation is therefore that migrants in such contexts will be weakly represented in the public discourse on immigration and ethnic relations issues, and will formulate few proactive demands for equal rights and participation. Moreover, we can expect that the rejection of immigrants as members of the political community in such contexts is reflected in the self-identification of migrants and the
degree to which they orient themselves politically to the country of residence rather than to their countries of origin. Where the political opportunity structures of the receiving society are closed to migrants, I expect them to remain strongly focused on the politics of their countries of origin and to mirror the way in which the receiving society sees them by continuing to identify strongly with their national and ethnic origins (see Koopmans and Statham 1999a for evidence substantiating this hypothesis).

In order to control for possible alternative explanations for regional and local differences, I use two indicators of the size and composition of the migrant population: the percentage share of all foreigners among the total population, and the percentage of Turks—by far the most important non-European, non-Christian immigrant group in Germany—among the population. The hypothesis associated with the first variable would be that migrants simply play an important role in public discourse where there are many of them, and one may likewise argue that such a concentration of migrants would make it easier for them to advance claims for rights. Or, alternatively, one might argue that large concentrations of migrants make it easier for them to retain their homeland identities (recall the transnational communities argument or the ‘parallel societies’ argument of opponents of too much migration). A higher propensity toward homeland-related claims could also be related to the size of the local population of Turkish origin. Turks and Turkish Kurds are particularly strongly involved in homeland-related claims-making in Germany, and it could be that levels of such claims-making in German regions and cities are merely a result of the size of the population of Turkish origin. As the main group of non-EU foreigners, the Turks could also be especially strongly associated with claims for equal rights, which for EU foreigners will not be very salient since they already to a large extent have such equality.

Regional and Local Differences in Germany

My analysis of Germany includes all 11 Western federal states (including Berlin), as well as a number of larger cities for which sufficient data for analysis were available. The analysis will focus only on West Germany since the East German situation can hardly be compared with that in the West: the number of foreigners is much lower, and most of them are asylum-seekers, refugees and other recent migrants, not former guestworkers. Moreover, policies of migrant incorporation, insofar as they exist, are so recent in East Germany that we can hardly expect them to have had much effect yet. Finally, the numbers of cases of migrant claims-making in the data set tend to be so low in the Eastern states as to make a meaningful analysis impossible. All in all, this leaves us with 16 cases for analysis: eight regular states, three city-states (Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen) and five other large cities.

Although little systematic information is available on differences in local and regional integration policies in Germany, Berlin and Frankfurt are generally seen as examples of particularly liberal incorporation regimes. Berlin’s Commissioner for Foreigners, Barbara John, is probably Germany’s most active and influential, and
although a CDU member, she has been a persistent advocate of extensions of migrant rights. Frankfurt is perhaps the only self-proclaimed ‘multicultural’ city in Germany and has a special Office for Multicultural Affairs, founded by Daniel Cohn-Bendit, a well-known Green politician. Indeed, Table 1 shows that these cities stand out as particularly inclusive. If we look at the fourth column in the table showing the average valence of the public discourse on migration and ethnic relations, we see that the public discourse in Berlin (+0.27) and even more so in Frankfurt (+0.64) is more than average in favour of migrant rights. For the Berlin case, the inclusiveness of the local incorporation regime is also shown by the naturalisation rate, which is by far the highest in Germany (because naturalisation is a state prerogative no data are available for Frankfurt). The pattern of migrant claims-making we find in these cities corresponds to the expectations drawn from the political opportunity model. Minorities in Frankfurt and Berlin play a clearly larger role in the local public discourse on migration and ethnic relations than elsewhere in Germany, they are clearly less preoccupied with homeland politics, and much more often preoccupied with issues pertaining to their integration and rights in the country of residence. The table makes clear that the state of Hesse (where Frankfurt lies) in its entirety, and the city-state of Bremen, display similar patterns of claims-making related to a similarly inclusive public discourse as in Berlin and Frankfurt.

