3. Ethnic Retention and Host Culture Adoption among Turkish Immigrants: A Controlled Comparison[17]

Abstract

This chapter explores the determinants of ethnic culture retention and host country culture adoption among Turkish immigrants in Germany, France, and the Netherlands, using original survey data. To maximize cross-national comparability, the focus is on immigrants from two Turkish regions who themselves or whose parents migrated before 1975. As indicators of ethnic retention we investigate Turkish and Muslim identification, Turkish language proficiency and observance of Islamic religious practices. Host culture adoption is measured by host country identification, host country language proficiency and use, and interethnic social contacts. We formulate hypotheses regarding cross-national differences based on how integration policy approaches affect the material benefits and emotional costs of retention and adoption. We find that ethnic retention is strongest in the Netherlands, where multicultural policies were long prevalent, while host culture adoption is strongest in the French context, which has granted immigrants a high degree of equal rights but also more strongly emphasised assimilation, at least where participation in the public realm is concerned.

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3.1 Introduction

One of the core challenges raised by increased global interactions and interdependencies is the increased cultural diversity resulting from long-distance migration flows. This challenge has been felt in a particularly pronounced way in European immigration countries, which – compared to the immigration countries of the New World – were until recently relatively culturally homogenous, and traditionally had ethno-culturally relatively "thick" conceptions of nationhood. While during the 1980s and 1990s several European countries experimented to varying degrees with multicultural approaches to immigrant's socio-cultural integration, more recently a "return to assimilation" has been observed in several countries (e.g., Brubaker 2001). This development is reflected in the legislation that several European countries introduced obliging immigrants to take citizenship and language courses (see, Costa-Lascoux 2006; Joppke 2007a). These policy innovations indicate a growing concern with socio-cultural aspects of immigrant integration such as language skills, interethnic relations, identification with the host society, and the role of religion, in particular Islam. These cultural aspects of integration are viewed both as important in their own right, and as conditions for successful socio-economic integration.

Though at the moment there seems to be some convergence, European countries have historically followed different approaches to cope with increased cultural diversity (see e.g., Brubaker 1992; Joppke 1999b; Favell 2001). Our aim in this chapter is to investigate to what extent these different approaches are related to different outcomes regarding immigrants' retention of ethnic culture, on the one hand, and the adoption of elements of the host country culture, on the other. This requires a cross-national comparative perspective. Although cross-national studies of immigrant integration have recently become more frequent, most focus on socio-economic aspects such as labour market participation and income (e.g. Kogan 2007; Morissens and Sainsbury 2005; Euwals *et al.* 2007; Muus 2003; van Tubergen *et al.* 2004). Cross-national studies of socio-cultural aspects of integration are few and far between, with some exceptions regarding language acquisition (Chiswick and Miller 1995; van Tubergen and Kalmijn 2005), religious affiliation and attendance (van Tubergen 2005), and identification and social contacts (Berry *et al.* 2006; Dagevos *et al.* 2006).

Whether they focus on socio-economic or on socio-cultural integration, previous comparative studies of immigrant integration faced important problems of cross-national comparability (Favell 2003). We circumvent such problems by focusing on one clearly circumscribed immigrant group, namely immigrants from selected parts of rural Turkey who arrived in the countries of destination before 1975, as well as the descendants of these immigrants. The evidence we draw on derives from cross-national survey data that were specifically collected for this study. On the destination country side, we focus on Germany, France, and the Netherlands, where more than 70 per cent of all people of Turkish origin in the European Union live. These countries have followed distinct approaches to immigrant integration over the past decades, and therefore differ significantly on our independent

variable of theoretical interest. We investigate four aspects of socio-cultural integration: identification, language use and proficiency, interethnic social contacts, and religious observance. These are common and significant indicators of ethnic culture retention and host country culture adoption (see e.g., Berry *et al.* 2006; Dagevos 2001; Gans 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). Islamic religiosity is treated as part of ethnic culture retention since Islam is the dominant religion in Turkey but not in any of the host countries.

