Second-best Decision Making of Railway Operators: How to Fix Fares, Frequency and Vehicle Size

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Abstract
Optimal strategies in railway networks call for a differentiated treatment of fares, frequencies, and vehicle sizes in various links. However, for several reasons, railway operators may apply uniform levels for these decision variables. In this paper the authors investigate the welfare losses implied by uniform setting of fares per km, frequencies, or vehicle sizes. This is done within the context of a model with uniform cost structures but where demand levels vary across segments of the network. They demonstrate that the largest welfare loss results when frequencies are made uniform across links. Their results suggest that where differentiated prices are important to address issues such as congestion and directional asymmetries in demand, differentiated supply in terms of vehicle size, and in particular frequencies, are the preferred ways of addressing demand variations on different segments in a network.

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1.0 Introduction

Suppliers of public transport services face decision problems with a considerable number of dimensions, including network structures, pricing, spacing of lines and stops, frequency of service, and vehicle size. In the present paper we will focus on railway operations and pay special attention to three of these instruments: choice of frequency of service, vehicle size, and price. We will investigate the potential contribution of these instruments to achieving a profit or welfare maximum.

An important feature of public transport is that on various segments within networks there are substantial differences in demand. For example, the closer one gets to a large city, the more traveller volumes increase. This calls for a differentiated policy in the supply of transport services and its pricing. However, in reality, there are several reasons why such a differentiated approach is not adopted, or only adopted to a limited extent. For example, car size is characterised by indivisibilities, which makes it impossible to adjust its size to changing circumstances. Differentiation in train size may imply costs of coupling and decoupling of cars. Indivisibilities may also be present in the case of frequencies. Differentiation in frequencies may be difficult to implement within given structures for timetables. For example, frequencies are usually set according to fixed rules such as two per hour, or four per hour. Then a frequency of three per hour on a certain link may lead to long waiting times for transfer passengers when in the rest of the network the frequency equals four. Further, differentiation in prices may confuse or irritate customers (Rietveld and Roson, 2002) and it may stimulate travellers to make detours. Also, lack of sophisticated software support will influence railway operators in their planning practices (Watson, 2001) and this may also lead to a preference for simple outcomes.

The question addressed in this paper concerns the potential contribution of variations in frequency, vehicle size and fares in order to achieve a profit or welfare optimum for a railway network where demand varies between links. More particularly the performance of second-best strategies will be investigated; for example, what are the losses in terms of welfare and profits when prices, frequencies, or vehicle sizes are kept uniform. This is an important theme that has received little systematic attention in railway research. One of the questions we will address is which of the three instruments — price, frequency, or vehicle size — is most detrimental to welfare or profits when it is made uniform.

In order to address these questions we will first give a short review of the literature on behaviour of public transport operators (Section 2). In Section 3 we present results for a simple model based on inelastic demand. This is
followed by Section 4, where the case of elastic travel demand is considered. Section 5 concludes.

### 2.0 Optimising the Supply of Public Transport Services

The base model of frequency choice by public transport operators has been formulated by Mohring (1972). It can be outlined as follows. Consider the demand for trips per time period on a certain line (denoted as $Q$) as given ($Q = Q_0$). Further, let $F$ denote frequency of service per time period and let costs of service equal

$$C_{\text{operator}} = u \cdot Q + v \cdot F,$$

where $u$ is the marginal cost per passenger and $v$ is the cost of an extra vehicle used to serve passengers.\(^1\) In addition to the costs experienced by the operator there are also costs for the passengers. These are related to waiting time, schedule delay, the fare $p$, and other travel cost components $tc$ (cost of in-vehicle time plus costs of travelling to and from railway station). When the vehicles are equally spaced, the interarrival time between vehicles equals $1/F$. This implies that the average waiting time for a traveller going to a public transport stop without consulting the timetable equals $0.5/F$. Other factors to be taken into account in the translation of frequencies into time related costs of travellers are scheduling costs in the form of ‘disguised waiting time’ and inconveniences of waiting at platforms. These factors are summarised in a factor $a$ giving the monetary equivalent of the interarrival time. Then the total costs of a representative traveller are:

$$C_{\text{traveller}} = [p + tc + a/F]Q.$$  \hfill (2)

Minimising the sum of total costs of company and travellers

$$C = C_{\text{operator}} + C_{\text{traveller}} = u \cdot Q + v \cdot F + [p + tc + a/F]Q,$$

leads to the optimum frequency:

$$F^* = \left[a \cdot Q / v \right]^{0.5}.$$  \hfill (4)

This result is known as the ‘square root principle’. It means that an increase of demand $Q$ with 10 per cent leads to an increase of frequency of services of 5 per cent. In a similar way optimal frequency will respond positively to changes in the cost of waiting time per passenger (factor $a$) and negatively to changes in costs of supply of an additional vehicle (factor $v$).

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\(^1\)Note that we do not take into account delays related to boarding and alighting in this formulation.
One of the limitations of this result is that vehicle size is not considered explicitly; it is assumed to be given. This leads to the conclusion that occupancy rates will be higher in situations of high demand and one would expect a tendency of introducing larger vehicles in this case, as for example indicated by Small (1992) and Quinet and Vickerman (2004). This obviously calls for a joint analysis of choice of frequency and vehicle size by operators.

