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PHILOSOPHY AS WELTANSCHAUUNG
IN TRENDELENBURG, DILTHEY, AND WINDELBAND

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements v

**Chapter 1**
Introduction: Philosophy between science and worldview

1. Weltanschauung: a problematic philosophical concept 1
2. Philosophy, worldview, and science: Husserl’s dilemma 3
3. Outline: three worldview concepts 7

**Chapter 2**
Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg:
At the roots of the worldview debate

1. Introduction 11
2. Towards a scientific resolution of the plurality of worldviews 13
3. Philosophy and the sciences: the programme of the *Logische Untersuchungen* 23
4. Key concepts of the *Logische Untersuchungen* 27
5. The metaphysical dimensions of the question of worldview 40
6. Motion and the mirror of nature 45
7. Trendelenburg’s idealism and the limits of philosophical language 56
8. Conclusion 60

**Chapter 3**
Wilhelm Dilthey’s *Weltanschauungstypologie* as post-metaphysical metaphysics

1. Introduction 63
2. Worldview and life 64
3. Worldview and the function of philosophy 69
4. Philosophical and other worldviews 73
5. The typology of worldviews 77
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

6. Trendelenburg as precursor of Dilthey’s *Weltanschauungstypologie* 82
7. Founding science: the limits of philosophy in Dilthey and Trendelenburg 89
8. Conclusion: worldview or theory of worldviews? 96

## Chapter 4
Wilhelm Windelband: Philosophy as the science of worldview

1. Introduction 99
2. The concept of worldview in Windelband’s early writings 100
3. The worldview concept in Windelband after 1900 105
4. Kant’s worldview and the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* 119
5. The foundations of a philosophical worldview: the *Einleitung in die Philosophie* 127
6. Kant’s and Windelband’s metaphysics 137
7. “Kuno Fischer und sein Kant” 143
8. Conclusion: science, worldview, metaphysics 148

## Chapter 5
Worldview and metaphysics

1. Introduction 151
2. Three philosophical concepts of worldview 152
3. Comparing the three worldview concepts: the systematic place of the worldview concept 157
4. Further comparison: the systematic background 167
5. From a philosophical concept of worldview to a philosophical worldview 181
6. Conclusion 186

Bibliography 191

Samenvatting in het Nederlands 197
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION:

PHILOSOPHY BETWEEN SCIENCE AND WORLDVIEW

1. Weltanschauung: a problematic philosophical concept

The concept of Weltanschauung is a philosophical concept with an unsettled history.\(^1\) It is perhaps provocative to call it a philosophical concept, since forceful arguments have been given for the thesis that a worldview is something fundamentally different from philosophy.\(^2\) Other authors acknowledge that a connection between philosophy and worldview did once exist, but that this connection was a historical phenomenon which has been or in any event must be overcome.\(^3\) Finally, almost all recent studies on the concept of worldview—including those who assert a positive relation between philosophy and worldview—assume a principal difference between a worldview and philosophy.\(^4\)

Even though the relationship between worldview and philosophy thus appears to be a problematic one from a contemporary point of view, the roots of the concept do lie within the philosophical domain. Moreover, several nineteenth and early twentieth century philosophers identified philosophy and worldview. I will therefore examine these philosophical roots of the concept of worldview, the arguments with which worldview and philosophy were identified, and the changes the concept underwent which lead to the separation of the two. To this end I will analyze the concept of Weltanschauung in the work of three

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\(^1\) Throughout this book I will use the words ‘Weltanschauung’ and its English counterpart ‘worldview’ interchangeably. Despite the fact that ‘weltanschauung’ has found its way into current English dictionaries, I will, true to its German origin, write it as Weltanschauung.

\(^2\) E.g. by Husserl, see section 2 below.

\(^3\) E.g. by Meier, Weltanschauung, and Marquard, ‘Weltanschauungstypologie’.

philosophers, Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Wilhelm Windelband. The choice of these three will be further discussed below (section 3 of the present chapter).

The purpose of the present study is to analyse how the concept of worldview was defined and used, and how philosophy and worldview were identified in philosophical discussions between 1847 and 1914—between the year of the first publication by Trendelenburg on the topic and the year of the last publication by Windelband addressing the concept of worldview. The analysis will demonstrate that the importance of the concept of worldview ultimately lies in the philosophical debate it prompts, and in the fundamental issues which this debate touches upon. I will not give an exhaustive historical analysis of the origin and use of the term ‘Weltanschauung’. There are several publications which focus on this task completely or in part. I will give here only a very brief overview of the term’s history, in order to reaffirm its philosophical roots.

The word Weltanschauung is used for the first time by Immanuel Kant, in his Kritik der Urteilskraft, which appeared in 1790. Kant uses the term only once, to refer to the (infinite) totality of the phenomenal world, as it is perceived (in a noumenal way). In the first half of the nineteenth century, the meaning of the term in philosophical discourse broadened as it came to be used outside the context of Kant’s critical philosophy. To give but one example, Hegel applies the term in his lectures on the history of philosophy to a detailed representation of the totality of knowledge of the world, which is expressed in historical philosophical systems. In the course of the nineteenth century one can observe a rapid increase in the term’s use. Its basic meaning becomes that of a ‘global outlook on life and the world’, a

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6 Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft (henceforth: KdU), A/B 92.


meaning which is further specified according to the particular context in which it is used. By the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, *Weltanschauung* could for instance be used synonymously with philosophy, but could also stand for a personal ‘view of the totality of the world and the place of man within it’.9

In the course of the twentieth century the term is often used with a meaning close to that of ‘ideology’.10 A worldview is thus taken as something fundamentally different from philosophy. A crucial role in this judgement of the relation between philosophy and worldview is played by the concept of science: a worldview cannot be scientific, it is argued, whereas philosophy has or claims to have a scientific character, and thus cannot be a worldview. A *Weltanschauung* is a ‘comprehensive conception or apprehension of the world esp. from a specific standpoint’,11 and is by definition subjective, as opposed to the objectivity of scientific philosophy.12

2. Philosophy, worldview, and science: Husserl’s dilemma

A clear expression of the dichotomy between science and philosophy on the one hand, and worldview on the other, can be found in Edmund Husserl’s essay ‘Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft’, which appeared in the first issue of the journal *Logos* in 1910.13 This was at a time when the concept of worldview was quite popular among philosophers, and during the period in which Wilhelm Dilthey developed and had started to publish his *Weltanschauungstypologie*.14 Husserl’s text raises several issues that bear relevance to our discussion of the relation between world-

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12 This is argued by Meier, *Weltanschauung*, passim.
13 *Logos* 1 (1910), 289-341.
14 Although Dilthey read Husserl’s essay as an attack on his position, Husserl claimed it was not directed at Dilthey specifically. Cf. Biemel, *Briefwechsel*, 438.
view and philosophy. As these issues offer a framework for the discussion of the relation of philosophy and worldview, I will briefly present them here.\textsuperscript{15}

According to Husserl, worldview philosophy (\textit{Weltanschauungsphilosophie}) is a systematic perfection—albeit a relative one—of life-experience, wisdom and ‘mere’ world- and lifeviews. As such, worldview philosophy fulfills an important function: it is an expression of the ideal of excellence (\textit{Tüchtigkeit}) and of the ‘idea of humanity’. The philosophical expression of a worldview provides the individual with directions for achieving a virtuous, excellent life. And since worldview philosophy has its roots in the common consciousness (\textit{Gemeinschaftsbewußtsein}) of its time, it appears to the individual to have objective validity. Worldview philosophy has an important ‘educational force’ (\textit{Bildungsmacht}).\textsuperscript{16}

Despite this positively valued function of worldview philosophy, it falls short in one important respect, according to Husserl: it cannot be rigorous science (\textit{strenge Wissenschaft}). The decisive point which separates worldview and science is the relation to time, which in turn rests upon the absoluteness (or lack thereof) of science and worldview. The idea of humanity, and the ideal of excellence which are incorporated in a worldview, are confined to a certain historical period. A worldview is relative to a certain ‘phase in the life of mankind’ (\textit{Phase des Menschheitslebens}).\textsuperscript{17} Rigorous science, on the other hand, is timeless, as it entails absolute values:

Die »Idee« der Weltanschauung ist dabei für jede Zeit eine andere …
Die »Idee« der Wissenschaft ist eine überzeitliche, und das sagt hier, durch keine Relation auf den Geist einer Zeit begrenzt. … Wissenschaft ist ein Titel für absolute, zeitlose Werte. Jeder solche Wert, einmal entdeckt, gehört hinfort zum Wertschatze aller weiteren Menschheit und

\textsuperscript{15} The topic of \textit{Wissenschaft} versus \textit{Weltanschauung} in Husserl is discussed more extensively (and in connection with Husserl’s later work) by Orth, \textit{Edmund Husserls ‘Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie’}, chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Strenge Wissenschaft}, 331-332.
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Strenge Wissenschaft}, 331.
bestimmt offenbar sogleich den materialen Gehalt der Idee der Bildung, Weisheit, Weltanschauung, sowie den der Weltanschauungsphilosophie.\textsuperscript{18}

The wealth of worldview philosophies, as observed by Husserl, has its practical legitimacy in the need for a worldview (\textit{Weltanschauungsnot}):\textsuperscript{19} It is inevitable to make decisions in practical life, based on the problems of everyday life—here and now:

\begin{quote}
In dem Drange des Lebens, in der praktischen Notwendigkeit, Stellung zu nehmen, konnte der Mensch nicht warten, bis – etwa in Jahrtausenden – Wissenschaft da sein würde…
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{20}A worldview provides the framework from which these decisions can be made.

Philosophy is faced with a dilemma here: Should philosophy aim to provide a worldview, and thus fulfil the need of the present time, or should it aim at rigorous science, thus fulfilling the need of the future—the need for a scientific basis from which practical decisions can be made? According to Husserl, the quest for philosophy as science should not be abandoned. The need of the present should not prevent the quest for an enduring, even eternal solution to the problems: a scientific solution. Only philosophy as rigorous science can provide a lasting, eternal answer to the questions to which worldview philosophy provides a temporary answer.

Husserl’s text is helpful for our analysis in that it offers an indication of what is at stake in the systematic discussion of the concept of worldview. Even if his plea for philosophy as ‘rigorous science’, and his characterization of a Weltanschauung as unscientific, leave several topics unaddressed,\textsuperscript{21} the central issues

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} \textit{Strenge Wissenschaft}, 332-333.
\item \textsuperscript{19} The observation of the need for a worldview is shared by Windelband and Rickert, cf. Griffioen, ‘Rickert, Windelband, Hegel und das Weltanschauungsbedürfnis’. See also the chapter on Windelband below.
\item \textsuperscript{20} \textit{Strenge Wissenschaft}, 334. Cf. 336: ‘Es ist sicher, daß wir nicht warten können. Wir müssen Stellung nehmen…’.
\item \textsuperscript{21} It would be especially interesting to discuss whether the ‘eternal’ and ‘absolute’ character which Husserl ascribes to true science is indeed a characteristic of (actual or ideal) science. Unfortunately, this would lead us too far astray. Even without addressing this issue, the key concepts and questions
\end{itemize}
which it raises can serve as the framework for an analysis of the relation between science and worldview. Husserl’s dichotomy of worldview and science provides us with the three key-terms for the subsequent analysis of the concept of worldview in Trendelenburg, Dilthey, and Windelband: philosophy, worldview, and science. Each of these authors argues for the identification of philosophy and worldview in one way or another. Yet the idea of philosophy as science is present in each of them as well. The guiding questions for this study therefore will be: 1. What is the meaning of the concept of worldview in the philosophical system under consideration, and what is its systematic place? 2. In what way is the concept applied to philosophy itself? 3. How is the scientific character of philosophy construed? 4. How is philosophy as worldview related to philosophy as science? 

The answers to these questions will provide us with three different interpretations of the relationship between philosophy and worldview. I will not mechanically address these questions one after the other for each of the three positions however, but rather start with the meaning of the concept of worldview, and analyze its philosophical role and significance from there. In each case however, the discussion will provide us with answers to the questions above. Together, the three perspectives will enable me to evaluate them in their mutual relations. From there Husserl’s topic, the question whether philosophy as science and philosophy as worldview are compatible, can be more thoroughly discussed, in chapter 5. A less radical distinction between science and worldview might provide another way out of Husserl’s dilemma than the rejection of worldview philosophy altogether.22

which arise from Husserl’s text serve very well as guiding concepts for the subsequent discussion.

22 Still another way out of Husserl’s dilemma is taken by the early Martin Heidegger in his lectures from the 1919 Kriegsnotesemester (Gesamtausgabe Bd, 56/57). Heidegger argues that philosophy is neither worldview nor theoretical science, but rather non-theoretical ‘original science’ (Urwissenschaft). Cf. Heinz, ‘Philosophie und Weltanschauung’.
INTRODUCTION

3. Outline: three worldview concepts

The concept of worldview and its systematic position in the work of Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (1802-1872) are analyzed in chapter 2. Trendelenburg is one of the first to apply the concept of worldview to philosophical systems themselves, and to develop a classification of types of worldviews. The concept of worldview is defined by Trendelenburg as the answer which a philosophical system gives to the fundamental metaphysical question: how are thought and being related? On the basis of this definition, he distinguishes three types of worldviews that have been realised in philosophical systems.

The aim of Trendelenburg’s classification of philosophical systems in accordance with their fundamental metaphysical principles is to come to a decision between the three types. As we shall see, the decision must be made in favour of the ‘organic worldview’, the metaphysical principle which ascribes priority to thought over being. However, the exposition of the different types of worldviews is not enough to provide this organic worldview with the foundation it needs. The foundation of the organic worldview which is derived from the classification of worldviews is not theoretical, but rather ‘practical’: one must choose in favour of the organic worldview for the sake of ethics. The metaphysical principle entailed in the organic worldview is the only principle which enables ethics, according to Trendelenburg.

The practical decision does not render a theoretical foundation of the organic worldview obsolete. A worldview represents the basic metaphysical principle of the philosophical system, according to Trendelenburg, and lack of theoretical support would leave the system as a whole unsupported. To provide a theoretical foundation for the organic worldview is therefore the task which Trendelenburg sets himself in his magnum opus, the Logische Untersuchungen (1840, 1862). The aim of this work is to provide a philosophical system based on the principle of motion (Bewegung), which according to Trendelenburg is a principle original to both thought and being. If this approach is successful, it provides the organic worldview with a theoretical foundation, thus making it a scientific worldview.
The Weltanschauungstypologie of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), a student of Trendelenburg, is the topic of chapter 3. Dilthey’s typology of worldviews has been presented as the exemplary philosophical approach to worldviews at the beginning of the twentieth century. Even though Dilthey was by no means the only one to philosophically address the issue of worldview, his approach is a significant one. More than other students of Trendelenburg who developed a typological approach to worldviews, Dilthey addresses the issue of worldview in his later work as a fundamental reflection on the method of post-metaphysical philosophy, in an age in which historical consciousness has come to full bloom. Dilthey aims to integrate the plurality of historical philosophical worldviews through the development of a historical theory, the Weltanschauungstypologie, which provides an explanation of their structure and relations.

The plurality of worldviews itself is accepted as an irreducible fact by Dilthey, as the different types of worldviews are produced by life. They each have their own legitimacy, and appear with necessity. Yet their respective claims to exclusivity and validity cannot be objectively decided on. The function of Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie is therefore different from the typological approach of Trendelenburg: for the latter, the typological argument must lead to a decision (albeit a provisional, practical decision) for one of the worldviews. I will argue that not only the function, but also the content of the typological theories of Trendelenburg and Dilthey is different. Contrary to a received view, the three types which make up Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie cannot be uniformly mapped to the three types which are distinguished by Trendelenburg.

Dilthey’s theory is marked by ambivalence towards metaphysics, as we shall see. On the one hand, the typology treats philosophical worldviews as merely historical phenomena. As metaphysical systems they claim absolute validity, yet these claims cannot be warranted. On the other hand, Dilthey observes that even though metaphysical systems belong, or should belong, to the past, the metaphysical tendency of human thought is ineradicable. I will argue that this persistence of metaphysics can be ob-

served in Dilthey as well, for his Weltanschauungstypologie itself aims at providing a worldview, which is a better understanding of life. This better understanding of life is based on a metaphysical foundation, however.

The third and final worldview concept, which is to be discussed in chapter 4, is that of Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915). Nowadays Windelband is best known for his Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, and as a representative of the ‘Southwest-German school’ of neo-Kantianism. I will argue that Windelband develops in his work a (rather unique) conception of philosophy as worldview. This conception is based on a metaphysical interpretation of Kant, especially of his Kritik der Urteilskraft. Windelband’s Kant interpretation owes much to that of his teacher, Kuno Fischer, who, in turn, had a notorious encounter with Trendelenburg over the right interpretation of Kant. This discussion focused on the question whether Kant had sufficiently argued for the exclusive subjectivity of space and time, as forms of appearance, in his transcendental aesthetics. I will argue that the differences in the evaluation of Weltanschauung in Trendelenburg and Windelband must be understood against the background of the Fischer-Trendelenburg controversy.

Early on in his philosophical career, Windelband held that a philosophical, scientific worldview, that is: knowledge of the world as it is in itself, is impossible. Windelband rejected the idea of a philosophical worldview with an appeal to Kant’s epistemology: Kant had shown the impossibility of all scientific knowledge beyond the realm of experience. In his later work, however, Windelband arrives at a different interpretation of Kant —and at a different, positive interpretation of the concept of worldview. Even if philosophy is primarily a theory of science, this theory results in a philosophical worldview. A crucial step in

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24 Although this is a common classification of Windelband, the term neo-Kantianism is in itself not very informative. It covers a wide range of philosophers and philosophical positions. Cf. E.W. Orth, ‘Die Einheit des Neukantianismus’.

25 Windelband’s interpretation of worldview and its systematic legitimation is also unique in the sense that it is different from that of other neo-Kantians, such as Heinrich Rickert for instance. Cf. Krijnen, Nachmetaphysischer Sinn, 120f.
Windelband’s argument is the inclusion of the historical sciences alongside the natural sciences: the philosophical foundation of the objectivity of the historical sciences can only be accomplished through a system of universally valid values. The philosophical knowledge of this noumenal realm of values constitutes the scientific, philosophical worldview. According to Windelband, this noumenal realm is expressed in history, and therefore can be known through history. At this point the metaphysical character of his concept of worldview, and of the Kant-interpretation underlying it, most clearly come to light.

In the final chapter I will compare and discuss the three interpretations of the concept of worldview and its place in philosophy. The question what systematic place the concept of worldview has in the philosophical systems under consideration will be the leading question for the comparison. How and why is the concept introduced into philosophy? Is it a ‘purely’ philosophical concept, introduced for systematic reasons, or is its introduction motivated by more general, cultural considerations?

After this first comparison, I will address the systematic foundations of the respective concepts of worldview. As each of the three positions discussed here make an identification between philosophy and worldview—each in its own way—the question whether this identification is philosophically warranted must be discussed. This boils down to the question—to use Husserl’s terminology—whether philosophy as rigorous science and as worldview are compatible, and if so, in what form. The answer to this question will show whether there is another viable way out of Husserl’s dilemma.26

26 ‘Another’ way, not only compared to the choice made by Husserl, but also compared to Heidegger, cf. note 21.
CHAPTER 2

FRIEDRICH ADOLF TRENDELENBURG:
AT THE ROOTS OF THE WORLDVIEW DEBATE

1. Introduction

Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg was the first to construe a philosophical system as a worldview (Weltanschauung or Weltansicht).\(^1\) Philosophical systems, in their basic forms, must be interpreted as Weltanschauungen. In an essay from 1847, ‘Ueber den letzten Unterschied der philosophischen Systemen’, Trendelenburg develops a classification of philosophical systems, according to their basic, metaphysical structure. In this chapter Trendelenburg’s concept of worldview and his classificatory account, as well as their systematic-philosophical background will be discussed.

Trendelenburg’s classification of philosophical systems, comprehended as worldviews, has been influential. Several of his students have formulated typological theories—of which Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie, which will be the topic of the next chapter, is the best known.\(^2\) It is not surprising, then, that parallels between Trendelenburg’s classification and these other attempts can be established. Especially Dilthey’s typology of worldviews has often been compared to Trendelenburg’s classification.\(^3\) Even if the nature and extent of the relation of Dilthey’s

\(^1\) These two terms are used alongside each other and as synonyms by Trendelenburg.

\(^2\) See also Kym, *Die Weltanschauungen und deren Consequenzen*. Köhnke, *Entstehung und Aufstieg*, 172f., lists a number of these attempts.

\(^3\) The structural similarity between Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie and Trendelenburg’s typological approach is emphasised by Wach, cf. Wach, *Typenlehre*, 8, 12, 18, and 31. Marquard refers to this text when he renders Wach’s thesis as the claim that ‘the three fundamental forms in Trendelenburg are in precise agreement with Dilthey’s types of worldviews’, cf. Marquard, *Weltanschauungstypologie*, 109. Although Wach indeed relates the types of worldviews in Dilthey to those in Trendelenburg, he does not speak of a precise agreement. Rather, he speaks of the more ‘differentiated’, and ‘subtle’
Weltanschauungstypologie and Trendelenburg’s classification of worldviews will be addressed later on, these observations already serve to indicate Trendelenburg’s influence. However, to give a more complete account of Trendelenburg’s systematic-philosophical relevance, not only his classificatory account as such must be taken into consideration, but also the philosophical theory of which it is a part. To this end, the concept of worldview and the classification built on it should not be studied in isolation, but in the context of the central philosophical goals that they serve.

This chapter will therefore analyze the concept of worldview in Trendelenburg’s work, notably his typology of worldviews, in the context of his systematic-philosophical project. Especially his principal work, the Logische Untersuchungen is taken into account. First the structure, function, and presuppositions of Trendelenburg’s theory of worldviews are analyzed in section 2. We will find that his typology of worldviews rests on a basic, metaphysical question. This question is also central to the programme of Trendelenburg’s Logische Untersuchungen. This programme, as it is most clearly expressed in the second edition of the Logische Untersuchungen, is the topic of section 3. Section 4 then studies in more detail some key concepts and results of this programme which are necessary to an understanding of Trendelenburg’s theory of worldviews and its relation to his systematic programme. Section 5 examines the metaphysical dimensions of Trendelenburg’s discussion of worldviews. Trendelenburg’s notorious discussion with Kuno Fischer on the interpretation of Kant (the so-called Fischer-Trendelenburg debate) serves to highlight the metaphysical dimensions of Trendelenburg’s account, and some central and potentially problematic issues in his ‘metaphysics of motion’. These issues, notably the issue whether Trendelenburg problematically employs a correspondence theory of knowledge, are discussed in section 6. It will be my conclusion that we must read Trendelenburg as an idealist to avoid these potential problems. In section 7, the scope of Trendelenburg’s idealism will be analyzed further and compared with German idealism. Together,
these results will enable a concluding perspective on the structure and function of Trendelenburg’s philosophical worldview theory, which will be given in section 8.

2. Towards a scientific resolution of the plurality of worldviews

Trendelenburg’s most concise definition of ‘worldview’ can be found in his *Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik* (1860):

> Die Weltanschauung ist der metaphysische Grundgedanke, der, consequent mit sich selbst, die besondern Erkenntnisse zum Ganzen einigt und Uebereinstimmung mit sich fordert.\(^4\)

This description reveals several relevant aspects of Trendelenburg’s use of the concept of *Weltanschauung*. First, a worldview is taken as a conception (*Gedanke*), more specifically, a fundamental conception (*Grundgedanke*). Because this conception is a fundamental conception, it cannot as such be deduced from other conceptions or principles. The adjective ‘metaphysical’ indicates that a worldview is a fundamental conception with respect to a metaphysical question. What this metaphysical question is, how a worldview can provide an answer to this question, and in what sense this answer is ‘fundamental’, are issues that will be discussed in detail in the following.

A further aspect of Trendelenburg’s use of the concept of *Weltanschauung* is that a worldview unifies the totality of knowledge. Although a worldview is ‘only’ a fundamental conception, it is also an ordering principle which unifies all knowledge in a coherent totality, and it even revises knowledge: ‘Was ihm [dem Grundgedanken] widerspricht, wird von ihm zurückgewiesen’.\(^5\) A worldview therefore not only unifies knowledge, but also corrects it by bringing knowledge into relation with the fundamental metaphysical conception.

\(^4\) Trendelenburg, *Naturrecht*, 22.
This critical unification of knowledge into a totality from a fundamental metaphysical conception (worldview) indicates a claim to exclusivity. As an ordering principle of the totality of scientific knowledge a worldview is incompatible with other worldviews. Different worldviews, departing from different fundamental metaphysical conceptions, result in different configurations of the totality of knowledge. The development of a worldview into a totality therefore leads to a denial of other worldviews; the choice of one fundamental metaphysical approach excludes the realisation of the others. Trendelenburg also speaks in this context of an ever-renewing conflict (Kampf) between different worldviews. For the very reason that a worldview embodies a fundamental metaphysical conception, which brings all knowledge into a relation with itself, it is also, according to Trendelenburg, incompatible with other worldviews.

It must be concluded, however, that the totalities that result from the different worldviews are relative, or limited totalities, that is, they are limited views of the world, relative to the fundamental metaphysical conception that lies at its root. These limited views on the totality are ‘final hypotheses’ (letzte Hypothesen) and as such cannot give definitive theoretical support for their fundamental metaphysical conceptions. If such theoretical support can be given, there will not be an ever-returning conflict between the different worldviews. The concept of worldview as it is employed here by Trendelenburg therefore entails recognition of the limits of philosophy, its inability to provide conclusive theoretical support of its most fundamental metaphysical conception—at least insofar as the current state of philosophy for Trendelenburg is concerned, for we will soon learn that he does see a way out of the recurring conflict of worldviews.

Trendelenburg’s notion of a worldview as a fundamental metaphysical conception, introduced here on the basis of his 1860 Naturrecht, has its origins in an essay of 1847, entitled Ueber den letzten Unterschied der philosophischen Systeme. In this text, Trendelenburg raises the question how philosophical systems—

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6 Trendelenburg, Naturrecht, 23: ‘Werden diese Weltanschauungen zur Totalität ausgebildet, so widersprechen sie einander und der Kampf derselben erneuert sich immer wieder, wie der Kampf letzter Hypothesen.’
in their diversity and detached from the ‘external’ context of history—are ‘internally related’. This question is first of all taken up as the search for a fundamental difference between philosophical systems, as the title of the essay indicates. This point of ultimate difference between philosophical systems is at the same time a point at which the connection between the systems reveals itself, and is therefore the point at which the systems can be brought in relation to one another.

Like natural objects, which according to Trendelenburg can only be put in a ‘meaningful overview’ from the perspective of a fundamental difference, philosophical systems should also be ordered and brought in relation from the perspective of a fundamental difference. Despite this analogy with taxonomies in the natural sciences, however, Trendelenburg’s treatment of philosophical systems differs in two essential respects. The philosophical ‘taxonomy’ of systems which Trendelenburg aims at has a non-empirical and dynamical character.

The classificatory procedures of philosophy should not take their starting point in the factual, historically present philosophical systems, as specimens for the taxonomy that has to be devised. The fundamental difference between systems should be developed from the philosophical subject matter as such (aus innern Verhältnissen der Sache) and only subsequently be applied to factual, historical philosophical systems. For Trendelenburg, common distinctions that are applied to the diversity of historical philosophical systems—such as nominalism/realism, dogmatism/scepticism, critical/dialectical philosophy—are insufficient as fundamental differences. For one thing, these distinctions often serve not as systematic distinctions, but rather as ‘catchwords’ (Stichwörter) which reveal only the systematic presuppositions of the philosopher who is applying them. Moreover, it cannot be determined without systematic discussion whether one of these distinctions can function as the fundamental dis-

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8 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 1: ‘[Naturkörper die sich...] nur in einem letzten Unterschied der Sache zu einem bedeutsamen Ueberblick ordnen.’
9 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 2.
tinction. Philosophy should therefore devise its ‘taxonomy’ of systems in a non-empirical way, and find the fundamental distinction between systems antecedently, out of the philosophical concepts themselves.

As a consequence of this approach, it can be concluded that the relation of Trendelenburg’s classificatory method to history—especially the history of philosophy—is secondary in character. This result is important in comparison to Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie, and other positions in the worldview debate which we will encounter later on, in which the relation between philosophy and (its) history plays an important role. While the philosophical-historical interests of Dilthey and other participants in the later philosophical debates around the topic of worldview cannot be overlooked, it is also clear from the outset that Trendelenburg’s prime motivation behind his classification of worldviews is not historical, but rather systematic.

This systematic motivation itself, however, has philosophical-historical consequences. It is applied by Trendelenburg, for instance, as an instrument for the analysis and classificatory presentation of the history of philosophy. Trendelenburg demands that the fundamental distinction between philosophical systems that has to be established for it to be a final and fundamental distinction must be applicable to every historical system. Moreover, the most general distinction should provide the ‘germ’ (Keim) of more specific differences between systems.\textsuperscript{10} Although Trendelenburg’s classificatory theory thus clearly has consequences for the study of the history of philosophy, his ‘taxonomy’ must be considered to be non-empirical, for it takes its point of departure in systematic considerations, not in the objects to be classified (the philosophical systems). This already reflects the systematic goal which, as we shall see, Trendelenburg’s classification serves.

This systematic concern becomes even more apparent when one considers the dynamic character of Trendelenburg’s classification. The distinction of philosophical systems that Trendelenburg aims at consists of more than just a ‘grouping’ (Anordnung, Gruppierung) of systems in a ‘descriptive system’. The philosoph-
ical systems are to be understood as ‘living processes in minds, struggles of fundamental ideas for the dominance in thinking and willing’. That is, the fundamental and final distinction is not only a point of separation between different kinds of systems, but also a point at which the different systems encounter one another, and ‘struggle for dominance’. The philosophical systems that are organised according to the fundamental distinction do not ‘statically’ stand next to each other, as in a mere description of different kinds, but compete for dominance in thinking. Consequently, the final distinction between worldviews also presents the ‘final and fundamental problems’ (die letzten Probleme). That philosophy should try and is able to solve these problems is apparent from the further course of Trendelenburg’s analysis. The classification of the different types of worldviews ends in (at least) a temporary solution of these problems, as we will see shortly.

How is this final and fundamental distinction between philosophical systems determined by Trendelenburg? The fundamental difference is to be found in a contrast of philosophical concepts:

In den verschiedenen Gestalten der Philosophie liegen Versuche vor, verschiedene Grundbegriffe als die letzten und als die schöpferischen geltend zu machen […] Wäre es möglich, den letzten Gegensatz unter diesen Begriffen zu bestimmen […] so würden sich in demselben vermutlich die letzten Unterschiede der Systeme nachweisen lassen.

Since the totality of knowledge in its origin is the object of philosophy, it can be expected that the greatest contrast between the concepts that determine and create other concepts (and therefore are able to form the ‘centre’ (Mittelpunkt) of a system) also determines the fundamental difference between philosophical systems.

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11 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 1: ‘… lebendige Vorgänge in den Geistern, Kämpfe der Grundbegriffe um die Herrschaft im Denken und Wollen.’
12 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 2.
13 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 3.
This fundamental contrast is eventually construed by Trendelenburg as the opposition between thought (Gedanke) and ‘blind’ or ‘naked’ force (Kraft). The contrast between the subjective and the objective, which according to Trendelenburg manifests itself in German philosophy ‘since Kant’, becomes sharpest when ‘thought opposes the world’ (das Denken der Welt gegenübersteht).\textsuperscript{14} The subjective, the ‘one, concentrated activity of thought’, seeks to understand and found the objective, the world, it seeks to absorb the infinite totality of beings (die unendliche Fülle des Seienden).\textsuperscript{15} But to constitute the fundamental difference, thought and the world must be taken in their greatest opposition. Being is most alien to thought, and therefore the opposition is greatest when being confronts thought with the claim (Anspruch) that it is ‘determined by itself and not by thought’.\textsuperscript{16} Being thus construed, fully independent of thought, is in sharpest contrast with ‘conscious thought’ (der bewußte Gedanke). This contrast between ‘blind force’ and ‘conscious thought’ is the greatest amongst the philosophical concepts.\textsuperscript{17}

But this opposition is not limited to philosophical concepts as such. It can also be encountered in the world: ‘In der Welt, welche wir überblicken, haben wir in beiden zwei Endpunkte, zwei Aeusserste vor uns’.\textsuperscript{18} The contrast therefore is not only a logical one, resulting from the principles of knowledge, but also a metaphysical one, that is, pertaining to the world as it is. In the experience of the world thought and being are two extreme and opposing spheres. For this reason, Trendelenburg can describe a

\textsuperscript{14} Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 4.
\textsuperscript{15} Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 5. This subjectivity must not be interpreted as pure thought (reines Denken), it has its organon in the ongoing generations of man. Trendelenburg’s critique of ‘pure thought’ in Hegel’s dialectics is discussed in Köhnke, Entstehung und Aufstieg, 48f.
\textsuperscript{16} Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 5: ‘...aus sich selbst und nicht aus dem Gedanken bestimmt zu sein.’
\textsuperscript{17} Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 7. According to Trendelenburg, the conceptual pairs subjective/objective and ideal/real can be used to express the same distinction, but they are also prone to confusion. Trendelenburg especially wants to avoid the impression of static objectivity in the objective and real. Instead he puts emphasis on the activity of force.
\textsuperscript{18} Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 9.
worldview as a fundamental metaphysical idea, and also construe the question of the relation between force and thought as the fundamental metaphysical question. This connection between logic and metaphysics will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.

The relation between force and thought can be conceived in three different ways, according to Trendelenburg. A first possibility is to take force as fundamental, in such a way that thought is not original, but a ‘product’, ‘*accidens*’, or ‘result’ of the blind forces. The philosophical systems that can be retraced to this metaphysical starting point are designated by Trendelenburg as *materialistic* systems, worldviews that are determined by the ‘active cause’ (*cause efficiens*). Alternatively, he also refers to this type of worldview as a physical or mechanical worldview, or—from a historical perspective—as *Demokritismus*. The second option, in contrast with the first, is to put thought before force. This option leads to the *idealistic* systems, worldviews determined by the ‘internal end’ (*causa finalis*), an *organic* or teleological worldview. Historically, this option is designated as *Platonism*. The third way in which the relation between force and thought can be conceived is the view which does not ascribe priority to either of these two fundamental concepts, but instead takes them to be equally valid ways in which the mind represents the ‘essence of the infinite substance’. These systems of *indifference* between cause and end are connected historically by Trendelenburg with the name of Spinoza.

The two fundamental concepts, force and thought, thus determine the final and fundamental distinction, and hence determine Trendelenburg’s classification of philosophical systems as worldviews. It is important to lay emphasis on the fact that these two concepts do not as such constitute the fundamental distinction, but that the fundamental distinction is determined by the way in which the *relation* between these two concepts is conceived. The fundamental metaphysical conception, which is

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20 ‘Platonism’ is used by Trendelenburg in a broad sense, which for instance also includes Aristotle. Cf. *Unterschied*, 14.
embodied by a worldview, is not to be conceived as one concept.\textsuperscript{22}
It is an answer to the question how these two fundamental concepts are related. An interpretation of Trendelenburg’s classification which takes each type of worldview as determined by only one fundamental concept thus fails to recognize the internal dynamics that philosophical systems have in Trendelenburg’s analysis. This dynamical relation between thought and force, or thought and being, is essential to Trendelenburg’s project of a philosophical ‘theory of science’. We will return to this in the next section.

The relation between the three possible types of worldviews is also of a dynamic nature. The worldviews stand in a relation of ‘conflict’ (\textit{Kampf}). Only one of the three worldviews can be ‘true and actual’.\textsuperscript{23} But this observation of a dynamics of worldviews as such is not the point at which Trendelenburg’s analysis ends, as in an irresolvable plurality of worldviews. His classificatory method aims at a critical judgement of the different fundamental metaphysical conceptions, and at a (preliminary) decision between them.

The worldview of ‘indifference’ between thought and being, Spinozism, is discarded by Trendelenburg. It is a merely hypothetical possibility of determining the relation between thought and force. Historically it has never been realised (not even by Spinoza himself) without collapsing into either materialism or idealism. The Spinozistic worldview is a systematic possibility, resulting from the determination of the fundamental contrast as the contrast between force and thought. Systematic and historic-

\textsuperscript{22} Joachim Wach therefore characterises Trendelenburg’s typological approach too simply as a reduction of a philosophical system to one concept (Wach, \textit{Typenlehre}, 14-15). Although Trendelenburg does occasionally speak of fundamental concepts (\textit{Grundbegriffe}, e.g. \textit{Naturrecht}, 3), he in fact assigns to each type a fundamental principle (\textit{Grundgedanke}) which describes the relationship between two fundamental concepts (i.e. thought and force). Wach ignores the dynamic character of Trendelenburg’s typological theory, which rests on the relationship between thought and force.

\textsuperscript{23} Cf. e.g. Trendelenburg, \textit{Unterschied}, 10 or Trendelenburg, \textit{Naturrecht}, 23.
al philosophical scrutiny shows that it cannot exist as an actual and an independent type of worldview, alongside the other two types.  

A decision between these two other types is not so easily made, however. Both the materialistic and the organic worldview carry inherent problems in them, which prevent a decision by purely theoretical means. The materialistic systems stand for the insoluble difficulty of explaining how the ‘harmony of the living’ can be derived from the ‘blind forces’ which this worldview takes as fundamental. Put differently, this is the problem of (physical) reductionism: when reality is ultimately taken to consist of forces, atoms or other elements, how can the possibility and existence of more complex structures be demonstrated?

The organic worldview in turn has problems explaining how the domain of thought (which is taken as fundamental) can realise itself in the domain of force: ‘Es hilft nichts, den Gedanken vor die Kraft zu stellen. Man soll zeigen, wie es geschehen könne, daß er die Kraft ergreife und regiere’. To solve this problem, the organic worldview has to presuppose an original common point of thought and force, but this point lies ‘as yet beyond speculation’ (bis jetzt über die Speculation hinaus). In this essay from 1847, however, Trendelenburg foresees the possibility of a solution to this problem of an original unity of thought and force:

Vielleicht läßt sich hoffen, daß einst die Naturwissenschaften die Kräfte zu einer ähnlichen Einheit fügen [...] Dann würden sie am Ende den Platonismus nicht stürzen, sondern nur fester gründen. Dann erst werden sich die Kräfte der Natur wie die Laute der Sprache verhalten; sie werden einen Sinn haben und einen göttlichen Gedanken kund geben, wie diese einen menschlichen.

25 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 22-23.
26 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 24.
27 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 25.
28 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 28.
The continuing scientific examination of the manifold of forces, which results in an incrementally developing unity of (scientific) knowledge of the forces, should eventually grasp the original unity of thought and force. Thus the origin of both blind force and human thought in a comprehensive, objective thought would be demonstrated.29

Although this task cannot be solved at the level of theoretical thought (yet), Trendelenburg decides in favour of the organic worldview. His argument for this decision is not theoretical, but practical. For the sake of ethics, Trendelenburg puts his confidence in the organic worldview.30 Only the organic worldview can be the foundation of ethics, Trendelenburg will argue in 1860,31 in 1847 he formulates more subtly: ‘Das Organische und Ethische steht in einem Bunde; denn das Ethische ist das sich selbst erkennende, das bewußt und frei gewordene Organische’.32 The materialistic worldview cannot provide a foundation of the good, nor of thought, because of its reductionist character. Only an organic worldview, which aims at totality, can provide a solution here: ‘Weder das Gute noch der Gedanke könnte am Ende und im Einzelnen herauskommen, wenn er nicht im Ursprung und im Ganzen läge’.33 Only a worldview which acknowledges the primacy of this original thought as the totality of knowledge over individual forces can provide the proper place for the good. To show how thought and being originate in this ‘original thought’ would become the aim of Trendelenburg’s Logische Untersuchungen, especially in the second edition.

29 Ibid.
31 Trendelenburg, Naturrecht, VII.
32 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 28.
33 Trendelenburg, Unterschied, 29.
AT THE ROOTS OF THE WORLDVIEW DEBATE

3. Philosophy and the sciences: the programme of the Logische Untersuchungen

In order to grasp the systematic-philosophical context of Trendelenburg’s classification of worldviews, I will analyze this classification against the backdrop of his principal theoretical philosophical work, the Logische Untersuchungen. The practical choice of the organic worldview turned out to be provisional in the previous section, a placeholder for a theoretical foundation. This is also apparent from Trendelenburg’s legitimation of the decision for the Platonic or organic worldview in his Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik. Although Trendelenburg argues here, too, that the ‘ethical principle’ only can be found in the organic worldview, he also points to the efforts of logic and metaphysics to found the organic worldview: ‘Die Logik und Metaphysik entscheidet sich nach unserer Ansicht für die organische Weltanschauung und sucht diese zu begründen’.34 It is in the Logische Untersuchungen that Trendelenburg undertakes the project of a theoretical foundation of the organic worldview. This programme of the Logische Untersuchungen, to provide a ‘logic and metaphysics as founding science’, is clarified by Trendelenburg in an additional chapter in the second edition of this work (1862).35 There he describes the task of philosophy in relation to the sciences as the articulation of a ‘theory of science’—and as such philosophy is a ‘founding science’.36

According to this view, philosophy has to rely on the sciences, and the sciences in turn have to rely on philosophy, to provide their foundation: ‘Wo es noch keine anderen Wissenschaften

34 Trendelenburg, Naturrecht, 23. In the synoptical table of contents at the beginning of the work, Trendelenburg writes that ‘only the organic worldview can be the foundation of ethics’, VII.
35 Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen 1, 414. Henceforth cited as LU, followed by volume number. References to the Logische Untersuchungen without date are to the expanded, second edition (1862). References to the first edition have the year of publication (1840) added. The difference between the first two editions as far as the concept of worldview is concerned will be discussed in the following.
36 LU 1, 11, 14.
giebt, da giebt es auch eigentlich noch keine Philosophie’. The special sciences develop at first independently and in a scattered fashion, like ‘disjointed parts’ (unverbundene Stücke). They deal with parts or even ‘parts of parts’ of the universe. According to Trendelenburg, the goal of scientific knowledge must be found in the totality:

Erst wenn das Universum vom erkennenden Geiste wieder erzeugt wäre, würde sich in vollem Sinne der Organismus der Wissenschaften darstellen, in welchem die einzelnen Disciplinen Glieder eines Ganzen werden.

