

THE ROAD FROM VIENNA TO LVOV
TWARDOWSKI'S THEORY OF JUDGEMENT BETWEEN
1894 AND 1897*

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Summary

In several manuscripts, written between 1894 and 1897, Twardowski developed a new theory of judgement with two types of judgement: existential and relational judgements. In *Zur Lehre* he tried to stay within a Brentanian framework, although he introduced the distinction between content and object in the theory of judgement. The introduction of this distinction forced Twardowski to revise further Brentano's theory. His changes concerned judgements about relations and about non-present objects. The latter are considered special cases of relational judgements. The existential judgements are analysed in a Brentanian way; whereas relational judgements are analysed in a Brentanian way only as far as the *act* is concerned, but not when it comes to the *object*: the object of a relational judgement is a relationship. With this notion of relationship Twardowski comes close to introducing a concept of state of affairs for the object of (relational) judgements.

Introduction

Kazimierz Twardowski is known as the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School, as the great inspirator of the flourishing of Polish logic at

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the beginning of the twentieth century, and as a pupil of Franz Brentano. When Twardowski left Vienna in 1895 for Lvov he had already improved upon the Brentanian theory of mental acts by giving the Bolzanian distinction between content and object pride of place in his Habilitationsschrift, *Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen* (1894). *Zur Lehre*, however, contains very little on the theory of judgement, a central theme in Brentanian logic, as acts of judgements are the bearers of truth and falsity.

Later, in a famous letter to Meinong, Twardowski says that he is working on a theory of judgement (Twardowski 1897b), and there are several manuscripts written in the period between 1894 and 1897 that concern this topic. The question we are concerned with in this paper is: what theory of judgement did Twardowski develop during that period?

Two of the manuscripts are in Polish, the short *Teoria sądów* (Theory of Judgement, Twardowski 1897a) and the much longer *Logika* (Twardowski 1895/6), containing the lecture notes for a course on logic given during his first year in Lvov; a third, important one is in German. This German manuscript, *Logik* (Twardowski 1894/95), is a parallel to the lecture notes in Polish; it collects the lecture notes for a course on logic given in Vienna. In the present paper we take as a starting-point the last manuscript because it contains the most original ideas of the three. This is probably due to the fact that the Vienna students were already familiar with the Brentanian framework, while in Lvov Twardowski had to start *ab ovo* (Ingarden 1938: 25 ff.).¹

The manuscripts show that in the years 1894 through 1897 Twardowski provides an improvement of Brentano's theory of judgement: not all judgements are existential, as Brentano thought. According to Twardowski, a strictly existential theory of judgement can account neither for judgements that have relations as objects, nor for judgements about the past. Twardowski seems to solve this problem by acknowledging states of affairs as objects of these judgements.

1. The Polish manuscript *Logika* (Twardowski 1895/6) is being currently edited by Arianna Betti, the German one by Arianna Betti and Venanzio Raspa. A fourth manuscript on relations (Twardowski 1893) seems to be a preparation for *Zur Lehre*.

1. *The Brentanian Concept of Judgement*

In his *Psychologie* from 1874, Brentano presents a theory of judgment in which he acknowledges two types of judgemental act, affirmation and denial. Judgements get their objects by an underlying act of presentation: anything that may be an object of presentation may be an object of judgement. According to Brentano, judgements do not have a subject-predicate structure. In a judgement we either affirm or deny the existence of an object, and therefore *all* judgements have the existential form ‘A exists’ or ‘A does not exist’. ‘Existence’ is here to be understood not as a predicate, but as part of the judgemental act. In a categorical judgement such as ‘A person is ill’ the object affirmed is a complex, namely an ill person (Brentano 1874: II, 56). With the affirmation of the complex object, the ‘subject’ is implicitly affirmed (Brentano 1874: II, 58). A universal judgement, like ‘Every triangle is a figure’, does not implicitly affirm that there are triangles, as such a judgement is taken to be a negative existential judgement; what is negated is a triangle that is *not* a figure.²

A Brentanian theory of judgement along these lines we also find in Twardowski’s *Zur Lehre*. Notwithstanding his Brentanian background and his loyalty to the spirit of the Brentanian enterprise, Twardowski’s philosophical construction has also much of its own. Twardowski’s first step away from a Brentanian theory of mental acts consists in the distinction he makes between the content and the object of an act borrowed from Bolzano. As is well known, for Brentano the object to which we are directed in an act is an object immanent to the act, also called the *content* of the act (Brentano 1874: I, 124, 125). For Twardowski, the object to which we are directed is not the object immanent to the act, but the object taken to be independent of the act (Twardowski 1894: 4), which may be the object of different acts with different contents. To use Twardowski’s example, Salzburg may be the object of the act of presentation whose content is *the birthplace of Mozart*, or it may also be the object of the act of presentation whose content is *the town that lies at the place of the Roman Juvavum*. Such presentations that share their object Twardowski calls *Wechselvorstellungen*, using a term from Bolzano’s *Wissenschaftslehre* (Twardowski 1894: 32). The distinction