Bavaria, ruled by the staunchly conservative CSU, is the paradigmatic case of a political environment which is exclusive with regard to migrants and minorities. This is born out by Table 1, which shows that Bavaria is the region with the public discourse climate most in favour of restrictions in migrant rights (−0.16, which makes Bavaria the only region with a negative average valence score). Also, Bavaria has by far the lowest rate of naturalisation of foreigners of all German states. In line with the political opportunity hypothesis, this exclusive regime is mirrored in a pattern of migrant claims-making opposite to what we find in cities such as Berlin and Frankfurt. Minorities in Bavaria are only half as often involved in claims-making on migration and ethnic relations as elsewhere in Germany, and they tend to be more involved in homeland politics and less with their integration and rights in Germany. Munich, the Bavarian capital, displays this pattern even more sharply. These typical characteristics of an exclusive incorporation regime are not limited to Bavaria. In fact, they characterise the whole South of the Federal Republic, including also Baden-Württemberg (very pronouncedly the state capital Stuttgart), Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saarland. The example of the Saarland, by the way, shows that exclusive migrant incorporation regimes may also occur in left-dominated regions. The Saarland is a long-time stronghold of the SPD (although recently ruled by the CDU), and stood out during the 1990s as a state relatively critical toward migrants and their rights (e.g. SPD regional leader Oskar Lafontaine’s initiating role in the discussion on limiting the constitutional right to asylum in the early 1990s).

The remaining regions and cities fall in between these extremes, or sometimes display inconsistent patterns, which for Cologne, Düsseldorf and Schleswig-Holstein may partly result from the relatively low number of cases of migrant claims-making.
Table 1 Characteristics of migrant claims-making, indicators of political opportunities, and migrant population in German regions and cities, 1990–99

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>% share of migrant claims in all claims</th>
<th>% of migrant claims on homeland politics</th>
<th>% of migrant claims on integration citizenship rights</th>
<th>Average valence of public discourse on migration and ethnic relations</th>
<th>% conservative votes in 1998 elections</th>
<th>Naturalisation rate according to Foreigner Law 1992–95</th>
<th>% foreigners of total population</th>
<th>% Turks of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schleswig-Holstein</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>+ 0.25</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Saxony</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>+ 0.34</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northrhine-Westphalia</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>+ 0.23</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>+ 0.46</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhineland-Palatinate</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>+ 0.12</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saarland</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>+ 0.11</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Württemberg</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>+ 0.03</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>- 0.16</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cities</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>+ 0.27</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>+ 0.13</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>+ 0.27</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Düsseldorf</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>+ 0.26</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cologne</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>+ 0.04</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>+ 0.64</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuttgart</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>- 0.21</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>- 0.20</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Consistent ‘inclusive’ patterns (above average valence of public discourse, share of migrant claims, and integration and citizenship claims; below average score of homeland politics claims) are in bold type. Consistent ‘exclusive’ patterns are in italics. Note also that Northrhine Westphalia excludes Bonn, which was the seat of the government for most of the 1990s. Claims made in this city were almost exclusively made by national actors and cannot be meaningfully interpreted as local claims-making. Note that Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen are city-states with the same political powers as the regions. Claims occurring in the other cities have also been included in their respective states (Düsseldorf and Cologne in Northrhine-Westphalia, Frankfurt in Hesse, Stuttgart in Baden-Württemberg, and Munich in Bavaria).
However, overall there seems to be a clear connection between the openness or closure of regional or local opportunity structures and the nature of migrant claims-making. This becomes clearer still from Table 2, which shows the correlations among the different variables.

First, we see in Table 2 that the three indicators of migrant claims-making are correlated in a consistent way amongst each other. Where migrants play an important role in the public discourse on issues of migration and ethnic relations, they tend to be less involved in homeland politics. This suggests that the identification of migrants with their homeland or with their countries of residence is strongly influenced by the opportunities that the receiving society offers them to participate in the political process (for further evidence in support of this thesis, see Koopmans and Statham 1999a, 2001). The significant positive correlation between the share of migrants in the public discourse and the degree to which such claims focus on proactive integration and rights claims points in the same direction.

