Chapter 1

Introduction
1.1 INTRODUCTION

European countries are experiencing ongoing changes in demographic behavior. This is reflected in new and heterogeneous family formation patterns. For example, marriage and childbearing have been postponed and levels of cohabitation and divorce have been increasing (Billari and Liefbroer, 2010; Corijn and Klijzing, 2001). Over the last decades, young adults have been increasingly expected to make their own choices and to shape their own individual life courses (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 2002; Giddens, 1991). These trends have been observed in most Western European countries, but the resulting behaviors still vary strongly by country. Historical, societal and structural factors such as policies and institutional arrangements have been found to affect the behavior of individuals (Buchmann, 1989; Lesthaeghe, 1998; Mayer, 2001; Reher, 1998). While these ongoing changes in the family and relationship domain have been extensively in the majority populations, relatively little is known about these patterns among young adults of migrant origin in Europe. This limited knowledge is unfortunate for at least two reasons.

First, migrants and their descendants constitute a growing share of the overall young adult population in Europe. For example, in Germany and the Netherlands children of migrants make up between 30 and 40 percent of the population below the age of 15 years (Statistics Netherlands; Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007). In cities, where most migrants live (Brama, 2008; INSEE, 2005; Simpson and Finney, 2009; Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007; Willaert, 2010; Zorlu and Mulder, 2008), these percentages are often even higher and can increase to 60 percent. In Europe, the largest migrant group are the Turks (Eurostat, 2010). They have settled in almost all countries in Northern and Western Europe. This group consists of approximately 4 million migrants and their descendants (see Table 1.1). Given the increasing size of migrant populations – in absolute and relative terms – migrants and their descendants account for a large part of the growth and dynamics in contemporary European populations. This makes it essential to include all parts of the population in the study on union formation and partner choice.

A second reason why the limited knowledge is unfortunate is that it is not clear whether union formation patterns of migrant and native young adults are driven by the same underlying mechanisms. Central questions in demography and family sociology relating to changes in family forms, to the interaction of social institutions and families, to family relations such as the division of labor and socialization, and to individual life course choices (Huininink, 2006), cannot be answered adequately without paying attention to the variations and differences that may characterize migrant families (Sørensen, 2007). While there is an increasing interest in studying migrant families, the consequences for demography and family sociology have received only limited attention.

Potentially different processes underlie the union formation choices of young adults of migrant origin. Union formation among this group is especially prone to changes and multiple spheres of influence due to the migration and settlement experience. Migrants take along known behaviors and values from their country of origin, which potentially influence
subsequent behavior of both themselves and their offspring. At the same time, these behaviors may, just like family relations, undergo changes during the migration and settlement process resulting in specific paths of behavior. In the case of family relations, these changes consisted of two opposite developments. For some migrants, family relations became closer while others experienced a dissolution of family ties (Foner, 1997; Nauck, 2001b; Phalet and Schönpflug, 2001a; Portes and Zhou, 1993). The host society is also an important sphere for shaping particular paths of union formation as it provides potential new and different cultural and societal conditions. Combining these different spheres of influences may be challenging. This may be particularly the case for migrants and their descendants from more collectivistic societies such as Turkey, which differ from more individualistic countries in Europe because the general assumptions on union formation choices are different or even contradictory (Nauck, 2001a). Furthermore, values and behaviors are not static, particularly in the migrant and settlement process where changes are constant. These changes may become more apparent for children of migrants. Compared with the migrants themselves, the children of migrants (the second generation) were born and raised in Europe, they were embedded in its institutional context and in peer groups of various ethnic origins, and were part of the same schooling system as the majority population. The potential dual socialization into the culture of their parent’s origin group and the host society raises the question as to how this will affect their union formation patterns.

The general objective of this dissertation is to increase our understanding of the union formation choices of second-generation Turkish young adults in Europe and the factors of influence on these choices. We do so by including several aspects of union formation behavior, by taking a comparative perspective and by paying attention to the multiple spheres of influence that impinge on second-generation young adults. Furthermore, three factors make for interesting cross-country comparisons of the Turkish second generation: The strong numerical presence of Turkish migrants and their descendants, their broad spread across Europe and the fact that a large part of the Turkish second generation that are now in their twenties and thirties share the characteristic that they were born primarily to labor migrants from the 1960s.

The first defining feature of this study is its focus on various aspects of union formation. We include the timing of a first union and first marriage, the ethnic origin of the partner, the type of union (marriage versus unmarried cohabitation) and gender-role behavior. This enlarged focus is in line with other recent studies on family formation of migrants that began to move away from mainly studying intermarriage and included additional family behaviors (Glick, 2010). The result is a richer picture of how migration, settlement processes and interactions within new conditions influence the acculturation of migrants and their descendants with respect to union formation. Taking this approach also allows us to better understand future population and family change as well as to study how policies directed at migrants or families in general work. With the second generation coming of age in Europe and experiencing these union formation events in larger numbers, an added advantage of this
study is that it is able to concentrate on actual behaviors, and not only on attitudes concerning union formation and gender-role behavior.

The second defining feature is the multidimensional focus on union formation choices of one specific second-generation migrant group, the Turks. We will compare young adults’ behavior within this second-generation group, with that of other origin groups as well as across countries. This three-dimensional perspective has several advantages and sheds light on potential similarities and differences. Within the Turkish second generation, individual differences are likely to be large. Previous studies in Turkey and on Turkish labor migrants in Europe showed that large behavioral and attitudinal differences exist by background characteristics such as place of origin, educational level and age (Çelikaksoy, Nielsen, and Verner, 2002; Hortaçsu and Oral, 1994; Kagıtçibasi and Ataca, 2005; Koç, 2008; Nauck, 2001a; Yavuz, 2006). Taking union formation behavior of other origin groups into account is relevant because migrant groups bring their own cultural values and behaviors. In encountering new conditions, different paths of behavior may occur. Finally, only a cross-country comparison helps us to understand the influence of the national context on behaviors and to discover differences unrelated to individual characteristics. We contribute to the literature by taking different institutional contexts into account whereas most previous studies on the union formation of migrants focused on one country context.

The third defining feature is the examination of how multiple influence spheres – each with their own cultural and societal opportunities and constraints – influence union formation processes among the Turkish second generation. We focus on the role of parents as members of the culture of origin and on the role of non-coethnic peers as members of the host society. Peers in particular have so far received very limited attention in studies on the union formation choices of the second generation.