In 1862 this totality is still far away, almost infinitely remote. In such a totality philosophy and the special sciences would no longer be disconnected disciplines. Philosophy assimilates (in sich aufnehmen) the sciences into itself, and the sciences help to build philosophy (auferbauen). On the road to this totality, philosophy has the task of investigating and presenting the ‘idea of the totality and the universal’ from the parts and from the particular:

Inzwischen ist es auf dem Wege zu dem weit hinausgerückten Ziel das Geschäft der philosophischen Forschung, die Idee des Ganzen in den Theilen, die Idee des Allgemeinen in dem Besondern aufzusuchen und darzustellen.

To fulfil this task, philosophy turns to the special sciences. These sciences are differentiated according to their respective objects and methods. The restriction of the object of knowledge is a hallmark of the special sciences. This restriction points beyond

37 LU 1, 5.
38 LU 1, 6.
39 ‘Ein solches Ganze, welches erst die Frucht vollendeter Erkenntnis sein kann, liegt wie die letzte Idee in weiter Aussicht, fast wie in unendlicher Entfernung’, LU 1, 6. The adverb ‘fast’ (almost) is important here: it signifies the difference between a real and an infinite task for human knowledge.
40 LU 1, 6.
41 ‘Der besondere Gegenstand jeder Wissenschaft thut sich als die Verzweigung eines allgemeinen Seins und die eigenthümliche Methode thut sich als eine besondere Richtung des erkennenden Denkens, des Denkens überhaupt, kund.’ LU 1, 6.
itself, however, in that the different objects of knowledge do not stand unrelated alongside each other, but in reciprocal relations (wechselseitige Beziehungen). In this way, a consideration of the object of scientific knowledge leads to the question of metaphysics—in its original, ‘Aristotelian’ sense according to Trendelenburg—what ‘being as such, the universal as ground of the particular object’ is. Likewise, consideration of the different scientific methods leads to the question of their origin in the ‘essence of thinking’ (das Wesen des Denkens). The question of the unity of the sciences leads thus to logic and metaphysics:

Wenn die Wissenschaften sich vollenden wollen, so bedürfen sie gerade dessen, worauf sie, über sich selbst hinaus, hinführen. Logik und Metaphysik sind insofern die Consequenz ihres wissenschaftlichen Triebes.45

A philosophical theory of science should therefore encompass logic and metaphysics. But this must not be taken as a mere addition of two disciplines. The question of being that metaphysics addresses, and the question of thinking that logic addresses, have to be completed by adding the question of the relation between thinking and being. Only from the relation of logic and metaphysics can the ‘inner possibility of knowledge’ be understood.44 For this (philosophical) science, which unifies the analysis of thinking and of being, and the disciplines of logic and metaphysics, Trendelenburg uses the expression ‘logic in a broad sense’ (Logik im weiteren Sinne), and his ‘logical investigations’ are aimed at precisely such a logic.45

Trendelenburg explicitly formulates this programme of a founding science which encompasses logic and metaphysics in the second edition of the Logische Untersuchungen of 1862, that is, fifteen years after the essay Üeber den letzten Unterschied der metaphysischen Systeme. Especially the additional first chapter, entitled ‘Logik und Metaphysik als grundlegende Wissenschaft’, reflects

42 ‘...das Seiende als solches, das Allgemeine als Grund des besonderen Gegenstandes’, LU 1, 6-9, quote: 9.
43 LU 1, 10.
44 ‘...innere Möglichkeit des Wissens verstehen und das Denken in seinem Streben zum Wissen begreifen’, LU 1, 11.
45 LU 1, 12.
this new self-interpretation of the *Logische Untersuchungen*. But other passages are examples of this revised self-interpretation as well, for instance an added paragraph in the *Rückblick* at the end of the work. There the aim of the work is described as a ‘theory of science’ which is ‘logic in a broad sense’ and which investigates the logical and metaphysical presuppositions of science.\(^{46}\)

This updated self-interpretation of the second edition notwithstanding, the programme that is made explicit in the second edition is in fact already found in the first edition. There Trendelenburg defines the task of logic, in relation to the special sciences, as follows: ‘to bring the unconscious to consciousness, and to understand what is different in its common origin.’\(^{47}\) The continuity of the systematic core of the work between the two editions is also clear when the central question of the work is taken into account: the question how thought and being are related.\(^{48}\) This question, identically formulated in both the first and second edition, is the same as the ‘basic metaphysical question’ which is used to classify the worldviews in the 1847 essay. Yet despite this continuity of the work’s basic question, it is only in the revised and expanded second edition, appearing years after the 1847 essay, that Trendelenburg explicitly describes the programme of the *Logische Untersuchungen* as the founding science of logic and metaphysics.

At this point it is possible to draw a preliminary conclusion with respect to the relation between the programme of the *Logische Untersuchungen* and the typology of worldviews which was discussed in the previous section. The typology of worldviews according to the way in which the relation between the fundamental concepts ‘thought’ and ‘force’ is construed stands in an immediate relation to the programme of the *Logische Untersuchungen*. The central question of the work in both the first and second edition is the question how of the thought and being ultimately

\(^{46}\) LU 2, 489, cf. the first edition, LU (1840) 2, 363.

\(^{47}\) ‘... das Unbewußte zum Bewußtsein zu erheben und das Verschiedene im gemeinsamen Ursprunge zu begreifen’, LU (1840) 1, VI-VII.

\(^{48}\) ‘Wie kommt das Denken zum Sein? Wie tritt das Sein in das Denken? Diese Frage bezeichnen wir als die Grundfrage.’, LU (1840) 1, 105. Cf. LU 1, 135. Trendelenburg’s answer to this question in the LU will be discussed below.
relate and are connected. The revised self-interpretation of the second edition, in terms of a founding theory of science which encompasses logic and metaphysics, makes the answer to this fundamental metaphysical question the foundation of the organic worldview, which integrates philosophy and the special sciences. The possible answers to this very same question are also studied and critically judged by Trendelenburg in his 1847 essay Über den letzten Unterschied der metaphysischen Systeme. The typology of metaphysical systems which is presented in this essay is therefore both a prolegomenon and a stand-in for the intended, final theory of science. It is a prolegomenon because it provides an inventory of the possible solutions to the fundamental metaphysical problem and suggests the direction in which the final solution can be found. Yet the typology of worldviews in Trendelenburg is also a stand-in, for it gives a practical argument for the selection of the organic worldview right now—until the theoretical project of an organic totality of knowledge and of the founding connection of thought and being is completed. The worldviews therefore embody what Trendelenburg called the ‘idea of totality in the parts, the idea of the universal in the particular’, but only as limited totalities, relative to the fundamental metaphysical conceptions that structure them. A theoretical, philosophical foundation of the organic worldview as the fundamental metaphysical conception, by way of the logical-metaphysical theory of science, can elevate this relative totality into a true totality of knowledge.

4. Key concepts of the Logische Untersuchungen

A worldview entails an answer to the fundamental metaphysical question: how are thought and being related? The classification of worldviews undertaken by Trendelenburg, and the subsequent critical discussion of the different types of worldviews, was a preliminary account to establish the organic worldview as the ‘right’ worldview. The classification of worldviews and the choice of the organic worldview that it enabled were merely a stand-in for a theory of science that, in conjunction with the results of the sciences themselves, would provide a final solution to the fundamental metaphysical problem.
A worldview, even the organic worldview, provides limited knowledge as long as it is not scientifically established. Until the scientific-philosophical foundation of the metaphysical stance that is incorporated in the organic worldview is completed, the knowledge that is provided by the worldviews is essentially unfounded. Although practical reasons can be given for a certain fundamental metaphysical stance—as Trendelenburg did in case of the organic worldview—these reasons are not sufficient as a theoretical foundation. And, as was argued above, the *Logische Untersuchungen* are considered by Trendelenburg to provide such a theoretical foundation of the organic worldview, from the second edition onwards.

The classification of worldviews is intrinsically connected to the project of a theory of science in Trendelenburg’s work. The fundamental question that is answered by a worldview is also the fundamental question of the theory of science. But worldviews and the theory of science also stand in a certain opposition. What a worldview in Trendelenburg’s classificatory analysis provides only provisionally, i.e. an answer to the fundamental metaphysical question, a theory of science as it is intended in the *Logische Untersuchungen* would provide definitively. The organic worldview would, strictly speaking, cease to be a worldview—i.e. a view of the world that allows for other, different views—were it to be founded in a theory of science. The completion of the intended theory of science—which would include the sciences and their philosophical foundation into an organic totality—would entail a resolution of the plurality of worldviews. To gain further insight into this relationship between philosophy as worldview and the sciences, the key concepts and arguments from the *Logische Untersuchungen* will be examined in more detail here.

### 4.1. An original mediating activity

The goal of the *Logische Untersuchungen* is to provide a systematic philosophical account of thought and being that will reveal the connection between the two, and thus provide a foundation of knowledge and an origin of being. To achieve this goal, Trendelenburg formulates several conditions which must be sat-
satisfied. Before examining these conditions however, some things will be said about the role of dualism in Trendelenburg’s account.

Trendelenburg’s account of knowledge takes its point of departure in a dualism. Even if he is aware of the criticisms levelled against dualistic accounts of knowledge, Trendelenburg holds that human knowledge entails the experience of separation between the knowing subject and the known object.\textsuperscript{49} The starting-point is therefore taken in the separation of thought and being, and the question is how they are united in the process of knowing (\textit{im Erkennen}).\textsuperscript{50} The human mind (unlike the mind of God, as Trendelenburg notes) is marked by separation, the mind lives from the experiences that it receives. A completely free, self-active (\textit{selbstthätig}) human mind, which receives nothing and constructs everything, would master itself, but would be a master in emptiness (\textit{einsame Herrschaft}), and would be disconnected from the world. The greatness of the human mind lies in the symmetry (\textit{Ebenmass}) of receiving and constructing (\textit{bilden}).\textsuperscript{51}

It is important to note that this dualism is indeed a point of departure: the philosophical analysis starts here, but the goal is to provide a connection or mediation between thought and being. Both the separation of thinking and being, and the connection of the two, are a common experience in the process of knowledge. Trendelenburg consciously takes a preliminary concept (\textit{Vorstellung}) of knowledge at the outset of his investigation.\textsuperscript{52} This preliminary concept is necessary because thought can only understand itself in a reflexive activity: one cannot provide a theoretically sufficient concept of thought or knowledge other than through reflexive analysis of thinking by itself.\textsuperscript{53} The preliminary concept is the starting-point on which the reflexive activity builds

\textsuperscript{49} LU 1, 135.  
\textsuperscript{50} LU 1, 134.  
\textsuperscript{51} LU 1, 135.  
\textsuperscript{52} LU 1, 131.  
\textsuperscript{53} ‘Wie das Sehen nur durch das Sehen begriffen wird, so das Denken nur durch das Denken. […] In einer höheren Weise wird auch das Erkennen alle seine Elemente voraussetzen, wenn es sich in sich selbst zurecht finden soll’, LU 1, 131.
its investigation. Furthermore, this preliminary concept should entail or lead to a contradiction (Widerspruch) that would drive the investigation.\textsuperscript{54} The preliminary concept of knowledge which Trendelenburg uses is that of knowledge as representational knowledge. Knowledge is always knowledge of something (even if one tries to gain knowledge of ‘nothing’).\textsuperscript{55} This something, which as object of knowledge is a part of being, is posited as a representation in thought. Knowledge (as it is taken in this preliminary concept) is therefore marked by the opposition of thought and being. This opposition is problematic, for the reality of scientific knowledge implies that the gap between thought and being can be successfully bridged. The ‘fact of the sciences’\textsuperscript{56} demonstrates for Trendelenburg the possibility of knowledge of the world:

\begin{quote}
Die Thatsache der Wissenschaften ist die Basis des logischen Problems. Sie dringen von den verschiedensten Punkten in die Welt ein. [...] Die Wissenschaften stellen der Skepsis ein Factum entgegen, dem bedenklichen Zweifel eine wachsende, schöpferische That.\textsuperscript{57}
\end{quote}

These two initial assumptions in the concept of knowledge, i.e. that knowledge is marked by the opposition between thought and being, and that knowledge of being (‘the world’) is possible, define the basic problem of Trendelenburg’s logical investigations anew:

\begin{quote}
Es ist die Aufgabe, den Gegensatz zwischen Denken und Sein zu vermitteln. In jeder Erkenntnis finden wir ihn ausgeglichen vor; er soll jedoch in diesem Akte der Ausgleichung zur Anschauung kommen.\textsuperscript{58}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{54} This is an indication of the dynamic character of Trendelenburg’s theory of knowledge. It is assumed here that, without an apparent contradiction in the preliminary concept, a further investigation would not commence. The idea that knowledge only grows through the encounter of contradictions, paradoxes and riddles figures more recently in the work of Thomas Kuhn.

\textsuperscript{55} LU 1, 132.

\textsuperscript{56} Cf. Orth, ‘Trendelenburg und die Wissenschaft als Kulturfaktum’.

\textsuperscript{57} LU 1, 130-131.

\textsuperscript{58} LU 1, 136.
It is for the successful completion of this task that Trendelenburg suggests a set of criteria by which a successful mediation can be recognized. The first observation is that that which mediates between thought and being must be something that is common to both elements of this opposition. More specifically, this commonality must not be understood as a property that is common to both thought and being. For such a commonality would not mediate. As mediation it must be an activity (Thätigkeit). The first criterion therefore is that that which mediates has to be an activity that is common to both thought and being.

Secondly, the mediating activity that is sought needs to be original, that is, have its origin in nothing but itself. For if the mediating activity originated in something else, then this latter activity would determine the former, and this activity would have to be taken as the mediating activity instead. The second criterion is therefore that the common mediating activity is original, such that it can only be known from itself. As such, it is the foundation (Grund) of knowledge. For the original mediating activity, the foundation of knowledge and the origin of being are the same.

From this second criterion follows, thirdly, that the mediating activity has to be simple, not composed. For something that is composed depends on the composing elements, and is therefore not original. The mediating activity is also the most general by consequence. For if there were a more general activity, this latter activity would determine the less general activity, and this less general activity would not be the original mediating activity. The third criterion is thus that the mediating activity is the most general, simple (not composed) activity.

In sum: the duality between thought and being that is experienced in knowledge has to be mediated, and thus resolved, by an activity that is prior to both thought and being. It forms the foundation of knowledge of itself, and the origin of its being. A

59 LU 1, 137.
60 ‘Wir haben also eine dem Denken und Sein gemeinsame Thätigkeit zu suchen.’ LU 1, 138.
61 LU 1, 139.
62 LU 1, 140.
question still open at this point is whether this original mediating activity is also the foundation of all knowledge, and the origin of all being. To this we will return shortly. The original dualism, which was assumed in the preliminary concept of knowledge, should be overcome by a more original and fundamental, monistic activity. Now that the criteria for such a mediating activity are stated, Trendelenburg’s proposition for the fundamental mediating activity can be examined: the principle of motion.

4.2. Motion

Motion (Bewegung) fulfils the three criteria formulated above, according to Trendelenburg. Since his line of reasoning provides valuable insight into the nature of this mediating activity that is provided by motion, it is worth examining the three arguments in some detail.\(^{63}\)

1. The argument for the commonality of motion to both thought and being. According to Trendelenburg, there is apparently (auf den ersten Blick) a distinction between the inside world of thought and the outside world of being.\(^{64}\) We must bear in mind that Trendelenburg here uses a common sense concept of knowledge, in which he points out a problem which makes it possible to gain further insight into what knowledge is. By making clear that this is Trendelenburg’s way of arguing, in line with his own prescriptions for the analysis of the concept of knowledge,\(^{65}\) we should be prevented from accusing him too quickly of naïvely assuming a dualism between an ‘internal’ and an ‘external’ world. The investigation into the nature of knowledge only takes this dualistic model of knowledge, which is borrowed from common sense, as a starting point to arrive at a concept of knowledge which is scientifically more sound by addressing the problems

\(^{63}\) For a succinct discussion of the concept of motion in Trendelenburg, see also: Kym, Bewegung, 1-4.

\(^{64}\) LU 1, 141.

\(^{65}\) Cf. LU 1, 131-132.
and contradictions entailed in this common sense concept. It is Trendelenburg’s intention not only to overcome the dualism entailed in this common sense concept on a logical or epistemological level, but also to secure the connection between being and thought on a metaphysical level, as we have seen.

As far as the outside world is concerned, every activity is connected to motion. Motion is the most widespread activity in being (die verbreiteste Thätigkeit im Sein). Everything that has become, every form that exists is produced (erzeugt) through motion, ‘which controls matter’. Even rest can only be understood through motion (rest as the counterbalance of motions) but not the other way round. If one tries to define motion as suspension (Aufhebung) of rest, motion is presupposed, since every ‘suspension’ already presupposes the concept of motion, says Trendelenburg. With references to natural sciences such as biology, geology, and astronomy (the absence of a fixed point in the universe, everything is in motion) he argues the claim that motion is everywhere in nature.

There must be a counterpart (literally: counter-picture, Gegenbild) of external motion in the inner world of thought. For without such a counterpart in thought, thought could not become conscious of the motion of being. This is what Trendelenburg calls ‘constructive motion’ (konstruktive Bewegung, as opposed to ‘external’ motion in space) which is at work in visual perception and imaginative representation (Anschauung and Vorstellung). Both in perception and in imaginative representation motion is essential. When one perceives something (Trendelenburg’s example is a mountain), one has to ‘circumscribe’ (umschreiben) it through one’s view and produce (erzeugen) it that way. When one imagines something, it must be produced in the

66 Trendelenburg’s use of common sense is therefore in line with Hegel’s, despite his critique of Hegel’s dialectical method in the third chapter of the LU. It will be argued further on, however, that Trendelenburg fails to address all hidden assumptions in the common sense concept of knowledge he uses, and that this prevents him from giving a fully satisfactory account of knowledge.
67 ‘…durch die wirkende, die Materie beherrschende Bewegung erzeugt.’ LU 1, 141.
68 LU 1, 141-142.
‘space of thought’, through the motion of an ‘inner view’ (die Bewegung seines inneren Blickes). The perceived inner objects are ‘drawn’ in the space of thought (although instantaneously), and this drawing can only be achieved through motion.69

In the more abstract activities of thought too, like syllogistic reasoning, motion plays a central role. These activities work with an arrangement of concepts (such as relations between untergeordnete, übergeordnete, nebengeordnete Begriffe), and this arrangement can only be produced through motion. Every development of thought puts elements after one another which must be connected through motion.70 Examples of this are causal and teleological reasoning. Even in the activities of abstract thought, therefore, the image of spatial motion proves essential. Motion is therefore common to thought and being, according to Trendelenburg. The only distinction that remains is that one kind of motion takes place in external space, the other in the internal space of thought. Motion in the space of thought, however, is always a counterpart (Gegenbild) of external motion. Trendelenburg notes that this is not an analogy which is rooted in language alone, but that perceptive and imaginative thought, as well as abstract reasoning, are possible only through constructive motion.71

2. The argument for the originality of motion. The second criterion that applied to the activity that mediates between thought and being was that it must originate in itself, that is, must be both known from itself as well as be the ground of its own being. The mediating activity cannot be known from something else or originate in something else. The cause (Ursache) of being and the foundation (Grund) of knowledge are the same thing for the mediating activity. Trendelenburg notes that this must not be taken to mean that the ground of knowledge is the source of being in general, but only that the fundamental activity in thought

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69 LU 1, 143.
70 LU 1, 145.
71 LU 1, 146.
and being has the same character (‘das Thätige im Sein soll der Art nach zugleich das Thätige im Erkennen sein’). An idealism of the former kind not (yet!) intended here.\textsuperscript{72}

Every explanation of an appearance in nature presupposes motion. Explanations in the natural sciences explain motion from other motions, the more complex motions from the more simple, comprehensive, universal (\textit{allgemeinen}) motion.

So weit also irgendwo die Untersuchung der Erscheinungen reicht, immer bleibt in der Erklärung der einzelnen Bewegung die allgemeine Vorstellung dessen, was erklärt werden soll, als ein unablösliches Element zurück. Wenn hiernach die Bewegung in der Natur nichts Fremdes kennt, woraus sie sich erzeugt, sondern sich allenthalben als etwas Ursprüngliches äussert, so kann sie auch nur aus sich verstanden werden; denn was wir sonst begreifen, begreifen wir aus dem, was erzeugend vorangeht.\textsuperscript{73}

Trendelenburg’s argument here appears to be more general than just an argument for the fact that motion is known only from itself. He argues that to understand anything at all, at least insofar as the world of experience is concerned, motion is involved. Moreover, motion as such is the only thing that results in the analysis of natural phenomena, it appears as an irreducible, original element in explanations. Since we can only understand something from that which produces it, and since motion is not produced by anything else, it is both the source of its own being as well as the foundation of its being known.

The situation is the same for representation (\textit{Vorstellung}), where inner motion plays a central role. The whole geometry of the external world is re-created in the internal space through constructive or creative motion (\textit{die schaffende Bewegung}). According to Trendelenburg, it cannot be put against this view that the inner objects are caused by external objects, for the answer to the question \textit{how} the external objects cause the inner ones always involves motion:

\textsuperscript{72} LU 1, 146.
\textsuperscript{73} LU 1, 148.
Die letzte Antwort bleibt immer die Bewegung. Der Gegenstand könnte die Vorstellung nicht erregen, wenn ihn die Vorstellung nicht durch ihre verfolgende Bewegung gleichsam zu begegnen verstände.\textsuperscript{74}

Since motion is also yielded by the final analysis, the conclusion must be the same. Motion in thought and being springs (stammt) only from itself, and is also known only from itself.

3. \textit{The argument for the simplicity of motion.} This seems to be the most problematic criterion according to Trendelenburg. Motion seems to be compounded of two moments: space and time. Motion is usually defined as a change in the external relation of a thing to a given space.\textsuperscript{75} This change occurs only in time. Due to the changing relation to the given space, motion has a certain direction, and due to the changing relation to the space and the relation to time, motion has a certain speed. Therefore motion seems to be composed of both space and time. In this way of arguing, space and time are taken as given (fertige Elemente). These given elements together compose ‘factors’ of motion. Trendelenburg asks with what justification space and time are taken as given elements, and whether the concept of composition (Zusammensetzung) is an original concept. It is claimed that three ‘elements’ of motion (space, time, factor) each presuppose (voraussetzen) motion.\textsuperscript{76} Trendelenburg argues that without motion the notion of composition of factors is impossible. Without motion the composing factors (space and time) cannot be put together. Motion is presupposed in the explanation. This is a variation of Trendelenburg’s more general argument that thought as such is impossible without motion; thinking something as being compound is a kind of thinking, and therefore presupposes motion.

In the same way, Trendelenburg analyzes space and time. The concept of time already entails motion (‘the flow of time’). But space, too, cannot be thought or imagined without motion: our

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} Trendelenburg refers to Kant’s \textit{Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaften} (1786), cf. LU 1, 149 and 151 also 151, note 1.
\textsuperscript{76} LU 1, 149.
common idea of space is created by motion. The third criterion is met insofar as motion is a necessary and indivisible (unzerleglich) activity, which results only in itself when it is analyzed.\(^{77}\)

Can the concept of motion be defined? If motion is simple, it cannot be determined (bestimmt) or explained (erklärt). According to Trendelenburg, every definition orders its object under a higher concept, and analyzes it into the composing elements. Since there have been multiple attempts at defining or explaining motion, a successful definition would counter the claimed simplicity of motion. Failure to provide a definition of motion would yield (indirect) evidence in favour of the simplicity of motion. Taking activity (Thätigkeit) as the more general concept from which motion would be derived is no option for Trendelenburg since no specific difference—by virtue of which motion can be derived from activity—can be found which does not already include the concept of motion.\(^{78}\)

When motion is defined as a change of spatial location, motion is also presupposed. The concept of change might seem to be more abstract and general than the concept of motion, but change (Veränderung) can only be thought as becoming different (anderswerden), and this becoming in turn cannot be conceived without motion.\(^{79}\) As Aristotle already observed, motion cannot be defined, Trendelenburg concludes. Every act of definition already presupposes motion.

In retrospect, Trendelenburg notices that the three conditions that the original mediating activity must fulfil can be taken as essentially one condition:

Weil die Bewegung eine in sich einfache Thätigkeit ist, die sich nur erzeugen, nicht zerlegen lässt, wird sie zugleich die letzte sein, die aus keiner anderen stammt, und wird darum auch aus sich erkannt werden; weil sie die letzte ist, wird sie allgemein sein und jeder Thätigkeit zum Grunde liegen; und wenn sich das Denken als die höchste Blüte der Thätigkeiten in der Welt erhebt, aber diese Blüte die übrigen gleichsam

\(^{77}\) LU 1, 150.

\(^{78}\) Ibid.

\(^{79}\) LU 1, 151.
als nährenden Boden und tragenden Stamm voraussetzt: so wird um
dieser Allgemeinheit willen die Bewegung dem Denken und Sein ge-
meinschaftlich angehören.\textsuperscript{80}

This way of formulating enables us, with the results thus far, to
answer the question left open earlier: motion is not only com-
mon, but also fundamental to thought and being as such. We
have seen that motion is the irreducible element of both
thought and being. Here, Trendelenburg writes that motion is
the activity which is fundamental to all activities. Since every-
thing that is is the result of motion, and since everything which
is known is known through motion, motion is the fundamental
activity as such. Motion is the foundation of all knowledge and
the source of all being.

4.3 End (Zweck)

The mediation which is accomplished by the principle of motion
is only the first step of the theoretical foundation of the organic
worldview. The result of this mediation is that the original rela-
tion of thought and being is explained, and thereby the possibil-
ity of knowledge. Every \textit{Weltanschauung}, in Trendelenburg’s use
of the concept, gives an answer to the fundamental metaphysical
question how thought and being are related. A theoretical an-
swer to this question, such as proposed by Trendelenburg’s prin-
ciple of motion, could be part of the project of a scientifically
warranted worldview as such, not just the organic worldview. To
specifically give a theoretical foundation to one of the three
worldviews distinguished by Trendelenburg is tantamount to spe-
cifying and theoretically demonstrating the hierarchy of the rela-
tionship between thought and being. Without such a further spe-
cification, the principle of motion could just as well be part of
the project of a naturalist or Spinozist worldview.

Providing the organic worldview with a theoretical founda-
tion thus includes demonstrating the priority of thought over be-
ing. This is the purpose of the second half of Trendelenburg’s
\textit{Logische Untersuchungen}, starting with the chapter on \textit{Der Zweck}

\textsuperscript{80} LU 1, 153-154.
(chapter VIII in the first edition, chapter IX in the second edition). Whereas the concept of motion established a relation between thought and being, by being common and original to both spheres, the concept of end (Zweck) is used to show how thought can control being. Or, as it was worded in the 1847 essay: it should explain how thought is able to ‘grasp and control’ force.

Just as the first stage of Trendelenburg’s Logische Untersuchungen, this second stage combines logic and metaphysics: If we can know with certainty that ends exist, this entails both logical and metaphysical knowledge. Trendelenburg again takes the distinction between thought and being as his starting point. Thought recognizes ends in being because of the ends of thought itself. The recognition of ends in being requires a different mode of analysis as compared to the recognition of causal processes: the later follow motion back to its source (the question: woher?), whereas the former follows motion to its destination (the question: wohin?). As this difference is only a difference of direction of analysis, the decisive question becomes: how can one know that these ends which are recognized in being are real ends, and not merely products of thinking?

According to Trendelenburg, ends are real in both thought and being. His argument for this is twofold: First, causal explanations (die Erklärung der wirkenden Ursache) are not sufficient to explain certain phenomena, such as those of organic life. Trendelenburg admits that this is only an indirect argument for the reality of ends, for it leaves open the possibility that more advanced research is able provide causal explanations for phenomen-

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81 Unterschied, 24: ‘Man soll zeigen, wie es geschehen könne, daß er [der Gedanke] die Kraft ergreife und regiere.’
82 LU 2, 68. One could read this as a re-introduction of metaphysics as a separate discipline, but I would rather suggest that this ‘metaphysical’ knowledge is the corollary of the mediation of thought and being through motion, which invalidates the distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself. Empirical knowledge entails ‘metaphysical’ knowledge by virtue of this mediation.
83 LU 2, 71.
84 LU 2, 72
ena for which such an explanation is currently lacking. A more direct and positive argument is supplied by Trendelenburg as well: especially in organic life, one finds phenomena for which their realization cannot be understood without a preceding notion of the end, for instance the growth of a germ into a full organism, or the ordering of cells in a body.

The reality of ends in the sphere of being is of the same nature as other scientific knowledge of being: i.e. it is hypothetical. Yet the hypothetical end is confirmed in the totality of knowledge of being, and therefore certain in the same sense as empirical knowledge. Trendelenburg’s argument for the reality of ends is a good example of his general approach: on the one hand philosophy should construct the organic worldview in conjunction with the sciences, while the results of the philosophical science are of the same, hypothetical character as the results of other sciences, on the other.

5. The metaphysical dimensions of the question of worldview

Let us retrace our steps up to this point, and summarize the results thus far. We started from the observation that Trendelenburg defines a ‘worldview’ as a fundamental metaphysical notion, as an answer to the fundamental metaphysical question how thought and being are connected. In this way, a worldview provides both an explanation of the possibility of knowledge and a foundation of the totality of knowledge. A worldview, taken as the fundamental metaphysical notion which secures the connection between thought and being, can thus be taken as an explanation and foundation of the possibility of a ‘view’ (knowledge) of the ‘world’ (being). Trendelenburg’s analysis of the three different ways in which the fundamental, metaphysical ‘worldview question’ can be answered resulted in a preliminary, practical decision in favour of the ‘organic worldview’, which awaits a theoretical, scientific foundation. Once this theoretical supremacy of the organic worldview, the worldview of a universal, founding thought, has been secured, it would strictly speaking cease to be

85 LU 2, 73.
a worldview—cease to be a mere ‘view of the world’, competing with other views. The theoretical foundation of the organic worldview would above all found the connection between thought and being in a scientific way. This theoretical foundation was the task which Trendelenburg set himself in his *Logische Untersuchungen*, the task which he tried to accomplish with his ‘founding science’ of logic and metaphysics, based on the original mediating activity of motion. These are the steps that have taken us from Trendelenburg’s notion of (philosophical systems as a) worldview to his metaphysics of motion.

It is now time to ask two questions. First, the question why Trendelenburg set out to answer the worldview question the way he did, i.e. through his metaphysics of motion, must be addressed. More precisely, what made Trendelenburg address the problem of knowledge, the problem of the relation of thought and being, in a new and different way from most of his predecessors in German Idealism? Trendelenburg’s objections to Hegelian metaphysics are extensively presented in the *Logische Untersuchungen*, but what made him deviate from Kantian metaphysics, and especially from the limits imposed by Kant on metaphysics, despite his affinities with Kantian philosophy and the role as instigator of the neo-Kantian movement which has been ascribed to him?86 The second question that has to be addressed is whether Trendelenburg succeeds in redefining the limits of metaphysics and solving the worldview question.

An answer to the first question emerges from a notorious discussion Trendelenburg had with Kuno Fischer, subsequent to the publication of the second edition of the *Logische Untersuchungen* in 1862. In this second edition, Trendelenburg claimed that Kant’s proof in the *Tranzendentale Ästhetik* that space and time are only subjective forms of perception is flawed. More specifically, Trendelenburg agrees that space and time are a priori forms of perception, and as such subjective, but contests that Kant has proven that space and time cannot be objectively real

86 See LU 1, chapter 3, for Trendelenburg’s critique of Hegel. See Köhnke, *Entstehung und Aufstieg*, chapter 1 for a discussion of Trendelenburg’s role in the genesis of nineteenth century neo-Kantianism.
Trendelenburg argues that Kant has not sufficiently excluded the ‘third possibility’ that space and time are both objectively and subjectively real:

Wenn wir nun den Argumenten zugeben, dass sie den Raum und die Zeit als subjective Bedingungen darthun, die in uns dem Wahrnehmen und Erfahren vorangehen: so ist doch mit keinem Worte bewiesen, dass sie nicht zugleich auch objektive Formen sein können.\(^87\)

Fischer replied in the second edition of his *System der Logik* to Trendelenburg’s claim that there is a ‘gap’ (*eine Lücke*) in Kant’s proof of the subjectivity of space and time with the counter-claim that there is no such a gap, and subsequently attacked Trendelenburg’s logic and metaphysics of motion on a number of issues.\(^88\) The discussion evolved into a bitter polemic, through a series of further publications and letters, by both Fischer and Trendelenburg and others.\(^89\) Prima facie, this encounter might merely seem a scholarly dispute about the correct interpretation of an element of Kant’s work. It can indeed be taken as such: A recent study, for instance, argues that although Kant does not in fact explicitly show how the possibility that space and time are both objective and subjective is excluded, it is implicitly contained in his proof of the subjectivity of space and time and his concept of the thing-in-itself.\(^90\) To restrict the historical interpretation of the encounter to a mere scholarly dispute, however, is to miss the importance that this point has in the context of Trendelenburg’s logic and metaphysics.\(^91\)

\(^{87}\) LU 1, 163.


\(^{90}\) Michel, *Zeitkonzeption*, chapter 10.

\(^{91}\) Köhnke attributes a decisive influence on Hermann Cohen’s critical idealism to the Fischer-Trendelenburg debate. Michel does mention the importance that the subjectivity and non-objectivity of space and time has for Kant’s idealism and his theory of the thing-in-itself (which in turn is decisive for the possibility of freedom in Kant). But she fails to recognize that this holds equally true for Trendelenburg, whose aim it is to replace Kant’s theory of the thing-in-itself.
What is at stake for Trendelenburg? To answer this question, we have to look at the objections that Trendelenburg formulates against Kant. With respect to the claim to exclusive subjectivity of space and time, Trendelenburg expresses the following worry:

Wenn dies wirklich folgt, so verflüchtigt sich damit die ganze Weltansicht in Erscheinung, und Erscheinung ist vom Scheine nicht weit entfernt.\textsuperscript{92}

Kant’s theory of the thing-in-itself, which results from the theory of the subjective forms of space and time as conditions of experience, pulls all knowledge into the ‘magic circle’ (\textit{Zauberkreis})\textsuperscript{93} of subjectivity. The distinction between ‘objects of experience’ and ‘things in themselves’ blocks the possibility of knowledge of things:

Es ist der spannende Nerv in allem Erkennen, dass wir das Ding erreichen wollen, wie es ist; wir wollen das Ding, nicht uns. Dieser Nerv wird durch jene Annahme [i.e. the strict subjectivity of space and time] gelähmt; denn ihr gemäss jagen wir nach dem Dinge, fangen aber uns selbst ein.\textsuperscript{94}

Separating the object of experience from the thing-in-itself would render Trendelenburg’s whole project—providing a connection between thought and being, and thereby a scientific foundation of the organic worldview—impossible. The feasibility of the project depends on the possibility of finding a mediating activity which is common to both thought and being. And because for Trendelenburg space and time as forms of experience are derived from motion, rather than the other way around as in Kant, the view of space and time as exclusively subjective would mean that motion, too, is subjective only. For thought and being are taken as ‘pure’ subjectivity and objectivity respectively, as became clear in the analysis of Trendelenburg’s discussion of the fundamental metaphysical question. This would mean that motion cannot be the mediating activity between thought and being.

\textsuperscript{92} LU 1, 158.
\textsuperscript{93} LU 1, 160.
\textsuperscript{94} LU 1, 161-162.
which Trendelenburg required in his programme of a founding science of logic and metaphysics. But if motion is taken as common to thought and being, and as both subjective and objective, the Kantian ‘gap’ is filled:

Wenn die Bewegung ebenso ursprünglich dem Denken, als dem Sein angehört, und wenn aus der Bewegung Raum und Zeit zunächst erzeugt werden: so liegt darin jene Harmonie des Subjektiven und Objektiven, die von Kant gewaltsam zerrissen wurde.\(^{95}\)

This way of rendering the difference between Kant and Trendelenburg also prevents an obvious objection from being raised (and here we move to the second question formulated above). For one could ask how Trendelenburg can demonstrate that motion is a common activity of both thought and being. An examination of Trendelenburg’s arguments as carried out above would lead to the conclusion that for thought he uses schematic notions of abstract reasoning and of perceptive and imaginative representation. He then shows how each of these presupposes motion. More interesting is how he shows that motion is also the original activity in being, for this would amount to overstepping the Kantian limit, from the realm of experience to the realm of being. We have seen above that Trendelenburg relies heavily on the results of the natural sciences for his demonstration of the originality of motion in being. This might be surprising at first. For would such a strategy not merely prove that motion is the original activity in our scientific image of the world? Would such a strategy not be necessarily limited to our empirical knowledge and therefore remain trapped in empirical consciousness, the realm of thought, the ‘magic circle’? However, such an objection is only possible by tacitly assuming a Kantian distinction between the object of experience and things in themselves. If we preclude such a distinction between the objects of (empirical) knowledge and things as they are in themselves, this objection can be prevented.

\(^{95}\) LU 1, 168.
But this would mean that objects (in themselves, if you like, though the addition is redundant and meaningless on this view) are as scientific knowledge tells us. And this in turn has consequences for the ontological part of Trendelenburg’s founding science of logic and metaphysics: the only ontological achievement of this founding science is that it secures the connection between thought and being. It does not tell us ‘how the world is’ or ‘what the world is made of’. That is a task that is left to the sciences—even if it means that we sometimes have to adjust the inventory of things that make up ‘the world’. Trendelenburg’s mediation between thought and being does therefore cross the limits which Kant has set to metaphysics, but it does so by a very small margin. Ontology as a philosophical discipline, or rather: as part of the founding science of logic and metaphysics that philosophy is, is restricted to the task of enabling the mediation of thought and being by demonstrating the originality of motion in both.

6. Motion and the mirror of nature.

Did Trendelenburg indeed succeed in filling the Kantian gap and in providing a foundation of our knowledge of the world? In order to answer this question, several other issues have to be addressed first. Somewhat ironically perhaps, these problems are best approached via the objections that Kuno Fischer made to Trendelenburg’s metaphysics of motion. In the second edition of his *System der Logik und Metaphysik oder Wissenschaftslehre*, which appeared in 1865, Fischer raised a number of objections to Trendelenburg’s *Logische Untersuchungen* and the metaphysics of motion it presents. We encountered one of the objections above, the objection to Trendelenburg’s claim that Kant failed to prove the strict subjectivity of space and time. Trendelenburg’s main aim in his responding essay ‘Ueber eine Lücke in Kants Beweis von der ausschliessenden Subjectivität des Raumes und der Zeit’ (1867) is to counter this specific objection of Fischer. The Fischer-Trendelenburg debate is often connected with just this particular question, the question whether there is indeed a ‘gap’ in Kant’s argument for the exclusive subjectivity of space and time.
But the objection concerning the Kantian gap is by no means Fischer’s only or even his main objection. Inspection of the 1865 edition of Fischer’s System der Logik und Metaphysik reveals that he considers Trendelenburg’s perception of a gap in the Kantian argument rather a symptom of more fundamental problems that attach to the metaphysics of motion. Trendelenburg’s Kant interpretation, indeed closely connected to the more general ontological-epistemological framework developed in the Logische Untersuchungen, is only a problem of secondary importance in Fischer’s critical discussion of Trendelenburg’s position. Fischer discusses the matter of the Kantian gap only as the penultimate of his objections, and even there he is more concerned with Trendelenburg’s claim that space and time are both subjective and objective than with the question whether Kant has excluded that possibility or not (although Fischer explicitly claims that Kant has in fact done so). In the summary of his objections at the end of §66 of his System der Logik und Metaphysik, Fischer does not even mention the issue of the ‘Kantian gap’. We will discuss two main points of critique that Fischer levels against Trendelenburg’s Logische Untersuchungen. First, an issue which amounts to a meta-critique targeting the enterprise of Trendelenburg’s Logische Untersuchungen as such. The question is raised by Fischer thus:

Wenn die Bewegung ist, was im Grunde die logischen Untersuchungen wollen, Bedingung und Princip alles Erkennens: wo bleibt unter diesem Gesichtspunkt die Möglichkeit der logischen Untersuchungen selbst?

This is the question of reflexivity: the question whether Trendelenburg’s epistemological claims, as knowledge claims, can explain the possibility of knowledge, including these claims themselves. According to Fischer, especially the ‘principle of knowledge’ (Erkenntnisprinzip) that is posited by a theory of knowledge should be such that it is not only able to explain and

96 Fischer, System, 165-182.
97 Fischer, System, 174f.
98 Fischer, System, 181-182.
99 Fischer, System, 180.
justify knowledge as such, but also explain and justify the insight into knowledge given by the theory of knowledge itself. This task cannot be fulfilled by the principle of motion, and therefore he considers the principle of motion to be ‘dogmatic’ with respect to the possibility of a theory of knowledge.100

A second main point of critique is that the concept of ‘motion’ as used by Trendelenburg is not one concept, but rather a set of homonyms:

Das Bewegungsprinzip ist nicht einmütig, denn es zerfällt in so viele Arten, die nur in dem Worte Bewegung übereinstimmen, aber nicht aus einer Quelle entspringen, auch nicht entspringen können.101

Fischer discerns, rightly, a double task that motion must fulfil, for it to be the fundamental mediating activity. On the one hand, motion is the source of correspondence between thought and being. On the other hand, motion is also what mediates between thought and being. Following on from the distinction of this double task, Fischer discerns four ‘kinds’ (Arten) of motion: 1. constructive motion in thought, 2. constructive motion in being, 3. nachbildende Bewegung, which brings being into the sphere of thought, 4. vorbildende Bewegung, which brings thought into the sphere of being. According to Fischer, motion as a principle is doubtful as long as its unity has not been proven sufficiently.102 Indeed, if it could be shown that Trendelenburg’s principle of motion is a compound of different principles, one of Trendelenburg’s conditions discussed above—that the original mediating activity cannot be compound—would not be satisfied. In addition, if motion in being is of a different kind than motion in thought, the correspondence between thought and being would need more argumentation than Trendelenburg provides.