2. For a more extended presentation of Brentano’s theory of judgement see Brandl (2002).

between content and object is also of use in semantics. The content *the birthplace of Mozart* is the meaning of the name ‘the birthplace of Mozart’; its object, i. e. what is named by it, is Salzburg (Twardowski 1894: 11, 12). Despite the references to Bolzano, with this distinction Twardowski stays within a Brentanian framework, because he acknowledges not only a content, but also an object for *every* act. Unlike Bolzano, Twardowski assumes that the act in which we present a round square has both a content and an object, where the content exists as a dependent part of the act. The question whether the object exists is not relevant as far as presentations are concerned; it may not exist, as in the example just given (Twardowski 1894: 30). Further, the content of the act in which a golden mountain is presented is not golden; such a property is to be attributed to the object, not to the content (Twardowski 1894: 31).

Although *Zur Lehre* is not devoted to judgements, Twardowski extends the distinction between content and object also to judgemental acts. That which is affirmed or rejected in the judgement ‘A is’ (or ‘A is not’) is the object A; it is that to which we are directed in our judgement. The content of an affirmative judgement is the existence of the object A, while the content of a negative judgement is the non-existence of it (Twardowski 1894: 9; cf. Brentano 1889a: 27). The two judgements ‘The birthplace of Mozart exists’ and ‘The town that lies at the place of the Roman Juvavum exists’ get their object, namely Salzburg, through the underlying act of presentation. The contents of the two judgements differ as much as the contents of the underlying presentations differ. It is not the content that is affirmed (or denied) in a judgement, however: the object affirmed in both judgements is Salzburg itself. The content of the judgements, respectively, *the existence of the birthplace of Mozart* and *the existence of the town that lies at the place of the Roman Juvavum*, has some similarity with a propositional entity. However, as we will discuss later at the end of section 4, it cannot be called a proposition straight away.

2. Twardowski's Problems with Brentano's Theory

Twardowski's introduction of the content/object distinction in Brentano's theory of judgement has problematic consequences discussed already in *Zur Lehre*. In a crucial passage Twardowski says:

the question of whether the terms of a relation exist or do not exist is completely irrelevant so far as the relation which ‘obtains’ between them is concerned, as Hoefler has shown. He does, however, make the mistake of confusing the content with the object of the presentation. He says: A judgment which asserts a relation does not assume a ‘real’ existence of the terms of the relation; it is sufficient to have a presentation of these terms, and the judgment then concerns these contents. This seems to be incorrect in as much as the contents of presentations do exist, but do not constitute the terms of the relation which is asserted in the judgment. If one says that the number four is greater than the number three, then one does not talk about a relation between the content of the presentation of three and the content of the presentation of four; for there are no relations of magnitude between contents. Rather, the relation occurs between ‘the number three’ and ‘the number four’, both taken as objects of presentations, regardless of whether they exist or not, if they are only presented *through* corresponding presentations (Twardowski 1894: 27; 1977: 24, 25).

In this passage Twardowski follows explicitly the *Logik* of the Brentanians Meinong and Höfler, but only in part, as for him relations do not obtain between *contents*, but between *objects* of presentations. Relations are not essentially dependent upon the mind; they belong to the realm of objects. Twardowski’s thesis that relations belong to the realm of objects immediately brings him into conflict with the Brentanian thesis that everything that is judged is a simple or complex object:

If this is so, then there arises another difficulty which was already pointed out by Hoefler. Relation-judgments which are about the existence of a relation between non-existing objects seem to affirm the objects themselves; and according to what was said earlier about the relationship between the affirmation of parts and the affirmation of the whole containing these parts, the affirmation of a relation must involve the affirmation of every term of this relation (Twardowski 1894: 27, 28; 1977: 25).³

In these two passages the term ‘relation’ carries a fundamental ambiguity. The *relation* in the latter passage has to be taken as a complex. Here the relation is a whole consisting of its members (terms), and not something between them; the members of the relation are conceived of as parts of this whole. In the first passage, instead, it seems that we have to take *relation* as a relation in the strict sense, that is, an object