Partner choice and union formation are not only determined by characteristics of individuals, but are interlinked with the persons an individual interacts with. Parents and parental characteristics remain crucial in shaping the life course choices of their children, although their overall influence is becoming smaller in adolescence when adolescents form more ties outside their family of origin (Prinstein and Dodge, 2008; Youniss and Smollar, 1985). Parental influence on union formation choices also remains important for migrant groups (De Valk and Liefbroer, 2007; Haug, 2005), where families are an important resource and support group. Parents may either enable or hinder behavior and this may be the case in particular among young adults from more collectivistic cultures like the Turkish one, where parents often still take an active role in the union formation choices of their children (Kagıtçibasi and Ataca, 2005; Nauck, 2001a). Although less studied, peers are just as relevant and important in the life course choices of young adults (Harris, 1995; Youniss and Smollar, 1985). For second-generation Turks, peers often represent their main contact with the host society, in particular if these peers are from outside their own ethnic group. These non-coethnic peers potentially have different views and behavior with regard to union formation. In encountering these different views and behaviors, changes may occur among the Turkish second generation.
In addition to these important others or “third parties”, the different institutional contexts in Europe may equally affect union formation among the second generation. Policies, specifically targeted at migrants or at families in general, offer arrangements that may facilitate or hinder choices with regard to union formation. Migration and integration policies shape the lives of migrants and their descendants, for example by determining the timing or possibilities for family reunification and setting requirements for the legal entry of partners. In addition, welfare state regimes not only influence the lives of the members of the majority population, but equally shape the life courses of migrants and their descendants through regulations on eligibility and access to resources. As these welfare state regimes and policies differ by country, place of residence is an important factor to take into account when studying union formation and partner choice among the Turkish second generation.

In summary, this study seeks to answer the following general research questions:

A) What union formation patterns are observed among the Turkish second generation? How do these patterns differ from those of other ethnic groups? How do these patterns differ between second-generation Turks in different European countries?

B) How can we explain the union formation patterns of the Turkish second generation? In particular, what is the role of third parties (parents and peers) and the institutional context?

In the following section of the introduction, we present a brief overview of union formation patterns among European majority populations and among the first generation of Turkish migrants as these represent the two main spheres influencing the second generation. This is followed by a review of single country studies on the union formation behavior of the Turkish second generation. We will then discuss our theoretical framework, the data, and the specific research questions that will be answered in the empirical chapters of this dissertation.

1.2 BACKGROUND

1.2.1 European union formation patterns

This short overview of union formation patterns in Europe will facilitate our understanding of the varied contexts in which the Turkish second generation is born and embedded. Just as among migrants and their descendants, union formation patterns among the majority populations are not static.

In Northwestern Europe, changes have occurred in recent decades in the timing, type, frequency and stability of unions, in contraceptive behavior and in the level and pattern of fertility, particularly in a postponement of marriage and parenthood and an increasing prevalence on non-marital cohabitation, non-marital fertility and voluntary childlessness (Billari and Liefbroer, 2010; Corijn and Klijzing, 2001). The changes in demographic behavior that have taken place since the 1960s were caused by increasing levels of individualization, secularization, economic independence of partners, legal opportunities to divorce as well as other economic and institutional changes, value changes, prolonged education, and a declining institutionalization of the life course. This is often referred to as the second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe and Van De Kaa, 1986).
Despite the fact that many of these changes in union formation can be found across Europe, profound differences remain in the union formation patterns between countries (Billari and Liefbroer, 2010; Blossfeld, Klijzing, Mills, and Kurz, 2005; Corijn and Klijzing, 2001; Elzinga and Liefbroer, 2007; Sobotka and Toulmon, 2008). For example, young adults in Sweden leave home earlier than those in Germany or Belgium, and those in Southern Europe even later, although the differences between young adults in the first three countries are relatively small. Cohabitation is most common in Northern Europe and least common in Southern and Eastern Europe. In Western and Northern Europe, around 64 to 94 percent of women belonging to the 1970s cohort cohabited in their first co-residential union (Billari and Liefbroer, 2010). In all countries, timing of a first union still occurs early, with a median age of 21 to 24 years. At the same time, marriage is clearly being postponed: the median age at first marriage was between 28 to 33 years among the 1970s cohort of women (Billari and Liefbroer, 2010). Gender-role behavior among partners, indicated by sharing routine household chores and female employment, is found to be more egalitarian in Northern Europe than in Western and Central European countries (Fuwa, 2004; Geist, 2005). Explanations for these differences refer to welfare state regimes, institutional arrangements, historically and culturally rooted differences, and economic factors (Billari, 2004; Lesthaeghe, 1998; Mayer, 2001; Reher, 1998).

1.2.2 Migration and union formation of Turkish migrants

Sizeable immigration from Turkey to Europe started in the 1960s in the form of labor migration designed originally as short rotation stays. Germany was the first country to reach an official bilateral migration agreement with Turkey in 1961. Other countries followed, for example the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria in 1964, France in 1965, and Sweden in 1967. Other forms of bilateral labor migration agreements were signed between Turkey and the United Kingdom in 1959, Switzerland in 1969 and Denmark in 1970 (Akgündüz, 2008). Although the first wave of labor migrants had quite diverse characteristics in terms of education and region of origin, the majority had a low educational attainment and was born in rural areas (Adler, 1981; Martin, 1991). This original diversity declined when chain migration by people who originated from rural areas accounted for the bulk of immigration, particularly in the peak of labor migration in the period between 1968 and 1973. The permanent settlement and subsequent building of communities took time. While joint couple migration of young and more highly educated individuals had existed before (González-Ferrer, 2007), mass family reunification and settlement did not start before the mid-1970s after the official end of labor migration (Bade, 2003). From the 1980s political refugees from Turkey, mainly Kurds, entered Europe. In Sweden a large part of the refugees consisted of Christian Assyrians.

---

1 Great Britain signed a social security agreement with Turkey before labor migration became an issue. The few labor migrants to Great Britain thus benefited from this agreement (starting in 1970 2,200 labor migrants were officially registered with the Turkish Employment Service IIBK) (Akgündüz, 2008).
Nowadays, migrants from Turkey present the largest migrant group in Europe and total more than four million people including migrants, descendants of migrants, naturalized citizens and political refugees (see Table 1.1). Exact numbers are difficult to obtain as calculations and definitions vary by country and it is often difficult to distinguish migrants and their descendants in national statistics. A very specific characteristic is the geographic concentration in both host countries and Turkey due to strong family and community ties and chain migration from certain areas and the subsequent clustering of those migrants in selected regions in Europe, e.g. approximately 25 percent of all Turks in Europe live in the German state of North-Rhineland-Westphalia (Manço, 2005). In many European countries with Turkish immigrants, a substantial share of these immigrants lives together in neighborhoods with immigrants from the same regions or villages in Turkey (Reniers, 1999; Wilpert and Gitmez, 1987). According to Akgündüz (2008), Manço (2005) and Reniers (1999), 25 percent of Turkish immigrants in Belgium that are over age 18 were born in the Afyon Province, whereas in the Netherlands a similar proportion are from the Karaman Province and in Sweden from Kulu (Konya Province).