This second central point of Fischer’s critique can also be expressed as the claim that motion cannot be original.103 It is in the context of this point of critique that Fischer makes an important

100 Fischer, *System*, 181.
103 Fischer discusses this as a separate objection, but I argue here that it is in fact another rendering of the same objection.
observation, namely that Trendelenburg employs a picture-theory of the (formation of) knowledge. To Fischer the problem is not that Trendelenburg employs a picture-theory of knowledge. His point is rather that this means that motion cannot possibly be original in all of its functions. When the ‘external’ motion, the motion in being, is pictured by an ‘internal’ motion, the motion of thought, both ‘kinds’ of motion cannot be original at the same time. As a picture, the motion of thought depends on the motion in being, which it represents. If the picture in thought is an independent ‘sketch’ (Entwurf) which does not depend on the motion in being, it is not clear how these two kinds of motion can correspond. For, according to Fischer, motion as representation and as ‘material process’ are not one and the same.¹⁰⁴

The objection that motion is a complex principle and the objection that motion cannot be original are two sides of the same coin. Fischer’s objection that Trendelenburg’s concept of motion is equivocal implies that motion in thought and motion in being are different. Something that is compounded of different elements, such as the principle of motion, cannot be original according to Fischer, for the elements are more original than the compound. The equivocality of the concept of motion, the complexity of this concept, thus implies that it cannot be original. Conversely, when one of two different things is an image of the other, the image depends on the original. In that case, Fischer claims, both cannot be original. Hence, since image and original are different, motion in being (original) and in thought (image) are different. The concept of motion, which covers both motion in thought and motion in being, is therefore a complex concept. The objections of Fischer discussed here can thus be summarised by the claim that Trendelenburg has not sufficiently proven the unity, originality and simplicity of the principle of motion, and that this principle fails to mediate between thought and being, for motion in thought and in being remain different.

Trendelenburg addressed Fischer’s objections in his essay ‘Ueber eine Lücke in Kants Beweis von der ausschliessenden Subjectivität des Raumes und der Zeit’. The bulk of this essay is dedicated to a discussion and refutation of Fischer’s claim that

¹⁰⁴ Fischer, System, 167.
Trendelenburg has not revealed a gap in the Kantian argument on the exclusive subjectivity of space and time. In the last part of the essay Trendelenburg also discusses the specific objections that Fischer raised in his System der Logik und Metaphysik.

By way of introduction to his discussion of Fischer’s objections, he also makes some more general observations on the method that he employs in the Logische Untersuchungen. These remarks about the method employed are intended as a clarification, and as an indication of the way in which it should be judged. According to Trendelenburg, the method of the Logische Untersuchungen is on a par with the method of other sciences, in that the Logische Untersuchungen first postulate their principle hypothetically, and subsequently investigate the consequences of this principle (i.e. motion) for the ‘facts of the sciences’ (Thatsachen der Wissenschaften). In this way, Trendelenburg’s investigation increasingly secures this principle as a foundation of the whole of knowledge, by relating it to all branches of science (and therefore by making it a worldview). A critique of this method would have to travel the opposite road to establish the invalidity of the principle. Trendelenburg accuses Fischer of giving only ‘external’ objections, and not engaging with the ‘inner’ structure of the Logische Untersuchungen. Although these remarks are intended as a rejection of Fischer’s critique as such, Trendelenburg also replies to Fischer’s objections in more detail. The replies to the most important objections, discussed above, will be analyzed here.

One of the two main objections discussed above is the problem of ‘reflexivity’ that Fischer raised. Or, as he argued: if the Logische Untersuchungen try to establish motion as the foundation of thought and being, what motion enables this enterprise itself? The answer to this objection already lies in the methodological

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105 Trendelenburg, ‘Ueber eine Lücke in Kants Beweis von der ausschlies senden Subjectivität des Raumes und der Zeit’ (henceforth: Lücke), 260. The ‘facts of the sciences’ are not only the results of the sciences—though these are taken into account in Trendelenburg’s argument as well, as we have seen—but first and foremost these facts are the sciences themselves (cf. das Faktum der Wissenschaft as discussed above). Trendelenburg’s logic is a ‘theory of the sciences’ (Wissenschaftslehre), that is, a theory which founds the possibility of the sciences as a method of producing valid knowledge.
clarification discussed above: the Logische Untersuchungen operate methodologically by analogy with the sciences, that is, hypothetically and empirically. That the theory of science has the whole of knowledge as its object does not constitute a fundamental difference to Trendelenburg. The principle of knowledge that founds and structures the whole body of scientific knowledge is itself a part of this body of knowledge. To Trendelenburg, the fact that the Logische Untersuchungen, as the results of a science (logic in Trendelenburg’s broad sense of the term), are subject to the same motion that they postulate as the founding principle of the whole of knowledge, does not lead to special difficulties.\footnote{Lücke, 262.}

Behind this difference of opinion on the issue whether reflexivity poses a problem lies a different concept of the function of a theory of knowledge. This different concept of (the task of) a principle of knowledge provides a possible explanation for the difficulties that Fischer has in understanding Trendelenburg’s approach in the Logische Untersuchungen on this point. It is a consequence of this element of Fischer’s critique that the principle of knowledge posited by a theory of knowledge is not itself a part of the body of scientific knowledge. For if this were the case any principle of knowledge would constitute instances of (scientific) knowledge itself. Any principle of knowledge would then be subject to the same objection that Fischer raised against Trendelenburg. According to Fischer, the principle of knowledge that explains and founds the possibility of knowledge is not itself part of the knowledge that it explains. Furthermore, the principle of knowledge should explain the possibility of a theory of knowledge itself. This ‘foundationalist’ approach to the principle of knowledge means that the founding principle is of a different order from the knowledge that it founds, and even different from the theory of knowledge itself. If it is knowledge at all, it can only be knowledge of another kind than the knowledge that is explained and founded by the principle of knowledge.

In Trendelenburg’s approach, the knowledge of the principle of knowledge, which is yielded by a philosophical theory of knowledge, is of the same nature as the knowledge of the sciences: it is hypothetical and empirical. It is hypothetical since
the principle of motion is proposed as the solution to the problem how thought and being can be mediated. It is empirical since the proposed principle is tested against the facts of the sciences; the principle of knowledge must be able to structure the body of scientific knowledge into an organised whole. But the project of a philosophical foundation of the organic worldview, of which the Logische Untersuchungen must be considered an important part, also indicates as much. The successful completion of this project depends on the input of the sciences as well, as we have seen when discussing Trendelenburg’s typological approach to worldviews above. It is not philosophy which provides a foundation for the sciences, as if it were laying the groundwork for them, but both philosophy and the sciences reciprocally enable each other to carry out their respective tasks. In the vocabulary just applied to Fischer, Trendelenburg’s approach to the principle of knowledge is therefore essentially non-foundational: there is nothing external to the whole of knowledge that is its foundation, but the ‘founding’, ordering principle is part of the whole of scientific knowledge itself, and can only be established in an ongoing investigation, both by philosophy and by the sciences.

Now let us turn to the second objection discussed above: that Trendelenburg has not proven the unity and originality of motion as the principle of knowledge. This objection is at the root of two specific objections by Fischer, as we have seen. First, he raises the issue that the principle of motion is a complex concept—compounded of different concepts that were gathered under the name of ‘motion’—and therefore cannot be original (which is demanded by Trendelenburg of the original, mediating activity). Secondly, Fischer claimed that Trendelenburg’s theory of knowledge employs a picture theory of knowledge, and that the original and the corresponding image cannot both be original, for the image depends on the original.

In his reply, Trendelenburg does not deny that the principle of motion fulfils different tasks in the Logische Untersuchungen. The question to be asked, then, is whether these different tasks correspond with different principles or not. According to Trendelenburg, this is not the case. Both the nachbildende and the vorbildende Bewegung are branches of the constructive motion
In that case the question is reduced to the question whether the constructive motion in thought and the constructive motion in being are the same:

Aber es ist ein alter Einwand, den sich auch die logischen Untersuchungen selbst machten, dass die Bewegung in der Vorstellung, die nur Vorstellung der Bewegung sei, nicht dieselbe sein könne, als die Bewegung im Sein, die Bewegung ausser unserer Vorstellung, die an die Materie gebunden ist.\(^{108}\)

Trendelenburg’s reply to this objection is that the mental image of (external) motion is something different from the motion that constructs the mental image (‘Die constructive Bewegung in der Vorstellung ist, wie wir glauben, etwas Anderes als die Vorstellung der Bewegung.’)\(^{109}\) The point, according to Trendelenburg, is not if and how one motion (internal) depicts another one (external), but whether motion is the founding principle in both thought and being. Trendelenburg’s claim is that motion is as constitutive for thought as it is for the realm of being. And a scientific refutation of this claim would have to take the form of a further specification of the concept of constructive motion, and would have to show how the different concepts that share the name of ‘motion’ can be disentangled.\(^{110}\)

This brings us to the more specific point whether Trendelenburg actually employs a picture theory of knowledge in the *Logische Untersuchungen*, and if he does, whether this is as problematic as Fischer asserts. Fischer asserted that in making a representation (*Anschauung*) of an object, the constructive motion makes a copy of the external, original motion. Therefore the internal motion cannot be original, for it is derivative with respect to the original, external motion. Trendelenburg reacts quite vehemently to this element of Fischer’s critique: he accuses Fischer of

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\(^{107}\) *Lücke*, 270: ‘Denn die den Dingen nachbildende und die den Dingen im Zweckbegriff vorbildende Bewegung sind im Geiste betrachtet nichts anders als die sich verzweigende constructive Bewegung, die bildende im Denken, die sich in jener auf das Gegebene, in dieser auf ein Problem anwendet.’

\(^{108}\) *Lücke*, 270.

\(^{109}\) *Lücke*, 271.

\(^{110}\) *Lücke*, 271.
employing a ‘dubious metaphor’ of copy and original, and a ‘dialectic of the painter’.\textsuperscript{111} On closer inspection, it turns out that Trendelenburg gives several arguments in his response to this element of Fischer’s critique.

In reply to Fischer’s question how the internal space, constructed by motion, can be original if it is an image \textit{(Abbild)} or copy of the external one, Trendelenburg states:

\begin{quote}
…dass im Geiste \textit{kein} Abbild, also auch nicht das Abbild des sogenannten Originalraums, zu Stande kommen kann, es sei denn durch Hülfe derselben entwerfenden Bewegung, welche schon für sich der Vorstellung des Räumlichen erzeugt.\textsuperscript{112}
\end{quote}

Trendelenburg in fact denies that there exists something like an ‘original’ space, before and independent of motion, which is subsequently represented in thought through motion. Only if our representations were to have access to the original space, without motion, it would make sense to speak of copy and original:

\begin{quote}
…nur wenn es ein Abbild gäbe ohne ein Bilden, d.h. ohne die Thätigkei, welche gerade die Vorstellung des Raumes in uns erzeugt, liesse sich vielleicht durch die zweifelhafte Metapher von Original und Copie etwas ausrichten.\textsuperscript{113}
\end{quote}

Reality, both as it is given to us in appearance and as it is represented in thought, always depends on motion. That is the argument that Trendelenburg gives for the originality of motion. This claim is not affected by the counter-claim that the ‘copy’ depends on the ‘original’, for both are constructed by motion and consequently both depend on motion.

This brings us to the more general question how thought and being are related, or more specifically: how motion in thought and motion in being are related—for it is motion which is the mediating activity. Fischer claims that the ‘internal’ image \textit{(Nachbild)} of the ‘external’ motion in being is dependent on its

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Lücke}, 263: ‘…zweifelhafte Metapher von Original und Copie…’, \textit{Lücke}, 268: ‘…Dialektik des Portraitmalers…’.

\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Lücke}, 263.

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Lücke}, 263.
external original (and therefore, again, is not itself original). Otherwise, if the image in thought is independent of being, the correspondence (Uebereinstimmung) between the two would be doubtful. Trendelenburg’s reply to this dilemma is two-staged. First, he dismisses Fischer’s doubt about the correspondence between thought and being, on the grounds that the success of the sciences gives no support to such a ‘vague doubt’ about the correspondence between thought and being, for the sciences are based on the assumption of correspondence. Secondly, Trendelenburg denies that the constructive motion in thought produces a copy (Nachbild) of the material motion. Instead he speaks of a ‘contrasting image’ or counterpart (Gegenbild).

It can be doubted whether this reply is entirely adequate. We can ask for instance whether the success of the sciences in accomplishing their tasks really proves the assumption of correspondence, and whether this is indeed a necessary assumption in scientific practice. But a more fundamental question, it seems, is whether Trendelenburg’s successfully defends his theory against Fischer’s claim that his ‘picture theory’ of the relation between thought and being is problematic. The essence of this defence lies in the fact that Trendelenburg speaks of ‘correspondence’ (Uebereinstimmung) and ‘counterpart’ (Gegenbild) instead of ‘copy’ (Nachbild) as such. But even a correspondence theory of knowledge, which does not assume a visual or other copy, must be able to explain how knowledge can correspond to its object. And it cannot be denied that Trendelenburg does in fact use a notion of correspondence in his analysis of knowledge, despite his explicit denial of the accusation of employing a picture theory (the German verb entsprechen can be translated as ‘to correspond’):

Die apriorische Thätigkeit des Geistes, als solche nimmer ein Abbild, entspricht der Bewegung im Raume.  

114 Fischer, System, 167.
115 ‘...so fragt sich, wie diesen weithin sich erstreckenden siegenden Thatsachen der Wissenschaft gegenüber, welche auf die Voraussetzung der Uebereinstimmung gegründet sind, sich die Fraglichkeit, die nur einen vagen Zweifel ausdrückt, noch aufrecht halten lasse’, Lücke, 268.
116 Lücke, 268.
The problems of a correspondence theory of knowledge in general, however, arise only when such a theory is accompanied by an ontological dualism. Knowledge is conceived as being inside, in the subject, in consciousness, the *res cogitans*, whereas the object to which knowledge corresponds is consequently on the outside, external, in being, the *res extensa*. The problem with such a metaphysical dualism is that the connection between inside and outside usually remains obscure. How can one know that knowledge indeed corresponds to an object outside of consciousness? An answer to this question would seem to involve the possibility of a point of view not limited to consciousness (or being), but one that encompasses both. For if the only access to the realm of being is through our knowledge of it, there are no means to secure the objectivity of our knowledge—i.e. secure that knowledge is indeed knowledge of objects ‘outside’ of consciousness. But a characteristic of modern philosophy since Kant is that the only recognized access to things is through their appearance, and this excludes such an encompassing point of view. The question how knowledge can be knowledge of things outside consciousness must be left unanswered if an ontological gap is assumed between consciousness and the world.

At first sight, Trendelenburg seems to assume an ontological dualism as well. He admits that dualism is a fundamental experience in human thought. And he routinely speaks of thought versus being, inside motion versus outside motion, and so on. But again, we must bear in mind that the dualism that Trendelenburg admits as a common experience in human thought is but a starting point in his analysis. He actually sets out to overcome the dualism that appears to exist between thought and being, or more precisely: he aims to show how thought and being are both derivative with respect to motion, which is original and the root of both.

Any dualism that might occur between subject and object of knowledge is not of an ontological kind, for both are rooted in motion, but is epistemological in character. The duality between subject and object of knowledge is the duality of two regions of...
motion, and therefore of a local character. The finitude of human thought which experiences something other than itself, beyond its boundaries, might deceive us into thinking that there is a fundamental, ontological gap between thought and being. Trendelenburg denies such a fundamental metaphysical dualism. Philosophy as theory of science unifies ontology and epistemology through the one principle of motion. Once one accepts that motion mediates between thought and being, these at first sight opposing concepts are retrospectively nothing but modalities of one principle: motion. To read Trendelenburg in such a way that his ‘correspondence’ theory is not problematic, despite his sometimes misleading terminology—even his project of a ‘mediation’ of thought and being suggests a given, ontological dualism instead of a mere apparent, local, epistemological dualism as a point of departure—we must read him as an idealist from the outset of his endeavour.

7. Trendelenburg’s idealism and the limits of philosophical language

The previous section concluded that we must read Trendelenburg as an idealist in order to avoid a problematic interpretation. This might seem a remarkable conclusion if one takes into account that Trendelenburg conceives his work as in many respects critical of German Idealism, especially Hegel’s idealism. Yet, despite the differences and criticism, some important parallels can be observed between Trendelenburg’s project and the central issues of German Idealism. Highlighting the parallels and the differences can help us to elucidate the nature of Trendelenburg’s idealism.

In a recent study, Frederick Beiser has suggested a common core among the many forms of idealism in the German philosophical tradition from Kant to Hegel.\textsuperscript{118} Although the philosophical positions discussed by Beiser differ considerably in many respects, he argues that a common set of philosophical problems can be discerned at the root of each of these positions. The two issues that preoccupied Kant and the philosophers fol-

\textsuperscript{118} Beiser, \textit{German Idealism}, 1-14.
lowing him were ‘how to explain the possibility of knowledge, and how to account for the reality of the external world.’ According to Beiser, the paradoxical situation arises that the solution of either of these issues undermines the solution to the other. For to show the possibility that the subject has knowledge of the object is to imply that some kind of identity between subject and object of knowledge must be established. To explain the reality of the external world, however, ‘it is necessary to establish some kind of dualism between the subject and object, given that it is just a fact of our experience that the object appears given to us and independent of our conscious control.’ The principle of ‘subject-object identity’ sought by German idealism therefore stood for the paradoxical task of both overcoming the dualism between the subject and object of knowledge as well as showing its necessity.

Besides this core programme of German idealism, Beiser argues that there are two general tendencies that play an increasingly important role in this period. Against common interpretations of German idealism, Beiser maintains that two of its central tendencies are a critique of subjectivism, and anti-foundationalism. The ‘struggle against subjectivism’ is revealed in the central place occupied by the problem of demonstrating the reality of the external world: ‘The refutation of idealism, the proof of the reality of the external world, became a fundamental desideratum and preoccupation of post-Kantian idealism.’ The anti-foundationalist tendency that Beiser discerns is directed against ‘Cartesian foundationalism’, which he describes as seeking to base our knowledge of the world in a self-evident first principle. Except for Rheinhold, most of post-Kantian idealism up to and including Hegel is marked by scepticism about first principles and foundationalist systems.

120 Ibid.
121 Beiser, *German Idealism*, 3.
122 Beiser, *German Idealism*, 6-9. Although Beiser acknowledges that ‘Hegel endorsed the systematic ideal’, he maintains that this was not a system based on self-evident first principles and constructed by a geometrical method. Hence his conclusion with respect to Hegel: ‘If Hegel was a foundationalist at all, it was only by subverting the foundationalism of the Cartesian tradition.’ (8).
Trendelenburg’s idealism shares these two tendencies, anti-foundationalism and a critique of subjectivism, with German idealism. His method, taking the sciences as a ‘fact’ and putting his philosophical theories forward in the same ‘hypothetic-empirical’ fashion as the sciences, is anti-foundational. Trendelenburg does not seek an external, indubitable foundation for scientific knowledge, but the principle of knowledge is posited as a metaphysical-logical hypothesis and is thus part of and on a par with the scientific knowledge that it founds. His critique of the Kantian distinction between the appearing object and the thing-in-itself brings out Trendelenburg’s fear that philosophy might fall prey to subjectivism. He expresses the fear that the exclusive subjectivity of space and time as forms of experience would confine us to the ‘enchanted circle’ of subjectivism. Reality, the world would be forever out of reach.

With respect to the first of the two central issues of German idealism—how the possibility of knowledge can be explained—Trendelenburg’s approach shows a similar strategy. The whole point of the Logische Untersuchungen, especially as explained in the added first chapter of the second edition, is to provide a theory of (scientific) knowledge. The central contribution of this theory of knowledge is to show how a mediation between thought and being can be brought about. It turns out that both thought and being originate in motion, which provides the principle of subject-object identity that enables an answer to the first question of idealism.

The principle of motion can be taken as Trendelenburg’s response to the second central issue of German idealism—the reality of the external world—and this response is more complex, for it redefines this very question as well. Although Trendelenburg admits a common sense experience of dualism between the subject and object (‘external’ reality) of knowledge, a metaphysical dualism is denied. The principle of motion also serves to assure that there is no fundamental dualism between thought and being. The epistemological dualism between subject and object of knowledge is produced by motion, and so was interpreted as a ‘local’ dualism above. The dualism that is experienced in ‘com-

123 LU 1, 160.
mon sense’ is therefore produced and can be explained by the principle of motion. In retrospect, the question about the reality of the external world is not the most fundamental question, for this question is a product of epistemological relations. It is not an ontological given. A philosophical explanation of the possibility means that the principle of motion is acknowledged as the mediating principle between thought and being. This explanation can also serve to explain the experience of dualism, as this experience is due to the finitude of human thought. It is by no means a universal, ontological condition.

At the same time, it is only in retrospect, and even then with some difficulty, that this interpretation can be given to Trendelenburg’s metaphysics of motion. What shines through here is the paradoxical relation of the two core issues of idealism, as indicated by Beiser, as well as the reversal of common experience that takes place. But the problem is also due to Trendelenburg’s terminology, which can be misleading at first sight. Much of the epistemological language contains dualistic metaphors. Trendelenburg also uses the terminology of a correspondence theory of knowledge, as we have seen. But if one persists in the idealist reading of Trendelenburg and, encountering dualistic terminology in his work, asks whether it is an epistemological dualism, or an ontological one, a consistent interpretation is possible. An epistemological ‘dualism’, the distinction between subject and object of knowledge, occurs in Trendelenburg’s analysis as well. But this epistemological distinction between subject and object cannot be taken as reflecting an ontological dualism, e.g. between thought and being.

Meanwhile, due to its ‘dualism ladenness’, ordinary language and even philosophical language reveal their limits here. This can be observed for instance in the grammatically suspicious title of the new first chapter of the second edition of the Logische Untersuchungen: ‘logic and metaphysics as founding science’. This title takes two disciplines, which are separated in common philosophical language, and conjoins them as the fundamental discipline. This prefigures the role that Trendelenburg will give to motion, which mediates between different philosophical domains and apparently distinct ontological spheres, between thought and being, between logic and metaphysics. This dualistic con-
tamination of language might also explain the confusion of tongues in the Fischer-Trendelenburg debate. Fischer’s critique shows an obsession with dualism: he cannot but interpret the principle of motion as divided. If the principle is original in thought and original in being, it must be a compound of different things, for thought and being are metaphysically disconnected spheres. Trendelenburg, however, tries to find a philosophical language that belongs to a discipline in which logic and metaphysics originate, a discipline that is prior to both. It is to such an original, non-dualistic philosophical discipline that the principle of motion belongs.

8. Conclusion

This chapter started investigating the notion of worldview in Trendelenburg’s work by observing that he employs a quite specific concept of Weltanschauung, especially in his 1847 essay Ueber den letzten Unterschied der philosophischen Systeme. Trendelenburg not only conceives a worldview as the fundamental metaphysical notion that underlies a philosophical system, but also as an answer to a fundamental metaphysical question: the question how thought and being are related. According to Trendelenburg, the possible answers to this question, which can be specified as the question how thought (Gedanke) and force (Kraft) are related, can be classified into three categories. An analysis of the question leads to a distinction of three possible answers, and three corresponding general types of worldviews: naturalism, idealism (also called Platonism, or the organic worldview), and Spinozism.

This apparently limited tool for classification of philosophical systems as types of worldviews turned out to have far-reaching implications against the background of Trendelenburg’s logical-metaphysical project as laid out in his Logische Untersuchungen. It is used by Trendelenburg to make way for the so called ‘organic worldview’, which awaits a theoretical, scientific foundation. Furthermore, it is exactly the question that lies at the foundation of a worldview (the relation between thought and being) that is the main theme of his philosophical theory of the sciences, which
encompasses logic (thought) and metaphysics (being). The Logische Untersuchungen aim to mediate between thought and being, and thereby answer the fundamental metaphysical question.

This mediation, it turned out, is sought by Trendelenburg in the principle of motion. As a principle which cannot itself be defined in terms of other principles, it is original to both thought and being. Can it also mediate between thought and being? The objections by Kuno Fischer deny this. An analysis of the discussion between Fischer and Trendelenburg yielded two important results. To read Trendelenburg in such a way that he is immune to a criticism of Fischer’s kind is to read him, first, as an idealist who denies an original ontological dualism and, second, as offering a non-foundational philosophical theory of scientific knowledge.

In conclusion, then, Trendelenburg’s discussion of the notion of worldview, and the roots of this discussion in the Logische Untersuchungen, showed that he rearticulates the relation of logic and metaphysics (or: epistemology and ontology). The ‘organic worldview’ pursued by Trendelenburg embodies a non-foundational metaphysics—a metaphysics which encompasses logic (the philosophical theory of thought) and metaphysics (as ontology: the philosophical theory of being). The task of this ‘theory of science’ is to show the possibility of scientific knowledge of the world. But since this theory of science and the principle of knowledge (motion) it proposes are part of science themselves, this theory is essentially non-foundational: there is no external foundation of the whole of scientific knowledge, contrary to Fischer’s requirement for a theory of knowledge. The sciences and the philosophical theory of science depend on each other. Philosophy as a theory of science shows the possibility of scientific knowledge, but is as such ‘formal’: it provides only the ontological connection between thought and being, which enables knowledge of the world. How the world is is a question answered by the sciences themselves.

Because of this dependence, a worldview, which strictly speaking is the principle of knowledge as such, the answer to the fundamental metaphysical question, can also be taken in a more general sense to include the totality of knowledge, consisting of philosophy and the sciences. The discussion of the notion of
worldview in Trendelenburg therefore gives rise to a discussion of the limits of philosophy. These limits are first the limits of the task of philosophy, especially as ontology. Because of the content of this task of philosophy, these limits are also its limits vis-à-vis the sciences. As a worldview, philosophy is theory of science. In the following chapters we will see to what extent Trendelenburg’s philosophical approach to worldview has been directional for the subsequent debate on this issue.
CHAPTER 3
DILTHEY’S WELTANSCHAUUNGSTYPOLOGIE AS POST-METAPHYSICAL METAPHYSICS

1. Introduction

The theme of classification—classification of types of thought, of religious and philosophical systems, and of worldviews—is present in the work of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) from early on. Sketches, ideas and suggestions of typological classifications can already be found in his diary entries from the 1860s. Yet Dilthey only started to publish elements of a mature typological theory of worldviews in his later work, from 1898 onwards. Dilthey developed what would become known as his ‘typology of worldviews’ (Weltanschauungstypologie) in two key publications, Das Wesen der Philosophie (1907) and Die Typen der Weltanschauung und ihre Ausbildung in den metaphysischen Systemen (1911). This typology of worldviews has set the tone for a large part of the worldview debate in the first decades of the twentieth century, and some consider it even, pars pro toto, as the philosophical approach to the question of worldviews.

In this chapter I will examine Dilthey’s theory of worldviews in the context of his central philosophical concerns and in the light of the discussion of Trendelenburg’s conception of worldview and philosophy in the previous chapter. Fundamental to an understanding of Dilthey’s theory of worldviews is the concept of life. This concept is the topic of section 2. Since Dilthey, especially in his 1907 essay, develops his theory in close connection

1 E.g. Der junge Dilthey, 80, 84, and 89. See also below.
2 Starting with ‘Die drei Grundformen der Systeme in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts’ (1898), and ‘Der entwicklungsgeschichtliche Pantheismus nach seinem geschichtlichen Zusammenhang mit den älteren pantheistischen Systemen’ (1900).
3 Odo Marquard’s position is exemplary in this respect, Marquard, Weltanschauungstypologie, 107.
PHILOSOPHY AS WELTANSCHAUUNG

with his programmatic concept of philosophy, the latter will also be discussed in some detail, in section 3. The concept of worldview—actually different interrelated worldview concepts—is then analyzed in relation to Dilthey’s conception of philosophy in section 4. Section 5 will study Dilthey’s classification of worldviews, his Weltanschauungstypologie.

The previous chapter already mentioned Wilhelm Dilthey as one of Trendelenburg’s students. It has been claimed that Trendelenburg’s classification of worldviews strongly influenced Dilthey’s typology, to such an extent that Trendelenburg can be considered a precursor to the Weltanschauungstypologie. The validity of this claim will be examined in section 6. The next section, section 7, addresses the notion of philosophy as a founding science, which can be found in both Dilthey and Trendelenburg. In the final section a number of preliminary conclusions are drawn.

2. Worldview and life

The concept of worldview as used by Dilthey in his later publications is much more complex than the concept in Trendelenburg’s work. For Trendelenburg, the concept of worldview was introduced as shorthand for the fundamental metaphysical notion at the root of philosophical systems. Philosophical systems, determined by their fundamental metaphysical notion, were accordingly construed as worldviews by Trendelenburg. This enabled him to formulate the ‘final distinction’ between philosophical systems as the distinction between these fundamental notions. This in turn allowed him to give a critical analysis of the possible fundamental metaphysical notions, an analysis which provided support for one of these notions: idealism, or the organic worldview.

For Dilthey, the philosophical worldviews are only the top of a pyramid of interrelated worldview concepts. He distinguishes between different kinds of worldviews, especially between religious, artistic, and metaphysical worldviews, which stand in different kinds of relations to each other. Furthermore, Dilthey proposes a classificatory or typological account for each kind of
Although his typological account of philosophical worldviews is the most elaborated one, we should bear in mind that it is only the zenith of this pyramid of interrelated worldview concepts. To understand the meaning and function of the concept of worldview in a philosophical sense in Dilthey, and the typological theory of worldviews he presents, we will start with an analysis of this pyramid, from the bottom upwards.

The ground on which this pyramid of concepts rests in Dilthey is the concept of life (*Leben*). ‘Life is the final root of the worldviews,’ says Dilthey in his 1911 essay on the types of worldviews. What does this statement mean? The concept of life—as is evident from Dilthey’s philosophical self-understanding as *Philosophie des Lebens*—lies at the heart of Dilthey’s philosophy as such and not only of his worldview theory. Yet it is a somewhat obscure concept as well. To enable us to interpret Dilthey’s theory of worldviews, we will therefore first attempt to clarify the concept of life and the function it has in the context of the theory of worldviews in this section. The further structure of the pyramid of worldview concepts in Dilthey will be discussed in the next two sections.

In the same 1911 essay, Dilthey gives the following description of life:

> In unzähligen einzelnen Lebensläufen über die Erde verbreitet, in jedem Individuum wieder erlebt, und, da es als bloßer Augenblick der Gegenwart der Beobachtung sich entzieht, in der nachklingenden Erinnerung festgehalten, andererseits wie es sich in seinen Äußerungen objektiviert hat nach seiner ganzen Tiefe in Verständnis und Interpretationen vollständig erfaßbar als in jedem Innewerden und Auffassen des eigenen Erlebnisses – ist das Leben in unserm Wissen in unzähligen Formen uns gegenwärtig und zeigt doch überall dieselben gemeinsamen Züge.\(^6\)

4 I will speak of *kinds* of worldviews when distinguishing between different kinds of worldviews (religious, artistic, philosophical worldviews), and use *types* when speaking of different types of worldviews that belong to the same kind of worldview.


6 *Typen*, 78.
Even if it is insufficient to serve as a theoretical definition of life, this comprehensive description at least indicates some important aspects of it. The concept of life as used by Dilthey here has a dual nature: it has a universal dimension, but at the same time expresses itself in a multitude of particular appearances. Life as such appears in every individual, in innumerable individual life-spans, but at the same time these individual lives are new experiences of something common (wieder erlebt). The innumerable forms show the same traits everywhere, despite life’s pluriform appearance.

The concept of life as used here has the character of a medium, in the sense in which ether was once considered to be the medium of electromagnetic waves. There are two respects in which this comparison makes sense: first, life is as such not directly visible (es entzieht sich der Beobachtung als bloßer Augenblick der Gegenwart), just as ether was considered to be a substance without any perceptible qualities, and, second, life connects apparently distant elements, just as ether was thought of as a medium connecting (sometimes very) remote places. Let us start by considering the first characteristic. Life as construed by Dilthey is not reflexively, rationally accessible as it is, in its totality. Dilthey also calls life ‘irrational’. Life ‘happens’ immediately, is always present (als bloßer Augenblick der Gegenwart), but is not known immediately. Only rational reflection can lead to an understanding of life. The access to this understanding of life is to be found in the sedimentation that life produces: it leaves its traces such as recollections in the form of life-experience in the individual (its basic form) and cultural objectifications (which can achieve different levels of abstraction with respect to the individual life-experience). Life therefore cannot be known as such, but only mediately, through reflexive interpretation of its products. These rational reconstructions provide partial interpretations of life, which is irrational in itself.

Life can be understood in Dilthey’s work as a creative force which is never at rest, always in motion. Life cannot be ‘seen’ as such, but is accessible only through its products, the objectifications it receives in human history. But these objectifications of life are themselves only finite, one-sided manifestations, so that
life in its totality, life as it is, never reveals itself completely in singular objectifications. We can only understand life through the totality of human history and the regularities life reveals in it.

The second aspect of the comparison of life with a medium is the characteristic of allowing a connection between different and (apparently) distant elements. In other words: life, in Dilthey’s analysis of it, also exhibits a mediating function.\(^7\) This mediating function can be elucidated by taking a closer look at the role of the individual subject. Each individual is a point of origin in the reflexive, interpretative reconstructions of life. The individual is connected to other people and things, and ‘everything that surrounds him he interprets as life and spirit that are objectified in it.’\(^8\) These interpretations of the world are what Dilthey calls worldviews. The individual thus plays a crucial role in the construction of worldviews. Yet the individual is not the final ground of these worldviews, it is life which creates its own world from the perspective of every individual.\(^9\) Observed from the individual’s perspective, life manifests itself both as Lebendigkeit and as Welt. Lebendigkeit can be understood as individual consciousness (including emotions, feelings, etc., through which the individual is connected to life as such). Welt can be understood as everything which Lebendigkeit encounters in its activities, everything to which it is connected through life-connections (Lebensbezüge). However, both are life viewed from a certain aspect. Both the Lebendigkeit of individual consciousness and the world connected to it through life-connections are part of the continuity of life. The distinction between inner life and outer

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\(^7\) More on Dilthey’s concept of life can be found in several studies, e.g. Bulhof, Wilhelm Dilthey, 164f., Bollnow, Dilthey, 33ff., Braun, Leben und Bewusstsein bei Dilthey, 25ff. The mediating function of life is observed both by Bulhof and Bollnow (although Bulhof interprets the mediation differently). Despite Bollnow’s extensive discussion of the ‘historical links’ of Dilthey’s philosophy, he does not mention Trendelenburg. Bulhof mentions Trendelenburg only in a short biographical sketch of Dilthey, as his ‘supervisor’ at the University of Berlin, ‘whose main interest was the history of philosophy’ (10).

\(^8\) Typen, 78-79.

\(^9\) Typen, 79: ‘So schafft das Leben von jedem Individuum aus sich seine eigene Welt.’
world therefore is only the product of an intellectual abstraction.\textsuperscript{10} Life mediates between ‘internal’ consciousness and the ‘external world’ because it precedes this distinction and forms the original unity from which these points of view are derived.

This mediating function of life, or rather: this two-sidedness of life—since the separation between individual life and world is a product of intellectual abstraction, and not itself original—suggests a parallel to the mediating function of the principle of motion (\textit{Bewegung}) in the work of Dilthey’s teacher Trendelenburg. We will return in the final chapter to the question whether Trendelenburg’s concept of motion and Dilthey’s concept of life can be considered to be functionally the same.

According to Dilthey, as we have seen, worldviews are ‘rooted in life’. But at the same time worldviews can be said to be interpretations of the world. How is it that these interpretations of the world are rooted in life? On the one hand, through the mediating function of life, the world can be understood as correlate to consciousness, for both are life, taken from a different point of view.\textsuperscript{11} Because the world is only experienced through the life-connections that consciousness has to it, life determines our interpretations, our ‘views’ of the world. On the other hand, the fact that worldviews are interpretations of the world can be seen as rooted in life as well. According to Dilthey, life itself gives rise to reflection on life in the individual. This reflection repeats itself in different individuals, giving rise to common life-experience (\textit{allgemeine Lebenserfahrung}). At the same time, the individual seeks to unite his life-experiences into a meaningful totality, but fails to do so because of the ‘riddles of life’: the experiences of birth, death, and the overall finitude of man. The worldviews which are provided by religion, art, or metaphysics are more or less systematized attempts to solve these riddles of life. Yet they are rooted in the individual life experiences, which yield the same questions over and over again.

\textsuperscript{10} Wilhelm Dilthey, \textit{Gesammelte Schriften} (henceforth quoted as GS followed by the volume number) 8, 16-17.

\textsuperscript{11} GS 8, 17.
The function of life for Dilthey’s theory of worldviews can therefore be summarized as follows: life mediates between the individual and his world, for both are part of life. Life is the medium which connects all individual (and therefore only partial) interpretations of it. This continuity underlying the different interpretations also explains the constant structure shared by the different, individual life-experiences and worldviews. Life thus also mediates between the individual world-experience and the shared experiences between individuals. Without life ‘gluing’ everything together, Dilthey’s approach entailing a typological understanding of worldviews would not come off the ground. Without the (metaphysical) foundation of life, the plurality of worldviews would be just that, an irreducible plurality of interpretations of the world. A question to be asked then is: why does Dilthey need a unifying, mediating structure behind the plurality of worldviews? A further question to be asked is whether life can fulfil the different functions which Dilthey ascribes to it, without losing its unity—and thus its unifying function. Much like Trendelenburg’s concept of motion, life fulfils different functions, and is claimed to be an original unity. Again the question emerges whether or not there is a functional difference between Trendelenburg’s concept of motion and Dilthey’s concept of life. To these questions we will return in the final chapter.

3. Worldview and the function of philosophy

In Dilthey’s work, as in Trendelenburg’s, the concept of worldview emerges in the context of a fundamental philosophical self-reflection. Dilthey discusses the ‘essence’ of philosophy, its function, limits and possibilities in an essay from 1907, *Das Wesen der Philosophie*. Although this essay is not entirely devoted to a discussion of the theory of worldviews (unlike the 1911 essay), the discussion of the essence of philosophy culminates in a discussion of philosophical worldviews, and in their typological classification. The classification of (philosophical) worldviews is thus

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connected for Dilthey to philosophy’s self-understanding with respect to its ultimate task and its means of fulfil this task. This connection between philosophy’s ultimate task and the concept of worldview is perhaps even more visible than in Trendelenburg’s account of worldviews. The editor of volume 8 of Dilthey’s Gesammelte Schriften, B. Groethuysen, has therefore aptly entitled it ‘Weltanschauungslehre. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie der Philosophie’. Dilthey’s theory of worldviews will in fact turn out to be a meta-philosophy, a ‘philosophy of philosophy’. But before we can examine this philosophical theory of worldviews, the concept of worldview and the concept of philosophy that underlies the theory of worldviews have to be elucidated. Both ‘philosophy’ and ‘worldview’ are quite complicated concepts in Dilthey’s analysis. Each stands for different functions and dimensions. I will first discuss the concept of philosophy which Dilthey presents in his 1907 essay in this section, and then discuss the concept of worldview, which rests on the concept of philosophy, in the next section.

In Das Wesen der Philosophie, Dilthey tries to determine a concept of the essence of philosophy (Wesensbegriff der Philosophie). To achieve such a concept, which would articulate the formative law (Bildungsgesetz) of philosophical systems, he starts with a first-order determination of the concept of philosophy. This first-order determination is carried out through a determination of the commonalities between the ‘empirical’ (i.e. historical) philosophical systems. This ‘empirical’ or ‘inductive’ determination of the concept of philosophy cannot be more than a first, approximative step towards a complete scientific determination of the concept of philosophy. The reason for this lies in the circular nature of all concept-formation in the human sciences. A selection of what is relevant from the manifold of human life already presupposes a guiding concept. Only on the basis of this

13 The expression ‘Philosophie der Philosophie’ is taken from a manuscript by Dilthey, GS 8, 204f.
14 The expression ‘first-order determination’ is used here analogously to the natural sciences. It refers to an iterative process of determination in which the value of some expression or parameter is determined. The first-order determination is an estimation, which is refined in subsequent approximative steps.
selection can a more precise and warranted concept be developed, which in turn can be used to correct the original selection. Dilthey takes his preliminary determination of philosophy from tradition: he examines positions which are traditionally considered to be part of philosophy.

The result of Dilthey’s empirical investigation is negative at first sight: if anything, historical consciousness reveals the relativity and transitoriness (Relativität und Vergänglichkeit) of all different definitions and appearances of philosophy. Yet Dilthey discerns some common characteristics of philosophical thought, which can serve to encompass the ‘empirical data’. These common characteristics are a tendency towards universality, towards foundation (Begründung), and the aim at the totality of the given world. Although Dilthey sometimes uses different terms (such as: Zusammenfassung, Grundlegung, Begründung) for this common core, it has two essential characteristics: the aim to grasp the essence of the totality of the world, and the aim to provide objective, universally valid knowledge. The first characteristic separates philosophy from the special sciences, which have limited parts of the world as their object. The second characteristic separates philosophy from religion and art, which do not seek to provide objective, scientifically warranted, universally valid knowledge. Conversely, the aim at the totality of the world is what connects philosophy to art and religion, while the striving for universally valid knowledge connects philosophy to the sciences.

The first-order determination of the concept of philosophy is therefore a functional determination: it does not define or prescribe a method or object of philosophy, but determines the common core of the different, empirical philosophical systems as a certain function. This function—to give a scientific, universally valid interpretation of the totality of the world—is what connects the historical systems. The different empirical philosophical systems result from a constant function which is executed in ever-varying circumstances. The function of philosophy must not be considered in isolation, but in connection with the environ-

15 Wesen, 364. For the experience of relativity, see also the discussion of Dilthey’s typology of worldviews, below.
ment in which it operates. To give a complete account of the concept of philosophy, the function of philosophy must be analyzed in its relation to society and to the psyche (Seelenleben).