3. The passage Twardowski mentions is to be found at Twardowski 1894: 8.

that obtains between its members, irrespective of the existence of the latter, and which in the further sections of *Zur Lehre* is called a *formal part* of a complex object (Twardowski 1894: 48, 51). Twardowski is convinced that if relations obtain between objects, and not contents, then the mereological thesis defended in the second passage—i. e. that the affirmation of the whole implies the affirmation of its parts—creates a problem. The question whether the existence of a relation requires the existence of its members is of great importance for Twardowski. The thesis of the intentionality of the act is interpreted by him such that there is a relation between the act of presentation and its object. He wants to prevent that the existence of this relation implies the existence of the (presented) object. As we have seen, for Twardowski it is possible that the object of an act of presentation may not exist.

The problem of relations as objects of judgements is relevant, because Twardowski considers, differently from Brentano, universal categorical judgements like ‘All radii of a circle are of the same length’ to affirm a relation. Still, Twardowski gives a solution within the Brentanian framework to the problem raised by these judgements. Such judgements do not implicitly affirm the existence of the radii, because a universal judgement is a denial according to the existential theory of judgement. Such a judgement rejects the inequality of the radii of a circle. Since the relation (as a complex) is denied, its members are not affirmed. So there seems to be still a solution within the existential framework. Judgements like ‘Poseidon is the god of the sea’ are not universal judgements, though. For this kind of judgements Twardowski resorts to a solution he finds in Hillebrand’s textbook of Brentanian logic (1891): a relation is affirmed between Poseidon and the sea, but one of the members is not Poseidon as such, but Poseidon *as named* (Twardowski 1894: 28), which does exist.

Whether or not Twardowski is right that ‘All radii of a circle are of the same length’ and ‘Poseidon is the god of the sea’ must be taken as being about a relation, he cannot apply the same solution he proposes in *Zur Lehre* to all relational judgements. A judgement about a relation between an act of presentation and a (presented) object is not a universal judgement, nor is it of the type ‘Poseidon is the God of the sea’. In the presentation of this relation I am not directed to the object as named, but to the *Vorstellungsgegenstand schlechthin*. What, though, if this object does not exist? All in all, Twardowski has not found a general solution within a Brentanian theory of judgement to the problem whether a rela-

tional object of judgement can exist while its members do not exist.

A similar problem emerges in connection with judgements about past objects, for which Brentano's theory is inadequate. In his *Logik* 1894/5 Twardowski mentions the problem explicitly. Consider the judgements

- (1) God exists
- (2) Once there was a king.

In the first case the content of the judgement is existence; what in the second? Many, like Prof. Brentano himself, think that also here existence is the content. But this cannot be the case. For: once there was a king = + a past king. Past = having existed, but not existing anymore. Thus the judgement seems to claim something contradictory (Twardowski 1894/5: 32v).⁴

According to Brentano a past object is unreal (Brentano 1890/91: 94); but this does not exclude that a past object *exists*. For, according to Brentano's theory of judgement, if a past object is an object of a true judgement, then it exists. And here 'exists' must mean 'exists presently (now, actually)'. The latter is a consequence that orthodox Brentanians have denied (Hillebrand 1891: 54), but it derives from at least three aspects of Brentano's theory: his theory of judgment, as just mentioned; the identification of content and object, as the content surely exists whenever we present something; and Brentano's interpretation of the adjective 'present'. As regards the latter, a present object N does not have any determination which enriches it, so it does not differ from N itself (Brentano 1890/91: 94). This argument has a perfect counterpart in Brentano's interpretation of 'existing': an existing N does not differ from N itself (Brentano 1874: II, 49; cf. Hillebrand 1891: 24, 25). Twardowski correctly agrees with the reading of 'exists' as 'exists presently', but no less correctly disagrees with Brentano that past objects do exist. Since past (and future, we can infer) objects are non-existing, the problem of judgements involving such objects is similar to the one of relations with non-existing members.

4. "Zum ersten Fall ist der Inhalt des Urteils die Existenz; was im zweiten? Viele, wie Prof. Br[entano] selbst, meinen, auch da sei Existenz der Inhalt. Aber das geht nicht. Denn: [---] ein[st] war ein König = +einen gewesenen König. Gewesen = existiert haben, aber jetzt nicht mehr existierend. Also scheint das Urteil etwas widersprechendes zu behaupten." This passage—crossed out in the original—has been amended in connection with p. 119, where Twardowski elaborates on this view.

Twardowski's problems, in sum, come from the fact that he accepts the basics of Brentano's existential theory, takes existence as spatio-temporal presence, and that he follows the Bolzanian distinction between content and object, together with a very broad notion of object. His general point is, as we shall see, that categorical judgements involving a non-existing object cannot be about the *existence* of a *complex*.