### Table 1.1: European country estimates of the size of the population of Turkish descent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected European countries</th>
<th>Total estimated population of Turkish descent</th>
<th>People with Turkish citizenship</th>
<th>1. Generation (born in Turkey)</th>
<th>2. Generation (born in Europe to Turkish parent(s))</th>
<th>Year of estimate</th>
<th>Type of data source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2,744,800</td>
<td>1,273,000</td>
<td>1,471,800</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>383,957</td>
<td>196,385</td>
<td>187,572</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>(350,000)</td>
<td>222,000</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>189,328</td>
<td>125,026</td>
<td>64,302</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2, 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>109,000</td>
<td>42,527</td>
<td>41,489</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>84,016</td>
<td>32,479</td>
<td>27,552</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>15,998</td>
<td>5,620</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>17,651</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,707,130</strong></td>
<td><strong>319,651</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Different years and measurements within countries, for instance some estimates cannot account for those who have citizenship of birth/residence country and for the UK the estimate only refers to ethnic Turks, while the other estimates include Kurds and other ethnic minorities in Turkey.

Type of data: 1 – register data, 2 – census, 3 – 1% sample of households, microcensus, 4 – 14% of registered persons, microcensus 5 – name recognition techniques, 6 – naturalization data, 7 – register updates based on census 2001 and administrative data

Sources: (Enneli, Modood, and Bradley, 2005; Haab, Bolzman, Kugler, and Yilmaz, 2010; Herzog-Punzenberger, 2007; INSEE, 2008; Manço, 2005; Martens and Casestecker, 2001; Statistics Denmark; Statistics Italy; Statistics Netherlands; Statistics Norway; Statistics Sweden; Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007)

The majority of the original labor migrants were married before migration, for instance an estimated 75, 75 and 70-82 percent of those working in France, Belgium and Germany, respectively (Tribalat, 1996; Reniers 1999; report Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 1978 cited in
O’Loughlin, 1980; Berlin study 1974 cited in Akgündüz 2008). This was one of the reasons for the low intermarriage rates among the parental generation of the Turkish second generation. Major family life transitions among this group took place at relatively young ages, and family and community were strongly involved in these decisions. For Turkish migrant women in Germany born between 1946 and 1960, Nauck (1997, 2002a) showed that the majority married young; the median age at marriage was 20.1 years, which was followed soon by the birth of the first child (Nauck, 2002a). There were almost no unmarried or childless Turkish women (Nauck, 1997, 2002a). Similar findings were found for the Netherlands (Alders, 2000; Garssen and Nicolaas, 2008). Cohabitation was almost non-existent and direct marriage was common. On average, Turkish migrant families had 2 to 3 children (in general more than in the majority population, but mainly because children born in Turkey joined their families at a certain point in time). Higher order births were much lower among migrated Turkish women than among women of the same birth cohorts in Turkey who had not migrated (Nauck, 1997, 2002a). For the Netherlands, Garssen and Nicolaas (2008) found a slightly slower fertility decline and a higher number of births of Turkish migrant women born between 1945 and 1959 compared with Turkish women of the same birth cohorts who had not migrated. As in Turkey, different groups (defined by education, place of residence and ethnicity) showed different union formation patterns, e.g. there was a postponement of marriage and a lower number of childbirths among higher educated pioneer migrant women (Nauck, 1997, 2002a, 2007). The majority of parents of the second generation came from rural areas in Turkey that even today have much more traditional family formation behaviors than people who for some generations have been living in urban centers in Turkey.

Union formation behavior is influenced by the two marriage systems that have existed side by side in Turkey for more than a century (Hortaçsu, 1997). Hortaçsu and Oral (1994) examined these couple- and family-initiated marriage systems and showed that they differ by urban/rural place of residence and educational level and are associated with different couple behaviors (less/more gender-specific lifestyles) and views about the marital relationship. The couple-initiated marriage system emphasizes romantic love, free partner choice and the conjugal relationship. It is widely accepted among well-educated segments of the urban population. The second marriage system, the patrilineal marriage regime of descent and family-initiated marriage, emphasizes the joining of two families. In this marriage system, the most suitable spouse is one that maximizes status through the exchange of goods and human capital within kinship systems. The system is characterized by the exchange of goods (bride price or reciprocal marriage), strong influence of the parents (and the broader community), arranged marriages, early marriage in the absence of any need for economic independence, and patrilocal residence. The spouses are often related, mainly cousins, or come from the same village. This form is widespread among the rural population in the central-, Northern, Southern and Eastern Anatolian provinces, as well as among the less educated (migrant) population in urban areas (Nauck, 2002b). Marriage between relatives is more common in migrant communities than in Turkey (Reniers, 2001). Both marriage systems are common and couple-initiated marriages were estimated to constitute between 27 and 50 percent of all
marriages in the 1990s in Turkey. However, the latter form is on the rise and sometimes it is not possible to distinguish between couple- and family-initiated marriages.

1.2.3 Union formation among the Turkish second generation

Union formation among the second generation has barely been studied in Europe. As studies focusing on union formation and partner choice tend not to explicitly distinguish between migrant generations, it is difficult to get a clear picture of the Turkish second generation in different European countries.

Generally, studies in different European countries (Germany, Belgium, France, Sweden and the Netherlands) find that marriage is a very important event in the life course and the large majority of Turkish young adults marry whereas cohabitation remains limited (Bernhardt, Goldscheider, Goldscheider, and Bjerén, 2007; De Graaf and Distelbrink, 2005; Nauck, 2002a; Timmerman, 2006; Tribalat, 1996). Nevertheless, an analysis of union formation preferences among children of Turkish migrants in the Netherlands and Sweden showed that a substantial share indicated positive attitudes toward cohabitation (Bernhardt and Goldscheider, 2007a; De Valk and Liefbroer, 2007). In terms of the ethnic origin of the partners of married second-generation Turks, the majority (60-90 percent) were found to have married a partner born in Turkey (Çelikaksoy, Nielsen, and Verner, 2006; De Graaf and Distelbrink, 2005; Reniers, 2001). The remaining marriage partners were mainly from the Turkish community in Europe. Recently, and compared with the first generation of Turkish migrants, these proportions have been growing (Lievens, 1999; Tribalat, 1996). This recent trend is due in part to the growing numbers of second-generation migrants and is partially connected with the more restrictive marriage migration policies that have taken effect in the last decade (for example: 2002, Denmark; 2004, the Netherlands; 2007, Germany). This led to a (short-term) decline in marriage migration (BMI/BAMF, 2009; CBS, 2009; Nielsen, Smith, and Çelikaksoy, 2009). Intermarriage is rare, although it is more common among the second generation than among the first generation (Kalmijn and Van Tubergen, 2006; Lievens, 1998; Lucassen and Laarman, 2009). Among Turkish women, intermarriage rates are lower than among men. This is linked to the patriarchal traditions in Islam (Todd, 1985). In comparison with the majority population, marriage occurs earlier among second-generation Turks, usually in their early twenties (De Valk, Liefbroer, Esveldt, and Henkens, 2004; Nauck, 2002a; Timmerman, Vandenvaeren, and Crul, 2003). Similarly, studies in various European countries showed that Turkish second-generation young adults have less egalitarian gender preferences than young adults from the majority populations and other migrant groups (Bernhardt and Goldscheider, 2007b; De Valk, 2008; Diehl, Koenig, and Ruckdeschel, 2009; Roehr-Sendelmeier and Yun, 2006).