In what follows, we clarify how we theoretically conceptualize our dependent – ethnic culture retention and host country culture adoption – and core independent – immigrant integration regimes – variables. We then specify hypotheses about the relationship between integration policies and adoption and retention, introduce our research design, and present the results of multivariate regression analyses. Of course we do not assume that immigrant integration regimes are the single or even the most important factor determining host culture adoption and ethnic retention. Therefore, a range of additional variables that might affect the dependent variables, including regional origin, socio-economic status, gender and the relative size and within-country distribution of the Turkish immigrant population, are controlled for. Although we also find important cross-national commonalities, we conclude that after controlling for all these additional factors, significant cross-national differences remain regarding most aspects of ethnic retention and host-culture adoption.

3.2 Socio-cultural integration and immigrant integration regimes

Socio-cultural integration of immigrants has long been discussed under the heading of "assimilation." Early studies of immigrant integration in the US presented assimilation as a linear and inevitable process and have been challenged by various scholars (see Alba and Nee 2003). The main criticisms were that immigrant integration into the host society consists of several dimensions, that adopting the host culture is not the same as abandoning the ethnic culture, and that there is no singular core culture that immigrants can blend into (Gans 1997; Alba and Nee 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2001). The different combinations that host-culture and ethnic-culture orientations can take have been conceptualized in a succinct way by Berry (1997). His model distinguishes two dimensions of what he calls "acculturation." The first is whether immigrants maintain their culture of origin (ethnic culture); the second whether they adopt the national, i.e. host country, culture.

Immigrants' opportunities to pursue various acculturation strategies are shaped by the societies in which they live (Gans 1997; Berry 2001). As explained in the first two chapters we employ the typology developed by Koopmans *et al.* to capture the policy differences between our countries of study. Almost all studies classify Germany, France, and the Netherlands as being closer to one of three different ideal-types, which are respectively characterised by difficult access for immigrants to individual citizenship rights and little accommodation of diversity (Germany), easy access to individual equality but little accommodation of diversity (France), and easy access to individual rights combined

with a relatively high degree of accommodation of diversity (the Netherlands). We follow Koopmans *et al.* (2005) in labelling these integration regime types as respectively *assimilationism*, *universalism*, and *multiculturalism*.

Of course, these are ideal-types, and no country fully fits any single one of them across all domains of integration. Moreover, immigrant integration policies are not set in stone and have changed over the years. Further, it is important to keep in mind that the position of immigrants is not only influenced by policies that aim specifically at immigrant integration but also by pre-existing institutional settings such as the relation between the state and religious cults and the degree of room for pluralism (see e.g. Soysal 1994; Favell 2001; Entzinger 2005).

Against typologies of integration regimes, some authors have argued that integration policies are influenced by pressures for international convergence rather than by national ideologies (e.g., Freeman 2004; Weil 2001; Joppke 2007a). As shown in Chapter 2, Koopmans *et al.* have empirically investigated policy changes in ten European countries over the course of 1980-2008. They found that Germany, France, and the Netherlands occupied distinct positions at each of the four time points they investigated (1980, 1990, 2002 and 2008). Evidence gathered by other projects of systematic policy comparison such as MIPEX (Geddes and Niessen 2005) and Banting *et al.* (2006) confirms the differences in the policies of these three countries.

As explained in Chapter 1, we view the conceptions of citizenship that are expressed in integration policies as opportunity structures that raise or lower the material as well as emotional costs and benefits attached to cultural retention and adoption. Policies that accommodate diversity can stimulate ethnic retention by granting access to institutional resources (e.g., state funding and access to decision making) based on (minority) group membership, and lowering the costs of retention such as exclusion from citizenship or opportunities for participation in various sectors of public life (e.g. in schools). The absence of cultural requirements for access to rights (e.g., those tied to citizenship) and institutions can have a negative impact on adoption because it lowers the benefits. Alternatively, the accommodation of diversity can have a positive impact on host culture adoption because the possibility to combine ethnic and host country culture lowers the emotional costs of adoption.

Policies that grant immigrants individual equality, such as citizenship access and protection from discrimination, signal permeable group boundaries. The perceived permeability of group boundaries can have a positive effect on host culture adoption. Policies that do not treat immigrants equal to host society ethnics can have a negative impact on adoption and also lead to a higher degree of retention through a process of reactive ethnicity. Some examples are given of how the types of integration policies prevalent in Germany, France, and the Netherlands affect these material costs and benefits. Subsequently we will use this information to make predictions about the relative levels of adoption and retention in each of the three countries.