The three political opportunity measures are associated in highly significant ways with the pattern of migrant claims-making. The relation is generally strongest for the valence of the public discourse. The more positive the discourse climate is with regard to immigrants and minorities, the more they participate in public debates, the less they focus on homeland issues, and the more they formulate proactive demands. This is both because such a favourable opportunity structure provides migrants with the discursive resources to intervene successfully in the public sphere, and because such a discourse climate invites them to see themselves as part of the local political community. The share of conservative votes—which unsurprisingly is strongly correlated with the valence of the public discourse—has an opposite effect on claims-making. In spite of the fact that conservative states such as Bavaria are preoccupied with the danger of ‘parallel societies’ and with combating political extremism imported from the homeland regions, the exclusive policies in these regions produce precisely what they are supposed to prevent, namely a higher preoccupation of migrants with conflicts in their homelands and a weaker orientation towards the receiving society. The correlations with the naturalisation rate point in the same direction but are generally weaker and significant only in the case of the positive association between the naturalisation rate and the share of migrants in the public discourse. This is actually where one would expect the relation to be strongest, since the major political consequence of high naturalisation rates is that many migrants obtain the right to vote and thereby gain a political leverage that makes them more relevant as speakers in the public discourse. The size and composition of the migrant population, by contrast, do not seem to play important roles in explaining patterns of migrant claims-making. The size of the foreign population seems to be completely irrelevant. Only for the size of the Turkish population do we find one weakly significant correlation, namely with the share of migrants in the public debate.

Of course, some of the effects suggested by these correlations may be spurious because they are influenced by the sometimes strong correlations among the different independent variables. Although the number of cases (11 or 16, depending
### Table 2  Correlations between characteristics of migrant claims-making, indicators of political opportunity structure, and migrant population in German regions and cities, 1990–99

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Share of migrant claims</th>
<th>Homeland claims</th>
<th>Integration claims</th>
<th>Valence of public discourse</th>
<th>CDU/CSU votes</th>
<th>Naturalisation rate</th>
<th>Foreign population</th>
<th>Turkish population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Share of migrant claims</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland claims</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration claims</td>
<td>-0.55**</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valence of public discourse</td>
<td>0.68***</td>
<td>-0.67***</td>
<td>0.43*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU votes</td>
<td>-0.70**</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>-0.54*</td>
<td>-0.60**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naturalisation rate</td>
<td>0.63**</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-0.63**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign population</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish population</td>
<td>0.47*</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.55**</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.67***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: *** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.10; significant correlations are in bold type.*
on which variables are included in the equation) is too low to perform reliable regression analyses, I did perform such analyses (not displayed here) using a stepwise procedure to check whether some effects would disappear and perhaps others would appear when controlling for the other independent variables. These analyses show that the naturalisation rate has no significant effect on migrant claims-making once we control for the valence of the public discourse. The same is true for the share of conservative votes, which also drops out of the equation once the valence of the public discourse is introduced. Of course, this does not imply that naturalisation regimes and the relative political weight of right and left parties are irrelevant. It just shows that their impacts are indirect, via the effect these variables have on the public discourse on immigration and ethnic relations. Interestingly, the effect of the size of the Turkish population on the share of migrants in the public debate remains after controlling for the valence of the public discourse. This effect may be due to the Turkish community’s relatively high level of organisation (see the paper by Berger et al. in this JEMS issue), and/or to the already-mentioned fact that as non-EU migrants of a different religion there is more need for them to intervene in the public debate than, say, Italians.

German Cities in Cross-National Perspective

The results in the previous section make clear that there are substantial differences in Germany regarding the characteristics of migrant claims-making in different regions and cities. The share of migrants in the public discourse is six times as high in Frankfurt (15 per cent) as in Stuttgart (2.5 per cent). Migrants in Northern Schleswig-Holstein are almost three times less likely to make claims related to the situation in their countries of origin than in, again, Stuttgart (26.7 per cent and 77.8 per cent respectively). Finally, while in Berlin (18.3 per cent) about every fifth public claim on immigration and ethnic relations issues was made by a migrant representative or organisation, migrants are completely absent from the public discourse on these issues in Düsseldorf. This seems to provide strong evidence for the waning power of national citizenship and integration regimes, and support for those who argue that nowadays the local level is crucial for shaping the political mobilisation and demands of migrants. However, such a conclusion would only be warranted on the basis of evidence on the relative magnitude of local and national differences. I will therefore now present data on the characteristics of migrant claims-making in other European cities and compare those to the eight German cities among the localities analysed in the previous section.

The number of cases available for analysis—considerably lower in the other countries than in Germany—limits the analysis to only a few cities or urban regions in the other two countries. In the Netherlands, I include the four largest cities, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, the government seat The Hague, and Utrecht. In the United Kingdom, sufficient data are available only for three urban regions, rather than cities proper: Greater London, Yorkshire (with Bradford and Leeds as the most important
sites of claims-making), and the West Midlands, with Birmingham as the most important urban centre.