3. Twardowski's Solution

Twardowski's answer to the deficiencies of Brentano's theory in the manuscripts is quite different from the answer he gives in *Zur Lehre*. In his *Logik* 1894/5 he states that there are two types of judgements, existential judgements and relational judgements; most of our judgements are relational ones. The terms 'existential judgement' and 'relational judgement' may be misleading, because the term 'existential' is derived from the *content*, whereas the term 'relational' is derived from the *object* of the judgement. A judgement is either the affirmation or denial of an object, or else the affirmation or denial of a *relationship* (*Verhältnis*). In both cases *there is* something, for which Twardowski uses the determinable term '*es gibt*': in the case of an existential judgement, an object is affirmed (or denied)—and the content of the judgement is existence. Its form is: $\pm e A$, where '+' stands for the act of affirmation, '-' for the act of denial, 'e' for existence, and 'A' is a schematic letter for a term that stands for the object. In the case of a relational judgement, a relationship is affirmed (or denied)—and the content is *subsistence* (*Vorhandensein, Bestehen*). Its form is $\pm b A$, where 'b' stands for '*das Bestehen*' (Twardowski 1894/5: 32v).⁵ In this case 'A' is a schematic letter for a term that stands for a relationship.

5. "Die zwei Arten des Inhalt<s> fassen wir unter den Namen des Vorhandenseins (es gibt, es gibt nicht) zusammen; er umfaßt sowol das Existieren, als das Bestehen. Beiden gemeinsam das Merkmal des objectiven Zwanges, das sie auf unsere Urteile ausüben, und demzufolge wir sie anerkennen müssen. Die eine Anerkennung bedeutet aber Existenz, die andere ein Vorhandensein: Allgemein $\pm A$: speciell $\pm e A \pm b A$." The idea that an objective force is characteristic of a judgement can also be found in Sigwart and it is criticised by Brentano (Brentano 1889b: 66 ff.). Twardowski certainly knew Sigwart's psychologistic logic because it is mentioned in the letter to Meinong, where he uses Sigwart's term 'objective validity', instead of 'objective force', and because this logic was widespread at the end of the nineteenth century. See also section 4.

Interestingly, Twardowski no longer follows Brentano in his analysis of universal categorical judgements. A judgement such as ‘Two infinitely long parallel lines do not intersect’ is not a negation, but an affirmation of a relationship, which does not imply that such lines exist. In general, an S-P judgement is a relational judgement, its object is a relationship, and it may or may not presuppose (*voraussetzen*) the existence of an S. The judgement as such does not differ in the two cases. Notice, in connection with this, that Twardowski in the *Logik* criticises Brentano’s attempt to introduce *Doppelurteile* (Brentano 1883: 194). There are not two judgements present in the judgement ‘S is P’ (Twardowski 1894/5: 198, 199). Judgements such as ‘This ...’, ‘He ...’ or ‘Josef ...’ normally presuppose that the object named by the subject exists, but not always. Besides, a name in subject-position cannot be used to make an assertion. All categorical judgements are judgements about a relation; moreover, also hypothetical judgements are categorical, and therefore relational judgements (Twardowski 1894/5, 124).

Twardowski is here not only indebted to Brentano, but also to Bolzano. For Twardowski, the general form of a declarative sentence expressing a relational judgement is ‘A has b’ (“Die allgemeine Form der Beziehungssätze: A hat b”, Twardowski 1894/5: 139; cf. Bolzano 1837: §127). The object of all types of relational judgements are translatable into the form *the having of a quality by an object*, without loss of meaning. The object is

the relationship between an object and a quality belonging to it, the relationship which consists in a quality *belonging* to an object, in an object *having* a quality. (Twardowski 1894/5: 132v).⁶

For example, instead of asserting that ‘Between A and B there is the relation of cause and effect’, we may say ‘A has the quality of effecting B’. (Twardowski 1894/5: 135). The content of relational judgements is the (non-)subsisting of a relationship of having of a quality *b* by the object *A* (Twardowski 1894/5: 140).

