For the Love of Mankind

A Sociological Study on Charitable Giving
Thesis committee:

Prof.dr. H.W. Bowman
Prof.dr. P. Dekker
Prof.dr. R. Koopmans
Prof.dr. M.H.D. van Leeuwen
Prof.dr. W. Raub

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For the Love of Mankind
A Sociological Study on Charitable Giving

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“Dat is het leven:
je vertelt iets waarmee je de ander steeds wijzer maakt,
terwijl je zelf steeds minder weet wat je eigenlijk aan het vertellen bent.”
- Abdelkader Benali
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The literal translation of the Greek word philanthropy is 'the love of mankind', 'philo' meaning 'love of' and 'anthropos' meaning 'mankind'. In this thesis I study one specific act of philanthropy, namely charitable giving. As you will see, charitable giving is not always initiated out of a sense of love for mankind. However, to some extent people do engage in charitable giving in order to do good for others. Researching the subject of charitable giving showed me how wonderful people can be. I never had a really skeptical view of mankind, but after writing this thesis I feel like I’m looking through rose-colored glasses.

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Chapter 1 Introduction to the research problem

1.1 Introduction
There are many ways in which individuals can act for the public good. People can volunteer time, donate blood or organs, or they can give money to charitable organizations. Whilst sociologists have made key contributions to the debate on some forms of benevolence (for example Titmuss 1970 on giving blood; and Wilson and Musick 1997 on giving of time), the discipline has largely absented itself from the study of giving of money. Economists and psychologists have dominated research in this field, even though charitable giving is essentially a form of social interaction, and therefore a matter at the heart of sociological enquiry. In the Netherlands, 1.9 billion euros was contributed to charitable organizations by households in 2003 (Schuyt et al. 2007) to meet a wide range of individual and social needs that are left unmet by the state and the market. Given the scale and impact of charitable giving on society, sociology's silence on this topic is deafening. This thesis fills that gap by contributing original sociological research into charitable giving.

Charitable giving is the voluntary donation of money to (representatives of) charitable organizations, which mainly benefit those other than oneself and one’s own family. In the Netherlands, charitable organizations are formally referred to as “religious, philosophical, charitable, cultural, scientific or public benefit institutions” by the Income Tax Act (Koele 2007:246). Examples of well-known charitable organizations are Oxfam Novib, Unicef, Greenpeace, and the Salvation Army. Charitable giving is omnipresent in today’s society. Almost all people give money to charitable organizations. In 2003 in the Netherlands, 95% of Dutch households made at least one donation to a charitable organization. Over the course of that year, Dutch households donated an average amount of €244 to charitable organizations, ranging from organizations supporting the homeless to art institutions (GINPS03 2003).

The most popular charitable organizations in the Netherlands are religious organizations, including churches. In 2003, Dutch households donated in total 725 million euros to the religious sub-sector. Organizations active in the field of health, such as the Cancer Association and the Heart Association, received a total of 273 million euros from the Dutch households. The next most popular causes are organizations active in the international relief sector. These organizations, such as
Oxfam Novib, the Dutch Médecins sans Frontières, and Unicef, received a total of 217 million euros in 2003 (Schuyt et al. 2007).

Figure 1.1 illustrates giving to charitable organizations in different charitable sub-sectors, for households in the Netherlands in 2003. It shows the differences in percentage donors, and amount donated between charitable sectors. Organizations active in the health sector receive, for example, low but frequent amounts. This contrasts with the somewhat higher, but less omnipresent donations received by organizations active in the international relief sector. Figure 1.1 illustrates that there is much variation in charitable giving by households in the Netherlands. In this thesis, we focus on explaining this variation. The main question we will answer is: Why do some people donate more money to charitable organizations than others, and why do they choose to donate to different organizations? This question expands on previous research on charitable giving, in which researchers identified charitable donors. Numerous previous studies have investigated who the charitable donors are (see for example Bryant et al. 2003; Jencks 1987; Schervisch, O’Herlihy, and Havens 2006). These studies have been conducted for many different countries: Australia (ACOSS 2005), Canada (Imagine Canada 2006), India (APPC 2002), Indonesia (APPC 2002), Japan (Yamauchi 2003), Korea (The Beautiful Foundation 2005), the Netherlands (GINPS05 2005), the Philippines (APPC 2002), Thailand (APPC 2002), the United States (Giving USA 2007), and the United Kingdom (CAF 2006b).

The explanatory question in this thesis, why some people donate more money to charitable organizations than others and why they choose to donate to different organizations, is less frequently researched, specifically in the field of sociology. We will expand on existing research by specifically examining why people differ in the amounts they donate to charitable organizations, and how and why people differ in the charitable organizations they donate to. Answers to explanatory questions on the topic of charitable giving can mainly be found in economics (Andreoni 2004; Vesterlund 2006) and psychology (Piliavin and Charng 1990; Schroeder et al. 1995).
Figure 1.1 Percentage donors and mean amount donated by donors to charitable organizations active in different charitable sub-sectors: the Netherlands, 2003 (GINPS03; N=1,316)
1.2 Economic research on charitable giving

In economic research, there are two main issues in the study of charitable giving. The first issue concerns the effects of price and income on giving. The second issue concerns whether public or private benefits of giving are more important in determining why people give (Vesterlund 2006).

Over the past three decades, economists have provided overwhelming evidence for a positive income effect and a negative price effect. The positive income effect refers to the finding that people with a higher income give more money to charitable organizations (Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter 2002). The negative price effect refers to the ‘price of giving’, the actual cost of a donation (Peloza and Steel 2005).

Tax regulations cause the financial costs of charitable donations to vary between households with different incomes (Jencks 1987). In many countries, including the Netherlands and the United States, giving to charitable causes is tax deductible. As a consequence, the real costs of a donation are smaller than the donation itself. If people receive more tax benefits from their donation, they are inclined to give more money. Most tax systems stimulate charitable behavior in such a way that people with a higher income are given more incentives to donate large amounts of money than people with a lower income. People in higher tax categories pay a relatively lower price of giving when they make a donation than people in the lower tax categories. Thus, the higher a household’s income, the lower the costs for making charitable donations. Economic researchers agree that there is a negative price effect (for overview articles on the price effect, see Peloza and Steel 2005; Simmons and Emanuele 2004; Steinberg 1990). The higher the ‘price of giving’, the lower the charitable donations. Additional questions that economists investigate with respect to price and income include differences between temporary and permanent changes in income and price of giving (Vesterlund 2006).

The second issue economists are concerned with in research on charitable giving is whether charitable donors are motivated by either the public or private benefits of giving. The public benefits of giving refer to the output that is produced by charitable organizations. Examples of public benefits are the construction of a school in rural Africa, the protection of the endangered Asian elephant, or public radio station broadcasts (Kingma 1989). As is argued by Andreoni (1989), people donating out of pure altruistic motives will only be concerned with the provision of
a public good, and not with the level of their own or another’s contribution to this public good.

The private benefits of giving refer to the direct personal benefits a donor experiences from giving, for example feelings of ‘warm glow’, a positive feeling people have when making donations (Andreoni 1989; Schiff 1990). At this point, it is interesting to note that economists use a broader definition of charitable giving than we do. We place the emphasis on the fact that charitable donations should mainly benefit others and not oneself and one’s own family. Economists on the other hand, do not use such restrictions. A typical economic definition of charitable giving is provided by Schiff (1990). Schiff considers charitable giving “to include giving to any tax-deductible organization” (Schiff 1990:5). In this definition of charitable giving, there is ample room for private benefits derived from donations.

Economists have investigated whether public or private benefits are more important for charitable giving by examining the ‘crowding out’ of private donations by an increase in public expenditures with a classical economic model. They argue that donations by people who are solely motivated to give to a specific cause because of the private benefits will be unaffected by an increase in public expenditures (typically government grants) on the same cause. On the other hand, donations purely motivated by the public benefits (altruistic donations) will be affected by public expenditures, as pure altruists are only concerned with the provision of the collective good, and not with the level of their own contribution to this good.

In an overview of some studies on crowding out, Brooks (2000) shows that results on crowding out are mixed. In general, there appears to be some form of incomplete crowd-out. That is, governmental grants only partly crowd out private donations. In an earlier overview study by Steinberg, this incomplete crowd-out was estimated to be somewhere between 0.5% and 35% (Steinberg 1991). This indicates that every euro spent by the government decreases private giving by an amount ranging between 0.5 and 35 cents. In her review article, Vesterlund (2006) also concludes that there is often no evidence for complete crowding out. These results suggest that private benefits for giving are more important than public benefits, leading to the conclusion that donors are ‘impure altruists’ rather than ‘pure altruists’. One reason economists give for incomplete crowding out is that many donors are unaware of government grants to charitable causes, and hence
cannot respond to changes in these expenditures (Horne, Johnson, and Van Slyke 2005).

We use knowledge gained in economic research in order to formulate hypotheses on why some people donate more money to charitable organizations than others, and why they choose to donate to different organizations. We use assumptions on the price of giving in order to account for differences in giving as a percentage of income between lower and higher income groups (chapter 3). Also, we use the private benefits people receive from giving to explain why people donate to particular charitable organizations (chapter 6).

1.3 Psychological research on charitable giving

Psychologists have done extensive research on individual helping behavior, usually referred to as prosocial behavior (Piliavin and Charng 1990; Schroeder et al. 1995). Prosocial behavior “represents a broad category of acts that are defined by some significant segment of society and/or one’s social group as generally beneficial to other people” (Penner et al. 2005:366). Charitable giving can be considered a specific act of prosocial behavior, in which the donor and the beneficiary generally do not interact in person, and in which the act can not only be beneficial to people, but also to organizations, institutions, and nature. Specifically the absence of past and (expectation of) future interaction between donor and beneficiary is important. This limits the direct (private) benefits people can experience from charitable giving compared to other forms of individual helping behavior, such as volunteering.

In psychological research, two different types of research on charitable giving can be distinguished. First, psychological research has contributed to the understanding of the importance of people’s cognitive and emotional characteristics for charitable giving. Second, psychologists have used applied research to investigate the effects of compliance techniques on the incidence and level of charitable giving.

Using experiments, psychologists have investigated the importance of many cognitive and emotional characteristics of individuals for prosocial behavior. Results show that people who display higher levels of helping behavior in general are “[...] people high in self-esteem, high in competence, high in internal locus of control, low in need of approval, and high in moral development” (Piliavin and Charng 1990:31). Bekkers (2004b) investigated the importance of both social and
psychological factors specifically for charitable giving. In his research, Bekkers specified that empathy, agreeableness, emotional stability, and self-esteem are the most important psychological characteristics that influence charitable giving.

The second type of knowledge psychologists contributed to the understanding of charitable behaviour concerns information on psychological compliance techniques. Social psychological literature defines compliance techniques as fundraising mechanisms developed in order to increase the likelihood and the level of charitable giving (Freedman and Fraser 1966). Well-known compliance techniques include the ‘foot-in-the-door’ technique, the ‘door-in-the-face’ technique, and the ‘even-a-penny-helps’ technique. Most of the compliance techniques are based on self-image evaluation, and on the perceived costs for making donations (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007). In short, when people perceive themselves as being helpful, for example after having complied to a very small favour, they are more inclined to comply to a second request, for example the request for a donation. The perceived costs for donations can be manipulated by first asking for a large request, followed by a modest request. Although in this case the first request is often declined, the compliance with the second request is likely to be seen as a concession.

The literature on compliance techniques can be traced back to the end of the 1960s and continues until the early nineties. After that, this type of knowledge only rarely reappears in psychological literature (Cialdini and Schroeder 1976; DeJong and Oopik 1992; Freedman and Fraser 1966; Reingen 1982). However, the

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1 The ‘foot-in-the-door’ technique refers to the use of two consecutive requests in order to increase incidence of giving (Brownstein and Katzev 1985; Freedman and Fraser 1966). First, people are asked for a very small favor. This favor is something to which almost all people would comply, for example signing a petition. Social psychologists argue that compliance with this small request brings people into a state of helpfulness, which increases the likelihood of compliance with a second, more substantial request for a donation (Rittle 1981). This second request is the main request, which typically comprises of a donation of some level.

2 The ‘door-in-the-face’ technique is an adaptation of the ‘foot-in-the-door’-technique, made by Cialdini et al. (1975). Instead of starting with a small request, the ‘door-in-the-face’ technique initially asks for a large request, which almost everyone would decline. After having declined this first unreasonable request, people are confronted with a moderate, reasonable request, to which they more often respond positively than in control conditions (Weyant 1996).

3 The ‘even-a-penny-helps’ technique refers to the legitimization of small donations. People who are requested to donate are told that “even a penny helps”. The argument is that this would defuse the argument that people cannot afford to make a donation. In addition, people might feel stingy when not even donating a penny. The ‘even-a-penny-helps’ technique increases incidence of giving. However, it does not increase the mean amount donated, as small donations are seen as legitimate (Reingen 1978; Weyant and Smith 1987).
psychological literature on compliance techniques has received some follow-up in marketing studies in the nineties. Weyant (1996) for example conducted a study on the effectiveness of compliance techniques for the increase of response to direct mail appeals.

In order to explain why people with more social resources donate more money to charitable organizations, we formulate hypotheses using psychological characteristics that are known to influence charitable giving in psychological studies (chapter 4). Furthermore, we implement ideas on compliance techniques in order to predict the specific organizations people donate to (chapter 6).

1.4 Sociological research on charitable giving
Although there is much sociological research on interpersonal gift giving (Cheal 1988; Komter 1996a; Komter 2005), there appears to be little sociological research on the subject of charitable giving (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007; Halfpenny 1999). Interpersonal gift giving refers to giving in many different forms (usually non-monetary) from one person to the other. According to Komter, “gift exchange is the cement of social relationships” (Komter 1996a:3). Examples of interpersonal gift giving include giving presents at Sinterklaas (The Dutch Santa Claus, Van Leer 1995), inviting friends for dinner, and giving birthday presents (Komter 1996b; Komter and Schuyt 1993). An important explanation for interpersonal gift giving is reciprocity or reciprocated altruism (Koopmans 2006). Komter and Schuyt (1993) named this the Matthew effect of giving. Those who give more, also receive more.

The reciprocity explanation for interpersonal gift giving can be traced to cultural anthropology. Cultural anthropologists perceive gift giving as a significant aspect of a society’s culture. Mauss ([1924] 2002) and Malinowski ([1922] 1960) studied gift giving in primitive societies. They found that status, power, and reciprocity are important aspects of gift giving in these societies. In interpersonal gift giving, there is no such thing as a free gift. According to Mauss ([1924] 2002), gift giving is invoked by the old Roman wisdom ‘do ut des’: I give in order that you will give in return (Komter 1996a). People who give are perceived as more generous and respectable: giving leads to increased social status. Receiving gifts results in obligations: Accepting a gift leads to the implicit obligation of making a reciprocal gift, of the same magnitude. Thus, giving can also be used to gain power over others. Giving people gifts they cannot return results in indebtedness. Gift
giving thus involves many obligations: The obligation to give, the obligation to receive, and the obligation to reciprocate.

Charitable giving differs substantially from interpersonal gift giving. The main difference is the absence of repeated personal interaction. In the case of interpersonal gift giving, donor and recipient often have repeated personal contact. In addition, gift giver and gift receiver are regularly connected through formal or informal bonds. In many cases, they are friends or relatives, who share a past and likely a future. Up to now, attempts to use sociological theories concerning interpersonal gift giving to derive hypotheses explaining charitable giving have remained fruitless (see for example Wiepking 2003). This is due to the different dynamics involved in interpersonal gift giving and charitable giving (Schuyt 2001).

According to Halfpenny (1999:208-9), there is little sociological research on the subject of charitable giving. Sociologists have devoted “substantial research attention […] to mapping the voluntary sector”, however, “sociological analyses have had less to offer than economic analyses on the question why individuals give” and

“there is only scattered sociological literature on individual charitable giving […]. What work there is […] tends to be empiricist, in the sense that it is untouched by theoretical reflection. There is almost no continuity across studies, which makes it difficult to identify common analytic themes” (Halfpenny 1999:208-9).

Thus, sociological research has in many cases focussed on the empirical descriptive question ‘who gives?’, rather than on the explanatory question ‘why do people give?’. However, Bekkers’ (2004b) study is an example of an exception to this statement. Bekkers investigated to what extent charitable giving (and volunteering) can be explained by either prosocial motives, such as empathic concern, perspective taking, and prosocial value orientations, or by the social conditions people live in, for example their religious participation, educational level, level of urbanization. Bekkers showed that charitable giving is primarily determined by social conditions.

1.5 For the love of mankind: A sociological study on charitable giving
The main objective of this thesis is to provide new and more sociological explanations for charitable giving. As we will show, sociology has a lot to offer the
field of philanthropic research. One of the benefits of sociological explanations for charitable giving can be illustrated by Pareto’s definition of sociology. According to Pareto, sociology is a science that explains non-logical actions, in contrast to economics, which is a science mainly concerned with logical actions (Pareto 1963 [1935]). Charitable giving is a perfect example of a non-logical action: Why do people give money away to (representatives of) charitable organizations without receiving straightforward private or public benefits? How do sociologists explain these non-logical actions?

In this thesis we use several general sociological theories in order to derive and test hypotheses explaining charitable giving. The most important are theories on integration, cultural reproduction, social capital, and trust.

First of all, we apply Durkheim’s ([1897] 1952) integration thesis to the case of charitable giving. Durkheim states that people who are more integrated into intermediary groups with specific norms will be more inclined to act according to the norms of these groups. Charitable behavior is generally not an isolated action, but is in many cases behavior that is displayed in a social environment. These social environments can have either positive or negative norms for charitable giving. Examples of social environments in which people have positive norms regarding charitable giving are religious networks, or service club networks (e.g., the Rotary and the Lions). When people actively engage in a social environment with more positive norms regarding charitable giving, they will act according to these norms and donate more money to charitable organizations (see for example Barman 2007; Bekkers 2004b; Carman 2003; Lindahl and Conley 2002).

Furthermore, we use Bourdieu’s theory of cultural reproduction (Bourdieu 1977) to explain charitable giving. In his theory of cultural reproduction, Bourdieu (1977) argues that people use cultural and economic capital as a strategy to create and reproduce social inequalities (Ultee, Arts, and Flap 1996). Bourdieu states that elites trying to keep the hierarchical distinctions in place will search for compensating strategies. Those belonging to the upper class will use either cultural or economic capital as a means of distinction.

First of all, the elites distinguish themselves by displaying refined cultural tastes. For example, they attend higher status cultural activities, such as theater, ballet, and opera performances. Charitable giving can be used as a means to display refined cultural tastes. However, in a society where everyone can afford to make donations, the elites will want to distinguish themselves by making donations
to organizations that are less accessible to people in lower social strata, such as high-status organizations like cultural institutions (Ostrower 1997).

Secondly, elites have been using charitable giving as a means of economic distinction for centuries. For example, in the Netherlands of the pre-welfare state, the philanthropic act of taking care of the poor was considered a privilege of the religious and private elites (Van Leeuwen 1994; De Swaan 1988). Participating in poor relief led to multiple advantages for the elites. It was a way to maintain social order, and at the same time it raised and guaranteed their social status. When we consider present-day private (non-governmental) poor relief, it is to a large extent still a high social status cause. Many local service clubs like the Rotary, and Lions, or private foundations headed by the wealthy, focus on helping those with little means to make ends meet. Thus, giving to the poor enables the elites to distinguish themselves both economically and culturally.

In sociological research, social capital theory (Coleman 1988; Lin 2001) has become an important source for explanations of all kinds of social phenomena, ranging from explaining participation in associations (Putnam 2000) to criminal behavior (Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer 2001). Following Bryant et al. (2003) and Bekkers et al. (forthcoming), we explore the possibilities of using social capital as an explanation for charitable giving. Charitable giving can be influenced by the resources people access through their network. For example, having a larger and more diverse social network enables easier access to charitable markets, decreasing the transaction costs of donating (Bryant et al. 2003).

People with more extended social networks are more frequently solicited to make donations to charitable organizations. Sokolowski (1996) finds, for example, that 80 per cent of the respondents received a solicitation for donations by a significant other over the course of a year. A more extended social network will increase the number of solicitations made through this network, likely increasing total donations to charitable organizations.

Furthermore, people with more extended social networks receive information about charitable organizations more easily through their social network (Brown 2005; Brown and Ferris 2007). This provides them, for example, with more information regarding the opportunity to give to certain charitable organizations. A first condition for donating money to certain charitable organizations is that people need to be aware that these organizations exist.
People can also receive information about the trustworthiness of charitable organizations through their social network. In charitable giving, confidence in the capacities of charitable organizations is very important for people in order to give money (Bekkers 2003b; Bekkers 2006b; Bowman 2004; Sargeant, Ford, and West 2006; Uslaner 2002). In addition, people need to trust that charitable organizations will spend their money well (Cheung and Chan 2000).

Confidence and trust are more important in social interactions with higher uncertainties. General theory on trust states that when the risk of a certain action is higher, people need higher levels of trust to engage in that action (Coleman 1990). The uncertainty of charitable giving varies with donating to different organizations. When charitable organizations have aims and objectives that are difficult to quantify, there is a higher degree of uncertainty that the donated money will reach the intended cause. In that case, confidence in the charitable organization is more important for charitable giving. Recent research on the origins and consequences of confidence in charitable organizations confirms this argument. Bekkers (2006b) shows that confidence is mostly important for giving to organizations that do not “[...] provide tangible services, and when its activities are located beyond the horizon of donors.” (Bekkers 2006b:8). People with higher levels of confidence in charitable organizations will thus donate to a larger range of charitable organizations.

1.6 Outline of the study
In this thesis we will present four extended examples of sociological studies on the understanding of charitable giving. These studies all contribute to answering the main question of this thesis: ‘Why do some people donate more money to charitable organizations than others and why do they choose to donate to different organizations?’ The four research chapters (chapters 3 to 6) reveal a range of possible sociological answers to this question. In addition, we derive hypotheses from economic and psychological theories when these theories provide additional explanations. In chapter 2, we start with an overview of methodological issues in the study of charitable giving, and we show how we deal with these issues in the remainder of this thesis. In this chapter we also introduce the main dataset, the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study.

The first research chapter (chapter 3) considers the effect of income on charitable giving. We both describe and give sociological explanations for the effect
of income on the incidence of giving and on the proportion of income donated. It is undisputed that people with a higher income donate more money to charitable organizations. However, up to now, researchers have failed to present conclusive evidence for the relationship regarding both the effect of income on the probability of giving, and the proportion of income people spend on charitable giving. Using the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study 2003 (GINPS03 2003), we present evidence for these effects for both total and religious charitable giving. In addition, we explain our findings with the introduction of the ‘giving standard’. In short, this giving standard refers to norms that people in different income groups have concerning the level of donations that are appropriate in specific situations. The giving standard is based upon the theoretical argument that people are ‘conditionally cooperative’ (Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr 2001; Frey and Meier 2004). People will contribute more often to a public good when they have information that others also contributed. In addition, people are even sensitive to social influences concerning the amount other donors contributed. They adjust the amount they donate according to their beliefs about the donations of others (Bekkers 2006a; Shang and Croson 2005).

In chapter 4, we describe and explain the effects of different social and human resources on the amount people donate to charitable organizations. Why do people with larger social networks donate more money to charities? And why do higher levels of formal education increase charitable giving? We use Durkheim’s integration thesis (Durkheim [1897] 1952), among others, to explain why people with more social resources are more generous donors. Other theories we use to formulate hypotheses explaining the positive effect of social and human resources on the level of charitable giving include social network theory (Flap and Völker 2004; Lin 2001), human capital theory (Becker 1964; Coleman 1988), and theory on generalized trust (Rosenberg 1957; Uslaner 2002).

In chapter 5 we investigate one specific example of charitable donations: national campaigns for charitable causes. Since 1951, there have been 59 national campaigns for charitable causes in the Netherlands. For example, there have been national campaigns for a cure for cancer, national campaigns for disabled athletes, and many national campaigns for victims of natural disasters and war. Examples of the most famous national campaigns are ‘Open het dorp’ (Open the Village) in 1962 and ‘Hulp aan Azië’ (Aid for Asia) in 2004. Many people donate during these national campaigns. In chapter 5 we give a concise description of the historical
development of national campaigns in the Netherlands. Additionally, we investigate why some national campaigns are more successful than others. What factors can explain why some national campaigns raise much more money than others? We formulate and test hypotheses on the success of national campaigns for charitable causes, using theories of compassion fatigue (Kinnick, Krugman, and Cameron 1996), and belief in a just world (Lerner 1980; Miller 1977).

In the final research chapter we investigate why people donate money to particular charitable organizations. How are people motivated to donate to a specific charitable organization, for example to Greenpeace or the Salvation Army? We examine how individual characteristics of donors are related to characteristics of charitable organizations. In chapter 6 we study how these relationships can explain charitable giving to particular organizations. We deduce hypotheses using, among others, sociological and economic theories on cultural reproduction (Bourdieu 1977) and confidence and trust (Coleman 1990).

Chapter 7 consists of a summary of the results, conclusion, and discussion. What are the sociological answers to why people donate to charitable organizations? And, do the sociological answers contribute to the understanding of charitable giving as much as we anticipate in this introduction?
Chapter 2 Methodological issues in charitable giving

2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we give an overview of methodological issues related to the charitable giving research reported in this thesis. Furthermore, we discuss the strategies we use to deal with these issues. We will start with measurement issues. Charitable giving can be considered either an individual or a household activity. We first discuss advantages of measuring either household or individual giving. We continue with a discussion on different types of questionnaires that are generally used when conducting giving research, and their effects on the results. This is followed by a short discussion on potential problems with social desirability in giving research. In the next section we discuss the main dataset used in this thesis, The Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study (GINPS). How are the data collected, and what are the advantages and potential problems involved when working with these data? Another important issue when studying charitable giving concerns how to deal with missing data on the dependent donation variables. We show the effects of different solutions to this missing data problem, and decide on the best solutions to use in this thesis. We conclude this chapter with a discussion of the statistical models that can be used when analyzing charitable giving.

2.2 Measuring charitable giving
2.2.1 Household or individual giving?
All research on charitable giving starts with a conceptual decision. This decision concerns how and which respondents to question about charitable giving. First of all, it is important to decide whether to question respondents in couple households about their individual giving or about total household giving (Hall 2001; Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish 2001). In addition, it is necessary to decide whether to question only one or both partners in a household. First, we discuss whether to measure individual or household giving.

The main argument for measuring household giving is that, in many cases, charitable giving is decided upon by all adult members in a household. In a focus group study in Britain, Burgoyne, Young and Walker (2005) found that whether people in a couple household decide individually or jointly on charitable giving depends largely on the system of financial organization used in the household.

* Section 2.5 of this chapter is based on Buis and Wiegking (2006).
Most households tend to organize their finances according to a so-called pooling system, in which both partners more or less equally have access to the household’s money and decide jointly how this is spent (Burgoyne, Young, and Walker 2005; Pahl 1995). In these households both partners decide on charitable giving. In addition, Burgoyne, Young and Walker (2005) found that decisions on more structural and larger charitable donations are made by both partners in the household, while the more spontaneous and smaller donations—like for example donations made in a street collection—are typically decided on separately. It is likely that measuring household giving will give a more complete overview of the overall level of charitable giving.

One argument for measuring individual donations is the likelihood of a more accurate recall of personal donations. However, other methods exist to increase accurate recall of donations. For instance, many larger donors will list charitable donations as itemized deductions. Therefore, it is useful to question people about their charitable donations directly after they filed their tax return. Having just filed a tax return, donations will still be fresh in the mind for those having itemized their donations. The donations listed as itemized deductions will in most cases refer to household donations, and not to personal donations. This is an argument in favor of measuring household donations, rather than individual donations. In the main dataset we use in this thesis, the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study, we measure charitable giving as a household activity. Also, we question respondents on their household’s charitable behavior directly after the tax return due date, in May.

In addition to deciding whether to measure household or individual giving, it is important to decide whether to question only one or both partners in couple households on the household’s charitable giving. There are clear advantages to questioning both partners (Thompson and Walker 1982). Although charitable giving is a household activity in many cases, it is very likely that respondents are not completely aware of all charitable donations made by their partner. Therefore, questioning only one partner can lead to an underestimation of total household giving. The best way to question couple households on charitable giving would therefore be to question both partners.

However, there are some problems that can arise when questioning both partners. As well as the higher costs involved, there can also be significant problems with non response as both partners need to cooperate. Furthermore,
when questioning both partners, there is a likelihood of overestimating the level of household giving. As noted previously, in many cases charitable giving is a household activity. When questioning both partners concerning their household’s donating behavior, it is likely that both partners will report the same household donations. Without very specific information on the donations, it would be difficult to disentangle the actual total amount donated by the household, leading to an overestimation of the household donations.

Mainly for practical and monetary reasons, in the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study we question only one partner about household giving. However, we took a precaution to limit underestimation due to incomplete awareness of household donations by the respondent—we ask the respondent to consult with their partner on household donations before filling in the questionnaire.

2.2.2 Different types of questionnaires measuring charitable giving

It is important to pay attention to survey methodology when studying charitable giving. There is an extensive literature on the effects of the use of different types of questionnaires on the reported incidence and level of charitable giving (Bekkers and Wiepking 2006; O’Neill and Roberts 2001; Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish 2001; Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish 2004; Schuyt et al. 2007). National surveys of charitable giving, such as Giving Australia (ACOSS 2005), Giving and Volunteering in Canada (Imagine Canada 2006), and Giving in the Netherlands (Schuyt et al. 2007), are primarily conducted to estimate total (aggregate) levels of giving in a country. Different survey methodologies lead to different total estimates of charitable giving. Rooney, Schervish, and Havens (2001) show in a methodological comparison of giving surveys that the more extensive a survey module on charitable giving, the higher the reported incidence and level of giving. Table 2.1 shows the differences in incidence and level of total giving, for eight different questionnaire modules asking about respondents’ charitable donations and volunteering behavior during the twelve months preceding autumn 2000 in Indiana, USA, as reported by Rooney, Steinberg and Schervish (2001:555/561).

The very short module consists of one very short question on charitable giving: “Did you give last year? If so, how much?” The ‘IU-PSID’ module is a questionnaire design based on several prompts focussing on key areas of giving, with a prompt for method of giving in the introduction. The ‘Validity Check’ module uses extensive prompts for sectors with the typically highest donations in the U.S.
(religion, education, health, human services, arts, culture, and humanities), while other sectors are captured in a catchall question. The ‘area’ module uses more extensive prompts, and this questionnaire design is based on the area of donations (charitable sub-sector: religion, health, international relief, etc.). The area design is comparable to the method design, except for the fact that questions in the ‘method’ module are based upon methods of donation (door-to-door collections, direct mail appeals, etc.). The last two questionnaire designs are the most extensive, and combine the method and area design. In the ‘IU-Area-Method’ module, people are first prompted on area of donation, then about the method of donation, for each combination possible. And the ‘IU-Method-Area’ module is based on prompts on method of donation, followed by prompts on area of donation, again for each possible combination. This results in over 650 questions considering both charitable giving and volunteering for the two IU methods. 

Table 2.1 Effects of survey modules on incidence and level of charitable giving

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Participants</th>
<th>Very Short</th>
<th>IU-PSID</th>
<th>Validity Check</th>
<th>Area Method</th>
<th>IU-Area-Method</th>
<th>IU-Method-Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># questionsa</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% donors</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>98.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meanb</td>
<td>1,299</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>2,044</td>
<td>1,051</td>
<td>3,325</td>
<td>1,218</td>
<td>2,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medianb</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1,104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: a Total number of questions in the module. This number refers to questions on both giving and volunteering; b in U.S. dollars.

Source: Table 1 and table 4 in Rooney, Steinberg, Schervish (2001:555/561).

The statistics in table 2.1 show that there are large differences in percentage of donors, and mean and median levels of charitable giving, dependent on the questionnaire module used. In general, the more questions, the higher the percentage of donors, and the higher the mean and median donations. Consider for example the differences in percentage of donors between the longest questionnaire modules, the ‘IU-Method-Area’ module and the ‘IU-Area-Method’ module, and the ‘Very Short’ module. The percentage of donors in either one of the long modules is over 25% higher than in the short module. Also, the mean and median donations are substantially higher in the long survey modules. More questions lead to a higher recall of donations, and hence to higher amounts donated in total. But is this also a more accurate recall?

4 The study by Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish (2001) does not differentiate between the number of questions asked concerning charitable giving and volunteering.
The conclusions Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish (2001) draw from these results are that people are likely to forget some or all the donations made during the previous twelve months, and that more extensive questionnaire modules using more prompts can help them recall their donations more accurately. In addition, they argue that the results from the ‘IU-Method-Area’ module and the ‘IU-Area-Method’ module are plausible, as the 95% donor level is comparable to the results of a diary study conducted by Havens and Schervish (1997; 2002). In this study, Havens and Schervish found that all participants (100%; N=44) made at least one donation over the course of a year. Although the number of participants is rather low in this diary study, it is not hard to imagine that actual donor level is very high. It is rather difficult not to donate at least once over the course of a whole year, when even very small donations are considered.