Another point that deserves attention is the possible response of travellers to higher frequencies. In the base line approach demand is inelastic \( Q = Q_0 \), but in a more general setting one would expect that travellers respond to higher frequencies and that operators take this into account in their decision whether or not to increase frequency.

Jansson (1980) introduced the issue of vehicle size by formulating a model where operators jointly optimise size and frequency, and where peak and off-peak periods are distinguished. Based on the assumption of inelastic demand he derives optimal levels of frequency and size of buses. The assumption is that during the peak the occupancy rate is 100 per cent, whereas it may be lower at other times. He concludes that at the time of research the structure of bus operations in Sweden was clearly sub-optimal since frequencies were too low and bus size was too large. The explanation of this gap between the actual and the optimum outcome is the neglect of user costs by public transport operators.

Using computer simulation techniques, Glaister (1986) analysed the potential consequences of deregulation of public transport in the city of Aberdeen based on the assumption of loss minimising operators, and where bus fares are also taken into account. His conclusions are comparable to those of Jansson that at that time busses were too large and that frequencies were too low. Although deregulated bus companies would not take into account directly the user costs of travellers, they may yet benefit from higher frequencies when travellers are prepared to pay
higher fares. One of the issues he raises is the possible emergence of differentiated services for different types of travellers, a point that has been investigated in more detail by Gronau (2000) who analyses optimum diversity in terms of service frequencies and vehicle size.

Oldfield and Bly (1988) formulate a model with elastic demand where social benefits are maximised by using size, service frequency, and price as control variables. Based on empirical data they find that both size and frequency vary approximately with the square root of demand. This underlines that with much more complex models also the square root principle seems to make sense. Jansson (1993) formulates a model for a welfare maximising public transport authority that considers price and frequency. Two forms of schedule delay are distinguished: one where frequencies are so high that customers do not consult timetables when they use public transport, and another one where timetables are consulted. The two forms have rather different effects on schedule delay costs and hence may lead to local optima in the frequency choice problem.

The literature surveyed above focuses on bus transport. It is, however, equally relevant for rail transport. Given the nature of rail operations the number of constraints in the planning of network structures, timetables, vehicle capacities and crew and vehicle schedules tend to be more complex compared with those of bus companies (Daduna and Wren, 1988; Daduna et al., 1995; Ceder, 2001). This may be an explanation why in the rail sector stylised models in terms of frequency and vehicle size only are not very common. Nevertheless, it may be argued that although models in the tradition discussed above give a simplified picture of the optimisation of rail operations, they are useful to analyse the basic trade-offs faced by the planners of transport services.

3.0 Different Levels of Demand at Different Parts of the Railway Line; Inelastic Demand

Consider now a simple network where the operator serves a line from A to C with a stop B in between. The demand on the three relevant markets is denoted as $Q_{AB}$, $Q_{BC}$, and $Q_{AC}$. These demands are assumed to be inelastic at this stage. We consider the case that demand is large on the $AB$ market, and smaller at the $BC$ and $AC$ markets. See Figure 2 for an example.

We study various regimes for frequencies and vehicle size in terms of whether they are uniform across the whole network or not (see Table 1). Clearly, in case 1, the differences in demand levels on various parts of the network are not matched by differences in supply. The implications of
the various capacity strategies for social costs will now be analysed subsequently. In the sequel we will use a second-best approach, implying that we compute optimal values for vehicle size and/or frequency under the relevant uniformity constraints — cases 1, 2 and 3 — after which we compare these with the first best optimum of entirely flexible capacity (case 4).

Before describing our model in detail it is necessary to consider some limitations of the model adopted in order to understand the context within which the conclusions apply.

In our modelling approaches we assume that frequency and vehicle size can be determined as continuous variables. This greatly simplifies the solution of the optimisation problems whereas there is no reason to expect that they will seriously affect the conclusions. We also assume that there are no upper limits to frequency and size, for example related to infrastructure constraints on route capacities and platform length. Also, limitations on rail infrastructure use due to the sharing of rail by passenger and freight transport are not discussed.

We model flexibility of vehicle size in terms of coupling and uncoupling carriages. This means that we do not pay attention to other means sometimes used by railway companies to make the capacity of trains flexible. For example, on certain commuter trains in various countries the capacity is made flexible by the use of tip-up seats, implying that at the quiet BC link...
passengers can sit, whereas at the busy AB link there is sufficient space for standees. Modelling this type of flexibility would make it necessary to take on board issues of valuation of comfort, an aspect that falls outside the scope of the present paper. It is certainly an interesting option to deal with high demand on short trajectories, but on long trajectories this is not a feasible alternative.

Cost elements taken into account concern all costs of operations except infrastructure related costs. Another factor we do not address is that of costs of coupling and de-coupling carriages of a train. This will to some extent bias the attractiveness of alternatives with flexible train sizes. We will return to this point in the concluding section. Unit costs are assumed uniform across the network. Another feature of our model is that we assume demand to be equal during the day. Hence issues of congestion will not be addressed, implying, for example, that congestion pricing is not an issue. Also back-haul problems are ignored in this paper. Further, demand elasticities are uniform across the network. As we will see these uniformity assumptions have a clear impact on the potential for price differentiation.