In Dilthey’s analysis, the structure of the psyche is a teleological one in which three global domains can be distinguished. The first is that of knowledge of the world (Welterkenntnis). The second is that of life-experience (Lebenserfahrung), which Dilthey defines as the processes in which we try to determine the values of life and of things.\(^\text{16}\) Finally, the domain of principles of action (Prinzipien des Handelns), by which we seek to govern our lives. According to Dilthey, the teleological nature of man (the Zielstrebigkeit) causes a development in which we seek to achieve ever-higher forms of knowledge of the world, life-experience, and principles of action. The highest forms of these functions of the psyche are achieved when they are based on universally valid knowledge. Since man strives by nature after reflexive knowledge of himself, this directedness of the three areas of the psyche at universally valid knowledge means that philosophy has its root in the nature of the psyche, in the nature of man:

Philosophie ist in der Struktur des Menschen angelegt, jeder, an welcher Stelle er stehe, ist in irgendeiner Annäherung an sie begriffen, und jede menschliche Leistung tendiert, zur philosophischen Besinnung zu gelangen.\(^\text{17}\)

The relationship of philosophy to society mirrors the structure of the psyche and can be considered to be an expression of it. Since society consists of individuals who are characterized by the threefold structure of the psyche just described, the same structural regularities can be discerned in society.\(^\text{18}\) How philosophy functions in relation to the different ‘systems’ that exist in society is a question that will be addressed in the next section.

The two characteristics that Dilthey determined as the (empirical) core of the concept of philosophy allow us to understand the basic structure underlying Dilthey’s determination of philo-

\(^{16}\) *Wesen*, 374.

\(^{17}\) *Wesen*, 375.

\(^{18}\) *Wesen*, 375: ‘Da nun diese Gesellschaft aus den strukturierten Individuen besteht, wirken sich in ihr dieselben strukturellen Regelmäßigkeiten aus.’
sophical systems as worldviews. Worldviews are interpretations of (1) the totality of the world, and philosophical worldviews are attempts to give (2) scientifically warranted interpretations of the world.

4. Philosophical and other worldviews

The notion of a philosophical worldview in Dilthey is as complex as the concept of philosophy. Unlike Trendelenburg, Dilthey sees the notion of a worldview as such as covering more than just philosophical or metaphysical worldviews. Besides philosophical worldviews Dilthey distinguishes religious and artistic or poetic (dichterische) worldviews. These kinds of worldviews stand, each in its own way, in relation to the philosophical worldview and refer to it. All these kinds of worldview have in common that they aim to provide interpretations of the totality of the world. And all of them claim validity for their interpretation. As such, they have reached a degree of objectification with respect to the individual’s interpretation of the world. These worldviews abstract from the particular individual ‘worlds’ and try to address what is common in the experience of life. Philosophical worldviews are further distinguished from artistic and religious ones in that they seek to establish objective, scientific validity for their interpretations of the world.

In addition to this external distinction between different kinds of worldviews, Dilthey also describes the inner structure of worldviews. He suggests that for each kind of worldview it is possible to give a classification of different types which belong to that kind—although the classification of philosophical systems is the only one that is fully developed. According to Dilthey, the inner structure of (philosophical) worldviews is produced by the structure of the inner life, the life of the mind:

19 For the relation between the philosophical worldview and religious and poetic worldviews: Typen, 87-93 and Wesen, 378-399.
20 Cf. Wesen, 375f., Typen, 87f.
21 Typen, 94f.
Das tiefste Geheimnis ihrer Spezifikation liegt in der Regelhaftigkeit, welche der teleologische Zusammenhang des Seelenlebens der besonderen Struktur der Weltanschauungsgebilde aufdrückt.\textsuperscript{22}

The threefold structure of worldviews, which is the counterpart of the three domains of culture addressed by philosophy, expresses the ‘structural coherence of the mind’ (\textit{seelische Strukturzusammenhang}).\textsuperscript{23} This common structure of human nature (\textit{gemeinsame Menschennatur}) has constant relations to life (\textit{festen Lebensbezüge}), which correspond to the three fundamental relations of philosophy to culture. Life, therefore, ‘always shows the same sides’.

But not only the regularities in the structure of worldviews spring from life. Life is above all the origin of the diversity (\textit{Mannigfaltigkeit}) of worldviews. The worldviews originate in ‘moods of life’ (\textit{Lebensstimmungen}), individual attempts to unify the multitude of life-experiences (which are conscious life-relations). Through several levels of reflection, these moods of life are developed into worldviews.\textsuperscript{25} Both the regularity of the structure of worldviews and their differentiation are therefore produced by ‘life’. For this reason, Dilthey can describe the relation between worldview and life as: ‘Die letzte Wurzel der Weltanschauung ist das Leben’.\textsuperscript{26} While life as such cannot be known, it reveals itself in different worldviews, in different, but always limited and one-sided, ways.

Philosophy and the philosophical worldview are related to culture. As a fundamental science philosophy addresses a tripartite structure of domains of culture. This tripartite structure re-

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Typen}, 85. The three levels of a worldview (and the three domains of culture) can be connected to the classical distinction between three intellectual powers: thinking (\textit{Weltbild}), feeling (\textit{Lebenswürdigung}), and willing (\textit{praktische Ideale}).
\textsuperscript{23} \textit{Wesen}, 407.
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Typen}, 85: ‘Das Leben zeigt immer dieselben Seiten.’
\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Typen}, 79-81.
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Typen}, 78.
turns as the internal structure of a philosophical worldview. The structure of a worldview (not just of a philosophical worldview) consists of three layers: First, it contains a ‘view of reality’ (Wirklichkeitsauffassung) or ‘world-picture’ (Weltbild) as its foundation. On top of this, there is a layer of life-values (Lebenswerte) and of an ‘understanding’ of the world (Weltverständnis). Finally, a layer of ideals, ‘achievements of the will’ (Willensleistungen), and aims (Zwecksetzungen), completes the worldview.

Since philosophy corresponds to a constant function and to the (constant) structure of the psyche, there is constancy in the function philosophy fulfils in society as well—despite the varying results which are produced by this constant function. As such, philosophy, in Dilthey’s view, can be considered a cultural system (Kultursystem). As a cultural system philosophy is connected to other cultural systems in the ‘household’ (Haushalt) of society. Although the term Kultursystem does not acquire a definite meaning in Dilthey’s 1907 essay, it can be understood along the lines of the structure of psyche (since the structure of the psyche is expressed in the structure of society). Like the psyche, society forms a teleologically connected totality. In the case of the psyche, all activities could be viewed from the perspective of the threefold structure, even if the activities were not directly aimed at one of the ends corresponding with this structure—knowledge of the world, evaluation of life, and principles of action. These three aspects are parts of the reflexive understanding that the individual forms of himself and his place in the world. Philosophy seeks to integrate these three aspects into a scientifically valid totality.


29 *Wesen*, 376.
In the case of society, Dilthey suggests a range of functions which covers the three functional aspects of the psyche. The functions of the systems of culture range from knowledge of the world (culminating in the sciences) to the systems in which voluntary actions (Willenshandlungen) are differentiated and connected to structures which have constancy throughout different individuals and generations—such as law, economic structures, and infrastructure (Naturbeherrschung).

The special sciences, art, religion, and philosophy, are taken as ‘systems of culture’ themselves. Philosophy has a special position in relation to the other systems here: to the sciences on the one hand, to art and religion on the other. Philosophy has in common with the special sciences that it aims at universally valid knowledge. They are separated by their respective objects, however: philosophy aims at universally valid knowledge of the totality of the world, whereas the special sciences have limited parts of the world as their object. Religion and art have in common with philosophy that they have the same ‘object’: the totality of the world, but they do not share with philosophy the pursuit of universally valid knowledge of this ‘object’. These systems are characterized by man’s contemplation of himself and the connected totality (Zusammenhang) of things. They are not bound by finite objects, but aim at an interpretation of the world as a totality. It is philosophy’s task to give an interpretation which also is universally valid. Yet all three systems, art, religion, and philosophy, aim at an interpretation of the totality of the world, and thus aim at a worldview. As such, they must cover the whole range of functions which is expressed in the psyche and in society. These systems cannot be equated with any one of the functions.

Worldviews are interpretations of the world, and therefore partial interpretations of life. These interpretations of life are constructed first of all by individuals who try to formulate answers to the ‘riddles of life’ by attempting to construct a coherent interpretation of the totality of the world. This can be taken as the basic level of the pyramid of worldview concepts in

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30 Wesen, 376. Dilthey does not give any examples of the ‘middle’ function: evaluation of life.
Dilthey. These worldviews are bound by the context of their construction, however, since the world interpreted is always the life-world of a certain individual. Since life produces similar experiences everywhere, worldviews can be detached from individual contexts and have non-local validity. Religious, artistic, and philosophical worldviews are forms of worldviews which have a certain stability or cultural objectivity—they are shared by (large) groups of individuals and are not exclusive to one of them (yet they still originate in one individual—the artistic, religious, or philosophical ‘genius’). These kinds of worldviews form the top of the worldview pyramid, and they aim at, and claim, validity for themselves. The philosophical worldviews aim at, and claim to achieve, objective, scientific validity for themselves. In this sense, the philosophical worldviews stand out from the other two kinds, and can be said to occupy the zenith of the pyramid of worldview concepts in Dilthey. The pyramid exhibits a hierarchy between the different kinds of worldviews, with the philosophical worldview at the top, claiming scientific validity. Now that we have seen what the concept of worldview involves, and how the philosophical worldview is related to other worldview concepts, we can go on to analyze Dilthey’s classification of (philosophical) worldviews, his Weltanschauungstypologie.

5. The typology of worldviews (Weltanschauungstypologie)

Worldviews are interpretations of the world, with the world understood as the life-world: the world connected through life-connections (Lebensbezüge) to the interpreting subject. The world interpreted in a worldview is therefore never completely separated from the personality of the interpreter. In fact, Dilthey claims that every worldview is determined by an underlying life-mood (Lebensstimmung). Every worldview is bound to the interpreting subject. Different interpreters in different contexts therefore arrive at different worldviews. Yet each worldview aims at validity, especially the philosophical worldviews. According to Dilthey, historical consciousness makes us aware of the antinomy between the claimed universal validity and the actual local validity of (philosophical) worldviews. Although metaphysical systems
claim to provide objective, universally valid knowledge of the world, they cannot fully substantiate this claim. The succession of different metaphysical systems in history reveals that none of them succeeds in providing objective grounds for themselves. Subjective, unscientific elements remain in them, elements which can be traced back to the personality of the creator of such a system and his context. Metaphysical systems are therefore dependent on the local, historical context of their realization, despite the fact that they claim to provide universally valid knowledge, founded on objective principles which are independent of this local context. This awareness of the historical relativity of philosophical systems (understood as worldviews), causes a crisis in philosophy in the traditional, metaphysical sense. According to Dilthey, the traditional, metaphysical systems of philosophy each embody a single worldview. This worldview is claimed to provide complete and objective knowledge of the world.31 Now, since historical consciousness has provided awareness of the historical relativity of every metaphysical worldview, it is no longer possible to practise philosophy in the traditional, metaphysical sense—at least not while doing justice to historical consciousness. A metaphysical philosopher who is aware of the historical relativity of his metaphysics is dysfunctional: for it is the function of metaphysical philosophy to provide absolute, not historically relative, knowledge.32

To overcome this aporia, philosophy, says Dilthey, should take this knowledge of historical relativity as its starting point. Instead of solving the conflict between metaphysics and historical consciousness, historical consciousness should be applied to metaphysical systems. For only when philosophical worldviews are taken as independent, objective totalities of knowledge of the world does the conflict (antinomy) between historical consciousness and metaphysics arise:

31 GS 8, 6: ‘Der Gegenstand der Metaphysik ist aber die objective Erkenntnis des Zusammenhangs der Wirklichkeit.’
32 GS 8, 3-7, 13.
Die Widersprüche entstehen also durch die Verselbständigung der objektiven Weltbilder im wissenschaftlichen Bewusstsein. Diese Verselbständigung ist es, was ein System zur Metaphysik macht.\(^{33}\)

The antinomy can be solved by going beyond the level of competing metaphysical systems and construing metaphysical systems as relative expressions of different sides of life. To achieve understanding, this historically aware philosophy should not engage with all possible worldviews as such, but try to establish patterns among them. By reducing the plurality of worldviews to certain basic types, which are possible ways of expressing life, it is able both to do justice to the consciousness of the historical relativity of each type and to gain an understanding of life, through the basic forms of its expression. Historical consciousness thus produces the need for a view which encompasses all (types of) worldviews, a view which is not bound to one worldview as its perspective on the world. Such a typological approach, which addresses not only philosophical worldviews, but religious and artistic ones as well, would itself result in a worldview of a higher order, not vulnerable to historical relativism.\(^{34}\)

The approach to be taken therefore is a comparative analysis of worldviews, in order to discover the basic types of worldviews by which life is expressed. Although this is valid for religious, artistic, and philosophical worldviews, Dilthey developed this approach for philosophical worldviews especially. Although typological approaches were a main concern for Dilthey from early on in his career (see the next section), it was only in the last stage of his life that he developed his typology of philosophical worldviews. In 1898 he published Die drei Grundformen der Systeme in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts, a study of the basic types of philosophical systems in German Idealism.\(^{35}\) In two further publications, he introduced a more general scheme for classifying historical philosophical systems as such: the already mentioned texts Das Wesen der Philosophie (1907) and Die Typen der Weltanschauung und ihre Ausbildung in den metaphysischen Systemen

\(^{33}\) GS 8, 8.  
\(^{34}\) GS 8, 9  
\(^{35}\) Reprinted in: GS 4, 529-554.
That Dilthey was concerned with this issue can be seen from related, unpublished material: the manuscripts on Weltanschauung brought together in volume 8 of his Gesammelte Schriften far exceed the published material (the 1911 essay).

To enable the comparison between Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie and Trendelenburg’s typological approach in the next section, I will briefly present Dilthey’s worldview typology here, using his 1907 and 1911 essays. His typology of philosophical systems is usually considered to be the Weltanschauungstypologie as such, but as we have seen, Dilthey deems a complete typology of all kinds of worldviews, including at least artistic and religious worldviews, necessary to solve the antinomy of historical consciousness and objective, metaphysical knowledge. But for our present purposes (the comparison with Trendelenburg), and because it is the part of Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie that is most elaborate and systematic developed, I will restrict myself here to a discussion of his typology of philosophical systems.

Dilthey distinguishes in the 1907 and 1911 publications between three basic types of philosophical systems. First, the type of naturalism: this worldview contains a sensualist epistemology and a materialistic metaphysics. There is no room to consider the world from the perspective of ‘value and goal’. The life-ideal of this type of worldview is determined by a double perspective: on the one hand man, as part of nature, is subject to its laws, on the other hand man tries to subjugate nature itself through (scientific) thought. In the second place Dilthey discerns the worldview type of the idealism of freedom (Idealismus der Freiheit), which is characterized by the notion of the ‘independence of the spiritual’ from all factuality (Gegebenheiten). The mind (Geist) is conceived as different from and independent of any physical causality. The autonomy (freie Selbstmacht) of the mind is only ethically bound by other persons. Epistemologically,
this type of worldview is based on the (transcendental) ‘facts of consciousness’.\textsuperscript{39} In \textit{objective idealism}, thirdly, the question of the meaning of the world is central. It is paired with a contemplative, aesthetic relation to the world. The ‘form of interpretation’ is characterized by a view of the parts as a totality (\textit{Zusammenschauen der Teile in einem Ganzen}), and by elevation of the life-structure to a world-structure (\textit{Erhebung von Lebenszusammenhang in Weltzusammenhang}).\textsuperscript{40}

The lack of systematic developmental relations between these different types of worldviews or philosophical systems has been taken as a problematic element in the \textit{Weltanschauungstypologie}.\textsuperscript{41} This objection, however, fails to grasp the intention of Dilthey’s approach, and only appears justified if one’s interpretation of Dilthey remains at the level of the historic worldviews themselves and the relationships among them. To Dilthey, worldviews are necessarily one-sided interpretations of the world which claim universal validity, but cannot substantiate this claim. Despite the claimed objectivity, worldviews still contain subjective, irrational elements (e.g. the underlying \textit{Lebensstimmung}). From Dilthey’s position it is therefore unfeasible to attempt a critical evaluation of the worldview types, analogous to the one Trendelenburg undertakes. Only by shifting the perspective to a meta-worldview which studies the historically appearing worldviews, Dilthey overcomes the perpetual ‘dialectic’ of systems among one another. The absence of a hierarchy of basic types is just a property of the way in which life expresses itself, not a weakness of the \textit{Weltanschauungstypologie} per se. By applying a scale of less or more ‘scientific’ to worldviews, Dilthey can construct a certain hierarchy between different \textit{kinds} of worldviews (religion, art, science). But since all philosophical worldviews which are subject to the \textit{Weltanschauungstypologie} ultimately fail to meet scientific standards, such a hierarchy cannot be established between the different \textit{types} of worldviews.

\textsuperscript{39} Typen, 109-110.
\textsuperscript{40} Typen, 115.
\textsuperscript{41} Makkreel, \textit{Dilthey}, 347.
6. Trendelenburg as precursor of Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie?

Trendelenburg has repeatedly been considered the precursor of Dilthey’s typological worldview theory.\textsuperscript{42} Starting with Joachim Wach’s 1926 essay \textit{Die Typenlehre Trendelenburgs und ihr Einfluss auf Dilthey}, the influence of Trendelenburg on Dilthey’s \textit{Weltanschauungstypologie} has mostly been taken for granted.\textsuperscript{43} At first sight, Trendelenburg’s typological approach does in fact seem to have a lot in common with the \textit{Weltanschauungstypologie}. But does this impression hold up under closer scrutiny? To determine whether and in what sense Trendelenburg’s typological approach can be taken as a precursor of Dilthey’s worldview-theory, one should not only consider the factual, structural parallels between the typologies as such. One should also take into account the systematic-philosophical context in which these typologies are embedded and the function they fulfil in this context. To this end I will not only compare the respective typological attempts as such, but especially the philosophical framework of which they are part.

The previous chapter determined the systematic place of Trendelenburg’s typology of worldviews in relation to the programme of his \textit{Logischen Untersuchungen}. This programme consists of a founding science, which would unite logic and metaphysics in a theory of science and which would found the unity of thought and being. The typology of worldviews turned out to be an argumentative strategy, which aimed to make an inventory of the ways in which the relation between the fundamental metaphysical concepts, \textit{Gedanke} and \textit{Kraft}, can be thought. It further aimed to enable the critical analysis of the possible answers to this fundamental metaphysical question, and to make a preliminary choice in favour of one of the answers, the organic worldview. Trendelenburg’s typology of worldviews therefore has a limited and circumscribed function: to provide a preliminary de-

\textsuperscript{42} I have previously present the argument of this section in my ‘Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg und die Weltanschauungstypologie Diltheys’.

cision between the possible metaphysical stances, and to support the organic worldview as long as it has not received a complete theoretical foundation. The concept of worldview which he employs turned out to be limited and circumscribed as well: philosophical systems are interpreted as worldviews and typified in accordance with their fundamental metaphysical thoughts.

The function of the Weltanschauungstypologie in Dilthey’s work is a different one. While the worldviews have their ‘root in life’, as we have seen, the historically appearing worldviews are as many expressions of life. The typology aims at a philosophical understanding of this expression of life in history: ‘Diese Typenunterscheidung soll ja nur dienen, tiefer in die Geschichte zu sehen, und zwar vom Leben aus.’\(^{44}\) The philosophical systems, each of which claims universal validity for itself, struggle for intellectual dominance among one another.\(^{45}\) But unlike Trendelenburg, Dilthey does not expect a victory in this struggle.\(^{46}\) Philosophy should not aim at a universal system, which accommodates all the other systems, but can only strive to find the formative law (Bildungsgesetz) in which the differentiation of systems is rooted. In a manuscript addition to the essay *Die Typen der Weltanschauung und ihre Ausbildung in den metaphysischen Systemen* Dilthey writes: ‘das geschichtliche Bewußtsein erhöht sich über das systematische Streben’.\(^{47}\) Philosophical analysis can only serve to systematize the historical consciousness of the plurality of philosophical systems. It cannot systematically reduce this plurality to a certain unity. The worldviews have their root in a ‘state of affairs which is inaccessible to proof or refutation.’\(^{48}\) None of the philosophical worldviews can be elevated by metaphysics to universal valid science. According to Dilthey, the Weltanschauungstypologie serves to understand life in the different ways in which it expresses itself in history; not to reduce the historical plurality of philosophical interpretations of the world to a systematic unity.

\(^{44}\) *Typen*, 100.

\(^{45}\) *Typen*, 75, and GS 8, 161.


\(^{47}\) GS 8, 161.

\(^{48}\) GS 8, 216.
This different function of the *Weltanschauungstypologie* in comparison with Trendelenburg’s typological approach can be recognized in a different concept of worldview and consequently a different content of Dilthey’s typology. The interrelation of the different types is less systematically developed than it is in Trendelenburg. For Trendelenburg, each worldview represents one of the possible fundamental relations between thought and force. If there is a comparable systematic relation between the types of worldviews to be found in Dilthey, it must be in the inner structure of worldviews. In the essay on *Das Wesen der Philosophie*, Dilthey argues that every type of worldview privileges one of the three ways of relating to the world—knowledge of the world in naturalism, the evaluation of life in objective idealism, and the principles of action in idealism of freedom. Every type of worldview gives an interpretation of the manifold of life from the perspective of one of the basic ways in which individual life relates to the world. But this three-fold structure receives no more systematic explanation than that it expresses the structure of the psyche (*seelische Strukturzusammenhang*). It has its final root in life therefore as the teleological structure of psychic life (*Wirkungszusammenhang des Seelenlebens*), which differentiates into the three ways in which individual life relates to the world. The goal, to understand (historical) life through its philosophical (self-)interpretations, determines the structure of the typology of worldviews. It reflects the structure of (psychic) life.

As observed above, Joachim Wach (and Odo Marquard following him) has defended the thesis that Dilthey’s *Weltanschauungstypologie* is developed in direct connection with Trendelenburg’s distinction of worldviews. There are, however, several points which speak against such an interpretation. It is

49 *Wesen*, 402-404. In *Typen* Dilthey does not explicitly connect the systematic relation between the different types of worldviews with the threefold structure of each worldview. Furthermore, Dilthey orders the types differently (*Wesen*: first objective idealism, then idealism of freedom, in *Typen* this is reversed), apparently so as to make a systematic connection between the three types and the threefold structure of a worldview.

50 *Wesen*, 404.

51 *Wesen*, 405 and 407; *Typen*, 82-83.

52 Cf. Chapter 2, note 3.
true that at first sight strong parallels seem to exist: both typologies differentiate between naturalism and idealism, and the distribution of the historical examples between the different types is also partly identical (except for the classification of Hegel, for instance).\footnote{Dilthey classifies Hegel under objective idealism (the third type in \textit{Typen}), whereas Trendelenburg classifies him under idealism, the second type in his discussion. Cf. Trendelenburg, \textit{Letzten Unterschied}, 19; Dilthey, \textit{Typen}, 112.} Despite these parallels, however, the differences must not be overlooked. To begin with—notwithstanding Wach’s claim that Trendelenburg’s typological approach is the ‘germ’ of the three basic forms in Dilthey’s typology\footnote{Wach, \textit{Typenlehre}, 18.}—it is not possible to establish unequivocal relations between Trendelenburg’s and Dilthey’s types. One of the most important differences is to be found in the relation between the different types of each typology. We have already seen that, although one of his expositions relates the three types to the three ways in which consciousness relates to the world, there is no hierarchical relation between the types in Dilthey. There is also no resolution of the plurality of types; the types are only made part of a historical investigation which takes them as possible expressions of life. In Trendelenburg’s critical analysis of the different types, however, the plurality is reduced to a single worldview (which is one of the original types, not a ‘higher-order’ historical worldview which encompasses all of them).

Trendelenburg’s treatment of the systems of ‘indifference’ or Spinozism is exemplary here. This third type in the classification is considered to be a mere theoretical possibility which arises out of the fundamental opposition between thought and force. In practice, Trendelenburg claims, it cannot be realized without gravitating towards one of the other types (naturalism, idealism). Hence this type of system was never fully realized in history, not even by Spinoza himself.\footnote{Trendelenburg, \textit{Letzten Unterschied}, 21.} By contrast, the worldview type which Dilthey associates with Spinoza, objective idealism, is the type to which the ‘central mass of philosophical systems’ can be assigned.\footnote{\textit{Typen}, 112.} In Trendelenburg’s classification the third type of
worldview is a mere theoretical option, never actually realized, while in Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie it is—at least historically speaking—one of the most important types.

Would a change of the order of types help to map the different typologies into each other? One must conclude that Dilthey’s objective idealism is indeed closer in important respects to Trendelenburg’s ‘organic worldview’. Regarding the epistemology of objective idealism Dilthey remarks for instance: ‘an die Stelle der logischen Relation des Besonderen zum Allgemeinen tritt in ihrem System das organische Verhältnis eines Ganzen zu seinen Gliedern.’57 The ‘metaphysical formula’ of this class of systems is described as the ‘Verwandtschaft aller Teile des Universums mit dem göttlichen Grunde und untereinander.’58 This characterization of objective idealism can be construed as being close to Trendelenburg’s second type—the organic worldview, idealism.59

Dilthey therefore has not systematically adopted Trendelenburg’s worldview-types as such. The historically and systematically important third type of objective idealism for Dilthey is closer to Trendelenburg’s second type than to the historically and systematically third type of Spinozism. But a simple reversal of the second and third worldview type (as in Dilthey’s presentation of the worldview typology in the 1907 essay Das Wesen der Philosophie) gives rise to other problems. Such a reversal would identify Dilthey’s objective idealism with Trendelenburg’s idealism or Platonism (the organic worldview). In the first place, this would render problematic the historical classification of Plato under ‘idealism of freedom’ in Dilthey’s typology (as well as the classification of Spinoza under ‘objective idealism’). Secondly, it seems impossible to connect the idealism of freedom in Dilthey with Spinozism, which is the worldview of identity or ‘indifference’ in Trendelenburg’s classification. This must lead us to the conclusion that there is no linear relation between Trendelenburg’s three types of worldviews and those of Dilthey. If nevertheless one wishes to give a schematic map of the relations

57 *Typen*, 116.
58 *Typen*, 117.
between the two classifications, it is a rather complex picture. Trendelenburg’s second type (idealism) is differentiated into two types in Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie (idealism of freedom and objective idealism). The third type of identity—problematic in Trendelenburg’s analysis—is absent in Dilthey and replaced by objective idealism in the Weltanschauungstypologie.

Historically it is also questionable whether Dilthey adopted his threefold typology from his teacher’s classification. The editor of volume 8 of Dilthey’s Gesammelte Schriften, B. Groethuysen, refers in his preface to this volume to several entries in Dilthey’s diary with respect to the genesis of the Weltanschauungstypologie. In the notes around 1860 which reflect on historiography, one often finds concepts such as ‘basic forms’ (Grundformen) of worldviews, ‘main worldviews’ (Hauptweltanschauungen) or schemes of worldviews. On April 1st, 1860 Dilthey then writes programmatically:

Soll die Analyse der Geschichte der Philosophie wirklich bis zu einer Klassifikation ihrer Hauptformen aus dem Wesen des menschlichen Geistes Herr werden, so muß sie in den konstituierenden Urelementen die Verschiedenheit ergreifen.

Such a classification should take the ‘wechselnden Formen der Bewegung des Geistes’ as its starting point. The goal is to find the elements which determine the differences between the systems, and to classify them accordingly. Note that Dilthey here interprets the motion of spirit (Bewegung des Geistes) as the continuity underlying the different philosophical systems (the changing forms). Although a proximity to Trendelenburg’s concept of motion could be assumed here, it is replaced by the concept of life as underlying continuity—a concept which shows fundamental differences with respect to Trendelenburg’s concept of motion, as we shall see.

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60 GS 8, VI-VII.
61 Der junge Dilthey, e.g. 80, 84, and 89.
62 Der junge Dilthey, 124.
63 Ibid.
Even if the idea of a typology or classification is present in Dilthey’s thought from early on, the notes in his diary which point to a realization of such a typology always indicate a distinction between only two basic forms of (philosophical) worldviews. On April 7, 1859 in a fragment ‘Zur Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung’ the diary reads for instance: ‘Zwei Hauptklassen von Systemen gibt es.’ Some time later, Dilthey writes without restrictions: ‘Zwei große Kreise bestimmen alle Systematik des menschlichen Geistes, nachdem sich die Anschauungsform derselben aus den Tiefen desselben herausgebildet hat.’

With respect to christian ethics, Dilthey distinguishes the ‘strongest opposition’ between the different worldviews as that between the ‘ethical-realistic’ worldview and the ‘idealist’ worldview. The ‘ethical-realistic’ worldview—of which Goethe, Schleiermacher and Lotze are exemplary—seeks the essence of man in both his grandeur and his limits (Hoheit und Schranke), while idealism confronts the ‘normal’ condition of man with an ideal of man. This last type which confronts man with a ‘you must’ (du sollst), and which Dilthey recognizes in the work of Kant, Fichte and Herbart, can be connected with the worldview type idealism of freedom in his later Weltanschauungstypologie. The ethical-realistic worldview can accordingly be connected with objective idealism (in terms of Dilthey’s historical examples as well). With respect to these typological attempts by the young Dilthey, too, we must conclud that it is impossible to make a linear connection between Trendelenburg’s typology and Dilthey’s typological sketches—perhaps even more so than with respect to the mature typology of worldviews. In the fragments from the diary there is no mention of naturalism or positivism in connection with the classification of worldviews, and Trendelenburg’s worldview of identity or indifference cannot be connected with either of the two types that Dilthey distinguishes early on. There is no evidence suggesting that Dilthey took Trendelenburg’s classification and developed it into his own Weltanschauungstypologie, for even the early classificatory attempts diverge strongly from Trendelenburg’s three types of worldviews.

64 Der junge Dilthey, 86.
65 Der junge Dilthey, 144-145.
One must conclude therefore, with respect to content and function of the typology of worldviews, that even if Trendelenburg gives a typological account of worldviews, he cannot be considered a direct precursor (Vorläufer—Marquard) of Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie. With regard to function and content of the classification and the subsequent evaluation of the types, both theories are essentially different, despite some points of correspondence. Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie is a meta-metaphysical theory of philosophical systems, aimed at mediation of the conflict between metaphysics and history. The plurality of worldviews is elevated to a more encompassing perspective, not reduced to a single worldview. Trendelenburg’s typological approach fulfils a more limited task: it is an argumentative strategy in the context of the programme of his Logische Untersuchungen, and it enables a practical and preliminary decision in the conflict of worldviews in favour of the ‘organic worldview’.

7. Founding science: the limits of philosophy in Dilthey and Trendelenburg

Further understanding of the relation between the positions of Trendelenburg and Dilthey can be gained by comparing their concepts of philosophy. Both similarities and differences reveal themselves in such a comparison. The notion of philosophy as a founding and unifying discipline is retained in Dilthey’s concept of philosophy. Both the validity of knowledge and the summing-up of knowledge into a totality, which are key elements in Trendelenburg’s programme of the logical founding of the organic worldview, can also be discerned in Dilthey’s concept of philosophy.

From the point of view of the reflexive and synthetic functions of thought, philosophy is the fundamental science (Grundwissenschaft), which can be compared to Trendelenburg’s grundlegende Wissenschaft.
Philosophie [ist] die *Grundwissenschaft*, welche Form, Regel und Zusammenhang aller Denkprozesse zu ihrem Gegenstand hat, die von dem Zweck bestimmt sind, gültiges Wissen hervorzubringen.\(^66\)

Philosophy, thus construed as a ‘theory of knowledge’ (*Theorie des Wissens*), examines as logic the validity of all thought processes. As epistemology (*Erkenntnistheorie*), philosophy examines the validity of the presuppositions of knowledge, especially the reality of experience and the objective reality of external perception.\(^67\)

But there are important differences between Trendelenburg’s and Dilthey’s position as well. On the one hand, Dilthey speaks of logic and epistemology as functions of philosophy as fundamental science, whereas Trendelenburg speaks of logic and metaphysics as the founding science. Although the terminological shifts might seem insignificant, Dilthey’s abandonment of the term ‘metaphysics’ is particularly telling. On the other hand, the difference between Dilthey’s expression ‘theory of knowledge’ (*Theorie des Wissens*) and Trendelenburg’s ‘theory of science’ (*Theorie der Wissenschaft*) reveals a distinction which is important for the worldview debate. Since they contribute to an understanding of Dilthey’s notion of philosophy, I will elaborate shortly on each of these two differences.

The fundamental metaphysical question for Trendelenburg was the question how thinking and being, taken in their maximal conceptual opposition as ‘thought’ and ‘force’, are connected. The founding science of logic and metaphysics is the philosophical discipline which seeks to answer this question. Philosophy tries to answer the question how ‘knowledge’ and the ‘world’ are connected. An answer to this question explains the possibility of scientific knowledge of the world, and thereby ‘founds’ scientific knowledge.\(^68\)

Dilthey also considers it part of the essence of thinking that it relates to the world:

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\(^{66}\) Wesen, 408.
\(^{67}\) Wesen, 408.
\(^{68}\) Trendelenburg’s answer is essentially non-foundationalist, as was argued in the previous chapter.
Das Denken bezieht sich [...] auf den gemeinsamen Gegenstand aller Denkakte der verschiedenen Personen, den Zusammenhang der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung, zu welchem die Vielheit der Dinge sich im Raume und die Mannigfaltigkeit ihrer Veränderungen und Bewegungen sich in der Zeit ordnet: die Welt.\(^69\)

Trendelenburg constructed an opposition between thought and the world to elucidate the fundamental metaphysical problem: if thought and the world are alien to each other, how is knowledge of the world possible? Dilthey thinks of the world from the outset as being connected to thought. The world is construed by Dilthey as the world \textit{as it is experienced} and acted upon. It is the world construed as life-world:

\begin{quote}
Dieser Welt sind alle Gefühle und Willenshandlungen eingeordnet durch die örtliche Bestimmung der ihnen zugehörigen Körper und die in sie verwobenen Anschauungsbestandteile. Alle in diesen Gefühlen oder Willenshandlungen gesetzten Werte, Zwecke, Güter sind ihr eingegliedert. Das menschliche Leben ist von ihr umfaßt.\(^70\)
\end{quote}

Given the thus construed relation between thought and being, Dilthey no longer designates as ‘metaphysics’ the founding science that philosophy is. Metaphysics is marked by a misunderstanding of the connection between thinking and the world:

\begin{quote}
Wir verstehen unter Metaphysik die Form der Philosophie, welche den in der Relation zur Lebendigkeit konzipierten Weltzusammenhang wissenschaftlich behandelt, als ob er eine von dieser Lebendigkeit unabhängige Objektivität wäre.\(^71\)
\end{quote}

Metaphysics thus introduces a ‘gap’ between thought and the world. Philosophy should explain and found the relation between thought and being. But this founding explanation does not take the complete separation of thought and being as its starting point, for it already presupposes in the concept of ‘world’ a connection between thought and being. The metaphys-

\(^{69}\) Wesen, 414.
\(^{70}\) Wesen, 414.
ical forms of philosophy cannot fulfil this founding task, for they mistakenly separate the world and consciousness, which tries to gain knowledge of the world. Due to this gap between thought and being which metaphysics introduces, it is impossible to give an adequate and satisfying answer to the question how knowledge of the world is possible.

Dilthey’s critique of metaphysics could be read as an implicit critique of his teacher Trendelenburg’s ‘fundamental metaphysical problem’. Trendelenburg asks how knowledge of the world is possible if thought and being are taken as radically different. He answers this metaphysical question by showing the common root in motion of both thought and being. Despite the radical difference between thought and being which metaphysics constructs, it becomes clear with hindsight that they have always been connected, for motion was always original to them. Even if Dilthey’s critique of metaphysics is aimed at Trendelenburg’s ‘fundamental science’ as well, Trendelenburg’s theory remains unaffected. For the connection between thought and the world is not merely assumed, but is the result of his fundamental science. Conversely, the radical difference between thought and the world is not the way in which ‘the world is treated’ by Trendelenburg, but is a constructive hypothesis, aimed at a theory which explains the connection between the two. Trendelenburg’s logic-metaphysics of motion is a theory of connection, not of separation.

This is a first and important point of divergence between Dilthey and Trendelenburg. One of the concepts from the pair ‘thinking’ and ‘world’ (or: thought and being), i.e. the world, is construed differently by Dilthey. Trendelenburg’s theory is aimed at giving an overview of the possible solutions to the fundamental, metaphysical problem of philosophy. But for Dilthey, there is no fundamental metaphysical problem, at least not the problem of how thought and being are connected. Trendelenburg’s notion of being as completely alien to thinking, even as a theoretical construction, is missing in Dilthey. From the outset being is only construed by Dilthey as ‘the world’: being as it is experienced, as life-world.
It is not only the world that is construed differently by Dilthey. The other term of the pairing ‘thinking’ and ‘world’, thinking, differs from Trendelenburg’s conception as well. Instead of a ‘theory of science’ (*Theorie der Wissenschaft*), Dilthey speaks of a ‘theory of knowledge’ (*Theorie des Wissens*). As logic, philosophy examines the criteria for the correctness of thought processes.\(^72\) Philosophical inquiry is aimed at thought processes as such, and is not limited beforehand to scientific thinking and scientific knowledge. Although the difference between a *Theorie der Wissenschaft* and a *Theorie des Wissens* might seem trivial and insignificant, it marks a fundamentally different conception in Dilthey of ‘knowledge’ and ‘thought’. For Dilthey, thinking and scientific thinking are not identical.

Philosophy construed as fundamental science, which engages with all forms of thinking, not only with the scientific ones, therefore has more than just theoretical significance:\(^73\) it relates to different ‘domains of culture’ (*Sphären der Kultur*), not just to scientific knowledge. Dilthey distinguishes between three areas of culture. First, philosophy examines the cultural domain of *Weltvorstellung* and *Welterkenntnis*. Here philosophy aims at the special sciences, examines and elucidates the methods, limits, presuppositions and goals of scientific knowledge. As such, philosophy is the ‘theory of theories, the foundation and the synopsis [Zusammenfassung] of the special sciences into knowledge of reality’.\(^74\) In this way, philosophy fulfils a task comparable to the one it fulfils in Trendelenburg’s conception of a ‘founding science’.

But the two other domains of culture with which philosophy engages go beyond Trendelenburg’s programmatic framework for a philosophical theory of science. These domains are not

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\(^{72}\) Dilthey: *Wesen*, 408.

\(^{73}\) Which is not say, of course, that Trendelenburg’s ‘grundlegende Wissenschaft’ does have only theoretical significance. Rather, the practical significance is in Trendelenburg’s case attached to the organic worldview which is established by the founding science. With Dilthey, it is a direct result of the broadening of the concept of knowledge to include more than just scientific knowledge, as we will see.

\(^{74}\) *Wesen*, 408: ‘Theorie der Theorien, die Begründung und die Zusammenfassung der Einzelwissenschaften zur Erkenntnis der Wirklichkeit.’
limited to the sciences. The next cultural domain engaged by philosophy is that of life-experience (\textit{Lebenserfahrung}). According to Dilthey, life-experience is the increasing reflection on life, where life is taken as the ‘inner connection of the psychic performance in the association of a person.’\textsuperscript{75} It is important to stress that this ‘life-experience’ is not a kind of immediate datum which is given to philosophy. Life-experience always has the form of reflection on life: ‘Lebenserfahrung ist die wachsende Besinnung und Reflexion über das Leben’.\textsuperscript{76} Life-experience is always reflexively mediated. Mediated by individual reflection and by the structures of society (\textit{die gesellschaftlichen Ordnungen}), this life-experience is part of the ‘foundation in reality’ (\textit{reale Grundlage}) of philosophy. Philosophy’s aim here is to overcome the subjective character of valuations of life. Philosophy should thus attain an estimation of the value of things and a conscious comprehension of the meaning of life. In such a way a ‘system of immanent life-values’ would be established.\textsuperscript{77}

Finally, philosophy also relates to the ideals and arrangements of the ‘practical world’. As such, it is the contemplation on the will and the arrangements of life in which the will has found its expression (\textit{Lebensordnungen} such as: economy, law, state, man’s mastery of nature, morality [\textit{Sittlichkeit}]). The philosophical analysis of these arrangements reveals their necessity on the one hand, but examines the extent of their validity on the other. Philosophy is therefore both an ‘inner force’ which aims at the development and enhancement of the arrangements of life and also provides ‘fixed norms’ (\textit{feste Maßstäbe}) for these arrangements. Philosophy thus mediates between reality and critical ideal by critically examining the norms which are taken from the ‘reality of life’.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Wesen}, 408: ‘die innere Beziehung der psychischen Leistungen im Zusammenhang der Person.’

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Wesen}, 408.

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Wesen}, 409-410.

\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Wesen}, 411: Philosophy becomes an ‘inneren Kraft, welche auf die Steigerung des Menschen und die Fortentwicklung seiner Lebensordnungen hindrängt,’ and provides ‘zugleich feste Maßstäbe für diese [Lebensordnungen] in der sittlichen Regel und in den Realitäten des Lebens.’
To draw a final comparison between Dilthey and Trendelenburg here, let us return to the relation of the different functions of philosophy. Trendelenburg interpreted the answers to the fundamental metaphysical question, the question of the relation between thought and being, as worldviews. These fundamental metaphysical conceptions secure the possibility of objective knowledge of the world as well. This reveals a close relationship between (in Dilthey’s terminology) the functions of establishing a worldview and the founding of scientific knowledge. In Trendelenburg the worldview function and the logical function are two sides of the same coin. The scientific foundation of the organic worldview includes the logical-metaphysical foundation of scientific knowledge as such.