In the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study, we use an adaptation of the ‘IU-Method-Area’ module, hereafter referred to as the ‘Method-Area’ module. We limited the number of questions by not using all possible combinations of questions on method and area of donating. In the ‘Method-Area’ module of the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study 2003, we first prompted respondents on 28 methods of giving. After that, respondents were asked whether or not their household made a donation to ten different areas: Religion, Health, International Aid, Environment/Nature protection, Animal protection, Education/Research, Culture, Sports/Recreation, and Public/Social Benefits, and Other causes. For all areas that the respondents responded positively, we asked for the exact amount of money that the household donated in 2003.

The ‘Method-Area’ module resulted in 95% of the Dutch households reporting having made some donation in 2003. The average total donation reported for 2003 is €244, with a median donation of €80.\(^5\) Note that the percentage of donors in the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study is comparable to the percentage of donors in the ‘IU-Method-Area’ module and the ‘IU-Area-Method’ module in Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish (2001). However, the mean and median amounts in the Dutch study are much lower than in the American study. This may reflect reality, as an international study of levels of household giving in different countries also found that the Americans are more generous donors than the Dutch (CAF 2006a). It could also be that the lower mean and median amounts are caused by the less extensive questionnaire used in GINPS. However, as 95% of

\(^5\) Mean and median donations calculated including non-donors.
the Dutch indicated that they had donated, it is not very likely that these differences in mean and median amounts are caused by the 5% reporting to have given no donations. It could be that we specifically did not prompt respondents about their largest donations. However, we argue this is unlikely, as the questions on area of donating prompt donations to a large range of charitable sub-sectors and organizations to which people can make donations.

2.2.3 Social desirability
A final measurement issue in giving surveys we wish to discuss concerns socially desirable responses (Hall 2001). Respondents making few or no donations might not want to admit their lack of donating behavior in a survey. They could choose to give socially desirable answers, for example report or a higher number and/or level of donations than actually made. One way to minimize socially desirable responses in general is to use a survey method that encompasses little or no interpersonal interaction, such as a mail or web surveys (Dillman 2007). In the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study, we use a Computer Assisted Self-Administered Interview procedure (CASI) with no interpersonal interaction in order to minimize socially desirable responses.

2.3 The Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study (GINPS)
2.3.1 Aim and objectives GINPS
Most studies in this thesis use the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study (GINPS01 2001; GINPS03 2003; GINPS05 2005) as primary data source. The GINPS originated from the earlier cross-sectional Giving in the Netherlands surveys conducted in 1995, 1997, and 1999. The main objective of all Giving in the Netherlands surveys (both the cross-sectional and the longitudinal ones) is to map household contributions to the philanthropic sector in the Netherlands. This is part of the more general research on the scope and size of the Dutch philanthropic sector. The Dutch Government commissions the Department of Philanthropic Studies at VU University Amsterdam to report on the Dutch Philanthropic Sector every two years. The most recent report is ‘Geven in Nederland 2007’ (Schuyt et al. 2007), reporting on the state of the Dutch philanthropic sector in 2005. For all waves of GINPS, data were collected by TNS NIPO (Dutch Institute for Public Opinion and Market Research). Surveys were consistently conducted around May
(directly after the tax return due date), asking respondents about their household’s donating behavior in the preceding calendar year.

2.3.2 Sample GINPS

Respondents are randomly selected from a pool of 72,000 respondents participating regularly in marketing and opinion research. TNS NIPO keeps this pool representative for the Dutch population by actively approaching respondents for participation in this panel. Table 2.2 includes response information on the longitudinal GINPS. In this thesis, we use the longitudinal GINPS03 as main data source, although we analyze these data with predominantly cross-sectional methods.\(^6\) The high response rates varying from 79% to 88% can be explained by the general high compliance rate among respondents participating in the TNS NIPO panel. The use of this panel also has a downside, as it is likely that people who voluntarily register to regularly participate in survey research are likely to have more prosocial characteristics related to the dependent variable in our research, namely charitable giving. The GINPS sample is therefore likely to be selective on prosocial characteristics to some extent. This is mainly a problem when making descriptions, rather than analyzing associations. In the latter case, the overrepresentation of people with prosocial characteristics is less of a problem, as in these analyses effects are studied when held constant for other characteristics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sampling information:</th>
<th>GINPS01</th>
<th>GINPS03</th>
<th>GINPS05</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participating respondents</td>
<td>1,964</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>1,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approached respondents</td>
<td>2,224</td>
<td>1,557</td>
<td>1,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response rate(^a)</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents in basic sample GINPS01</td>
<td>1,707</td>
<td>1,078</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents in additional Protestant sample</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New respondents in GINPS03</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New respondents in GINPS05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>752</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: \(^a\) Response rate = (participating respondents/approached respondents)*100

Table 2.2 also gives information about additional sampling and drop-out. First of all, GINPS01 included an additional sample of 257 Protestants in order to report in more detail on the giving behavior of this section of the population in the report

\(^6\) This project does not take full advantage of the longitudinal design of GINPS because this research project started in a period when only GINPS01 was available for analysis. Consequently, the research questions that are answered in this thesis were formulated when no longitudinal data were available.
'Geven in Nederland 2003’ (Schuyt 2003).\textsuperscript{7} Due to drop-out of respondents, new respondents were included in the sample both in GINPS03 and GINPS05.\textsuperscript{8} When sampling additional respondents, the data collection agency TNS NIPO takes care to keep the sample representative for the Dutch population with respect to age, gender, and urbanization, although ethnic minorities are not represented. The GINPS includes detailed information on socio-economic, demographic, and personality characteristics of respondents that are of interest when explaining charitable giving. More information on these characteristics can be found in the specific chapters discussing the effects of these characteristics.

2.4 Missing data
2.4.1 The ‘don’t know’ problem
In survey studies on charitable giving, a recurring problem is the large percentage of respondents that indicate having made a donation, but failing to name an amount, giving a ‘don’t know’ (DK) or a similar nonanswer (Bowman 2004; Brooks 2004). This problem does not only occur in surveys on charitable giving, but also in surveys on adultery, criminal behavior, and less controversial characteristics such as income from paid work (Allison 2002).

In this section, we illustrate the ‘don’t know’ problem using missing values on the donation variables in GINPS03. In GINPS03, 23% of the respondents indicate having donated money to a specific charitable sub-sector, but fail to name an amount at least once.\textsuperscript{9} This is higher than the ‘don’t know’ rates in the United States. According to Brooks (2004), the ‘don’t know’ rates in charitable giving research in the U.S. are around 15%. This difference can be explained by the fact that the probability of giving a ‘don’t know’ answer is much higher when more giving prompts are used, like in the ‘Method-Area’ module used in GINPS. In GINPS03, respondents have ten options to give a ‘don’t know’ answer, compared

\textsuperscript{7} The additional sample of Protestants was included in GINPS03 (n=168) and GINPS05 (n=107) as well. In this thesis, the Protestant sub-sample is excluded from descriptive analysis. In multivariate analyses we use the complete sample, including the Protestant sub-sample.

\textsuperscript{8} The drop-out is selective to some extent. Respondents who stopped participating after GINPS01 were less often prompted for gifts in 2001, less likely to volunteer, less likely to be home owner, and more likely to have a higher number of children. Respondents who stopped participating after GINPS03 were also less often prompted for gifts, and more likely to have a higher number of children, but those who dropped out after GINPS03 were also more likely to be younger than 45, living in the city, and international relief donor in 2003. In this study we use cross-sectional methods, therefore we will not go further into the problems concerning selective response in panel data.

\textsuperscript{9} The ‘don’t know’-rates in GINPS01 are 29%; in GINPS05 they are 24%.
to only one option when the 'Very Short' questionnaire module is used. Table 2.3 shows that most respondents giving 'don’t know' answers fail to name an amount for donations to only one or two specific charitable sub-sectors.

Table 2.3 Number of ‘don’t know’ answers: the Netherlands, 2003 (GINPS03; N=1,316)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of ‘don’t know’ answers</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,013</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To illustrate the ‘don’t know’ problem in more detail, figure 2.1 shows the number of donors, number of ‘don’t know’ answers and percentage of ‘don’t know’ answers relative to the number of donors per charitable sub-sector. In general, the ‘don’t know’ rate fluctuates around 15% per charitable sub-sector, comparable to the U.S. findings. Relatively most ‘don’t know’ answers are given when asked for the amount donated to education and research, followed by donations to public and social benefits.

The overall ‘don’t know’ rate of 23% poses a serious problem for analyzing charitable giving. Before we discuss possible solutions, it is important to first determine whether respondents give these ‘don’t know’ answers at random, or whether specific respondents give more ‘don’t know’ answers than others. Theoretically, there are two arguments for giving ‘don’t know’ answers. First, people may have problems recollecting the exact amount they donated to a specific charitable sub-sector during the course of a whole previous calendar year. This can lead to them giving a ‘don’t know’ answer. People giving ‘don’t know’ answers according to this mechanism are likely to be smaller donors, for whom charitable giving is a less salient act in life.

Second, people may give ‘don’t know’ answers when they do not want to make public how much they donated. People giving ‘don’t know’ answers according to this mechanism are likely to be larger donors, who donate for example out of religious motivations (“thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself”, Leviticus 19: 17-
18), and who believe that the level of one’s charitable giving is private (“But when
thou dost alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doth”, Matthew
6:3).

Figure 2.1 Number of donors, ‘don’t know’ answers and percentage of ‘don’t know’
answers relative to the number of donors per charitable sub-sector: the
Netherlands, 2003 (GINPS03; N=1,316)

These two theoretical arguments imply that ‘don’t know’ answers are not Missing at
Random (MAR). Missing values on a variable are MAR when the value of the
dependent variable cannot predict the location of the missing scores (Allison 2002).
In this case, the donation variable is very likely not missing at random, because we
specifically expect both smaller and larger donations to be missing. This poses a
challenge for finding a solution for dealing with ‘don’t know’ answers in data on
charitable giving.

To test which people have a higher probability of giving ‘don’t know’
answers, and whether it is likely that specific amounts donated are represented by
‘don’t know’ answers, we perform a logistic regression of giving at least one ‘don’t
know’ answer on general predictors of charitable giving.\footnote{These predictors are based on the analyses in chapter 4, “Resources that Make You
Generous”. Descriptions of these predictor variables can be found in that chapter.} Unfortunately, we cannot
directly test whether people giving ‘don’t know’ answers are in reality small
The results from this analysis are displayed in table 2.4. These results show how general predictors of charitable giving—like educational level, income, level of trust—predict giving a ‘don’t know’ answer.

Table 2.4  Coefficients from logistic regression of giving at least one ‘don’t know’ answer on general predictors of charitable giving: the Netherlands, 2003 (GINPS03; N=1,316)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size and range of network</td>
<td>-0.039</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive ability</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized trust</td>
<td>-0.126</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathic concern</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of times asked for donations</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.937</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
* Not religious (ref.)                           |       |       |        |
| Roman Catholic denomination                     | 0.104 | 0.182 | 1.110  |
| Protestant Dutch Reformed denomination          | 0.516*| 0.204 | 1.676* |
| Protestant Rereformed denomination              | 0.095 | 0.284 | 1.100  |
| Small Christian denomination                    | 0.190 | 0.335 | 1.210  |
| Ln (annual after-tax household income)          | 0.037 | 0.129 | 1.038  |
| Income from wealth                              | 0.094 | 0.250 | 1.098  |
| Home owner                                      | 0.101 | 0.150 | 1.106  |
| Age                                            | -0.020| 0.024 | 0.980  |
| Age squared                                     | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.000  |
| Female                                         | 0.269 | 0.140 | 1.309  |
| Partner                                        | -0.190| 0.168 | 0.827  |
| Volunteer                                      | 0.184 | 0.145 | 1.202  |
| Constant                                       | -0.022| 1.369 |        |
| Log likelihood                                  |       |       | -691.144 |
| LR chi2 (df)                                    | 37.86 | (19)  |        |

Notes:  * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01

The results in table 2.4 show that, when held constant for other characteristics, only belonging to a Protestant Dutch Reformed denomination has a positive effect on giving ‘don’t know’ answers. As the odds ratios show, people of a Protestant Dutch Reformed denomination have a 68% higher probability of giving a ‘don’t know’ answer than people not belonging to a religious denomination. From research on religious giving in the Netherlands, we know that people belonging to

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11 We attempted to investigate whether people giving ‘don’t know’ answers are small donors in reality. We tested a model with the natural log of donations in 2001 (from GINPS01) as additional predictor. We found no effect of level of giving in 2001 on giving ‘don’t know’-answers in 2003. We do not present this model, as (excluded) ‘don’t know’ answers on giving questions in 2001 pose serious problems for the validity of this analysis. In combination with sample drop-out, the exclusion of ‘don’t know’ answers also reduced the number of cases used in the analysis to 893.
any Protestant denomination are generous donors (Bekkers 2004b). These ‘don’t know’ answers are therefore likely to represent larger donations. In the case of people belonging to a Protestant Dutch Reformed denomination, it is likely that people giving ‘don’t know’ answers do not want to make their level of donations public, they might argue that this is a matter between them and God. Because belonging to a Protestant Dutch Reformed denomination is the only significant predictor of giving ‘don’t know’ – answers, the problems with MAR might be serious, but possibly smaller than anticipated.

2.4.2 Solutions for the ‘don’t know’ problem
In general, research on charitable giving does not mention the ‘don’t know’ problem, let alone provide solutions to it. Two exceptions are the previously-mentioned articles by Brooks (2004) and Bowman (2004). There are several ways of dealing with the ‘don’t know’ problem, the most important of which are:

1. DK=0 Replace the ‘don’t know’ answers for each separate charitable sub-sector with a zero (0) donation
2. DK=2 Replace the ‘don’t know’ answers for each separate charitable sub-sector with a small donation (e.g., 2 euros)
3. DK=median Replace the ‘don’t know’ answers for each separate charitable sub-sector with the median donation to the specific charitable sub-sector
4. DK=2001/2005 Replace the ‘don’t know’ answers for each separate charitable sub-sector with the value of the donation to the specific charitable sub-sector in respectively 2001 (GINPS01) or 2005 (GINPS05)
5. DK=missing Exclude from analysis respondents giving one or more ‘don’t know’ answers
6. DK=multiple imputation Impute values for the ‘don’t know’ answers for each separate charitable sub-sector using multiple imputation

Figure 2.2 shows six distributions of (the natural log of) total charitable giving, each generated with a different solution to the ‘don’t know’ problem. To further illustrate the effects of using the different solutions to the ‘don’t know’ problem, in appendix A of this thesis we show the results from an OLS regression analysis of
the natural log of amount donated to charitable organizations on general predictors of charitable giving, with the six different solutions for dealing with ‘don’t know’ answers.

From the distributions in figure 2.2 and the analyses in appendix A, it is evident that the choice for a solution will affect the results when analyzing charitable giving. Figure 2.2 shows that replacing the ‘don’t know’ answers with zero donations or replacing them with 2001/2005 donations leads to a large fraction of zero donations in the data. The large fraction of zero donations that emerges when ‘don’t know’ answers are replaced with 2001 or 2005 answers indicates that many respondents did not make a donation in 2001 or 2005 to the sub-sector for which a ‘don’t know’ answers is given in 2003. Replacing ‘don’t know’ answers with a zero donation is not an ideal solution because it disregards information given by the respondents. Remember that respondents giving a ‘don’t know’ answer did state that they made a donation to the specific charitable sub-sector, they only failed to provide an amount. A zero donation is therefore unlikely (except when a ‘don’t know’ answer is in reality given by a non-donor giving a socially desirable answer).

Figure 2.2 Distribution of amount donated with different solutions for dealing with ‘don’t know’ answers: the Netherlands, 2003 (GINPS03; N=1,316)\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{12} First of 9 imputations is used to generate histogram for DK=multiple imputation.
The same argument holds for the exclusion from analysis of respondents giving ‘don’t know’ answers. This solution also disregards information given by the respondents, since in many cases these respondents did provide information on donations to other charitable sub-sectors. In addition, from the results in table 2.4 we know that people of a Protestant Dutch Reformed denomination are overrepresented among respondents giving a ‘don’t know’ answer. Thus, when excluding respondents giving ‘don’t know’ answers from analysis, a selective group will be excluded from the dataset. Replacing ‘don’t know’ answers with the median donation to the specific charitable sub-sector is also a problematic solution. One theoretical assumption about the ‘don’t know’ answers is that some of these donations are in reality small donations, not recalled by the respondents. Replacing ‘don’t know’ answers with a small donation of 2 euros would be the ideal solution if all ‘don’t know’ answers can be characterized as small ‘forgotten’ donations. However, we do know that this is not the case. ‘Don’t know’ answers are disproportionately given by people of a Protestant Dutch Reformed denomination, who in general donate relatively larger amounts.

That leaves the solution of multiple imputation of the ‘don’t know’ answers. Multiple imputation creates a small number of copies of the data (in this thesis we create 9 copies), and in each of these copies of the data the ‘don’t know’ answers to specific charitable sub-sectors are replaced with imputations. These imputations are generated using linear predictions. The predictor variables used in these linear predictions include donations to other charitable sub-sectors and variables known to affect level of charitable giving (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007). In the end, each copy of the data is analyzed separately, after which a single estimate is given by averaging the estimates across copies. Unfortunately, using multiple imputation to replace ‘don’t know’ answers also has its problems. As stated before, ‘don’t know’ answers are not MAR, one of the conditions necessary for using multiple imputation of missing data. In addition, a limited number of negative donations (1%) is imputed. In reality, people do not give negative donations. However, with current knowledge, multiple imputation seems the best method to deal with missing data on the donation variable. For this reason, we use multiple imputation to deal with ‘don’t know’ answers in this thesis.

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13 In this case the predictor variables also used in table 2.4.
2.5 Modeling charitable giving

2.5.1 Methodological models

Which statistical models can best be used to analyze charitable giving? One recurring problem in the analysis of charitable giving is how to deal with people who did not make a donation, the non-donors. In recent literature, different ways have been specified for analyzing charitable giving, some giving solutions to the problem, others just ignoring problematic aspects.

One of the first models used is Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analysis on the amount of money donated (Boskin and Feldstein 1977; Brown 1987). However, OLS regression analysis produces biased results, due to truncation. Fortunately, in practice this is only a problem when the proportion of non-donors is large.\(^{14}\) In the case where the proportion of non-donors is large, simply excluding the non-donors from the dataset would be a solution, but only when making statements about the population of donors. It is very likely that charitable donors are a non-random sample of the population, hence the results cannot be generalized to the entire population when non-donors are excluded (Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish 2001; Yen 2002). A final problem with using OLS regression analysis is that it fits a straight line through the data. And any straight line (except a horizontal line indicating no effect) will eventually become negative, leading to predicting negative donations (Breen 1996; Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish 2001).

Another model often used when analyzing charitable giving is the Tobit model (Andreoni, Brown, and Rischall 2003; Brown 2001; Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish 2001; Smith, Kehoe, and Cremer 1995). Tobit is a form of truncated regression analysis that can be used to censor the non-donors (left-censoring). Researchers using the Tobit model to analyze charitable giving assume that people decide on charitable giving according to a censoring mechanism (Buis and Wiepking 2006). According to this censoring mechanism, people first decide how much they are willing to give to a charitable organization, let’s call this amount y*. There are reasons to believe that some amounts of y* are too low to actually donate, either because these amounts are socially undesirable, or because they are not worth the effort (such as donating €0.10 by bank giro credit slip). Therefore a

\(^{14}\) It is difficult to give the percentage of non-donors over which using OLS regression analysis becomes problematic. When in doubt, it is useful to perform both OLS regression analysis and Tobit or Heckman Two Stage regression analysis. When the results differ, it is likely caused by problems with truncation or sample selection caused by non-donors. In that case, it is advisable to use a selection or censoring model.
person will only give $y^*$ if $y^*$ is more than some minimum. When $y^*$ is less than that minimum, no donation will be made. According to this censoring-mechanism, there is an absolute cut-off point below which someone decides not to make a donation at all. The main disadvantage of the Tobit model is the strictness of the assumptions: All persons with an intended donation less than the threshold do not donate (Buis and Wiepking 2006; Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish 2001).

A final model that can be used to analyze charitable giving is the Heckman Two-Stage model (Heckman 1979). When researchers use the Heckman Two-Stage model to analyze charitable giving, they assume that people decide on charitable giving according to the selection mechanism (Buis and Wiepking 2006). The selection mechanism is less strict than the censoring mechanism, and assumes that the probability that people will make a donation is not distributed evenly across a population. People who intend to give a relatively large donation have a very large probability of actually making that donation. At the same time, people who intend to give a relatively small donation have a higher probability of not making a donation at all.

2.5.2 Practical choices in analyzing charitable giving
In practice, many researchers analyzing charitable giving use OLS regression. And although OLS regression indeed predicts negative donations, results appear to be valid and reliable in most cases. However, it is important that the fraction of non-donors (zero donations) is rather limited when using OLS regression analysis. When the fraction of non-donors is larger, the problems with truncation or a selection bias become nonignorable, as they are likely to affect the validity of the results.

In most chapters of this thesis we analyze total charitable donations, and in that case there are only around 5% non-donors in the sample. In those instances, we use OLS regression analyses. However, in chapter 3, ‘The Philanthropic Poor’, we analyze specifically religious donations, and in that case, there is a nonignorable fraction of non-donors. In chapter 3 we use the Heckman Two-Stage model. We thus assume that people decide on charitable giving according to the less strict selection mechanism (Buis and Wiepking 2006). We argue that the probability that people will make a religious donation is not distributed evenly across a population. People who intend to give a relatively large religious donation have a very large probability of actually making that donation. At the same time,
people who intend to give a relatively small religious donation have a higher probability of not making a donation at all.

2.6 Conclusion
In this thesis we pay substantial attention to methodological issues in the research of charitable giving. We use the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study as main data source. In the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study, donating behavior is measured on the household level, by asking one respondent about the total household donations. This is in line with general research on charitable giving, in which giving is considered a household activity (Burgoine, Young, and Walker 2005). Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish (2001) show that more extensive questionnaires result in more complete measurements of level of household giving. We therefore use an extended ‘Method-Area’ module, questioning respondents first on the methods of giving used by their household, followed by donations to different charitable sub-sectors. Furthermore, in order to minimize socially desirable responses, we use a Computer Assisted Self-Administered Interview procedure in the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study.

Many studies on charitable giving do not mention problems with missing data on the dependent variable. We discussed this problem and showed six possible solutions, ranging from replacing ‘don’t know’ answers with zero donations to using multiple imputation. In this thesis we use multiple imputation in order to replace the missing data. We concluded this methodological chapter with a discussion of statistical models that can be used when analyzing charitable giving. We will use OLS regression analysis in the remainder of this thesis when the proportion of non-donors is rather small, and a selection model (Heckman Two-Stage regression analysis) when there is a higher proportion of non-donors.
Chapter 3 The Philanthropic Poor: In Search of Explanations for the Relative Generosity of Lower Income Households∗

3.1 Introduction
In the Netherlands, as well as in other Western countries, philanthropy is big business. The total household contribution made to charity is estimated at 1,899 million euros in 2003 (Schuyt et al. 2007). Ninety-five per cent of the Dutch households contributed to this total, donating on average €257.15 What makes people donate their money so generously to philanthropic causes?

A very basic but plausible explanation for higher levels of charitable giving can be found in the availability of financial resources. In order to give money away, access to at least some level of income and wealth is necessary. The argument is simple: The more and better access to financial resources, the higher the charitable donations people can—and to some extent will—make. The absolute effect of financial resources on the level of charitable giving is indeed that cut. Higher levels of income and more wealth lead to higher donations (Auten and Rudney 1990; Bekkers 2004b; Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish 2001; Schlegelmilch, Love, and Diamantopoulos 1997). The wealthy give more. However, and this is the puzzling topic we consider in this chapter, philanthropic researchers fail to present consistent findings linking the effect of income on the probability of giving and the proportion of financial resources people spend on charitable giving.

In the United States, research on the relationship between income and the probability of giving produced inconsistent results. For example, Rooney, Steinberg and Schervish (2001) and Smith, Kehoe and Cremer (1995) found that people do not differ with respect to the likelihood of donating to charitable causes when they are in different income categories. Contrary to these findings, Regnerus, Smith and Sikkink (1998) report that people in higher income categories are more likely to donate to “organizations that help poor and needy people”. Schervish and Havens (1995a), McClelland and Brooks (2004), and Banks and Tanner (1999) also find that (both for the United States and Great Britain) the probability of giving is higher among people in high-income groups than among people in low-income

∗ A slightly different version of this chapter has been published in Voluntas (Wiepking 2007b). An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the 33rd ARNOVA Conference, Los Angeles, November 2004.

15 Calculated using only donors. Mean donation of all Dutch households (calculated using both donors and non-donors) is €244.
groups. Bivariate results for the Netherlands show a small positive effect of income on whether or not a donation is made (Schuyt 2003).

The initiation of the scientific debate on giving as a proportion of income can be traced back to the early eighties of the 20th century. At that time, Clotfelter and Steuerle (1981) presented the first evidence for a U-shaped curve that describes the relationship between income and proportion of income donated in the US. This U-shaped curve indicates that both the lower- and the higher income households donate the largest proportion of income to charitable organizations. Right through the mid-nineties, the U-shaped curve continued to be the main relationship found to describe giving as a proportion of income (Andreoni 2004; Hodgkinson and Weitzman 1996; Jencks 1987; Schervish and Havens 1995a; Schervish and Havens 1995b).

In 1994, however, Hoge and Yang showed a different relationship specifically for the proportion of income spent on religious giving. America’s poorest households donated the largest proportion of their income to the church, and those with the highest income donated the smallest proportion. Not much later, this negative relationship between income and giving as a proportion of income was also found for total and secular giving in the U.S. (Independent Sector 2002; McClelland and Brooks 2004), as well as in Great Britain (Breeze 2004), and the Netherlands (Wiepking 2004). To make matters more complicated, in 2007 James III and Sharpe again reported a U-shaped relationship for total giving as a proportion of income in the United States.

One major shortfall in most studies on the relationship between income and charitable giving is the lack of (empirically-tested) explanations for this relationship. However, ad hoc explanations are numerous. For example the high proportion of donations from those with a lower income are said to be caused by the religious poor, who donate disproportional amounts to their church (Jencks 1987; Schervish and Havens 1995a). Or, as mentioned by Andreoni (2004), among those with a lower income there might be many younger people, who expect their income to rise in the near future, and hence feel that they can afford to give a larger proportion of their income.

In this chapter we both describe and explain the relationship between income and charitable giving in the Netherlands. We examine the effect of income on total giving and religious giving separately. Religious giving appears to be a special case when studying the relationship between income and giving, as shown
by Hoge and Yang (1994). In the next section we formulate hypotheses on the
different effects of income on both the probability of giving and the proportion of
income donated. We do not extensively examine the effect of income on the
absolute amount donated, as it is clear from previous research that income has an
undisputed positive effect on the absolute amount donated to both religious and
total charitable giving (Auten and Rudney 1990; Bekkers 2004b; Rooney,
Steinberg, and Schervish 2001). However, we will provide some descriptive results
for the relationship between income and absolute level of giving. We empirically
test the hypotheses using the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study 2003
(GINPS03 2003), in which 1,316 respondents answered questions about their
donating behavior in 2003. The availability of the GINPS03 data is the main reason
for studying the Netherlands. GINPS03 provides very detailed information on
charitable giving, and a large range of financial and social background
characteristics. We believe the explanatory results can be generalized to other
Western countries, as conditions that differ between countries (such as taxation)
are controlled for. The object of our analysis are households rather than
individuals, as we consider charitable giving an act that involves all adult members
of a household (Andreoni, Brown, and Rischall 2003; Wiepking and Bekkers 2006).

3.2 Theoretical considerations

3.2.1 Financial resources and the probability of giving

In order to give money away, at least some financial resources are necessary.
However, the simple act of charitable giving need not be affected by someone’s
income or wealth. Charitable donations can be as low as one euro or even ten
cents, for example given at the cash register after receiving change. Of course,
someone receiving a state pension will not be able to donate such a high amount
for the university library to be named after them. It is, however, hard to imagine a
financial barrier for sliding a euro coin into a donation canister benefiting the
Cancer Foundation. Because of the possible variation in the amounts that people
can donate, we formulate the hypothesis that household income and wealth do not
influence the probability of giving to any charitable organizations.

However, the story is somewhat different when we consider donations to
religious or faith-based organizations. When people in different income groups
differ in their religious affiliation, it is likely that this will affect the probability of
donations to religious organizations. People with a stronger religious affiliation
donate money more often to faith-based organizations (Hoge and Yang 1994). And in the U.S., lower income households are more often religiously affiliated, hence they donate more often toward religious causes than higher income households (Feldstein 1975; Hood, Martin, and Osberg 1977; Schervish and Havens 1995b). In the United States, 82% of the population attends church (Davis, Smith, & Marsden, 2003). This is quite different in the secularized Dutch society, where only 20% go to church on a regular basis (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 2003; GINPS03 2003). When these select Dutch church members are disproportionately more often representatives of lower income groups, it is likely that households with a lower income donate more often to religious organizations than households with a higher income. Therefore, we formulate the hypothesis that lower income households have a higher probability of making donations to religious organizations.

3.2.2 Financial resources and the proportion of income donated

As argued in the introduction, there is no consensus among philanthropic researchers with respect to the effect of income on the proportion of income donated. Some argue that this relationship is U-shaped (Andreoni 2004; Hodgkinson and Weitzman 1996; James III and Sharpe 2007; Jencks 1987; Schervish and Havens 1995a; Schervish and Havens 1995b), while others are convinced there is a negative relationship (Breeze 2004; Hoge and Yang 1994; Independent Sector 2002; McClelland and Brooks 2004). In our previous study on this issue, we found a negative effect of income on proportion of income donated. Lower income households donated the highest proportion of income in the Netherlands in 2001 and higher income households donated the lowest proportion (Wiepking 2004). In this chapter we use more recent data, but in line with the previous results we expect there to be a negative effect of income on proportion of income donated in the Netherlands. In addition, we investigate the more pressing question of how this negative effect of income on proportion of income donated can be explained.

First, the costs of donating vary between low- and high-income households. This can influence the relationship between income and giving as a proportion of income. An important factor that influences differences in costs for making donations is a country’s tax regulations. Tax regulations cause the financial costs of charitable donations to vary between households with different incomes (Jencks 1987). In some countries, such as the Netherlands and the United States, giving to
charitable causes is tax-deductible (Article 6.32 in Wet op de Inkomstenbelasting 2001, Income Tax Act). In the Netherlands, the amount of money donated to charitable causes above 1% of taxable income (with a minimum of €60) can be deducted from taxable income. As a consequence, the real cost of a donation is smaller than the donation itself. If people receive more tax benefits from their donation, they are inclined to give more money. The Dutch tax system—like the American tax system—stimulates charitable behavior in such a way that people with a higher income are given more incentives to donate high amounts of money than people with a lower income. People in higher tax categories ‘benefit’ more when they make a donation than people in the lower tax categories. The higher a household’s income, the lower the costs for making charitable donations. When investigating proportional giving between different income groups, it is therefore very important to control for the ‘price of giving’: the effective cost of charitable donations. We expect the effect of income on the proportion of income donated to become more strongly negative when the effect of price of giving is taken into account. This argument is depicted in figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1  Effect of income and price of giving on charitable giving as a proportion of income

The effect of price of giving on the level of giving as a proportion of income is negative. The higher a household’s price of giving, the larger proportion of the gift the household pays for, and hence the smaller the proportion of income that will be donated. The effect of income on price of giving is also negative, as a higher income leads to higher levels of income tax, which leads to the possibility of larger tax deductions for charitable donations. These two negative effects enhance the effect of income on charitable giving as a proportion of income. When this effect is
negative as we predicted, taking the price of giving into account will lead to a stronger negative effect of income on the level of giving as a proportion of income.

Consequently, accounting for the costs of donations in the form of the price of giving does not explain the expected lower proportional donations from higher income households. We expect that there are two other—conflicting—arguments that can explain why low- and high-income households differ in charitable giving as a proportion of income: the giving standard and religious affiliation. First, we consider the possibility that there is something like a ‘giving standard’ which determines the amount people donate to charitable causes in specific circumstances (Andreoni 2004; Harbaugh 1998). According to the giving standard there are social and internalized norms regarding the amount of money households prefer to donate to charitable causes in specific circumstances. These social and internalized norms are comparable to the norms people have about restaurant tipping for example (Conlin, Lynn, and O’Donoghue 2003). What determines this giving standard?