I will not focus here primarily on the differences between individual cities as I have done for Germany. What interests me here is whether differences between cities are largely independent from the country in which they are situated, which would be the case if German cities could be found both in the upper and in the lower ranges of a particular aspect of migrant claims-making, and the same would be true for cities in other countries. This is the pattern we should find if those who relativise the importance of the nation-state are right. On the contrary, if the nation-state is still the most important frame of reference for migrant claims-making, we should find a pattern in which the remarkable differences between German regions and cities which we observed in the previous section, suddenly pale in comparison to the differences between German cities and those in the Netherlands and in the United Kingdom.

Regarding such differences among countries, the expectations are similar to those derived for the comparison among German cities and regions. As I indicated at the beginning of this paper, citizenship in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands is much more easily accessible; indeed, naturalisation rates in these countries are much higher than in Germany. Therefore, I expect that migrants in the former two countries will play a larger role in the public debate, be less oriented toward homeland politics, and focus strongly on proactive demands for rights and participation.

In Table 3, we first look at the share of migrants in the public discourse in cities in the three countries. What emerges is a picture that provides support for the greater importance of cross-national rather than cross-local differences. On the one hand, we find that most British and Dutch cities have above average levels of participation of migrants in the public debate, while the bottom half of the table is made up almost entirely of German cities. The British West Midlands and Yorkshire regions show by far the highest level of migrant participation, while Munich and Stuttgart display the lowest participation levels of all 15 cities.

There is, however, one substantial deviation from this pattern: The Hague has a much lower level of migrant participation than other Dutch cities, and occupies a position in the table in the middle of the cluster of German cities. This is related to the fact that this city is the seat of the national government. As a result, we have many claims here that are made by national politicians and government representatives, which depresses the relative share of migrants, or any other type of civil-society organisations and groups, for that matter. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that the London figure is also twice as low as the Midlands and Yorkshire figures. The German seat of government during most of the 1990s, Bonn, was excluded altogether from the table, because virtually none of the numerous claims made in this city had a local origin, and almost all of them stemmed from parliamentarians and members of the national government. Nevertheless, the results for these seats of government are not meaningless, because in theory it could have been the case that we had found many claims by national migrant organisations in these cities. In that
Table 3 Percentage share of migrant claims in all claims on immigration and ethnic relations in 15 cities/urban regions in Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire (Leeds, Bradford)</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Midlands (Birmingham)</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater London</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utrecht</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cologne</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Düsseldorf</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hague</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuttgart</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

case, the share of migrants in what is, in these cities, essentially a largely national public debate, would not necessarily have been lower. That the results go in a different direction and show much lower participation than in other cities in the same country suggests that the national political level is much less accessible to migrants than the local level.

Table 4, which shows the percentage of migrant claims focusing on homeland issues in the same 15 cities, provides a more consistent picture, one that offers strong support for the primacy of national citizenship regimes in shaping migrant activism. The British urban regions have, without exception, very low levels of homeland-oriented claims. Next come the four Dutch cities with considerably higher levels of homeland activism, and the bottom half of the table is populated entirely by German cities. Apparently, there is again an effect of government seat, albeit much weaker than in Table 3. The seats of national government tend to have considerably higher levels of homeland activism than other cities in the same country. The obvious explanation is the presence of embassies from the home country in these cities, which are often a preferred target for opponents—and sometimes also supporters—of the homeland regime. In addition, as the hub of foreign politics, the seat of government is also a likely place to make claims on the government of the country of residence to ask it to pressure homeland authorities to further the interests of the claimants.

The most important message of Table 4, however, is the overriding importance of national differences and a strong relativisation of the differences within Germany that earlier seemed so impressive. Even Berlin, which has the lowest level of homeland claims-making among German cities, looks very ‘German’ when compared to British and Dutch cities. Vice versa, the range of variation among cities
Table 4 Percentage of migrant claims-making directed towards homeland issues in 15 cities/urban regions in Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Midlands (Birmingham)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater London</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire (Bradford, Leeds)</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utrecht</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hague</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Düsseldorf</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cologne</td>
<td>68.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuttgart</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

within the latter countries may look impressive if viewed from the inside; e.g. specialists of ethnic relations in Britain may find Bradford a universe away from London. But cities and urban regions in the United Kingdom are highly similar if we broaden the comparative perspective to include countries with very different citizenship regimes such as Germany.