Since Dilthey also distinguishes these two functions (among others), the question can be raised how he construes the relation between them. We have already learned that the common property of the different philosophical functions is their reflexive and synthetic nature. But does this also mean that philosophy ultimately addresses only one problem? At the end of his essay on the essence of philosophy, Dilthey writes retrospectively:

So überliefert dann die Geschichte der Philosophie der systematischen philosophischen Arbeit die drei Probleme der Grundlegung, der Begründung und Zusammenfassung der Einzelwissenschaften und die Aufgabe der Auseinandersetzung mit dem nie zur Ruhe zu bringenden Bedürfnis letzter Besinnung über Sein, Grund Wert, Zweck und ihren Zusammenhang in der Weltanschauung, gleichviel in welcher Form und Richtung diese Auseinandersetzung stattfindet.\footnote{Wesen, 416.}

The question is then whether this threefold problem of philosophy, and the problem that springs from the ever-present ‘need for a worldview’, can be solved by one and the same philosophical project, or whether they are two distinct issues that philosophy has to deal with. Dilthey remains somewhat obscure on this issue, and it is not surprising that both interpretations can be found in the literature. Rudolf Makkreel, in his study \textit{Dilthey. Philosopher of the Human Studies}, argues that the worldview task of philosophy comes ‘in addition to establishing the foundations of
knowledge’. He concludes that ‘taken by itself’ (!) Dilthey’s worldview theory is problematic and ‘in many respects the least satisfactory part of Dilthey’s philosophy.’

Ilse Bulhof, on the contrary, interprets Dilthey’s worldview theory as an integral and concluding part of his philosophical work. I will return to this question in the final chapter. The importance of this question must not be underestimated. It is not only relevant to the question how Dilthey’s worldview theory relates to his other philosophical concerns. More importantly, it also decides how Dilthey philosophically positions the concept and theory of worldview. Therefore it is decisive for the question whether Dilthey’s philosophy also constitutes a worldview.

8. Conclusion: worldview or theory of worldviews?

Does Dilthey only offer a theory of worldviews (Weltanschauungslehre)—a theory which does not claim to offer a worldview, an interpretation of the world, itself? It has recently been argued that although Dilthey aims to provide a scientific theory of worldviews, he in fact ‘falls prey’ to a non-scientific worldview himself.

Yet such an interpretation presupposes a rigid opposition between ‘science’ or ‘scientific philosophy’ on the one hand and ‘worldview’ on the other—in other words: it takes Husserl’s dilemma for granted.

But the interpretation of Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie presented in this chapter argues that Dilthey’s theory of worldviews is an attempt to overcome the limits of traditional, metaphysical worldviews. Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie is not just a theory of different worldviews, but an attempt to provide a more complete interpretation of life. Instead of abandoning the idea of a philosophical worldview, Dilthey tries to overcome the limits of traditional philosophical worldviews by integrating the historical plurality in his typology of worldviews. Yet this further step is also an attempt to provide a more complete understand-

80 Makkreel, Dilthey, 345.
81 Bulhof, Wilhelm Dilthey, chapter five.
ing of life (‘tiefer in das Leben sehen…’), and thus a ‘view of life and the world’—a worldview. According to Dilthey’s analysis, the theory of worldviews therefore results in a more complete, more valid, more scientific view of life and the world. Despite the profound differences between Dilthey’s and Trendelenburg’s theory of worldviews, they both aim at establishing a scientific, philosophical worldview.

Rather than one who abandons philosophical worldviews, Dilthey must be considered a philosopher who attempts to construct a philosophical worldview. Yet the question must be asked whether Dilthey, in trying to overcome the limits of ‘metaphysics’—the claim of universal validity for limited (and therefore only partly valid) perspectives on the world—does not fall prey to another kind of metaphysics, the metaphysics of life. This question will be taken up in the final chapter.
CHAPTER 4

WILHELM WINDELBAND:
PHILOSOPHY AS THE SCIENCE OF WORLDVIEW

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will discuss the concept of worldview in the work of Wilhelm Windelband. In Windelband we find—as we did in Trendelenburg and Dilthey—an interpretation of philosophy as worldview, or at least as aimed at a worldview. Windelband’s position is similar to that of Trendelenburg and Dilthey in important respects, but differs from them in others, which are perhaps even more important. The relation between the three positions in the worldview debate and the evolution of the debate which they reveal will be the topic of the next chapter. This chapter deals with Windelband’s position on the philosophical question of worldview.

In order to understand his position, I will first address what can be considered his early writings (section 1). These works form a somewhat separate group both historically and through the systematic position presented in them. Secondly, I will address two key publications on Kant and the concept of worldview which appeared in 1904 (section 2). In these publications, Windelband connects the question of a worldview to the interpretation of Kant, and especially to Kant’s *Kritik der Urteilskraft*. The third section will further discuss Windelband’s interpretation of this work and its relevance to the worldview question. In section 4, we turn to Windelband’s final major work, his *Einführung in die Philosophie*. As we shall see, Windelband advances in some respects beyond his 1904 worldview concept in this book. Section 5 will then discuss the ‘metaphysical character’ of Windelband’s worldview concept and of his Kant interpretation. Finally, section 6 discusses the historical context of Windelband’s Kant interpretation, especially the influence of his teacher, Kuno Fischer. This will reveal a systematic connection between Fi-
scher’s position in the debate with Trendelenburg and Windelband’s reading of the Third Critique. In the concluding section, I will sketch the development of the concept of worldview in Windelband and summarize its most important elements.

2. The concept of worldview in Windelband’s early writings

Windelband’s early writings, those dating from the 1870s and 1880s, do not use the term Weltanschauung (worldview) very often. If one considers the eleven essays originating in the years up to and including 1883 in his two-volume collection Präludien, the term Weltanschauung is absent in seven of these essays. Some of these seven essays do use related terms such as Weltbetrachtung, Weltauffassung, or Lebensbetrachtung, but no more than a few times, and they do not figure prominently. Of the remaining four essays in which the term is used explicitly, one uses the term only in passing and in a clearly non-technical, non-philosophical way. The topic of worldview is thus addressed more or less systematically in only three out of Windelband’s eleven early essays collected in the Präludien.

1 The Präludien, originally a one-volume collection of essays, steadily expanded with each of the subsequent publications. From the fourth edition (1911) onwards, it was published in two volumes. The fifth edition (1914) is the last to which new essays were added. The work contains most of Windelband’s essays, with a few notable exceptions. For the purpose of this section (the worldview concept in the early period), no relevant publications outside the Präludien exist, cf. Jakowenko, Wilhelm Windelband (1941), which still contains the most extensive published bibliography of Windelband’s works.


4 ‘Zum Gedächtnis Spinozas’ (1877).
Yet this cursory look at the use of the term *Weltanschauung* in Windelband’s early work does not warrant the conclusion that this concept, and the philosophical questions connected to it, were not an important issue for him at the time. For in the three essays which address the topic (‘Pessimismus und Wissenschaft’ from 1876, ‘Immanuel Kant’ from 1881, and ‘Was ist Philosophie?’ from 1882), a clear notion of the concept of worldview and its philosophical value emerge. Furthermore, the concept of worldview plays a central role in Windelband’s discussion of the nature of philosophy as science. Especially the essays ‘Immanuel Kant’ and ‘Was ist Philosophie?’ include important systematic discussions connected to, or even centred around, the concept of worldview.

In the essay ‘Immanuel Kant’ of 1881, originally a lecture commemorating the centennial of the first edition of Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Windelband argues that Kant has ‘destroyed’ (zersetzte) the concept of *Weltanschauung* ‘in its traditional sense’ (im alten Sinne).\(^5\) This traditional sense of worldview is taken by Windelband as synonymous with ‘world-picture’ (*Weltbild*).\(^6\) According to Windelband, it makes no sense to speak of a ‘picture of the world’ or of ‘picturing the world’ as a totality and as it is in itself, within Kant’s critical philosophy. As such, one cannot speak of Kant’s worldview.

This statement is presented by Windelband as an argument against the possibility of a scientific worldview which goes beyond the world of appearances. He specifically targets (but does not name) interpreters of Kant who maintain that Kant has shown that scientific knowledge can only give us knowledge of the ‘world of appearances’, and that a worldview must go beyond the sciences. Since—these interpreters go on to argue—science cannot know anything about things as they are in themselves, a worldview which contains complete knowledge of the world cannot be based on science alone. A worldview—which is thus understood as containing knowledge of things as such, not of mere appearances alone—must therefore be completed by the ‘necessary presuppositions of ethical consciousness’ and by the ‘genial

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\(^5\) ‘Immanuel Kant’, 141.

\(^6\) ‘Immanuel Kant’, 141, see also 140.
intuitions of art’. But to Windelband in 1881, such an extension of the concept of knowledge beyond empirical, scientific knowledge is not an option for philosophy. Rather than relaxing the criteria for scientific knowledge, Windelband discards the concept of worldview as scientifically unattainable for philosophy. Since knowledge of the world as such and in its totality is not possible in a scientific, objective way, a scientific, philosophical worldview is also an impossibility. There can be no (metaphysical) knowledge of the world apart from the sciences, and a worldview which would claim to provide knowledge of the world as it is in itself cannot be scientific.

A year later—in an essay dating from 1882—Windelband discusses the question ‘Was ist Philosophie?’. In an age in which the special sciences are flourishing and have appropriated many of the topics which were traditionally the domain of philosophy, the question about the nature of philosophy as a science must be addressed. If philosophy is science, what is its object? According to Windelband in this essay, philosophy has no direct object in reality, not even in the totality of the real. Such a science of the cosmos (Weltall) is a metaphysical dream from which philosophy has awoken.

Instead, philosophy should be a reflexive critique of the products of reason. Windelband explains this in terms of the difference between judgements (Urteile) and evaluations (Beurteilungen). The former expresses a relation between two representations (Vorstellungsinhalte), while the latter expresses a relation between a representation and the evaluating consciousness. Scientific judgements are always accompanied by an evaluation which either asserts or denies the truth of the judgement. Philosophy should deal with the legitimacy of these claims of truth or falsity by means of the quaestio juris. The quaestio facti, the judgements about objects, are a matter of science themselves. This pertains not only to science but to other judgements, such as moral and aesthetic judgements as well. The object for philosophy are not these judgements themselves, but the evaluations attached to them, or rather, the principles which have absolute validity, and on the strength of which these evaluations can legit-

7 ‘Immanuel Kant’, 141.
imately be made. Philosophy must therefore be taken as a reflexive discipline which examines the validity of the uses of reason and the principles which provide this validity.

Kantian, critical philosophy must therefore be understood as the science of principles or norms, or, as Windelband writes, the science of ‘normative consciousness’ (Normalbewußtsein). This normative consciousness is not an empirical or metaphysical reality, not that which is factually valid, but rather the totality of that which should be valid. Philosophy reflects on (the products of) empirical consciousness in order to discover how much of this normative consciousness is realized in it:

Philosophie also ist die Wissenschaft vom Normalbewußtsein. Sie durchforscht das empirische Bewußtsein, um festzustellen, an welchen Punkten darin jene normative Allgemeingültigkeit hervorspringt.\(^8\)

Windelband maintains that Kantian critical philosophy has shown the impossibility of a universally valid metaphysics, understood as ‘science of worldview’.\(^9\) Such a metaphysical worldview would entail immediate philosophical knowledge of the world. In this sense, Windelband claims, metaphysics is impossible. Philosophy cannot be a ‘metaphysics of things’, but only a ‘metaphysics of knowledge’.\(^10\) The task of philosophy can only be taken in relation to the faculties of reason, especially theoretical reason as it is employed in science. The object of philosophy is not (some part of) the world, the object of philosophy is formed by the knowledge claims that science makes about the world, and the validity claims, the evaluations that are entailed in all activities of reason.\(^11\) Philosophy examines the validity of these claims by means of the faculties of reason, it does not provide knowledge of the world in the form of a philosophical (metaphysical) worldview, according to Windelband in this essay. A worldview here is a rather circumscribed concept—metaphysical

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\(^8\) ‘Was ist Philosophie?’, 46.
\(^9\) ‘Was ist Philosophie?’, 27.
\(^10\) ‘Was ist Philosophie?’, 19.
\(^11\) ‘Was ist Philosophie?’, 23f.
knowledge of the world as it is—which is sharply distinguished from philosophy, whose object is the world as it should be, i.e. the normative consciousness.

An even more specific use of the concept of worldview can be found in his early essay ‘Pessimismus und Wissenschaft’ (1876). Here, the term *Weltanschauung* is used in a discussion of the question whether a scientific evaluation of the totality of the world as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is possible. If it could be established objectively whether the world as such is good or bad, a scientific foundation of optimism or pessimism could be given. Windelband is especially concerned with philosophical pessimism which, due to the influence of Schopenhauer, was a popular stance in this period. Windelband agrees that optimism or pessimism exist as ‘moods’ (*Stimmungen*). As mere moods, they are personal, and not a subject for philosophy. But if pessimism or optimism are claimed to be scientifically founded judgements of the value of the world as such, they are important for philosophy:

\[\text{Will ich dagegen die Stimmung als solche in eine Weltanschauung umsetzen und jene Verallgemeinerungstätigkeit der Stimmungsbetrachtung bis an das letzte Ende führen, wo dann das Urteil: „die Welt ist gut“ oder „die Welt ist schlecht“ den Anspruch auf objektive Wahrheit und allgemeine Anerkennung macht – dann stehen wir vor einer Prinzipienfrage ersten Ranges.}\]

Pessimism elevated to the level of scientific knowledge leads to the philosophical question (‘Prinzipienfrage ersten Ranges’) whether the totality of the world can be evaluated with scientific objectivity. Without addressing the specific arguments which Windelband provides, his conclusion is a denial that such a scientific evaluation of the totality of the world (or universe) is possible. Optimism and pessimism cannot be given an objective status as scientific interpretations of the totality of the world.

What does this tell us about the concept of worldview in the 1876 text? According to Windelband, pessimism or optimism as worldviews, as universal judgements about the value of the world, cannot be given a scientific foundation. Although the dis-

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12 ‘Pessimismus und Wissenschaft’, 223.
discussion is limited here to these two particular worldviews, Windelband’s conclusion on the possibility of giving a scientific basis to such a worldview is in line with the more general position taken in the two later texts which we just discussed. In these two later texts he expresses the position that a worldview as such cannot be scientific, without limiting this to any particular worldview.

In these three early texts (1876, 1881, and 1882), Windelband can thus be seen as being opposed to the idea of a philosophical, scientific worldview. A worldview claims to contain knowledge about the totality of the world, and has a metaphysical character, for it goes beyond the empirical knowledge of the sciences. Such a Weltanschauung cannot be scientifically warranted, as only empirical scientific knowledge can have universal validity (Allgemeingültigkeit). Philosophy should examine the claims of scientific knowledge to such validity. Worldviews are relegated from philosophy to a proto-philosophical domain, which is personal, subjective and most of all non-scientific. In his later texts, however, Windelband develops a notion of philosophical worldview that is different from the ‘metaphysical’ notion which he rejects in his early work, as we shall see.

3. The worldview concept in Windelband after 1900

After the publications of the early 1880s, Windelband did not publish many systematical texts until after 1900. In the historical works from this period, the concept of worldview is not addressed systematically. Consequently, no information about the place of the concept of worldview in his thought in this period is available to us. Interestingly, two of the publications which appeared after this period of systematical silence give a prominent place to the concept of worldview, which, as we shall see, differs

13 He did publish several historical works, including his 1893 publication Geschichte der Philosophie, which appeared in many subsequent editions (the last in 1993), renamed Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie from the 1903 edition onwards. See Jakowenko, Wilhelm Windelband, for further bibliographical data.
markedly from the earlier treatment. Furthermore, the concept of worldview plays an important role in Windelband's interpretation of Kant.

3.1 Windelband’s Kant-interpretation of 1904

Part I: Kant’s worldview

The centenary of Kant’s death in 1904 was the occasion for two contributions by Windelband on the state of Kantian critical philosophy. One was an essay which appeared in the *Kant-Studien*, entitled ‘Nach hundert Jahren’. The other was an address he held at the University of Heidelberg, under the title ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’. In these two contributions, Windelband presents an interpretation of Kant’s critical philosophy and its relevance which differs from his earlier interpretation from the 1880s. For one thing, Windelband’s interpretation of the relevance of Kantian philosophy is now more extensive than the earlier one. And even more importantly for our present purposes, this revised Kant interpretation is developed largely in terms of the concept of worldview. In this section I will analyse Windelband’s Kant interpretation of 1904 and the role which the concept of worldview plays in it. This sub-section starts with an analysis of the position taken by Windelband in ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’. The other 1904 text is discussed in the next sub-section.

Looking back on the impact of Kant’s critical philosophy, Windelband attributes the impact of his philosophy to the ‘intimate and concentrated essence of his personality.’ Ascription of (part of) the historical impact of persons to their individual character is an element which forms part of Windelband’s notion of the historical development of philosophy from at least as early as his *Geschichte der Philosophie* (1892). Here, in his 1904 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, this ‘individual’ contribution is specified as stemming from the philosopher’s worldview:

Windelband does not evaluate the apparently ‘subjective’ root of Kant's philosophical work negatively, or as un-scientific. On the contrary, he considers the role of the philosopher’s individuality a prerequisite for historical relevance.\(^16\) It is the role of Kant's personality, therefore, which is the ground of his pre-eminent position in the history of philosophy:

Und so meine ich auch, daß Kants überragende Stellung in der Geschichte der Philosophie in der ganz besonderen Art beruht, wie er diese letzte und höchste Aufgabe aller Philosophie aus seiner Persönlichkeit heraus gelöst hat.\(^17\)

This final and highest task of philosophy is the task of a worldview, which is therefore both an expression of the philosopher’s individuality and a solution to the scientific problem which philosophy faces. Kant’s works express a worldview, and this is the expression of his personal worldview, in scientific terms.\(^18\)

Windelband is aware that his analysis of Kant’s worldview as Kant’s most important contribution to philosophy might estrange those who subscribe to the common interpretation that Kant has proven the impossibility of a scientific metaphysics.\(^19\)

And, as should be recalled from the discussion of Windelband’s early concept of worldview above, he himself subscribed—with explicit reference to Kant—to the view that a scientific worldview, understood as metaphysics, is impossible. However, Windel-

\(^{15}\) ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 4.


\(^{17}\) ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 5.

\(^{18}\) Which can be seen e.g. from this expression by Windelband: ‘Diese Weltanschauung in den monumentalen Grundzügen, wie er sie in seinen Werken niedergelegt hat, aus den Formeln des Systems herauszulösen, scheint mir die würdigste Art, sein Bild in dieser Gedächtnisstunde lebendig vor uns aufzurichten.’ ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 5-6.

\(^{19}\) ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 6.
band maintains now that Kant’s demonstration of the impossibility of a scientific metaphysics must be understood as only part of the Kantian worldview. The first stage of Kant’s critical philosophy—the reduction of scientific knowledge to the world of experience—is indeed only a first step. The sciences cannot achieve knowledge beyond experience, but this does not preclude a metaphysics that goes beyond the knowledge of the physical world, the world of experience that the sciences study.

Windelband interprets Kant’s famous dictum that he had to restrict knowledge for the sake of faith along these lines as well. The restriction of scientific knowledge to the domain of experience means that traditional, natural science cannot achieve knowledge beyond experience. To achieve a comprehensive worldview, therefore, another kind of experience and another kind of science are needed. Hence the ‘faith’ meant here by Kant is not religion in one of its various historical forms, but rather a system of necessary and universally valid beliefs:

Freilich ist dann dieser Glaube nicht irgend ein individuell oder historisch bestimmt, nicht Kants oder irgend eine andere Privatansicht, sondern ein System von Überzeugungen, die aus den innersten Notwendigkeiten des menschlichen Lebens durch die philosophische Überlegung herausgelöst und in ihrer allgemeinen Geltung für die Vernunft erwiesen werden. In diesem Sinne habe ich es von jeher als die epochemachende Bedeutung Kants in der Geschichte der Philosophie angesehen, daß die Gründe für seine wissenschaftliche Weltanschauung nicht einseitig in den begrifflichen Formen des Wissens, sondern in der ganzen Breite der menschlichen Vernunftbetätigung liegen [...] 20

This kind of ‘faith’ is therefore not opposed to philosophy and to scientific knowledge, but rather forms a unity with scientific knowledge in the philosophical worldview. This ‘faith’ is demonstrated faith (‘in ihrer allgemeinen Geltung für die Vernunft erwiesen’). We will return to the question how the term ‘science’ is transformed here later. For now, it is sufficient to note that the ‘scientific worldview’ (wissenschaftliche Weltanschauung) is based on more than the sciences (begriffliche Formen des Wissens). The ‘scientific’ character of Kant’s worldview is not

the same as the scientific character of the traditional, natural sciences, for the latter are indeed incapable of knowledge beyond the domain of experience.

According to Windelband, the core of the worldview expressed in Kant’s philosophical work is to be found in the fundamental opposition (Gegensatz) between the material (sinnlichem) and immaterial (übersinnlichem) world. To prevent the distinction between these two domains from being erased was the main concern of Kant’s work:

Die Verwischung der Grenzlinien zwischen den beiden Welten zu verhüten, erkannte er als die eigentliche Aufgabe seines Nachdenkens, und das hat ihn zum kritischen Philosophen gemacht.21

The structure of Kant’s main critical work—the three critiques—is analyzed by Windelband in the light of the two sides of the opposition between material and immaterial world, and their relationship. The first of Kant’s critiques, the Critik der reinen Vernunft, is concerned with the first side of the opposition, the sensuous, material world, the world of experience. To be more precise, it is concerned with the delimitation of knowledge to the world of appearances (Erscheinungen). The two roots of knowledge, sensuous experience and intellectual forms, are two independent roots, but they are both rooted in the knowing subject. The empirical knowledge thus achieved is only knowledge of the world of appearances. This is the part of ‘Kant’s worldview’ which early neo-Kantianism—and the early Windelband as well, as we have seen—mistakenly took for the whole, thus concluding the impossibility of a ‘scientific metaphysics’, of knowledge of the immaterial world. But this part of Kant’s philosophy, which restricts science to experience, is itself limited. It is limited by Kant’s concept of science as Newtonian, natural science.22

A more complete interpretation of Kant’s worldview is called for, according to Windelband, one which acknowledges the limits of Kant’s concept of science as well. The way to this more complete interpretation of Kant can be found in the limited in-

interpretation itself. The delimitation of science to the sensuous, material world points beyond these limits, to the immaterial world:

Die Sinnenwelt kann Erscheinung nur heißen im Verhältnis zu einer höheren Welt von tieferer Realität, zu der übersinnlichen Welt der Dinge an sich.\textsuperscript{25}

Scientific knowledge of the world of appearances points beyond itself because of what Kant called \textit{der transzendentale Schein}—the metaphysical illusions stemming from the principles of theoretical reason.\textsuperscript{24} For instance, the idea of the totality of the world is a necessary (regulative) idea for theoretical reason, but this totality cannot be the object of experience, and therefore cannot be known—in the sense of \textit{scientific knowledge}.\textsuperscript{25}

This does not mean that the immaterial world is out of reach for philosophy—and this is the point where Windelband goes beyond the earlier, restrictive interpretations of Kant:

Wo das Wissen versagt, tritt das Gewissen ein. Ist die theoretische Vernunft aus der höheren Sphäre des Übersinnlichen ausgeschlossen, so ist die praktische darin heimisch, und mit ihr faßt Kants Lehre festen Fuß in der Welt, die der wissenschaftlichen Einsicht nur als Grenzbestimmung ihres eigenen Bereiches gesetzt war.\textsuperscript{26}

For empirical, scientific knowledge the relation between the material and the immaterial world was determined by the absolute boundary of experience—even if the transcendentental ideas pointed beyond the domain of experience. As far as practical reason is concerned, the relation between material and immaterial can be described as an antagonistic opposition. Man is a citizen of both the material and the immaterial world, and to fulfil the duties which he is aware of through his conscience he must confront and oppose his natural dispositions.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} KrV B 349f.
\textsuperscript{25} Cf. e.g. KrV B 397.
\textsuperscript{26} ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 17.
This connection of the material and the immaterial world in man enhances the reality of both worlds with respect to scientific knowledge. The immaterial world is a reality for man in conscience, whereas it was only present as a regulative idea for theoretical reason. According to Windelband the reality of the sensuous, material world is enhanced as well. It is no longer merely appearance, but a reality to be confronted:

All true human life is considered the work of the ethical will to realize itself in the opposing material world. The material and the immaterial world are connected for practical reason, but in an antagonistic way. This antagonism must not be taken as a merely negative opposition, however, for it the ground of all human history.

The question whether there is not a deeper connection between the two worlds than this antagonistic one can be asked as well. Thus the final and highest problem for Kantian philosophy, according to Windelband, is the question whether empirical reality, the world of appearances, can ultimately be considered the realization of a super-sensuous teleological law (eine übersinnliche Zweckgesetzgebung). If this were indeed the case, a fundamental connection between the two worlds would be discovered:

Dürfte diese Frage bejaht werden, so läge darin eine freilich über alle unsere wissenschaftliche Erkenntnis hinausgehende Deutung der tiefsten Wesens- und Lebensgemeinschaft zwischen beiden Welten.
Note that philosophical knowledge of this deep unity is of another, higher order than scientific knowledge. In order to call the Kantian worldview a ‘scientific’ worldview, therefore, the concept of science must be adjusted. We will return to this further below.

For Windelband, it is the merit of Kant’s *Kritik der Urteilskraft* to have given a positive answer to this most fundamental question. It is therefore Kant’s ‘greatest work’. In the experience of art, Kant finds an experience of a teleological structure (eine Zweckmäßigkeit) which is unintentional (absichtlos). In other words, the teleological structure which in the experience of art is encountered in the sensuous world is not created by the experiencing subject.

For Kant, this experience of an unintended teleological structure is only an indication (eine Hindeutung) of the deep connectedness between the material and the immaterial worlds. As Windelband writes:

> Das gilt ihm als die von uns zu erlebende Hindeutung auf eine tiefste Lebensgemeinschaft der beiden Welten, die hier im harmonischen Einklang erscheinen. Aber er ist niemals der Meinung gewesen, daß sich damit die Kluft zwischen Sinnlichem und Übersinnlichem wirklich schließe.

It is in human labour rather than in aesthetic contemplation that the connection between the two worlds must be sought. The adequateness of the material world to the realization of immaterial ends gives man the prospect that his work is not futile. The completion of Kant’s worldview can be found in his conception of history as the realization of immaterial ends in the material world:

> So vollendet sich Kants Weltanschauung in dem Verständnis der Geschichte als der Verwirklichung der Zwecke der übersinnlichen Welt in der Sinnenwelt selbst.

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33 Ibid.
34 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 27.
Despite the fundamental adequacy of the material world to the ends of the immaterial world, Windelband stresses that the dualism between the two worlds is not overcome. The realization of the immaterial ends in the material world is never completed, reality is never fully adequate to the ideal:

In diesem Sinne beharrt Kant bei seiner dualistischen Weltanschauung: er tut es gerade, weil er nie anders philosophiert hat als aus der Erfahrung und aus dem Leben selbst. Er stellt es als die letzte und unüberwindliche Tatsache, als das absolute Faktum der Vernunft fest, daß wir uns in einer solchen in sich antagonistischen Welt befinden, und er bejaht dies Faktum gerade aus der Energie des sittlichen Willens heraus. Es ist gut so, denn nur so gibt es wirklich etwas zu tun in der Welt.  

Or, as Windelband has argued elsewhere: the antagonism between (ideal, universal) norm and (factual, individual) realization is the driving force behind history. If the ideal and its realization were identical, there would be no history.

In sum, Windelband presents ‘Kant’s worldview’ here as a dualistic metaphysics. The traditional, natural sciences are restricted to the world of experience, experience of the material world. Yet this critical reduction of the scope of natural science is only a limited part of the Kantian worldview in Windelband’s interpretation. The immaterial world is experienced through conscience, and philosophical reflection can achieve a system of necessary principles of this world. As such, philosophy can go where natural science cannot: it can achieve knowledge of the immaterial world.

This indicates that both knowledge and experience of the immaterial world are possible—and therefore that metaphysics is possible. The extension of the concept of (scientific) knowledge and the concept of experience, and the interpretation of Kant as a metaphysician connected to them, will be further emphasized by examining Windelband’s other 1904 contribution on Kant’s philosophy, ‘Nach hundert Jahren’.

36 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 422f., esp. 432.
3.2 Windelband’s Kant-interpretation of 1904

Part II: Kant’s metaphysics

The other publication of 1904 takes a somewhat different, although complementary, perspective on Kant and the concept of worldview. The main question in assessing Kant’s legacy after a century, according to Windelband in this text, is the question whether his philosophical work can serve as a philosophical worldview. What such a philosophical worldview should entail remains implicit, but it should serve at least two purposes. First, as far as the sciences are concerned, a philosophical worldview should provide an integrated, comprehensive perspective (eine Gesamtanschauung). Such a comprehensive view must incorporate the results of the special sciences, which are disjoined as a result of their exclusive focus on different, limited parts of reality. This is not to say that the sciences themselves must broaden their respective views to more comprehensive ones, rather it is intended by Windelband as a critique of naturalism, which maintains that the scientific perspective represents all there is to know about reality. On the contrary, the limitedness itself of the sciences already points beyond these limits, and gives rise to the question of the whole, of which the sciences study only parts.

The other purpose which the philosophical worldview must serve has a more general, cultural character. The ‘national spirit’ (die Volksseele) turns to philosophy for a worldview, which is an expression of the inner motives of the national spirit:

Durch gewaltige Geschicke und mächtige Umwälzungen des öffentlichen Lebens im Tiefsten aufgereggt, von fieberhaftem Bedürfnis nach neuer Selbstgestaltung ergriffen, verlangte die Volksseele nach dem bestimmten und bestimmenden Ausdruck dessen, was sie bewegt: [...] eine Weltanschauung.

37 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 150.
38 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 149. A similar argument is employed by Trendelenburg to describe the relationship between the sciences and philosophy. See chapter 2, section 3, above.
39 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 149.
A worldview thus has to have what Windelband later calls practical relevance, it has to be an expression of the deepest motives of culture (‘Aussdruck dessen was sie bewegt’). This expression is a determining cultural factor itself, at the same time (‘bestimmten und bestimmenden Ausdruck’).

According to Windelband, the question what, ‘after hundred years’, should become of Kantian philosophy must be asked against the background of the question of a philosophical worldview. If Kantian philosophy has relevance, it must prove itself capable of providing at least the foundations of a philosophical worldview which can accomplish both tasks—an integration of scientific knowledge and a motivating expression of culture.

According to Windelband, Kantian critical philosophy is in fact capable of fulfilling these tasks. Moreover, Kant’s work already contains a fully developed worldview. Although the early neo-Kantian (and Windelband’s own early) interpretation focused exclusively on Kant’s critical, anti-metaphysical theory of knowledge, this meant neglect of an important part of his work—and according to Windelband in 1904, neglect of the most important part. Windelband does not hesitate here to describe Kant as a ‘metaphysical’ philosopher:

Darum ist der Streit, ob Kant ein Metaphysiker war, ein Wortstreit gewesen. Es ist offenkundig, daß Kant das, was er Wissenschaft nannte, mit zwingenden Gründen als unfähig zur Überschreitung der Grenzen der Erfahrung, zur Erkenntnis der Ding-an-sich, zum Aufbau einer Metaphysik im Sinne der „Wissenschaft vom Übersinnlichen“ erwiesen hat. Aber es ist ebenso offenkundig, daß er von der Realität der „intelligenblichen Welt“ unerschütterlich überzeugt war, und daß er von ihrem Inhalt und Leben, wie von ihren Beziehungen zur Erscheinungswelt sehr bestimmte und wohldurchdachte Vorstellungen hatte. Der ganze Bestand seiner philosophischen Lebensarbeit enthält eine streng geschlossene und völlig ausgebildete Weltanschauung; und sie liegt nicht etwa nur keimartig zugrunde oder andeutungsweise im Hintergrunde, sondern offen ausgesprochen zutage.40

40 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 150-151, emphasis in original.
Kant’s ‘belief’ in the immaterial world is not of a personal, subjective, pre-scientific nature. The ‘postulates and principles’ of practical reason and of the power of judgment have necessary and universal validity to the same extent as the mathematical-scientific knowledge of the world of appearances.\textsuperscript{41}

To see this worldview of the ‘metaphysical Kant’, one has thus to look beyond the critique of pure reason and the critical reduction of the scope of the natural sciences that Kant undertook in it. Yet this reduction was a necessary step to make room for ethics and aesthetics in the philosophical worldview. It is the ‘greatness and originality’ of Kant’s critical philosophy to have sought the principles and content of the philosophical worldview not only in scientific theory, but in the totality of reason.\textsuperscript{42}

This limitation of science must not be understood as a charter for subjective elements in the philosophical worldview. Although Kant limits science to make room for ‘faith’ or ‘belief’, this must not be taken as a particular religious or subjective foundation of the philosophical worldview, but rather as a rationally valid belief. The development of such a universally and necessary valid belief remains the task of philosophy:

\begin{quote}
Nicht jedes Glauben oder jedes Betrachten hat dies metaphysische Recht, sondern nur das notwendige und allgemeingültige, das vernünftige. Dies aber, das allein berechtigte, aus der Fülle der individuellen und historischen Ansprüche herauszuschälen, bleibt auch bei Kant die Sache der Philosophie, der „wissenschaftlichen“ Klärung; — ja, es ist ihre vornehmste Aufgabe.\textsuperscript{43}
\end{quote}

This 1904 interpretation of Kant might seem only remotely connected to Windelband’s Kant interpretation of the early 1880s, and to his early perspective on the task of philosophy in general. For in his early work, Windelband stressed the anti-metaphysical nature of philosophy and determined its task as a reflexive ‘science of validity’, first and foremost aimed at the validity of scientific knowledge. Here, Kant’s most important contribution is understood as his limitation of science for the benefit of a more

\textsuperscript{41} ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 151.
\textsuperscript{42} ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 151-152.
\textsuperscript{43} ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 153.
comprehensive philosophical worldview. If philosophy can still be construed as theory of science, as the foundation of scientific objectivity, one might get the impression that this is now only a part of the more comprehensive worldview concept.

Windelband, however, presents the worldview task of philosophy as identical with the foundation of scientific objectivity which a philosophical theory of science should accomplish. This identification involves a crucial addition to the Kantian framework as interpreted by Windelband. This step beyond Kant enables Windelband to construe philosophy as a theory of scientific knowledge and as a worldview, as metaphysics, at the same time. The addition to the Kantian worldview consists of an extension of Kant’s concept of science. According to Windelband, Kant’s concept of science is that of natural, Newtonian science. But now, after a century, philosophy has to address the ‘new fact’ of historical science as well.44

Historical science needs to be treated differently by philosophy. Although both natural science and historical science make a selection from a manifold of ‘empirical’ material, the means used to make this selection are different. The selection of the natural sciences is aimed at achieving knowledge in the form of general laws. They are therefore described as nomothetical sciences, sciences of law (Gesetzeswissenschaften).45 Historical science, by contrast, is not aimed at knowledge of general laws, but rather at an understanding of particular events, processes or periods of history. To this end, it selects, from the manifold of what merely ‘happens’, those elements which are of significance. According to Windelband, such a selection can only be made in a necessary and objectively valid way when it is based on a system of universally valid values.46 As such, the critical-philosophical foundation of historical science leads to the philosophical task of establishing a system of universally valid values, which can serve

as the basis for the historian’s selection of significant material. This system must cover all activities of reason, and so include not only theoretical values, but also ethics, aesthetics, and religion. Thus the system of values that Windelband has in mind is not only ‘metaphysical knowledge of the immaterial world’, but also the foundation of the historical sciences.47

By interpreting the philosophical, metaphysical knowledge of the immaterial world as the necessary foundation of the historical sciences, Windelband achieves an identification of the worldview task of philosophy and his early concept of philosophy as a theory of scientific objectivity. It is no surprise therefore that the philosophical worldview, metaphysics, and the foundation of the sciences are closely related—if not identical—from Windelband’s point of view:

Denn nichts anderes kann doch schließlich die Aufgabe der philosophischen Weltanschauungslehre — sagen wir doch ruhig der Metaphysik — sein, als uns darüber zu verständigen, welches Recht wir haben, dem objektiven Weltbilde, das uns die Wissenschaften als das notwendige, und allgemeingültige Denken der Menschheit darbieten, die Kraft zur Erfassung der Realität, der absoluten Wirklichkeit zuzutrauen. Das ist die Frage der Erkenntnistheorie und — der „Metaphysik“.48

Although less explicitly than in the *Kant-Studien* essay, the distinction between the material and the immaterial world, and the dualistic interpretation of Kant developed on the foundation of this distinction, plays an important role here as well. And again, Windelband ascribes to the *Kritik der Urteilskraft*—‘Kant’s greatest work’—the accomplishment of having secured the relation between the two worlds. History must be understood as the realization in the material world of the values of the immaterial world. Whether Windelband succeeds in his identification of the philosophical worldview and the foundation of the historical sciences, and if he succeeds, at what price, is a question which will be addressed in the section on ‘Windelband’s metaphysics’ below. First, we will look at Windelband’s interpretation of Kant’s *Kritik der Urteilskraft* as his most important work in more detail.

47 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 158.
4. Kant’s worldview and the Kritik der Urteilskraft

To understand Windelband’s interpretation of the ‘Kantian worldview’, we must understand his interpretation of the Kritik der Urteilskraft, (KdU) as this work functions prominently in both of Windelband’s 1904 texts on Kant. Both texts end with a relatively long discussion of the central role of the KdU in the Kantian worldview, both in its historical form and as a worldview which can fulfil the ‘needs of the present time’. In these 1904 publications, the KdU is lauded by Windelband as ‘Kant’s greatest work’ and ‘the most powerful of his works’ (das gewaltigste seiner Werke). To comprehend Windelband’s appeal to critical philosophy as a philosophical worldview, therefore, we must examine his interpretation of Kant’s Third Critique in more detail. To this end, we will have to examine not only the interpretation offered in the two 1904 texts, but also the interpretation offered in Windelband’s historical works from this period.

4.1 The Kritik der Urteilskraft in Windelband’s historical works

In the second edition of his Geschichte der Philosophie (1900), Windelband considers the KdU to contain the mediating principle which can provide the synthesis between theoretical and practical reason. The sharp distinction which Kant drew between nature and freedom endangered the unity of reason. According to Windelband, the KdU argues for the a priori possibility of regarding nature as purposive. In nature’s ‘mechanism of causal relations’ the realization of a highest end of reason (Vernunftzweck) can be observed. This highest end is ethical law itself, which is realized in the history of mankind:

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49 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 22.
50 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 151.
51 Geschichte der Philosophie (1900), 456.
52 Geschichte der Philosophie (1900), 456.

Even in this 1900 edition, the result is more than a teleological ‘view’ (eine Betrachtungsweise) of totality, by which our knowledge of nature is unified into a meaningful whole. The upshot of Windelband’s argumentation seems to be metaphysical, that is, the material, sensible world is conceived of as a realization of an immaterial world.

The metaphysical character of Windelband’s interpretation of the Third Critique is reinforced by an addition to the quoted passage in the 1907 edition of this work (which by then went under the title Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie). There Windelband concludes:

So zeigt sich, daß das „System der Erfahrung“, die Gesamtheit der Sinnewelt in ihrer räumlichen Ausdehnung und ihrer zeitlichen Entwicklung letzthin als die Verwirklichung des die intelligible Welt bestimmenden Zweckes angesehen werden muß. Der Dualismus von theoretischer und praktischer Vernunft ist in der ästhetischen nicht nur formell, sondern auch sachlich überwunden: hier erst findet Kants philosophische Weltanschauung ihren Abschluß, und von hier aus versteht man den letzten Sinn aller der einzelnen Lehren die er an der Hand der besonderen Probleme entwickelt hat.

The mediation between theoretical and practical reason, between material and immaterial world, is not only accomplished formally by the KdU, but also materially (sachlich): for the material world is considered a realization (Verwirklichung) of the immaterial world. The dualism in Kant’s work is not a dual view of an undivided reality, but reality itself is considered by Windelband

53 Geschichte der Philosophie (1900), 462.
54 Cf. Geschichte der Philosophie (1900), 462: ‘Aber sie darf auch nie etwas anderes sein wollen, als eine Betrachtungsweise’.
55 Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie (1907), 475.
to be stratified. Two worlds exist: the phenomenal world and the noumenal world. On closer inspection, however, the existence of the phenomenal world is relative to the existence of the noumenal world, for the former is a realization of the latter. The Kantian dualism as construed by Windelband is therefore ontological and not just formal, for it expresses what constitutes reality.

The dualistic interpretation of Kant as such, and the role played by the Third Critique in the mediation of this dualism, can already be found in Windelband’s early work.\(^56\) The opening paragraph of Windelband’s discussion of Kant’s aesthetics in the second volume of the first edition (1880) of his *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, for instance, reads:

Die Weltanschauung des Kritizismus charakterisiert sich vor allen anderen dadurch, dass ihre Wurzeln mit vollem und mit wissenschaftlich sich begründendem Bewusstsein nicht lediglich in der theoretischen, sondern hauptsächlich in der praktischen Vernunft liegen. Daraus aber entspringt ihr dualistischer Charakter. Der *Dualismus* von Ding an sich und Erscheinung, von übersinnlicher und sinnlicher Welt, der sich durch Kants ganze Lehre hindurchzieht, ist derjenige von praktischer und theoretischer Vernunft.\(^57\)

As he would argue later in his *Geschichte der Philosophie*, Windelband here considers it the accomplishment of the *KdU* to have mediated the Kantian dualism. The unity of reason and thus the unity of Kant’s worldview would be on shaky ground were this dualism to be left unmediated. As we have seen in our discussion of the 1904 essay on Kant’s worldview, Windelband considers it an essential part of this worldview that—despite mediation—the dualism between material and immaterial world is not fully resolved. The tension that results from the opposition of the material and immaterial world is a necessary one.\(^58\) Yet, as far as reason is concerned, there must be a connection between the two sides of the dualism as well. Not only because of the ‘fact’ that

\(^{56}\) The dualistic interpretation also is by no means exclusive to Windelband. The influence of his teacher Kuno Fischer on Windelband’s Kant interpretation will be discussed in the next section.

\(^{57}\) *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie* (1880), 146.