Case 1: Minimisation of social costs; inelastic demand. Uniform frequency, uniform vehicle size. As the reference case we impose the restriction that the operator applies a uniform service in terms of frequency and vehicle size on all market segments and that a uniform price per km is charged. The total number of passengers who travel between A and B equals $Q_{AB} + Q_{AC}$, and between B and C it equals $Q_{BC} + Q_{AC}$. We assume again that total capacity (the product of frequency $F$ and the number of seats of a train $S$) should be at least sufficient to meet total demand. Hence:

$$Q_{AB} + Q_{AC} \leq F \cdot S \quad Q_{BC} + Q_{AC} \leq F \cdot S.$$  \tag{5}

Assume that demand on the AB segment is larger than on the BC segment. Then, it follows that $F \cdot S = Q_{AB} + Q_{AC}$. We assume that demand is symmetric in both directions.

The costs of the production of transport services consist of various elements. Per passenger the costs of ticket counters, cleaning, and other personnel are equal to $u$. We assume the case of a locomotive hauled train and treat the costs of the locomotive and the carriages separately. The locomotive related costs are proportional to frequency $F$ and length $d$ of the trip ($vFd$; where $v$ is the cost per locomotive km). These costs refer to the capital and energy costs of the locomotives and the labour costs of drivers. Note that these costs do not depend on the size $S$ of the trains. The latter factor plays a role in the next term of the cost function: the cost of energy use related to drawing the carriages. They might be
subject to a certain degree of economies of scale, for example in the case of
the use of double deck carriages (Gijsen and van den Brink, 2002). This
leads to a formulation of energy costs such as $C_{\text{energy}} = wFS^b$, where $b$
equals 1 or attains a value slightly below it. In the present context we
confine ourselves to short run scale adjustments by adding carriages to a
train which means that $b = 1$. In a similar way the capital costs of the
carriages are equal to $rFS^c$ with a value for $c$ close to or equal to 1.
Thus, costs of operations on a certain line of length $d$ are equal to:

$$C_{\text{operator}} = uQ + vFd + wFS^b d + rFS^c d.$$  (6)

Then, the total cost of operations on the line between $A$ and $C$, also includ-
ing the costs of passengers (see equation (2)) is:

$$C = u[Q_{AB} + Q_{BC} + Q_{AC}] + vF(d_{AB} + d_{BC}) + wFS^b (d_{AB} + d_{BC})$$
$$+ rFS^c (d_{AB} + d_{BC}) + [p_{AB} + tc_{AB} + a/F]Q_{AB}$$
$$+ [p_{BC} + tc_{BC} + a/F]Q_{BC} + [p_{AC} + tc_{AC} + a/F]Q_{AC}. \quad (7)$$

Since we assume here that demand is inelastic, welfare maximisation is
equivalent to cost minimisation. Another implication of inelastic demand is
that price setting may be ignored. Thus, the remaining instruments are
frequency $F$ and vehicle size $S$. We assume that capacity $F \cdot S$ is set in
such a way that it is just equal to demand in the busiest part of the network:
$S = [Q_{AB} + Q_{AC}]/F$. After substitution$^2$ of this equation in the cost
function, minimisation of costs $C$ with respect to frequency $F$ leads to:

$$F = \frac{[a(Q_{AB} + Q_{BC} + Q_{AC})]^{0.5}}{[v(d_{AB} + d_{BC}) + w(Q_{AB} + Q_{AC})^b (1 - b)F^{-b}(d_{AB} + d_{BC})$$
$$+ r(Q_{AB} + Q_{AC})^c (1 - c)F^{-c}(d_{AB} + d_{BC})]^{0.5}}. \quad (8)$$

It can be easily checked that in the case of constant returns to scale in
energy use and costs of rolling stock ($b = c = 1$) this boils down to a
square root result Thus, this expression also applies in the context of
more complex networks. In order to explore the consequences of the
various second-best strategies we will consider a network with the following
demand levels and distances: $Q_{AB} = 10,000; Q_{BC} = 5,000; Q_{AC} = 7,500;
d_{AB} = 10; d_{BC} = 30; d_{AC} = 40$. Further, we use the following technical
parameters: $u = 0.65; v = 40; w = 0.0125; r = 0.05; b = 1; c = 1$. These
parameters are based on studies on costs structures in railway operations

$^2$By this substitution the costs of energy and carriages become dependent on demand at the $AB$ part of
the network. Travel volumes on the $BC$ segment do not matter as long as they are smaller than at the
other market.
Table 2
Minimisation of Social Costs under Various Assumptions of Uniform Frequency and Size: Effects on Frequency, Size and Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Minimisation of social costs; inelastic demand</th>
<th>Uniform freq. &amp; size</th>
<th>Varying freq., uniform size</th>
<th>Varying size, uniform freq.</th>
<th>Varying freq. &amp; size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$F$, Frequency $AB$</td>
<td>26.52</td>
<td>33.07</td>
<td>26.52</td>
<td>35.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$BC$</td>
<td>26.52</td>
<td>23.62</td>
<td>26.52</td>
<td>22.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$S$, Size $AB$</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$BC$</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_{\text{traveller, Costs}}$</td>
<td>202,104</td>
<td>201,254</td>
<td>202,104</td>
<td>201,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_{\text{operator}}$</td>
<td>100,801</td>
<td>90,576</td>
<td>91,426</td>
<td>90,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$C_{\text{tot}}$</td>
<td>302,905</td>
<td>291,830</td>
<td>293,530</td>
<td>291,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$OR$, Occupancy rate $AB$</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$BC$</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$AC$, Average cost per passenger km $AB$</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$BC$</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$MC$, Marginal cost per passenger km $AB$</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$BC$</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Van den Brink and Gijsen, 2000; Gijsen and Van den Brink, 2002; Rietveld and Roson, 2002), and on confidential data from the National Railways.