An interesting kind of non-existents in Twardowski’s conception are, as we saw, past objects, since existence is conceived as spatio-

6. “[D]as Verhältniß zwischen einem Gegenstand und einer ihm zukommenden Beschaffenheit, das Verhältniß, das darin besteht, daß einem Gegenstand eine Beschaffenheit *zukommt*, daß ein Gegenstand eine Beschaffenheit *hat*. [...] <Wir> wollen es einfach als das Verhältniß *des Habens einer Beschaffenheit* bezeichnen.”

temporal presence. That past objects do not exist is also clarified in a section of *Logik* in which Twardowski says that proper names can be used to refer to people who passed away (Twardowski 1894/5: 200, 201).⁷ The problem of judgements about non-present objects as a special kind of non-existents is a strong reason for Twardowski to acknowledge another type of judgement next to existential ones (Twardowski 1894/5: 119). If ‘Once there was a king’ is not to be contradictory, the content of this judgement cannot be the existence of an object. There must be judgements whose content is “the subsistence of a relationship, without consideration for the existence of the members of the relationship” (Twardowski 1894/5, 32v).⁸ Existing can be only objects which come into and go out of being; subsisting, on the contrary, are unchanging objects with no temporal determinations; *relationships* are construed as timeless objects whose ‘members’ may be objects which are past. Twardowski’s position is that all sentences with an occurrence of the verb ‘to exist’ or similar in a non-present tense do not express an existential judgement; they express the subsistence of a relationship. Besides judgements about present tense existence, only those weather (‘it hails’), impersonal (‘it’s hot in here’), and subjectless (predicateless) sentences (‘Bomb!’) whose object is said to exist now, express existential judgements. Sentences like ‘It rained’ and ‘It was hot in there’, instead, do not express existential judgements, but relational ones. For, according to Twardowski, while the content of ‘God exists’ is the *existence* of God, the content of ‘Once there was a king’ is the *subsistence* of the relation of contemporaneity between a king and a certain period of time in the past. Or, more properly, *the subsistence of a relation of having between a king and a quality of being contemporary with a certain time-section in the past*. By taking relationships as objects of such judgements Twardowski’s theory offers also a solution to the problem with time left open by Brentano’s theory mentioned above.

7. In the passage he classifies names according to the existence of their objects: there are names meaning something such that we *can* infer that their objects do not exist; names meaning something such that we *cannot* infer that the objects do or do not exist; names meaning something such that we can infer that the objects exist. In the second group fall most of the names, including proper names which can be used to indicate someone who no longer lives, like ‘Roderick Chisholm’ and ‘Giambattista Vico’. In the first group fall ‘round square’, ‘golden mountain’, while in the third group falls only ‘I’ (cf. Russell 1910/11: 121).

8. “Also nicht immer Existenz im eigentlichen Sinne Inhalt des Urteils, sondern auch das *Bestehen* einer Beziehung, ohne Rücksicht darauf, ob die Glieder der Beziehung selbst existieren.” (Twardowski 1894/5, 32v).

4. *Relations, Complexes, Sachverhalte*

Twardowski's solution largely consists in introducing a special notion, subsistence, in order to prevent that the existence of a relationship brings with it the existence of its members. Relations in *Zur Lehre* could not exist without its members, but in the manuscripts they can *subsist* irrespective of whether its members exist or not. Is Twardowski's solution just an easy, cosmetic way-out, or is there something more to it? The answer to this question depends largely on what Twardowski means by his new notion of *relationship* as object of relational judgement. What kind of object is it? Is it a state of affairs? It is not uncommon to speak about the obtaining (*das Bestehen*) of states of affairs rather than their existence (*Existenz*), because states of affairs are ideal, propositionally structured entities. Existence is preferably used for objects in space and time. It is tempting to say that what Twardowski spotted in *Zur Lehre* was indeed something similar to a state of affairs, that we see in full action only later in the manuscripts. This would be what makes his solution attractive, at least to friends of states of affairs. It is plausible that the reason why Twardowski got into trouble in *Zur Lehre* is that he did not have the tools, at that stage, to distinguish among relations, complexes, and finally states of affairs as objects of judgement. These distinctions were still *in fieri*. Incidentally, let us note that Twardowski in *Zur Lehre* had also adjunctive problems on relations in the strict sense, caused by his peculiar mereological analyses, which, notoriously, Husserl found (correctly) indigestible (Husserl 1900/01: B₁ 280; see also Rosiak 1998: 87). Besides, the Brentanian influence was still too strong to allow Twardowski to make a decisive turn towards an ontology of states of affairs.