\(^{58}\) This line of thought returns in his *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 432.
human consciousness is at home in both worlds, the realm of nature and the realm of freedom, but also because theoretical and practical reason are in interplay:

Die gesamte Arbeit der theoretischen Vernunft zeigt sich zuletzt durch die Aufgaben bestimmt, welche ihr die praktische setzt, und die Energie der sittlichen Aufgabe findet anderseits ihre Begründung gerade in dem Widerspruche, worin sie zu der sinnlichen Natur des Menschen steht. So weisen in allen ihren Ausgestaltungen die praktische und die theoretische Vernunft stets aufeinander hin und deuten miteinander auf eine Einheit, die in keiner von beiden allen vollständig zum Austrag kommt. [...] So einander bestimmend und beschränkend, verlangen die theoretische und die praktische Vernunft den Begriff einer einheitlichen Funktion, worin ihre ursprüngliche Identität, vermöge deren allein sie jene Beziehungen entwickeln konnten, selbst zum Ausdrucke kommt.  

According to Windelband’s interpretation of Kant, therefore, not only must an identity between theoretical and practical reason exist, but this identity is also more original than theoretical or practical reason, for the original identity is the condition for the interplay between theoretical and practical reason.

This makes it clearer why Windelband considers the mediation which the KdU accomplishes the ‘truly decisive and completing principle of Kantian philosophy’. Yet this conclusion is only explicitly drawn in a passage which is added to the 1907 edition of this work:

Daher beruht der Abschluß, den Kants Philosophie in der Kritik der Urteilskraft gefunden hat, nicht etwa in seinem persönlichen Triebe zum Systembau, sondern der »systematische Faktor« ist in seiner tief sachlichen Begründung das eigentlich entscheidende und vollendende Prinzip der Kantischen Philosophie, ohne dessen Verständnis und Anerkennung man nur die disiecta membra philosophi vor sich hat.

59 Geschichte der neueren Philosophie (1880), Bd. 2, 147. Geschichte der neueren Philosophie (1907), Bd. 2, 156.
60 Geschichte der neueren Philosophie (1880), Bd. 2, 146-147. Geschichte der neueren Philosophie (1907), Bd. 2, 155.
61 Geschichte der neueren Philosophie (1907), Bd. 2, 155.
The accomplishment of the Third Critique is therefore not only a unification of the ‘body parts’ of Kantian philosophy into a system, but it also contains the true principle of Kantian philosophy.

As in the different editions of the (Lehrbuch der) Geschichte der Philosophie, the basic interpretation of the KdU as the mediating, concluding, and completing part of Kant’s work is already present here in the earlier text. The explicit conclusion that the Kritik der Urteilskraft is the most important (most phenomenal, truly determining) of Kant’s works is a discovery that was added by Windelband after 1900.

Windelband edited the Kritik der Urteilskraft for the Kant edition by the Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. The KdU appeared in volume five of this series in 1908. In comparison to the added passages in both his Lehrbuch and his Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, the interpretation offered here seems more modest. Windelband presents the Third Critique as a necessary and completing addition to the two earlier Critiques. But the metaphysical dimension of the mediation brought about by the KdU is not mentioned. Yet Windelband repeats, almost in passing, the qualification of the KdU as the ‘most impressive’ of Kant’s works (das gewaltigste seiner Werke).

4.2 Windelband’s 1904 Kant-interpretation and the role of the KdU

Now let us return to the 1904 texts and re-examine the role of the KdU in them. We have seen in our discussion so far that Windelband considers the KdU to be a necessary and completing addition to the first two Critiques. Yet this—not uncommon—interpretation of the KdU is not in itself enough to warrant Windelband’s claim that the Third Critique is the greatest and most impressive of Kant’s works, that it contains the ‘truly decisive principle’ of Kantian philosophy, and even contains the original identity of theoretical and practical reason. What is it in the KdU that can carry the burden of these claims?

63 E.g. Dorner, ‘Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft’ (1900). See also section 4 below.
64 Cf. Geschichte der neueren Philosophie (1911), Bd. 2, 155.
To find an answer to this question, we must go back to Windelband’s 1904 *Kant-Studien* essay ‘Nach hundert Jahren’. Two elements spring to mind when we read this text: Windelband’s emphasis on the role of historical science for philosophy, and his praise for the *KdU* and its central role in Kantian philosophy. In order to fully understand the latter issue, the role of the *KdU*, one must also consider the former, the role of historical science for philosophy. The importance of history and historical science for philosophy is itself only fully comprehensible against the background of Windelband’s interpretation of the Third Critique. Both elements combined reveal the core of Windelband’s Kant interpretation, as well as what he considers to be the necessary step beyond Kant. Let me elaborate this claim.

We have already noted that Windelband considers the existence of the historical sciences the ‘great new fact’ which post-Kantian philosophy to take into account.\(^{65}\) Theoretical philosophy should explain the objectivity of historical knowledge. In doing so, theoretical philosophy necessarily enters the domain of practical reason, for objective historical knowledge presupposes a system of universally valid values. These values cannot be object in an empirical sense, they are meta-empirical. The system of universally valid values is discovered by all three domains of reason, not just theoretical reason. Unlike the natural sciences, the theoretical foundation of the historical sciences enlists philosophy as a whole.

Although the foundation of the objectivity of the historical sciences thus alters the relation between the different domains of philosophy—practical reason, theoretical reason, aesthetics—this line of argument cannot do more than that. Specifically, this argument by Windelband does not provide for the mediation between the noumenal and the phenomenal world. It serves to connect theoretical and practical reason, but it cannot establish the unity of reason, let alone the unity of the (noumenal and phenomenal) ‘world’.

But there is a further role played by history and the historical sciences for the philosophical worldview, one that has less to do with the foundation of historical objectivity and much more with

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\(^{65}\) ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 155.
the mediating place of history itself and the role of historical science as an organon for philosophy. This is apparent from Windelband’s interpretation of the KdU in this 1904 text (‘Nach hundert Jahren’). The question which remains unresolved—after the system of universally valid values is introduced as the necessary foundation of the historical sciences—is that of the relation between the noumenal and the phenomenal world, or in Windelband’s phrasing: how are the realm of (natural) laws (das Reich der Gesetze) and the realm of values (das Reich der Werte) related? According to Windelband, the KdU makes its decisive contribution in providing a basis for the answer to this question.

Kant’s Third Critique demonstrated the compatibility of natural law and purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit), of nature and freedom. Or as Windelband formulates it, referring to Hermann Lotze’s ‘teleological idealism’: the totality of laws is a system of forms by which the content of the realm of values is realized. The concepts of realization (Verwirklichung) and development (Entwicklung) are the key concepts in the KdU. It is the overarching concept of realization, the realization of the immaterial through the material world, which provides the unity of Kant’s worldview. The essence of life and the universe must necessarily be considered a development.

Interestingly, this view leads Windelband to discover a problem in Kant’s transcendental aesthetics, the basis of the Kantian theory of knowledge:

Wenn die Entwicklung als das reale Wesen des Lebens und des Universums vernunftnotwendig betrachtet werden soll, — wie ist damit die Phänomenalität der Zeit vereinbar? Wenn die Werte in der Verwirklichung begriffen, nur in ihr zu verstehen sind, so muß das Geschehen, das ohne Zeit nicht denkbar ist, eine wesentliche Bestimmung des Wirklichen selber sein, so darf es nicht bloß als Form der Anschauung gelten.

66 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 162: ‘wie verhält sich das Reich der Gesetze zu dem Reich der Werte?’.
67 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 162.
68 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 163.
Although the problem is only mentioned and not addressed by Windelband, it is remarkable enough, especially in comparison with Trendelenburg’s position. The central concept in the latter’s ‘organic worldview’ was the concept of motion. Trendelenburg arrived at this dynamic concept through a critique of the exclusive subjectivity of space and time in Kant’s transcendental aesthetics. If space and time did not have objectivity as well, a mediation between thought and being (or between the phenomenal and the noumenal world) would be impossible. Here Windelband arrives at a fundamentally dynamic view of the world as well: the essence of ‘life and the universe’ is development and realization of the realm of values, the essence of the phenomenal world is historical—yet this realm of values itself is timeless and static, an important difference compared with Trendelenburg’s position, which we will come to speak about later. The common denominator is the problem that both dynamic views of the world have with the exclusive subjectivity of time in Kant’s transcendental aesthetics.

Towards the end of the 1904 essay, Windelband reveals his motivation for this interpretation of the Kantian worldview: it is the ‘battle’ against naturalism. Earlier on we encountered Windelband’s criticism of an empiricist, naturalistic interpretation of Kant, focusing on the First Critique and the impossibility of knowledge of the immaterial world. Here we encounter the corollary of Windelband’s ‘more complete’ interpretation of Kant: we should consider the material world to be more than a law-governed, material world, we should construe it as the realization of an immaterial world of values. As such, the worldview of critical philosophy would grasp the ‘spiritual value-content’ of

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reality. But to grasp the ‘spiritual content’ of reality presupposes that such a content is present, and it is this which is demonstrated by the Third Critique, in Windelband’s interpretation of it. Or, as Windelband formulates it poignantly in his lecture on Kant’s worldview from the same year:

So vollendet sich Kants Weltanschauung in dem Verständnis der Geschichte als der Verwirklichung der Zwecke der übersinnlichen Welt in der Sinnenwelt selbst.

The reverse side of the argument for the dynamism and historicity of the phenomenal world is that history and historical science become a necessary organon for philosophy. Although the system of values, the ‘normative consciousness’ (Normalbewußtsein), works immediately, it can only be known mediately, more specifically: it can only be known through a philosophical analysis of history. History is therefore the primary source of material for philosophical analysis.

Yet this ‘normative consciousness’ is now more than just the totality of universally valid norms which it represented in Windelband’s early work. Instead, this expression refers to a metaphysical realm of values. It refers to an absolute reality, which is realized (although only partially) in history. We will return to this metaphysical dimension of Windelband’s interpretation of the ‘Kantian worldview’ below.

5. The foundations of a philosophical worldview:

The Einleitung in die Philosophie

70 ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 165: ‘So drängt alles darauf hin, daß die kritische Philosophie, wenn sie die Lebenskraft, die sie ein Jahrhundert lang bewahrt hat, auch in der Bewältigung der intellektuellen Bedürfnisse der Gegenwart bewähren soll, sich fähig erweisen muß, mit ihrem Begriffssystem eine Weltanschauung zu tragen, welche den geistigen Wertinhalt der Wirklichkeit in sicherem Bewußtsein zu erfassen vermag.’

71 ‘Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung’, 27.
The last major work which Windelband published during his lifetime is his *Einleitung in die Philosophie* (1914). This work gives a prominent place to the concept of a philosophical worldview. Such a philosophical worldview is to be understood as a worldview which is the result of philosophical science, a worldview which is constructed by philosophy. In the opening paragraph of the book, Windelband observes a growing interest in, and ‘need’ (*Bedürfnis*) for, philosophy. This need is aimed at a worldview, and this need of a worldview is a constant inclination (*Trieb*) of human nature. But can and must philosophy as a science—and it is considered to be a scientific enterprise by Windelband—cater to these needs?

Windelband’s answer is affirmative, but not unqualified. First he distinguishes between a pre-scientific worldview and a scientific treatment of the problem. In a sense, everyone always has a worldview. This is the pre-scientific or proto-philosophical sense of worldview, described by Windelband as ‘a view of the totality of the world and the position of man within it.’ Since these proto-philosophical worldviews carry different kinds of presuppositions in them, their domain of validity is limited.

Philosophy aims at universally valid, scientific knowledge. If one turns to philosophy for a worldview, one should be prepared to discard the presuppositions which are carried by one’s proto-philosophical worldview. Philosophy can change one’s view of life and the world. Yet this does not imply for Windelband that these proto-philosophical worldviews should be discarded completely. On the contrary, since science always starts from life it-

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72 *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 1.
74 *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 3: ‘Sie alle haben natürliche, individuelle, historische Voraussetzungen und damit die Grenzen für den Bereich ihrer Geltung.’
75 *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 5-6.
self, and since philosophy starts from the special sciences, both the sciences and life provide philosophy with the material to work with:

Wie das Leben in seinen vorwissenschaftlichen Begriffen das Material für jede wissenschaftliche Arbeit, so geben das Leben und die Wissenschaften zusammen in den vorwissenschaftlichen und den vorphilosophischen Begriffen das Material für die Arbeit der Philosophie ab.\footnote{Einleitung in die Philosophie, 6.}

Two things should be noted. The first is that Windelband introduces here the proto-scientific concepts of life as an (at least partial) factual basis for philosophy. And secondly, life is placed alongside the special sciences in that respect.

In the period up to the 1904 Kant publications, Windelband adhered to the view of philosophy as a theory of science or of scientific objectivity—even if he had to broaden the concept of science in his 1904 Kant essay in order to maintain this view. As a theory of science, the sciences are the immediate object of philosophy. Every relation that philosophy has to ‘life’ or the ‘world’ is mediated by the sciences. The relation between philosophy and science is more complex here in the Einleitung, however. If philosophy is construed as a theory of scientific objectivity, the sciences can be said to provide the ‘material’ for philosophy, since philosophy should explain what the special character of scientific theories is which causes them to provide us with objective, universally valid knowledge of reality. But since life is placed alongside the sciences as giving philosophy its material, it is clear that the interpretation of philosophy as a theory of worldview (Weltanschauungslehre) can no longer be completely identified with the interpretation as a theory of science. As we recall, Windelband’s 1904 Kant essay interpreted philosophy as a theory of science and as a theory of worldview at the same time, and both aspects exhausted the philosophical task. Here, in the 1914 Einleitung, the worldview task of philosophy is not exhausted by providing a theory of science, because the introduction of life
would not be necessary on such an account. Rather the material provided by life is itself a necessary contribution to the philosophical worldview project.

Unfortunately, the relations between life and science and between life and philosophy remain unclear and are not specified in the Einleitung. As a consequence, Windelband fails to discuss several potential problems which arise when life is placed alongside the sciences as a basis for philosophy, without the relationship between the two being explicated. For instance, if the pre-scientific concepts of life are the material for science, and the pre-philosophical concepts of science are the material for philosophy, why (and how) should the pre-scientific concepts be the material for philosophy as well, since these proto-scientific concepts are already transformed into scientific knowledge? Windelband seems to assume that science somehow is not able to cover the whole of reality, and that philosophy therefore needs another medium to reach this totality (life). But why science fails, and what its limits are with respect to the philosophical worldview-project, are topics which remain unaddressed.

Despite the obscurity surrounding the concept of life, it is nevertheless used by Windelband to explain the project of an ‘introduction’ to philosophy and the relation between its systematical and historical dimensions. Philosophy should examine the presuppositions which occur in science and in life. An introduction to philosophy should accordingly lead from the instinctive, unreflected presuppositions of life and science to the basic problems of philosophy. Throughout history, these basic problems of philosophy, together with the basic forms of their solutions, appear in persistent, yet mutually opposing forms.\(^77\)

Both the introduction of the concept of life as providing the material for philosophy, and the idea of certain basic, persistent philosophical problems and ‘stereotypical’ solutions to them, are reminiscent of Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie. And in fact, like Dilthey, Windelband asks whether this constant return to the

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\(^{77}\) Einleitung in die Philosophie, 10: ‘Es kommen immer die gleichen Fragen wieder […] Aber auch die Versuche der Antwort haben etwas Stereotypes an sich. Gewisse Gegensätze der Welt- und Lebensaussassung treten immer wieder von neuem auf, befehden sich und zerstören sich in gegenseitiger Dialektik.’
same questions does not signify a lack of progress in philosophy, and whether the apparent incapacity of philosophy to solve its basic problems is consistent with its scientific pretensions. According to Windelband, the persistence of the philosophical problems shows that these problems are universal and necessary problems for thought. If anything, the fact that philosophy returns to ever the same questions shows that these questions are unavoidable and that they should be addressed by philosophy, even though they have not been and perhaps never will be solved definitively.  

According to Windelband, however, a classification of philosophical problems and answers has its place only in an *introduction* to philosophy. Whereas Dilthey’s analysis of philosophy ends with a typological theory, beyond which no unification can be expected, Windelband starts with an inventory and classification of problems and solutions, in order to enable the subsequent critical analysis and judgment of these problems and proposed solutions:

Daher faßt sich die Aufgabe, um die es sich hier handelt, dahin zusam-
men, die Hauptprobleme der Philosophie und die Richtungen, nach
denen ihre Lösung zu suchen ist, mit umfassender Darlegung ihrer his-
torischen Erscheinungen zu entwickeln, zu begründen und zu beurtei-
len: auf diesem Wege gestaltet sich die Einleitung in die Philosophie zu
einer kritischen Untersuchung über die möglichen Formen philosophi-
scher Weltansicht.  

Such an introduction has a historical as well as a systematic dimen-
sion. The historical dimension of philosophy serves a system-
tatic purpose, or as Windelband expresses it: history, especially
the history of philosophy, is an *organon* for systematic philosophy. This interpretation of history as an *organon* for system-
tatic philosophy is construed by Windelband as a *preliminary*
phase: the study of the historic forms of philosophical problems

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78 *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 11-12.
79 *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 14.
80 *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 17, also see Windelband, ‘Geschichte der Philosophie’ (1904), and my discussion in ‘Philosophy and the Problem of History’.
and concepts provides systematic philosophy with its task. As an *organon* for systematic philosophy, it is a *prolegomenon* as well: the problems of philosophy are ‘prepared’ by history for their systematic treatment.\(^{81}\)

This systematic task of philosophy is subsequently defined by Windelband in terms of a worldview:

> Als Wissenschaft der Weltanschauung hat die Philosophie zwei Bedürfnisse zu befriedigen. Man erwartet von ihr einen umfassenden, sicher gegründeten und womöglich abschließenden Ausbau aller Erkenntnis und daneben eine auf solcher Einsicht errichtete Überzeugung, die den inneren Halt im Leben zu gewähren vermag.\(^{82}\)

The genitive in ‘science of worldview’ should thus be read such that a worldview is the *result* of the philosophical science, not its object (as in Dilthey’s *Weltanschauungstypologie*, for example). An analysis of (historical) worldviews is part of this scientific enterprise only as a prolegomenon.

The most conspicuous element of Windelband’s definition of philosophy as science of worldview is the dual task of such a philosophical worldview. Philosophy as science of worldview has both theoretical and practical relevance (*Bedeutung*). Any form of philosophical endeavour which aims to fulfil only one of these two elements of the philosophical task is considered one-sided and inadequate (*unzulänglich*) by Windelband.\(^{83}\) A worldview as intended by philosophy is thus a matter of knowledge (an integration of all knowledge into a comprehensive and well-founded totality), but also a matter of ‘belief’ (*Überzeugung*). The practical relevance of philosophy lies in the purchase on life that it provides.

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\(^{81}\) *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 17: ‘Ihm [Hegel] verdanken wir die Einsicht, daß die Gestaltung der Probleme und Begriffe, wie sie die Entwicklung der menschlichen Vernunft in der Geschichte herbeigeführt hat, für uns die allein zureichende Form ist, um die Aufgaben der Philosophie für ihre systematische Behandlung vorzubereiten.’

\(^{82}\) *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 19.

\(^{83}\) *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 19.
Windelband takes up a Kantian element—the division of philosophy into theoretical and practical—but transforms this Kantian element according to his own needs. For the Kantian distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy is a distinction between theoretical principles, the laws of (knowledge of) nature, and the laws of (realization of) freedom. Practical philosophy is practical because its principles derive from the formal law of freedom, not because its principles are applicable in practice.⁸⁴

According to Windelband, the element of ‘belief’, i.e. a philosophy which is applicable in actual life, is a necessary element of scientific philosophy:

Die Philosophie ist Wissenschaft, Begriffsarbeit, wie alle anderen Wissenschaften, Umsetzung des anschaulich Gegebenen in Begriffe. Aber in ihr waltet zugleich das Bedürfnis, aus dem Abstrakten und Begrifflichen in das Leben, in Anschauung und Wirken zurückzugelangen. Sie bedarf der Gestaltung zu einer lebendigen Gesamtanschauung, die damit eben auch eine tatkräftige Ueberzeugung bedeutet. Philosophie kann niemals bloß Wissen, sie will und soll künstlerisches und sittliches Leben sein.⁸⁵

This ‘intimate union’ (innige Gemeinschaft) of the theoretical and practical dimensions which philosophy exhibits, must be seen in the light of the introduction of life as a basis for philosophy. For without the connection between life and philosophy which Windelband established with this introduction, the possibility of and need for this ‘practical relevance’ of philosophy would be incomprehensible. Now—even if the philosophical motivation and justification of Windelband’s introduction of life remains obscure—the distinction between philosophy’s theoretical relevance (for science) and practical relevance (for life) is consistent with the dual basis of philosophy in life and science.

The duality of philosophy’s theoretical and practical aspects points to the fundamental philosophical dualism on which Windelband already laid much emphasis in his 1904 Kant inter-

⁸⁴ KdU A/B XV-XVI. On the formality of the principles of practical philosophy, see below.
⁸⁵ Einleitung in die Philosophie, 22.
pretation: the dualism between the phenomenal (sinnliche) and the noumenal (übersinnliche) world. Throughout the Einleitung in die Philosophie this dualism is present, and it is explicitly addressed in the final part of the work.

In the Einleitung Windelband discusses the different domains of philosophical principles and their validity. He applies the terminology of values (Werte), which he adopts from Hermann Lotze. The three fundamental philosophical disciplines—logic, ethics, aesthetics—can be understood as three domains of values, that is, three domains of universally valid norms.

The relation of logical values to the other two value-spheres is somewhat peculiar in Windelband’s discussion. He introduces the apparently fundamental concept of value at the start of the second chapter of the Einleitung ‘Axiologische Probleme’ (value problems), after discussing ‘theoretical problems’ (i.e. logic, theory of knowledge) in the first chapter. But after the concept of value has been introduced, it appears in retrospect that the principles of theoretical reason are ‘values’ as well:


On the other hand, immediately after the quoted passage Windelband distinguishes the ‘theoretical order’ (logic) and the ‘practical order’ (ethics and aesthetics) and apparently identifies this distinction with the distinction between the ‘world of being’ and the ‘world of values’:

Allein das Verhältnis der theoretischen Weltordnung zu der praktischen fordert deshalb auch eine letzte Synthesis. Sie besteht in der Frage, wie die beiden Ordnungen im ganzen Zusammenhange der Dinge sich

86 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 245.
87 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 255.
Instead of the relation between the different faculties of reason, or between the *principles* of theoretical and practical reason, we now face the problem how two ‘worlds’—the world of being and the world of value—can be related. However, the problem of the relation of the different faculties of reason need not necessarily be treated this way, as the next section will show.

A similar problem arises with the ‘subjective’ character derived from the metaphor of value, that is, the question whether values can only exist in relation to the valuing consciousness of a subject. Although Windelband stresses that the discussion of the validity of values must be freed from psychological lumber, this apparently does not apply to the question whether values are always values of a valuing subject: in fact values always exist in relation to a valuing consciousness, according to Windelband.

Since philosophy evaluates factual human valuations in order to arrive at universally valid values (meta-values as it were), there must be a consciousness to which these universally valid values correspond. This ‘normative consciousness’ (Normalbewusstsein) is only a necessary postulate—necessitated by the quest for universal values—and is therefore not a metaphysical reality at this stage of Windelband’s argument.

However, the ultimate reality of the universal values to which Windelband strictly adheres (unlike his former student Heinrich Rickert), and his adherence to the correlation of values and

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88 *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 255-256.
89 E.g. *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 251. This is a constant theme in Windelband which can already be found in some of the early essays, e.g. ‘Was ist Philosophie?’, ‘Kritische oder genetische Methode?’ (1883).
90 *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 254.
91 Windelband speaks of ‘eine Bewertung zweiter Stufe’ and ‘eine Wertung der Wertungen’, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 252.
92 *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 253-254.
93 Rickert stressed the ‘unreal’ character of values, and the following passage in Windelband can be read as a direct reference to Rickert’s position in this matter: ‘Andererseits aber bedeutet doch gerade die Unabhängigkeit des Geltens von allen psychischen Vorgängen, in denen es anerkannt wird, ein
valuing consciousness, lead him to introduce an ‘absolute consciousness’, which he nominally identifies as ‘God’. The final chapter of the Einleitung, in which all these problems culminate, is entitled ‘religious problems’. To secure their universal validity, the absolute values require a meta-empirical, metaphysical foundation:

In diesem Sinne verlangt das Wertleben eine metaphysische Verankerung, und wenn man jenen übererfahrungsmäßigen Lebenszusammenhang der Persönlichkeiten mit dem Namen der Gottheit bezeichnet, so kann man sagen, daß ihre Realität mit dem Gewissen selbst gegeben ist.

The conclusion that the reality and validity of conscience imply the reality of an absolute metaphysical subject (God) is only valid if one subsequently assumes that (a) values need an absolute, metaphysical foundation to be valid, and (b) values need a correlate consciousness in order to be real. Both assumptions can be contested however, and are not self-evident, to say the least.

To conclude this section, let me summarize its results. It has been argued that Windelband makes a number of interpretative and systematic philosophical choices (that is to say, he introduces arbitrary, not sufficiently founded theses) in working out his philosophical worldview and his theory of values. These choices lead him to construct a fundamental distinction between the domain of the theoretical and that of the practical, between the ‘world of being’ and the ‘world of value’, and to the introduction of an absolute, metaphysical consciousness as correlate to the universally valid values. Most importantly, these choices lead Windelband to assume a fundamental dualism between two ‘worlds’, the noumenal and the phenomenal. In the next section these choices will be discussed in relation to Kant.


94 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 255 and 388ff.
95 Einleitung in die Philosophie, 392.
6. Kant's and Windelband's metaphysics

We have seen that Windelband endorses a metaphysical interpretation of the *KdU* in his 1904 essay and lecture on Kant: that is, the duality which is bridged by the teleological power of judgment is a dualism in reality, between the noumenal and the phenomenal world. The ultimate ground of reality must be sought in a noumenal world, beyond experience, which—though it cannot be known in the same way as the empirical world is known—can be grasped philosophically, and which expresses itself in the empirical, phenomenal world in the course of history. This interpretation of Kant returns in the final part of Windelband’s 1914 *Einleitung in die Philosophie*. In this section we will examine this metaphysical interpretation of the Third Critique in more detail.

Windelband considers an absolute, metaphysical foundation necessary for the universal validity of values. This metaphysical foundation and the relation of human consciousness to this metaphysical foundation are considered to be religious. The sacred (*das Heilige*) is defined as the relation between the values and this metaphysical foundation. Furthermore, Windelband ascribes this interpretation of the relation between the phenomenal world and a meta-empirical, noumenal reality (*eine übersinnliche Realität*) to Kant too:

Deshalb hat diese metaphysische Verankerung des Wertens nicht bloß die Geltung eines Ueberzeugtseins oder eines Glaubens, das ja auch ein Meinen oder eine Illusion sein könnte. Man hat Kants Lehre, wonach jener überempirische Lebenszusammenhang nicht Sache der auf die Sinnenwelt beschränkten Erkenntnis, sondern vielmehr eines vernunftnotwendigen Glaubens sei, so aufgefaßt, daß dies Postulat des Glaubens ein Ideal enthalte, das nur für ein Fürwahrhalten aus dem Interesse der Vernunft gelte und das deshalb auch wohl eine für den praktischen Zweck gültige Illusion oder Fiktion sein könnte. Albert Lange hat seinerzeit die Energie des kantischen Gedankenganges in dieser Weise abgeschwächt, und die neueste „Philosophie des Als-ob“ ist ihm darin gefolgt. In der Tat aber steckt in dem Inhalt des Gewissens, das ein zweifelloso ebenso gewisses Erlebnis ist wie jede andere Erfahrung, die wir im Aufbau unserer Welterkenntnis verwenden, diese Beziehung auf eine übersinnliche Realität: mögen alle Vorstellungen, die wir uns davon machen können, bildhaft und unzutreffend, mögen sie Illusionen oder

96 *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 390f.
Fiktionen sein, — diese Beziehung selbst ist etwas völlig Unzweifelhaftes, es ist wie Kant gesagt hat, das *Faktum der reinen Vernunft*. Und darauf allein kommt es an, wenn wir die Gewißheit gewinnen sollen, daß das religiöse Problem ein durchaus reales und nicht ein fiktives Problem der Philosophie ist.\(^97\)

Hence the noumenal in Kant’s theory is a metaphysical reality. The ‘experience’ of conscience is used as an analogy to sensuous experience (‘ein ebenso gewisses Erlebnis wie jede andere Erfahrung’). It is instructive to compare Windelband’s metaphysical interpretation of Kant’s Third Critique, and the philosophical framework from which this interpretation is developed, with Kant’s views on the coherence of philosophy as a system. A concise version of Kant’s view on this matter can be found in the two versions of the introduction to the *KdU*—the published version and the longer version now known as the ‘first introduction’. Kant in fact set himself the task of mediating between theoretical and practical reason in the *KdU*. but what is to be mediated, and how does this mediation take place?

In the published introduction to the *KdU* Kant writes the following with respect to the division of philosophy:

Unser gesamtes Erkenntnisvermögen hat zwei Gebiete, das der Naturbegriffe, und das des Freiheitsbegriffs; denn durch beide ist es a priori gesetzgebend. Die Philosophie teilt sich nun auch, diesem gemäß, in die theoretische und die praktische. Aber der Boden, auf welchem ihr Gebiet errichtet, und ihre Gesetzgebung ausgeübt wird, ist immer doch nur der Inbegriff der Gegenstände aller möglichen Erfahrung, sofern sie für nichts mehr als bloße Erscheinungen genommen werden.\(^98\)

The philosophical problem under discussion in the Third Critique is the problem how the principles of knowledge of the natural world (*Naturbegriffe*)—which he examined in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*—are related to the principles of ‘freedom’, that is, principles of knowledge of right action—which were examined in the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*. It is important to note that this distinction between principles of (knowledge of) nature

\(^97\) *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 392-393.

\(^98\) *KdU* A/B XVII.
and principles of freedom is a distinction within philosophy, more specifically, within the philosophical analysis of the cognitive faculty.

The formal possibility of the co-existence of these two sets of principles (of nature and freedom) was already demonstrated by Kant in the First Critique. Yet this demonstration does not fully resolve the problem of the relation between nature and freedom. For even if the two sets of principles have different kinds of objects—the principles of nature enable theoretical knowledge of empirical objects, whereas the objects which are connected to the principles of freedom are things-in-themselves—they do have a common ground: both sets of principles are ‘legislations’ (Gesetzgebungen) which apply to the realm of experience (‘the totality of objects of possible experience’). The demonstration of the possibility of co-existence must be completed by a demonstration of the compatibility (and even unity) of the two sets of principles:

Ob nun zwar eine unübersehbare Kluft zwischen dem Gebiete des Naturbegriffs, als dem Sinnlichen, und dem Gebiete des Freiheitsbegriffs, als dem Übersinnlichen, befestigt ist, so daß von dem ersteren zum anderen (also vermittelt des theoretischen Gebrauchs der Vernunft) kein Übergang möglich ist, gleich als ob es so viel verschiedene Welten wären, deren erste auf die zweite keinen Einfluß haben haben kann: so soll doch diese auf jene einen Einfluß haben, nämlich der Freiheitsbegriff soll den durch seine Gesetze aufgegebenen Zweck in der Sinnenwelt wirklich machen; und die Natur muß folglich auch so gedacht werden können, daß die Gesetzmäßigkeit ihrer Form wenigstens zur Möglichkeit der in ihr zu bewirkenden Zwecke nach Freiheitsgesetzen zusammenstimme. – Also muß es doch einen Grund der Einheit des Übersinnlichen, welches der Natur zum Grunde liegt, mit dem, was der Freiheitsbegriff praktisch enthält, geben, wovon der Begriff, wenn er gleich weder theoretisch noch praktisch zu einem Erkenntnisse desselben gelangt, mithin kein eigentümliches Gebiet hat, dennoch den Übergang von der Denkungsart nach den Prinzipien der einen, zu der nach Prinzipien der anderen, möglich macht.

99 KdU A/B XVIII.
100 KdU A/B XIX-XX.
Although the principles of practical and theoretical philosophy are radically different (‘eine unübersehbare Kluft’), they have a common ground on which they work, on which the laws of nature are valid, and on which the law of freedom must be realized. Therefore they have to have a unifying ground as well, according to Kant. This calls for a mediation. But what exactly has to be mediated? According to Windelband’s interpretation of the KdU, the dualism between the noumenal and the phenomenal world is mediated in such a way that the latter is considered to be a realization of the former. Yet such an interpretation cannot be warranted by Kant’s exposition of the problem in the KdU alone. According to Kant in the passage quoted above, the difference between the ‘domain of the principles of nature, as the phenomenal’ and the ‘domain of the principles of freedom as the noumenal’—it is worth to recall that these are domains of the cognitive faculty—can be understood as if (‘als ob’) these were two different ‘worlds’. But the metaphor of two different worlds only serves to highlight the fundamental difference between the two domains of the cognitive faculty. Their relationship is just as important for Kant, since they are both legislations which have validity for the realm of experience, and is the decisive point in the endeavour which he undertakes in the Third Critique.

The central question facing the Kritik der Urteilskraft is therefore how the two ‘legislations’ (of nature and freedom) are related. That is to say, how a transition from one ‘way of thinking’ (Denkungsart) to the other is possible. The question is thus a question how two fundamentally different sets of philosophical principles can be connected. Despite Kant’s use of the metaphor of two worlds—which serves to stress the difficulty and urgency of the problem—one cannot find enough ground here to support a metaphysical or ontological interpretation which construes the two worlds as two realms or domains of reality. By taking the metaphor of two worlds literally, such that they are really two different metaphysical realms, Windelband misses an important subtlety in Kant’s presentation of the central issue of the KdU.
Next, let us have a closer look at Windelband’s appeal to the ‘Faktum der reinen Vernunft’ in Kant. In the passage quoted above, Windelband claims that it is a fact of reason that we experience the reality of the noumenal world in our conscience. The reality of the relationship to a noumenal world is given with conscience. We have already seen that Windelband considers the reality of this noumenal world (which he calls God) given with the reality of conscience as well. We must therefore conclude that Windelband considers it a ‘fact of reason’ that God (as a name for the metaphysical ground of the values) is a reality which is experienced through the experience of validity in our conscience.

The expression ‘Factum der Vernunft’ appears in §7 of Kant’s *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, where Kant discusses the ‘fundamental law of pure practical reason’ (*Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft*). According to Kant, the fundamental law of pure practical reason—act in such a way that the maxim of your will could be a universal law as well—is the only principle of practical reason which is ‘given’, that is: posits itself and does not derive from anything else:

Man kann das Bewußtsein dieses Grundgesetzes ein Faktum der Vernunft nennen, weil man es nicht aus vorhergehenden Datis der Vernunft [...] herausvernunfteln kann, sondern weil es sich für sich selbst uns aufdringt als synthetischer Satz a priori [...] Doch muß man, um dieses Gesetz ohne Mißdeutung als gegeben anzusehen, wohl bemerken: daß es kein empirisches, sondern das einzige Faktum der reinen Vernunft sei, die sich dadurch als ursprünglich gesetzgebend (sic volo, sic iubeo) ankündigt.

This fact of reason is indubitable, and it is synonymous with the autonomy, the self-legislative character, of practical reason. Kant’s description of this fundamental moral law as ‘given’ may

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101 *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 393.
102 *KpV* A 54f.
103 *KpV* A 56-57.
104 *KpV* A 58-59: ‘Also drückt das moralische Gesetz nichts anderes aus, als die *Autonomie* der reinen, praktischen Vernunft, d.i. der Freiheit, und diese ist selbst die formale Bedingung aller Maximen, unter der sie allein mit dem obersten praktischen Gesetze zusammenstimmen können.’
give the impression that reason is dependent on something external to it. However, the ‘givenness’ of the fundamental law refers to its self-productive nature, which is indubitable, but not demonstrable. The autonomy of reason follows from the formal and reflexive nature of the fundamental law: it is a principle for selecting maxims, not a maxim itself. The fundamental law is itself undetermined, and it determines by appealing to the form of universality, not by measuring the content of maxims to its own content. Concrete maxims are material maxims: they are directed at certain objects and therefore are (partially) dependent on empirical laws, so not autonomous.  

Now, does this fundamental law, as an indubitable fact of reason, constitute a relationship to a noumenal reality, a metaphysical foundation, as Windelband claims? To answer this question, let us look at the concept of ‘sacredness’ (Heiligkeit), which is used by Windelband to describe the relation to the noumenal reality, and which is used by Kant in his discussion of the fundamental moral law as well.

As ‘pathologically affective’ beings, affected by needs and empirical causes, the human, finite will is capable of producing maxims which are not in accordance with the fundamental moral law. As a reasonable being, man is in possession of a pure will: that is, is capable of self-legislation. But only a will which is not capable of producing maxims which are incompatible with the fundamental moral law is called ‘sacred’ by Kant. By consequence, the fundamental moral law is also called ‘sacred’ by Kant, since it projects the ‘practical idea’ of such a sacred will to finite reasonable beings, who can only try to approach such an ‘archetype’ (Urbild) in an infinite progression.

Again, it would seem that only the ascription of ‘practical reality’, that is, reality as an ideal construction for the benefit of practical reason, to the ‘sacred’ or the ‘sacred will’ is warranted by Kant’s discussion of the matter. But it is exactly against such an ‘as-if’ interpretation of Kant that Windelband turns.  

105 KpV A 59.  
106 KpV A 57-58.  
107 KpV A 58.
Windelband stresses that the foundation of the validity of values lies in a noumenal, metaphysical reality, which indicates more than just ‘practical reality’.

Windelband’s use of the concept of the sacred is different from Kant’s, however. Whereas for Kant the concept of the sacred is derivative with respect to the fundamental law, as an ideal construction, for Windelband the sacred secures the universal validity of the values itself. For Windelband it is the relation to a noumenal world which gives the fundamental moral law its validity, while for Kant this validity is given by reason itself.

One could perhaps argue that Windelband merely describes the universal legislative character of the fundamental moral law in different terms, by calling it a noumenal reality. Yet this would miss the importance which Kant ascribes to the formal character of the fundamental law. According to Windelband, on the other hand, the metaphysical foundation of the values is a ‘meta-empirical life-connection of personalities’, a ‘transcendent, metaphysical essence of conscience’, a ‘transcendent authority’ (*eine überweltliche Instanz*).

7. ‘Kuno Fischer und sein Kant’

The question of the ‘right’ interpretation of Kant, and especially of his stance towards metaphysics, was a much debated topic around 1900. Friedrich Paulsen, for instance, presented his interpretation of Kant in his work *Immanuel Kant: sein Leben und seine Lehre* (1898), which appeared in the series *Frommanns Klassiker der Philosophie*. This book aroused so much criticism that Paulsen felt it necessary to reply to his critics (among whom Vaihinger, Cohen, and Rickert were the most prominent) in two

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110 *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 391.
contributions in the *Kantstudien*, in 1900 and 1903 respectively.\footnote{111} In his 1900 article, Paulsen describes ‘Kant’s metaphysics’ in a similar way to Windelband:

...eine Metaphysik, die als vernunftgemässe Weltanschauung über die physikalische Ansicht der Wirklichkeit hinausgehe zu einer Auffassung, die man als objektiven Idealismus bezeichnen kann.\footnote{112}

Paulsen also motivates his Kant interpretation as an attempt to present ‘the whole personality of Kant’, not just the Kant of the First Critique.\footnote{113} Faith and knowledge are not radically different, but the philosophical worldview entails both scientific knowledge and (rational) faith.\footnote{114} Yet despite the parallels between Windelband and Paulsen, the despondent tone of Paulsen’s 1903 article reflects the severe criticism that his position aroused.\footnote{115}

Kuno Fischer also participated in the debate about Kant’s metaphysics around 1900. The earlier exchange between Fischer and Trendelenburg was by no means the end of the discussion, and other participants in the discussion had taken Trendelenburg’s place, resulting in a debate that was no less heated. In the preface to the fourth, revised edition of his *Immanuel Kant und seine Lehre*, which appeared in 1898, Fischer complains about both the complete misunderstanding and the ‘rude insults’ (gröblichsten Ausfälle) addressed to him by the ‘editor of the *Kantstudien*’ in the latter’s recent commentary on Kant.\footnote{116} In the same preface, Fischer extensively thanks Windelband for the

\footnote{111} F. Paulsen, ‘Kants Verhältnis zur Metaphysik’, *Kant-Studien* 4 (1900), 413-447, and ‘Kant und die Metaphysik’, *Kant-Studien* 8 (1903), 111-112.
\footnote{112} Paulsen, ‘Kants Verhältnis zur Metaphysik’, 413.
\footnote{113} Paulsen, ‘Kants Verhältnis zur Metaphysik’, 415: ‘Ich wollte eben den ganzen persönlichen Kant, nicht blos die Gedanken, die er in der Kritik der r. V. ausgeführt hat dem Leser vor Augen stellen.’
\footnote{114} Paulsen, ‘Kants Verhältnis zur Metaphysik’, 446-447.
\footnote{115} Paulsen, ‘Kant und die Metaphysik’, 111: ‘Meine Hoffnung, dass es überhaupt möglich sei, über Kant zu reden und verstanden zu werden, ist längst fast bis auf den Nullpunkt herabgesunken.’
\footnote{116} Fischer, *Immanuel Kant und seine Lehre* (1898), VI-VII. Although Fischer does not mention his name, this refers to Hans Vaihinger, who was the editor of the *Kantstudien* at the time and published a two volume commentary on Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft.*
commemorative essay written on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Fischer’s dissertation. Windelband’s Festschrift was entitled ‘Kuno Fischer und sein Kant’, exactly the same title as one of Trendelenburg’s polemic contributions in the earlier exchange. But according to Fischer, Trendelenburg’s essay is a text from the past, and from another philosophical ‘area’.