Table 2 (left column) gives the outcomes for the optimal frequency and train size under the constraint that these are uniform in the network. The occupancy rate in the busy part $AB$ is 100 per cent, whereas in the quiet part $BC$ it is 71 per cent. Marginal costs per passenger kilometre are very different in the three market segments: in the busy part $AB$ they are about eight times as high compared with the quiet part $BC$. Note also the large divergence between average costs and marginal costs in some market segments. These results are obviously caused by the excess supply of capacity implied by the restriction that in all segments there should be sufficient capacity, and that capacity does not vary between market segments.

The implications of this second-best approach for the responsiveness of size and frequency with respect to changes in demand are shown in the left column of Table 3. It appears that an increase in demand on the busy segment $AB$ of 1 per cent leads to an increase in overall frequency and train size on this segment of 0.22 per cent and 0.35 per cent, respectively. In Figure 2 we illustrate the sensitivity of frequency for changes in passenger demand. The figure demonstrates the rather low response of frequency with respect
to demand in the busiest part of the line (AB). This reinforces the fact that in the case with spatial variations in demand, it is optimal that the operator sets frequency in a way that departs from the simple Mohring rule.

An increase of demand in the quiet part (BC) leads to a small frequency increase and a small size decrease, keeping total capacity constant. This means that travellers on the AB segment would benefit from an increase of demand in the quiet segment because of the increase in frequency. This is an example of a positive consumption externality in a network context. In the lower part of Table 3 the effects of demand increases on frequency and size are summarised. It appears that an increase in demand such that all market segments grow at the same rate leads to a proportional capacity response in terms of frequency and size (0.50 + 0.50 = 1.00). Thus, in this slightly more complex setting Mohring’s square root principle is also found to apply.3

Table 3
Minimisation of Social Costs under Various Assumptions of Uniform Frequency and Size: Elasticities of Supply with respect to Changes in Demand

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elasticity</th>
<th>Uniform freq. &amp; size</th>
<th>Varying freq., uniform size</th>
<th>Varying size, uniform freq.</th>
<th>Varying freq. &amp; size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F_{AB} – Q_{AB}</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F_{BC} – Q_{AB}</td>
<td>–0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S_{AB} – Q_{AB}</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S_{BC} – Q_{AB}</td>
<td>–0.22</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C_{oper} – Q_{AB}</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F_{AB} – Q_{BC}</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>–0.14</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F_{BC} – Q_{BC}</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S_{AB} – Q_{BC}</td>
<td>–0.11</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>–0.11</td>
<td>–0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S_{BC} – Q_{BC}</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C_{oper} – Q_{BC}</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F_{AB} – Q_{AC}</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F_{BC} – Q_{AC}</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S_{AB} – Q_{AC}</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S_{BC} – Q_{AC}</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C_{oper} – Q_{AC}</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F_{AB} – skms</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F_{BC} – skms</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S_{AB} – skms</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S_{BC} – skms</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C_{oper} – skms</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3Sensitivity analysis with economy of scale parameters b and c lower than 1 yield a slightly lower responsiveness of frequency that is, however, still very close to the elasticity value of 0.5.
Another result of our analysis is that it allows us to investigate economies of density in the railway sector. Economies of density are usually studied in the context of aggregate cost functions where network structures and variations in demand at various segments are ignored (see, for example, Caves et al., 1980; Small, 1992). The present model allows the aggregation of total output (seat kilometres) and total costs of the operator. Then the welfare maximisation approach adopted here leads to a total cost elasticity of about 0.77. The returns to density measure would be $1/(0.77) = 1.27$, which is close to estimates usually obtained for costs functions based on aggregate data (see, for example, Pels et al., 2003).

Case 2. Minimisation of social costs; inelastic demand. Varying frequency, uniform vehicle size. We now drop the restriction that the operator applies a uniform service in terms of frequency. The frequency on the segment $AB$

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Footnote: It should be noted that our estimate is not directly comparable with these elasticities as reported in the literature, since we do not take into account infrastructure related costs.
differs from the frequency on the segments $BC$ and $AC$. Because the
demand on $AB$ is larger than on $BC$, the frequency on the first segment
will be higher than on the latter. This means that trains that arrive at $B$
not always continue to $C$, they sometimes immediately return to $A$. There-
fore, some changes in the cost function are to be applied. The costs of the
public transport operator now become:

$$C_{\text{operator}} = u[Q_{AB} + Q_{BC} + Q_{AC}] + v[F_{AB}d_{AB} + F_{BC}d_{BC}]$$
$$+ wS^{b}[F_{AB}d_{AB} + F_{BC}d_{BC}] + rS^{c}[F_{AB}d_{AB} + F_{BC}d_{BC}]. \quad (9)$$

The costs of the passengers become:

$$C_{\text{traveller}} = [p_{AB} + tc_{AB} + a/F_{AB}]Q_{AB} + [p_{BC} + tc_{BC} + a/F_{BC}]Q_{BC}$$
$$+ [p_{AC} + tc_{AC} + a/F_{BC}]Q_{AC}. \quad (10)$$