The Turkish second generation has in common that their parents migrated from the same, more collectivistic country while the European countries in which they were born have a more individualistic orientation. General cultural values within collectivist cultures are conformity, security and group orientation, with an emphasis on the familial obligations of the
individual and the conservation of in-group traditions (Triandis, 1989). These collectivistic values are reflected in a strong family and kin orientation and strong ties with Turkey and the region of origin. These values are also connected to a more active role of the family in the union formation and partner choice process. Traditional marriage practices (kin marriage, arranged marriage) are often upheld and, in combination with migration pressure and family reunification being one of the few legal entries into Europe, marriage rates to a partner from Turkey remain high (Beck-Gernsheim, 2007; Timmerman, Lodewyckx, and Wets, 2009). There are advantages in choosing a partner from the country of origin with respect to status, physical attractiveness, bride price and family value expectations (Çelikaksoy, et al., 2002; Nauck, 2001a; Timmerman, 2008; Wilpert, 1992). As marriage remains the dominant union type and the available number of potential spouses decreases fast within the - at least partial - arranged marriage system, marriage generally occurs early. The patriarchal family structure in Turkish families remains important. Turkish men are expected to earn a living and represent the family outside the home, while a large share of Turkish women are taking up mother and childcare roles and have no (or only a few years of) experience in the labor market (Bernhardt, et al., 2007; INSEE, 2010). The roles and behaviors of women have to be upheld by fathers and brothers, and women and daughters are thus more strongly supervised. Nevertheless, the choices of the second generation in the family domain are open to change and although changes occur compared with the parental generation, they still tend to be small compared to changes observed among young adults in the majority populations (Hooghiemstra, 2001; Strassburger, 2003).

1.3 FRAMEWORK FOR UNION FORMATION ANALYSIS

When studying union formation and partner choice among second-generation Turks, two strands of literature offer a useful framework for analysis. The first one is migration and integration literature. The second are theories on partner choice and the timing of union formation developed for the majority population.

Migration and integration theories offer a wide range of theoretical starting points on how migrants and their descendants may shape their lives in a new country (Alba and Nee, 2003; Gans, 1992; Gordon, 1964; Massey et al., 1993; Portes and Zhou, 1993). These theories are, however, only partially applicable to the union formation process. First, they often fail to differentiate between structural and socio-cultural assimilation/acculturation. They tend to focus on structural assimilation or psychological models of acculturation in various domains. These theories are not very suitable for the formulation of specific hypotheses on different aspects of union formation such as why a second-generation young adult chooses a specific partner, at a specific time, and why he or she opts for either marriage or cohabitation. Second, these theories have mainly been developed in and focus on the United States (not Europe) and they address the first generation rather than on the second generation, with the exception of Gans’s (1992) second generation decline, Portes and Zhou’s segmented assimilation theory (1993) and Brubaker’s argument (2001) that assimilation only occurs intergenerationally.
Within demography and family sociology, a wide variety of specific theories exist that seek to explain union formation and partner selection (overview in Klein 2001b). However, most of these theories – sociological, economic or psychological – were developed for majority populations in Western societies. They may therefore only offer a partial understanding of the multiple spheres influencing the union formation choices of the Turkish second generation.

As a result, the focus of this thesis is on a more general framework that allows for the incorporation of a whole range of union formation aspects and for the comparison of similar mechanisms among the second generation and majority group. These are two of the aims of this study. We start from a general model of partner choice proposed in a review of factors influencing intermarriage and homogamy (Kalmijn, 1998) and supplement it by including theoretical ideas from the general union formation discourse. Kalmijn (1998) describes three main types of factors shaping partner choice: (1) individual preference of partner characteristics, (2) influences of social groups (third parties), and (3) opportunity structure. In the following section we will discuss each of these aspects first in general and then with respect to the Turkish second generation: the shaping of preferences from a rational choice theory perspective, the role of third parties – particularly parents and (non-coethnic) peers – and the institutional context defined by general welfare state policies, migration and integration policies as well as the local marriage market.

1.3.1 Union formation and partner choice preferences

Individual preferences for a certain partner are most often explained with the aid of rational choice theories. A standard assumption in rational choice theories is that individuals want to maximize social and economic utility in a partnership (Becker, 1991; Klein, 2001b). However, several ways of striving for maximization of this utility can be envisaged. First, people may prefer a partner who shares their taste, thus maximizing compatibility (Becker, 1991). Generally, people choose a partner with similar cultural and social characteristics (Epstein and Guttman, 1984; Haller, 1982; Kalmijn, 1998). This process of cultural mating allows a couple to have a similar lifestyle, to have the same expectations about whether to marry or cohabit, about the division of labor, female employment and the proper timing to form a co-residential relationship. Similar values and lifestyles give affirmation to an individual’s self-perception and are more rewarding (Kalmijn, 1998; Wirth, 2000). A second potential way in which people can maximize their utility is by preferring a partner with characteristics that complement their own. Such an opposite constellation of partner characteristics is important because most societies are still gendered: incomes, occupational careers and the division of labor are all to an extent gendered within marriage and society (Blossfeld and Drobnič, 2001; Blossfeld and Timm, 2003). It can be expected that, if gender specialization becomes less salient in society, matching on similar characteristics becomes more important than matching on complementary characteristics.
In both cases, i.e. choosing a partner with similar cultural and social characteristics or seeking a partner with the highest possible socio-economic or social status, people end up marrying people similar to themselves. This is also true in the second case because the members of the highest strata select among themselves, and the rest follow this behavior. This phenomenon is called homogamy. Partner homogamy can be found for most social characteristics, such as education, religion, ethnic group and socio-economic status (Hill and Kopp, 2001).