The relationship between Fischer and Windelband was close in Windelband’s early period, but also in the period around 1900. This is not only borne out by Windelband’s rather hagiographical essay and Fischer’s response to it in the preface of the fourth edition of his Kant book, but also by the fact that Windelband was Fischer’s successor in Heidelberg in 1903 and by the extensive in memoriam he wrote for his teacher in

118 ‘Es giebt eine ebenso bezeichnete Schrift, welche in der Vergangenheit liegt und in einer anderen Gegend der Philosophie ihren Ursprung hatte,’ Fischer, Immanuel Kant und seine Lehre (1898), VI. Fischer does not mention Trendelenburg’s name either.
Bearing in mind the Fischer-Trendelenburg debate over the interpretation of the subjectivity of space and time in Kant, the question how Fischer’s and Windelband’s Kant-interpretations relate is an interesting one. I will briefly discuss the relation between Windelband and his teacher as far as their interpretation of the Third Critique is concerned.

According to Windelband in his ‘Kuno Fischer und sein Kant’, the interpretative picture that Fischer draws of Kant is that of ‘transcendental idealism in its metaphysical sense’. The dualism of phenomenal and noumenal world, of theoretical and practical reason, the phenomenality of space and time, the inability of theoretical reason to know things in themselves are the cornerstones of Fischer’s Kant interpretation. In fact Fischer stresses time and again the importance of the exclusive subjectivity of space and time, and of the dualism between experience and the thing-in-itself that follows from it.

Yet the relation between the two sides of the dualism figures as prominently in Fischer’s presentation of the Kantian system as the dualism itself. The last part of his Kant book is entitled ‘Kritik der kantischen Philosophie’, and despite its title it is rather a concise presentation and defence of Fischer’s own Kant interpretation against the criticism of others. The third chapter of this critique of Kantianism, entitled ‘Die kantische Philosophie als Entwicklungslehre’, discusses the relation between the phenomenal and the noumenal world, and the role of the Third Critique in establishing this relation. According to Fischer, Kant’s philosophy is ultimately to be understood as a theory of development (Entwicklungslehre):

Wir sehen, wie sich die kantische Philosophie in ihrer gesammten Weltanschauung als Entwicklungslehre darstellt: sie betrachtet die Natur wie die Freiheit, die Cultur wie den Staat, die Religion wie die Kirche entwicklungsgeschichtlich, und wenn sie diese Themata auch nicht ausführt,  

According to Fischer, the constant theme of Kant’s worldview (1) is thus its developmental character, an observation that is echoed by Windelband in his 1904 essay ‘Nach hundert Jahren’.  

This developmental character of Kant’s philosophy is most evident in his Third Critique. Kant’s theory of the teleology of nature establishes a connection between the noumenal and the phenomenal world, which from the perspective of theoretical reason appear fundamentally different. The thing-in-itself, which cannot be known by theoretical reason, can be known by practical reason.  

As in Windelband therefore, we already find in Fischer’s interpretation of Kant an extension of the concept of knowledge and of the concept of appearance (Erscheinung). Whereas the noumenal world cannot be known by (natural) science and theoretical reason, practical reason does have access to it. Furthermore, the connection between the noumenal world and the phenomenal world that is established in the Third Critique and which completes Kant’s teleological worldview allows for an interpretation of history as appearance of the noumenal world, appearance of the thing-in-itself:

Mit dem Zweck tritt der Wille, mit diesem die Freiheit, der intelligible Charakter oder das Ding an sich in die Erscheinung ein und immer deutlicher hervor, je höher die Entwicklung der Dinge fortschreitet. Die Weltentwicklung gilt in der Lehre unseres Philosophen als die Erscheinung und zunehmende Offenbarung der Freiheit.  

122 Fischer, *Immanuel Kant und seine Lehre* (1898), 574.
Windelband’s statement that ‘Kant’s worldview culminates in the interpretation of history as the realization of the ends of the noumenal world in the phenomenal world’ is thus prefigured in his teacher’s interpretation of the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* and the completing picture that this Third Critique enables. One does not find in Fischer similar explicit judgements about the *KdU* as Kant’s ‘greatest’ or ‘most powerful’ work. Yet Fischer’s interpretation of this work and its place in the Kantian worldview implicitly assigns a comparable status to it. Windelband’s 1904 Kant interpretation has strong connections to Fischer’s interpretation and his position in the debate about Kant’s metaphysics.

8. Conclusion: science, worldview, metaphysics

Let me recall the three stages of the concept of worldview in Windelband which were discussed in this chapter. First, the early works, especially the two publications from the early 1880s. Second, the period around 1904, from which the two 1904 Kant publications and the related historical work on Kant were discussed. Finally, the *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, which is the last published work by Windelband in which the topic of worldview is addressed.

Although Windelband is negative about the possibility of a scientific worldview in the early period, his arguments contain the central concepts which return in his later discussions of the topic. In the early texts, he considers a worldview to be metaphysical, for it aims at knowledge beyond the scope of the empirical sciences. As such, a scientific worldview is a contradictory concept, for by definition the worldview goes beyond scientifically warranted knowledge. According to the early Windelband, this was demonstrated by Kant, who proved the impossibility of metaphysics as science and restricted scientific knowledge to the world of experience. In short: Kant demonstrated the impossibil-

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ity of a scientific worldview. Philosophy cannot achieve a scientific 'view of the world'. The object of philosophy is not the totality of the world, but rather the totality of universally valid values, taken in a non-metaphysical way. Philosophy should be a theory of normative consciousness only.

In his Kant interpretation of 1904, Windelband qualifies this earlier position considerably. The most conspicuous change is the turnaround in his evaluation of the prospects for a scientific worldview. Where the earlier texts completely denied the possibility, with an appeal to Kant, now Kant himself is described as having a worldview, not just a personal one, but one that is expressed in the totality of his philosophical work. The critique of scientific knowledge is now considered to be only the first stage of the Kantian worldview. It is Kant’s worldview, Windelband claims, which is the cause of his exceptional historical influence.

This shift in the interpretation of the concept of worldview in Kant is connected to shifts in meaning of other concepts, especially the concept of science. A first alteration of the concept of science is the explicit inclusion of the historical sciences. According to Windelband, this leads philosophy in its task of founding the sciences (philosophy as theory of science is an important part of Windelband’s concept of philosophy as science of normative consciousness) to ethics and aesthetics too, for a complete system of values is needed to warrant scientific objectivity in the historical sciences. This extension of the concept of knowledge allows Windelband to present philosophy as theory of science and as a comprehensive worldview, encompassing ethics and aesthetics, at the same time.

But yet another extension of the concept of scientific knowledge can be discerned in Windelband, one that is not explicitly recognized. Philosophy is both science and metaphysics, as Windelband recognizes in his 1904 texts. Yet this is paradoxical, since by definition scientific knowledge cannot be metaphysical knowledge, for the Kantian critique of science, even if it is to be considered only a first stage of the Kantian worldview, still stands. The implicit assumption is therefore that philosophy as a science is different from the other sciences, for it can have knowledge of the noumenal world, the realm beyond experience. Although Windelband carefully avoids drawing this con-
clusion, it is a corollary of his argument that philosophy discovers principles which have universal and necessary validity. Furthermore, the noumenal world is realized (and thus appears) in history, and therefore accessible to philosophy through history.

Windelband’s interpretation of Kant as providing a metaphysical worldview places him firmly in the debate about Kant’s metaphysics at the time, as we have seen. The metaphysical interpretation of Kant in Windelband can be traced back to the Kant interpretation of his teacher, Kuno Fischer. And Fischer’s Kant interpretation has its foundations in the dualism between the noumenal and the phenomenal world, a dualism which is itself rooted in Kant’s theory of the exclusive subjectivity of space and time, according to Fischer. The question what a philosophical worldview is and whether (neo-)Kantian philosophy could provide such a worldview connects Windelband to Fischer and his debate with Trendelenburg. The worldview debate is at least partially, too, the debate about how Kant should be read. We will return to this issue in the next chapter, in which Trendelenburg’s worldview concept will be compared to Dilthey’s and Windelband’s worldview concepts.

In his 1914 *Einleitung*, Windelband further complicates the worldview concept, by loosening the tie between philosophy and science—which he still retained, at least formally, in his 1904 discussion. Now life is introduced as a basis for philosophy, alongside the sciences. Also, the worldview which philosophy constructs—philosophy is now explicitly defined as ‘science of worldview’—should have relevance in ‘life’ as well. This connection of the philosophical worldview with life, which Windelband calls the ‘practical’ side, though it is not practical in the Kantian sense, is not further developed in this work, unfortunately. The relation between science and life remains obscure as far as the philosophical worldview is concerned.
CHAPTER 5

WORLDVIEW AND METAPHYSICS

1. Introduction

The previous chapters have shown that the discussion of the concept of worldview is invariably linked to the most fundamental philosophical concepts—thought, being, knowledge, validity, metaphysics. The analysis of the concept of worldview led us in each of the three cases to a more general discussion of the basic structure and limits of philosophy. The question of a philosophical worldview is intimately connected to the question what philosophy as science can achieve. In this chapter I will discuss the three concepts of worldview and their systematic philosophical background, and the systematic connections which exist between them.

Before discussing general systematic implications of the preceding analysis of the concept of worldview, I will give a brief overview of the three worldview concepts as they were analyzed in the previous chapters. Following this, I will compare the three worldview concepts with respect to the systematic place which they occupy. After that, I turn to the systematic framework in which these worldview concepts are embedded. A discussion of the philosophical theories underlying the worldview concept will enable an understanding of the relation between the three positions discussed separately (even though some comparisons have already been made). As a prelude to this discussion of the systematic connections between the three positions, I will return to the Fischer-Trendelenburg debate on Kant’s metaphysics. Fischer’s influence on Windelband’s Kant interpretation is an important historical and systematic nexus which links central concerns of Trendelenburg’s worldview concept to the Kant interpretation underlying Windelband’s worldview concept. After that, the relationship between Trendelenburg and Dilthey will be discussed. As it turns out, both these systematic-historical
relations lead to a discussion of the metaphysical character of the concept of worldview. Together with the comparison of worldview concepts, these systematic considerations allow a concluding assessment of the worldview concept among the three protagonists of this study.

2. Three philosophical concepts of worldview

According to Trendelenburg, a worldview, in its philosophical sense, is first of all a fundamental metaphysical notion (metaphysischer Grundgedanke). It presents an answer to the question how thought and being are related. Yet this fundamental notion determines the totality of knowledge: as a basic principle, it orders and transforms the totality of philosophical and scientific knowledge. The concept of worldview in Trendelenburg denotes both the basic principle and the ordered totality which derives its structure from this fundamental principle.

The fundamental metaphysical question how thought and being are related can be answered in three different ways, according to the typological distinctions made by Trendelenburg in his 1847 essay ‘Die Typen der Weltanschauung’. These three worldviews are opposite and mutually exclusive ways to unite and organize the totality of philosophical and scientific knowledge into a meaningful whole. Only one of them can be ‘true and actual’. As I have argued, the point of Trendelenburg’s classification in this essay is to arrive at a critical evaluation of the three types of worldviews. More specifically, he aims to build a case for the organic worldview, the view which gives thought priority over being in its answer to the fundamental question how the relationship between them must be conceived. The case for the organic worldview (also referred to as the teleological worldview, idealism, or Platonism by Trendelenburg) is only supported by practical arguments in this text. The choice of the organic worldview must be made for the sake of ethics. A sufficient theoretical foundation was a task which could not be yet completed, according to Trendelenburg in this 1847 essay.
The *Logische Untersuchungen*, in the revised second edition of 1862, aims to establish this theoretical foundation of the organic worldview, which was not yet attainable in 1847. The programme of the *Logische Untersuchungen* consists of a theoretical answer to the fundamental metaphysical question, i.e. a theoretical answer to the question how thought and being are related, which at the same time is an answer to the question how knowledge is possible. This programme is the project of a founding science which simultaneously encompasses logic (the possibility of knowledge) and metaphysics (the connection between thought and being). According to Trendelenburg, such a fundamental science (*Grundwissenschaft*) must take its point of departure in the sciences (*das Faktum der Wissenschaft*) and establish the philosophical preconditions for scientific knowledge. However, the validity of the results of this philosophical discipline is not different from that of empirical scientific knowledge. The philosophical fundamental science is hypothetical as well as ‘empirical’, i.e. it should adequately explain the possibility of its object—the sciences themselves. Such a fundamental science can be described as ‘non-foundationalist’, since it does not locate the source of the validity of knowledge in a (metaphysical) foundation which is external to it.

The concept of motion (*Bewegung*) plays a crucial role in executing this programme of the *Logische Untersuchungen*. With this concept, Trendelenburg claims to have identified the mediating principle between thought and being, or rather: the principle which is prior to both thought and being, the principle from which they are both constructed. With this principle, Trendelenburg achieves the first part of the task he set himself. The principle of motion explains the relation between thought and being, and thus explains the possibility of knowledge. Yet the theoretical foundation of the organic worldview demands more than this. To found the organic worldview, Trendelenburg also has to prove the priority of thought over being, in other words: he has to answer the question how thought can determine being.
This second step of his argument can be found in the chapters of the *Logische Untersuchungen* which deal with end (Zweck) and the will.¹ In these chapters, Trendelenburg argues for the possibility of an influence of thought on being, through a discussion of the reality of ends in nature. Since ends are realized in nature, ‘blind forces’ are not enough for an understanding of nature. Furthermore, man as both a natural and a thinking being, can realize, or at least can try to realize, his own ends in nature. ‘The ethical’ is defined as organic life—life in the biological sense—which has become free through knowledge and the will. In this regard, Trendelenburg has fulfilled the task which he set himself, to give a theoretical account of the organic worldview.

In sum: Trendelenburg’s discussion of a philosophical worldview and his classification of types of worldviews have an epistemological character, since they deal with the possibility of knowledge. The programmatic essay from 1847 reveals that this epistemological discussion (or: logical-metaphysical discussion, to use Trendelenburg’s own characterization) has an underlying practical motivation: Trendelenburg’s aim is a theoretical foundation² of the organic worldview, which is a prerequisite for ethics. The discussion in the *Logische Untersuchungen* must be read as an explanation for the possibility of knowledge of the world, as well as of ethics. We will return to the issue of ethics and freedom in Trendelenburg in our discussion below.

The second philosophical interpretation of the worldview concept we encountered was that of one of Trendelenburg’s students, Dilthey. Dilthey’s worldview concept is much more complex than Trendelenburg’s. As I have argued, the concept of worldview in Dilthey must be understood as representing a pyramid of different worldview concepts. In addition, Dilthey also specifies the internal structure of worldviews, especially the threefold structure of philosophical worldviews. In general,

¹ LU 2, chapters IX and X.
² It is hard to avoid ‘foundationalist’ language when discussing Trendelenburg’s position. As I have argued, this foundation is not an absolute, metaphysical foundation. In other words: the foundation is not fundamentally different from the building it is supposed to support. See chapter 2.
worldviews are interpretations of the totality of the world. This holds for the most immediate, unscientific worldview as well as for the most sophisticated scientific-philosophical one. The difference between the concepts which make up this pyramid lies in their validity. The higher levels of this worldview-pyramid—Dilthey distinguishes especially religious, artistic, and philosophical worldviews—are characterized by an increasing amount of inter-subjective stability and validity. The zenith of the pyramid is formed by the philosophical worldviews, for which objective, scientific validity is claimed.

According to Dilthey, however, this scientific validity is only a claim. Historical consciousness reveals a recurring competition between philosophical worldviews which can be classified into three basic types. This is the point where the Weltanschauungstypologie comes in. The crucial observation which Dilthey makes in his publications on this topic is that the competition between the different worldviews cannot be decided in favour of one of them: the typology of worldviews represents an irreducible plurality. The historical plurality of types of worldviews and their perpetual interplay is the horizon beyond which no philosophical unification is possible.

The reason for this ultimate plurality of worldviews is that all worldviews are rooted in life, according to Dilthey. Life is the substrate and cause of all human expression. Yet life itself cannot be known directly; only through an interpretation of these cultural expressions can an ‘understanding’ of life be reached. Since the philosophical types of worldviews are equally—but partially—valid interpretations of life, one cannot rationally decide between them. A philosophical-historical typology of worldviews is the only option for a philosophical worldview theory. Whether Dilthey abandons the idea of philosophy itself being a worldview, is a question which will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter.

The third and final philosophical worldview concept analyzed is found in the writings of Windelband. In his early work up to and including the 1880s, Windelband rejected the idea of a philosophical worldview. He construed a worldview at that time as something which would give knowledge of the world as a totality, which meant both the world of appearances and the world of
the thing-in-itself, the noumenal world. With an appeal to Kant’s critique of metaphysics, Windelband claimed that such a worldview could not be scientifically established.

Interestingly, the Kant year 1904 saw two publications by Windelband in which he turned again to both the concept of worldview and the interpretation of Kant. In these two publications, Windelband ascribes a worldview to Kant himself, not just a personal worldview, but one which has acquired scientific validity. The critique of metaphysics is now interpreted by Windelband as only a first stage of the Kantian worldview, concerning empirical, natural science. Philosophy has to address the historical sciences, which also established themselves in the nineteenth century.

The philosophical foundation of the historical sciences is to be found in a system of universally valid principles, or values. This system of values, or: normative consciousness, is the true object of philosophy. Although knowledge of this noumenal realm of values is not possible in the same way that empirical knowledge, knowledge of the phenomenal world, is possible, philosophy can show the necessity and content of this world of values. History plays a crucial role in this philosophical project, since the noumenal world is realized in history. Because of this actuality of the noumenal world, Windelband does not hesitate to describe Kant as a ‘metaphysician’. As I have argued, this Kant interpretation has a strong affinity with that of Windelband’s teacher, Kuno Fischer.

The philosophical worldview is a scientific worldview for Windelband: the system of values is the necessary foundation of the objectivity of the historical as well as natural sciences. The validity of the sciences is established by this philosophical worldview, and the worldview itself is the result of philosophical science. This concept of science is broader than the concept employed by Windelband in his early period: scientific knowledge is not restricted to the world of appearances alone.

The third and final stage in the development of the concept of worldview in Windelband’s work saw the introduction of the concept of life. In his 1914 work *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, Windelband refers to both the sciences and life as the ‘material basis’ for philosophy—unfortunately without specifying this basis
3. Comparing the three worldview concepts: The systematic place of the worldview concept

The three different worldview concepts we encountered can be compared at different levels. Before discussing particular systematic questions raised by the topics discussed so far, I will provide in this section a first comparison of the three worldview concepts. This first comparison will cover (1) the systematic place of the concept of worldview in relation to the general philosophical theory in which it occurs, (2) the related topic of how the plurality of worldviews is dealt with, and (3) how the relation between science and worldview is construed.

(1) First, let us compare the place of the worldview concept in the philosophical system or within the more general philosophical theory as developed by the authors under consideration. For Trendelenburg, the concept of worldview is not a basic concept in his philosophical system. This might seem more than a little surprising, since we have seen that Trendelenburg denotes the worldview as a fundamental, metaphysical thought (metaphysischer Grundgedanke). Yet this fundamental character only pertains to the content of this metaphysical thought, namely the specification of the relation between thought and being. The nature of this relationship is a fundamental question in Trendelenburg’s work, a question which is answered by his theory of motion. The concept of worldview and the classification of worldviews are preliminary to the theoretical foundation of the ‘organic worldview’, which is the most important result of Trendelenburg’s system. This theoretical foundation of the organic worldview effectively renders the classification of worldviews obsolete, since only the organic worldview is capable of being theoretically founded. Insofar as the worldview concept entails the idea of a
plurality of worldviews—as a mere view of the world which admits of other, different views—the concept of worldview itself would be obsolete after Trendelenburg’s logical-metaphysical foundation of the organic worldview. The fact that Trendelenburg still uses the term Weltanschauung even in his retrospective section (Rückblick) at the very end of the Logische Untersuchungen can be seen as an indication that the concept of worldview is not necessarily pluralistic in his account. So even though the concept of worldview is an important, systematic concept in Trendelenburg, it is not as fundamental as the metaphysical thought which is entailed in it.

Whereas for Trendelenburg the classification of worldviews comes early in his work, only to be replaced or even made obsolete in his later work, for Dilthey the typology of worldview is a product of his later work. Systematically, it is a philosophical account which seeks to integrate the historical plurality of forms of philosophical systems into a single account (without reducing the plurality itself to a single form, more on this below). As I argued in the chapter discussing Dilthey’s concept of worldview, the Weltanschauungstypologie itself has the character of a worldview, and aims to provide a better understanding of life—better in such a way that the limits of the different, historical types of worldviews are overcome. The typology of worldviews therefore rounds off Dilthey’s work, by integrating the different types of philosophical systems—between which no rational decision can be made, they are equally valid interpretations of life—into a reflexive, historical theory. Rather than dissolving the project of a philosophical worldview into historical relativism, the typology of worldview takes the next step by adding historical awareness to the philosophical worldview theory.

In Windelband’s work, the concept of worldview gains increasing importance, culminating in the interpretation of the ‘ultimate and highest task’ of philosophy as the construction of a worldview. Philosophy should provide a scientific worldview, and the concept of worldview can be considered a shorthand for the results of philosophical science as such. The concept of worldview is therefore not a technical term in Windelband, it is not

part of his philosophical theory, but it is the denominator for this philosophical theory itself. Philosophy is science of worldview, and I have argued that this must be read as a science which results in a worldview. The interpretation of philosophy as science of worldview is itself not philosophical: it is an external interpretation and, as the arguments for this interpretation are given prior to the philosophical enterprise itself, they are (as I shall argue below) non-philosophical. Furthermore, these non-philosophical arguments are not replaced by philosophical ones later in Windelband’s work.

The identification of philosophy and worldview is not sufficiently warranted by philosophical arguments in Windelband, and therefore this identification is an external determination of philosophy. Since this is a far-reaching and perhaps controversial statement, I will go into some detail to support it here. A survey of the different occurrences of the concept of worldview in Windelband serves to confirm the statement. In the early texts, we have seen that worldview and philosophy are considered mutually exclusive. If anything, the concept of worldview serves a ‘negative systematic function’, philosophy is not a worldview (which is construed as knowledge of the world ‘as it is’, beyond appearances). Since, according to Windelband, the concept of worldview does not define philosophy but rather is fundamentally different from philosophy, it is a non-philosophical concept in the early texts.

In the 1904 texts on Kant the situation is quite different. In the text on ‘Kant’s worldview’, the concept of worldview is introduced by the following line of reasoning: Kant’s historical success—and historically effective philosophical work in general—results from the essence (innerste Wesen) of the philosopher’s personality. This essence is to be found in the philosopher’s worldview, by which ‘he projects his individual character onto reality’. Kant’s superior place in the history of philosophy rests on the special way in which he has solved the ‘highest task’ of philosophy—i.e. to express a worldview. The task which Windelband sets himself in this commemorative essay is to extract this worldview from the ‘formulas’ of Kant’s system. It is clear that the

concept of worldview is applied to the definition of philosophy in general, since it is used as an interpretation of the results of philosophy as such. Yet this is not subsequently vindicated in Windelband’s discussion. He posits that Kant’s philosophy is the expression of a worldview, and that this worldview connects the essence of his personality with his scientific work. He also posits that any historically effective philosophy derives its effectiveness from the fact that it contains a worldview. No further arguments for the claim that philosophy is (is an expression of, contains) a worldview are given, however—the argument from historical effectiveness is insufficient to warrant the validity of this claim.\(^5\) The identification of worldview and philosophy is therefore not an identification warranted by philosophical arguments, hence we must consider this identification to be non-philosophical.

In ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, the other 1904 text on Kant, Windelband starts his discussion by observing that contemporary culture is in need of a worldview, that the ‘national spirit’ (Volksseele) even ‘demands’ (gebieterisch erheischt) a worldview from philosophy.\(^6\) In the assessment of Kant’s legacy, the central question therefore is whether his critical philosophy can serve as a philosophical worldview. We have seen how Windelband in his—affirmative—answer to this question primarily discusses the role of historical science, the connection between the noumenal and the phenomenal world, and thus the question of the unity of reason. Two important questions are neither asked nor answered, however. The first is the question whether the philosophical theory outlined by Windelband can serve as a worldview in the sense in which it is required of philosophy. The second question is whether the cultural demand of a philosophical worldview is a legitimate one.

\(^5\) Windelband does not present the coincidence between effective historical philosophical work and this personal mark of a worldview as an argument for the identification of philosophy and worldview. It would have been a peculiar argument for Windelband had he claimed this, for the examination of the validity of natural, empirical, or historical ‘facts’ is an important thread throughout his work.

\(^6\) Windelband, ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, 149-150.
The fact that Windelband does not ask or answer these questions indicates that the concept of worldview is not a systematic concept here either: the task of philosophy is set externally, by culture in general, by the ‘national spirit’. This task is to provide a worldview. Windelband thus operates with a concept of worldview which is pre-philosophical, for it is put forward before philosophy can start to fulfil its task. Even if the characteristics required of such a worldview are not specified beyond the observation that it must be a motivating expression of the essence of culture, at the very least a rudimentary worldview concept is needed to specify this task for philosophy. Furthermore, since Windelband fails to answer whether his philosophical worldview theory (Weltanschauungslehre) can indeed serve the purpose which it is meant to have (and also fails to provide a retrospective vindication of the task which he formulates in advance), the concept of worldview with which he begins does not receive sufficient theoretical foundation afterwards.

In his 1914 Einleitung in die Philosophie, Windelband starts by similarly observing that there is a general cultural need for philosophy to provide a worldview.\(^7\) A worldview is demanded (verlangt man) of philosophy. And even though everyone always has a worldview, philosophy should provide a special kind of worldview: one that has scientific validity. Philosophy, thus interpreted as a ‘science of worldview’, has a double task:

Als Wissenschaft der Weltanschauung hat die Philosophie zwei Bedürfnisse zu befriedigen. Man erwartet von ihr einen umfassenden, sicher gegründeten und womöglich abschließenden Ausbau aller Erkenntnis und daneben eine auf solcher Einsicht errichtete Ueberzeugung, die den inneren Halt im Leben zu gewähren vermag. Darin besteht die theoretische und die praktische Bedeutung der Philosophie: sie soll Weltweisheit und Lebensweisheit zugleich sein, und jede Form der Philosophie, die nur die eine oder die andere dieser Aufgaben erfüllen wollte, würde uns von vornherein als einseitig und als unzulänglich erscheinen.\(^8\)

\(^7\) Windelband, Einleitung in die Philosophie, 1.
\(^8\) Windelband, Einleitung in die Philosophie, 19.
Windelband’s dual definition of the task of philosophy was already discussed in the previous chapter. Here I want to draw attention to the perspective from which this passage has been written. Philosophy receives a task, but from whom exactly? Philosophy should fulfil two needs, it must be wisdom of the world as well as of life. But these demands and constraints on the results of philosophy are given in advance, before philosophy has really taken off (in the prolegomena of the introduction). This is apparent from the last sentence, quoted above as well: A form of philosophy which would address only one of the tasks put forward by Windelband would be considered inadequate from the outset (von vornherein).

Without acknowledging it, Windelband in effect works with two worldview concepts, the worldview as it is demanded of philosophy by the ‘national spirit’ on the one hand, and the concept of worldview in the philosophical sense on the other. The philosophical concept of worldview basically denotes the epistemological foundation of knowledge, as discussed by Windelband in ‘Nach hundert Jahren’. Yet he fails to elucidate the relation between these two concepts; indeed, he does not distinguish between them and seems to assume that the two are identical. It is by no means self-evident, however, that the philosophical worldview can in fact be the worldview demanded by cultural needs. Windelband should provide a connection between the philosophical and the cultural worldview concept, in both directions: he should argue that philosophy should indeed take up the worldview task put forward by cultural demands, but he should also argue that the philosophical worldview as he envisioned it does in fact fulfil these demands. However, both lines of argument are missing in Windelband’s elaborations.

It would seem therefore, that the double task for philosophy is derived from extra-philosophical—and thus non-philosophical—considerations. The double worldview task also seems to be indubitable: every form of philosophy which fails to address both tasks is rejected as insufficient. This is all the more striking since the main characteristic of the philosophical worldview in distinction to other kinds of worldviews (religious, poetic, etc.) is that philosophy examines and when necessary corrects or rejects the presuppositions of these other kinds of worldviews. The interpre-
tation of philosophy as itself resulting in a worldview, a worldview which should fulfil a double task, is a presupposition which is apparently indubitable and which is not subjected to critical examination. In any case, there are no arguments to be found in Windelband which could serve as a subsequent (philosophical) vindication of these prior constraints on philosophy.

For these reasons, the identification of philosophy as science of worldview must be considered an external interpretation of philosophy: it is not a self-interpretation, the worldview task of philosophy is an external demand, which receives no internal-philosophical justification. The concept of worldview as applied to philosophy is therefore an external, non-systematic concept: its meaning and its application are motivated by considerations which are derived from other sources than philosophy.

Put next to one another, the worldview concepts could be schematically described as (a) an internal-philosophical concept in Trendelenburg, (b) a boundary concept in Dilthey, and (c) an external, non-philosophical concept in Windelband: (a) The worldview concept is introduced by Trendelenburg as a concept to be used in a systematic evaluation of basic philosophical concepts of the relationship between thought and being. It is therefore both internal to his philosophical system and has a clear systematic function within it.

(b) Dilthey’s concept of worldview is both a technical term used for various kinds of worldviews and a term which is applied to philosophical systems as a whole. In its latter sense, the concept is the basis for his typology of (philosophical) worldviews. With this theory, Dilthey adds a new reflexive level to philosophy, the typology of worldviews tries to combine what in itself cannot be combined: the mutually exclusive types of worldviews. By making them part of a theory which explains both their necessity and their historical relativity, he tries to overcome the inherent limits of the types of worldviews. Dilthey can only save philosophy by extending its boundary: he tries to save metaphysics by overcoming it, at least overcoming it in its historical, relative form.

(c) In Windelband’s case, the concept of worldview and the identification of philosophy and worldview are presuppositions of his systematic work (from 1904 onwards), presuppositions
which are not sufficiently vindicated either beforehand or afterwards. They appear in systematic texts and discussions, but they do not originate in Windelband’s more general philosophical theory, rather it is the other way around: the identification of worldview and philosophy by Windelband is used to describe the philosophical task and to constrain its results. Since the concept of worldview and its identification with philosophy do not originate from within philosophical theory, this identification is an external, prior determination. Since it also does not receive philosophical vindication afterwards, the identification of philosophy and worldview must be considered external and non-philosophical itself.

To conclude this general comparison of the systematic place of the concept of worldview, an interpretation of Windelband must be considered which, when adopted, could perhaps elucidate (but not warrant) his anterior identification of philosophy and worldview. We have discussed Windelband’s notion of a ‘realm of values’ which is timeless (‘eternal truths’). It is possible to conceive of this noumenal realm of values as being in essence, or rather the essence of, the ‘philosophical worldview’, which is only gradually explicated in the history of philosophy. Yet whatever validity the philosophical worldview has (as an actual result of philosophical work), it has, by virtue of this noumenal realm of values, normative consciousness. This ‘Platonic’ constellation might explain why Windelband apparently sees no problem in identifying philosophy and worldview before actually developing any systematic or foundational theory. Philosophy insofar as it has any validity, and therefore insofar as it has any prospect of scientifically fulfilling the tasks assigned to it, is an expression of this eternal realm of values. Philosophy is worldview for Windelband, because the concept of philosophy contains this ‘Platonic’ worldview. Yet the metaphysical character of the theory of values in Windelband is problematic itself, as we have seen. The question of the validity of the identification of philosophy and worldview transforms into the question of the validity of the metaphysical worldview underlying Windelband’s concept of philosophy.

(2) Elaborating on this first comparison, one can further compare the different worldview concepts with respect to their stance towards the plurality of worldviews. We have already not-
ed the transient character of Trendelenburg’s classification of worldview types. The concept of worldview is not intrinsically pluralistic. This is also evident from the definition of worldview as the fundamental metaphysical thought: Trendelenburg’s aim is to provide one metaphysical thought with sufficient theoretical support. The concept of worldview can therefore return in his Logische Untersuchungen, while the classification of worldviews is no longer needed. The worldview concept in Dilthey on the other hand is intrinsically pluralistic. Different types of worldviews are equally valid interpretations of life, which are produced with a certain necessity and among which no rational choice can be made. The Weltanschauungstypologie is an attempt to fixate this plurality in a theory of historical reflexivity, an attempt to achieve a more complete interpretation of life by integrating the plurality of its interpretations. In the case of Windelband, the matter is less clear. Although he talks in the Einleitung about an inventory of forms of world-views (Formen der Weltansicht), such an inventory only functions as a prolegomenon to a single philosophical system which is established with scientific validity. Yet the conventional character of the concept of worldview in Windelband—i.e. the concept of worldview is an external interpretation of philosophy as a whole, not a necessary systematic concept—allows for the possibility that other, philosophical or non-philosophical, systems can function as ‘worldviews’ as well.

(3) One can also compare the worldview concepts with respect to their relationship with the concept of science. More specifically, one can ask whether the worldview concepts are concepts of scientific worldviews or whether they must be understood as the basis for a philosophical, scientific theory of worldviews—or still differently. With Husserl’s terminology in mind, this question could be rephrased as: are these philosophical concepts of worldview able to combine in a single concept the notions of philosophy as worldview philosophy and as scientific philosophy?

In Trendelenburg we find both approaches intertwined. First of all, there is continuity between the concept of science and the concept of philosophy: philosophy, itself a fundamental science, should address the sciences as a ‘fact’ (Faktum). Secondly, the concept of worldview is introduced in a philosophical-scientific
theory of worldviews (the typological classification). This theory of worldviews is superseded by the theoretical foundation which one of the worldviews receives in the *Logische Untersuchungen*. So the concept of worldview is retained while the scientific theory of worldviews is no longer systematically needed. Trendelenburg aims at giving one of the worldviews, one answer to the fundamental metaphysical question, a philosophical-scientific foundation. This worldview therefore can be called a *scientific* worldview if indeed the *Logische Untersuchungen* succeed in their attempt to give it its theoretical basis. In Trendelenburg the concept of worldview thus develops from a scientific theory of worldviews to a scientific worldview. In terms of Husserl’s distinction between worldview philosophy and scientific philosophy, one could say that the concept of worldview as applied to philosophy in Trendelenburg is derived from the scientific nature of philosophy: the sciences, as a ‘fact’, lead Trendelenburg to a conception of philosophy as ‘theory of science’ of which the basic question is the ‘worldview question’, the question how thought and being are related, i.e. the question how (scientific) knowledge is possible.

Dilthey frames his concept of worldview in a scientific theory of worldviews—the *Weltanschauungstypologie*—from the outset. Yet I have argued that this theory of worldview has the pretension to constitute a worldview itself—a worldview which would therefore be scientific, more scientific than the worldviews analyzed in the typology. It must be borne in mind however, that this is accompanied in Dilthey by a broadening of the concept of science and of knowledge. The typology of worldviews is presented as an attempt to save the scientific character of philosophy, Dilthey thus apparently chooses one horn of Husserl’s dilemma: philosophy as science. Yet, due to the pretensions of the *Weltanschauungstypologie* constituting itself a (more scientific) worldview, Dilthey in fact aims at combining both approaches (philosophy as science and as worldview). Unfortunately, the price for this manoeuvre is the metaphysical character of life which underlies the typology of worldviews, as will be discussed below. This casts doubt on the success of Dilthey’s approach as a scientific one.
Windelband—although using the expressions ‘theory of worldview’ (Weltanschauungslehre) and ‘science of worldview’ (Wissenschaft der Weltanschauung)—sees a worldview as resulting from philosophy, with scientific validity. At the same time he also construes philosophy, especially in his 1904 essay ‘Nach hundert Jahren’, as a theory of the principles of scientific objectivity. In his 1914 Einleitung, the relation between science and worldview is loosened by Windelband’s introduction of life as a basis for the philosophical worldview, alongside science. Unfortunately, this role of life is not specified, and it cannot be compared with the role of Dilthey’s concept of life in his theory of worldviews. Like Dilthey and Trendelenburg, Windelband aims at combining the two approaches which Husserl presented as mutually exclusive: philosophy as science and as worldview. Even though Windelband presents his discussion of philosophy as theory of scientific objectivity as a worldview theory, I have argued that this concept of worldview differs from the one which is expected from philosophy as worldview philosophy. Windelband does not succeed in connecting the interpretation of philosophy as (theory of) science with the interpretation of philosophy as worldview. Whereas for Trendelenburg and Dilthey the concept of worldview resulted from a discussion of the scientific character of philosophy, for Windelband the role of philosophy as worldview is put forward prior to philosophical theory.

4. Further comparison: the systematic background

Now that we have compared the three worldview concepts on different aspects, I will turn to some systematic issues connected to the concept of worldview in the philosophical positions we encountered. To this end, I will first return to the Fischer-Trendelenburg debate and one of its central questions, which remained unresolved so far. After that I will discuss the relation between Windelband and Trendelenburg and between Dilthey and Trendelenburg respectively. Both these comparisons raise similar is-
sues in different forms. This discussion together with the preceding comparison of worldview concepts will enable a final assessment of the worldview concept among our three protagonists.

4.1 The Fischer-Trendelenburg debate revisited: Freedom and metaphysics

Prima facie, the Fischer-Trendelenburg debate can be considered a merely technical discussion about a detail of Kant’s epistemology, viz. the question whether Kant has proven the exclusive subjectivity of space and time as necessary forms of appearance. The underlying motivation for Trendelenburg’s allegation that Kant in fact did not prove the exclusive subjectivity of space and time, and that they could be objective as well, has a much broader impact and determines the evaluation of Kantian philosophy as a whole. The restriction of empirical knowledge to knowledge of mere appearances, and not of things in themselves, is what ultimately worries Trendelenburg. Knowledge would thus be doomed to remain in the ‘magic circle’ (Zauberkreis) of subjectivity,\(^9\) and would never be knowledge of the world. And as we have seen, the project of Trendelenburg’s Logische Untersuchungen was precisely aimed at the demonstration of the possibility of a ‘worldview’: a principle and subsequent system of knowledge in which thought and being are connected, in which knowledge can be seen as knowledge of the world indeed. According to Trendelenburg, the exclusive subjectivity of space and time, and the ensuing distinction between empirical objects and things in themselves, constitute an abyss between knowledge and the world which cannot be bridged.

Now that we have analyzed some aspects of Fischer’s Kant interpretation in more detail in the last chapter, it is more clear why he opposed Trendelenburg’s claims so vehemently. To Fischer, and even more to his pupil Windelband, the theory of the thing-in-itself and the general distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal which it exemplifies are part of the core structure of Kant’s philosophy. According to Windelband, the theory of values (which to him is the contemporary expression

\(^9\) LU 1, 160.
of Kantianism) needs a metaphysical foundation, a foundation in the noumenal world. Even more than in theoretical philosophy, the distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal world is essential to practical philosophy.

It is indeed the case that Kant considered the noumenal world to be the ‘realm of freedom’, the sphere where (practical) principles of freedom reign, not the causal laws of empirical nature. Without this distinction between noumenal and phenomenal, freedom as the principle of practical philosophy would have no place. Yet Trendelenburg considers the non-dualistic, organic worldview to be the necessary philosophical foundation of ethics, as we have seen: without the organic worldview, ethics is not possible. The question which still needs to be asked about Trendelenburg’s project is therefore: how is freedom possible in this account?

To obtain an answer to this question we turn once again to the *Logische Untersuchungen*. The concept of freedom appears in the second volume of this work, in the chapters on ends (*der Zweck*) and the will. Given the mediation between thought and being, which is established by motion, both an influence of being on thought and an influence of thought on being are possible and real according to Trendelenburg. The concept of end represents the influence of thought on being. It is a necessary concept for our understanding of the world. Yet it has more than a mere hypothetical or ‘regulative’ status: it has reality and it is a determining reality in nature. Trendelenburg is therefore critical of Kant’s ascription of only regulative validity to the products of the reflexive power of judgement (*reflektive Urteilskraft*).\(^\text{10}\) Ends are real, not only as far as our knowledge of the world goes; they have a determining power in reality as well.

This is especially true with respect to the ends of the (human) will. All living (‘organic’) beings strive to fulfil their needs, and thus are aimed at ends. Human life is characterized by being conscious of itself and the needs and ends it has, according to Trendelenburg. And as a thinking being, it can subscribe to ends other than its particular, natural needs:

\(^\text{10}\) LU 2, 46-54.
Anders der Mensch, dessen Wesen es ist, dass er denke und dass das Denken das Begehren und Empfinden durchdringe und zu sich in die Höhe ziehe. Durch das Denken ist er des Allgemeinen fähig und dies bewusste Allgemeine hebt den Menschen über das Thier, indem es in die blinden Regungen des Eigenlebens bestimmend eintritt und umgekehrt das Eigene in sich aufnimmt.

Im Gegensatz gegen das blind Organische der Natur bezeichnen wir, was aus dieser eigenthümlich menschlichen Quelle fliesst, als ethisch.\textsuperscript{11}

The origin of the domain of ethics is therefore the distinction, which appears in nature only in human beings, between immediate, natural needs and the ends which are posited by reason. Man’s ability to reflect upon his own needs and to act in accordance with ends which are derived from thought, and which thus may differ from natural needs, is what constitutes free will:

Diese Fähigkeit, im Widerspruch mit den Begierden und unabhängig von sinnlichen Motiven das nur im Gedanken erfasste Gute zum Beweggrund zu haben, nennen wir die \textit{Freiheit} des Willens.\textsuperscript{12}

Freedom according to Trendelenburg is thus to be found in the ability to reflect on one’s needs and to determine one’s actions in accordance with different ends if they are the result of this reflection.

The difference from Kant’s concept of freedom is evident, and it is not surprising that Trendelenburg criticizes the Kantian concept of freedom, just as he criticized the Kantian concept of end. There are two problems with the Kantian point of view. The first objection is a general contradiction which Trendelenburg observes in Kant’s idealism.\textsuperscript{13} Although causality is restricted to the sphere of appearances and has no meaning outside of this sphere, the thing-in-itself becomes a causal factor as intelligible freedom (\textit{intelligible Freiheit}). As such, the concept of causality is applied outside the realm of appearances, across the boundary between phenomenal and noumenal world.