In the letter to Meinong previously mentioned, Twardowski says about the new theory of judgement he is working on:

The main idea I have is: in every judgement we may distinguish 1. act (affirmation or denial) 2. content: the existing, the being there, the subsisting (*Das Existieren, Vorhandensein, Bestehen*) 3. object (the judged state of affairs (*der beurteilte Sachverhalt*) = either an absolute datum or a relation or both together) Example: 'God exists': object: God; content: existence; act: affirmation.⁹ Or 'Two times two is four': object: equality between the

9. We amended the German text on the basis of the original manuscript letter. Kindinger wrongly reads 'Beziehung' (relation) instead of 'Bejahung' (affirmation).

product of two times two and four; content: the existence (subsistence) of this equality. Act: affirmation.⁹ I believe to attain two things with this theory: 1. A liberation for all theories of judgement of the unclarity that pertains to the concept of existence, 2. A unification of the Brentano-Meinong-Höfler-theory with the theory of Sigwart, where these three moments (act, content, object) are clearly distinguished (act = consciousness; content = objective validity; object: that what, according to Sigwart, is unified in the presentations (Twardowski 1897b: 143, 144).

This passage confirms what we found in the manuscripts: next to existential judgements, Twardowski acknowledges also relational judgements, which are judgements about a relation whose existence/subsistence we accept or reject. However, the passage does not settle the matter whether a relationship is a *Sachverhalt* beyond doubt. What does ‘Sachverhalt’ mean in the passage above? From the examples we cannot decide that it is the technical notion of *Sachverhalt*, as it was later to be used by Husserl and Reinach. It is not unlikely that Twardowski knew of a technical use of the term ‘Sachverhalt’, namely as the term was used by Stumpf (Stumpf 1888: 242), whose course in 1892 Twardowski followed (Twardowski 1926: 8). But Twardowski’s use of the term is certainly different, as Stumpf employs the term for the content of a judgement. Following the quotation, we can say that a *Sachverhalt* is simply a presented object (‘absolute datum’), a relation, or a relation together with its relata.

To decide whether Twardowski’s relationship is a state of affairs we need some preliminary terminological and conceptual clarifications concerning relation, complex, *Sachverhalt* and cognate notions. Most of this conceptual apparatus comes from the Austrian tradition, especially from Meinong. Meinong is of considerable relevance in this context. First, he takes over two important theses from Twardowski, namely that there are objects which do not exist, and that non-existing objects may have properties. Secondly, it is Meinong who, among the Brentanians, was most involved in the theory of relations: we find relations as objects of categorical judgements both in the *Logik* written with Höfler (Höfler & Meinong 1890: 97), and, most important, in his review of Hillebrand’s militant book of Brentanian logic (Meinong 1892: 453).

If the individual object *a* stands in the relation *R* to the individual object *b* (for instance, *a* is a friend of *b*), we can distinguish at least three different kinds of entities. First, there is the particular *relation R* of friendship between *a* and *b*. What relates *a* and *b* is not a universal,

repeatable entity; this relation is as particular as the related members. Secondly, there is the *complex a-in-the-relation-of-similarity-to-b*, a *whole* of which *a* and *b* are *parts* related by *R*. Finally, there is the *state of affairs* that *a* is a friend of *b*, *a*'s being a friend of *b*, *a*'s having friendship with *b*. What is the difference among these three kinds of entities?

According to Meinong, whenever there is a relation *R* between *a* and *b*, there is also a complex made up of *a* and *b* in virtue of this very same relation *R*: *Wo Relation, da Komplexion*, and *vice versa*. This is what Meinong called the *Partialkoinzidenz-Prinzip* between relations and complexes. The complex is not a collection (*Kollektiv*) of *a*, *b* and *R*, but a unitary whole 'glued together' by *R*; and while *R* is a mode of union of a complex, it is never a *constituent part* (*Bestandstück*) of it (Meinong 1899: 389–391; Findlay 1963: 95, 145). What the principle grants us is that in the case of existing complexes, the state of affairs (*Objektiv* in Meinong) that the complex *a-in-relation-R-to-b* exists and the state of affairs that the relation *R* subsists between *a* and *b* are *different but equivalent*.

But why is a state of affairs different from a complex? A state of affairs is not a complex because it is not taken to have constituents in any appreciable sense in which a complex has parts. The difference between a complex and a state of affairs is probably best grasped when we say that a complex whose parts *a* and *b*—related by a suitable relation—exist, exists as well, while a state of affairs whose 'constituents' *a* and *b* exist, at most *subsists* or *obtains*. This means that a state of affairs, in contrast to a complex, is essentially an *ideal* object, beyond space and time. A state of affairs is a special object in which *a*, *b* and *R* are, say, *reticulated* together.¹⁰ A state of affairs is a relationally articulated object, but it is not a relation, whether universal or particular, as this articulation involves the *relata* as well. The German name for a state of affairs, 'Sachverhalt', better expresses the relational status of it (cf. Mulligan 1985: 145). Further, a state of affairs is to be distinguished from a particular property, or *moment*, such as the particular redness of some particular rose, and it is also to be distinguished from a particular relation, or relational moment, such as the friendship between *a* and *b*. Such moments are as particular as the objects whose properties they are; they exist in space and time as dependent entities.