The Turkish second generation experience the above processes of preference formation with regard to union formation and partner choice in a unique way. We discussed in sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 that more traditional union formation patterns and gender-separated lives are still dominant among the Turkish second generation (Bernhard et al., 2007). Consequently, marriage remains the norm and cohabitation is less important. Similarly, gender-related exchanges in partner choice are still common among a large part of this group. The socio-economic position of men and their families are therefore important while they are less important for women. Turkish second-generation men with higher levels of education have good chances of finding a partner in both Turkey and within the Turkish migrant community, but lower educated men have more limited choices and may thus opt for a partner from Turkey (Schroedter and Kalter, 2008; Furtatdo, 2006). In the case of marriage migration between Turkey and Europe, favorable living conditions can be exchanged for a high bride prize, physical attractiveness or education (Timmerman, 2009). At least parts of the Turkish migrant population have a (semi-)arranged marriage system with an emphasis on joining two families instead of a couple. In this type of partner selection, social and socio-economic attributes of the family of origin are more important than acquired characteristics such as education (Nauck, 2001). As these social status attributes are known quite early in life, union formation can occur at an early age. By contrast, second-generation young adults who adhere to the couple-initiated marriage system prefer acquired characteristics over those based on the social background of the family.

1.3.2 The influence of third parties

Union formation decisions are not just influenced by the preferences of the partners involved, but also by the opinions and actions of so-called “third parties”. Third parties refer to a variety of people or groups an individual interacts with. These could include parents, peers, a community, or the state. Parents and peers are expected to be particularly important, and examining the relative importance of parents and peers is one of the main aims of this thesis.

Two main mechanisms of transmitting values and norms can be distinguished: social influence and social learning. Social learning (modeling of behavior) through the experiences of significant other people or the perception of other people’s experiences in the group helps to reduce uncertainties, and may change the probability of choosing a certain behavioral pattern (Bandura, 1977). The other mechanism, social influence or value transmission, is generally very influential because people seek approval from people relevant to them.
In a group, people’s only alternatives to normative pressure are to agree with other members of the group or to cut that cluster from their interaction network (Burt, 1992; Moscovici, 1985), which is hardly possible in the case of the family. These considerations suggest that third parties influence union formation in two analytical ways. First, behaving according to one’s parents’ or peers’ socialized norms because of the internalization of their ideas is an indirect effect via individual preferences. Second, behaving according to one’s parents’ or peers’ norms because of the anticipation of their sanctions is an indirect effect via the opportunity structure.

As indicated above, both parents and peers can be expected to influence the behavior of an individual and are thus potentially important for an understanding of the union formation choices of the Turkish second generation. Parents are usually thought to continue to represent the most important socializing agents, despite changes in parent-child relations toward more egalitarian childrearing and a more autonomous and peer-centered adolescence (Youniss and Smollar, 1985). Parents remain particularly important to migrant young adults, although there is a debate in the literature as to whether the migration and settlement experience results in stronger family relations and more parental influence or a disruption of these ties and thus a weaker influence of parents on their children. However, most research on the Turkish group has shown the continued importance of parents and parental characteristics on the attitudes and behavior of children (De Valk, 2006; Nauck, Kohlmann, and Diefenbach, 1997; Phalet and Schönpflug, 2001b). Still, heterogeneity is to be expected. Turkish second-generation children are raised in a mixture of individualistic and collectivistic models of parenting (Kagitçibasi, 1996; Kagitçibasi and Ataca, 2005; Nauck, 2001a). According to Kagitçibasi and Ataca (2005), three main family models exist, with two of particular relevance to Turks, which we will concentrate on. In the first model, the traditional family model of interdependence, child rearing goals emphasize collectivistic family values and a dependence and compliance of children. Most families originating from less developed, rural areas and with a low socio-economic status belong to this family model (Hortaçsu and Oral, 1994; Nauck, 2002a; Wilpert and Gitmez, 1987). The second model, the model of psychological interdependence, is particularly common among families originating from urban areas and with a higher socio-economic status. Children are raised to be more autonomous in order for them to be more competitive in an urban environment. Emotional relatedness and conformity to parental preferences and expectations remains high in both types of family models (Kagitçibasi and Ataca, 2005).

In adolescence, children extend their social networks and build friendships with peers. Adolescents’ friendships and peer relations are important for social, cognitive, and emotional development. They teach them key social skills and serve as a source of social support (Newcomb and Bagwell, 1995). There is a strong association of behaviors among individuals and their peers in many aspects of life (Prinstein and Dodge, 2008). Selection and socialization effects both operate at the same time in peer relationships (Prinstein and Dodge,
A variety of studies looked at both causal directions and concluded that due to the egalitarian nature of peer friendship, peers select each other because they are similar and they socialize each other to be similar in behaviors and values. For migrant groups, friendship building may in some cases be more difficult. In the US, studies have shown that friendship relations may be of different value to different migrant generations: first- and second-generation Asian migrants were found to have fewer friendships and to be more (pressured to be) oriented towards their families than was the case for the third generation (Harker, 2001; Harris, Harker, and Guo, 2003; Kao, 1995, 1999). A study in the Netherlands (Pels and Nijsten, 2003), however, showed that Turkish adolescents associated highly with both their parents and peers. This indicates that the importance of peer networks may differ between migrant groups and between generations. That said, for our research group of Turkish second-generation young adults, peers can be expected to be important.