When deciding how much to donate, people think about the amount they feel that is ‘right’ to donate in specific circumstances. This right amount is influenced by the amount people believe others will donate in the same circumstances. Several researchers have conducted experiments regarding people’s adjustment to donate according to their belief about others’ donations. Fischbacher, Gachter, and Fehr (2001), and Frey and Meier (2004) for example show that many people are ‘conditionally cooperative’: They will contribute more often to a public good when they have information that others also contributed. Shang & Croson (2005) even show that people are sensitive to social influences about the amount other donors contributed. Information about the size of other donors’ contributions influences donations made by new donors. In addition, Bekkers (2006a) finds that people adjust the amount they donate according to their beliefs about the donations of others. People donate more when they believe others will also donate more.

When people donate according to a giving standard, this implies that when deciding how much to donate people think of an absolute amount, rather than a relative amount. Information about charitable household donations in the Netherlands concurs with this reasoning. When people donate by responding to a direct mail appeal, over 80% of the households donate between €5 and €25, and in a door-to-door collection over 90% of the households donate an amount below €10
Other exemplifications of a giving standard are the donations made by households to the victims of the Tsunami in December 2004 and to those of the earthquake in Kashmir in September 2005. In both cases the majority of households donated €25 (TNS NIPO 2005a; TNS NIPO 2005b).

We argue that the giving standard is equal for households with either high or low incomes. Household income does not influence the norms about what is ‘right’ to donate. And when the total amount that households donate to charitable causes is to a large extent determined by a giving standard, this total amount will be a larger proportion of income for lower income households than for higher income households. The giving standard implies that there is a persistent negative direct effect of income on proportion of income donated that can not be explained by other factors, such as age (as argued by Andreoni 2004) or religion (argued by Jencks 1987; Schervish and Havens 1995a). From the giving standard, we deduce the hypothesis that there is a strong and persistent negative direct effect of income on the proportion of income donated to charitable causes in the case of both total and religious donations.

To challenge the giving standard hypothesis, we examine whether stronger religious affiliation can explain all or part of the effect of income on proportion of income donated. Jencks (1987) and Schervish and Havens (1995a) argued that lower income households are disproportionately more often stronger religiously affiliated than higher income households, which can explain higher proportional donations to religious causes by these households. In contrast to the giving standard hypothesis, we formulate the religious affiliation hypothesis: The negative effect of income on religious donations as a proportion of income can (partly) be explained by stronger religious affiliation of lower income households.

In addition, we control for age in order to see whether the higher proportional donations of lower income households are due to an overrepresentation of younger people in lower income households. These younger people might expect their income to rise in the near future, and hence feel that they can afford to give a larger proportion of their income, as argued by Andreoni (2004).

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16 Door-to-door collections are very common in the Netherlands. 91% of the households made a donation in 2003 by means of a door-to-door collection (Schuyt and Gouwenberg 2005).
3.3 Data: the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study 2003

In order to test the hypotheses, we use data from the second wave of the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study 2003 (GINPS03). In May 2004, 1,587 respondents were approached. They were questioned about their donating behavior in 2003, using Computer Assisted Self-Administered Interview procedures (CASI). Respondents were randomly selected by TNS NIPO (Dutch Institute for Public Opinion and Market Research) from a pool of 72,000 respondents participating regularly in marketing and opinion research. 83% of these respondents (N=1,316) completed the questionnaire.\(^7\) The data are representative for the Dutch population with regard to age, sex, and urbanization.

3.3.1 Donating behavior

The four dependent variables in our research are: 1) whether or not a household made at least one donation in 2003, hereafter referred to as the probability of giving; 2) whether or not a household made at least one religious donation in 2003, hereafter referred to as the probability of religious giving; 3) the natural logarithm of the ratio between the total amount of money donated by a household to charity in 2003 and annual after-tax household income, hereafter referred to as total charitable giving as a proportion of income; and 4) the natural logarithm of the ratio between the amount of money donated to religious causes and annual after-tax household income, hereafter referred to as religious giving as a proportion of income. In GINPS03, donations to ten different categories of charitable causes are measured separately, among which religious causes.\(^8\) First, respondents were questioned about which method they used to make a donation, for example, a donation canister or a bank giro credit slip. After that, for each category of charitable causes, respondents were asked whether or not their household had made a donation. Third, for all categories given a positive answer by respondents, the exact amount of money the household donated in 2003 was asked for. This way of questioning is called the ‘Method-Area’ module. This

\(^7\) The high response rates can be explained by the general high compliance rate among respondents participating in the TNS NIPO panel. The use of this panel also has a downside, as it is likely that people who voluntarily register to regularly participate in survey research are likely to have more pro-social characteristics, related to the dependent variable in our research, charitable giving. The GINPS sample is therefore likely to be selective to some extent on pro-social characteristics. Although this affects the descriptive results, it is unlikely that the multivariate results are biased.

\(^8\) These ten categories of charitable causes are: Religion, Health, International Aid, Environment/Nature protection, Animal protection, Education/Research, Culture, Sports/Recreation, Public/Social Benefits, Other (unspecified, including Service Clubs).
stepwise questioning module leads to a better recollection of donations and to less biased results compared to asking people directly for the total amount they donated over the course of a year (Bekkers and Wiepking 2006; Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish 2001).

Of the 1,316 respondents that completed the questionnaire, 303 (23%) indicated having made a donation to one or more specific sub-sectors, but failed to specify the exact amount. This can be either because they forgot how much they donated to that charitable sub-sector or because they didn’t want to reveal this information in a questionnaire. In these cases, the missing amounts were imputed independently for each charitable sub-sector. One problem with using multiple imputation in giving data is that the missing values are not MAR, an assumption that needs to be satisfied when imputing missing data (Allison 2002). This is problematic, but multiple imputation seems the best solution for dealing with missing values in giving data. See Brooks (2004) and Bowman (2004) for more information on solutions for missing values in charitable giving data. Multiple imputation can result in negative donations. This appeared to be a minor problem, as after imputation only 1% of the donations was negative. In line with Schafer (1997) we substituted all donations below 1 with a donation of 1 euro.

To construct total and religious charitable giving as a proportion of income, we divided both the summed amount of money donated to all charitable causes and the amount donated to religious causes by annual after-tax household income. In order to have somewhat larger coefficients to interpret, we multiplied the proportional donations by 100. This ratio variable is very skewed. Many households donate a very small proportion of their income to charity. Therefore, we used the natural logarithm of the proportional donation.

As 53% (n=698) of the households did not make any donation to a religious organization in 2003, we used Heckman Two-Stage regression analysis, to avoid problems with truncation or a selection bias (Heckman 1979). Because of this large proportion of non-donors in the case of religious giving, performing Ordinary Least Squares regression would produce biased results (Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish 2001). Only 65 (5%) households did not make any charitable donation in

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{19} There are also some very large proportional donors in the GINPS03 data. Two households indicated having donated more than 20\% of their income to all charitable organizations, and six households donated more than 20\% to religious organizations. When we performed the Heckman Two-Stage regression analysis also without these most generous households, this did not alter the conclusions. We did exclude these households from the bivariate statistics however (figure 3.2 and 3.3, table 3.2).} \]
2003, but for reasons of comparability we also performed Heckman Two-Stage regression analysis on total giving as a proportion of income. See Smith, Kehoe, and Kremer (1995) and Buis and Wiepking (2006) for a discussion on the use of sample selection models in the analysis of donating behavior.

### 3.3.2 Predictor variables

*Annual after-tax household income* is measured by asking the respondents about their and (if appropriate) their partners’ monthly after-tax income, and multiplying this by twelve. 15.3% of the respondents did not answer this question. For these respondents we estimated annual after-tax household income with an adjustment of gross household income\(^{20}\) (6.6%; \(n=88\)) if available, or with the mean income of their social class (8.7%; \(n=114\)). In the analyses, we used the natural log of income.\(^{21}\)

For each household, we calculated the price of a charitable donation using the following formula\(^{22}\):

\[
P = 1 - (t*d)
\]

In which \(P\) is the *price of giving*, \(t\) is the household’s marginal tax rate, and \(d\) is whether a household deducted its philanthropic gifts (1 if yes). Because of the available factual information about whether or not a household deducted gifts, information about the threshold of 1% is not used. It is important to take into account whether people deduct their donations, because in the Netherlands some people do not know about this possibility or are principally against deducting charitable donations. In that case they pay a higher price of giving. If a household did not deduct its gifts, it has value 1 on the price of giving, stating that they paid for the whole gift. If a household with a marginal tax rate of .52 deducted

\(^{20}\) Gross household income is multiplied by .69 in order to estimate after-tax household income. This is an estimated gross-net transfer formula for Dutch income data (Goudswaard, Caminada, and Vording 2004).

\(^{21}\) We are aware of the potential problems caused by respondents not reporting their after-tax income. Therefore we performed analyses with a) yearly gross household income in 2003; b) yearly gross household income in 2001 (with GINPS01; containing data about household donating behaviour in 2001); and c) average yearly gross household income between 2001 and 2003 as a measure of permanent income. These analyses yielded similar results (results available from the author).

\(^{22}\) The complete formula for price of giving from economic literature is \(P = (1 – MTR)/(1- OR)\), in which MTR is the marginal tax rate and OR is the overhead ratio for the receiving charity (Bowman 2006; Tinkelman 2004; Weisbrod and Domínguez 1986). We use the simplified formula, as we have no information on overhead ratio.
philanthropic gifts in 2003, its value on the price of giving is .48. This household paid for only 48% of their charitable donations.

Respondents were asked how many times they had visited church during the previous six months. Responses were recoded to church attendance in times a month. Age of the respondent is included in three categories, with age between 35 and 65 as reference category. Household income is not the only indicator that can be used for a household’s financial resources. Therefore we also include three dichotomous variables indicating whether or not the respondent was a home owner in 2003, whether or not the respondent received income from wealth in 2003, and whether or not the head of the household held a private health insurance in 2003. In order to control for differences in necessary financial household expenses, we use household size as a control variable. Household size has seven categories: (1) one household member; (2) two household members ... up to (7) seven household members or more.

Other control variables which are known to influence donating behavior (Bekkers 2004b) that were included in the analyses are: Education, which is measured on a seven-point scale, with (1) only primary education; (2) primary education and some vocational school; (3) lower secondary education; (4) middle secondary education; (5) higher secondary education; (6) higher vocational education and (7) higher tertiary education. The dichotomous variable volunteer indicates whether or not the respondent participated in volunteering activities in 2003, and female indicates the gender of the respondent. Finally, the variable requests for donations counts the methods with which a respondent was asked to make a donation in the two weeks prior to the interview. We asked whether respondents were asked for a gift by means of thirteen different methods, including—but not limited to—a direct mail appeal, a door-to-door collection, a church collection, a street collection, and a request for donations on television. Respondents who indicated that they had not been asked for a donation in these two weeks were assigned the value 0 on this variable. Table 3.1 contains a descriptive overview of all variables used in the analyses.
Table 3.1 Descriptive overview of all variables (GINPS03; N=1,316)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variables</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Lowest</th>
<th>Highest</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Probability of giving</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability of religious giving</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In (total giving as a proportion of income)(^a)</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>-6.70</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In (religious giving as a proportion of income)(^b)</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>-9.12</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor variables</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ln (annual after-tax household income)</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>7.09</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>10.02</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price of giving</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance (times/month)</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.67</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged under 35</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged over 65</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home owner</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private health insurance</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from wealth</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requests for donations</td>
<td>1,316</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Descriptive statistics obtained with first (of 9) imputed dataset(s); \(^a\) Non-donors are assigned missing values for the Heckman Two-Stage regression analysis; \(^b\) Religious non-donors are assigned missing values for the Heckman Two-Stage regression analysis

3.4 Results

The bivariate relationship between income and donating behavior to all charitable causes and to religious causes in particular is shown in table 3.2 and depicted in figures 3.2 and 3.3.\(^{23}\) On average, 95% of the Dutch households made at least one donation to some charitable cause in 2003. There is a very small difference between low- and high-income households in whether or not they made any donation to charitable causes. When examining the different income categories, we find that between 91% and 99% of the households in all income groups donated money. The small differences in percentage charitable donors between the ten different income groups are not statistically significant $\chi^2 (9, n = 1,142) = 13.04$,

\(^{23}\) The respondents that indicated having donated over 20% of their annual after-tax household income in 2003 ($n=6$; all with a annual after-tax household income under €20,000) and respondents from the additional sample of Protestants ($n=168$) were excluded from the descriptive analyses (table 3.2, figure 3.2 and 3.3). The descriptive results were obtained with the first imputed dataset.
\( p = .161. \) Fewer households donate to religious causes—on average 41% of the Dutch households made at least one donation to a religious cause in 2003. The bivariate differences between income groups in probability of religious giving are also not statistically significant \( \chi^2 (9, n = 1,142) = 8.44, p = .490. \)

Table 3.2 Percentage of households that made any donation or a religious donation, and mean proportional total and religious donation per household for ten income groups: the Netherlands, 2003 (GINPS03; \( n=1,142 \))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual after-tax household income</th>
<th>All respondents</th>
<th>Donors only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( n )</td>
<td>% that made donation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; ( \varepsilon 8,000 )</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \varepsilon 8,000 - \varepsilon 11,000 )</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \varepsilon 11,000 - \varepsilon 15,000 )</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \varepsilon 15,000 - \varepsilon 18,300 )</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \varepsilon 18,300 - \varepsilon 24,000 )</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \varepsilon 24,000 - \varepsilon 28,600 )</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \varepsilon 28,600 - \varepsilon 35,000 )</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \varepsilon 35,000 - \varepsilon 42,000 )</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \varepsilon 42,000 - \varepsilon 48,000 )</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; ( \varepsilon 48,000 )</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,142</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The respondents who indicated having donated over 20% of their annual after-tax household income in 2003 (\( n=6 \)) and respondents from the additional sample of Protestants (\( n=168 \)) were excluded from the descriptive analyses (table 3.2, figure 3.2 and 3.3); Descriptive results obtained with first (of 9) imputed dataset(s).

The mean donation of all donating Dutch households to all charitable organizations in 2003 is €257.\(^{24}\) In general, the tendency is that a higher income corresponds with higher donations, although there are some fluctuations. For example, the highest income households donate on average €80 less to religious organizations than those in one income category lower. For most income categories, the amount donated specifically to religious charities is similar to the amount donated to all charitable donations. When only donors are considered, we find that religious donations are on average somewhat larger than total donations. There are four

\(^{24}\) The mean total and religious donations for the different income groups were calculated using only donors (non-donors were excluded). This is for example why the mean religious donation for households with an income between €11,000 and €15,000 is higher than the mean total donation for this income category (the mean religious donation among religious donors is €277, compared to a mean total donation of €186 among all donors).
income categories in which the average religious donations are substantially larger than the total donations (among donors). This is the case for households with an income between €11,000 and €15,000, for households with an income between €24,000 and €28,600, for households with an income between €35,000 and €42,000, and for households with an income between €42,000 and €48,000. Households in the highest income category donate on average less to religious charities.

Figure 3.3 shows the mean donation as a proportion of income for the different income categories (both for total and religious donations; including non-donors). In the case of total charitable donations, the lowest income group donates the highest percentage of their income: 2.25%. Households with the highest incomes (over €42,000) donate only 0.83% of their annual after-tax household income. All donating households donate on average 1.09% of their income. Bivariately, there appears to be a negative relationship between income and proportion of income donated. With respect to religious giving, religious donations as a proportion of income are comparable to total donations (on average 1.16% in table 3.2), with the exception of households with the lowest incomes. In the case of total donations as a proportion of income, those with an income below €8,000 donate a significantly higher proportion. This is not the case for religious donations: In that case, the lowest income group donates a more or less similar proportion of income to religious organizations as other lower income groups. But the question remains whether these results hold when we examine the effect of income on proportion of income donated using multivariate methods.

Table 3.3 shows the results of the Heckman Two-Stage regression analyses of total and religious giving as a proportion of income. It is important to note that in the second stage of the Heckman Two-Stage regression analysis, the dependent variable is a latent variable, in this case latent charitable giving as a proportion of income. This is interpretable as the proportion of income that a household would want to donate, even when they did not make a donation. The first stage models the likelihood to donate.

Model 1 (in table 3.3) presents the results for the effect of income on total charitable giving as a proportion of income, when the price of giving is not taken into account. Clearly, there is no effect of income on the probability of making any donation (see the selection stage), but there is a strong negative effect of income on the level of charitable donations as a proportion of income.
Figure 3.2 Mean total and religious household donation in euros and percentage of households that made a donation: the Netherlands, 2003 (GINPS03; n=1,142)
Figure 3.3  Mean total and religious donation as a proportion of income for households: the Netherlands, 2003 (GINPS03; including non-donors; \( n=1,142 \))
### Table 3.3  Heckman Two-Stage regression analysis of the natural log of total and religious giving as a proportion of after-tax income: the Netherlands, 2003 (GINPS03; N=1,316; based on 9 imputed datasets)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In (total charitable</td>
<td>In (total charitable</td>
<td>In (religious donations</td>
<td>In (religious donations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>donations as a proportion</td>
<td>donations as a proportion</td>
<td>as a proportion of</td>
<td>as a proportion of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of after-tax income)³</td>
<td>of after-tax income)³</td>
<td>after-tax income)²</td>
<td>after-tax income)²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second stage²</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln (annual after-tax</td>
<td>-0.673**</td>
<td>0.081</td>
<td>-0.718**</td>
<td>0.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>household income)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price of giving</td>
<td>-2.751**</td>
<td>0.283</td>
<td>-4.008**</td>
<td>0.552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td>0.292**</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.193**</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home owner</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from wealth</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private health insurance</td>
<td>0.352**</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.322**</td>
<td>0.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
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<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged under 35</td>
<td>-0.363**</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>-0.303**</td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged over 65</td>
<td>0.497**</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.456**</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>0.100**</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.078**</td>
<td>0.027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>0.212*</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.153</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requests for donations</td>
<td>0.214**</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.188**</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.582**</td>
<td>0.816</td>
<td>7.797**</td>
<td>0.860</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### First (selection) stage³

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In (annual after-tax</td>
<td>In (annual after-tax</td>
<td>In (religious donation</td>
<td>In (religious donation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>household income)</td>
<td>household income)</td>
<td>as a proportion of</td>
<td>as a proportion of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>after-tax income)²</td>
<td>after-tax income)²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ln (annual after-tax</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>household income)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price of giving</td>
<td>-0.395</td>
<td>0.829</td>
<td>-2.866**</td>
<td>0.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.181</td>
<td>0.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home owner</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from wealth</td>
<td>-0.102</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>0.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private health insurance</td>
<td>0.161</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged under 35</td>
<td>-0.158</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>-0.156</td>
<td>0.157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged over 65</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>0.391*</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.393*</td>
<td>0.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0.091</td>
<td>0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requests for donations</td>
<td>0.308**</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.306**</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.372</td>
<td>1.065</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>1.380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athrho</td>
<td>-1.96</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>-0.209</td>
<td>0.219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lnsigma</td>
<td>0.298**</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.260**</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Censored observations³</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncensored observations³</td>
<td>1251</td>
<td>1251</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>618</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; ³ In (((total donation/after-tax household income)*100); ² In (((religious donation/after-tax household income)*100); ³ Parameters in the second stage represent unstandardized intended donations; ⁴ Parameters in the first (selection) stage represent unstandardized Probit coefficients; ⁵ Number of censored and uncensored observations based on first imputation.
When a household’s income rises by 10%, their total charitable donation as a proportion of income declines by 6.7%.

In Model 2 (in table 3.3), we consider the effect of income on total donations as a proportion of income, when price of giving is taken into account. We predicted that this would increase the negative effect of income. The results support our hypothesis: In Model 2 a 10% increase in income leads to a 7.2% decrease in total charitable donations as a proportion of income. The effect of price of giving is negative, as predicted. If an itemizing household’s marginal tax rates were to decrease from 52% to 42% (implicating an increase in the price of giving from .48 to .58), their total charitable donations decrease by 28%. For itemizing households, tax incentives are important for the proportion of income they will donate. But when the price of giving is taken into account, there still is no effect of income on the probability of making any donation.

In addition we look at the results of religious giving as a proportion of income, as represented in Model 3 (in table 3.3). In this Model, we examine the effect of income on religious donations as a proportion of income, without taking church attendance into account. The effect of income on religious giving as a proportion of income is stronger than the effect on total charitable giving as presented in Model 2: A 10% increase in income leads to an 8.6% decrease in religious donations as a proportion of income. The negative effect of income on religious giving as a proportion of income does not change much after the inclusion of church attendance in Model 4. If a household’s income increases by 10%, their religious donations as a proportion of income now decrease by 8.4%. Going to church more often does increase a household’s religious donation. The effect of income on the probability of making a religious donation is not significant in either Model 3 or 4, contrary to our expectations.

The effect of the control variables included in the analyses resembles results found in other Dutch research with the amount that households donate as the dependent variable (Bekkers 2004b; Schuyt and Gouwenberg 2005). In Model 2 in table 3.3 there is a positive effect of volunteering and receiving more requests for donations on the probability of making any donation. The probability of making a religious donation is positively influenced by a lower price of giving, church attendance, home ownership, being over 65, volunteering, and requests for donations (see Model 4 in table 3.3).
In Model 2 in table 3.3 there is a positive effect of church attendance, private health insurance, age, education, and the number of requests for donations on the level of charitable giving as a proportion of income. In Model 4, the level of religious giving as a proportion of income is negatively influenced by price of giving and positively influenced by age.

3.5 Conclusion and discussion
The main conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that there is a persistent negative effect of income on charitable donations as a proportion of income, irrespective of whether these donations are total donations or religious donations. The higher a household’s income, the smaller the proportion of income a household donates. Additionally, the costs of donations are important in studying the effect of income on charitable giving as a proportion of income: When the price of giving is taken into account, the negative relationship between income and giving as a proportion of income becomes even more negative. These results are in line with the giving standard hypothesis. Many people in higher income groups give the same absolute amount as people in lower income groups, resulting in total donations that consist of a larger proportion of the income of lower income households than of higher income households.

However, the results presented in this chapter do not provide conclusive evidence for the giving standard hypothesis. It is clear that differences in religious affiliation between lower and higher income groups, as well as differences in age and other characteristics, cannot explain the direct negative effect of income on giving as a proportion of income. But there is always the possibility that the negative effect of income on proportion of income donated can be explained by other characteristics, not included in these analyses. We do not have any hypotheses on what these characteristics could be, but encourage other researchers to provide more challenges for the giving standard.

In addition, one should note that this research is based upon a representative sample of the Dutch population. As a result, only a very limited number of very high-income donors is included in this sample.25 This limitation implies that we can only formulate conclusions about charitable giving by the general Dutch population, and make no specific statements about giving by the

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25 In GINPS03 there are five households (less than 1%) that have an after-tax income of over €100,000 a year.
highest income groups. Future research with other data sources is needed to
decide whether a U-shaped relationship between income and proportion of income
donated appears when the highest income households are represented.

Another conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that the negative
effect of income on the proportion of income donated is stronger for religious
donations than for total donations. A 10% increase in after-tax household income
leads to an 8.4% decrease in religious donations as a proportion of income,
compared to a 7.2% decrease in total donations as a proportion of income.
However, this stronger negative effect cannot be explained by a stronger religious
affiliation of lower income households, as hypothesized by the religious affiliation
hypothesis. Controlling for religious affiliation does not substantially decrease the
effect of income on proportion of income donated to religious organizations. There
might be a stronger giving standard for religious donations than for total
donations. It would be interesting to investigate this in future research.

Note that the results of the Heckman Two-Stage regression analysis differ
from the bivariate findings as displayed in figure 3.3. Figure 3.3 showed no clear
relation between income and proportion of income donated to religious
organizations. However, from the Heckman Two-Stage regression analyses, we
know that there are other variables such as price of giving that have to be taken
into account in order to fully understand the effect of income on donations as a
proportion of income. This is why it is important to study not only bivariate
statistics when investigating the effect of income on proportional donations, as
some other researchers have done in previous studies. Because of correlations
between independent variables, using bivariate statistics can easily lead to drawing
false conclusions.

The results of the Heckman Two-Stage regression analysis do not show an
effect of income on the probability of giving, neither in the case of total donations
(as expected), nor in the case of religious donations (not expected). Household
income and wealth play no role in the act of giving money to charitable
organizations (with the exception of home ownership in the case of religious
donations). What does matter are requests for donations and volunteering, both in
the case of total and religious donations. In addition, people over 65, those
attending church more often, those with a lower price of giving, and those being
home owners have a higher probability of specifically making religious donations,
but not total donations. As most people donate, it is not surprising that we do not find many predictors of the probability of total giving.

The results of this chapter with respect to the giving standard can be of importance to fundraisers. If people with a higher income understand how miserly their gifts compare to the donations of people with lower incomes, it is possible that they will be prepared to donate more substantial amounts. The giving standard implies that people think in absolute amounts when deciding on donations. Fundraisers should take advantage of this knowledge and more often use absolute amounts in their requests for donations, rather than relative examples of how much people should donate (for example 2% of their income). In addition, these amounts should reflect the financial capacity of the potential donors. This could increase total fundraising, and people with both low and high incomes would be requested to donate according to their own means.
Chapter 4 Resources That Make You Generous: Effects of Social and Human Resources on Charitable Giving

4.1 Introduction
Charitable giving is a wide-spread and frequently recurring form of prosocial behavior. Over 95 per cent of Dutch households made a donation to a charitable organization in 2003, donating on average $301 (GINPS03 2003). Giving to charitable organizations is certainly not just a Dutch phenomenon. A selection of research findings shows that especially the Americans are very generous. Over the course of 2002, 66 per cent of the Americans donated on average $1,872 (Giving USA 2004; Giving USA 2005). The British are also generous with an average donation of $537 in 2004, donated by 57 per cent of the population (CAF 2006b). There is less information on charitable giving in other parts of the world, but for example 64 per cent of the South Koreans donated on average $88 in 2004 (The Beautiful Foundation 2005). All these charitable donations provide much-needed support for many beneficiaries, ranging from the homeless to animals, and from cultural institutions to athletes. These donations also have an impact on the charitable donors and their social environment. Donors are likely to receive psychological and social benefits from their donation, such as feelings of joy or warm glow, enhanced self-esteem, and increased social status (Andreoni 2004; Bennett 2003; Ickes, Kidd, and Berkowitz 1976; Odendahl 1990; Ostrower 1997; Ribar and Wilhelm 2002). Charitable giving thus has a positive impact on society, and on the people living in it.

From previous research on charitable giving we know that there are many factors influencing charitable giving. Giving to charitable causes is positively related to, among others, a higher household income, a higher education, and church membership (Bekkers 2004b; Regnerus, Smith, and Sikkink 1998; Smith,

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* Co-author is Ineke Maas (ICS/Sociology). A slightly different version of this chapter is currently under review. Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the 34rd ARNOVA Conference, Washington, November 2005, and at the Sociologendag, Brussel (Belgium), June 2005, and at the 5th European Ph.D. Network Seminar on the Third Sector and Civil Society, Ruldoc (The Netherlands), May 2005.

26 1 US dollar = 0.855 euros (exchange rate June 2, 2003; source: www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/20030609/ [accessed January 12, 2006].

27 1 US dollar = £0.559 (exchange rate January 2, 2004; source: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/Hist/dat00_uk.txt [accessed July 3, 2007]. Donations in Britain were measured over the course of a month in 2004: During that month, 57% of the British donated on average $45.

28 1 US dollar = 1,025 (Source: The Beautiful Foundation 2005).
Kehoe, and Cremer 1995; Wiepking 2007b). Although there is a considerable amount of factual knowledge about charitable giving, theoretical models explaining charitable donations are scarce. This may be due to two reasons: First, philanthropic research is often driven by practical questions, as practical knowledge about charitable behavior is desired by the philanthropic sector itself and by society as a whole. Furthermore, philanthropy as a phenomenon is subject to research from several disciplines. Economists, psychologists, and sociologists all strive to understand why people display charitable behavior. Truly interdisciplinary research is, however, scarce. As a consequence, hypotheses from one discipline are seldom integrated into theoretical models from another discipline.

Some notable exceptions can be found in the studies of Wilson and Musick (1997), Musick et al. (2000), and Bryant et al. (2003). Wilson and Musick (1997) and Musick et al. (2000) developed theoretical models based on psychological, sociological, and economic insights to explain volunteering behavior. Their models single out the possession of human capital, social capital, and cultural capital as important predictors for participation in volunteering activities. Bryant et al. (2003) extended these theoretical models in order to explain both volunteering and donating behavior. From their work it becomes clear that having more, and different forms of capital leads to higher levels of charitable giving, but exactly how and why remains unclear.

The aim of this study is to explain why people with more social and human capital—or resources—donate larger amounts to charitable organizations. We will show, both theoretically and empirically, that the effects of social and human resources on charitable giving are largely intertwined. Hypotheses on the mechanisms that connect resources and charitable giving will be tested using the second wave of the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study (2003; N=1,316).

4.2 Theoretical considerations
Most theories explaining differences in charitable giving are either adaptations of rational choice theory, variations on cognitive and emotional psychological theory, or based on structural functionalistic theory, depending on the scientific discipline of the researcher attempting to explain charitable giving.

Economists and rational choice sociologists attempt to explain charitable giving from the perspective of rational man, homo economicus. Rational actors are assumed to have identical goals, and try to maximize their utility through their
choice of actions. However, different actors face different costs for the same actions, and these costs influence actual behavior (Becker 1964). Andreoni (2004) implements rational choice theory in the research of charitable giving. He shows that conventional rational choice theory is not able to provide us with explanations of individual contributions to collective goods. Assumptions about individual psychological values are necessary, such as the feelings of warm glow people experience when making charitable donations. For an overview of economic theory about charitable giving, see Vesterlund (2006).

Psychologists investigate the effect of many cognitive and emotional characteristics of individuals on charitable giving. There is an extensive literature about factors influencing individual helping behavior (Pilliavin and Charng 1990; Schroeder et al. 1995). Results show that people who display higher levels of helping behavior are more empathic, more agreeable, emotionally stable, and have a higher self-esteem (Bekkers 2004b).

Sociologists argue that, next to costs and personality characteristics, charitable giving is also influenced by social restrictions. As Durkheim (1897] 1952) explains in his study on suicide, people who are more integrated into intermediary groups with specific norms will be more inclined to act according to the norms of these groups. Regarding charitable giving, there is much evidence that making donations to charitable causes is not an isolated action purely determined by costs and personality characteristics, but in fact is very much influenced by the context or situation in which charitable behavior is displayed. When people actively engage in networks of people with more positive norms regarding charitable giving, they will act according to these norms (see for example Barman 2007; Bekkers 2004b; Carman 2003; Lindahl and Conley 2002).

Wilson and Musick (1997), Musick et al. (2000) and Bryant et al. (2003) transcend the boundaries of specific theoretical disciplines by using theoretical ideas about costs, personality characteristics, and structural factors in order to explain charitable behavior. Their explanations are based upon the resources that are available to people. We expand on their work, and attempt to find answers to the question why social and human resources influence charitable giving, and how the influence of these resources on giving is intertwined.
4.2.1 Social resources
An interesting finding in research on charitable giving is that individuals with more extended networks give larger amounts (Bekkers et al. forthcoming; Bryant et al. 2003). We argue that there are at least five explanations for this generosity of people with more extended networks. Two of these explanations concern specific network characteristics that have a positive effect on charitable giving. The other three explanations involve individual characteristics or resources that influence both network extension and charitable giving.

We first discuss the two explanations that assume a causal relationship between network characteristics and charitable giving. In the Netherlands, as in other countries, there are some specific extended networks that consist of people holding strong positive norms regarding charitable giving. Examples of such networks are religious organizations and service organizations, such as the Rotary and the Lions (Bekkers 2004a; Brown and Ferris 2007; Lohmann 1992 in Bennett 2003:13). Although people can have extended networks without being a member of either the church or a service organization, such a membership usually implies developing contacts with many others. Applying Durkheim’s ([1897] 1952) integration thesis to the case of charitable giving we hypothesize that people with more extended networks donate more money to charitable causes, because it is more likely that they are integrated in networks with strong positive norms regarding charitable giving.