10. The term is Barry Smith's, cf. Smith 1989: 421.

A state of affairs is, however, not only to be distinguished from a relation, a complex and a moment, but also from a proposition. Many Austrians did not make this distinction. For example, for Meinong, the *Objectiv* has characteristics of both states of affairs and propositions. It is understandable that the distinction is neglected, because both types of entities are propositionally articulated, and thus named by nominalizations of declarative sentences. Where we are now used to name a proposition by a that-clause, such a clause can also be used to name a state of affairs: *that the knife is on the table* is a fact (a state of affairs that obtains). But, whereas a proposition is a homogeneous meaning-entity, whose parts are meaning-entities themselves, a state of affairs is not a homogeneous entity. The latter is, for example, conceived of as built out of objects like tables and mountains, on the one hand, and universals, on the other hand. But, whatever objects are involved in a state of affairs, the state of affairs itself is outside space and time. One of the weaker points of a theory of states of affairs, therefore, is that it is left unexplained how objects in space and time can ‘constitute’ an object outside space and time. A state of affairs cannot be a whole with, for instance, a mountain as a part. We may have states of affairs whose ‘constituting’ objects are no longer there. Further, propositions and states of affairs can be distinguished by the different roles they may play. While a proposition is given the role of the content of judgement, a state of affairs is given the role of the object of judgement; where propositions are often given the role of truth-bearer, states of affairs are given the role of truth-maker. ‘The existence of *a*’, which is used by Brentano and Twardowski for the judgemental content, is less appropriate for expressing a state of affairs or a proposition, because there is no verb present; ‘the existence of *a*’ has a form similar to ‘the redness of *a*’, which is used for moments in space and time. A state of affairs is distinguished from a moment not only by its being an ideal entity, but also by the special syntactic structure it has, comparable to the structure of a proposition, as we have seen above. Because of this syntactic structure, a state of affairs is most aptly named by a nominalization of a declarative sentence: *that a is b*, or, preferably, *a’s being b*, so that the that-clause can be used for propositions. The linguistic form *the being b of a*, which is similarly a nominalization of a sentence, we also consider to be apt for expressing a state of affairs.

5. Twardowski and the Sachverhalt

Is then a relationship (*Verhältnis*) a state of affairs for Twardowski? Unfortunately, when speaking of relations, Twardowski fails to provide us with the distinctions which we would need, both in *Zur Lehre* and in the manuscripts. Besides, in the manuscripts Twardowski no longer offers the complicated analyses of relations and complexes we find in *Zur Lehre*. But, clearly, he no longer construes the object of a relational judgement, a relationship, as a complex with its members as parts. What does Twardowski mean then, when he claims in his *Logik* 1894/5 that the object of the judgement ‘The apple is ripe’ is *the relation of having the quality of ripeness by the apple*? There are three arguments for the claim that Twardowski’s *relation of having a quality by an object* is a state of affairs.

The first is that the object of the judgement cannot just be the relation between the apple and its ripeness, because the mere relation does not involve the *relata* as such. Apparently, for Twardowski, the object of a relational judgement is a relationship, which is the having of ripeness by the apple, the apple and the ripeness included. This argument is not decisive, though: the ‘relationship’ can be interpreted as a complex as well.

The second favourable argument is that *the relation of having the quality of ripeness by the apple* subsists timelessly even if the objects pass away. The having by the apple of the quality of ripeness, the apple’s being ripe, cannot be, for instance, the *particular* ripeness of the apple, a moment that exists and is destroyed when the apple is eaten. For the same reason it cannot be a relational moment. Like in Meinong, existence of objects and subsistence of relationships should be kept strictly apart. For Meinong, the subsistence of the objective is in no way dependent upon the existence of its object (Meinong 1904: 495); as for Twardowski, an object may be said to have a property even if the object does not exist. *Sachverhalte* may then be said to subsist, whereas their *reticulata* do not exist. By this criterion, Twardowski’s relational objects are states of affairs.