Regarding access to resources, France and Germany are less accommodating of immigrants' ethnic culture and religion than the Netherlands. Dutch legislation offers relatively much room for the public expression of particularistic identities (Entzinger 2005). Legislation originating in the time of "pillarization" (Lijphart 1968) allowed for the set-up of fully publicly funded Islamic and Hindu schools and broadcasting corporations. Currently, there are about 45 publicly funded Islamic schools in the Netherlands, against one in Germany and France. Moreover, many non-denominational public schools in areas with large Muslim populations offer Islamic religious education classes, whereas in Germany this is only the case in Berlin, and nowhere in France. The Dutch national public broadcaster NPS is required by law to direct twenty per cent of its programmes to ethnic minority audiences[18], and there are “multicultural” broadcasters on the local level. By contrast, special public media organizations or broadcasts for immigrant groups are rare in Germany and absent in France (where public media are required by law to broadcast only in French). In addition, the Netherlands has an extensive system of subsidized ethnic consultative bodies. Germany has local consultative bodies, the *Ausländerbeiräte*. However, in Germany all immigrant groups are represented in one advisory council, whereas, in the Netherlands there are separate consultation bodies for each major ethnic group (e.g., Turks, Surinamese, Chinese). All three countries have recently initiated some form of consultation of Muslim organizations. However, while in the Netherlands Muslim organizations can appoint the members of the body, and in France it is elected by individual Muslims, in Germany the Minister of the Interior appoints the members of the *Islamkonferenz*, which as a result includes several unaffiliated secular persons from a Muslim background, who are very critical of the role of Muslim organizations.[19]

There are also significant differences in the degree to which expressions of religious faith can be a barrier to full participation in public life. The Netherlands gives most room for Muslims to publicly practice and express their religion. In public schools, the wearing of headscarves by both students and teachers is allowed without restrictions. Only for certain positions within the civil service (the courts and the police) there is a ban on headscarves and other religious signs. In France the headscarf is not allowed for civil servants, primary and secondary school students or teachers. Contrary to France, students in Germany are allowed to wear a headscarf, but in the majority of federal states teachers and other civil servants are not. While in France the ban on headscarves in public schools follows from a law affecting all "ostentatious" religions symbols and in that sense treats Islam and other religions alike, various Southern German states have banned Muslim headscarves, while nuns teaching in public schools can wear their habits. This inequality is

[18] See the yearly reports ‘Multiculturele programmering’ of the public broadcasting organizations, e.g. http://pics.portal.omroep.nl/upnos/ZakoiolHC_RAP_MC2004_21.pdf Last accessed: 29 October 2008.
[19] See http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/cln_117/nn_1319546/SubSites/DIK/DE/DieDIK/Teilnehmer/teilnehmer-node.html?__nnn=true Last accessed: 25 July 2009

also reflected in the fact that Christian denominations and Judaism are officially recognized as corporations under public law (*Körperschaften des öffentlichen Rechts*), which among other things implies that the government levies church taxes for these religious communities, whereas Islam lacks this recognized status and Muslims have therefore experienced great difficulties in obtaining equal rights (Laurence 2006).