As Table 2 shows, the result of the relaxation of the condition of equal
frequency in all segments is clear: on the busy segment frequency increases,
whereas on the quiet segment it decreases. From a welfare perspective the
average traveller will benefit: generalised costs decrease by about 0.5 per
cent. Note, however, that this does not imply that all travellers benefit:
travellers on the quiet segment are obviously better off with the high
frequencies in the reference case. Note that also the costs of the railway
operator decrease by about 11 per cent. Thus, making frequency flexible
has a much larger effect on operator costs than it has on traveller costs
(but note that traveller costs also depend on fares, and access costs, so
that indeed a substantial part of these costs cannot be influenced by the
operator). Occupancy rates are now equal on all market segments, and
the variation in the marginal costs of passenger kilometres among the
market segments is smaller than in the reference case. Interestingly
enough, the marginal costs are now highest in the quiet segment $BC$. The
reason is given in Table 3 where it appears that frequency in the $AC$
segment has become somewhat responsive to demand on $BC$.

Table 3 also shows that on the busy market, frequency has become very
responsive, whereas size has become very unresponsive here. On the other
hand, size has become responsive to changes in demand on the long
distance market. At the overall network level we observe that dropping
the equal train size constraint has considerable impact on cost levels (a
decrease of 11 per cent, mentioned above), but a negligible effect on
economies of density estimates. Thus, constraints on railway operations
may have a substantial impact on inefficiencies, while at the same time
estimates of economies of density in railway operations remain
unaffected.
Case 3. Minimisation of social costs; inelastic demand. Uniform frequency, varying vehicle size. We return to the base model (uniform frequency and uniform vehicle size), but now drop the restriction of uniform vehicle size. We consider the possibility of (un)coupling a railway carriage at B; in that way the vehicle size on segment AB differs from the size on BC. The costs of the public transport operator are:

\[
C_{\text{operator}} = u[Q_{AB} + Q_{BC} + Q_{AC}] + vF[d_{AB} + d_{BC}]
+ wF[S_{AB}^b d_{AB} + S_{BC}^b d_{BC}] + rF[S_{AB}^c d_{AB} + S_{BC}^c d_{BC}].
\]

(11)

The costs of the passengers become:

\[
C_{\text{traveller}} = \left[ p_{AB} + t_{c_{AB}} + a/F \right] Q_{AB} + \left[ p_{BC} + t_{c_{BC}} + a/F \right] Q_{BC}
+ \left[ p_{AC} + t_{c_{AC}} + a/F \right] Q_{AC}.
\]

(12)

This alternative way of introducing flexibility by allowing varying vehicle size leads to better outcomes in terms of operator costs compared with the reference case, whereas traveller costs remain the same since frequencies do not change (see Table 2). When compared with the case of flexible frequency, it is inferior. The effect on operator costs is less attractive and also the development of traveller costs is not as good. The latter is a plausible result, since in our model formulation changes in vehicle size do not have a direct effect on travellers’ utility, because nuisance due to crowding is ruled out. With changes in frequencies this is different since these have a direct impact on the costs of both travellers and operator. Hence we conclude that in this context the welfare gains of making frequency flexible are larger than those of making vehicle size flexible.

Case 4. Minimisation of social costs; inelastic demand. Varying frequency, varying vehicle size. The last extension to this model is making the vehicle size segment-dependent. For example, one may allow that the vehicle size on the segment AC is larger than on the segment AB. We distinguish trains with size \( S_{AB} \) running between A and B with frequency \( G_{AB} \), and trains running between A and C (via B) with size \( S_{AC} \) and frequency \( G_{AC} \). Hence, the frequency \( F_{AB} \) experienced by travellers on AB equals \( G_{AB} + G_{AC} \). The capacity restrictions are in this case:

\[
Q_{AB} + Q_{AC} \leq G_{AB}S_{AB} + G_{AC}S_{AC} \quad Q_{BC} + Q_{AC} \leq G_{AC}S_{AC}.
\]

(13)

The last restriction holds because there are no trains solely on the segment BC: passengers that want to travel from B to C, travel with a train that
drives between A and C. The corresponding cost function is:

\[
C_{\text{operator}} = u\left(\frac{Q_{AB} + Q_{BC} + Q_{AC}}{C_{138}}\right) + v\left(\frac{G_{AC}d_{AC} + G_{AB}d_{AB}}{C_{138}}\right) + wS_{AB}^{b}G_{AB}d_{AB} + wS_{AC}^{b}G_{AC}d_{AC}
\]

\[
(14)
\]

\[
C_{\text{traveller}} = [p_{AB} + tc_{AB} + a/(G_{AB} + G_{AC})]Q_{AB} + [p_{BC} + tc_{BC} + a/G_{AC}]Q_{BC} + [p_{AC} + tc_{AC} + a/G_{AC}]Q_{AC}.
\]

\[
(15)
\]

Table 2 shows that the entirely flexible case has differentiations in size and frequency that are indeed more pronounced than the differences in the preceding alternatives. The outcome is a high frequency/small train service at the short distance, and a low frequency/long train service at the long distance market. However, the differences in total costs are very small compared with the case that only frequency is flexible. This leads to the conclusion that, compared with the reference case of uniform frequency and size, varying frequency is a very well performing second-best alternative to the first-best solution where both size and frequency vary.