The second explanation focuses on the resources people can access through their network (Flap and Völker 2004; Lin 2001). Having a larger and more diverse social network enables easier access to charitable markets, decreasing the transaction costs of donating (Bryant et al. 2003). People with more extended social networks will more easily receive information about charitable organizations, or be solicited for making donations to these charitable organizations (Brown 2005). Sokolowski (1996) finds, for example, that 80 per cent of his respondents received a solicitation for donations by a significant other over the course of a year. A more extended social network will increase the number of solicitations made through this network. We hypothesize that people with more extended social networks will be more often solicited for donations through this social network, and hence in total donate larger amounts to charitable organizations.29

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29 Assuming that people who are more often solicited, make more donations, resulting in larger total amounts donated to charitable organizations.
Thirdly, we expect that people with more extended social networks donate higher amounts of money to charitable organizations, because they are more trusting. Uslaner (2002) has done extensive research on the causal relationship between generalized trust and civic engagement. He shows that generalized trust is a prerequisite for group membership, and not vice versa, as argued by Putnam (2000). People with higher levels of trust build more extended social networks. At the same time, Uslaner shows that trust is essential for charitable giving. “Giving to charity [...] involves helping people who are different from yourself” (Uslaner 2002:138). In addition, charitable giving implies giving money to organizations or people you don’t personally know, and who are physically located at a distance. This implies that there are limits to the level of control donors have over the ways charitable organizations spend their money (Bekkers 2006b). Therefore, trust is necessary for donating (more) money to charitable organizations. We hypothesize that the higher donations of people with more extended social networks can be explained by their higher levels of generalized trust.

Fourthly, social psychological research shows that the ability to empathize with others is important for making (new) friends. Understanding other people’s emotions is an important personality trait in forming and maintaining (more) relationships (Twenge et al. 2007). People with higher levels of empathic concern are better able to participate in more extended social networks. At the same time, people with higher levels of empathic concern are known to be larger charitable donors, mainly because they better understand potential beneficiaries’ needs. Therefore, we argue that the higher donations of people with more extended social networks can be explained by their higher levels of empathic concern.

Finally, the social brain hypothesis states that cognitive abilities limit the size of the social group people are capable of participating in (Barrett, Henzi, and Dunbar 2003). Stiller and Dunbar (2007) argue that people with higher cognitive abilities are better able “to integrate and maintain an updated mental database of the social relationships” in their network (Stiller and Dunbar 2007:94-95). Their results indeed show that people with higher cognitive abilities participate in more extended social networks. At the same time, people with higher cognitive abilities are also larger charitable donors (Bekkers 2005b; Bekkers and De Graaf 2006). Bekkers and De Graaf (2006) explain this by arguing that people with a higher cognitive ability are better able to understand the needs of distant others. We
hypothesize that the higher donations of people with more extended social networks can be explained by their higher cognitive ability.

4.2.2 Human resources

People have access to different individual resources that help them achieve goals more accurately, one of these being human resources. Human resources (or capital) refer to the personal resources that enable people to be economically productive (Coleman 1988). Formal educational attainment is the most important of these resources. With respect to the relationship between charitable giving and education, Brown (2001) finds that—controlling for social resources—higher educated people donate more money to charitable causes than lower educated people. This can be a direct result of higher educated people’s higher productivity and consequently higher income. According to Brown and Ferris, however, higher educated people donate more because education has a ‘socializing influence’, which lowers the costs, and at the same time enlarges the rewards of making donations (Brown and Ferris 2004:9).

One way in which this ‘socializing influence’ of education can be interpreted is that people learn to be more social in school. The longer they stay in school, the more they learn about society and about people who are different from themselves, and the more they will care for the wellbeing of other people, the environment, and society as a whole. In other words: Educational achievement enables people to develop a more prosocial attitude towards situations or people not directly related to themselves. Preliminary empirical results, however, do not support this hypothesis. Bekkers and De Graaf (2006) show that, in the Netherlands, higher educated people do not have more prosocial motives for making charitable donations than lower educated people.

Bekkers and De Graaf (2006) provide an alternative explanation for the positive effect of education on charitable giving. They argue that this effect is mainly due to the higher financial resources that people with a higher education have access to, and to their higher cognitive abilities. As we already argued, people with a higher cognitive ability are better able to understand the needs of distant others. We hypothesize that not only the higher donations of people with more extended networks can be explained by their higher cognitive abilities, but also those of higher educated people.
Following up on this last explanation, we also expect a better understanding of abstract situations to facilitate trust. For example, in order to trust that money donated for ‘empowering women in Africa’ is well spent, a certain level of abstract thinking is required. People without this level of abstract thinking will prefer to donate money to more concrete causes with quantifiable goals, such as an orphanage for children who lost their parents due to the Tsunami, or local food banks that supply food to people without adequate financial resources. However, in many cases goals set by charitable causes are not directly quantifiable. Donations to these organizations require trust on the part of potential donors, which can be facilitated by a better understanding of the abstract goals. This leads to the hypothesis that higher educated people will donate to a larger range of charitable organizations, and donate more money in total to charitable causes, because they are more trusting.

To sum up, we hypothesize that a higher level of education is causally related to charitable giving through three mechanisms: the possession of more financial resources, higher cognitive ability, and more trust. Two of these mechanisms are also related to network extension. People with more trust and a higher cognitive ability are expected to have more extended social networks. The human resources explanation and the social resources explanation are thus expected to be intertwined. More extended social networks may also affect charitable giving through prosocial norms in certain extended networks, and through the likelihood of being asked to make a donation. Finally, more empathic individuals will develop more extended networks and are also likely to donate larger amounts to charitable causes.

4.3 Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study
In order to test the hypotheses, we use data from the second wave of the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study: GINPS03 (2003). The GINPS is a bi-annual longitudinal study on charitable giving and volunteering in the Netherlands, which started in 2001. In May 2004, 1,557 persons were approached. They were questioned about their donating behavior in 2003. In total, 1,316 respondents (85%) completed the questionnaire, using Computer Assisted Self-Administered Interview procedures (CASI). The data are representative for the Dutch population with regard to age, sex, and urbanization.
4.3.1 Charitable giving
The dependent variable in our research is the natural log of the total amount of money a household donated to charitable causes in 2003. In GINPS03, donations to ten particular sub-sectors of charitable organizations are measured separately. First, respondents were questioned regarding which method they used to make a donation, for example, a donation canister or via a bank giro credit slip. After that, for each sub-sector of charitable organizations, respondents were asked whether or not their household had made a donation. Third, for all sub-sectors that received a positive answer by respondents, the exact amount of money the household donated in 2003 was asked. Of the 1,316 respondents that completed the questionnaire, only 65 households (5%) indicated not having made any donation in 2003.

303 households (23%) indicated having made a donation to one or more specific sub-sectors, but failed to specify the exact amount. This can be either because they forgot how much they donated to that charitable sub-sector or because they didn’t want to reveal this information in a questionnaire. In these cases, the missing amounts were imputed independently for each charitable sub-sector using multiple imputation. One problem with imputation of missing values in data on charitable giving is that the missing values probably are not MAR, an assumption that needs to be satisfied when imputing missing data (Allison 2002). This is problematic, but multiple imputation seems a better solution for dealing with missing values in such a case than list-wise deletion or other imputing strategies. See Brooks (2004) and Bowman (2004) for more information and a discussion on imputing missing values in charitable giving data. Multiple imputation is based on linear predictions, which can result in negative donations. This is a minor problem, because after imputation only 1% of the donations are negative. In line with Schafer (1997) we substitute all donations below 1, including the zero donations, with a donation of 1 euro. This enables us to calculate the natural log of the total amount donated.

4.3.2 Predictor variables
The great advantage of using GINPS03 is the availability of a large range of explanatory variables that can be related to charitable giving. A disadvantage of

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the GINPS studies is that only one person per household participates. This person is randomly chosen from all adults in the household. As a consequence, the effects of individual characteristics, such as education, on the size of the household donation will be somewhat underestimated. Table 4.1 gives a description of the variables included in this chapter.

Table 4.1 Descriptive overview of all variables (GINPS03; N=1,316)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donation (ln)</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network extension</td>
<td>7.44</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education (ref.)</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary education</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requests for donations</td>
<td>1.22</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathic concern</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized trust</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive ability</td>
<td>8.02</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income (ln)(^a)</td>
<td>10.02</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>7.09</td>
<td>12.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from wealth</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home ownership</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged under 35</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged between 35 and 65 (ref.)</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged over 65</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Descriptive statistics obtained with first (of 9) imputed dataset(s); \(^a\) annual after-tax household income

**Formal education.** The respondent has completed a primary or lower secondary educational level (reference category), a higher secondary educational level, or a tertiary educational level (college level or above).\(^{31}\)

\(^{31}\) Educational level is originally measured in eight categories (Nuffic 1994): (1) primary school; (2) lower secondary vocational education (LBO); (3) lower general secondary education (MAVO); (4) upper secondary vocational education (MBO); (5) upper general secondary education (HAO) and pre-university education (VWO); (6) higher professional education (HBO) and propaedeutic examination (WO-kandidaat); (7) university education (WO); (8) post-‘doctoraal’ program (Postdoctorale opleiding). Categories 1 to 4 form the primary or lower secondary educational level, categories 5 and 6 compose the higher secondary educational level, and categories 7 and 8 are combined to the tertiary educational level.
Network extension. We used a position generator in order to gain insight into the networks of respondents (Van der Gaag 2005; Lin 1999). The position generator consisted of a list of 15 occupations (including—but not limited to—a police officer, teacher, truck driver, journalist, medical doctor, and an artist) and respondents were asked to indicate whether they knew anyone (family, friends or acquaintances) with those occupations. Every effort was made to include both mainstream and some more specialist occupations, and both higher and lower status occupations. By adding the number of occupations present in a respondents’ network we computed an indicator for the extension of the network. The mean network extension is 7.44, indicating that respondents on average know 7 persons with one of the different occupations. Although there is a high correlation between the size of the network and the number of different occupations, the latter is a better measurement of network extension, because it also includes the diversity in social positions that can be reached through the network.

Integration in religious network. An indicator for integration in a religious network is church attendance. Respondents were asked how often they had attended church during the previous six months. Response categories include: (1) (almost) never; (2) once a year, or a few times a year; (3) about once a month; (4) about once a week; (5) more often than once a week. We expect that the more often people visit church, the more integrated they are in a religious network with positive norms regarding charitable giving. The data do not contain information on membership in service organizations.

Requests for donations. In order to measure the number of times people are requested to make a donation, we asked with which methods respondents were approached to make a donation in the two weeks prior to the interview in 2004. We inventoried whether they were asked for a gift by means of thirteen different methods, including an appeal letter, a door-to-door collection, and a church collection. Respondents who indicated that they had not been asked for a donation in these two weeks were assigned value 0 on this variable. The respondents who were most often approached had received 8 requests for charitable donations.

Empathic concern is measured by seven 5-point Likert scale items (see Bekkers 2004b; Davis 1994). Among others, these items include: “I am often touched by things that other people go through” and “When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel bad”. Reliability analysis showed that reliability is
highest when one item ("I am a soft-hearted person") is excluded. Deleting this item increased Cronbach’s Alpha from .727 to .749.

*Generalized trust* is measured on a 5-point Likert scale asking respondents about their agreement with the statement: “In general, people can be trusted” (Uslaner 2002). The mean score on generalized trust is 3.33.

*Cognitive Ability.* In order to establish the cognitive ability of a respondent we use the total number of correct descriptions chosen for difficult words in a vocabulary test (see Bekkers and De Graaf 2006). At worst, the respondent scored 0 out of 12 (0.8%), at best 12 out of 12 (3.3%). The average score was 8 out of 12 (16.1%).

*Financial Resources.* In order to obtain annual after-tax household income, we multiplied by twelve the sum of the exact monthly after-tax income for the respondent and (if applicable) the partner. For 202 households (15.3%) no information on monthly after-tax income was available. We substituted these answers with information on gross annual household income, multiplied by * .69, assuming an average income tax of 31%. After this transformation, we still had missing information on after-tax income for 114 households (8.7%). We estimated their after-tax income using the mean income of the household’s socio-economic status class. In the analyses we used the natural log of income. Additional indicators of a household’s financial stability and wealth are whether or not households received income from wealth, and whether or not they owned their home in 2003.

*Control Variables.* In the analysis we controlled for aged below 35, aged over 65, female gender, whether or not the respondent was a volunteer in 2003, and whether or not the respondent has a partner. According to Bryant et al. (2003) females and those with a partner are more connected with societal networks. Females because they “traditionally have carried the burden of much of the volunteering, especially for those activities serving children and the elderly”, and those with a partner, because they “share each other’s social network” (Bryant et al. 2003:45-46). In addition, being a volunteer also increases one’s access to social resources. Table 4.2 presents the correlations for the variables used in the analyses.
Table 4.2 Correlations (GINPS03; N=1,316)

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Donation (In)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 Network extension</td>
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<td>3 Primary education</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 Secondary education</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.62**</td>
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<td>5 Tertiary education</td>
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<td>0.16** -0.46** -0.41**</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 Church attendance</td>
<td>0.51**</td>
<td>0.18** -0.06*</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
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<td>7 Requests for donations</td>
<td>0.37**</td>
<td>0.22** -0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.37**</td>
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<td>8 Empathic concern</td>
<td>0.27**</td>
<td>0.14** -0.02 -0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
<td>0.18**</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Generalized trust</td>
<td>0.17**</td>
<td>0.14** -0.07** -0.03</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
<td>0.02</td>
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<td>0.10**</td>
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<td>0.18** -0.21** -0.02</td>
<td>0.26**</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
<td>0.10**</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 Household income (In)</td>
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<td>0.13** -0.14** 0.03</td>
<td>0.13**</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 Income from wealth</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
<td>0.09** -0.06*</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.07**</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.12** -0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
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<td>0.13**</td>
<td>0.17** -0.08** 0.00</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.07**</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
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<td>14 Aged under 35</td>
<td>-0.16**</td>
<td>0.01 -0.28** 0.11**</td>
<td>0.19**</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.12** -0.09** -0.07** -0.22** -0.13** -0.10** -0.03</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 Aged 35-65</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.14** -0.07*</td>
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<td>0.08** -0.01</td>
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<td>0.17** -0.05</td>
<td>0.15** -0.63**</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Aged over 65</td>
<td>0.17** -0.11</td>
<td>0.14** -0.06*</td>
<td>-0.10**</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.10**</td>
<td>0.24** -0.08**</td>
<td>0.19** -0.15** -0.29** -0.52**</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 Female</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06* -0.02</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.27**</td>
<td>0.07** -0.01</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.02*</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 Partner</td>
<td>0.10**</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>0.18** -0.07** -0.13**</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.10** -0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.35** -0.01</td>
<td>0.22** -0.25**</td>
<td>0.22** -0.00</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Volunteer</td>
<td>0.24**</td>
<td>0.26** -0.07*</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
<td>0.28**</td>
<td>0.23**</td>
<td>0.16**</td>
<td>0.10**</td>
<td>0.11**</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.09**</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.08**</td>
<td>0.07*</td>
<td>0.02</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; correlations obtained with first (of 9) imputed dataset(s).
4.4 Results

Table 4.3 displays the results of an OLS regression analysis of the natural log of the total amount donated to charitable organizations. In the base model (Model 1) we include only the direct effects of variables measuring social resources (network extension) and human resources (formal education), in addition to the control variables. From this base model we can conclude that people with a more extended social network indeed show a higher level of charitable giving, as expected.

The extension of someone's network with one point (on a scale of 0 to 15) leads to making 9% higher donations. Compared to people with primary education, those with secondary education donate 42% more money to charitable causes. People with a tertiary educational level donate 77% more than those with only primary education. Hence, there is a positive effect of educational level on charitable giving. This is in line with results from other research (Bekkers and De Graaf 2006; Brown and Ferris 2004).

Model 2 explores whether the effect of the extension of the network is explained by the network and individual characteristics, as hypothesized. The variables measuring network characteristics (church attendance and requests for donations) both have a significant positive effect on the level of charitable giving. Intensifying religious involvement with one step (e.g., going to church once a week instead of once a month) increases the level of charitable giving by 60%. Receiving one more request for a donation leads to 21% higher donations. The variables measuring individual characteristics also all have a significant positive effect on the level of charitable giving. An increase in the level of empathic concern by one point increases charitable donations by 54%. Having one point more trust in others

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32 Because only 5% of the respondents did not make a donation, problems with sample selection and truncation are negligible (Bradley, Holden, and McClelland 2005; Buis and Wiepking 2006). We performed a Tobit analysis to test for the sensitivity of the statistical model. The results obtained using the Tobit analysis resemble the results obtained using OLS regression analysis almost perfectly. Because Tobit is not a certified regression command for using with multiple imputed data, we choose to report the results obtained with OLS regression analysis.

33 It could be argued that network extension is an endogenous variable. This would imply that there is not only a causal effect of network extension on level of giving, but also an effect of the level of giving on network extension, for example because through their charitable behaviour people make new acquaintances. We used the GINPS panel character (GINPS03 2003; GINPS05 2005) to test for causality between network extension and level of giving. When we analyse the effect of level of giving in 2003 on network extension in 2005 and control for network extension in 2003, empathic concern, generalized trust, and the other variables included in table 4.3, we find no effect of level of giving in 2003 on network extension in 2005.
increases the level of charitable giving by 22%. And finally, knowledge of the meaning of one more difficult word in the vocabulary test increases charitable giving by 9%.

Table 4.3  Regression of the natural log of the total amount donated to charitable causes on human and social resources: the Netherlands, 2003 (GINPS03; N=1,316; based on 9 imputed datasets)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Base model</th>
<th>(2) Social resources</th>
<th>(3) Human resources</th>
<th>(4) Social + Human resources</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>S.E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network extension</td>
<td>0.090**</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.029*</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education</td>
<td>0.415**</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.236*</td>
<td>0.102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary education</td>
<td>0.766**</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.368**</td>
<td>0.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td>0.599**</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requests for donations</td>
<td>0.210**</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathic concern</td>
<td>0.543**</td>
<td>0.087</td>
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<tr>
<td>Generalized trust</td>
<td>0.216**</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.204**</td>
<td>0.061</td>
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<td>Cognitive ability</td>
<td>0.088**</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.084**</td>
<td>0.023</td>
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<tr>
<td>Household income (In)</td>
<td>0.320**</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.322**</td>
<td>0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income from wealth</td>
<td>0.152</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.153</td>
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<tr>
<td>Home owner</td>
<td>0.238*</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>0.220*</td>
<td>0.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged under 35</td>
<td>-0.540**</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>-0.255*</td>
<td>0.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 35–65</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged over 65</td>
<td>0.737**</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.393**</td>
<td>0.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>-0.189*</td>
<td>0.088</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>0.353**</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.243*</td>
<td>0.097</td>
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<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>0.628**</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.094</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.836**</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>-0.946*</td>
<td>0.372</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-square</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.41</td>
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</table>

Note: * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01.

Once we control for the explanatory variables, the effect of network extension decreases. Where in Model 1 a one-point extension of someone’s network increased the level of charitable giving with 9%, in model 2 this increase is reduced to 3%. Additional analyses (not shown) reveal that the inclusion of measures of
Resources that make you generous

network characteristics (church attendance and requests for donations) caused a larger decrease of the effect of network extension on level of charitable giving than the inclusion of the measures of individual characteristics (empathic concern, generalized trust and cognitive ability).

Model 3 explores whether the direct positive effect of formal education on charitable giving can be explained by the hypothesized mediating individual characteristics. In Model 2 we already showed the positive effect of generalized trust and cognitive ability on level of charitable giving. The indicators for financial resources are new in Model 3. Results show that the elasticity of charitable giving with respect to income is .320, meaning that a 10% increase in annual after-tax household income increases the level of charitable giving by 3.2%. Being a homeowner increases the level of charitable donations by 24%. There is no significant effect of receiving income from wealth.

Both the effects of secondary educational level and tertiary educational level decrease substantially after including the variables measuring generalized trust, cognitive ability, and income. However, the effects of different educational levels on charitable giving remain significant. Additional analyses reveal that the effect of education on charitable giving is mediated for the greater part by cognitive ability and the indicators for financial resources. Cognitive ability specifically decreases the positive effect of tertiary educational level. The higher educated indeed donate more money because of their higher cognitive abilities. Generalized trust is less important for explaining the educational effect.

In Model 4 we include all variables. The results show that the human- and social resource explanations are indeed intertwined as expected. In the complete model, the effects of network extension and educational level on charitable giving are no longer significant. It appears that the social- and human resource mechanisms together explain both the effect of formal educational level and that of network extension on charitable giving.

The changes in the effects of the control variables on the level of charitable giving between the four models are also noteworthy. Bryant et al. (2003) used female gender and having a partner as alternative indicators for having access to social resources. We argued that volunteering is also such an alternative indicator. In the base model, having a partner has a positive effect on the level of charitable giving. Those with a partner donate 35% more than singles. The effect of having a partner decreases after the inclusion of the indicators of the network mechanisms
(Model 2), but remains significant. After the inclusion of the income indicators in Model 3, the partner effect is no longer significant. Apparently, having a partner leads to making higher donations not only because of the access to social resources, but mainly because having a joint household increases one’s financial resources.\footnote{It could be argued that having a partner is an endogenous variable, as well as network extension (see note 33). We tested for causality between having a partner and level of giving. When we analyse the effect of level of giving in 2003 on having a partner in 2005, and control for having a partner in 2003 and the other variables included in table 4.3, we find no effect of level of giving in 2003 on having a partner in 2005.}

Being a volunteer is also positively related to the level of charitable giving. Volunteers donate 63\% more than those who do not volunteer. Including the social resources (Model 2) completely explains the effect of volunteering, whereas human resources (Model 3) have nothing to do with the relationship between volunteering and charitable giving. Additional analyses reveal that the larger donations made by volunteers are mostly explained by their stronger integration in religious networks.

Although the effect of gender is not significant in the base model and in the complete model, it is significantly negative in the model that includes social resources. If we take women’s larger social resources into account, they report smaller donations to charitable causes than men. Part of this difference is explained by men’s larger financial resources (Model 4).

The effect of age is consistent with findings in the philanthropic literature (Bekkers and Wiekking 2007). Younger people give less than middle-aged people because they are less integrated in the church and because of their smaller financial resources. Older people donate more than middle-aged people. This is partly explained by their larger social resources, especially indicated by church attendance, and for a small part by older people’s higher cognitive abilities. A substantial age effect, however, remains unexplained.

4.5 Conclusion
In this study we examined the effects of human and social resources on charitable giving. The main goal was to answer whether and how social and human resources makes one more generous. In order to answer this question, we expanded on previous research by constructing a model combining insights from economics, psychology, and sociology. With these insights we formulated hypotheses on the importance of human and social resources for charitable giving. Furthermore, we attempted to explain why these different resources promote higher levels of
charitable giving. The hypotheses were tested using the second wave of the longitudinal Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study (GINPS03 2003). Our results showed that social and human resources do make one generous, but how this works exactly is rather complicated.

First, having a more extended social network increases charitable donations. For a large part this is due to the fact that those who are more integrated in religious networks also have more extended social networks. And in religious networks one finds strong positive norms for making regular and substantive charitable donations. Thus, being more integrated in a religious network increases the level of charitable giving and reduces the positive effect of the social network on charitable giving. In addition, part of the positive effect of having a more extended social network on charitable giving can be explained by the more frequent requests for donations that people with a more extended network receive. People with a more extended social network are more often exposed to solicitation by charitable organizations, very likely through people in their own network, e.g., a nephew asking to sponsor his laps in a school walk-a-thon, or a neighbor standing at the doorstep around dinnertime asking for a small contribution to his favorite charity. To a lesser extent, the positive effect of having a more extended social network on level of charitable giving can be explained by the fact that individuals with more trust, more empathic concern, and a higher cognitive ability both have more extended networks and donate larger amounts. Thus, part of the 'effect' of network extension is in fact spurious and caused by these common causes of both charitable giving and having an extended network.

Second, having a higher level of formal education also increases charitable donations. As expected, this effect is partly due to the larger financial resources people with a higher education have access to. But the generosity of the higher educated is not only caused by their better financial situation. People with a higher level of formal education also have a higher cognitive ability, which facilitates a better understanding of the needs of (distant) other people, increasing charitable donations. In addition, people with more formal education and a higher cognitive ability also have more trust that donations will be spent well, which also increases their donations.

A methodological issue that deserves discussion concerns the dealing with respondents who state that they have made a donation to a charitable sub-sector, but fail to specify the amount donated. We use multiple imputation to replace these
missing values. However, these missing donations are not Missing at Random, as they are very likely dependent on the actual amount donated. People giving smaller donations are more likely to have forgotten the exact amount they donated, as giving is a less salient act in their lives. Consequently they are more likely to say that they have donated, but not how much. Philanthropic research generally does not mention this problem, let alone provide solutions, with the exception of Brooks (2004). Future philanthropic research should pay more attention to this methodological issue, and attempt to provide answers for dealing with this problem.

Notwithstanding the previous issue, this study provides insight into the mechanisms behind charitable giving, showing how and why exactly social and human resources positively effect charitable giving. The mechanisms behind these explanations originate not only in sociological theory, but also in psychology and economics. They explain the effects of education and network extension, and also most of the effects of control variables, such as gender, having a partner, and volunteering. The results can be used to understand the findings of more practical-oriented research, in which for instance the direct effects of income, educational level, and religiousness on charitable giving are studied. They may also help philanthropic practitioners to fine-tune their strategies. Finally, they may be a building block in more extended interdisciplinary explanations of prosocial behavior, such as charitable giving.
Chapter 5 Picturing Generosity: National Campaigns for Charitable Causes in the Netherlands'

5.1 Introduction
The Netherlands has an imposing tradition of national campaigns for charitable causes. Some of these campaigns are still remembered decades afterwards, others were forgotten as quickly as possible. Who can forget TV presenter Mies Bouwman during the legendary campaign ‘Open het dorp’ (Open the village), lasting 23 hours in 1962? Other campaigns that are still remembered by many people are ‘Beurzen open, dijken dicht’ (Purses open, dykes closed) in 1953, and of course the colossal campaign for the victims of the Tsunami in 2005. But history also registers campaigns that were less successful. Examples of these are the campaign for the earthquake in Iran in 1990 and the campaign for the floods in Eastern Europe in 1997.

In this article we give a description of the campaigns for charitable causes that have been held in the Netherlands. At the same time, we make an inventory and test explanations for the success of national campaigns for charitable causes. Why is one campaign so much more successful than another? In this context we quantify the success of a campaign as the amount of money that is raised during this campaign. It is difficult to clearly define the concept of a national campaign for charitable causes. We classify a campaign as a national campaign when this campaign is once-only and can potentially reach the entire Dutch population. Additionally, the main goal of the campaign must be to raise money for a charitable cause. This excludes, for example, television programmes that raise money for a charitable cause through lotteries or quizzes.

The results of this chapter provide insight into the factors of success and failure of national campaigns for charitable causes. What factors of national campaigns trigger people to donate (more) money? In this chapter we focus on organizational aspects, rather than on the donating individuals. National campaigns for charitable causes differ in many aspects. How do these different characteristics of national campaigns affect charitable giving by the donating public? The results of this chapter can provide more detailed insight into the mechanisms that drive charitable giving. Studying national campaigns can also provide useful practical information about the role of fundraising in charitable giving. The results can, for

* The descriptive part of this chapter (section 5.1 to 5.3) is based on Wiepking (2007a).
example, be used to predict the success of fundraising strategies used by charitable organizations in other methods of giving, such as television campaigns, advertisements, and direct mail appeals. In addition, the results can be used to gain more insight into the role of the media in fundraising for charitable causes.

In the descriptive section of this article, a brief overview is given of the history of national campaigns for charitable causes in the Netherlands. This history gives background information to the hypotheses about success factors of national campaigns that are formulated in the explanatory section of this article. In this explanatory section we explore factors that can explain the success of the 59 national campaigns that were identified for the Netherlands between 1951 and 2005.

5.2 National campaigns in the Netherlands: A brief history
In the Netherlands between 1951 and 2005, a total of 59 national campaigns for charitable causes were held. Figure 5.1 shows these campaigns, including the year in which they were held and the amount of money that was raised in millions of euros. The campaigns are classified into nine possible types of campaigns, from campaigns for the disabled in the Netherlands to campaigns for war victims. Appendix B includes a list with the national campaigns by year, with the total amounts raised.

5.2.1 1951-1962: The beginning
An important person during the first national campaigns for charitable causes is Johannes Bodegraven. The very first campaign, the ‘Haak-in’ (Link arms) campaign in 1951, is based on his own ideas. ‘Haak-in’ is an interactive radio show broadcast by the NCRV (Nederlandse Christelijke Radio-Vereniging, Dutch Christian Radio Association). In the studio, contestants form chains of words, in which they use the last syllable of a word to form a new word, for example: letterbox – boxcar – carpet. Listeners participate by mailing a postcard with their solution for the last word of the show. They mail their postcard with an additional postage stamp, the proceeds of which go to the Koningin Wilhelmina Fonds (now KWF Kankerbestrijding, Dutch Cancer Association). On 24 May 1951, Johannes Bodegraven presents a closing ceremony in Amsterdam. People from all over the
country come to Amsterdam to personally donate money. The total amount raised by this first national campaign for a charitable cause is 8.1 million euros.\(^{35}\)

Two years later, Johannes Bodegraven is also the presenter of ‘Beurzen open, dijken dicht’ (Purses open, dykes closed) following the flood disaster of February 1953. The format of the first national campaigns turned out to be a huge success. Grand galas were to dominate the look of national campaigns for decades to come. These galas consist primarily of amusement and are interrupted by citizens and companies who make an appearance to pledge donations. The public is kept informed at regular intervals of the intermediate status and encouraged to donate more, so that the ‘target figure’ will be achieved.

As well as Johannes Bodegraven, Mies Bouwman is one of the historic faces of national campaigns for charitable causes. In 1962, she presents the ‘Open het dorp’ (Open the village) campaign, one of the most famous national campaigns for charitable causes. The aim of the campaign is to build a specially-designed village for disabled adults who have completed their revalidation phase. In November 1962, a 23-hour long television marathon is broadcast by the AVRO broadcasting company (Algemene Vereeniging Radio Omroep, General Radio Broadcasting Company Association) from the RAI in Amsterdam. This marathon ultimately raises 52 million euros. The entire country is mobilized, amongst other things, by handing in matchboxes filled with money that has been raised, at post offices or supermarkets (Constant 1993; Dietz 1999; Wikipediagebruikers 2007).

International research into ‘telethons’ (marathon broadcasts on television for a charitable cause, of which ‘Open het dorp’ is an example) cites the American ‘Jerry Lewis Telethon’ as the first ever telethon broadcast (Devereux 1996; Tester 2001). Since 1966, the ‘Jerry Lewis Telethon’ has been broadcast every year in the weekend before Labor Day (the first Monday in September), and has as its aim to raise as much money as possible for the Muscular Dystrophy Association. ‘Open het dorp’ was broadcast in November 1962. This means that ‘Open het dorp’ was possibly the first television marathon for charitable causes ever. The huge success of ‘Open het dorp’ ensures, amongst other things, that the national (television) campaign for charitable causes becomes a periodically recurring phenomenon.

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\(^{35}\) Converted to the value of a euro in 2005, using the Consumenten Prijs Index (Consumer Price Index) (CPI) of CBS (Statistics Netherlands) (2006). These converted amounts will be used in the remainder of this chapter.
Figure 5.1  Money raised by different types of national campaigns for charitable causes: the Netherlands, 1951-2005 (N=59)
5.2.2 1963-1983: The galas

Despite the success of ‘Open het dorp’, the next national campaign did not appear until four years later. On Saturday 19 February 1966, Novib, Mensen in Nood, Unicef, Stichting Oecumenische Hulp aan Kerken en Vluchtelingen (one of the precursors of KerkinActie) and Unesco Centrum Netherlands organize a two-hour broadcast for radio (NRU) and television (NTS) under the banner ‘Eten voor India’ (Food for India). At that moment, India was suffering from famine as a result of crop failure due to drought. As with ‘Open het dorp’, thousands took to the streets to offer their donations. This time the collections took place in town halls, churches and other public buildings. Civil servants stood waiting to count the donations and pass their figures on to the national exchange at the Amsterdam town hall. In this way, the result of the collections could be made known that same evening on radio and TV: A total of 38,4 million euros was raised (NOVIB 1966).

‘Eten voor India’ in 1966 would be followed at least every two years up till 1977 by a national campaign for charitable causes. These campaigns vary widely in character: From ‘Geven voor Leven’ (Give for Life) for children with cancer, to ‘Geef gezondheid’ (Give health) for health care in developing countries. The majority of campaigns in this period are extremely successful and raise more than 30 million euros. In particular, the campaigns focused on the ‘Third World’ (famine, Christian development aid) turn out to be successful. National campaigns for war victims are less popular. The Biafra campaign ‘Uw Geld - Hun Leven’ (Your Money – Their Life) in 1969, and the campaign for ‘Bangladesh’ in 1972 raise ‘only’ 3,4 million euros and 0,7 million euros, respectively.