Third and finally, we look in Table 5 at the percentage of proactive migrant claims for integration, participation, and rights. The by-now familiar patterns of British and

Table 5 Percentage of migrant claims-making on integration and citizenship rights in 15 cities/urban regions in Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utrecht</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yorkshire (Bradford, Leeds)</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater London</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotterdam</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Midlands (Birmingham)</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amsterdam</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuttgart</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cologne</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Düsseldorf</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dutch cities in the top half of the table, and German cities occupying the lower ranks, is again reproduced. While in most cities in the first two countries more than half of the claims are proactive ones concerning integration and rights, in German cities fewer—and often substantially fewer—than 20 per cent of claims are of this type. This implies that, in as far as migrants in Germany are concerned with issues referring to the country of residence, these are more often defensive and reactive issues concerning entry rights and expulsions, and racist and xenophobic attacks from the side of the majority population. Thus, the pattern of migrants’ claims-making in Germany fully reflects their lack of full citizenship rights, and the symbolic exclusion of migrants as ‘Ausländer’ from the political community. And once again, the differences between German cities that earlier seemed so large, now look very modest compared to the differences with cities in Britain and the Netherlands. Equipped with full rights, the political leverage of the vote, and the formal as well as symbolic entitlement to fully equal treatment, migrants in Britain and the Netherlands are in a much stronger position to make proactive claims for extending their rights and promoting equal participation.

Conclusion: Local Incorporation Along Nationally-Defined Paths

The results presented in this paper clearly speak against the popular view that, nowadays, national integration and citizenship regimes have lost their power to shape patterns of migrant incorporation, and have given way to the local level as the main locus where migrant integration takes shape. In a radical variant of this argument, we are told that ‘global cities’ such as London and Amsterdam, or Munich and Berlin, have become largely decoupled from their national contexts, and have more in common with their sisters in the global network than with their more parochial hinterlands. While the global cities view may adequately describe the social habitus of frequent flyers in the academic and business communities, it has little to do with reality as far as the incorporation of immigrants is concerned. If we look at patterns of migrant claims-making, Amsterdam is much like ‘provincial’ Utrecht, and London is like not-so-global Leeds, and each of these cities is very different from German metropolises such as Berlin and Munich, which are in turn very similar to relative backwaters such as Bremen and Stuttgart.

Of course, it would not be wise to overstate the point, because the results for Germany also show that, within a broad national pattern, there is substantial scope for local variation. To an important extent, it is this variation on a national theme that policy-makers have to work with. Even if German policy-makers would agree that, say, the British model is preferable to the German one, Germany cannot simply become Britain. Migrant incorporation policies have deep roots in national traditions of citizenship and notions of national identity that cannot be changed at will—although it must be said that Germany has recently shown that radical changes of direction are occasionally possible. Another reason why we should not conclude that the local level is unimportant for migrants’ political integration is that, as the results for cities that are seats of national government in the previous section suggest,
the local level is generally more easily accessible for migrants than is the national political arena. In that sense, there is a kernel of truth in the claim that integration takes place primarily at the local level. The important qualification is that how such local incorporation occurs is largely determined by national repertoires of citizenship and integration policies. Local policy-makers may deviate from, or innovate within, such national repertoires, but they generally do so within relatively narrow limits.

Regardless of the question of local and national variation, the results also show that citizenship and integration policies matter and do so in ways that conform to the expectations drawn from a political opportunity approach. This is not such a self-evident conclusion as it may seem to some readers. In the recent academic literature on migration and ethnic relations there has been a strong tendency to see migrants as free-floating transnational communities whose position and rights are secured by supranational rights and discourses and whose identities and types of claim are largely independent from the policies of the receiving countries. This view, my findings show, is way off the mark. Differences in types of incorporation regime linked to different conceptions of citizenship go a long way in explaining both national and local differences in the central characteristics of migrant mobilisation and claims-making. In more inclusive political contexts, migrants play a more important role in the public debate on issues concerning them, they are much less oriented toward the politics of their homelands, and focus more strongly on issues pertaining to their integration and rights in the receiving society.