The third argument for the thesis that Twardowski’s relationship is a state of affairs comes from the way he names a relationship. Twardowski uses the form ‘the having of *b* by *a*’ to express the general form of objects of relational judgements. In section 4 we said that such a nominalization of a sentence is most apt for expressing a state of affairs. Twardowski’s

choice of expression might indicate that he meant the object of relational judgements to be a state of affairs (here the difference between ‘the having of *b* by *a*’ and ‘the being *b* of *a*’ is not relevant). In *Logika 1895/6* we find the expression ‘the rising of the sun’ as a name for the object of the judgement ‘the sun rises’ (Twardowski 1895/6: 91). The expression ‘the rising of the sun’ is clearly different from the expression ‘the rising sun’; the latter denotes nothing but a complex object. Twardowski rarely uses a that-clause to name a relationship, and never in a technical way.

We may note that Twardowski, instead, uses a that-clause for the content in a considerable amount of cases, but only in the Polish *Logika* (Twardowski 1895/6: 90, 91). For Twardowski, we have seen, the standard form of the content of a judgement is $\pm \textit{es gibt} (A)$; that is, ‘the (non-)existence of *A*’—or ‘the (non-)subsistence of *A*’, in the case of relational judgements. For Twardowski the judgemental content functions as the meaning of a sentence, which is one of the characteristics of a proposition. Nevertheless, for him a proposition is neither a truth-bearer nor an entity independent of the act.

There are also some important arguments against the thesis that Twardowski’s relationships are states of affairs. Twardowski does not discuss the ontological status of a relationship to any satisfactory degree. And, he does not use the word ‘*Sachverhalt*’ in any technical sense. This confirms that the use of *Sachverhalt* in the letter to Meinong is also not technical. It would certainly be exaggerated to say that Twardowski has a theory of relationships; for instance, he gives no identity criterion for them. Do judgements such as ‘*a* is bigger than *b*’ and ‘*b* is smaller than *a*’ have the same relationship as object? Contrary to what Meinong and Husserl were to claim, for both Brentano and Twardowski a judgmental act is dependent upon an act of presentation of the very same object. This means that a judged relationship is also an object of an act of presentation, and there is thus no special object of judgement. Further, even if relationships are states of affairs, they cannot be negative. There is not a relationship expressed by ‘*a*’s not being *b*’. For both Brentano and Twardowski, negation has its place on the side of the act. Twardowski also acknowledges negation in the content, but as derived from the quality of the act. A difference with other ontologies of *Sachverhalte*, like Husserl’s and Meinong’s (but not a disadvantage), is also that the object of a judgement such as ‘God exists’ is, exactly like in Brentano, God itself, and not a special object

such as *that God exists* or *God's being (there)*. Finally, the relation between the relationship and its 'parts' or *reticulata* is not explained by Twardowski. Failure to explain this relation seems, however, a general problem of theories of states of affairs, more than an argument against reading Twardowski's concept of relationships as a concept of states of affairs.

There are differences, then, between Twardowski's relationships and some standard ways of conceiving states of affairs; however, these differences are not relevant enough to consider Twardowski's relationships a fourth notion next to relation, complex and state of affairs. Also, a theory like Twardowski's would not gain from keeping relationships separate from states of affairs. On the contrary, the identification of Twardowski's relationships with states of affairs makes his theory interesting. The notion of state of affairs can provide an answer to the question of what we are directed to in our judgements about the past and the future. Although there is no object or complex left to judge about, there is still the ideal state of affairs that is the object of our judgement.

However, there seems to be a similar problem with relationships as there is with states of affairs: how can a relationship subsist, in case its members do not exist? And, how can a spatio-temporal object 'constitute' an ideal object? How can an existing object 'constitute' a subsisting object?

Conclusion

In several manuscripts, written between 1894 and 1897, Twardowski developed a new theory of judgement with two types of judgement: existential and relational judgements. In *Zur Lehre* he tried to stay within a Brentanian framework, although he introduced the distinction between content and object in the theory of judgement. The introduction of this distinction forced Twardowski to revise further Brentano's theory. His changes concerned judgements about relations and about non-present objects. The latter are considered special cases of relational judgements. The existential judgements are analysed in a Brentanian way; whereas relational judgements are analysed in a Brentanian way as far as the *act* is concerned, but not when it comes to the *object*: the object of a relational judgement is a relationship. For Twardowski, a relational judgement is *correct*, if the relationship *subsists*; and the relationship

may subsist even if the objects that are related do not exist. With this notion of relationship Twardowski comes close to introducing a concept of state of affairs for the object of (relational) judgements, as it may later be found in the writings of other Brentano pupils, e.g., Meinong and Husserl. The theory is in fact more acceptable than Meinong's, because Twardowski makes a distinction between the judgemental content and the judgemental object. However, Twardowski's theory suffers from the same problem as every theory of judgement relying on states of affairs, as states of affairs are entities whose constitution is unclear.

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