The tide of national campaigns between 1966 and 1977 continues to be strongly influenced by the successful format of the first national campaigns, such as ‘Beurzen open, dijken dicht’ and ‘Open het dorp’. It is interesting to note that between 1978 and 1983, hardly any national campaigns for charitable causes are held. In this period, a trend of moderation concerning the willingness of broadcasting companies to organize national campaigns for charitable causes manifests itself. In 1977, in quick succession, the AVRO produces two galas that turn out to be less successful: ‘Land zonder Drempels’ (Country without Thresholds) for a holiday village for the disabled, and ‘Gééf om de Natuur’ (Give/care for Nature) for the Wereld Natuurfonds (World Wildlife Fund). In the latter case, the target figure was 50 million guilders, but a ‘mere’ 15 million guilders was raised (the equivalent of 14,4 million euros). Stoffels concludes from
this that the popularity of the television galas was waning: “The programme
concept turned out to have been exhausted” (Stoffels 1995:36).

The national campaigns in the form of television galas are costly affairs, and
so in 1978 a number of broadcasting companies decide to collaborate with
charitable organizations in another way. A change in the Wet op de Kansspelen
(Law on Gambling) in 1978 provides for this option (Wet op de Kansspelen 1978 in
Stoffels 1995:20). As a result of the change in the law, charitable institutions are
allowed to declare 40% of the amounts raised by a campaign as costs, on condition
that the collection includes an element of chance. From 1978 then, charitable
organizations start paying the broadcasting companies for money-raising
programmes which include an element of chance. These programmes form a new
trend and start to flood the TV screens. Examples include AVRO’s ‘Telebingo’ in
1979 and VARA’s ‘De Willem Ruis Lotto Show’ in 1981. Although these television
programmes also collect money for charitable causes, they are not national
campaigns. They are quiz programmes that are broadcast for several seasons, with
the money raised for charitable causes as a secondary element. This rise in bingo-
and lottery shows ensures that there is no more room for the ‘classical’ national
campaign in the form of a gala (Stoffels 1995).

In 1983 however, a humanitarian disaster in the Horn of Africa slowly marks
the end of the ‘campaignless’ period. As a result of periods of extreme drought,
between two and three million people die of hunger. Campaigns are initiated on
a worldwide scale, in the Netherlands this leads to the well-known ‘Eén voor Afrika’
(One for Africa) in 1984. This campaign marks an important point in the history of
national campaigns in the Netherlands. ‘Eén voor Afrika’ forms namely the start of
a long-term collaboration between various international aid organizations: the
Dutch Cooperative International Aid Organizations (Samenwerkende
Hulporganisaties, SHO). As SHO employee, Jan Bouke Wybrandi is involved with
‘Eén voor Afrika’ and says the following in the VPRO (Vrijzinnig Protestantsche
Radio Omroep, Liberal Protestant Radio Broadcasting Company) TV and radio guide
in 2003:

“The first campaign I worked on was Eén voor Afrika in 1984. The devastating
images of the hunger in Ethiopia are indelibly stamped in everyone’s minds. Those
images had already existed for months, but nobody was able to capture the
interest of the media for them. By the time they did get their attention, it was too
late for the people there. But the campaign was a success. Moved by the images of
the famine-starved bellies and hollow eyes, people gave 85 million [guilders] at
the time. The state contributed another 15 million. Everyone took part, even the
NS (the Dutch railways): an ‘Eén voor Afrika’ train rode all through the
Netherlands, with posters.” (Van der Velden 2003; translated from Dutch)

The picture painted by Wybrandi demonstrates that the media in 1983 did not
consider the humanitarian disaster in Africa newsworthy. Various international aid
organizations had been lobbying for months for attention to be paid to the drought.
It was only in 1984 that the Netherlands was ready for this message, and that the
‘Eén voor Afrika’ campaign was launched.

5.2.3 1984-2005: The era of the SHO
The ‘Eén voor Afrika’ campaign in 1984 is an overwhelming success. A total of 10
hours of television and 18 hours of radio were broadcast. It wasn’t just the public
broadcasting companies that collaborated with each other – something that had
occurred more often in the past – but various international aid organizations also
joined forces. This is a new development, prompted by an emerging need for
effectiveness on the part of the media and the public.

When once again, in 1987, famine strikes Africa, the same concept is used.
With the ‘Afrika Nu’ (Africa Now) campaign, various aid organizations collaborate to
collect money, and in the communication with the press, and therefore with the
donating public. This collaboration works so well that the Dutch Red Cross, Mensen
in Nood/Caritas Neerlandica, the Stichting Oecumenische Hulp (SOH), Novib, the
Dutch Comité Unicef, Memisa, Terre des Hommes Netherlands, the Dutch Medecins
sans Frontieres, and TEAR fund agree to structural collaboration in the case of
national campaigns for victims of major international disasters. A major
(international) disaster is understood to be:

"an emergency situation in which the daily lives of a large number of people are
seriously disrupted, and people are reduced to suffering and neediness, as a result
of which they have a clear need of rescue, protection, food, clothing, housing,
medical and social care, or other basic provisions.” (SHO 2005: 2; translated from
Dutch)
In 1989, this collaboration becomes formalized in an agreement of the SHO. In the early years of the SHO, it seems as though every disaster is seized upon as an opportunity to organize a national campaign. Between 1988 and 1999, a total of no less than 24 national campaigns are organized by the SHO. During this period, the agreement dating from 1989 remains fundamentally unchanged (SHO 2005).

As a result of the emergence of the SHO as initiator of national campaigns, the format for national campaigns for charitable causes changes. As observed earlier, in the early nineteen-eighties, the popularity of massive television galas was on the wane. The national SHO campaigns provide more room for ‘infotainment’: Via the television items, the audience is informed about the problem in an area for which a campaign is being run. As well as this infotainment, however, there is still a lot of room made available for entertainment. And during the national SHO campaigns too, the top artists and Dutch celebrities fill the screens while appealing to the audience to donate.

The national SHO campaigns enjoy varying degrees of success between 1988 and 1993, but the high yields of ‘Eén voor Afrika’ (59,1 million euros) and ‘Afrika nu’ (35,6 million euros) are a thing of the past. The most successful national SHO campaigns between 1988 and 1993 do however compare favourably with the campaigns for famine-struck Africa: ‘Afrika sterft van de honger’ (Africa is dying of hunger) (in 1990, 25 million euros raised) and ‘Actie voor Afrika’ (Campaign for Africa) (in 1992, 25 million euros raised). Other campaigns with relatively high results are campaigns for victims in Europe (Romania, 1989; Yugoslavia (and Somalia), 1992; and Former Yugoslavia, 1993).

Many SHO campaigns in this period are, however, less successful in terms of amounts raised for charitable causes: Eight campaigns each raise less than 10 million. These campaigns are primarily aimed at victims of natural disasters: Floods in Bangladesh (1988 and 1991), hurricanes (Nicaragua, 1988) and earthquakes (Armenia, 1988; Iran, 1990; India, 1993).

In 1998 and 1999, a total of six national SHO campaigns are organized, three of which are successful: ‘Midden Amerika’ (44,3 million euros), ‘Help Vluchtelingen Kosovo’ (Help Kosovo Refugees) (60,6 million euros) and ‘Help slachtoffers aardbeving Turkiije’ (Help victims of the earthquake in Turkey) (35,5 million euros). These campaigns are a turning point in the SHO strategy. On 21 December 1999, the Dutch daily newspaper NRC Handelsblad reports that the SHO has decided to change its approach. SHO chairman Van Ham says:
“In the past, it was considered fine if you raised between five and ten million guilders with a campaign. Now the bar has been raised to such a gigantic level that you will certainly need to raise at least 60 million guilders per campaign if you don’t want the campaign to be branded a failure.” (Van Asbeck 1999:2; translated from Dutch).

The SHO participants are concerned that the popular disasters negatively influence the fundraising for the less popular disasters. The idea is suggested of running national SHO campaigns for only ‘really big disasters’ and leaving the fundraising for smaller-scale disasters to ad hoc coalitions of organizations that are most closely involved with the disaster. This would then work against ‘campaign-content inflation’.

After ten months of discussion (from September 1999 to June 2000), the SHO produces a new agreement (SHO 2002), which indeed lays down that national SHO campaigns will be organized especially for major disasters. From 1999, the campaign frequency of national SHO campaigns decreases somewhat.

In the period between 1999 and 2005, the SHO organizes eight campaigns, one of which is extremely successful: ‘Hulp aan Azië’ (Aid for Asia) (2004, 208 million euros). It is interesting to note that in this period only two national campaigns are run that are not organized by the SHO: the ‘Vuurwerkrimp Enschede’ (Enschede Firework disaster) by the Nationaal Rampenfonds (National Disaster Fund) (2000, 21 million euros), and ‘Nationale Actie Volendam’ (National Campaign Volendam), for the victims of the New Years’ fire in Volendam (2001, 1 million euros). Charitable causes are given ample exposure on Dutch television – for example, the game shows involving various lotteries for charitable causes – but rarely in the form of a national campaign.

At the end of 2004 and during the beginning of 2005, the campaign ‘Hulp aan Azië’ is held for the victims of the Tsunami. This is to become the most successful campaign in the history of the SHO. Granted, the disaster for which the money is being raised is of immense proportions: On Boxing Day 2004 a Tsunami overwhelms millions of people, 226 thousand of whom eventually die.
5.3 Possible explanations for the success of national campaigns

The innocent victim

From the socio-psychological literature, we know that people are more likely to help others if those others are not (or hardly) to blame for their neediness. As Miller says: “If people witness undeserved suffering, they will be motivated to re-establish ‘justice’.” (Fong 2007; Lerner 1980; Miller 1977). Victims of whom it is considered that they themselves are to blame for their pitiable situation will be less likely to be helped than people who, in total innocence, find themselves in a specific situation of neediness. Examples of people of whom it is considered that they need help through no fault of their own are victims of a natural disaster, famine, and children. On the other hand, it is often thought that war victims have themselves to blame in some way for their misfortune (Meijer, Bekkers, and Schuyt 2005). We formulate the hypothesis that campaigns that are held for victims of a war are less successful than other campaigns.

Signature

The first national campaigns run in the Netherlands take place in a strongly ‘pillarized’ country. This leads to these first campaigns being not at all as ‘national’ as the term might suggest. The signature of the organizing broadcasting company and charitable causes strongly influences who donates to such a campaign, as borne out by data collected by the Dutch Institute for Public Opinion (Nederlandse Instituut voor de Publieke Opinie) in response to the campaign ‘Open het dorp’ (NIPO 1962). In total, it turns out that 89% of the Dutch households have given ‘something’ to the campaign: 52% did this via the famous matchbox (own calculations using dataset ‘Open het Dorp’, NIWI/DANS 1962). One of the most striking results of the NIPO questionnaire is the low level of willingness to give on the part of Protestants. The Dutch people with a Protestant background contributed significantly less often to the campaign ‘Open het dorp’. Protestants had as much as a 60% lower probability of giving to the ‘Open het Dorp’ campaign than people with another religious affiliation, or no affiliation at all, even when controlled for background characteristics such as age, income, education, and size of municipality. This is striking because Protestants have traditionally been known to be generous givers to charitable causes (Bekkers 2003).

Although no data are available about the signature of donors to the other campaigns in the pillarized Netherlands of the nineteen-fifties and sixties, it can be
assumed that the lack of Protestant donors can be explained by the fact that the AVRO broadcasting company was responsible for the ‘Open het dorp’ broadcast. The AVRO is not affiliated to a specific religion or political conviction, in contrast to, for example, the NCRV or the VPRO. In the early nineteen-sixties, Protestants watched less television than people from other ‘pillars’, and it is very probable that Protestants hardly watched programmes broadcast by the AVRO (RKK 2004). Consequently, fewer Protestants watched the ‘Open het dorp’ broadcast, which in turn led to relatively few donations from Protestants.

We expect the signature of a national campaign to have an effect on the success of that campaign. Because people with a Protestant Christian background have the reputation of being the most generous givers, we formulate the hypothesis that campaigns organized by charitable causes or broadcasting companies with a Protestant Christian signature are more successful than other campaigns. We shall then control for the percentage of the population with a Protestant Christian signature in the year of the campaign.

News value of disaster
Some disasters or causes have a greater potential for bringing in money than others. In order to donate money to a national campaign, people need to have knowledge about the opportunity to donate to this campaign. People can become aware of this opportunity through media attention for victims of disasters or diseases, or through media attention for the campaign itself. When a campaign, or the disaster or cause, receives more media attention, the chances of success for a campaign are higher, and more money is raised (Simon 1997). According to Adams (1986) and Meijer et al. (2005), the degree of media attention for a disaster is determined by the news value of this disaster. The news value of a disaster is then influenced by two factors: The number of victims, and the distance to the disaster.

Number of victims
Firstly, the news value of a disaster is influenced by the number of victims. The number of victims, fatal or otherwise, of a disaster gives an indication of the scale of the disaster. A larger scale has a positive influence on the news value. This argument does not always hold true however, in view of the fact that in the past the number of fatalities of a disaster is often only established weeks or even months after the disaster itself. Adams (1986) shows that there are great
differences between the preliminary estimates of the number killed in an earthquake and the final number of ‘official’ fatalities. An example is the earthquake in China in 1976. The first estimates mentioned 100,000 fatalities, while the official established number of fatalities turned out later to be 800,000. Current information technology makes it possible, however, for experts in the Netherlands to determine with a fair degree of accuracy, and in a relatively short space of time, the number of victims of a disaster elsewhere in the world. We formulate the hypothesis that the greater the number of victims that are involved for a campaign, the more successful this campaign will be.

*Distance to the disaster or the beneficiaries*

In addition to the number of victims, the distance to the disaster or beneficiaries is important for the news value. This concerns both the geographical distance and the social (or cultural) distance. When the geographical distance is shorter, information about the disaster can reach the public more quickly and with a greater degree of reliability, for example in the case of news coverage about the number of fatalities, as already mentioned.

Additionally, the news value is also determined by the social or cultural distance. According to Adams (1986), the annual number of American tourists in an area is the most influential factor for the amount of airtime that a disaster in that same area gets on American television. Rosenblum says – in response to relatively much American media attention in 1976 for an earthquake in Italy (with ultimately 946 official deaths; the initial estimate was 1,000 deaths) compared with little media attention for an earthquake in Guatemala (with ultimately 22,778 official deaths; the initial estimate being 5,200 deaths) – about tourism as a yardstick for the social and cultural distance to an area:

"[It occurs] partially because Italy is easier to cover than Guatemala, and more reporters are immediately available. But it is mainly because Italians are seen as individuals, with physical and cultural characteristics familiar to Americans. Many editors and readers have been to Italy, and they recognize place names in the stories. Guatemalans are seen, on the other hand, only as faceless residents of the underdeveloped world." (Rosenblum 1981 in Adams 1986:120).
The social or cultural distance to a disaster area can also be reduced through the fact that an area is in the news more frequently. People become familiar with an area and its peoples, in the words of Rosenblum: “People get a face”. We formulate the hypothesis that the smaller the geographical and social distance is to victims or beneficiaries of a campaign, the greater the success of this campaign will be.

**Viewing figures**
More media attention leads to more people being aware of a national campaign. This increases the chance that people will watch or listen to the national campaign. When more people watch or listen, more people are aware of the opportunity to donate to a campaign, thus increasing the chance that more people will give money to the campaign. We formulate the hypothesis that the greater the number of people who watch or listen to a national campaign, the greater the success of this campaign will be.

**Campaign fatigue**
In some periods, there is an overabundance of national campaigns for charitable causes. This influences the success of these campaigns. Both the media and potential donors become rather tired of the national campaign as a phenomenon. Employees of the SHO have a name for this: ‘campaign fatigue’ or ‘campaign inflation’ (Van Asbeck 1999). When this campaign fatigue concerns specific targets, such as for example ‘hunger in Africa’, we call this compassion fatigue. Compassion fatigue means that the public has become ‘overtired’ with regard to a social or societal problem. According to Kinnick, Krugman and Cameron (1996) the major cause of compassion fatigue is the media that continuously broadcast coverage on the same subjects. This leads to a normalization of social problems. People are no longer surprised that certain problems exist. When they are confronted with these problems, they no longer experience any emotions.

Compassion fatigue can also occur with regard to the phenomenon of national campaigns. When too many campaigns are organized in too short a period, then the audience can become indifferent with respect to these campaigns. This has major implications for the willingness to donate, and in turn for the amount that is raised during national campaigns. We formulate the hypothesis that the higher the campaign frequency (that a larger number of other campaigns take
place prior to or at the same time as the campaign), the less successful a campaign will be.

**Economy**

A final explanation for the success (or lack of it) of some national campaigns can be found in the economic situation in the Netherlands. During a stagnating economy or even a recession, the Dutch are more concerned with their own problems and have less financial capacity for donations to national campaigns. At the same time, organizers of national campaigns, such as the broadcasting companies, production companies, and charitable organizations, also have fewer financial possibilities and they will therefore invest minimally in large-scale national campaigns during such periods. We formulate the hypothesis that the greater economic growth in a certain period, the greater the success of a national campaign will be.

### 5.4 Data and methods

Information with respect to national campaigns in the field of disasters, for example as a result of natural disasters such as flooding and earthquakes, or as a result of famines and wars, has been documented by the SHO (SHO 2006). Information about national campaigns other than disasters has been gathered using the online archives of seven national daily newspapers. For some daily national newspapers, the archives can be searched from 1990 onwards (LexisNexis 2006). We performed searches of these archives using the keywords ‘nationale actie’ (national campaign), ‘goed doel’ (charitable cause) and ‘televisie’ (television), in view of the fact that the majority of national campaigns are linked to a television broadcast.

Using, amongst other things, overview articles in the newspapers searched, we identified 59 national campaigns held between 1951 and 2005. Then, using the names of the national campaigns, we searched on Internet (via Google) for additional information on these campaigns, such as the number of fatalities and the signature of the campaign and/or the broadcasting company. In the same manner, we also retrieved more information for each national campaign about the precise

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36 Some national campaigns in the field of international assistance are, however, not mentioned in the SHO overview for some unknown reason. That is why supplementary information has been gathered using the annual report of the Centraal Bureau Fondsenwerving (Central Agency for Fundraising) (CBF 2005).
charitable cause for which money was being raised. The figures for total numbers of viewers of television broadcasts in response to national campaigns were obtained from the archive of the Dutch Audience Research Foundation (Stichting Kijkonderzoek).

Money raised by campaigns

We have operationalized the success of national campaigns for charitable causes as the final amount that was raised during the campaign. The money raised by each campaign has been converted to the value of the euro in 2005, using the Consumenten Prijs Index (Consumer Price Index) (CPI) of the CBS (Statistics Netherlands) (2006). The amount of money raised by the campaigns is strongly right-skewed, and that is why we use the natural logarithm. There is one extreme value, namely the money raised for the ‘Hulp aan Azië’ campaign for the victims of the Tsunami in 2004: 208 million euros. This one case strongly influenced the results and has therefore been excluded from the analyses.

Predictor variables

In the analyses, we compared the amount raised in campaigns held for war victims with the other campaigns. A total of seventeen campaigns for victims of wars were held. Examples are the campaigns ‘Help vluchtelingen Kosovo’, ‘Rwanda’ and ‘Help Sudan’.

A total of eight campaigns were organized by charitable causes and/or broadcasting companies with a Protestant Christian signature. Additionally, for each year in which a campaign was held, we totaled the percentage of hervormden (Dutch Reformed Church) and gereformeerden (Reformed Churches in the Netherlands) (CBS 2007b). In this way, the total percentage of Protestants in the Netherlands was calculated. For those years in which the percentage of Protestants was not known, an estimate was made based on the years for which information was available.37

The news value of a campaign is determined by the number of victims or beneficiaries, and the distance to the disaster or beneficiary. The number of victims or beneficiaries for whom a campaign is held is difficult to operationalize. We have

37 The percentage of Protestants is not known for example for the year 1968. We have therefore estimated this percentage using the percentage of Protestants in 1960 (37%) and 1971 (31%). The estimated percentage of Protestants in 1968 is then 33% (37-(37-31/1971-1960)*(1968-1960)).
chosen to use the number of *fatal victims* (in millions) in preference to the number of wounded or beneficiaries of a campaign. Simon (1997) has shown that the number of fatal victims is more important for predicting media attention than the number of wounded. Determining the number of beneficiaries is extremely complex for some campaigns. It is, for example, impossible to determine the number of beneficiaries of campaigns such as ‘Geven voor leven’ for KWF Kankerbestrijding (Dutch Cancer Association) in 1974 or ‘Géef om de natuur’ for the Wereld Natuur Fonds in 1977. It often happens that different sources specify different numbers of fatal victims. In that case, we tried to select the most objective source. It is also not clear whether the sources specify estimated numbers of victims or the actual final numbers of victims. We have used the actual final numbers of fatal victims as much as possible.\(^{38}\) We were not able to establish the actual final numbers of victims for all campaigns. In the end, we were able to establish the number of fatal victims for 46 campaigns.

The *geographical distance* to a disaster or a beneficiary for which a campaign was held was measured by the number of kilometres (in 1000 kilometres) from the Netherlands to the disaster or beneficiary. When a campaign was for Dutch beneficiaries, the number of kilometres was specified as 0. We tried to operationalize the *social distance* to the country or beneficiary using the numbers of Dutch tourists that visit the area for which a campaign was held, in the year of the campaign. However, for many campaigns, the number of Dutch tourists in that area and that year turned out to be either close to zero or very high in the case of campaigns held for Dutch beneficiaries. We did not succeed in operationalizing social distance with another measure. For this reason, we were unable to test the hypothesis related to social distance.

The *number of viewers* was measured in thousands of viewers (Peeters, Jager, and Kalfs 2005). The data are obtained from the (partly digital) archive of the Dutch Audience Research Foundation. This archive dates back to 1966. For the national campaigns held prior to 1966 \((n=4)\), no viewing or listening figures are known. It turned out to be difficult to find some campaigns in the archive. This was because the name by which a television programme was registered in the archive did not match the name of the national campaign. Additionally, the names of the

\(^{38}\) For the campaign ‘Honger in zuidelijk Afrika’ in 2002, there was an extremely high number of fatal victims. According to the BBC, a total of more than 12 million people died as a result of the famine (BBC 2002). Excluding this extreme value from the analyses had no effect on the results.
television programmes in the archive were abbreviated to a maximum of 40 characters (Peeters, Jager, and Kalfs 2005). These abbreviations did not always include the name under which a national campaign is known. Furthermore, it was not always possible to establish the exact date on which a television programme was broadcast in connection with a national campaign. This made the search process for viewing figures considerably more difficult. In total, it was possible to establish viewing figures for 25 campaigns via the archive.

The *campaign frequency* is determined via the number of campaigns that were held in the 12 months prior to the corresponding campaign. On average, two other campaigns are held in these 12 months. We use the proportional volume movements of the Gross Domestic Product as indicator for the *economic growth* in the year in which a campaign was held (CBS 2007a).\(^{39}\) Table 5.1 provides an overview of the descriptive statistics of the variables.

Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics of the variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>n</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount raised (In)(^{a})</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>4.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant Christian signature</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Protestants in the Netherlands</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>25.84</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatal victims(^{b})</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical distance(^{c})</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of viewers(^{d})</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21.29</td>
<td>19.37</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>68.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign frequency</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>8.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: \(^{a}\) Amount raised for ‘Hulp aan Azië’ (€208 million) biases the results and is therefore excluded; \(^{b}\) Fatal victims in millions; \(^{c}\) Geographical distance in 1000 kilometres; \(^{d}\) Number of viewers x 1000.

5.5 Results

In table 5.2 we show first of all the correlation between campaign characteristics and the natural log of the amounts of money raised by national campaigns. In this way we assess whether there is a relationship between the amount raised by a campaign and a specific campaign characteristic. The results in table 5.2 show that there is no relationship between campaigns held for victims of war and amount

\(^{39}\) The proportional volume movements of the Gross Domestic Product was not available for 1987. We have replaced this missing value with the average volume movement of 1986 and 1988.
raised. This indicates that campaigns held for victims of war do not raise less money than other campaigns. We therefore cannot accept the hypothesis that campaigns that are held for victims of a war are less successful than other campaigns. There is a positive relationship between campaigns with a Protestant Christian signature and amount of money raised for national campaigns. The percentage of Protestants in the Netherlands also has a positive relation with amount raised.

There is no relationship between the number of fatal victims and the amount of money raised for national campaigns. Therefore, we cannot accept the hypothesis that the greater the number of victims that are involved for a campaign, the more successful this campaign will be. There is also no relationship between the geographical distance to a disaster or beneficiaries and the amount of money raised for national campaigns. Thus, we can also not accept the hypothesis that the greater the number of victims involved in a campaign, the more successful this campaign will be.

Table 5.2 Correlations (n=58)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Money raised(^a) (ln)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 War</td>
<td>-.161</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Protestant Christian signature</td>
<td>(+.183)</td>
<td>-.148</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Percentage Protestants in the Netherlands</td>
<td>(+.216)</td>
<td>-.127</td>
<td>.592**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Fatal victims(^b)</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>-.075</td>
<td>-.140</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Geographical distance(^c)</td>
<td>-.031</td>
<td>-.030</td>
<td>-.283*</td>
<td>-.207(^{(+)})</td>
<td>.166</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Number of viewers(^d)</td>
<td>(+.333)</td>
<td>-.207</td>
<td>.050</td>
<td>.616**</td>
<td>.303</td>
<td>-.288(^{(+)})</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Campaign frequency</td>
<td>-.267*</td>
<td>.267*</td>
<td>-.250*</td>
<td>-.393**</td>
<td>-.038</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>-.573**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Economic growth</td>
<td>.261*</td>
<td>-.087</td>
<td>.335**</td>
<td>.452**</td>
<td>-.311*</td>
<td>-.069</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>-.296*</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: \(^{(+)}\) \(p \leq .10\); \(^*\) \(p \leq .05\) (one sided); \(^a\) Amount raised for “Hulp aan Azië” is excluded; \(^b\) Fatal victims in millions \((n=46)\); \(^c\) Geographical distance in 1000 kilometres; \(^d\) Number of viewers x 1000 \((n=25)\).

For the 25 campaigns for which we were able to determine the number of viewers, there is a significant positive relationship with amount of money raised. There is also a significant positive relationship between economic growth in the year of a national campaign and the amount raised. Finally, there is a significant negative
effect of the number of campaigns held in the twelve months prior to the corresponding campaign and the amount of money raised for that campaign.

Another noteworthy result in table 5.2 concerns the high significant negative correlation between number of viewers and campaign frequency. Although from table 5.2 we cannot draw conclusions on the causality between these two characteristics, it could very well be the case that once the campaign frequency increases, fewer people watch national campaigns, possibly due to ‘campaign fatigue’.

For the campaign characteristics that have a significant relationship with amount raised, we performed regression analyses with the natural log of the amount raised by national campaigns for charitable causes as dependent variable. This is displayed in table 5.3.

Table 5.3 Coefficients from regression of the natural log of the amount raised by national campaigns for charitable causes: the Netherlands, 1951-2005 $(n=58)^a$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$B$</td>
<td>$S.E.$</td>
<td>$B$</td>
<td>$S.E.$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant Christian</td>
<td>.172</td>
<td>.329</td>
<td>.312</td>
<td>.502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>signature</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>-.035</td>
<td>.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Protestants</td>
<td>.016+</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in the Netherlands</td>
<td>.066+</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>-.152+</td>
<td>.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of viewers$^b$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.090+</td>
<td>.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R-square</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n$</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: $^{(+)p \leq .10; * p \leq .05; ** p \leq .01}$ (one sided); $^a$ Amount raised for ‘Hulp aan Azië’ is excluded; $^b$ Number of viewers x 1000 $(n=25)$

In Model 1 in table 5.3 we first test the hypothesis that campaigns organized by charitable causes or broadcasting companies with a Protestant Christian signature are more successful than other campaigns. It appears that no positive significant effect of the Protestant signature of a campaign or the broadcasting company that broadcast a campaign exists, when taking into account the percentage of Protestants in the Netherlands in the year in which the campaign was held. We can therefore not accept the hypothesis that national campaigns with a Protestant signature raise more than other campaigns.

Next we test the hypothesis that the more people who watch a national campaign, the bigger the success of that campaign will be. Model 2 in table 5.3
shows that the number of viewers has a significantly positive relation with the amounts raised by national campaigns. When 10,000 more people watch a campaign, the amount raised for a campaign increases by 16%. However, once we control for Protestant Christian signature, percentage of Protestants, campaign frequency, and economic growth (in Model 4 in table 5.3), there is no longer an effect of number of viewers on amount raised. Therefore, we cannot accept the hypothesis that the more people who watch or listen to a national campaign, the more money that campaign will raise.

We can, however, accept the next hypothesis: The higher the campaign frequency, the less significant the success of campaigns. Model 3 in table 5.3 shows that one more campaign held in the twelve months prior to the corresponding campaign decreases the amount of money raised for that campaign by 7%. This hypothesis can also be accepted when we control for the other significant effects. In Model 4, the effect of one more campaign held in the prior twelve months is even stronger than in Model 3. In this complete Model 4, one more campaign decreases amount raised by 15%. However, in Model 4 we only analyze the 25 campaigns for which the viewing figures are available. These results are thus based on a less representative sample.

Finally, we can also accept the economic growth hypothesis. Model 3 in table 5.3 shows that the effect is in the expected direction. The stronger the economic growth in the Netherlands, the more successful the campaign will be. One percent more economic growth in the year that a national campaign is held increases the amount raised by this campaign by 9%. In Model 4 of table 5.3, economic growth increases amount raised even more strongly (by 46%), but as noted before, this result only holds for the 25 campaigns for which we have information on the number of viewers.

5.6 Conclusion and discussion
In this study we have provided an overview of national campaigns for charitable causes in the Netherlands. We described the development of national campaigns held between 1951 and 2005. Figure 5.1 shows the target of the campaign and the

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40 We include the bivariate effect of number of viewers on the natural log of the amount of money raised in Model 2 in table 5.3 additional to the correlation reported in table 5.2 (the standardized effect), because we report the unstandardized effects (B’s) in table 5.3. In this way the (unstandardized) effect of number of viewers in Model 2 can be compared with the (unstandardized) effect in Model 4 in table 5.3, in which Protestant Christian signature, percentage of Protestants, campaign frequency, and economic growth are held constant.
amount raised, with the year in which the campaign was held. In this chapter we have globally distinguished three periods of national campaigns: 1) the start of the national campaigns (1951-1962); 2) the galas for charitable causes (1963-1983); and 3) the era of the national SHO campaigns (1984-2005).

In addition to an overview of the development of the national campaigns for charitable causes that have been held in the Netherlands, in this study we also tested explanations for the success of national campaigns. How can we explain the fact that some campaigns are much more successful than others? Campaigns are more successful when the economic growth in the Netherlands in the year of the campaign is stronger, and less successful when the campaign frequency is higher. The negative effect of campaign frequency on the success of a campaign substantiates the theory that when there is an excess of national campaigns, people become tired of the phenomenon of national campaigns. The result is campaign fatigue. This leads to people giving less money to national campaigns. The positive effect of the economic situation in the Netherlands on the success of campaigns substantiates the theory that in a period of a stagnant economy or an economy in recession, donors and organizers of national campaigns are more focused on their own problems, and have less financial capacity for, on the one hand, organizing national campaigns (in the case of organizers) and on the other hand, giving donations (in the case of donors).

The results in this study do not support the theory of the success of innocent victims from the socio-psychological literature. This theory states that people will tend to help others more readily when those others are considered to be blameless for their own situation of neediness. People often think that victims of wars are to blame in some way for their misfortune. Our results show that campaigns held for victims of wars do not raise significantly less money than campaigns held for other causes.

There is some support for the hypothesis that the number of people that watch a campaign on television affects the success of national campaigns. The more people that watch the broadcast, the higher the amounts raised. However, once we control for other variables, there is no longer an effect of number of viewers on amount raised. Nevertheless, television is an excellent medium for extending the reach of a campaign. Before people can give to a campaign, they must first have knowledge of the fact that a campaign is being held. The positive effect of the number of viewers for a campaign on the amounts raised supports the
theory that the more people who are aware of the existence of a campaign, the higher the amounts raised will be. Other characteristics of national campaigns turned out to have no effect on the success of these campaigns. These characteristics are the Protestant signature of a campaign, the number of fatal victims for which a campaign is held, and finally the geographical distance to beneficiaries of a campaign.