Interethnic friendships are becoming more common in an ethnically diverse society. Studies in Europe have shown that the second generation has more contact with non-coethnics than their parental generation, who focused more exclusively on their own ethnic group (Esser, 1991; Leggewie, 2000; Nauck, 2002a). For example, in a German study, one third of Turkish Hauptschüler indicated that they had interethnic friendships (Reinders, 2003). Children of migrants have more interethnic friendships because their schools are often ethnically more diverse, increasing the opportunity of meeting members of other groups (Smith and Schneider, 2000). Schools belong to the most important places where children and adolescents form friendships (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). Although adolescents are more likely to form friendships with peers who have similar characteristics to themselves, close contact in organized spheres such as schools leads to more positive ethnic attitudes and more extensive interethnic interaction (Hallinan and Smith, 1985), thus increasing the chance of close interracial friendship. Several studies found that attending an ethnically mixed school can influence interethnic contact and friendships in adulthood (Ellison and Powers, 1994; Emerson, Kimbro, and Yancey, 2002; Sigelman, Bledsoe, Welch, and Combs, 1996). The heterogeneous results for quality (stability, intimacy, conflict, reciprocity) of interethnic friendships are found to be largely dependent on minority and majority group context (Reinders and Mangold, 2005). In Germany, most studies on Turks and Germans usually indicated a similar quality of intra- and interethnic friendships (for an overview see Mangold, 2009). According to the contact theory, being friends with non-coethnics increases feelings of cultural closeness and resemblance (Pettigrew, 1998). Friendship with non-coethnics can also affect school attainment (Baysu and De Valk, forthcoming), identity development (Hamburger and Hewstone, 1997; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2000; Reinders, Mangold, and Greb, 2005), cultural openness (Pettigrew, 1998) and autonomy (Reinders and Varadi, 2008). Through interaction with close non-coethnic friends, going to a school with non-coethnics and contacts with their families and friends, the Turkish second generation is exposed to attitudes, values and norms that potentially differ from those prevalent in their own families of origin. The more non-coethnic friends an individual has, the more likely the exposure to these alternative values is. This contact between peers can lead to
renegotiation of new norms and values within the peer group (Oswald, 1993; Seiffge-Krenke and Von Salisch, 1996). Thus, interethnic friendships expose people to alternative norms and behavior, which may also affect the union formation choices of the Turkish second generation. There have been only a few studies on interethnic/interracial friendship and union formation. Studies in the US have found that more diverse interethnic networks or more diverse schools can lead to a greater likelihood of interethnic dating and marriage (Clark-Ibanez and Felmlee, 2004; Yancey, 2002). In addition, partners are often introduced to one another by members of social networks or are network members themselves. We also see that ethnically diverse networks provide potential support for interethnic partnerships that would otherwise be lacking (Clark-Ibanez and Felmlee, 2004; King and Harris, 2007).

1.3.3 The institutional and societal context

Patterns of union formation and partner choice also depend on structural opportunities and constraints (Blau, 1994). The size of a migrant group and its sex ratio are well-studied elements of the opportunity structure. However, the economic, cultural-historic and institutional circumstances of a country equally influence the occurrence and timing of major life events (Buchmann, 1989; Lesthaeghe, 1998; Mayer, 2001; Reher, 1998). These processes are often highly complex and difficult to disentangle. In this study we are interested in particular in the role of policies, both general welfare policies and migration and integration policies. Examining the role of these different policies in the union formation behavior of the Turkish second generation is one of the main aims of this thesis.

Social institutions, welfare state regimes and general welfare-related policies offer opportunities to young adults to shape their lives and promote particular patterns of behavior (Buchmann, 1989). Some societies promote an extended stay in the educational system and may thus delay union formation. They may provide on-campus residence in universities, give allowances to young adults to set-up their own households, or provide unemployment benefits for young workers, allowing earlier autonomy and independence from parents while other countries let the family or the market be responsible for such provisions. Social security provisions give young adults more planning security and protection from sudden hardships and may thus influence family and union formation decisions (Liefbroer and Goldscheider, 2007). The most widely known typology of welfare state regimes was developed by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999). He distinguishes three (later four) types of regimes: the socio-democratic, the conservative, the liberal and the Mediterranean welfare regime. The socio-democratic welfare state regime is the most generous, providing far-reaching support to individuals and families irrespective of their family structure. Scandinavian countries are usually counted among this regime. The conservative welfare state regime is found in many central European countries and provides almost equally generous social security provisions. These are, however, dependent on certain requirements, such as a male breadwinner division of labor. This type of regime reinforces existing stratifications in society. The liberal regime countries rely more on market regulation than state redistribution and provide benefits mainly
to the poorest strata of society. The Mediterranean model relies heavily on the family in providing social assistance and the state provides only limited social security coverage. Esping-Andersen’s typology was not developed to explain patterns of union formation but rather to evaluate general social equality. Still, correlations exist between individual behavior and welfare state regime. For example, welfare state provisions promote work-family balance and gender egalitarian behavior to varying degrees, e.g. by level of childcare arrangements and parental leave policies. In conservative central European welfare states these provisions still mainly support a male breadwinner model, where the man earns an income and the woman takes care of the children, particularly when the children are young (Coltrane, 2000; Pfau-Effinger, 2004). General welfare policies affect all young adults in society, including second-generation Turks. However, parts of the second generation in different European countries do not have the citizenship of their country of birth and therefore do not have the same entitlements as nationals. This immediately relates back to the other policy domain to which the second generation is more exposed than the majority group: migration and integration policies.

Migration and integration policies and laws potentially influence the union formation choices of the second generation. They can influence union formation by facilitating or hindering the options for family formation, such as timing of union formation, the type of union and gender-role behavior. Many European countries have introduced restrictions on family formation or the reunification of migrants. For example, under regulations in Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands the possibility to import a spouse is dependent on age, language proficiency and income. The aim of these policies is to limit the possibility to import a partner from abroad. However, as transnational marriage remains one of the few legal entry possibilities into Europe and push factors towards better living conditions in Europe are still important (Timmerman, et al., 2009), the effects of these measures are debatable. These policies may also partially influence cohabitation rates, as in most countries marriage is a requirement to bring over one’s partner. European countries are usually classified into three main groups of migration and integration regimes (Castles and Miller, 2003): (i) countries promoting multicultural policies, (ii) countries promoting restrictive integration and (iii) countries promoting assimilative policies. While differences are less clear than a few decades ago, this major classification still applies. In countries promoting multicultural policies, migrants and their descendants are better able to live according to their own cultural rules than in countries with a more restrictive integration or assimilative policy. A study argues that these cultural allowances would result in less social integration among migrants in the first set of countries than in the last (Koopmans, 2008). As a result, union formation and gender-role behavior in the first set of countries is expected to resemble more strongly those of the parental generation from Turkey than in the second set of countries.

The local context may also influence decisions regarding union formation. The local marriage market is the total of all opportunities and constraints of meeting potential partners and consists mostly of the demographic and social structures, which jointly influence the availability of potential partners. The size of the relevant group is determined by the age,
marital status distribution and sex ratio of potential spouses in local geographies (Blau, 1994; Klein, 2001a; Hill and Kopp, 2001). In addition, the local marriage market could be further subdivided into partial markets defined by ethnic, educational, religious and socio-economic characteristics. Intense social interaction increases the chance of contact and of meeting a partner. This is most likely in partial markets like the neighborhood, friendship networks and networks of relatives. In general, these markets often overlap. In the case of the Turkish second generation, they are confronted with various marriage markets – not only the local marriage market but also their parents’ region of origin.