Acknowledgement

The research reported in this article is part of a larger research project on ‘Mobilisation on Ethnic Relations, Citizenship and Immigration’ (MERCI). This is a collaborative project that includes, besides the present author, Paul Statham, Marco Giugni, Florence Passy and Thom Duyvené de Wit.

Notes

[1] Since the data for Germany in this paper refer to the period 1990–99, we are dealing with the period before the overhaul of naturalisation legislation that went into force in 2000, and which among other things introduced a conditional form of *jus soli* for children of migrants born in Germany. In the future, we may expect the patterns of claims-making of migrants in Germany to move in the direction of their counterparts in countries such as France, the Netherlands, or Britain. Where Germany will end up will depend, to an important extent, on how it will deal with the issue of cultural difference—an issue which is only beginning to enter the German political debate.

[2] The relative positioning of these countries on the two dimensions of citizenship is confirmed by a comparative study of empirical indicators of rights, entitlements, and duties of migrants in Germany, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Indicators for the individual dimension include, e.g. the criteria for naturalisation, social
and residence rights, and anti-discrimination legislation (see Cinar et al. 1995; Davy 2001). The cultural group rights dimension includes, e.g. rights to state-funded Islamic schools or religious education, exemptions from dress codes on religious grounds, or positive action schemes for ethnic and racial groups.

[3] The coding manual is available from the author on request. For a more extensive discussion of the method, see Koopmans and Statham (1999b).

[4] The data for the other two countries were gathered by Paul Statham and Thom Duyvené de Wit. For more detail on migrant mobilisation in these countries, see Statham (1999) and Duyvené de Wit and Koopmans (2001). The data for the Netherlands refer to a somewhat shorter time period, namely 1992–99.

[5] The comparison of the left-liberal quality newspaper Frankfurter Rundschau and the right-wing tabloid Bild is a case in point. The number of reported claims in the domain of immigration and ethnic relations turns out to be 4.6 times higher in the Rundschau than in Bild. However, distributions across different issues hardly differ between the two papers, and neither does the representation of different actors in the coverage. In a similar vein, we find that the national newspapers actually report more events of regional scope than the regional newspapers, which tend to report much about their own region, but virtually nothing about what happens in other regions and localities.

[6] This definition is close to the one used by Charles Tilly in his recent work (e.g. 1995: 16).

[7] This does not have to occur by way of an opportunistic or fatalistic adaptation of migrant organisations to the limits of the possible and the legitimate, but probably more often occurs through competition between different migrant organisations. Imagine for instance the fate of two migrant organisations in France, one—of the type SOS Racisme—mobilising universalist collective identities on behalf of migrants as a general category and against the making of differences on the basis of ethnicity by the extreme right, and another mobilising for cultural group rights for a specific ethnic group. In the French context, the former group is likely to receive much media attention and broad support from political elites, including perhaps direct financial support from the state or political parties. The latter group is likely to be either ignored, or to encounter very negative reactions in the French public sphere. As a result, the former group will flourish, will be able to strengthen its position in the public debate, and its strategies and demands are likely to be copied by other migrant organisations. The latter group, on the contrary, will remain marginal, its failure makes it unlikely that other groups will see it as an example to follow, and in the longer run the organisation may even disappear altogether.

[8] Next to homeland-oriented claims and claims for rights, integration, and participation, two other categories of claims concern questions of entry and exit (e.g. family reunification, expulsions, asylum recognition), and anti-racism. These categories are not analysed separately here because their relation to migrants’ opportunities is ambiguous. On the one hand, compared to homeland-oriented claims, entry and exit and anti-racism claims may indicate a stronger orientation toward the country of residence. On the other hand, these are also primarily reactive claims, which reflect the precarious status of many migrants, both in terms of residence rights, and in terms of acceptance by the majority population.

[9] This excludes claims against racism and the extreme right. Because the rejection of xenophobic violence—to which most of these claims pertain—is consensual within the German public discourse, such claims hardly discriminate, neither among actors nor among regions.

[10] Theoretically, it would have been good to also have a measure of the second, cultural group rights dimension of citizenship. Unfortunately, there was so little debate about cultural issues in Germany that it was not possible to separate these out and construct a valence measure of public discourse with regard to cultural rights.

Note that these two measures are logically independent from one another. The share of homeland claims among all migrant claims bears no intrinsic relation to the share of migrants in public debates on immigration and ethnic relations issues.

References