We would like to conclude with a few remarks on the validity of this study into explanations for the success of national campaigns. This study is emphatically an exploratory study, whereby explanations for the success of national campaigns have been tested for the first time. For some characteristics, it turned out to be difficult to collect data for all national campaigns. This is specifically the case for the numbers of fatal victims, and the numbers of viewers. At other points in this study, attention has been paid to the problems that arose in connection with this data collection. The number of missing values for these variables may have affected the validity of this study. Additionally, we have maintained a none too conservative significance level when testing the hypotheses ($p \leq .10$). This means that the chance of accepting a hypothesis wrongfully is 10%.

The results of this study are interesting, despite the methodological shortcomings. We believe that, with the 59 national campaigns in this study, we have identified many (if not all) of the national campaigns that were held in the Netherlands between 1951 and 2005. There are simply no additional cases available to analyze. This is the first study into national campaigns for charitable causes in the Netherlands. As far as we have been able to ascertain, no study has ever been carried out in other countries into national campaigns for charitable causes and/or their success factors. We know now that the success of national campaigns for charitable causes can be influenced in some cases. The results of this study show that awareness of the opportunity to donate to national campaigns for charitable causes is an important factor. The more people who watch a television broadcast for the national campaign, the more money will be raised. The media are thus important for raising money for national campaigns. Also, campaigns raise more money in years of economic prosperity, than in years of economic misfortune. Finally, it is unwise to hold too many national campaigns for charitable causes in a short period. The more campaigns that take place in the year prior to a campaign, the lower the amounts raised for the charitable cause.
Chapter 6 Giving to Particular Charitable Organizations: Do Materialists Support Local Organizations and Do Democrats Donate to Animal Protection?∗

6.1 Introduction
Charitable giving by households is an important financial resource for civil society in many Western countries. For example, in the United States 75% of charitable giving revenues comes from household donations (Giving USA 2004). In the Netherlands, this percentage is smaller, as households make up 42% of revenues (Schuyt and Gouwenberg 2005). Both in the USA and in the Netherlands, these percentages were stable between 2003 and 2005, indicating that household donations are not only a substantive, but also a continuous factor in the funding of charitable organizations active in the civil society (Giving USA 2006; Schuyt et al. 2007). In order to maintain the significance of these sources of funding, it is important to understand why and how households donate money to these charitable organizations.

There is an extensive literature on charitable giving by households (see Bekkers and Wiepking 2007; Vesterlund 2006 for an overview). In general, this literature investigates the effects of household characteristics on the overall amount donated to charitable organizations by these households (see for example Auten, Sieg, and Clotfelter 2002; Bryant et al. 2003; Lee, Piliavin, and Call 1999). This is important when one is interested in the general mechanisms and principles behind charitable giving (Lindahl and Conley 2002; Schervish and Havens 1997). Another question, however, is why people donate to particular charitable organizations. Why do some people donate to an organization saving stray dogs, and others to an organization subsidizing cancer research?

Households differ to a great extent in the organizations they donate to. In 2003, 87% of the Dutch households made a donation to organizations active in the health sector. Charities active in the public and social benefits sector receive second most donations, as 53% of the Dutch households made a donation to organizations active in this sector, followed closely by donations to the environment and nature sector, to which 52% of the households made a donation. In the Netherlands, organizations in the education and research sector receive

∗ A slightly different version of this chapter is currently under review. Earlier versions of this chapter have been presented at the ICS forumday, Groningen (The Netherlands), November, 2006 and at the 35th Annual ARNOVA Conference, Chicago, November, 2006.
donations the least, as only 8% of the Dutch households made a donation to this charitable sector in 2003 (Schuyt and Gouwenberg 2005).

There is a limited amount of philanthropic research that focuses on charitable giving to particular organizations. In most cases, these studies focus on giving to one specific charitable sector, for example donations to religious organizations (Bekkers 2003a; Berger 2006; Jackson and Mathews 1995; Wuthnow 1991) or donations to international relief organizations (Meijer, Bekkers, and Schuyt 2005; Micklewright and Schnepf 2007). Results indicate that there are differences between people who donate to one specific charitable sub-sector rather than another. For instance, a higher education matters more for donating to international relief organizations than for donating to domestic organizations (Micklewright and Schnepf 2007). Religious involvement is naturally more important for giving to religious organizations, although those belonging to Protestant denominations also have a higher probability of donating to secular causes (Bekkers 2003a).

Notwithstanding these results, research in which donations to several particular organizations are considered simultaneously is more suitable for explaining why people donate to particular charitable organizations. Up till now, not many attempts have been made to explore this aspect, with the exception of Bennett (2003). Bennett investigates whether personal values influence charitable giving to particular organizations. In an experimental setup in central London, 250 people were told to suppose that they had been given £100, and that they had to donate this amount to one of three organizations: A cancer care organization, an animal welfare organization, or a human rights organization. Bennett finds that similarities between personal values and organizational values indeed increase the probability for donations to particular organizations. His findings show for example that more individualistic people have a higher probability of donating to the human rights organization, and that more empathic people tend to give to both cancer care and animal welfare.

The hiatus in the philanthropic literature concerning charitable giving to particular organizations is very likely due to a lack of data on this subject (Micklewright and Schnepf 2007). However, in 2003 through the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study (GINPS03 2003; N=1,316) we collected data on household donations to 64 particular charitable organizations, ranging from organizations supporting cancer research to evangelical organizations helping drug
addicts. Because there is very little research available on the topic of giving to particular organizations, we present in this chapter a first study on whether or not people donate to particular organizations. The specific aim of this chapter is to find out which people donate money to which particular charitable organization and why. An interesting next step could be to study the level of the donations people give to different charitable organizations.

In this chapter we will use GINPS03 to explain why people donate to particular charitable organizations in the Netherlands. We believe that the results will not only give information about charitable giving to particular organizations in the Netherlands, but can also provide information about giving to particular organizations in other Western countries. The main reason for this is that we will investigate general hypotheses on why people give to specific charitable organizations. These general mechanisms are assumed to be working in different settings. Another reason is that many organizations in GINPS03 are international organizations, with associated Dutch chapters.

6.2 Theory and hypotheses

We argue that there are three mechanisms that influence the particular organizations that people make donations to. According to the first mechanism, people need to possess knowledge about the opportunity to donate to a particular organization. Second, their incentives for making donations influence which organizations they donate to. And finally, their level of confidence also affects the specific organizations that donations are directed towards.

In this section, we use the three mechanisms of knowledge, incentives, and confidence to formulate hypotheses predicting why different people donate to particular charitable organizations. Specifically, the hypotheses predict how individual (donor) characteristics are related to organizational (charity) characteristics, and consequently predict which people donate to which organizations. In theory, many such relationships are possible.

6.2.1 Knowledge

First, in order to donate money to a charitable organization, people need to possess knowledge about the opportunity to donate to this organization. This knowledge can, on the one hand, be facilitated through solicitation by the charitable organization itself. On the other hand, people can become aware of
needs of beneficiaries’ of charitable organizations without direct solicitation by this charitable organization, for example through media coverage on victims of disasters or diseases (Bekkers and Wiegking 2007).

6.2.1.1 Knowledge through solicitation
Charitable organizations differ in the solicitation methods they employ. At the same time, people differ in the probability with which they receive solicitations for donations through these different solicitation methods. Examples of solicitation methods are door-to-door collections, direct mail appeals, church collections, television appeals, and fundraising events. We will discuss the effects of two omnipresent solicitation methods in the Netherlands: door-to-door solicitation and direct mail appeals (Schuyt and Gouwenberg 2005).

The methods that charitable organizations use for solicitation (or fundraising) are to some extent historically determined. In the period before World War II, charitable fundraising in the Netherlands was mainly limited to door-to-door solicitation (Lengkeek 2001). Today, more established charitable organizations still use door-to-door soliciting as a fundraising method. The main advantages of this solicitation method are relatively small overhead costs due to the large numbers of volunteers, and a very large potential donor base as many households are solicited. The downside of door-to-door solicitation is that people only donate small amounts. For example, the median donation in door-to-door solicitations in the Netherlands in 2005 is two euros (own calculations GINPS05 2005).

Although many are at risk of being solicited by means of door-to-door solicitation, not everyone has the same probabilities of encountering these solicitations (Bekkers 2005a). Those who are more often at home—such as those who don’t have paid work or work part-time, women, and the elderly—have a higher probability of receiving requests for a donation at the door. Conclusively we formulate the hypothesis that people who are more often at home have a higher probability of donating to charitable organizations using door-to-door solicitations.

Not all charitable organizations use direct mail appeals to the same extent. Overhead costs are relatively high for this fundraising method, while response rates are rather low (Bekkers and Crutzen 2007). However, when people do respond, they donate relatively large amounts, with a median donation of fifteen euros in the Netherlands in 2005 (own calculations GINPS05 2005). Due to the
higher costs, direct mail appeals are in general employed as a fundraising method by larger and more professionalized organizations.

At the individual level, people have different probabilities of receiving and responding to direct mail appeals. It is common knowledge among fundraisers that the elderly respond differently to direct mail appeals than younger people.\textsuperscript{41} Organizations using direct mail appeals for fundraising frequently target older people. Because the elderly tend to take letters more seriously, they are more inclined to open a direct mail letter and respond to it (Supphellen & Nelson, 2001). Thus we formulate the hypothesis that older people have a higher probability of donating to charitable organizations soliciting money with direct mail appeals.

6.2.1.2 Knowledge through beneficiaries’ need

In addition to solicitation by charitable organizations, knowledge about the opportunity to donate to particular organizations is also facilitated by the visibility of beneficiaries’ needs. Major differences exist across organizations in the visibility of their beneficiaries’ needs. Beneficiaries of some organizations are more visible by the public than those of others, depending on, amongst others, the total number of (potential) beneficiaries, their news value, and the level of empathic concern that people have for the beneficiaries (Davis 1983; Meijer, Bekkers, and Schuyt 2005). In general, all people will have a higher probability of donating money to organizations that serve beneficiaries with more visible needs.

However, we are interested in differences between people in donating to particular charitable organizations. We argue that these differences occur when the needs of organizations’ beneficiaries are less visible. In these cases, donor characteristics will have an influence on the probability of making a donation. When beneficiaries’ needs are less visible, potential donors have to make a greater effort to become aware of the opportunity to donate to these organizations. In general, people with a higher level of formal education and a higher cognitive ability are better equipped to collect and process information about organizations supporting less visible beneficiaries. After all, the more accessible mass media do not report on these beneficiaries. We formulate the hypothesis that people with a higher cognitive ability and educational level have a higher probability of donating to charitable organizations serving beneficiaries whose needs are less visible.

\textsuperscript{41} Information gathered through personal communication with fundraisers.
6.2.2 Incentives
It is not only knowledge that influences the charitable organizations people donate to, but incentives for making donations also affect this decision. We argue that there are three incentives for making donations that influence the particular organizations people donate to: psychological benefits, social status, and the love for mankind (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007).

6.2.2.1 Psychological benefits
How do psychological benefits give people incentives to donate to different charitable organizations? Charitable giving can increase people’s positive altruistic and social self-image, and consequently enhance their self-esteem (Ickes, Kidd, and Berkowitz 1976; Lee, Piliavin, and Call 1999; Piliavin and Callero 1991; Schroeder et al. 1995). Bekkers (2004b) argues that ‘psychologically closer’ organizations, for example local charities (compared to national or international charities) are better able to confirm a positive self-image (Bekkers 2004b:65, 73). People are (biologically) better able to experience emotions about persons or situations closer to them. It is for example easier to feel empathic concern for someone close by, than for people far away (Davis 1994).

Not all people will use charitable giving to confirm their prosocial self-image to the same extent. Following Bennett (2003) and Ciagouris and Mitchell (1997), we argue that especially people who strive for more materialistic goals will use charitable giving to increase their positive self-image. According to Bennett (2003) and Ciagouris and Mitchell (1997), materialists are “happy-seeking via consumption”, with conspicuous consumption patterns (Ciagouris and Mitchell 1997:264). We believe that people with higher materialistic values are not so much interested in the outcome of the work performed by charitable organizations. They are preoccupied with their own feelings and behavior. When materialists make charitable donations, they will choose to donate to organizations that increase their positive self-image to the largest extent.

As a result, we argue that people with higher materialistic values prefer to make donations to local organizations, because donations to these organizations will increase their positive self-image to a larger extent. In conclusion, we formulate the hypothesis that materialistic people have a higher probability of donating to psychologically close charitable organizations.
6.2.2.2 Social status
In his theory of cultural reproduction, Bourdieu (1977) argues that people use cultural and economic capital as a strategy to create and reproduce social inequalities (Ulteev, Arts, and Flap 1996). Bourdieu states that elites trying to keep the hierarchical distinctions in place will search for compensating strategies. Those belonging to the upper class will use either cultural or economic capital as a means of distinction.

First of all, the elites distinguish themselves by displaying refined cultural tastes (Bourdieu 1977). For example, they attend higher status cultural activities, such as theater, ballet, and opera performances. Charitable giving can be used as a means to display refined cultural tastes. However, in a society where everyone can afford to make donations, the elites will want to distinguish themselves by making donations to organizations that are less accessible to people in lower social strata, such as high-status organizations like cultural institutions (Ostrower 1997).

Second, elites have been using charitable giving as a means of economic distinction for centuries. For example, in the Netherlands prior to the welfare state, the philanthropic act of taking care of the poor was considered a privilege of the religious and private elites (Van Leeuwen 1994; De Swaan 1988). Participating in poor relief led to multiple advantages for the elites. It was a way to maintain social order, and at the same time it raised and guaranteed their social status. When we consider present-day poor relief, it is still a high social status cause to a large extent. Many local service clubs, like the Rotary, and the Lions, or private foundations headed by the wealthy focus on helping those with little means to make ends meet. Thus, giving to the poor still enables the elites to distinguish themselves economically. We formulate the hypothesis that people with a higher socio-economic status have a higher probability of donating to higher-status charitable organizations, such as cultural institutions and organizations focused on poor relief.

6.2.2.3 For the love of mankind
Some people experience incentives for making donations because they want to make the world a ‘better’ place. They donate money in order to change the world in a direction more in line with their own values and beliefs (Bennett 2003; Frank 1996). Their personal definition of what a better place comprises is paramount in their donations to charitable organizations. In order to make the world a better
place, they make charitable donations to specific organizations supporting their cause. We label these incentives for donations as ‘For the love of mankind’.

Left-leaning people are generally more concerned about environmental protection and animal welfare (Neumayer 2004). At the same time, people with a left-wing political orientation are also more concerned about the economic well-being of needy individuals (Pyle 1993; Regnerus, Smith, and Sikkink 1998). Especially organizations working in the international relief sector, in the nature sector, the environment and animal protection sectors, and in the public and social benefits sectors attempt to change the world in line with the values of people having a left-wing political orientation. Therefore, we formulate the hypothesis that left-leaning people have a higher probability of supporting organizations working in the international relief sector, the nature sector, the environment and animal protection sectors, and the public and social benefits sectors.

In addition, religious values are more important for religious people than for people without a religious affiliation. Religious values include compassion and concern for the suffering of others. Specifically faith-based organizations will attempt to change the world in line with their own religious values. Therefore we formulate the hypothesis that religiously affiliated people have a higher probability of donating to faith-based organizations.

6.2.3 Confidence
Next to knowledge and incentives, confidence also influences the specific organizations people donate to. In charitable giving, confidence in the capacities of charitable organizations is very important for people when considering giving money (Bekkers 2003b; Bekkers 2006b; Bowman 2004; Sargeant, Ford, and West 2006). In addition, people need to trust that the charitable organizations will spend their money well (Cheung and Chan 2000).

Confidence is more important in social interactions with higher uncertainties. General theory on trust states that when the risk of a certain action is higher, people need higher levels of trust to engage in that action (Coleman 1990). The uncertainty of charitable giving varies with donating to different organizations. When charitable organizations have more ‘abstract’ and less quantifiable goals, the uncertainty that the donated money will benefit the intended cause is higher. In that case, confidence in the charitable organization is more important for charitable giving.
Recent research on the origins and consequences of confidence in charitable organizations confirms this argument. Bekkers shows that confidence is only important when giving to organizations striving to solve ‘difficult problems’ (Bekkers 2006b:8). Or, in other words, when charitable organizations have more ‘abstract’ and less quantifiable goals, confidence in charitable organizations is a more important factor when considering making a donation. We formulate the hypothesis that people with higher levels of confidence in charitable organizations have a higher probability of donating to charities with less quantifiable goals.

6.3 Description of the data and methods

6.3.1 Data

All analyses are conducted using the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study 2003 (GINPS03, 2003). GINPS03 is the second wave of a bi-yearly longitudinal data collection, mapping charitable giving and volunteering by households in the Netherlands. In May 2004, 1,557 persons were requested to fill out a questionnaire on their household’s donating behavior in 2003. In total, 1,316 respondents (85%) completed the questionnaire, using Computer Assisted Self-Administered Interview procedures (CASI). The data are representative for the Dutch population with regard to age, sex, and urbanization (for more information, see Schuyt and Gouwenberg 2005).

Respondents were questioned about their household’s charitable giving, using the ‘Method-Area’ module, in which first questions are asked about methods of donating, followed by questions about donations to different charitable sub-sectors (Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish 2001). In addition to questions about giving to charitable sub-sectors, respondents in GINPS03 were also prompted about their household’s donations to 64 particular charitable organizations. These organizations were selected either based upon their financial size (over 10 million euros in own fundraising; average own fundraising in the Netherlands is 1.9 million euros in 2003 (CBF 2004)) or based upon their impact on redistribution of money in the Netherlands. An overview and description of the 64 particular charitable organizations is included in appendix C. Table 6.1 presents statistical descriptions of all variables used in this chapter.

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42 The data on donations to particular organizations were originally collected for a project about the redistribution of philanthropic money in the Netherlands.
6.3.1.1 Dependent variable

Donation is a dichotomous variable indicating a donation to a particular charitable organization. The mean value of 0.13 in table 6.1 indicates that households donated on average to approximately one in every eight organizations included in this chapter.

6.3.1.2 Individual characteristics

Individual characteristics in the analyses include part-time, which is 1 if the respondent works less than 24 hours a week or has no paid work. Female indicates the gender of the respondent. Aged over 65 is 1 if the respondent is over 65 years. In order to establish the cognitive ability of a respondent, we use the total number of correct descriptions chosen for difficult words in a vocabulary test (Alwin 1991; Bekkers and De Graaf 2006). At worst, the respondent scored 0 out of 12 (0.8%), at best 12 out of 12 (3.8%). The average score was 8 out of 12 (15.0%). The educational level of the respondent is measured on a seven-point scale: 1) only primary education; 2) primary education and some vocational school; 3) lower secondary education; 4) middle secondary education; 5) higher secondary education; 6) higher vocational education and 7) higher tertiary education. Materialistic values are measured using questions on the importance of materialistic goals. For two lists of four political goals, the respondent was scored when a materialistic goal (maintain order in the nation, reduce inflation, increasing economic wealth, a strong army) was ranked as one of the two most important goals in that list. See also De Graaf (1988) and Bekkers (2004b).\(^{43}\)

High socio-economic status is based upon educational level and occupational status, resulting in five socio-economic status groups: 1) working class; 2) lower middle class; 3) middle class; 4) upper middle class; 5) upper class. People in category 5 are considered as having a high socio-economic status (14.0%).\(^{44}\)

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\(^{43}\) Materialistic values and political left-right self placement are measured in the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study 2001 (GINPS01, 2001). As GINPS03 includes information on 70 ‘new’ respondents that did not participate in GINPS01, we have no materialistic value and political left-right self placement score for these respondents. Therefore, these 70 (non-selective) respondents were excluded from the analyses, reducing the number of cases used to 1246.

\(^{44}\) To a certain extent, it is problematic that high socio-economic status is partly based on educational level, because educational level is also included in the analyses. However, we argue that problems with multicollinearity are likely to be limited as neither educational level nor high socio-economic status are included in the analyses as main effects, but only as interaction effects. Pearson’s correlation between the interaction educational level*less visible needs and high socio-economic status*high status organization is r = 0.05 (p ≤
Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics of the variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>St.dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variable (N=79,744)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donation</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual characteristics (n=1,246)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged over 65</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive ability</td>
<td>8.09</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materialistic values</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High socio-economic status</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political right-left self placement</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in charitable organizations</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organizational characteristics (N=64)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Door-to-door solicitation</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct mail appeals</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less visible needs</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychologically close</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-status organization</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International relief sector</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature, environment, and animal protection sectors</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public and social benefits sectors</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith-based organization</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less quantifiable goals</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: GINPS03 (2003), CBF (2004)

*Political right-left self placement* is measured by asking respondents to place their political values on the following 5-point scale: 1) very right; 2) moderate right; 3) neither right nor left; 4) moderate left; 5) very left, with the additional answer possibility “I have no opinion”. 110 respondents (8.8%) indicated having no opinion, and we recoded these to answer category 3) neither right nor left (see footnote 43).

Respondents were asked whether they belonged to a religious denomination. 55% of the respondents indicated being religiously affiliated. The Level of confidence in Dutch charitable organizations is measured using a 5-point Likert scale item asking respondents about how much they are in agreement with the statement: “How much trust do you have in general in Dutch charitable

.01). In addition, we examined the results after the separate exclusion of the effects of educational level*less visible needs and high socio-economic status*high status organization. These exclusions did not change the results significantly.
organizations?" Response categories include: 1) none; 2) a little; 3) moderate; 4) quite a lot; 5) very much. The mean score on confidence in charitable organizations is 3.1.

### 6.3.1.3 Organizational characteristics

Most organizational characteristics were obtained studying the organizations’ web pages, on which their mission statement, amongst other things, can be found.\(^{45}\) Also, we consulted the yearly report from the Central Bureau of Fundraising (CBF 2004), which provides information on charitable organizations in the Netherlands. Appendix C gives a detailed description of the organizations used in this chapter, and the different organizational characteristics that apply to the specific organization. In the analyses we include whether organizations used door-to-door solicitation as a fundraising method in 2003, as self-reported to the Central Bureau of Fundraising (CBF 2004). We also include whether they use direct mail appeals as fundraising methods, again as self-reported to the Central Bureau of Fundraising (CBF 2004).

Organizations supporting beneficiaries whose needs are less visible are, for example, organizations which receive little media attention. Examples of organizations supporting beneficiaries with less visible needs are ‘Alzheimer Nederland’ (Alzheimer Association) and ‘Milieudefensie’ (Friends of the Earth). In contrast, organizations with more visible needs are organizations that receive much media attention, for example Cliniclowns Nederland or Unicef. Organizations supporting Dutch beneficiaries and causes, such as patients’ associations and organizations helping disadvantaged children in the Netherlands are considered psychologically close organizations.

Organizations supporting cultural institutions and poor relief are considered high-status organizations. We also include dichotomous variables for organizations active in the nature, environment, and animal protection sectors, organizations active in the international relief sector, organizations active in the public and social benefits sectors, and faith-based organizations (organizations with religious affiliations).

Organizations supporting goals that are more difficult to quantify are included in the analyses as organizations with less quantifiable goals. Examples are

\(^{45}\) The organizations’ web pages were consulted in the period between July 2006 and October 2006.
many organizations active in the international relief sector: ‘Amnesty International’, ‘Humanistisch Verbond’ (Humanistic Association), and ‘Stichting Aids Fonds’ (Aids Fund). In contrast, organizations with quantifiable goals are, for example, health organizations such as KWF Kankerbestrijding (Cancer Association) and Diabetes Fonds Nederland (Diabetes Association).

Table 6.2 presents the correlations between organizational characteristics. It should be noted that there are high correlations between some organizational characteristics, for example between organizations active in the international relief sector, psychologically close organizations, and organizations with less quantifiable goals. In order to avoid possible problems with multicollinearity, we performed additional analyses, testing each hypothesis separately. These results did not differ much from the results reported in this paper, to the extent that significance levels and direction of the effects were similar.⁴⁶

### 6.3.2 Modeling

In order to test our assumptions, we use conditional logistic regression analysis (McFadden 1974). Conditional logistic regression analysis is the standard estimation method for analyzing grouped data with a binary dependent variable. Conditional logistic regression analysis enables us to study the probability of household donations to different charitable organizations, conditional on individual and organizational characteristics. The dependent variables in this chapter are donations to 64 particular charitable organizations. The dataset that is input to these analyses contains 64 rows per respondent: one row for a donation to each organization.

In GINPS03, we have valid responses for 1,246 respondents, which leads to a total of \((1,246 \times 64) = 79,744\) cases, clustered in 1,246 groups (= individuals). 74 respondents (4736 cases) did not donate to any of the 64 organizations and were excluded from the analysis.⁴⁷

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⁴⁶ The only effect that seems affected by multicollinearity is the main effect of organizations active in the nature, environment, and animal protection sectors in model 1 in table 6.3. See footnote 48 for more information.

⁴⁷ The question is why people donate to particular charitable organizations. With the conditional logistic regression model, we estimate the probability that people with particular individual characteristics donate to charitable organizations with other particular characteristics. People that did not make a donation to any of the 64 organizations are excluded from the analyses automatically, as they do not contribute to the log-likelihood. In order to contribute to the log-likelihood, at least a donation to one organization (one positive outcome) is necessary.
Table 6.2 Correlations between organizational characteristics (GINPS03, CBF; N=64)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Door-to-door solicitation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Direct mail appeals</td>
<td>0.20*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Less visible needs</td>
<td>0.01*</td>
<td>-0.19**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Psychologically close</td>
<td>0.10**</td>
<td>-0.07**</td>
<td>0.50**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 High-status organization</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.07**</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
<td>0.21**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 International relief sector</td>
<td>-0.16**</td>
<td>0.12**</td>
<td>-0.49**</td>
<td>-0.88**</td>
<td>-0.19**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Nature, environment, and</td>
<td>-0.07**</td>
<td>-0.02**</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
<td>-0.05**</td>
<td>0.06**</td>
<td>-0.17**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>animal protection sectors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Public and social benefits sectors</td>
<td>-0.08**</td>
<td>0.11**</td>
<td>-0.07**</td>
<td>0.24**</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
<td>-0.21**</td>
<td>-0.13**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Faith-based organization</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02**</td>
<td>-0.07**</td>
<td>-0.06**</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.11**</td>
<td>-0.13**</td>
<td>0.09**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Less quantifiable goals</td>
<td>-0.15**</td>
<td>0.06**</td>
<td>-0.41**</td>
<td>-0.79**</td>
<td>-0.14**</td>
<td>0.68**</td>
<td>0.46**</td>
<td>-0.28**</td>
<td>0.10**</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01
These non-donating respondents do not help to explain why people donate to particular organizations. This brings the total number of cases used in the analysis to 75,008, clustered in 1,172 groups.

The hypotheses formulated in this chapter all concern the effects of individual characteristics in interaction with organizational characteristics. Consider, for example, the confidence hypothesis: People with higher levels of confidence in charitable organizations have a higher probability of donating to charities with less quantifiable goals. Our dependent variable ‘donation’ indicates whether or not a donation is made to each of the 64 charitable organizations. In order to test whether people with higher levels of confidence in charitable organizations have a higher probability of donating to organizations with less quantifiable goals, we include an interaction between the organizational characteristic ‘less quantifiable goals’ and the individual characteristic ‘confidence in charitable organizations’. In addition, we include the main organizational characteristic ‘less quantifiable goals’. The main effect of the individual ‘confidence in charitable organizations’ is excluded from the analysis, because the individual characteristics are constant for each respondent. Therefore this effect cannot account for differences in giving to particular charitable organizations (Mcfadden 1974).

6.4 Results
Table 6.3 displays the results of the conditional logistic regression analyses on donations to particular charitable organizations. In the base model (Model 1) we include only organizational characteristics. The results show that when an organization uses door-to-door solicitation, this increases the probability that people will donate to this organization by 245%. The use of direct mail appeals also leads to more donations, but to a lesser extent, as the use of this fundraising mechanism increases the probability of donations by 45%. In addition, psychologically close organizations also have a higher probability of receiving donations. Organizations supporting Dutch beneficiaries (psychological close organizations) have a 32% higher probability of receiving donations. Other organizational characteristics that increase the probability of receiving donations
are activity in the nature, environment, and animal protection sectors, and the international relief sector.⁴⁸

Supporting beneficiaries with visible needs turns out to be very important for receiving donations. The probability that people donate to organizations whose beneficiaries’ needs are less visible is 72% lower. There are more organizational characteristics that decrease the probability of receiving donations. Faith-based organizations have a 63% lower probability of receiving donations, and organizations with less quantifiable goals have a 59% lower probability of receiving donations. Finally, both high-status organizations and organizations active in the public and social benefit sectors have lower probabilities of receiving donations, respectively 23% and 16% lower. Note that these are the results of multivariate conditional logistic analysis. This means that an organization that has both less quantifiable goals and is faith-based has an \([(1-(0.41*0.37))*100=\] 85% lower probability of receiving donations.

In Model 2 in table 6.3 we include the interaction effects between individual and organizational characteristics. First, we discuss the results for the hypotheses that were deduced from the knowledge mechanism. We expected that those persons who are more often at home have a higher probability of donating to organizations using door-to-door solicitation. Model 2 shows that the more frequent donations received by organizations using door-to-door fundraising cannot be explained by donations made by people who are more often at home, such as people not working or working part-time, women, and those over 65. It is interesting to note that those over 65 even have a lower probability of donating to organizations using door-to-door solicitation. Additional analyses revealed that this effect is increasingly negative at a higher age. One likely explanation for this unexpected effect is that many older people do not open the door in the evenings—out of fear or because they go to bed early. And this is the time when door-to-door solicitation usually takes place. Another explanation could be that it takes older people longer to reach their door. It is possible that the solicitor has already moved on to the next house, before older people have answered the door.

⁴⁸ Although the main effect of organizations active in the nature, environment, and animal protection sectors in Model 1 of table 6.3 seems large, this effect is very unstable due to problems with multicollinearity. Excluding the main effect of less quantifiable organizations from the analyses results in a small and insignificant main effect \((B=0.068)\) of organizations active in the nature, environment, and animal protection sectors on donations.
In contrast, we do find that those over 65 have a higher probability of donating to organizations using direct mail appeals as a fundraising method. In general, people have a 40% higher probability of donating to these organizations. People over 65, however, have a 67% higher probability. This supports the hypothesis that older people have a higher probability of donating to organizations using direct mail appeals. Furthermore, the results indicate that there is no effect of a higher educational level or higher cognitive abilities on donating to organizations supporting beneficiaries with less visible needs.

Next, we consider whether and how incentives for making donations influence the particular organization people donate to. We find that people with higher materialistic values indeed have a higher probability of donating to organizations supporting Dutch beneficiaries and causes. In general, people have a 28% higher probability of supporting psychologically close organizations. For people with materialistic values, this probability is more than twice as big: 66%. This result supports the psychological benefits hypothesis. We also find some support for the social status hypothesis. In general, people have a 25% lower probability of making donations to high-status organizations. People belonging to the highest socio-economic class have a 3% lower probability of donating to these higher-status organizations, compared to the probability of donating to other organizations.

The results for the hypothesis concerning donations made for the love of mankind show that people who are one step more politically left-oriented have a 19% higher probability of donating towards organizations active in the nature, environment and animal protection sectors. In addition, these people have only a 13% lower probability of making a donation to organizations active in the international relief sector (compared to a 29% lower probability in general).

There is no effect of a stronger left-wing political orientation on making donations to organizations in the public and social benefit sectors. The effect of being religious is significantly positive, but does not reverse the lower probability of making donations to religious organizations as expected. In general, people experience an 80% lower probability of making religious donations.
Table 6.3  Conditional logistic regression analysis on donations to particular charitable organizations (GINPS03; n = 75,008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$B$</td>
<td>$S.E.$</td>
<td>Odds Ratio</td>
<td>$B$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Door-to-door solicitation</td>
<td>1.24**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>1.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* part-time</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* female</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>* aged over 65</td>
<td>-0.40**</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Direct mail appeals</td>
<td>0.37**</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1.45</td>
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<td></td>
<td>* aged over 65</td>
<td>0.18**</td>
<td>0.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Less visible needs</td>
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<td>0.28</td>
<td>-1.41**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>* cognitive ability</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychologically close</td>
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<td>0.07</td>
<td>1.32</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-status organization</td>
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<td>0.11</td>
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<td>0.05</td>
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<td>1.31</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</table>

*Note:* $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$. 
Giving to particular organizations

Religious involvement does decrease this negative effect, but people belonging to a religious denomination still have a 50% lower probability of making donations to religious organizations. One likely explanation for this effect is that religious people do not donate to the particular religious organizations included in our sample, but rather make their donations in church, to their own church.

Finally, we discuss the effect of the confidence mechanism on the particular charitable organizations people donate to. We expected that people with higher levels of confidence in charitable organizations have a higher probability of making donations to organizations with less quantifiable goals. This turns out to be the case, although the effect is only modest. People with one step more confidence in charitable organizations (for example ‘quite a lot’ of confidence compared to ‘moderate’) have an 81% lower probability of making donations to organizations with less quantifiable goals, whereas people in general have an 86% lower probability of donating to these organizations.