1.4 THIS STUDY

1.4.1 Data: The Integration of the European Second Generation

This study is based on data from “The Integration of the European Second Generation” (TIES) survey. TIES is a comparative urban survey of children of migrants collected in 2007-2008. The focus is on the second generation as there is still a lack of data on migrants and their descendants in Europe, particularly for comparative research. The goal of TIES is to enable research into different domains of the lives of the descendants of immigrants from Turkey, Morocco and former Yugoslavia as well as native control groups. The survey was carried out among young adults (18-35 years) in 15 cities in 8 European countries: Amsterdam, Rotterdam (Netherlands); Antwerp, Brussels (Belgium); Paris, Strasbourg (France); Barcelona, Madrid (Spain); Basel, Zurich (Switzerland); Linz, Vienna (Austria); Berlin, Frankfurt (Germany); and Stockholm (Sweden). Using a similar approach and a standardized questionnaire, the survey was carried out in the above-mentioned 15 cities, which have a high concentration of second-generation young adults. For the survey, 250 interviews were targeted per group and city, summing up to approximately 10,000 respondents.

TIES offers useful data for the purpose of this thesis as the survey covers a whole range of topics related to union formation such as demographic characteristics, educational careers, labor market experience, union formation and partner characteristics, parental background, and social networks. This thesis concentrates on the second generation of Turkish descent, a group that was covered in most survey countries and is of clear numerical importance in many European countries. Taking this second-generation group allows for a true European.

---

2 The TIES survey was carried out by survey bureaus under supervision of the nine national TIES partner institutes: Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) and Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) of the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands, the Institute for Social and Political Opinion Research (ISPO), University of Leuven in Belgium; the National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED) in France; the Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies (SFM) of the University of Neuchâtel in Switzerland; the Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations (CEIFO) of the University of Stockholm in Sweden; the Institute for Migration Research and Intercultural Studies (IMIS) of the University of Osnabrück in Germany, the Institute for the Study of Migration (IEM) of the Pontifical Comillas University of Madrid in Spain, and the Institute for European Integration Research (EIF) of the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Austria. See www.tiesproject.eu for country documentation and the edited book by Crul and Schneider (forthcoming) for further information on the survey design, sample characteristics and first comparative analyses on various topics relating to the three second-generation groups.
comparative analysis and the testing of hypotheses on mechanisms behind union formation patterns in different contexts. To enable a comparison between different second-generation groups, we have also included the Moroccan second generation from the Dutch dataset (see 1.4.3).

In the survey process, two main obstacles were encountered that are common to migrant surveys. The first obstacle is a lack of knowledge on the size of the second generation and, in relation to this, a lack of available sampling frames to sample members of migrant groups, including the second generation. If information on the second generation was available, municipality registers were used, but this was only the case in the Netherlands and Sweden. In some other countries (Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, Austria), population registers are also available, but either privacy rules and regulations prevent adequate access to the register for research purposes (e.g. Belgium) or the register does not record all the required information, such as place of birth of parents, which would permit the identification of the second generation as a distinct group (e.g. Germany, Switzerland, Austria). In the case of France, it appeared almost impossible to identify and access suitable sampling frames. The registration of ethnic affiliation and parental place of birth is subject to strict privacy rules. In consultation with local survey agencies, sampling frames were created based on listings of names and addresses obtained from electricity board registers, telephone registers, etc. Analyses of first names and surnames provided information about ethnic origin. Thus, France, Germany, Switzerland, Austria and partially Belgium were sampled with the help of phone books and onomastic methods.

The second obstacle is the low general response rate. The level varies between 24 and 50 percent per city (Groenewold and Lessard-Phillips, forthcoming). Non-response analyses revealed that in all ethnic groups, men and lower educated people were slightly under-represented among the respondents. These results are comparable to other migrant surveys. Ethnic minorities generally have low response rates in many Western countries (Deding, Fridberg, and Jakobsen, 2008; Eisner and Ribeaud, 2007; Feskens, Hox, Lensvelt-Mulders, and Schmeets, 2006; Van Den Brakel, Vis-Visschers, and Schmeets, 2006). In addition, non-Western foreigners have below average response rates, even taking into account individual characteristics such as education and age. The main factors that result in these low response rates are that migrant groups predominantly live in urban areas, are more often unemployed and have lower levels of education than the majority population. Further factors affecting response are problems in contacting migrants: wrong contact information, lack of land phone lines, language issues in approaching families that may have complex household structures, living in urban areas where contacting is very difficult, e.g. large apartment block buildings, the fact that parts of this group are abroad for prolonged periods of time period, and the fact that they represent an overall young and mobile population group. Dissecting the non-response phenomenon shows that contact rates among ethnic minorities are lower and non-response due to an inability to produce the required information is higher. However, cooperation rates (once contact could be established) are higher among ethnic minorities than among the majority population in a study in six countries (Feskens, et al., 2006). The opposite
result was found in a Danish study on Turkish immigrants, there lower cooperation rates were found among Turkish migrants than among the majority population (Deding, et al., 2008).

Although the general response rate of the TIES survey is low, it is comparable to other studies targeting migrant populations in large cities. For the Netherlands, we tested whether this non-response may have resulted in bias. The age, gender and marital status distributions of the respondents were compared with information from the population register. Only small differences were observed with regard to gender. There were slightly more women in the survey because they were more likely to be at home than men; Moroccan men were the most difficult to reach. In addition, the educational attainment of respondents in the TIES survey was very similar to that of second-generation groups in the same age bracket in other surveys that have subsamples of the second generation in urban areas in the Netherlands, such as the Survey Integratie Minderheden (SIM 2006) and Leefsituatie Allochtone Stedelingen (LAS 2004-05). Thus, despite the high level of non-response, there is little evidence of strong selectivity in the data.

To sum up, the data of the TIES survey are unique in the sense that this was the first large-scale survey focusing exclusively on the second generation. So while the data cannot claim to be representative due to a lack of appropriate sampling frames and the low general response rate, the survey represents one of the few currently available comparative studies on the second generation, and therefore represents an important source of information.

1.4.2 Terminology

Some points relating to terminology used throughout this dissertation should be specified. While different definitions of the term “second generation” exist, we use the standard definition of many statistical offices that was the base for sampling in the TIES survey. We refer to a person as being second generation when the person was born in one of the European countries of our study and at least one parent was born abroad. For most of our Turkish second-generation respondents, both parents have the same ethnic origin seeing as the parental intermarriage rate was below 5 percent. If we include characteristics of the partner, however, we broaden the definition of second generation to include those partners mainly socialized in the host country. This means that a person who was born in Turkey but migrated to Europe with her/his family before the age of six will be defined as a second-generation partner. A “first-generation” individual, by contrast, was born abroad and migrated at an older age. Furthermore, in this study, a “union” is defined as the formation of a co-residential partnership. A union refers to both marriage and unmarried cohabitation if not otherwise specified. The terms “migrant group” and “ethnic group” are used and refer to migrants as well as their descendants, with the term ethnic group being used mainly when referring to several groups in the population, including the majority group. Finally, if not otherwise indicated, the term “peers” refers to both close friends and the wider network of friends.
1.4.3 Specific research questions and outline of the study

In order to answer our general research question on the union formation choices within the Turkish second generation between groups and across European countries, we will pose four more specific research questions. They will focus on particular union formation choices, on one or two of the comparative aspects, and on the role of third parties and specific contexts to examine differences in union formation choices. The combined findings of these four specific research questions, which represent the four empirical chapters of this study (Chapters 2 to 5), will form the basis for discussion in the final chapter.