The ease or difficulty with which immigrants can become citizens is an important determinant of access to rights, which include not only the right to vote and stand for office, but also access to certain welfare benefits, employment as a civil servant, full protection against expulsion, and freedom from visa obligations when travelling abroad. All three countries demand linguistic and cultural assimilation of applicants for naturalisation but to varying extents. Until 2003, the Netherlands was least demanding (see Chapter 2). Since 2003, language requirements have been tightened and a formal test has to be passed, which also includes some questions on Dutch society. In France linguistic and cultural assimilation is assessed in a personal interview with a civil servant. France fully allows dual nationality, and the Netherlands allow it de jure for the second and de facto for the large majority of first-generation naturalisations, including virtually all naturalised Turks (Böcker *et al.* 2005). In Germany, applicants must have completed four years of schooling in Germany, have a certificate from a German language school, or demonstrate equivalent proficiency in a formal language exam. Until 2000, German naturalisation guidelines explicitly viewed commitment to Germany and to the country and culture of origin as mutually exclusive: "the voluntary and permanent commitment to Germany shall be judged from his fundamental attitude with regard to the German cultural realm [deutscher Kulturkreis]. A permanent commitment is principally not to be assumed when the applicant is active in a political emigrant organization" (naturalisation guidelines, as cited in Hailbronner and Renner 1998: 866; our translation from the German). The mutually exclusive view that prevails in Germany regarding ethnic and host-culture orientations is also shown in the country's rejection of dual nationality, which is only granted on exceptional grounds and in a minority of naturalisations. This also applies to the second generation, who since 2000 are automatically granted German citizenship (if the parents have lived in Germany for at least eight years), but on the condition that they give up their parents' nationality at majority. These policy differences are reflected in naturalisation rates, which have been highest in the Netherlands and lowest in Germany. The average yearly rate for the period 2000-2004 was 6.3 per cent for the Netherlands, 4.2 per cent for France and 2.1 per cent for Germany (Bauböck *et al.* 2006: 298-299).

Policies in France and the Netherlands are more ‘civic’ than those in Germany. This is not only reflected in shorter residence requirements for naturalisation (five years, versus eight in Germany) and the higher acceptance of dual nationality but also in the more extensive anti-discrimination policies. In addition Dutch policies grant foreigners a high degree of citizen rights such as local voting rights and the right to work in the civil service (with the exception of the police force and the army).

Following our theoretical model, these policy differences lead to predictions about the relative levels of adoption and retention in each of the three countries. In many cases, immigrants in the Netherlands can claim state funding and institutional rights on the basis of their ethnicity or religion, e.g. in the form of faith schools, public media access, consultation rights, and organizational subsidies. In France and Germany these possibilities are much more limited. We predict that this leads to a higher degree of retention in the Netherlands than in the other two countries. In Germany however, immigrants have less access to individual equality than in France. Through a process of reactive ethnicity this may lead to higher retention. We therefore hypothesise that:

H1: Rates of ethnic retention will be highest in the Netherlands, intermediate in Germany and lowest in France

The low individual equality in Germany can hinder host culture adoption. We expect that host culture adoption is higher in France and the Netherlands than in Germany. The relative level in France compared to the Netherlands is determined by the effect of accommodative policies. Access to rights is least tied to giving up the ethnic culture and adopting the host-country in the Netherlands. If these lower benefits have a negative impact on rates of adoption, we should see that;

H2A: Host culture adoption will be highest in France, intermediate in the Netherlands and lowest in Germany

If however Dutch accommodative policies have a positive impact on rates of adoption because they lower the emotional costs of adoption, this would mean:

H2B: Host culture adoption will be highest in the Netherlands, intermediate in France and lowest in Germany

3.3 Research design

Comparative survey studies of immigrant integration usually rely either on independently gathered national immigrant surveys with divergent questions and sampling methods, or on cross-national surveys such as the European Social Survey that are not specifically targeted at immigrants, who therefore tend to be strongly underrepresented, among other things because the questionnaire is only offered in the host country language. These studies moreover, face the problem of widely diverging compositions of the immigrant population across countries. By conducting our own survey we avoid dependence on cross-nationally varying sample-selection criteria, interviewing techniques, and question wordings. To control for composition effects, we do not use a representative survey of all immigrant groups, but circumscribe our target group in a number of ways. As explained in Chapter 1,

the target group is limited to immigrants from two rural regions in Central Turkey (South-Central and East-Central Anatolia)

Whereas Germany, France, and the Netherlands have different integration approaches, they are relatively similar where a number of other potentially important influences on immigrant integration are concerned. All three became immigration countries at around the same time in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and halted guest-worker recruitment after the 1973 Oil Crisis. In that respect, they differ importantly both from long-standing immigration countries such as the United States or Australia, and from countries that have only recently become immigration countries such as Ireland or Spain. Further, they have developed welfare states, distinguishing them both from the United Kingdom and the Southern European countries with their lean welfare states, but also from the more generous Scandinavian welfare states (Esping-Anderson 1990).