6.5 Conclusion and discussion
This chapter is one of the first to examine why people donate money to particular charitable organizations. We formulated hypotheses using three mechanisms that facilitate charitable giving to 64 particular charitable organizations: knowledge, incentives, and confidence. The results show that all three mechanisms influence charitable giving to particular organizations to some extent. Knowledge about the opportunity to give has an effect on the specific organizations to which donations are directed, either through solicitation by charitable organizations or by means of awareness of beneficiaries’ needs. Organizations using door-to-door fundraising receive more donations, except from older people, who are probably afraid of opening the door to strangers. On the other hand, organizations soliciting by means of direct mail appeals have a higher probability of receiving donations from the elderly. Organizations supporting beneficiaries with less visible needs, for example beneficiaries with little news value, in general have a lower probability of receiving donations. The results indicate that people’s educational level and cognitive ability do not facilitate awareness of, and consequently donations to, organizations supporting beneficiaries with less visible needs.

Incentives for donations were found to have a substantial effect on the organizations people donate to. People with higher materialistic values donate more often to psychologically close organizations (organizations supporting Dutch
beneficiaries and causes). This result supports the theory that especially people who strive for more materialistic goals use charitable giving to increase their positive self-image (Bennett 2003; Ciagouris and Mitchell 1997). In addition, the results in this chapter show some support for the theory that people experience incentives for making donations to particular organizations because they want to make the world a ‘better place’, and make charitable donations for the love of mankind. We found that people with a stronger left-wing political orientation have a higher probability of donating to organizations active in the nature, environment, and animal protection sectors and the international relief sector. This is in line with the theories that left-leaning people are generally more concerned about environmental protection and animal welfare (Neumayer 2004) and also are more concerned about the economic well-being of needy individuals (Pyle 1993; Regnerus, Smith, and Sikkink 1998). However, we also hypothesized that people with a stronger left-wing political orientation have a higher probability of donating to organizations active in the public and social benefits sectors, which is not confirmed by the results. A post-hoc explanation for this deviant result is that people with a stronger left-wing political orientation believe that the government should take responsibility for the tasks carried out by organizations active in the public and social benefits sectors. Furthermore, in this chapter we used Bourdieu’s theory of cultural reproduction (1977) to deduce a hypothesis on incentives for giving to particular organizations though social status. The results show that people with a higher socio-economic status have a higher probability of donating to higher-status charitable organizations. This supports the theoretical argument that people with a higher socio-economic status use charitable giving as a means of distinguishing themselves from people in lower status groups by making donations to higher-social status organizations.

A surprising finding is that, although people with religious values have a higher probability of donating to religious organizations, the probability that these organizations receive donations is lower than is the case for other organizations. This could be because religiously affiliated people donate to their church, rather than to the particular faith-based organizations included in our sample. Finally, people’s confidence in charities increases the probability of donations to organizations with less quantifiable goals, such as general international relief organizations. This result supports the theory that when uncertainties are higher in
charitable giving—like in other forms of social interaction—a higher level of confidence is needed in order to make donations (Coleman 1990).

Although there are many interesting and novel findings in this chapter, it is also important to note the limitations. First of all, the results in this chapter are conditional on the sample of organizations, which is to some extent selective. This is especially likely to be a problem when an organizational characteristic can only be found in a few organizations in our sample, which is the case for high-status and faith-based organizations. In addition, there are many possible relations between individual and organizational characteristics that can affect donations to particular organizations. Although we have put great effort into selecting those relations expected to strongly affect donations to particular organizations, other relations might still exist that need investigation.

This chapter provides ideas for a variety of new directions for future work. First of all, it would be very interesting to expand on this study by examining the different amounts people donate to particular organizations. This could lead to important new insights into the mechanisms behind charitable giving. Do knowledge, incentives, and confidence also affect level of giving to particular organizations? Or are there different mechanisms that drive the amounts people donate to particular organizations? However interesting this aspect may be, it will be challenging to specify statistical models that are appropriate for examining such questions.

Another promising extension to this chapter would be to investigate the effects of other incentives people experience for donating to particular organizations, such as incentives through material benefits. Although charitable giving is defined as the voluntary donation of money to charitable organizations that mainly benefit people other than oneself, people can still experience material (private) benefits from making donations. Think, for example, of donations to the opera, that result in better seats (Buraschi and Cornelli 2002), or donations to museums that provide entrance to exclusive previews of exhibitions.

It would also be very interesting to use the information on donations to the 64 organizations in GINPS03 to learn more about the effects of social pressure on donating. The 64 organizations use many different fundraising methods. These methods are based on different levels of social pressure, for example, the difference between personal and impersonal solicitation methods, and the difference between solicitation over the internet or by telephone. How do these
different levels of social pressure affect incidence and level of giving by different types of donors?

We conclude this chapter with some recommendations for charitable organizations. Our results show that organizations supporting more abstract, less quantifiable goals have a lower probability of receiving donations. Charitable organizations with more abstract goals could try to better communicate their aims and objectives to the public, so that potential donors understand their goals better. The same holds for organizations supporting beneficiaries with less visible needs. More visible needs lead to more donors. Therefore, it could be worthwhile to use innovative communication strategies to make these needs more visible to the public. And finally, people donate to organizations whose values match their own. Many charitable organizations already have a wealth of information on (past) donors available in their own databases. However, too few use this information in the solicitation process. Charitable organizations can use information on the interests of their donors in order to more strategically target these donors. When charitable organizations solicit donors for projects that match their interests and values, this could significantly increase fundraising success.
Chapter 7 For the Love of Mankind. Conclusions and a discussion of a sociological study on charitable giving

7.1 Introduction
In this thesis, we presented four different sociological studies on the understanding of charitable giving. We derived hypotheses from mainly sociological theories, and tested these hypotheses in order to provide new sociological answers to the main question of this study: ‘Why do some people donate more money to charitable organizations than others and why do they choose to donate to different organizations?’ The four studies are based upon four different sub-questions. What can we conclude, now that we have answered these four sub-questions?

7.2 Conclusions from sub-questions
7.2.1 The giving standard
The first sub-question considered the effect of income on charitable giving. What is the effect of income on the incidence and proportion of income given? In addition, we investigated how these effects can be explained. In line with previous research, we indisputedly found that people with a higher income donate more money to charitable organizations (Auten and Rudney 1990; Bekkers 2004b; Rooney, Steinberg, and Schervish 2001; Schlegelmilch, Love, and Diamantopoulos 1997). The results for the effect of income on the incidence of giving and on the proportion of income donated are more interesting. Up to now, researchers have failed to present conclusive evidence for these effects (compare for example James III and Sharpe 2007; McClelland and Brooks 2004; Schervish and Havens 1995b). We used the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study 2003 (GINPS03 2003) to investigate the effect of income on the probability and incidence of giving, for both total and religious charitable giving in the Netherlands. We found that there is no effect of income on the incidence of giving. People in different income categories have the same probability of donating to charitable organizations, no matter whether only religious or total organizations are considered. We did find strong evidence for a persistent negative effect of income on charitable donations as a proportion of income, irrespective of whether these donations are total donations or religious donations. The higher a household’s income, the smaller the proportion of income a household donates: The poor donate a larger proportion of their income to charitable organizations. These results support what we have defined as the giving standard hypothesis. The giving standard refers to norms concerning the
level of donations in specific situations that people in different income groups share. Many people in higher income groups donate only slightly higher absolute amounts than people in lower income groups, when considering separate incidences of giving. Consequently, the total donations of people with a lower income consist of a larger proportion of their income than the total donations of people with a higher income. With this giving standard we also found support for the theoretical argument that people are ‘conditionally cooperative’ (Fischbacher, Gachter, and Fehr 2001; Frey and Meier 2004). People contribute more often to a public good when they have information that others also contributed, and people are sensitive to social influences concerning the amount other donors contributed. They adjust the amount they donate according to their beliefs about the donations of others (Bekkers 2006a; Shang and Croson 2005).

7.2.2 The intertwined effects of social and human resources
In chapter 4, we described and explained the effects of different social and human resources on the amount people donate to charitable organizations. The main goal of the chapter was to answer whether and how social and human resources make one more generous. In order to answer this question, we expanded on previous research by constructing a model combining insights from economics, psychology, and sociology. With these insights we formulated hypotheses on the importance of human and social resources for charitable giving. Furthermore, we attempted to explain why these different resources promote higher levels of charitable giving. The hypotheses were tested using the second wave of the longitudinal Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study 2003 (GINPS03 2003). Our results showed that social and human resources do make one generous, but how exactly this happens is rather complicated.

For a sociological answer to the question why people with more social resources are more generous, we applied Durkheim’s ([1897] 1952) integration thesis to the case of charitable giving. We deduced the hypothesis that people with more extended networks donate more money to charitable causes, because it is more likely that they are integrated in networks with strong positive norms regarding charitable giving. Our results indeed showed that having a more extended social network increases charitable donations. For a large part this is due to the fact that those who are more integrated in religious networks also have larger social networks. And in religious networks strong positive norms are present
Conclusion

for making regular and substantive charitable donations. Thus, being more integrated in a religious network increases the level of charitable giving, and reduces the positive effect of a social network on charitable giving. This result is in support of Durkheim’s general integration thesis, applied to the case of charitable giving.

In addition, we also found support for other explanations for the higher donations of people with more extended social networks. First of all, people with a more extended social network are more often exposed to solicitation by charitable organizations, very likely through people in their own network, which explains part of their generosity. To a lesser extent, the positive effect of having a more extended social network on level of charitable giving can be explained by the individual resources of trust, empathic concern, and cognitive ability.

Our results support Uslaner’s (2002) theory that trust in other people is a prerequisite for group membership, and that more trust also leads to higher levels of charitable giving. Our results specifically showed that people with larger social networks partly donate higher amounts to charitable organizations because they have more trust in other people. Furthermore, our results showed that the higher donations of people with larger social networks can be explained by their higher levels of empathic concern. This is in line with the social psychological theory that empathy is important for forming and maintaining more relationships (Twenge et al. 2007). Additionally, we showed that donations of people with more extended social networks can be explained by their higher cognitive ability. This result is in support of the social brain hypothesis, which states that cognitive abilities correlate with the size of the social group people are capable of participating in. People with a higher cognitive ability are thus better able to form and maintain more extended social networks (Barrett, Henzi, and Dunbar 2003; Stiller and Dunbar 2007).

In line with the hypotheses we deduced from human capital theory (Coleman 1988), we find that having a higher level of formal education also increases charitable donations. As expected, this effect is partly due to the larger financial resources people with a higher education have access to. But the generosity of the higher educated is not only caused by their better financial situation. People with a higher level of formal education also have higher cognitive abilities, which facilitate a better understanding of needs of (distant) other people, increasing charitable donations. In addition, people with more formal education and a higher cognitive
ability also have more trust that donations will be spent well, which also leads to higher donations.

7.2.3 Picturing generosity: National campaigns for charitable causes in the Netherlands
In chapter 5 we investigated one specific example of charitable donations: national campaigns for charitable causes. Campaigns for charitable causes are defined as national campaigns when these campaigns are once-only and can potentially reach the entire Dutch population. Additionally, the main goal of the campaign must be to raise money for a charitable cause. We started with a concise description of the historical development of national campaigns in the Netherlands. Between 1951 and 2005, 59 national campaigns for charitable causes were held in the Netherlands. For example, there were national campaigns to cure cancer, national campaigns for disabled athletes, and many national campaigns for victims of natural disasters and war. Examples of the most famous national campaigns are ‘Open het dorp’ (Open the Village) in 1962 and ‘Hulp aan Azië’ (Aid for Asia) in 2004. We differentiated between three periods of national campaigns: 1) the start of the national campaigns (1951-1962); 2) the galas for charitable causes (1963-1983); and 3) the era of the national SHO campaigns (1984-2005).

As well as this descriptive research, we investigated why some national campaigns are more successful than others. What factors explain why some national campaigns raise much more money than others? In this study, we formulated hypotheses explaining the success of national campaigns. These hypotheses were tested with the data on the 59 national campaigns.

We found that success of national campaigns is (bivariately) positively affected by the number of viewers. The more people watched a national campaign on television, the more money was raised. Furthermore, we found support for the economic hypothesis that higher macro economic growth in a year lead to higher amounts raised for national campaigns held in that year. And finally, we found that the higher the number of national campaigns held in a period, the less successful these national campaigns were. This result is in support of the hypothesis derived from compassion fatigue theory (Kinnick, Krugman, and Cameron 1996). When there are too many national campaigns in too short a period, the public becomes insensitive to national campaigns.
7.2.4 Matching preferences: Donations to particular organizations

In chapter 6, we focused specifically on why people donate money to particular charitable organizations. We examined how individual (donor) characteristics are related to organizational (charity) characteristics, and how these relations affect giving to particular organizations. We formulated hypotheses using three mechanisms that facilitate charitable giving to particular charitable organizations: knowledge, incentives, and confidence. The hypotheses were tested using conditional logistic regression analysis using the Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study 2003 (GINPS03). GINPS03 includes information on donations to 64 particular charitable organizations.

The results showed that all three mechanisms influence charitable giving to particular organizations to some extent. Knowledge about the opportunity to give has an effect on the specific organizations at which donations are directed, either through solicitation by charitable organizations or through awareness of beneficiaries’ needs. Organizations employing door-to-door fundraising receive more donations, except from older people. On the other hand, organizations soliciting by means of direct mail appeals have a higher probability of receiving donations from the elderly. Organizations supporting beneficiaries with less visible needs, for example beneficiaries with little news value, in general have a lower probability of receiving donations. The results indicated that people’s educational level and cognitive ability do not facilitate awareness of, and consequently donations to, organizations supporting beneficiaries with less visible needs.

Incentives for donations were found to have a substantial effect on the organizations people donate to. People with more materialistic values donate more often to psychologically close organizations (organizations supporting Dutch beneficiaries and causes). This result is in support of the theory that especially people who strive for more materialistic goals use charitable giving to increase their positive self-image (Bennett 2003; Ciagouris and Mitchell 1997). In addition, the results showed some support for the theory that people experience incentives for making donations to particular organizations because they long for ‘world change’, and donate out of the love for mankind. We found that people with a stronger left-wing political orientation have a higher probability of donating to organizations active in the nature, environment, and animal protection sectors and the international relief sector. This is in line with the theory that left-leaning people are generally more concerned about environmental protection and animal welfare
(Neumayer 2004). An unexpected result was that people with a stronger left-wing political orientation do not have a higher probability of donating to organizations active in the public- and social benefits sectors. A post-hoc explanation for this deviant result is that people with a stronger left-wing political orientation believe that the government should take responsibility for the tasks carried out by organizations active in the public- and social benefits sectors. Furthermore, in this chapter we applied Bourdieu’s theory of cultural reproduction (1977) to deduce a hypothesis on incentives for giving to particular organizations using social status. The results show that people with a higher socio-economic status have a higher probability of donating to higher status charitable organizations. This supports the theoretical argument that people with a higher socio-economic status use charitable giving in order to distinguish themselves from people in lower status groups by making donations to higher social status organizations.

A surprising finding is that, although people with religious values have a higher probability of donating to religious organizations, the probability that religious organizations receive donations is lower than is the case for other organizations. This could be because religiously affiliated people donate to their church, rather than to the particular faith-based organizations included in our sample. Finally, people’s confidence in charities increases the probability of donations to organizations with less quantifiable goals, such as general international relief organizations. This result supports the theory that when uncertainties are higher in charitable giving—like in other forms of social interaction—a higher level of confidence is needed in order to make donations (Coleman 1990).

7.3 Conclusions for research on charitable giving and further questions
In our introduction, we stated that the main objective of this thesis would be to use general sociological theories in order to derive and test hypotheses explaining charitable giving. Now it is time to draw conclusions on the use of these general sociological theories in research on charitable giving.

In this thesis, we applied Durkheim’s integration thesis ([1897] 1952) to derive hypotheses explaining charitable giving. Durkheim ([1897] 1952) states that people who are more integrated in intermediary groups with specific norms will be more inclined to act according to the norms of these groups. We stated that charitable behavior is a social action, influenced by people’s social environment.
When people’s social environment has stronger positive norms for charitable giving, they will be influenced to make more and larger charitable donations. For example, people belonging to religious networks have stronger positive norms for charitable giving. In this thesis, we showed that people belonging to religious networks indeed donate more. Applying Durkheim’s integration thesis to the case of charitable giving proved to be useful.

There are more tests of Durkheim’s integration thesis to the case of charitable giving imaginable. For example, people belonging to service club organizations also have more positive norms for charitable giving. According to the integration thesis, people belonging to service club organizations should also be larger charitable donors. Future research could use Durkheim’s integration thesis to explain level of charitable giving by different groups in society, for example giving by ethnic minorities. It would also be interesting to test an application of Durkheim’s integration thesis to the case of charitable giving in international research. Do people in different countries have different norms for charitable giving, leading to different levels of giving in these countries?

Over the course of this thesis, we found that one of the more successful sociological explanations for charitable giving concerns the opportunity to give. People experience the opportunity to give when they gain knowledge about the possibility of making a donation to a specific charitable organization. We concluded that people with more social resources donate more money to charitable organizations because they have more opportunities to give: They receive more requests for donations. In addition, we were able to explain donations to particular organizations with the opportunity to give. Some people experience more opportunities to give to particular organizations (through different methods of solicitation), which increase the probability to give to these organizations. In the chapter on national campaigns for charitable organizations we also found evidence for the importance of the opportunity to give. The success of national campaigns can partly be explained by the number of viewers, which very likely is the same number of people that have the opportunity to give to these telethons. The conclusion that opportunity to give is important is in line with Bekkers’ (2004b) conclusion that social conditions are very important for charitable giving.

The finding that the opportunity to give is a successful explanation for charitable giving can be important for future research. Up to now, with the exception of marketing research, in scientific research on charitable giving very
little attention has been paid to the effects of fundraising on charitable giving. Although the idea of the opportunity to give is simple, it is a necessary prerequisite for people to make charitable donations. Not controlling for the different opportunities that different people have to give could easily lead to drawing false conclusions.

Next to the importance of the opportunity to give, we found support for the theory that people are ‘conditionally cooperative’ when it comes to charitable giving (Fischbacher, Gachter, and Fehr 2001; Frey and Meier 2004). The giving standard implies that different people donate roughly the same amounts on separate occasions. People will contribute more often to a public good when they have been informed that others also contributed. This can be explained by the fact that people are sensitive to social influences about charitable behavior by other donors (Shang and Croson 2005). Information about the size of other donors’ contributions influences donations made by new donors. People donate more when they believe others will also donate more (Bekkers 2006a).

In this thesis, we did not provide a conclusive test of the existence of a giving standard. Future research is needed, in which it would be interesting to test the giving standard for different areas of giving. In chapter 3, we found that there might be a stronger giving standard for religious donations than for total donations. Are there different giving standards for different areas of giving? In addition, it would be interesting to investigate the giving standard for different methods of giving. Do people donate the same amounts when solicited in a door-to-door collection, or when they are requested to donate by means of a direct mail appeal? And how does the level of personal interaction affect the giving standard? Is there a stronger giving standard when people are requested to make a donation in person, which is the case with the door-to-door solicitation, than when they are asked to make a donation in an impersonal way, which is the case with the direct mail appeal?

In this thesis, we also applied Bourdieu’s theory of cultural reproduction (1977) to the case of charitable giving. Bourdieu (1977) states that when social inequalities are diminishing in a society, the societies’ upper class uses compensating strategies in order to keep hierarchical distinctions in place. Charitable giving could be used as such a strategy, both promoting cultural and economic distinction. Charitable giving can be used to promote cultural distinction by means of displaying refined cultural tastes. The elites can use charitable giving
to high-status organizations, such as museums and the opera, to distinguish themselves. Elites have been using charitable giving as a means of economic distinction for centuries. In the Netherlands, taking care of the poor was historically considered a privilege of the elites. It gave the elites many advantages: While maintaining social order among the dregs of society, their charitable donations raised and guaranteed their social status, and was believed to lead to their salvation (Van Leeuwen 1994; De Swaan 1988). In this thesis, we showed that charitable giving is still being used today as a means to promote distinction. People with a higher socio-economic status have a higher probability of donating to higher-status charitable organizations, including those taking care of the poor. Applying Bourdieu’s theory of cultural reproduction (1977) to the case of charitable giving thus proved to be useful.

Bourdieu’s theory of cultural reproduction could also very well be applied to study charitable giving in an international context. Could the different level of giving to particular high-status organizations in different countries be explained by the elites in these countries using compensating strategies? Countries differ in the presence of elite classes. It would be interesting to examine the relationship between elites, level of economic inequality, and level of charitable giving to high-status organizations in different countries.

As stated in the introduction, social capital theory (Coleman 1988) has become an important source for explanations of all kinds of social phenomena. Charitable giving turned out to be one of these phenomena, as in this thesis we showed that social capital theory is very useful for deriving hypotheses on charitable giving. We showed that people’s social resources are important for their level of charitable giving. For one thing, people with more social resources are more often exposed to the solicitation of charitable donations. They experience more opportunities to give, which explains part of their generosity.

We found another successful explanation for giving in the level of confidence and trust people have in charitable organizations and other people in general. General theory on trust states that when the risk of a certain action is higher, people need higher levels of trust to engage in that action (Coleman 1990). In charitable giving, confidence in the capacities of charitable organizations is very important for people in order to give money (Bekkers 2003b; Bekkers 2006b; Bowman 2004; Sargeant, Ford, and West 2006). In addition, people need to trust the charitable organizations to spend their money well (Cheung and Chan 2000).
We found that people’s confidence in charities increases the probability of making donations to organizations with less quantifiable goals, such as general international relief organizations. This is in line with the theory that when there is a greater degree of uncertainty in charitable giving, a higher level of confidence is needed in order to make donations. In addition, we found that part of the larger donations by people with more social and human resources can be explained by their higher levels of generalized trust.

Naturally, the list of sociological theories that can be applied to the case of charitable giving is not limited to the theories used in this thesis. There are other (sociological) theories that seem promising for explaining charitable giving. One of these theories is social movement theory (Klandermans, Kriese, and Tarrow 1988). It is likely that there are similar mechanisms that drive both engaging in social movements and donating money to charitable organizations. The same holds for theories on political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). There might be very similar processes influencing people to vote and to make charitable donations. Future research could examine the application of these theories to the explanation of charitable giving.

Overall, we can conclude that the sociological explanations applied in this thesis have been very useful for a better understanding of charitable giving. However, from this thesis it also becomes clear that the most successful explanations of charitable giving can be found when applying interdisciplinary research, using explanations from many disciplines, including—but not limited to—sociology, economy, and social psychology. The fact is, however, that up to now sociological explanations of charitable giving have been underrepresented in research on charitable giving (Bekkers and Wiepking 2007). With the sociological explanations for charitable giving used in this thesis, we have created new insights into explanations for charitable giving.

7.5 Lessons for charitable organizations
What can charitable organizations learn from this thesis? Many lessons for charitable organizations can be found throughout this thesis. In this last section, we give some examples. To start with, the findings with respect to the giving standard can be of importance to fundraisers. If people with a higher income understand how miserly their gifts compare to the donations of people with lower incomes, it is possible that they will be prepared to donate more substantial
amounts. The giving standard implies that people think in absolute amounts when deciding on donations. Fundraisers should take advantage of this knowledge and use absolute amounts in their requests for donations rather than relative examples of how much people should donate (for example 2% of their income). It can be useful to provide potential donors with a range of exemplary absolute amounts that are considered appropriate donations in a specific donation opportunity.

The finding that confidence in the capacities of charitable organizations is important for making charitable donations should be taken seriously by charitable organizations. This holds specifically for organizations with less quantifiable goals, such as general international relief organizations. Specifically, new and smaller charitable organizations do not always understand how important clear communication on spending and evaluation is. This communication is necessary in order to gain the confidence of the donating public.

Furthermore, our results show that organizations supporting more abstract, less quantifiable goals have a lower probability of receiving donations. Charitable organizations with more abstract goals could try to better communicate their aims and objectives to the public, so that potential donors understand their goals better. The same holds for organizations supporting beneficiaries with less visible needs. Because more visible needs lead to more donors, the use of innovative communication strategies to make these needs more visible to the public could be worthwhile.

In addition, our results showed that people donate to organizations whose values match their own. Many charitable organizations already have a wealth of information on (past) donors in their databases. However, too few use this information in the solicitation process. Charitable organizations can use information on the interests of their donors in order to more strategically target these donors. When charitable organizations solicit donors for projects that match their interests and values, this could significantly increase fundraising success.
### Appendix A

Coefficients from OLS regression of natural log of amount donated to charitable organizations on general predictors of charitable giving, with six different possibilities for dealing with DK answers: the Netherlands, 2003 (GINPS03; N=1,316)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) DK=0</th>
<th>(2) DK=2</th>
<th>(3) DK= median</th>
<th>(4) DK= 2001/2005</th>
<th>(5) DK= missing</th>
<th>(6) DK= multiple imputation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Primary education</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Secondary education</strong></td>
<td>0.196</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.129)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
<td>(0.114)*</td>
<td>(0.109)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tertiary education</strong></td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>0.288</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.160)*</td>
<td>(0.128)*</td>
<td>(0.113)</td>
<td>(0.142)**</td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size and range of network</strong></td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)*</td>
<td>(0.014)*</td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Church attendance</strong></td>
<td>0.529</td>
<td>0.528</td>
<td>0.545</td>
<td>0.557</td>
<td>0.591</td>
<td>0.593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.048)**</td>
<td>(0.039)**</td>
<td>(0.034)**</td>
<td>(0.043)**</td>
<td>(0.041)**</td>
<td>(0.038)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of times asked for donations</strong></td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.201</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.042)**</td>
<td>(0.033)**</td>
<td>(0.029)**</td>
<td>(0.037)**</td>
<td>(0.035)**</td>
<td>(0.033)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Generalized trust</strong></td>
<td>0.294</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.168</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.066)**</td>
<td>(0.053)**</td>
<td>(0.046)**</td>
<td>(0.058)**</td>
<td>(0.056)**</td>
<td>(0.053)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Empathic concern</strong></td>
<td>0.529</td>
<td>0.548</td>
<td>0.547</td>
<td>0.527</td>
<td>0.656</td>
<td>0.554</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.109)**</td>
<td>(0.087)**</td>
<td>(0.077)**</td>
<td>(0.097)**</td>
<td>(0.093)**</td>
<td>(0.089)**</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cognitive ability</strong></td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.081</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)**</td>
<td>(0.020)**</td>
<td>(0.018)**</td>
<td>(0.022)**</td>
<td>(0.022)**</td>
<td>(0.020)**</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ln (annual after-tax household income)</strong></td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td>0.277</td>
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<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.275</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.102)**</td>
<td>(0.082)**</td>
<td>(0.072)**</td>
<td>(0.090)**</td>
<td>(0.088)**</td>
<td>(0.082)**</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Income from wealth</strong></td>
<td>-0.084</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>0.112</td>
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<td>(0.158)</td>
<td>(0.138)</td>
<td>(0.174)</td>
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<td>(0.156)</td>
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<td><strong>Home owner</strong></td>
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<td>0.229</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>0.207</td>
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<td>(0.095)*</td>
<td>(0.083)**</td>
<td>(0.105)**</td>
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<td>(0.093)*</td>
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<td>(0.140)</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Aged between 35 and 65</strong></td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Aged over 65</strong></td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td>0.486</td>
<td>0.462</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.152)**</td>
<td>(0.122)**</td>
<td>(0.107)**</td>
<td>(0.134)**</td>
<td>(0.134)**</td>
<td>(0.120)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Female</td>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>R-square</td>
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<td>------------</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<td>----------</td>
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<td>-0.255</td>
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<td>0.094</td>
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<td>(0.115)</td>
<td>(1.077)**</td>
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<td>(0.092)</td>
<td>(0.862)**</td>
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<td>(0.080)</td>
<td>(0.756)**</td>
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<td>0.194</td>
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<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.101)</td>
<td>(0.952)**</td>
<td>1316</td>
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<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.098)</td>
<td>(0.920)**</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>-0.168</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>-4.113</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.087)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
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Notes: * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; Standard errors in parentheses.
Appendix B Overview of national campaigns for charitable causes: the Netherlands, 1951-2004 (N=59)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>National campaign</th>
<th>Amount raised in millions of euros</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Haak-in-actie</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Beurzen open, dijken dicht</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Goed-zo-actie</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Open het dorp</td>
<td>52.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Eten voor India</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Kom over de brug</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Biafra actie 'Uw Geld - Hun Leven'</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Geef Gezondheid</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Kom over de brug II</td>
<td>75.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Geven voor Leven</td>
<td>92.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Gééf om de natuur</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Land zonder drempels</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Eén voor Afrika</td>
<td>59.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Hart voor Israël</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Afrika Nu</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Nederlandse gehandicapten</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Actie Bangladesh</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Armenië</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Help Sudan</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Orkanen</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Roemenië</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Actie Ethiopië</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Drempels weg</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Afrika sterft van de honger</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Help Rusland or ‘Help de Russen de winter door’</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Aardbeving Iran</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Golfcrisis</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>Actie Bangladesh</td>
<td>9.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Help slachtoffers Burgeroorlog in Irak</td>
<td>7.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Collectieve Israël Actie</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>Help slachtoffers Golfoorlog Irak</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>Actie voor Afrika</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>Een kwestie van Leven of Dood</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>Watersnood aktie</td>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>Bescherming en dekens voor Bosnie</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>India geschokt</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Somalische en Mozambique</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1993</td>
<td>Sporters voor Sporters</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Geef Zuid-Afrika een eerlijke kans</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Nationale Actie Watersnood</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Watersnood Oost Europa</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Midden Amerika (Mitch)</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Actie Sudan sterft van de honger</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Steun Bangladesh in de strijd tegen het water</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Help Vluchtelingen Kosovo</td>
<td>60.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Help Slachtoffers Aardbeving Turkije</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Help slachtoffers watersnood India (Orissa)</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>Vuurwerkkramp Enschede</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>Help slachtoffers watersnoodramp Mozambique</td>
<td>12.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Aardbeving India</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Aktie help de Afghanen, juist nu</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>Nationale Actie Volendam</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Honger in Zuiderlijk Afrika, also: ‘Help hongerend Afrika nu’</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Help slachtoffers aardbeving Iran</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Help de mensen in Irak</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Hulp aan Azie</td>
<td>208.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Noodhulp Darfur Sudan</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Appendix C  Description of the charitable organizations used in chapter 6 Giving to Particular Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name organization (English/US equivalent, if available)</th>
<th>Description (organizational characteristics)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adullam voor Gehandicaptenzorg</td>
<td>Provides care for disabled people based on Calvinist principles (dt; lv; ic; rel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alzheimer Nederland (Alzheimer's Association)</td>
<td>Patients' association. Improving quality of life for people with Alzheimer and their families, supporting research on Alzheimer (dt; lv; dm; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANGO Algemene Nederlandse Gehandicapten Organisatie</td>
<td>Pressure group for disabled people (dt; lv; dm; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artsen zonder grenzen (Medecins sans Frontieres)</td>
<td>Independent international medical humanitarian organization that delivers emergency aid to people affected by armed conflict, epidemics, natural or man-made disasters, or exclusion from health care in more than 70 countries (iq; dm; ir).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astma Fonds</td>
<td>Patients' association. Improving quality of life for people with asthma, supporting research on asthma (dt; lv; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartimeus</td>
<td>Patients' association for the blind and visually handicapped (lv; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIO-Kinderrevalidatie</td>
<td>Holidays for disabled children and their families, research on child recovery from brain damage (lv; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cliniclowns Nederland (Hospital clown)</td>
<td>Entertainment for seriously ill children, either in hospitals or at home (pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordaid</td>
<td>Catholic umbrella organization for international relief (iq; ir; rel).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diabetes Fonds Nederland (American Diabetes Association)</td>
<td>Patients' association for diabetics. Supports scientific research on diabetes (dt; lv; dm; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dierenbescherming (WSPA; World Society for the Protection of Animals)</td>
<td>Association fighting for animal rights (dt; iq; dm; pc; ne).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doe een Wens Stichting Nederland (Make-a-Wish-Foundation)</td>
<td>Granting wishes of children with life-threatening medical conditions (pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epilepsie Fonds (Epilepsy Foundation)</td>
<td>Patients' association for people with epilepsy. Supports scientific research on epilepsy (dt; lv; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenpeace (Greenpeace)</td>
<td>International organization focussing on combating the most crucial worldwide threats to our planet's biodiversity and environment (iq; lv; ne).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hartstichting (American Heart Association)</td>
<td>Patients' association for people with cardiovascular diseases. Supports scientific research on cardiovascular diseases (dt; dm; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hendrick de Keyser</td>
<td>Association for the preservation of architectural or historically valuable houses in the Netherlands (lv; pc; hs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hersenstichting Nederland</td>
<td>Patients' association for people with brain diseases. Supports scientific research on brain diseases (dt; lv; dm; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanistisch Verbond</td>
<td>Association striving for more humanism in society (iq; lv; dm; pc; rel).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jantje Beton (Nationaal Jeugdfonds)</td>
<td>Enabling children to play in their own neighbourhood (dt; dm; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerkinactie</td>
<td>Missionary organization of the Protestant churches in the Netherlands (dm; pc; rel).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kika Kankerfonds</td>
<td>Supporting research on cancer and children, funding seven child cancer centres in the Netherlands (pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koninklijk Concertgebouworkest</td>
<td>Royal Concertgebouw Orchestra is generally regarded as one of the best symphony orchestras in the world (lv; dm; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWF Kankerbestrijding (American Cancer Society)</td>
<td>Patients’ association for people with cancer. Supports scientific research on cancer (ddt; dm; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leger des Heils (Salvation Army)</td>
<td>International movement for “the advancement of the Christian religion... of education, the relief of poverty, and other charitable objects beneficial to society or the community of mankind as a whole.” (Salvation Army 1980) (ddt; ir; hs; rel).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liliane Fonds</td>
<td>Improving life of disabled children in Africa, Asia, and South America (lq; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maag Lever Darm Stichting</td>
<td>Patients’ association for people with diseases on stomach, liver, and intestine. Supports scientific research on diseases on stomach, liver, and intestine (ddt; lv; dm; ir).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memisa</td>
<td>Roman Catholic international relief organization for improving health care in Third World countries (ddt; lq; dm; ir; rel).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mensen in Nood</td>
<td>Roman Catholic international relief organization providing emergency relief (ddt; lq; dm; pc; rel).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milieudensfie (Friends of the Earth)</td>
<td>Pressure group for environmental issues and animal welfare (lq; lv; pc; ne).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MS Research (National MS Society)</td>
<td>Patients’ association for people with MS disease.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationaal Fonds Kinderhulp</td>
<td>Organization giving Dutch children living in difficult situations (for example in an orphanage) a present or a vacation (ddt; pc; hs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationaal Fonds Sport Gehandicapten (NFSG)</td>
<td>Organization promoting sport for disabled people (ddt; lv; dm; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationaal Fonds tegen Kanker</td>
<td>Patients’ association for people with cancer, specifically providing information on different regular and alternative treatments. Supports scientific research on these different treatments of cancer (dm; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationale Collecte Verstandelijk Gehandicapten</td>
<td>Involvement, effort, and support for people with a mental disability and their families (ddt; lv; dm; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natuurmonumenten</td>
<td>Independent organization preserving Dutch nature, landscape, and cultural history (lq; lv; pc; ne; hs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nederlands Kanker Instituut (NKI)</td>
<td>Cancer Association of the Antonie van Leeuwenhoek hospital in Amsterdam, specialized in the care for people with cancer (pc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nederlandse Stichting voor het Gehandicapte Kind (NSGK)</td>
<td>Providing disabled children with funds in order to live a normal life (ddt; lv; dm; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nierstichting</td>
<td>Patients’ association for people with kidney diseases. Supports scientific research on kidney diseases (ddt; lv; dm; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxfam Novib (Oxfam)</td>
<td>International relief organization striving for a just world without poverty (lq; ir).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan Nederland</td>
<td>International relief organization supporting children and the surroundings in Third World countries (lq; ir).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prins Bernhard Cultuurfonds</td>
<td>Fund supporting culture and nature preservation in the Netherlands (ddt; lv; pc; hs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prinses Beatrix Fonds</td>
<td>Patients' association for people with muscular diseases. Supports scientific research on muscular diseases (dtd; lv; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rembrandt Vereniging</td>
<td>Providing museums with financial aid in order to enable these institutions to acquire new works of art (lv; pc; hs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reumafonds</td>
<td>Patients' association for people with rheumatism. Supports scientific research on rheumatism (dtd; lv; dm; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revalidatie Fonds</td>
<td>Pressure group for disabled people (lv; dm; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rode Kruis (Red Cross)</td>
<td>Organization providing national and international disaster services (dtd; lq; ir).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ronald McDonald Kinderfonds</td>
<td>Organization supporting families with a child which needs professional care (dtd; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slachtofferhulp Nederland</td>
<td>Organization providing support and care for victims of a traffic accident or crime (lv; dm; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOS-Kinderdorpen</td>
<td>International relief organization for the care of orphans (lq; dm; ir).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spieren voor Spieren</td>
<td>Patients' association for people with muscular diseases. Supports scientific research on muscular diseases (lv; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stichting Aids Fonds</td>
<td>Active in the fight against AIDS and in supporting people with HIV/AIDS (dtd; lq).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terre des Hommes</td>
<td>International relief organization striving for the rights of children (lq; dm; ir).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unicef</td>
<td>International relief organization for children, focusing on providing health care, education, equality, and protection for all children (lq; dm; ir).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vluchteling</td>
<td>International relief organization helping international refugees (lv; dm; ir).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vluchteling Studenten UAF</td>
<td>Organization financially supporting student asylum seekers in the Netherlands (lv; dm; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vluchtelingenwerk Nederland (VVN)</td>
<td>Organization supporting and helping asylum seekers in the Netherlands (lv; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vrienden van de Hoop</td>
<td>Evangelical center for helping drug addicts (lv; pc; rel).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waddenvereniging</td>
<td>Environmental organization for the preservation of 'De Wadden' a unique part of the Netherlands (lq; lv; dm; pc; ne).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Child</td>
<td>International relief organization providing child victims of war with creative workshops (lq; dm; ir).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wereld Kanker Onderzoek Fonds WKOF (American Institute for Cancer Research)</td>
<td>Patients' association for people with cancer. Special focus on the relation between food and cancer (dm; pc).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wereld Natuur Fonds (World Wildlife Fund)</td>
<td>Wildlife protecting agency leads international efforts to protect endangered species and their habitats (lq; dm; pc; ne).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woord en Daad</td>
<td>Poverty relief in Third World Countries, based on biblical grounds (dtd; lv; rel).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zonnebloem</td>
<td>Association helping those who are disabled by sickness, handicap or age (dm; pc; hs).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: dtd = door-to-door solicitation; lq = less quantifiable goals; lv = less visible needs; dm = direct mail appeals; pc = psychologically close organizations; ir = international relief sector; ne = nature, environment, and animal protection sector; hs = high-status organization; rel = faith-based organization.
Samenvatting 'Uit menslievendheid. Een sociologische studie naar geefgedrag'