Table 3 finally gives a view on how the planning in terms of size and frequencies in the various markets is affected by changes in demand in submarkets. With uniform frequency and size, the elasticities are rather small, which is no surprise since frequency and size have been optimised in view of all submarkets. In the most flexible alternative, an increase in travellers in the busiest segment (AB) has a rather strong effect on size (elasticity equal to 0.58), whereas size in this AB market strongly decreases with increasing demand in the other market (BC). This table shows that the responsiveness of size and frequency with respect to demand shifts in submarkets varies strongly according to the regime of fixed versus flexible size and frequency. In the lower part of Table 3 we have introduced the effects of a proportional increase in all submarkets. Then it appears again that the elasticities of size and frequency with respect to travel demand are both equal to 0.5. This underlines the robustness of Mohring’s result derived for a simple one-line network in the context of more complex networks as long as constant returns to scale prevail (\(b = c = 1\)).

Our overall conclusion is that when demand is inelastic the second-best strategy of working with non-uniform frequencies leads to outcomes for total costs that are very close to the first best strategy. Setting the range between the completely uniform service and the first-best solution equal to 100 (202,104 – 201,206) for travellers and 100,801 – 90,528 for the operator we find that the loss of keeping vehicle size uniform (case 2) is only 1 to 5 per cent of this range. On the other hand, the loss of keeping frequency uniform and only varying vehicle size is 100 per cent for traveller
costs and 9 per cent for operator costs. Thus, compared with strategies involving different frequencies at different parts of the network, strategies dealing with non-uniform vehicle size are performing much worse.

An important question is to what extent this result is also obtained for other network configurations. For that purpose we carried out a sensitivity analysis such that the differences in the sizes of the various sub-markets become more pronounced. The ensuing results for the relative welfare losses are shown in Table 4.

The table shows that when the AB and BC markets have equal size, frequency and vehicle size will be chosen such that they are equal in all markets, implying zero welfare losses when equality constraints would be imposed. The third case (with demands equal to 10,000, 5,000, and 7,500 respectively) was the reference case in the optimisations above. The sensitivity analysis also shows that when small differences in demand levels occur in the submarkets, the policy of differentiating frequencies yields a large share of potential welfare gains. We conclude that the strategy of making frequency flexible while keeping vehicle size equal performs very closely to the first-best strategy of making both frequency and vehicle size flexible for a very wide range of market sizes. This underlines the robustness of the results above.

A limitation of the present analysis is that due to the assumption of given travel demand, the price instrument cannot be considered. Therefore we shift our attention now to the case of elastic travel demand. We will address the question whether the above conclusion on the superiority of

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Table 4

Relative Welfare Performance for Various Combinations of Uniform Frequency and Vehicle Size: Sensitivity Analysis for Various Market Sizes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marketsize</th>
<th>(Q_{AB})</th>
<th>(Q_{BC})</th>
<th>(Q_{AC})</th>
<th>(C_{\text{traveller}})</th>
<th>(C_{\text{operator}})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,625</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>11,250</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>18,750</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this specific case of a fully symmetric network the four strategies lead to identical results, implying that the relative welfare measures cannot be computed.

5Note that the absolute range of outcomes on which the relative differences in Table 4 are based is small when the differences in demand levels remain of limited size.
frequency as an instrument above vehicle size is still valid when demand is inelastic, and how the efficiency of these capacity oriented measures compare with the efficiency of price measures.

4.0 Optimisation of Railway Operations under Elastic Demand

We now consider the case that demand is elastic, so that it depends on frequency and fares. Let demand for trips depend on generalised costs $GC$, where $GC$ depends on the fare $p$, scheduling costs that are related to frequency $F$, and other travel cost components $tc$ as outlined in (2). Demand also depends on other factors such as income and supply of competing modes, which are incorporated in a factor $A$. Thus, the demand for trips on the three segments is:

$$Q_{AB} = A_{AB} \cdot [p_{AB} + tc_{AB} + a/F]^z,$$
$$Q_{BC} = A_{BC} \cdot [p_{BC} + tc_{BC} + a/F]^z,$$
$$Q_{AC} = A_{AC} \cdot [p_{AC} + tc_{AC} + a/F]^z,$$

where $z$ is the generalised cost elasticity of demand ($z < 0$). This formulation with elastic demand means that in addition to frequency and vehicle size, also fares are considered. We consider two cases, one where the objective is the maximisation of profits, and one where it is the maximisation of social welfare.

4.1 Maximisation of social welfare; elastic demand

The maximisation of social surplus with elastic demand means that the overall objective can no longer be formulated in terms of costs, but that consumer surplus and profits have to be considered. The inverse demand function is $GC = (Q/A)^{1/z}$. Thus, consumer surplus equals

$$CS = \int_0^{Q_{AB}} [q/A_{AB}]^{1/z} dq + \int_0^{Q_{BC}} [q/A_{BC}]^{1/z} dq + \int_0^{Q_{AC}} [q/A_{AC}]^{1/z} dq$$
$$- [p_{AB} + tc_{AB} + a/F]Q_{AB} - [p_{BC} + tc_{BC} + a/F]Q_{BC}$$
$$- [p_{AC} + tc_{AC} + a/F]Q_{AC}.$$