\textsuperscript{11} LU 2, 106.
\textsuperscript{12} LU 2, 111.
\textsuperscript{13} LU 2, 115.
The second objection which Trendelenburg presents is a corollary of the first. According to Kant, the human will and human acts have both an empirical and an intelligible character. The empirical character is determined by causal relations, and from this point of view there is no freedom. Yet the same will and the same acts also have an intelligible character, by which they are not subject to causal relations but are instead free. Trendelenburg’s objection to this view is that it is far from clear how the two perspectives (empirical, intelligible) on the same act are related and how freedom can become a factor in the causal relations.\(^\text{14}\)

Trendelenburg’s objections exemplify the more general problem he has with the Kantian distinction (or dualism) between the phenomenal and the noumenal world. The Kantian concept of freedom is described as nothing less than an ‘invented’ solution to escape the causal constraints of the empirical world:

\[\text{Um aus diesem Zwang des Determinismus den Willen zu retten und damit die Moral möglich zu machen, ersann Kant, der das Causalgesetz für die ganze Welt der Erscheinung, aber nur für diese anerkannte, die intelligible Freiheit, die Freiheit jenseits und gleichsam hinter der Erscheinung.}\(^\text{15}\)

Trendelenburg’s own concept of freedom does not have, and does not need, a metaphysical foundation.\(^\text{16}\) The metaphysical possibility of freedom, which Kant sought to warrant by making a distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal world, is given by the reality of ends. The reality of ends in Trendelenburg’s analysis exemplifies the possibility of an effect of thought in being and is a delimitation of causal relations. The ability of human beings to subscribe to ends that are contradictory to natural needs and inclinations is an ability which is learned.\(^\text{17}\)

\(^{14}\) LU 2, 117-118.
\(^{15}\) LU 2, 113.
\(^{16}\) LU 2, 111-112.
\(^{17}\) LU 2, 113: ‘Wie das Denken erst nach und nach reift, so wird auch der freie Wille nicht fertig geboren, sondern in der Entwicklung erworben.’
According to Trendelenburg, the concept of freedom needed in ethics is not an unconditional or absolute (unbedingte) freedom. One expects human beings to be able to do what is morally demanded of them—otherwise all ethics would be in vain. Trendelenburg’s ethics needs a concept of freedom which enables man to do that which is morally asked of him, i.e. to set himself ends which are given by reason and not by nature.\textsuperscript{18}

The concept of end, therefore secures freedom in an ethical sense. For Kant, the reign of causality in the empirical world required the introduction of a noumenal world, a world beyond experience where causality had no place. For Trendelenburg, in line with his refusal to take space and time as only subjective forms of appearance, both thought and being, the noumenal and the phenomenal, have their origin in motion. And because both a causal effect of being on thought and a teleological effect of thought on being are possible in his view, the problem of freedom is not a special, metaphysical problem.

\textit{4.2 Windelband and the metaphysical dimensions of the philosophical worldview}

In Trendelenburg’s analysis, the problem of freedom is thus solved almost in passing. One could argue that the ‘problem of freedom’ is never a real problem for Trendelenburg, because of his logical-metaphysical starting point: the division between a causally determined world of appearances and a noumenal world of freedom is precluded in his ‘metaphysics of motion’. The distinction between thought and being, the starting point for his analysis of the types of worldview, is only a ‘conceptual’ distinction, used to classify philosophical systems. This distinction is a mere hypothetical starting point of the \textit{Logische Untersuchungen} as well, a starting point but not a point of origin, as the distinction originates and finds unity in motion. So the metaphysical problem of freedom never occurs as a fundamental problem in Trendelenburg, and (rightly!) receives comparatively little attention in his discussion. Notwithstanding this relatively minor position of the problem of freedom in Trendelenburg’s

\textsuperscript{18} LU 2, 112.
work, the possibility of a philosophical ethics was a main concern for him. This is evident from the discussion of his classification of worldviews—which is intended to lend practical support to the organic, ethical worldview—and of his founding science—which is intended to give it theoretical support.

Windelband’s worldview concept shares a certain practical motivation with Trendelenburg’s project. We encountered this practical motivation in both the 1904 texts on Kant and in his 1914 *Einleitung*. The high point of Windelband’s Kant interpretation of 1904 is his interpretation of the Third Critique. According to Windelband, Kant did not only prove the possibility of the realization of the noumenal world, but the upshot of the Third Critique is that history must be considered the actual realization of the noumenal world. The thing-in-itself, the noumenal realm of practical, moral values, appears in history—even if this is a gradual work of human labour. Without the metaphysical distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal world, practical values would not have absolute validity. Without the bridge built by the Third Critique in Windelband’s interpretation, it would not be possible for man to realize his duties in the phenomenal world in which he is at home.

In his later work, culminating in the 1914 *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, Windelband laid more and more emphasis on the practical relevance which the philosophical worldview itself should have.\(^{19}\) The philosophical worldview should not only be able to integrate the totality of knowledge into a meaningful whole, it should also be an ‘active belief’ (tatkraftige Ueberzeugung)\(^{20}\) which is a motivating factor in culture and in life in general. This practical actuality of the philosophical worldview can only be achieved by founding it on universal, absolute values. Therefore the application of values in life—Wertleben as it is called by Windelband—needs a metaphysical foundation.\(^{21}\) The relation of man’s conscience to this noumenal realm of values,

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\(^{19}\) Of Windelband’s later work, the 1907 lecture ‘Die Erneuerung des Hegelianismus’ may serve to illustrate the increasing importance which he ascribes to the philosophical worldview.

\(^{20}\) *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 22.

\(^{21}\) *Einleitung in die Philosophie*, 392.
this metaphysical reality, is described by Windelband as a religious one. Wertleben is therefore religious life: living in relationship with absolute, universal values.

However, this exposition of the practical dimension of Windelband’s concept of philosophical worldview does more than reveal a shared motive with Trendelenburg. It also shows how fundamentally different their respective approaches to the concept of worldview are, especially when the ‘practical motive’ just observed must be converted into fundamental philosophical theory. For Windelband, the only way to secure the validity of the practical values is to give them a ‘metaphysical foundation’, a foundation in the noumenal world. Or to rephrase his position programmatically: only Kant’s dualism enables ethics. Trendelenburg, on the contrary, deliberately discards any dualisms from his founding science. In his view, only a logical-metaphysical science based on the concept of motion is able to secure ethics. Any metaphysical distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal world (or any distinction at all, for that matter), is constructed from the principle of motion.

It is not difficult to find the origin of these two approaches to the concept of worldview in the respective interpretations of Kant, and therefore in the Fischer-Trendelenburg debate. Fischer’s almost obsessive defence of the exclusive subjectivity of space and time as forms of appearance is reflected by his comparably rigorous dualistic interpretation of the distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal. Only an exclusive subjectivity of space and time warrants the introduction of the thing-in-itself and the ensuing distinction of noumenal and phenomenal worlds. Or, as a recent interpretation of Kant’s transcendental aesthetics has argued (commenting on the Fischer-Trendelenburg debate): without the exclusive subjectivity, the problem of freedom would not be solved.\(^{22}\)

\(^{22}\) Cf. Michel, Zeitkonzeption. Michel argues that Trendelenburg missed the important consequences which Kant’s transcendental aesthetic has for his theory of freedom. I have shown that the ‘problem’ of freedom is solved differently in Trendelenburg’s work, and that Trendelenburg’s denial of the exclusive subjectivity of space and time does not have the consequences which it would have in the Fischer/Michel interpretation of the transcendental aesthetic. Whether Fischer’s interpretation is more faithful to the letter of
Fischer’s position is reflected in Windelband’s 1904 essay on Kant’s worldview, where Windelband determines the metaphysical dualism between the noumenal and the phenomenal world (and the role of the Third Critique in determining the relationship between the two) as the fundamental point of the Kantian worldview. According to Windelband, the dualism is a necessary and integral part of Kant’s work. The claim in Windelband’s 1904 *Einleitung* that a metaphysical foundation is necessary for the validity of values is the systematic counterpart of this Kant interpretation.

In sum, although a certain shared motive can be discerned in Trendelenburg and Windelband concerning the question of worldview—the importance of the practical, i.e. ‘ethics’23 for Trendelenburg, and the universal, absolute validity of values for Windelband—the philosophical theories in which these basic motives are substantiated are radically divergent:

For Windelband, the validity of values can only be secured by a ‘metaphysical foundation’, by which he means a realm of values which is eternal, transcendent (beyond the realm of experience), transcendental (the values are constitutive of and normative for the activities and products of human reason). According to Windelband, this metaphysical, transcendent realm of values is realized—and thus actually appears!—in history, through which it can (partially, incrementally) be known. The philosophical worldview is thus historically determined—since the eternal values are realized and known through history—and a determining force in culture (and therefore determinative for history)—since the eternal values are constitutive of human cultural activities.

For Trendelenburg, by contrast, ethics is only possible when the philosophical worldview has a fundamentally unitary, non-dualistic character. The ‘founding science’ is a non-foundational but rather hypothetical philosophical theory, which takes into

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23 For Trendelenburg, ‘ethics’ is much more than ‘moral philosophy’, it includes the study of the philosophical foundations of law, and also what is nowadays described as ‘social philosophy’. Cf. Trendelenburg’s *Naturrecht auf dem Grunde der Ethik* (1860).
consideration the results of the special sciences and is open to future development. Since there is no opposition between a realm of eternal truths and historical realization in Trendelenburg, his theory of worldviews is not a philosophy of history, and not even a theory of the historical development of (philosophical) knowledge. Such a founding science is extremely restrictive in its metaphysical pretensions—the asserted relationship between thought and being has a merely hypothetical character. Within these limits, ethics is enabled only by the ‘metaphysics of motion’, which gives priority to thought over being.

4.3 Life and motion: Worldview and metaphysics in Dilthey and Trendelenburg

As we have seen, the concept of life is introduced by Windelband as a (partial) factual basis for philosophy in his 1914 Einleitung in die Philosophie. As such, it appears to have a similar role as life in Dilthey. However, the function of life as a basis for philosophy in Windelband is a supplement to the function of the sciences: they remain the primary basis for philosophy, even in the Einleitung. A further comparison between Dilthey and Windelband on this point is not possible, due to the lack of a systematic elaboration of the role of life for philosophy in Windelband’s work.

In the case of Trendelenburg, the concept of life is not a fundamental concept in his theories, nor are there apparent similarities to Dilthey in this respect. Yet the question can be asked whether similarities in their approach exist at a more fundamental level. I am thinking here of a possible parallel between Trendelenburg’s principle of motion and the concept of life in Dilthey. It would seem that the function of ‘life’ in Dilthey’s philosophy and the function of ‘motion’ in Trendelenburg’s are in many respects comparable. Let us examine this impression in more detail.

Both life in Dilthey and the principle of motion in Trendelenburg have a mediating function, which is fulfilled, on closer inspection, by being original to the two sides that are being mediated. Motion mediates between thought and being, according to Trendelenburg, because it is original and prior to thought and being. As such, the principle of motion serves to explain the pos-
sibility of objective knowledge: the object (being) can be known by the knowing subject (thought) because both are produced by, and actually rooted in, motion. In Dilthey, life is original to individual consciousness (the \textit{Lebendigkeit} of the individual) and the world as it is known by the individual. Object and subject of knowledge are never completely independent, but always connected through the life-connections between the inner life of the subject and the ‘external’ world of objects. Through life, consciousness and the world are correlative to each other.

Can this support the hypothesis that Dilthey’s ‘life’ and Trendelenburg’s ‘motion’ are functionally the same, that they fulfil a comparable \textit{function} in both philosophies? This would perhaps be plausible if there was no further evidence against the identification of motion and life. There are apparently subtle, but important differences between the two concepts, however. One of the most important differences can be found in the metaphysical status of the respective mediating concepts.

Let us recall the metaphysical status of the principle of motion in the interpretation of Trendelenburg’s \textit{Logische Untersuchungen} presented in chapter 2 above. The principle of motion does not refer to an independent metaphysical reality, which founds the possibility of objective knowledge. Instead, it was argued, the principle of knowledge must be taken as itself part of the body of knowledge of which it explains the possibility. This I called the non-foundational character of Trendelenburg’s theory of knowledge.

Dilthey’s concept of life refers to more than just a non-foundational epistemological principle, or so it seems. Consider a passage like the following (already quoted in chapter 3):

\begin{quote}
In unzähligen einzelnen Lebensläufen über die Erde verbreitet, in jedem Individuum wieder erlebt, und, da es als bloßer Augenblick der Gegenwart der Beobachtung sich entzieht, in der nachklingenden Erinnerung festgehalten, andererseits wie es sich in seinen Äußerungen objektiviert hat nach seiner ganzen Tiefe in Verständnis und Interpretationen vollständig erfaßbar als in jedem Innewerden und Auffassen des
\end{quote}
eigenen Erlebnisses – ist das Leben in unserm Wissen in unzähligen Formen uns gegenwärtig und zeigt doch überall dieselben gemeinsamen Züge.\textsuperscript{24}

It is hard to see how life in this sense cannot be an ontological reality, independent of our knowledge of it. Life, in this sense, is different from the knowledge of life, for it shows itself in knowledge. Life is something that precedes our knowledge of it, and it escapes from complete determination, for our knowledge of life is always limited and partial at best. Life, as foundation of the possibility of human knowledge, is therefore a ground which precedes knowledge. It is a metaphysical reality, which is called upon by Dilthey to found knowledge. Trendelenburg’s ‘motion’, on the contrary, is not something we have knowledge of—I have therefore described it as ‘empty’—but is an epistemological principle that serves to explain the possibility of knowledge. As an epistemological principle it also has a hypothetical status, and is itself part of knowledge—it is far from being an independent, metaphysical reality.

This different metaphysical status of the central concepts in Dilthey and Trendelenburg also sheds light on the reasons why both consider these concepts indefinable. Life in Dilthey cannot be defined, for it cannot be fully known. It always shows itself in limited ways, never complete. Furthermore, it always shows itself indirectly, by means of the expression it receives through the \textit{Lebendigkeit} of individuals. Life is only reflexively accessible.

Motion, on the other hand, itself a reflexive principle of knowledge, cannot be defined because it is presupposed in the act of defining itself. It is the point beyond which no further questions can (and need) be asked, not because it provides a metaphysical ground for knowledge, but because it provides a hypothetical answer to the possibility of knowledge. The principle of motion does not refer to a hidden world which reveals itself in limited perspectives, but it is the principle which is original to revealing and viewing alike. Every act of determination is

\textsuperscript{24} Dilthey, \textit{Typen}, 78.
possible only by virtue of this principle, therefore it is both itself
indeterminable and the precondition for determinability as such
at the same time.

Life, although it makes subjective determinations of it possible
by virtue of the connections between subject and world it provides, is not the principle at work in acts of determination,
viewing, revealing, etc. Although it is ‘activity’ and ‘force’, it also
is passive, to be determined through the series of worldviews
which historical consciousness must start to grasp in a compre-
hensive, post-metaphysical view of the metaphysical systems. Al-
though it can be known reflexively, it is not a reflexive non-foun-
dational principle of knowledge. It remains a metaphysical
ground, a foundation beyond knowledge, in the independent re-
ality of life which produces worlds which the individual can ex-
xperience, but life as such hides itself behind them.

This brings us to Dilthey’s equivocal approach to metaphys-
ic.25 On the one hand, Dilthey appears to firmly reject meta-
physics. Metaphysics, the ‘objective knowledge of the totality of
the world’ (die objektive Erkenntnis des Zusammenhangs der Wirklich-
heit)26 is characterized by a self-certainty which historical con-
sciousness has revealed as unfounded. As a result of historical
consciousness, metaphysical systems of philosophy are no longer
a viable approach to understanding the world, for historical con-
sciousness shows the lack of universal validity of these systems,
despite their claimed objectivity.27 The antinomy between meta-
physical certainty and historical relativity cannot be solved at the
level of metaphysical systems themselves (by providing another,
better, more valid system). It can only be solved by taking the his-
torical systems themselves as the object of a philosophical anal-
ysis which takes them as expressions of life.

Yet, despite the ‘destruction’ of metaphysics as a universally
valid science, there is a metaphysical consciousness in man that
is eternal, according to Dilthey: ‘Die metaphysische Wissenschaft
ist ein historisch begrenztes Phänomen, das meta-physische Be-

25 See also Bollnow, Dilthey, 90-92.
26 Dilthey, GS 8, 6.
27 Dilthey, Wesen, 404-406.
Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie, which is an attempt to overcome the historical blindness of metaphysical systems, aims at providing a complete interpretation of life by overcoming the one-sidedness of traditional metaphysical systems. Again, this complete interpretation is only possible by virtue of the connecting, unifying presence of life behind the worldviews which it produces. The reality of life, which lies beyond experience and can only be known through its ‘appearances’ in worldviews, remains a metaphysical element in Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie. It provides an external foundation of knowledge. Life becomes something beyond experience, of which the typology of worldviews seeks to obtain knowledge. As such, this enterprise is exemplary of man’s natural metaphysical tendency to find knowledge beyond experience (Kant). But since there are no criteria for distinguishing adequate from inadequate interpretations of life, this enterprise leads not to knowledge of life, but only to ‘dialectical make-believe’ (dialektischer Schein) and false conclusions (Trugschlüsse).

Another difference in the approaches of Dilthey and Trendelenburg can be discerned in the role of the (human) subject and its finitude, in relation to life and motion respectively. We have seen that the individual human subject plays a decisive role in Dilthey’s conception of life and his typology of worldviews, for it is the origin of the worldviews. The world which is interpreted in a worldview is always the world as it is experienced by the individual. Even if life expresses itself through different individuals in structurally comparable ways—both the inner structure of worldviews and the outer types show a persistency throughout the manifold of individual worldviews—the subjective element is irreducible in a worldview.

The principle of motion in Trendelenburg is not specifically subjective. The system of knowledge based on idealism, the organic worldview, is a system that does not assign a special place to the human subject. The human subject is characterized by finitude, and can therefore only hope to achieve the full system of scientific knowledge grounded in the organic worldview, in the

28 GS 1, 386, as quoted in Bollnow, Dilthey, 91.
29 Cf. Kant, Prolegomena, §57, §60.
long run, with the cooperation of philosophy and the sciences. Yet this finitude of the human subject is not the source of a plurality of worldviews. Because the worldviews themselves are ultimately not grounded in the individual’s experience of the world, the finitude of the human subject does not cause the limits and one-sidedness of worldviews, as in Dilthey. The finitude of human knowledge is an obstacle to achieving full development of the organic worldview, but not a definitive barrier which cannot be taken. Therefore the finitude of man does not prevent Trendelenburg from critically reducing the plurality of worldviews to a single worldview. For Dilthey, this plurality can only be overcome by occupying a more comprehensive, historical perspective. The one-sidedness and limits of the different worldviews are a finitude which cannot be overcome by further developing one of these worldviews.

5. From a philosophical concept of worldview to a philosophical worldview

Throughout the three worldview concepts discussed here, there is an intrinsic connection between worldview and metaphysics. This is especially evident in Windelband’s case. According to Windelband, the scientific worldview which results from philosophy needs a metaphysical foundation, in order to be valid. Windelband uses a particularly strong concept of metaphysics, as I have argued: his discussion of ‘Kantian metaphysics’ culminates in the identification of history as the expression of the noumenal world. The philosophical worldview developed by Windelband through his discussion of the objectivity of historical science is a scientific interpretation of this expression of the noumenal world, and thus knowledge of the noumenal world—even if this knowledge can never be complete knowledge.

Trendelenburg’s 1847 essay already laid the foundation for the connection between worldview and metaphysics: a worldview is a fundamental metaphysical principle (metaphysische Grundgedanke). ‘Metaphysics’ is understood by Trendelenburg in this connection as (a philosophical understanding of) the relationship of thought and being. Beyond this relationship, Trendelen-
burg sees no use for metaphysics as knowledge of the noumenal world. Accordingly, his foundation of the organic worldview is not an absolute foundation, but rather a hypothetical construct, connecting, explaining and thus enabling the sciences. The metaphysical character of the concept of worldview is thus restricted: Trendelenburg describes a worldview as a fundamental metaphysical thought because it addresses the metaphysical question how thought and being are related. He does not need or aim for a metaphysical foundation of the philosophical worldview, rather it is the other way around: the scientific foundation of the organic worldview answers the basic metaphysical question in a scientific, non-metaphysical way.

The connection between metaphysics and worldview can also be discerned in Dilthey’s work. As was discussed in the chapter on Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie, this connection even exists at two different levels. First, the typology of worldviews interprets the (historical) philosophical systems as metaphysical systems, that is, as attempts to achieve knowledge beyond the limits of knowledge. That is why the competition between the rival types of worldviews cannot be ended: one cannot make a rational choice between them and adopt one of them as true knowledge. According to Dilthey the time for these metaphysical interpretations of life has come to an end. The typology of worldviews replaces the individual metaphysical attempts to understand life. Yet it also acknowledges the validity contained in each of them, as they are partial interpretations of life. The mistake was to ascribe absolute truth to what is only a partially legitimate worldview. A historically reflexive interpretation (i.e. the Weltanschauungstypologie) can overcome the limits of these historical, metaphysical systems, according to Dilthey.

Can Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie avoid the pitfall of metaphysics as well? I have argued that it cannot, and this is the second level at which worldview and metaphysics are connected in Dilthey. The typology of worldviews does aim to provide a better, more complete interpretation of life. As such, the typology aspires to be a worldview itself, even if it is a worldview which can overcome the historical short-sightedness of previous worldviews. As was argued, life itself cannot be experienced directly, and thus cannot be known directly. Life-in-itself can be said to have a
noumenal character in Dilthey, for it is beyond experience. It can only be interpreted through the (historical) interpretations of it—the historical worldviews. The Weltanschauungstypologie aims at an integration of these mutually exclusive and partially legitimate interpretations of life. As such, it tries to achieve what the individual, historical worldviews cannot accomplish: a valid interpretation of life. The typology of worldviews purports to gain knowledge beyond experience, and can therefore be described as metaphysical. Dilthey confirms his own observation that even though the metaphysical philosophical systems are something of the past, the metaphysical need cannot be extinguished.

It is tempting to ascribe the metaphysical character of the worldview theory in Windelband and Dilthey to the extra-philosophical function which they assign to the philosophical worldview. Since both Dilthey and Windelband assign a ‘cultural function’ to the philosophical worldview, one could argue, they need a strong philosophical foundation to carry the weight imposed by this demand. The important, external function given to philosophy is counterbalanced by an absolute foundation of philosophy and the philosophical worldview. Such a hypothesis must be examined carefully, however. Windelband does in fact argue that the philosophical worldview is valid only by virtue of its foundation in the noumenal realm of values. For Windelband, the practical function of the philosophical worldview is dependent on the metaphysical foundation of philosophy, as any function of philosophy presupposes its validity. I have argued that Trendelenburg does not seek to found philosophical validity metaphysically; instead, philosophical theory has hypothetical validity, as has any scientific theory. Yet it would be mistaken to conclude that Trendelenburg denies practical significance to the philosophical worldview because its validity does not depend on a metaphysical foundation. It was shown before that the prime motivation behind Trendelenburg’s introduction of the concept

\[\text{(To be precise, Dilthey does not directly assign a determining function in culture to the philosophical worldview, but it is only through the other kinds of worldviews in the ‘worldview pyramid’ (see chapter 3) that philosophical worldviews have a mediated cultural actuality.} \]
of worldview as description of the basic metaphysical stance of a philosophical system was to provide an—at least provisional—foundation of the organic worldview. Only by adopting the organic worldview ‘would ethics be possible’. The prime motivation for Trendelenburg is therefore practical as well.

However, one must clearly distinguish between Trendelenburg’s practical motivation and the cultural function of philosophy in Windelband. The provisional foundation of the organic worldview through the classification of worldviews and the subsequent theoretical foundation in the Logische Untersuchungen aim at securing the possibility of ethics as a philosophical discipline. The organic worldview, which gives thought primacy over being, is a necessary and completing principle of philosophy, without which the part of philosophy which can be described as practical (ethics, theory of law) would lack a foundation.

For Windelband, philosophy should itself be a worldview which is a determining cultural factor. More than a scientific discipline, the result of philosophy should be a worldview which functions as a ‘rational belief’, giving meaning to life. It is this function of philosophy, a function attributed to it by Windelband beforehand, which requires a metaphysical foundation of philosophical knowledge.

The situation is more complex in Dilthey, for he does not directly ascribe a comparable function to philosophy. The typology of worldviews does, however, help us to gain a better understanding of life and thus to achieve a worldview which is historically aware, a worldview which does not make absolute what is relative. As was argued, the price paid by Dilthey is the metaphysical character of life, which forms the continuous factor behind the different interpretations of life in the different types of worldviews. If the typology of worldviews can indeed provide us with a better understanding of life, we must assume this noumenal character of life-in-itself. Without it, there would be no guarantee that the different ‘appearances’ of life (the different types of worldviews), which are taken together in the Weltanschauungstypologie, are indeed different expressions of the same.

The most important difference between the worldview concept in Trendelenburg on the one hand and in Dilthey and Windelband on the other is that a strictly philosophical concept
(Trendelenburg) is applied outside philosophy as well (Dilthey), or is even applied to philosophy from the outside (Windelband). The concept of worldview is used by Trendelenburg to refer to the way in which the fundamental metaphysical relation between thought and being is construed in a philosophical system. As such, the concept of worldview can also be applied to the philosophical system as a whole, for the basic metaphysical structure determines the structure of the complete system, according to Trendelenburg. Beyond this, the concept of worldview does not apply to anything else. A worldview is intrinsically philosophical, it is so by definition.

Dilthey distinguishes between different, interrelated kinds of worldviews from the outset—especially religious, artistic, and philosophical ones. The philosophical worldview is a special kind of worldview, a worldview for which scientific validity is claimed. Yet the general characteristics of a worldview are shared among all kinds of worldviews, philosophical and non-philosophical, according to Dilthey’s analysis. Since these general characteristics of a worldview are invariable among the different kinds, one could argue that a general concept of worldview is applied to philosophy, and that the philosophical worldview is determined by this general concept of worldview, which would seem to have a non-philosophical origin. Again, however, the matter is more complex in Dilthey. The analysis of the different kinds of worldviews and of the general structure of all worldviews, philosophical and non-philosophical, applies only to historical philosophical systems. However, Dilthey discards both the idea that a metaphysical system can have scientific validity and the idea that philosophy must necessarily have the form of such a system. The typology of worldviews is meant to overcome these defects. By offering an interpretative model for the classification of the historical philosophical systems, Dilthey aims at integrating the conflicting worldview types into a meaningful totality, and thus offering a better interpretation of life. This interpretative model can only succeed if there is indeed a continuity (life) connecting the different worldview types. At this point the extension of the concept of worldview beyond philosophy to other spheres provides a nexus between life in its basic forms and in its most reflexive form—philosophy. Both the extension of the concept of
worldview beyond philosophy and the noumenal character of life are the result of Dilthey’s attempt to overcome the limits of traditional metaphysics.

Even though Dilthey applies the concept of worldview beyond philosophy, the concept itself is determined in the Weltanschauungstypologie, which can be considered a philosophical theory. Windelband, however, works with a concept of worldview which is apparently not part of the philosophical discussion, the characteristics of which are predetermined and which predetermine philosophy. The connection between philosophy and worldview is no longer intrinsic but extrinsic: it is demanded of philosophy that it provides a worldview which is able to fulfil a double task.

6. Conclusion

We have come to the point where the results of this study can be summarized. I have presented a historical and systematical analysis of the concept of worldview and its function in three philosophical positions from the middle of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century. Historically, Trendelenburg was the first to systematically apply the term Weltanschauung to philosophical systems as such, and to develop a typological account of worldviews. Dilthey’s Weltanschauungstypologie and Windelband’s philosophical worldview theory are representatives of a period in which the concept of worldview was a central topic in philosophy.

The core of Trendelenburg’s worldview concept—which denotes the fundamental metaphysical orientation of a philosophical system—can be recognized in both Dilthey’s and Windelband’s theories. The basic metaphysical question is the question how thought and being are related, according to Trendelenburg. The philosophical worldview is the answer to this question. This connection between worldview and metaphysics is present in Dilthey and Windelband as well, albeit that their worldview theories are much more elaborate and differ in many respects. Important differences exist in the way in which each of these philosophers arrives at an answer to the fundamental metaphysi-
cal question, and in the status which is ascribed to this answer. For Trendelenburg, the basic metaphysical question must be answered by philosophical theory. As part of a philosophical theory, the answer to the fundamental question has a hypothetical nature (as all scientific theory has).

According to Dilthey, the historical metaphysical systems are to be overcome by a typology of worldviews. In this account, philosophy should aim only at a typological classification of previous answers to the fundamental metaphysical question. None of these past answers has in itself scientific validity. It seems therefore that Dilthey abandons the quest for a definitive answer to the fundamental metaphysical question. I have argued, however, Dilthey’s typology of worldviews introduces a new metaphysical layer: life as the noumenal substrate which underlies its interpretations, the worldviews. Even if the historical metaphysical systems are revealed as partial interpretations of life, this basic metaphysical structure (life as the root of worldviews) is considered given by Dilthey. Trendelenburg offers a theoretical explanation of a ‘fact’, science, whereas Dilthey does not attempt to give a theoretical foundation to this constellation of life as it is which cannot be known, yet underlies and connects the interpretations of it.

For Windelband, the basic metaphysical structure of philosophy is given by what he calls the ‘Kantian worldview’, the fundamental dualism between the noumenal and the phenomenal world. To Windelband, this basic metaphysical structure is not the result of an independent philosophical inquiry, but a predetermined constellation within which he operates. Critical philosophy, even a hundred years after Kant, should have its point of departure in the dualism of the noumenal and the phenomenal world.

Windelband’s interpretation of the Kantian legacy is adopted from the Kant interpretation of his teacher Kuno Fischer. Fischer and Trendelenburg had a notorious encounter concerning the interpretation of Kant’s transcendental aesthetics. The Fischer-Trendelenburg debate is a turning point, connecting Trendelenburg’s concept of worldview with Windelband’s, even if they take opposite directions. Trendelenburg’s Kant interpretation seeks to avoid a dualism in the fundamental metaphysical
structure. Adopting the exclusive subjectivity of space and time would necessarily result in a dualism between the noumenal thing-in-itself and the phenomenal world of appearance. Fischer, on the other hand, insists on a dualistic interpretation of Kant and defends the exclusive subjectivity of space and time as forms of appearance. Windelband’s worldview theory rests on an interpretation of Kant which is perhaps even more radical than that of his teacher Fischer. Windelband places his interpretation of Kant’s Third Critique (an interpretation which he adopted from Fischer as I have shown) at the centre of his worldview theory. Kant’s worldview is characterized by a fundamental dualism between the noumenal and the phenomenal world. The upshot of this worldview, as well as of Windelband’s own worldview, is the expression of the noumenal world in the phenomenal world. Thus Windelband sees history as the expression of the noumenal realm of values. Such a worldview presupposes a distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal world which is not possible in Trendelenburg’s account of transcendental aesthetics. And this worldview has a metaphysical character, a point which is admitted by Windelband as well: he sees no problem in calling Kant a metaphysical philosopher.

The metaphysical character of Dilthey’s and Windelband’s worldview theories is the result of an extension of the concept of worldview beyond the basic notion which it has in Trendelenburg. Whereas for Trendelenburg the interpretation of philosophy as worldview is a strictly internal-philosophical interpretation, Dilthey and Windelband extend the concept of worldview beyond that. Dilthey’s _Weltanschauungstypologie_ aims at an interpretation of life, which is posited as the continuous ‘thing-in-itself’ beyond ‘appearances’, the different worldviews. For Windelband, philosophy as a worldview should have relevance to life. This can only be achieved by a metaphysical foundation of the validity of values.

From a systematic-philosophical point of view, Trendelenburg’s approach to the topic of worldview is superior to those of Dilthey and Windelband. The metaphysical character of life in Dilthey and Windelband’s adherence to a metaphysical dualism at the heart of the philosophical worldview must be considered serious disadvantages when compared with Trendelenburg’s fun-
damental science. Both approaches involve a sphere which determines philosophy (life, the realm of values respectively), yet both these spheres are beyond philosophical reflection. The foundation of philosophy is thus located in a sphere which is inaccessible to reason. Trendelenburg, on the other hand, aims to provide a foundation to philosophy without recourse to any metaphysics. Philosophy as a founding science has a hypothetical-empirical character and as such is neither metaphysical (it does not need an external foundation) nor absolute (philosophical knowledge is not definitive). Since the metaphysical character of both Dilthey’s and Windelband’s worldview theory is the result of an extension of the concept of worldview as compared with Trendelenburg, we must conclude that Trendelenburg’s philosophical worldview concept is superior as well.

In the light of Husserl’s dilemma\(^3\) of choosing between philosophy as science and philosophy as worldview, Trendelenburg’s approach is also the most viable position of the three discussed in this study. On the one hand, his conception of philosophy as founding science must be interpreted as a hypothetical-empirical approach, which respects the results of the sciences without succumbing to mere naturalism. Philosophy has its own task as founding and integrating science, yet does not fulfil this task by recourse to some given or eternal realm beyond experience. The validity of philosophy as science is not fundamentally different from that of the special sciences. This approach cannot be rejected as failing the ideal of ‘rigorous science’ without further arguments. On the other hand, Trendelenburg’s founding science does not draw a similar sharp distinction between worldview and science as Husserl did. For Trendelenburg, philosophy is (founding) science and worldview at the same time, there is no need to choose between the two. He achieves this through a specific interpretation of philosophy as Weltanschauung, as we have seen. Whether a worldview in this specific sense can fulfil the ‘need for a worldview’, a need observed by Windelband and Husserl alike, is a different question, the answer to which depends on what philosophy is expected to achieve. This is a question which cannot be answered by philosophy itself.

\(^3\) See chapter 1, section 2.
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SAMENVATTING IN HET NEDERLANDS

TRENDELENBURG, DILTHEY EN WINDELBAND
OVER FILOSOFIE ALS WELTANSCHAUUNG


Volgens Trendelenburg kan de fundamentele metafysische vraag naar de verhouding van denken en zijn op drie verschil- lende manieren beantwoord worden. Ik betoog dat het doel van zijn classificatie is om tot een kritische evaluatie van deze drie typen van weltanschauungen te komen. Meer precies, het gaat hem om een pleidooi voor de organische weltanschauung, de zienswijze die in zijn antwoord op de fundamentele vraag
denken prioriteit over zijn toekent. Trendelenburgs argument voor de organische *weltanschauung* is in eerste instantie alleen *praktisch*: zonder deze *weltanschauung* is ethiek niet mogelijk.

Trendelenburg stelt zich in zijn magnum opus, de *Logische Untersuchungen* (in de tweede editie van 1862) de theoretische fundering van de organische *weltanschauung* ten doel. Het programma van de *Logische Untersuchungen* richt zich op een theoretisch antwoord op de fundamentele metafysische vraag. Deze vraag (naar de verhouding van denken en zijn) is tegelijkertijd de vraag naar de mogelijkheid van kennis. Het programma is daarom een project voor een grondleggende wetenschap die logica (de mogelijkheid van kennis) en metafysica (de verhouding van denken en zijn) in zich verenigt.


Dit tweede deel van de argumentatie is te vinden in de hoofdstukken van de *Logische Untersuchungen* die gaan over doeleinde (*Zweck*) en de wil. In deze hoofdstukken beargumenteert Trendelenburg de mogelijkheid van invloed van denken op het zijn, via een discussie van de realiteit van doeleinden in de natuur. Omdat doeleinden in de natuur feitelijk gerealiseerd zijn, is de ‘blinde kracht’ niet genoeg om de natuur te begrijpen. Bovendien is de mens als natuurlijk en denkend wezen in staat zijn doeleinden in de natuur te realiseren. Het ‘ethische’ is volgens Trendelenburg het organische leven dat vrij geworden is door kennis en de door de wil. Hiermee heeft Trendelenburg de taak
die hij zichzelf stelde, een theoretische beschrijving en (daarmee) fundering van de organische *weltanschauung*, volbracht.

**Hoofdstuk 3.** De tweede filosofische interpretatie van het begrip *weltanschauung* is die van één van Trendelenburgs leerlingen, *Wilhelm Dilthey*. Diltheys begrip van *weltanschauung* is complexer dan dat van Trendelenburg. In feite kan het opgevat worden als een piramide van verschillende begrippen. Bovendien specificeert Dilthey een drievoudige interne structuur van (filosofische) *weltanschauungen*. In het algemeen moeten *weltanschauungen* opgevat worden als interpretaties van het geheel van de wereld. Dit geldt voor de meest onmiddellijke, proto-wetenschappelijke vorm zowel als voor de meest geavanceerde filosofisch-wetenschappelijke *weltanschauung*. Het verschil tussen de verschillende niveaus van de piramide van *weltanschauungen* ligt in hun geldigheid. De hogere niveaus—Dilthey noemt speciaal religieuze, esthetische en filosofische *weltanschauungen*—worden gekenmerkt door een toenemende mate van intersubjectieve stabiliteit en geldigheid. De top van deze piramide wordt gevormd door filosofische *weltanschauungen* waarvoor objectief-wetenschappelijke geldigheid wordt geclaimd.

Volgens Dilthey is dit niet meer dan een claim: Historisch bewustzijn laat een terugkerend conflict zien tussen drie fundamentele typen van filosofische *weltanschauungen*. Dit is het centrale punt van de *Weltanschauungstypologie*. De centrale stelling in Diltheys betoog is dat er geen objectieve keuze gemaakt kan worden voor één van de typen van *weltanschauung*. De pluraliteit is niet reduceerbaar en vormt de horizon waarachter geen verdere filosofische unificatie mogelijk is. De oorzaak van deze uiteindelijke pluraliteit is de wortel van de *weltanschauungen* in het leven. Leven is het substraat en de oorzaak van alle menselijke expressie. Het leven is echter zelf niet direct kenbaar. Slechts door interpretatie van deze culturele expressies kan een ‘begrip’ van het leven bereikt worden. Als interpretaties van het leven hebben de *weltanschauungen* elk hun (beperkte) geldigheid, omdat ze elkaar uitsluiten is er geen synthese mogelijk.
Hoofdstuk 4. Het derde filosofische begrip van *weltanschauung* dat onderzocht wordt, is dat van Wilhelm Windelband. In zijn vroege werk tot en met de jaren 1880 verwerpt hij de idee van een filosofische *weltanschauung*. In die periode interpreteert hij *weltanschauung* als iets dat kennis zou opleveren van de totaliteit van de werkelijkheid. Dit zou betekenen dat er kennis zou zijn van zowel de wereld van de verschijnselen als van de noumenale wereld. Met een beroep op Kants kritiek van de metafysica claimt Windelband dat een dergelijke *weltanschauung* niet op een wetenschappelijke manier bereikt kan worden.

In het Kant-jaar 1904 verschijnen twee publicaties waarin Windelband de problematiek van een filosofische *weltanschauung* en de interpretatie van Kant opnieuw en in samenhang met elkaar bespreekt. In deze twee teksten schrijft Windelband Kant zelf een *weltanschauung* toe. Deze *weltanschauung* is niet slechts een persoonlijke wereldbeschouwing, maar één die wetenschappelijke geldigheid verkregen heeft. De filosofische fundering van de wetenschap moet gezocht worden in een systeem van universeel geldige principes, of waarden. Dit systeem van waarden (ook wel normaal bewustzijn genoemd door Windelband) is het werkelijke object van de filosofie. De filosofie kan de noodzakelijkheid en inhoud van deze noumenale wereld van waarden opsporen. Deze noumenale wereld wordt in de geschiedenis gerealiseerd. Vanwege deze actualiteit van de noumenale wereld, heeft Windelband er in zijn interpretatie geen moeite mee om Kant een metafysisch filosoof te noemen. Deze Kant-interpretatie heeft sterke verwantschap met die van Windelbands leermeester, Kuno Fischer.

Hoofdstuk 5. In het laatste hoofdstuk worden de drie besproken posities onderling vergeleken en gewogen. Het eerste punt van vergelijking betreft de systematische betekenis en functie van het begrip *weltanschauung*. Betoogd wordt dat het bij deze denkers gaat om respectievelijk een intern-filosofisch begrip (Trendelenburg), een grensbegrip (Dilthey) en een niet-filosofisch begrip (Windelband).
Vervolgens worden systematische kwesties besproken die nauw samenhangen met het begrip *weltanschauung* in de besproken posities. Er wordt nader ingegaan op de Fischer-Trendelenburg discussie over Kants metafysica. Angetoond wordt dat deze discussie niet slechts een technisch punt van de Kant-interpretatie betreft, maar dat het debat verstrekende gevolgen heeft voor de posities van met name Trendelenburg en Windelband met betrekking tot een filosofische *weltanschauung*. Trendelenburgs verzet tegen een dualistische interpretatie van Kant is één van de leidende motieven in de organische *weltanschauung* en in de *Logische Untersuchen*. Windelband daarentegen volgt Fischer in zijn dualistische interpretatie van Kant. Dit leidt bij hem tot een dualistische *weltanschauung* waarin het metafysische onder- scheid tussen fenomenale en noumenale werkelijkheid een grote rol speelt.


De discussie in hoofdstuk 2 tot en met 5 toont aan, dat het begrip *weltanschauung* (tenminste in deze drie posities) intrinsiek verbonden is met de discussie over metafysica: Trendelenburg defineert *weltanschauung* als het metafysische grondprincipe, bij Dilthey zijn de historische *weltanschauungen* metafysische systemen (hoewel ook de *Weltanschauungstypologie* een metafysisch karakter heeft, zoals betoogd), en bij Windelband tenslotte rust de filosofische *weltanschauung* op een metafysische fundering (de noumenale wereld van waarden). Bij Windelband en Dilthey vindt een uitbreiding van het begrip *weltanschauung* plaats. De expliciet metafysische fundering van de filosofische *weltanschauung*
ung bij Windelband en de impliciet metafysische basis van de Weltanschauungstypologie bij Dilthey zijn de keerzijde van deze uitbreiding. Als filosofische funderingsstrategieën schieten deze benaderingen echter tekort. Om deze reden moet de positie van Trendelenburg filosofisch superieur geacht worden aan de latere twee opvattingen: slechts zijn (metafysisch) restrictieve opvatting van weltanschauung biedt een verdedigbaar alternatief voor het dilemma van Husserl.