Summary in Dutch

Inleiding
Er zijn verschillende manieren waarop mensen kunnen bijdragen aan het publieke goed. Mensen kunnen vrijwilligerswerk verrichten, bloed of organen doneren en ze kunnen geld geven voor het publieke goed. In dit proefschrift onderzoeken we deze laatste vorm van prosociaal gedrag: het vrijwillig geven van geld aan goedgedoelde organisaties. In 2003 hebben Nederlandse huishoudens 1,9 miljard euro aan goedgedoelde organisaties gedoneerd (Schuyt e.a. 2007). Zowel maatschappelijk, maar zeker ook wetenschappelijk bestaat er een groeiende interesse in het fenomeen ‘filantropie’. In een literatuurstudie naar het geven van geld aan goede doelen door huishoudens vinden Bekkers en Wiepking (2007) dat er steeds meer wetenschappelijke disciplines zijn die filantropie bestuderen.

Historisch gezien zijn de meeste studies naar filantropie gepubliceerd in economische en psychologische wetenschappelijke tijdschriften. Meer recent verschijnen er echter ook steeds meer artikelen in tijdschriften op het gebied van marketing, politieke wetenschappen en beleid. Het is interessant dat er relatief weinig sociologische studies blijken te zijn die het onderwerp filantropie bestuderen. Dit is opmerkelijk, omdat sociologie de samenleving en sociale interactie bestudeert. Daarom bestuderen we in dit proefschrift het geven van geld aan goede doelen door huishoudens vanuit een sociologisch perspectief. In dit proefschrift gebruiken we algemene sociologische theorieën om hypothesen te herleiden en te toetsen, zodat we de volgende hoofdvraag kunnen beantwoorden:

Waarom geven sommige mensen meer geld aan goedgedoelde organisaties dan andere mensen en waarom geven ze aan bepaalde goedgedoelde organisaties?

In dit proefschrift volgt na de inleiding eerst een methodologisch hoofdstuk, waarin de methodologische problemen van het onderzoeken van het geven van geld aan goede doelen door huishoudens worden beschreven. Daarnaast geven we in dit methodologische hoofdstuk aan hoe we deze problemen in dit proefschrift hebben opgelost en geven we een beschrijving van de belangrijkste dataset die gebruikt is,
de Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study (GINPS). Na dit methodologische hoofdstuk volgen vier hoofdstukken waarin vier verschillende deelvragen centraal staan, die samen bijdragen aan het beantwoorden van de hoofdvraag. In het laatste hoofdstuk volgt tenslotte de conclusie en een discussie van de resultaten. Wat zijn de sociologische antwoorden op de vraag waarom sommige mensen meer geld aan bepaalde goededoelenorganisaties geven dan andere mensen? En dragen deze sociologische antwoorden inderdaad bij aan een beter begrip van het geven van geld aan goede doelen door huishoudens?

Methodologie
In het methodologische hoofdstuk laten we allereerst zien waarom we het geven aan goede doelen door huishoudens, tegenover het geven door individuen, hebben onderzocht. Net als andere onderzoekers gaan wij er vanuit dat geven aan goede doelen gedrag is dat mensen met hun hele huishouden vertonen en niet individueel (Burgoyne, Young en Walker 2005). Daarnaast laten we zien dat de (lengte van de) gebruikte vragenlijst invloed heeft op het gemeten geefgedrag. Des te meer vragen er over geefgedrag worden gesteld, des te hoger is het door het huishouden totaal gegeven bedrag aan goede doelen. In navolging van Rooney, Steinberg en Schervish (2001) gebruiken we in de Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study een vragenlijst met vragen naar zowel methoden van geven (zoals bijvoorbeeld geven in een huis-aan-huis collecte of geven via een vaste overschrijving) als vragen naar doelen waaraan gegeven wordt, ingedeeld in subsectoren (bijvoorbeeld kerk- en levensbeschouwing, internationale hulp en gezondheid). Om sociaal wenselijke antwoorden te beperken gebruiken we een vragenlijst die via de computer moet worden ingevuld.

In GINPS zijn er problemen met ontbrekende waarden op de afhankelijke variabele (de bedragen die gegeven zijn aan goede doelen). We bespreken mogelijke oplossingen en laten zien waarom we er voor kiezen om deze ontbrekende waarden te vervangen via multiple imputatie. Ten slotte bespreken we in het methodologische hoofdstuk verschillende statistische modellen waarmee geefgedrag geanalyseerd kan worden. Welke modellen geschikt zijn, hangt af van de proportie mensen in de analyse die niets hebben gegeven. Wanneer deze proportie laag is gebruiken we Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressie-analyse. Wanneer de proportie niet-gevers hoger is gebruiken we een selectiemodel: Heckman Two-stage regressie-analyse.
De geefstandaard


We gebruiken de Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study 2003 om te onderzoeken wat het effect van inkomen is op het al dan niet geven en op de proportie van het inkomen dat wordt gegeven aan goede doelen in Nederland, voor zowel totaal (aan alle verschillende doelen) als religieus geven. Onze resultaten laten zien dat er in Nederland geen effect is van inkomen op het wel of niet geven aan goede doelen, zowel voor totaal als religieus geven. Mensen met een hoger inkomen geven dus niet vaker aan goede doelen dan mensen met een lager inkomen. Onze resultaten laten verder zien dat er een sterk negatief effect is van inkomen op de proportie van het inkomen dat aan goede doelen wordt gegeven. Mensen met een lager inkomen geven een groter gedeelte van hun inkomen weg dan mensen met een hoger inkomen. Dit geldt zowel voor de totale donaties als specifiek voor religieuze donaties.

Deze resultaten ondersteunen de geefstandaardhypothese. Deze hypothese heeft betrekking op de normen die mensen hebben over de hoogte van donaties. Deze normen verschillen nauwelijks tussen mensen met verschillende inkomens. Voor veel mensen met een hoog inkomen geldt dat ze maar een klein beetje meer geld aan goede doelen geven dan mensen met een laag inkomen. Dit leidt er toe dat de donaties van mensen met een lager inkomen een grotere proportie van hun inkomen beslaan dan de donaties van mensen met een hoger inkomen. Met deze geefstandaard vinden we ondersteuning voor de theorie dat mensen ‘conditioneel coöperatief’ zijn (Fischbacher, Gachter en Fehr 2001; Frey en Meijer 2004).
Mensen geven vaker aan een goed doel wanneer ze denken dat anderen ook hebben gegeven. Ook zijn mensen gevoelig voor informatie over de hoogte van de bedragen die anderen hebben gegeven. Ze stemmen het absolute bedrag dat ze doneren af op het bedrag dat ze denken dat anderen hebben gegeven (Bekkers 2006a; Shang en Croson 2005).

**Waarom sociale en individuele hulpbronnen mensen genereuzer maken**

In het vierde hoofdstuk beschrijven en verklaren we de effecten van verschillende sociale en individuele hulpbronnen op het bedrag dat mensen aan goede doelen geven. Waarom zijn mensen met meer hulpbronnen vrijgeviger? Om deze vraag te beantwoorden hebben we bestaand onderzoek naar geefgedrag uitgebreid met ideeën vanuit de economie, psychologie en sociologie.

Voor een sociologisch antwoord op de vraag waarom mensen met meer sociale hulpbronnen genereuzer zijn, hebben we Durkheims ([1897] 1952) integratiethese toegepast op het geven van geld aan goede doelen. We hebben de hypothese afgeleid dat mensen met een uitgebreider sociaal netwerk meer geld geven aan goede doelen, omdat ze een grotere kans hebben geïntegreerd te zijn in een netwerk met sterke positieve normen voor het geven van geld aan goede doelen. Onze resultaten laten zien dat een uitgebreider sociaal netwerk inderdaad leidt tot het geven van meer geld aan goede doelen. Voor een gedeelde komt dit doordat mensen die meer geïntegreerd zijn in religieuze netwerken tegelijkertijd ook een uitgebreider netwerk hebben. In religieuze netwerken bestaan sterke positieve normen voor het geven van geld aan goede doelen. Uiteindelijk leidt meer geïntegreerd zijn in een religieus netwerk dus tot het geven van meer geld aan goede doelen en reduceert dit het directe positieve effect van een uitgebreider sociaal netwerk op het geven van geld aan goede doelen. Dit resultaat is een onderbouwing voor Durkheims ([1897] 1952) integratiethese toegepast op het verklaren van het geven van geld aan goede doelen.

We hebben ook ondersteuning gevonden voor andere verklaringen van de grotere bedragen die mensen met een uitgebreider sociaal netwerk geven. Allereerst komen mensen met een uitgebreider sociaal netwerk vaker in aanraking met verzoeken om donaties aan goede doelen. Zeer waarschijnlijk worden deze verzoeken gedaan door mensen in hun eigen netwerk en dit verklaart een gedeelte van hun genereuze gedrag. In mindere mate kan de vrijgevigheid van mensen met een uitgebreider sociaal netwerk verklaard worden door de individuele
eigenschappen die deze mensen in sterkere mate bezitten, namelijk: vertrouwen, empathie en cognitieve capaciteiten.

Onze resultaten vormen een onderbouwing van Uslaners (2002) theorie dat vertrouwen in andere mensen een voorwaarde is voor groepslidmaatschap en dat meer vertrouwen leidt tot vrijgevigheid. Onze resultaten laten specifiek zien dat mensen met een uitgebreider sociaal netwerk gedeeltelijk hogere bedragen aan goede doelen geven omdat ze meer vertrouwen hebben in andere mensen. Verder laten onze resultaten zien dat de genereuzere donaties van mensen met een uitgebreider sociaal netwerk verklaard kunnen worden door de sterkere empathische waarden die deze mensen bezitten. Dit is in lijn met de sociaal psychologische theorie dat empathie belangrijk is bij het vormen en onderhouden van sociale relaties (Twenge e.a. 2007). Vervolgens vinden we ondersteuning voor de hypothese dat de hogere donaties van mensen met een uitgebreider sociaal netwerk te verklaren zijn doordat deze mensen betere cognitieve capaciteiten hebben. Dit resultaat is een onderbouwing voor de ‘social brain’-hypothese, welke stelt dat de cognitieve capaciteiten van mensen bepalend zijn voor de grootte van een groep waarin ze kunnen functioneren. Mensen met betere cognitieve capaciteiten zijn beter in staat uitgebreidere sociale netwerken te vormen en te onderhouden (Barrett, Henzi en Dunbar 2003; Stiller en Dunbar 2007).

In lijn met de hypotheses die we hebben afgeleid van de human capital theorie (Coleman 1988) vinden we dat mensen met een hogere (formeel) opleiding meer geld geven aan goede doelen. Zoals verwacht kan dit effect gedeeltelijk verklaard worden door de grotere financiële hulpbronnen waarover mensen met een hoger opleidingsniveau de beschikking hebben. Uit ons onderzoek blijkt echter dat de grotere financiële hulpbronnen niet de enige verklaring vormen voor de vrijgevigheid van hoger opgeleiden. Mensen met een hogere opleiding hebben tevens betere cognitieve capaciteiten. Doordat deze capaciteiten een beter begrip van de nood en ellende van andere mensen faciliteren, geven mensen met een hogere opleiding meer geld aan goede doelen. Tenslotte hebben mensen met een hogere opleiding en betere cognitieve capaciteiten meer vertrouwen dat hun geld op de juiste plek terecht zal komen. Dit leidt ook weer tot hogere donaties.

**Vrijgevigheid in beeld: Nationale acties voor het goede doel**

In het vijfde hoofdstuk hebben we één specifieke vorm van het geven van geld aan goede doelen onderzocht, namelijk nationale acties voor het goede doel. Acties
voor het goede doel zijn gedefinieerd als nationale acties wanneer deze acties eenmalig zijn en in potentie de hele Nederlandse bevolking kunnen bereiken. Verder moet geld inzamelen voor een goed doel het hoofddoel van de actie zijn.


Naast een overzicht van de ontwikkeling van de nationale acties voor het goede doel die in Nederland zijn gehouden, hebben we in dit hoofdstuk ook verklaringen getoetst voor het succes van nationale acties. Sommige acties zijn succesvoller dan andere, hoe kunnen we dit succes verklaren? In dit hoofdstuk hebben we hypothesen geformuleerd die verklaren waarom sommige acties meer geld ophalen dan andere acties. We hebben deze hypothesen getoetst met gegevens over de 59 nationale acties voor het goede doel die we hebben weten te identifieren.

Onze bivariate resultaten laten zien dat het succes van nationale acties voor het goede doel positief beïnvloed wordt door het aantal mensen dat naar de televisie-uitzending voor een actie kijkt. Hoe meer mensen kijken, des te hoger de opbrengst. Televisie is een uitstekend medium om het bereik van een actie te vergroten. Om aan een actie te kunnen geven, moeten mensen allereerst kennis nemen van het feit dat er een actie wordt gehouden. Het positieve effect van het aantal kijkers van een actie op de opbrengst ondersteunt de hypothese dat hoe meer mensen kennis hebben genomen van een actie, des te hoger de bedragen die worden opgehaald.

Verder hebben we ondersteuning gevonden voor de economische hypothese dat acties succesvoller zijn wanneer de economische groei in Nederland in het jaar van de actie sterker is. Het positieve effect van de economische situatie in Nederland op het succes van acties vormt een onderbouwing van de hypothese dat donateurs en organisatoren van nationale acties gedurende een stagnerende of
Samenvatting

dalende economie meer op hun eigen problemen zijn gericht en minder financiële ruimte hebben voor enerzijds het organiseren van nationale acties (in het geval van organisatoren) en anderzijds het schenken van donaties (in het geval van donateurs).

Tenslotte blijkt dat het aantal andere acties dat voorafgaand aan een actie wordt gehouden een negatieve invloed heeft op het bedrag dat wordt opgehaald. Dit negatieve effect van actiedichtheid op het succes van een actie vormt een onderbouwing van de hypothese dat wanneer er een overdaad is aan nationale acties, mensen uitgekeken raken op het fenomeen nationale acties. Er ontstaat actiemoeheid met als gevolg dat mensen minder geld geven aan nationale acties.

**Geven aan specifieke goede doelen**

De laatste deelvraag die we onderzoeken betreft waarom mensen geld geven aan specifieke goederenorganisaties, zoals bijvoorbeeld Greenpeace, het Rode Kruis of KWF Kankerbestrijding. We hebben onderzocht hoe individuele kenmerken van donateurs samenhangen met kenmerken van goede doelen. We hebben hypothesen geformuleerd met behulp van drie mechanismen: kennis, motieven en vertrouwen. De hypothesen zijn getest met Giving in the Netherlands Panel Study 2003, welke informatie bevat over het geven aan 64 specifieke goede doelen.

De resultaten laten zien dat alle drie de mechanismen het geven van geld aan specifieke goede doelen in bepaalde mate beïnvloeden. Kennis over de mogelijkheid om te geven heeft een effect op de specifieke organisaties waar mensen aan geven, enerzijds door verzoeken om donaties die organisaties zelf doen, anderzijds doordat potentiële donateurs bewust zijn of worden van de behoeften van beneficiënten. Organisaties die huis-aan-huiscollectes gebruiken om fondsen te werven ontvangen meer donaties, behalve van ouderen. Organisaties die fondsen werven door middel van brieven met een acceptgiro (direct mail letters) ontvangen juist vaker donaties van ouderen. Goederenorganisaties die zich inzetten voor beneficiënten met minder zichtbare behoeften, zoals bijvoorbeeld beneficiënten met een lage nieuwswaarde (bijvoorbeeld ‘mensen met alzheimer’ of ‘de kastanjeboom’), hebben een lagere kans om donaties te ontvangen. De resultaten laten zien dat een hoger opleidingsniveau en betere cognitieve capaciteiten geen kennis faciliteren van doelen met minder zichtbare beneficiënten en dien te gevolge niet leiden tot meer donaties aan deze doelen.
We hebben drie verschillende motieven voor donaties onderscheiden en alledrie hebben ze een substantieel effect op het geven aan specifieke organisaties. Allereerst, mensen met meer materialistische waarden geven vaker aan doelen die Nederlandse beneficiënten steunen. Dit resultaat is een onderbouwing voor de theorie dat specifiek mensen die streven naar materialistische doelen het geven van geld aan goede doelen gebruiken om hun positieve zelfbeeld te versterken (Bennett 2003; Ciagouris en Mitchell 1997).

Verder onderbouwen onze resultaten de theorie dat mensen donaties aan specifieke organisaties geven, omdat ze van de wereld een betere plaats willen maken. Mensen doneren aan die specifieke organisaties die doelen steunen die de wereld tot een betere plaats maken (‘for the love of mankind’). Onze resultaten laten zien dat mensen met een sterkere linkse politieke voorkeur vaker geld geven aan organisaties die actief zijn op het gebied van natuur-, milieu- en dierenbescherming en op het gebied van internationale hulp. Dit is onder andere in lijn met het idee dat mensen met een linkse politieke voorkeur in het algemeen bezorgd zijn over de bescherming van dieren en de natuur (Neumayer 2004). Een onverwacht resultaat is dat mensen met een linkse politieke voorkeur geen grotere kans hebben om geld te geven aan organisaties die actief zijn voor publieke en sociale doelen. Een voor de hand liggende verklaring hiervoor is dat juist mensen met een linkse politieke voorkeur vinden dat de overheid voor deze doelen zou moeten zorgen en dat goededoelenorganisaties hiervoor niet verantwoordelijk horen te zijn.

In dit hoofdstuk hebben we Bourdies theorie van culturele reproductie (1977) toegepast om te verklaren waarom sommige mensen aan bepaalde goede doelen geven. Met behulp van Bourdies theorie hebben we de hypothese opgesteld dat mensen met een hoge sociaal-economische status specifiek gemotiveerd zijn om aan doelen met een hoge sociaal-economische status te geven. Voorbeelden zijn doelen gericht op culturele instituten, zoals theaters en musea. Maar ook doelen op het gebied van armoedebestrijding hebben van oudsher een hoge status (Van Leeuwen 1994; De Swaan 1988). Onze resultaten laten zien dat mensen met een hoge sociaal economische status vaker aan deze twee soorten doelen geven.

Tenslotte laten onze resultaten zien dat mensen met een sterker vertrouwen in goede doelen vaker geven aan organisaties met moeilijker te kwantificeren doelen, zoals bijvoorbeeld algemene internationale hulporganisaties. Dit resultaat
vormt een onderbouwing van de theorie dat wanneer onzekerheden groter zijn in het geven van geld aan goede doelen, net zoals in andere vormen van sociale interactie, een hoger vertrouwensniveau nodig is om over te gaan tot een donatie.

**Uit menslievendheid. Conclusie en discussie van een sociologische studie naar geefgedrag**

In dit proefschrift hebben we verschillende algemene sociologische theorieën toegepast op het verklaren van geefgedrag, zodat we de volgende vraag kunnen beantwoorden: Waarom geven sommige mensen meer geld aan bepaalde goededoelenorganisaties dan andere mensen? Nu is het tijd om deze vraag te beantwoorden en te laten zien in hoeverre het succesvol is geweest om de sociologische theorieën toe te passen op het verklaren van geefgedrag.

In hoofdstuk 4 hebben we Durkheims ([1897] 1952) integratiethese toegepast om een hypothese te formuleren over het geven van geld aan goede doelen. Durkheim ([1897] 1952) stelt dat mensen die hechter geïntegreerd zijn in een groep met specifieke normen, deze normen ook sterker zullen naleven. We beargumenteerden dat het geven van geld aan goede doelen sociaal gedrag is, dat beïnvloed wordt door de sociale omgeving. Wanneer de sociale omgeving van mensen sterkere positieve normen heeft voor het geven van geld aan goede doelen, dan zullen deze mensen beïnvloed worden om vaker en in totaal hogere donaties te schenken aan goede doelen. Bijvoorbeeld religieuze groeperingen hebben sterke positieve normen ten opzichte van geefgedrag. In dit proefschrift hebben we laten zien dat mensen die geïntegreerd zijn in een religieus netwerk inderdaad meer geld geven aan goede doelen. Het toepassen van Durkheims ([1897] 1952) integratiethese op het verklaren van geefgedrag is dus succesvol gebleken.

Een andere succesvolle sociologische verklaring van geefgedrag in dit proefschrift omvat de mogelijkheid die mensen hebben om geld te geven. Mensen hebben namelijk pas de mogelijkheid om geld te geven aan specifieke goede doelen wanneer ze hiervan kennis hebben genomen. We hebben geconcludeerd dat mensen met meer sociale hulpbronnen meer geld geven aan goede doelen, onder andere omdat ze meer mogelijkheden hebben om te geven; ze ontvangen meer verzoeken om donaties. Verder bleken we in staat om donaties aan specifieke goede doelen te verklaren met de verschillende mogelijkheden die mensen hebben om geld te geven. Sommige mensen ervaren meer mogelijkheden om aan
specifieke goededoeleindenorganisaties te geven dan anderen, bijvoorbeeld doordat
organisaties een bepaalde manier van fondsenwerving toepassen die niet alle
mensen gelijk bereikt. In het hoofdstuk over de nationale acties voor het goede
doel hebben we ook onderbouwing gevonden voor het idee dat de mogelijkheid om
te geven een belangrijke verklaring is voor geefgedrag. Het succes van nationale
acties kan gedeeltelijk worden verklaard door het aantal mensen dat naar een
televisie-uitzending rondom de nationale actie heeft gekeken. Deze mensen
hebben de mogelijkheid om te geven aan de desbetreffende nationale actie. De
conclusie in dit proefschrift dat de mogelijkheid om te geven belangrijk is, is in lijn
met Bekkers (2004b) conclusie dat sociale condities belangrijk zijn voor het
verklaren van geefgedrag.

Naast het belang van de mogelijkheid om te geven is ook de theorie dat
mensen ‘conditioneel coöperatief’ zijn (Fischbacher, Gachter en Fehr 2001; Frey en
Meijer 2004) een belangrijke verklaring van geefgedrag. De
geelstandaardhypothese impliceert dat verschillende mensen ongeveer dezelfde
bedragen doneren in dezelfde omstandigheden. Mensen geven vaker aan een goed
doel wanneer ze denken dat anderen ook hebben gegeven. Dit kan worden
verklaard doordat ze gevoelig zijn voor informatie over geefgedrag van anderen.
Ze stemmen het absolute bedrag dat ze doneren af op het bedrag dat ze denken
dat anderen hebben gegeven (Bekkers 2006a; Shang en Croson 2005).

In dit proefschrift hebben we ook Bourdieu theorie van culturele reproductie
(1977) toegepast om geefgedrag aan specifieke goede doelen te verklaren.
Bourdieu (1977) zegt dat, wanneer sociale ongelijkheden kleiner worden in een
samenleving, de bovenklasse (de elite) compenserende strategieën gaat toepassen
om de hiërarchische verhouding gelijk te houden. Het geven van geld aan goede
doelen kan worden gebruikt als een compenserende strategie. Door geld te geven
aan goede doelen kan zowel culturele als economische onderscheiding worden
bewerkstelligd.

In Bourdieu (1977) theorie onderscheidt de elite zich allereerst cultureel
door te participeren in vormen van hogere cultuur, bijvoorbeeld door naar theater,
opera of balletvoorstellingen te gaan. Het geven van geld kan ook gebruikt worden
voor culturele onderscheiding, bijvoorbeeld door geld te geven aan doelen die
gerateerd zijn aan hogere cultuur, zoals culturele instituten. De elite kan zich
echter ook economisch onderscheiden door middel van het geven van geld aan
goede doelen. Dit doet de Nederlandse elite al sinds de Gouden Eeuw. In het
verleden werd het zorg dragen voor de armen gezien als een privilege van de elite. Enerzijds was armenzorg een manier om de eigen sociale status te vergroten, anderzijds zorgde het voor sociale orde in de samenleving. Vandaag de dag is de private armenzorg vaak nog steeds in handen van de elite. Lokale serviceclubs, zoals de Rotary en de Lions, en vermogensfondsen gesticht door de rijken zorgen vaak voor extra’s voor mensen met een inkomen onder de armoedegrens. In dit proefschrift hebben we laten zien dat het geven van geld gebruikt wordt om onderscheiding te bewerkstelligen. Mensen met een hoge sociaal-economische status geven vaker geld aan doelen met een hogere status, zoals culturele instellingen en organisaties die zorg dragen voor armen.

De laatste sociologische theorieën die we succesvol hebben toegepast op het verklaren van geefgedrag zijn theorieën over vertrouwen (Bekkers 2003b; Bekkers 2006c; Bowman 2004; Sargeant, Ford en West 2006). Coleman’s algemene theorie over vertrouwen stelt dat als het risico van een transactie hoger is, het niveau van vertrouwen dat mensen nodig hebben om deel te nemen aan de transactie ook hoger is (Coleman 1990). Bij het geven van geld aan goede doelen is het belangrijk dat mensen vertrouwen hebben in de capaciteiten van goededoelenorganisaties (Bowman 2004; Bekkers 2003b; Bekkers 2006c; Sargeant e.a. 2006). Verder is het belangrijk dat mensen vertrouwen hebben dat goededoelenorganisaties eerlijk en zorgvuldig met hun donatie omgaan. In dit proefschrift hebben we gevonden dat wanneer mensen een hoger vertrouwen hebben in goededoelenorganisaties ze vaker geld geven aan organisaties met moeilijker te kwantificeren doelen. Verder hebben we gevonden dat een gedeelte van de hogere donaties van mensen met meer sociale en individuele hulpbronnen verklaard kan worden door hun hogere niveau van vertrouwen in andere mensen.

Natuurlijk zijn er nog meer sociologische theorieën die toegepast kunnen worden op het verklaren van geefgedrag. Toekomstig onderzoek zou bijvoorbeeld kunnen proberen om theorieën uit de sociale-bewegingenliteratuur of theorieën uit de politieke-participatieliteratuur toe te passen op het verklaren van geefgedrag. In dit proefschrift concluderen we dat de door ons toegepaste sociologische verklaringen zeker hebben bijgedragen aan een beter begrip van het geven van geld aan goede doelen. Uit dit proefschrift blijkt echter ook dat de meest succesvolle verklaringen van geefgedrag ontstaan wanneer theorieën uit verschillende disciplines, waaronder economie, psychologie en sociologie, samen worden toegepast op het verklaren van geefgedrag.
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