The parameters in this demand function have been set at the following values: $A_{AB} = 10,000$; $A_{BC} = 5,000$; $A_{AC} = 7,500$; $tc_{AB} = 2.04$; $tc_{BC} = 3.79$; $tc_{AC} = 4.67$; $a = 50$, $z = -1.5$. 
In the case of welfare maximisation the objective is to maximise total surplus \( TS \), that is consumer surplus plus profits \( p_{AB}Q_{AB} + p_{AC}Q_{AC} + p_{BC}Q_{BC} - C \):

\[
TS = \int_0^{Q_{AB}} [q/A_{AB}]^{1/2} dq + \int_0^{Q_{BC}} [q/A_{BC}]^{1/2} dq + \int_0^{Q_{AC}} [q/A_{AC}]^{1/2} dq \\
- \left[ tc_{AB} + a/F \right] Q_{AB} - \left[ tc_{BC} + a/F \right] Q_{BC} - \left[ tc_{AC} + a/F \right] Q_{AC} \\
- u[Q_{AB} + Q_{BC} + Q_{AC}] - vF(d_{AB} + d_{BC}) - wFS^b(d_{AB} + d_{BC}) \\
- rFS^c(d_{AB} + d_{BC}).
\] (18)

Table 5 reports the results for maximisation of social welfare. In order to prevent outcomes with negative profits, we impose the constraint that profits should be positive. Depending on the institutional setting where

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Uniform freq., size &amp; price</th>
<th>Varying freq., uniform size</th>
<th>Varying freq., uniform price</th>
<th>Varying freq. &amp; size, uniform price</th>
<th>Varying freq. &amp; price, uniform size</th>
<th>Varying freq., uniform price &amp; size</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( F ), Frequency</td>
<td>( AB )</td>
<td>21.25</td>
<td>25.11</td>
<td>61.38</td>
<td>26.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( BC )</td>
<td>21.25</td>
<td>25.11</td>
<td>14.38</td>
<td>26.61</td>
<td>27.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( S ), Size</td>
<td>( AB )</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( BC )</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( p ), Price</td>
<td>( AB )</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( BC )</td>
<td>7.93</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>5.92</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>5.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( AC )</td>
<td>10.57</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>7.89</td>
<td>5.69</td>
<td>7.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Q ), Demand</td>
<td>( AB )</td>
<td>13,385</td>
<td>9,134</td>
<td>23,543</td>
<td>19,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( BC )</td>
<td>2,840</td>
<td>6,466</td>
<td>3,132</td>
<td>4,003</td>
<td>3,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( AC )</td>
<td>2,710</td>
<td>4,580</td>
<td>3,115</td>
<td>4,185</td>
<td>3,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( OR ), Occupancy rate</td>
<td>( AB )</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( BC )</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R ), Revenues</td>
<td>( AB )</td>
<td>86,552</td>
<td>87,582</td>
<td>89,552</td>
<td>90,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( BC )</td>
<td>86,552</td>
<td>87,582</td>
<td>89,552</td>
<td>90,187</td>
<td>85,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Z ), Profits</td>
<td>( AB )</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( BC )</td>
<td>363,776</td>
<td>384,687</td>
<td>409,981</td>
<td>413,688</td>
<td>398,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( CS ), Consumer surplus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( W ), Welfare</td>
<td>363,776</td>
<td>384,687</td>
<td>409,981</td>
<td>413,688</td>
<td>398,978</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
subsidies are given to public transport, this might be replaced by side conditions, that losses do not exceed a certain maximum level. A major lesson to be learnt from Table 5 is that flexibility of prices (column 2) is a rather ineffective way to improve welfare compared with flexibility of size or frequency.

Compared with the reference case (column 1), flexible prices only lead to an increase of potential welfare of \((384,687 - 363,776)/(413,790 - 363,776) = 42\) per cent. As illustrated in Figure 4, this figure is 71 per cent for flexible vehicle size, and for flexible frequency it is as high as 92 per cent. Thus flexible prices do help to improve the social surplus in rail transport, but changes in the supply of capacity (frequency and train size) appear to be more efficient. Another result is that when two instruments are applied in a non-uniform way, most of the potential welfare gains can be achieved. Least attractive is the combination of vehicle size and fare with a score of about 77 per cent, the combinations of \(F, p\) and \(F, S\) approach a score of 100 per cent. It is interesting to note that the combination \(F, p\) performs slightly better than \(F, S\). This reveals that the degree of overlap in the effects of \(F\) and \(S\) is larger than in the effects of \(F\) and \(p\).

From Table 5 we learn that flexible prices with uniform frequency and size imply that the per km price in the busy segment \((AB)\) is about 7 times higher than in the quiet segment \((BC)\) – note that we assume \(BC\) to be three times as long as \(AB\). Thus optimal fares indeed vary strongly in a situation with differences in demand levels, but in spite of this the price instrument is not very effective in getting close to the welfare optimum. Comparison of the first-best case with the case where the price per km is
uniform in the network (the two right-most columns in Table 5) reveals that the welfare loss of imposing a uniform price per km is very small.

There is an interesting link with the literature on road pricing. It is well known that when the degree of congestion varies between different links in the network, important welfare gains can be achieved with differentiated prices. However, this result only holds true as long as capacity is fixed. As demonstrated by Verhoef and Rouwendal (2004), when capacities are optimised there are no welfare gains from using differentiated road prices. This result is obtained under the assumption of constant returns to scale for road capacity. In the present railway case with slightly different cost structures, we do find a welfare increasing effect of the introduction of non-uniform prices. However, this effect is very small, so that the main conclusion still holds, that the additional effect of differentiated fares is close to zero when capacities are fixed at the optimal level.