Our first specific research question, addressed in Chapter 2, focuses on the role of non-coethnic peers in union formation decisions and reads:

1) **Does the level of social embeddedness into non-coethnic networks influence the union formation decisions of second-generation Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands?**

Although the importance of peers is well-established in areas such as fertility decisions, school attainment and delinquency (Biddle, Bank, and Marlin, 1980; Billy and Udry, 1985; Ennett et al., 2006; Entorf and Lauk, 2008; Haynie and Osgood, 2005; Shah and Zelnik, 1981), few studies so far have concentrated on the role of peers in union formation choices (King and Harris, 2007; Clark-Ibanez and Felmlee, 2004). The role of non-coethnic peers may be particularly interesting in the case of second-generation young adults because friendships or more casual acquaintances at school may bring them into contact with potentially different views on union formation compared with the views of their family of origin. We will look at members of the Turkish and Moroccan second generation to examine the role of peers (and parents) in influencing four separate aspects of union formation as the importance of these aspects may differ for (migrant) parents and thus the influence of peers may differ as well. As the influence of non-coethnic peers may also differ by type of contact (Granovetter, 1973), we distinguish between strong ties (close non-coethnic friends) and weak ties (ethnic composition of secondary school) and study the effects of both types of ties on the timing of a first union, the timing of first marriage, the type of union (unmarried cohabitation or marriage) and the ethnic origin of the partner. Additionally, we will compare patterns of union formation among the Turkish and Moroccan second generation with those among the Dutch majority population.

In a next step, the focus shifts from differences between ethnic groups in one country to cross-country differences among members of the same ethnic group. Chapter 3 focuses on the timing of first union formation among second-generation Turks and addresses research question 2:

2) **To what extent do parents and peers influence the timing of a first co-residential union among the Turkish second generation in seven European countries? Does the influence of parents and peers differ by the institutional context in which the Turkish second generation lives?**

We will examine whether country differences in the timing of union formation may be related to the societal context and if so, whether the role of parents and peers differs between
these contexts. Integration policies and welfare regimes are hypothesized to hinder or allow migrants and their descendants to live according to their culture of origin. In particular, a recent study (Koopmans, 2008) proposed that countries that have multicultural policies may hinder social integration by stimulating migrants to keep a strong orientation on their country of origin. This should influence the relative importance of parents and peers on union formation decisions. The importance attached to parents among members of collectivistic groups (De Valk and Liefbroer, 2007; Haug, 2005; Hooghiemstra, 2001) may remain strong in multicultural countries where they are not pressured to change.

Chapter 4 examines partner choice among the Turkish second generation. A fourfold distinction is made between choosing a (i) first- or a (ii) second-generation partner from Turkey (endogamous marriage) or a (iii) native partner or a (iv) partner of another migrant origin (exogamous marriage). We compare the determinants of these four partner choice outcomes. Again, a cross-country comparative perspective is applied. The third specific research question reads:

3) What is the ethnic origin of partners chosen by the Turkish second generation in seven European countries? Which roles do parents, peers and the institutional context play in this partner choice?

One of the most crucial union formation choices is the choice of the partner her/himself. In migrant research, particular attention is usually paid to the origin of the partner (US: Lieberson and Waters, 1988; Pagnini and Morgan, 1990; Qian and Lichter, 2007 and Europe: Coleman, 1994; Dribe and Lundh, 2008; Kalmijn and Van Tubergen, 2006; Klein, 2001a; Lievens, 1998; Lucassen and Laarman, 2009; Muttarak and Heath, 2010; Safi and Rogers, 2008), as this will allow conclusions about social distance between groups and, at the individual level, about the level of contact with the majority population (Alba and Nee, 2003; Blau, 1994; Coleman, 1994; Gordon, 1964). However, intermarriage rates among the Turkish second generation remain low and the majority have a partner from their country of origin or from their own migrant community. The Turkish second generation may also have a partner from another migrant group. We investigate which factors are related to the ethnic origin of the chosen partner and whether findings vary by institutional context. Differences in distribution are examined by grouping countries by integration policies and size of the second generation per city. Again, contact with non-coethnic peers during adolescence is likely to be a good indicator of later intermarriage with members of the majority population or other migrant groups (Clark-Ibanez and Felmlee, 2004; King and Harris, 2007). Friendships can develop into romantic relationships, particularly if friends belong to the opposite sex. However, the ethnic origin of the partner is believed to be an area in which parents are still quite influential.

Chapter 5 addresses the final specific research question on gender-role behavior among second-generation Turks across European countries. We want to study whether welfare state policies targeting gender-role behavior have a similar influence on migrant groups as on majority groups. The question reads:
4) What gender-role behaviors are observed among second-generation Turks in Europe? What roles do the ethnic origin of the partner and welfare state policies play in the division of tasks between partners?

Although gender-role behavior is not often studied within the literature on union formation, it allows crucial insights into the ways in which unions are actually structured. Migrants and their descendants are seldom studied across countries in gender-role studies, and the emphasis is often on attitudes rather than behavior (for an exception see Goldscheider, Goldscheider, and Bernhardt, 2011). This neglects the importance of understanding how context influences gender-role behavior among migrant groups. Majority groups are heavily influenced in their individual gender-role behavior by the context surrounding them, which leads to different behaviors throughout Europe (Fuwa, 2004; Geist, 2005; Knudsen and Wæreness, 2008). Previous studies showed that Turkish migrants display less egalitarian gender preferences than the majority population and other migrant groups (Bernhardt and Goldscheider, 2007b; De Valk, 2008; Diehl, et al., 2009; Roehr-Sendlmeier and Yun, 2006), but these studies focused mainly on individual-level characteristics. We aim to jointly address the role of the context, e.g. whether welfare state regimes and policies have a similar effect on the second generation as on the majority population, and the role of individual characteristics, e.g. gender ideology and the consequences of (transnational) partner choice.

All empirical chapters that deal with the specific research questions were written as journal articles and can thus be read independently. One effect is a certain overlap in some of the topics covered; however, the focus of each chapter differs. The final chapter of this thesis (6) summarizes and discusses the main findings of the study in relation to the overall research questions.