We conclude that the most efficient way to deal with variations in a network with non-uniform demand is to use differentiated frequencies. Differentiation of vehicle size achieves the second position and differentiation of fares is least attractive. Using a similar sensitivity analysis with respect to differences in relative market size confirms the robustness of this result for variations in market demand.

4.2 Maximisation of profits; elastic demand

Profits of the monopolist are equal to:

\[
Z = (p_{AB} - u)Q_{AB} + (p_{BC} - u)Q_{BC} + (p_{AC} - u)Q_{AC} \\
- vF(d_{AB} + d_{BC}) - wFS^e(d_{AB} + d_{BC}) - rFS^e(d_{AB} + d_{BC}).
\]

The maximisation of profits appears to lead to higher prices, and lower frequencies and vehicle sizes compared with maximisation of welfare. Given the purpose of our paper we focus on relative welfare performance of the various strategies, illustrated in Figure 5.

The relative efficiency effects of imposing uniformity constraints on fares, frequencies and vehicle size in the case of profit maximisation are similar to those of welfare maximisation, as can be observed by comparing Figures 5 and 4. In both cases the most efficient instrument to cope with variations in demand in various market segments is the use of the frequency instrument. As soon as frequencies and vehicle size have been established at their optimal levels, only small efficiency gains can be achieved by the introduction of differentiated fares per km.

An important proviso that has to be made here is that the results may change when the assumption is removed that demand is the same in both directions. Directional imbalances may be substantial in public transport.
Table 6 gives an illustration for a train service between A, B and C, where C is a large city. In the morning peak demand for train services is assumed to be high for the BC part, 50 per cent lower for AB, and lower again in the opposite direction. As demonstrated in the table a policy to accommodate demand at the BC section leads to a rather low average occupancy rate of below 50 per cent even during the morning peak.

The case of directional imbalances — also known as the back-haul problem — is essentially a matter of joint production: if services are produced in one direction, there will also be services in the opposite direction. It will appear that opportunities to address the demand imbalances by adjustments in capacity — size, frequency — are limited. It is here that

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Table 6

**Directional and Spatial Asymmetries in Travel Demand**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demand during morning peak: passenger kms</th>
<th>Capacity: seat kms</th>
<th>Occupancy rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CB</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,875</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

We do not go into details here on strategies that are sometimes available, such as letting trains wait near the work location after the morning peak until the start of the afternoon peak, or using the excess capacity in other parts of the network.
pricing measures — implying direction dependent pricing — can be shown to be of vital importance to improve efficiency (see, for example, Rietveld and Roson, 2002). Other obvious areas where differentiated prices may be expected to perform favourably are price differentiation by time of day to address congestion problems, and price differentiation reflecting differences in unit costs in various parts of the network.

5.0 Conclusions

There are various reasons why railway operators may wish to apply uniform frequencies, vehicle size, and fares per km. These reasons include indivisibilities in frequencies and in car size. It is more convenient for travellers when frequencies are a fixed integer number per hour. And given network interdependencies, having a frequency of three per hour in a system where two per hour is the standard is not very comfortable. For vehicle size, flexibility can be achieved by coupling cars, but car size itself is fixed in the short run, and costs of coupling and uncoupling may be substantial. Also different prices per km may lead to resistance from travellers when these are considered as non-transparent or unfair. In the present paper we investigate the welfare consequences of the imposition of such uniformity constraints.

The use of uniform frequencies and vehicle size in railway networks with varying levels of demand leads to losses in terms of both operator costs and generalised traveller costs. When demand is inelastic the second-best strategy of working with non-uniform frequencies and keeping vehicle size constant leads to outcomes for total costs that are very close to the first-best strategies. If we had added costs of coupling and uncoupling in the model, this would reinforce our conclusion that allowing flexibility of size is less attractive than allowing flexibility of frequency. Sensitivity analysis on the degree of variation of demand between segments reveals that this conclusion is robust for a wide range of demand levels. Thus, although the results obtained depend to some extent on the chosen parameter values, the conclusions are probably robust within the limits of the model adopted.

In the variants with elastic demand the price instrument can also be incorporated. We find that differentiated prices do help to increase overall efficiency of the railway system, but that the effect is small. When supply, measured in terms of vehicle size and frequency, has been optimised the potential contribution of differentiated prices is limited. Thus, in the context of the present model, only when size and frequency are far from their optimal level — or when the costs of having flexible frequencies and
vehicle sizes are high — price differentiation becomes important. Other examples where price differentiation remains important are the backhaul problem, networks where unit costs vary among segments, and demand variations in time of day.

An additional result is that the square root formula — derived in simple network models — still applies in more complex networks with constant returns to scale in energy and capital costs of the running stock. And when economies of scale would prevail it is still a good approximation. However, when there are non-uniform changes in demand in various parts of the network quite differentiated frequency responses may be called for.

The model formulations employed here are based on detailed cost functions for individual links. They can be used to compute aggregate economies of scale in railway operations in larger networks. In our numerical example we arrive at economies of scale of about 1.25. It also appears that this parameter hardly depends on specific frequency or size constraints imposed on the operator. Thus, uniformity of frequency or vehicle size certainly matters for total cost levels, but not for the economies of scale parameter.

References