3.4 Data collection and variables

Sampling and data collection

As explained in the Chapter 1, the sample is drawn with a combination of techniques. The main method was sampling from online phonebooks, based on stems of common Turkish surnames, supplemented with a sample of holiday makers and a snowball sample (details in Appendix C). None of the three sampling techniques is free of potential biases. Therefore, dummy variables for the sampling technique by which a respondent was recruited were included in all the regressions reported below. We find no significant differences between the three subsamples in any of our regressions.

Dependent variables

We analyse eight dependent variables covering four areas of ethnic retention and host culture adoption (Table E in the appendix gives the means and standard deviations for all dependent and independent variables used in the analyses):

Host-country and Turkish identification. Respondents were asked several questions on the strength of their identification with the host society and with Turkey or Turks: ‘To what extent do you feel connected to [group]?,’ ‘To what extent do you feel [group member]?,’ and ‘To what extent are you proud of being [group member]?’. Answer categories ranged from 1 “not at all” to 5 “completely”. Average scores across these items were summarized into two scales for host-country identification (Cronbach’s alpha 0.78) and Turkish identification (alpha 0.68).

Host-country and Turkish language proficiency and use. Proficiency in the host country language and in Turkish was measured by asking respondents how often they experienced problems in understanding these languages. Respondents could answer along a 5-point scale. For analysis, inverse scores were used so that a score of 1 means that a

respondent "always" has problems understanding the respective language and 5 means he or she "never" experiences such problems.[20] Language use was measured by asking respondents which language they spoke most frequently in three different contexts, namely with their friends, partner, and children: Turkish, the host country language, or both about equally often. Answers were scored 0 "always Turkish," .5 "equally often Turkish and French/Dutch/German" and 1 "always French/Dutch/German." Average scores across these three questions were combined into a scale with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.66.[21]

Interethnic social contacts. Respondents were asked about the ethnic composition of the social group they went out with. Answer categories were 1 "predominantly Turkish," 2 "about equally mixed," and 3 "predominantly people of Dutch/German/French descent."[22]

Religious identification and observance. Religious identification was measured analogously to host-country and Turkish identification on the basis of three questions: "To what extent do you feel connected to Muslims?," "To what extent do you feel Muslim?" and "To what extent are you proud of being Muslim?". Answers could range from 1 "not at all" to 5 "completely." The items were combined into a scale with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.80. Religious observance was measured by four questions, asking respondents about how often they eat halal food, participate in Ramadan, wear a headscarf (or for males: have a partner who wears a headscarf), and visit a mosque. Answer categories for the first three items were 1 "never," 2 "sometimes," 3 "most of the time," and 4 "always." The scale for mosque visits ranged from 1 "never" to 6 "daily". The z-scores of these items were averaged and combined in a scale with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.77.[23] Those – very few – respondents who defined themselves as non-religious or who adhered to another faith than Islam were excluded from the analysis of the religion variables.

Independent variables

Country of residence: dummy variables for respondents living in the Netherlands and France were included in each reported regression, with effects denoting the difference with Turks living in Germany, the reference category. Additional regressions were undertaken to check for the significance of the contrast between French and Dutch Turks. If this contrast is significant, we indicate this in the regression tables.

Region of origin: South-Central Anatolia (the reference category) is a predominantly ethnic Turkish and religiously Sunnite region. The provinces of Karaman and Konya, which form the core of the region, are renowned for their religious

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[20] Van Tubergen and Kalmijn (2005) found that self-assessed language proficiency is a reliable measures of language proficiency.

[21] For respondents without a partner or children, the scale was based on the average of the remaining items.

[22] The middle category includes a small number of respondents (n=93), who indicated that the majority of their social contacts were with members of other immigrant groups than Turks. We also ran the analyses excluding this group and found similar results as those reported below.

[23] For male respondents without a partner, the scale excluded the headscarf question and was based on the average of the remaining items.

conservatism. East-Central Anatolia, by contrast, has more ethnic and religious diversity (Kurds and Alevis). For respondents born in the host country, the region of origin refers to that of the parents.

Alevi denomination: A dummy is included for respondents who adhere to Alevism. The reference category consists of Sunni Muslims and the small group (1.6%) of non-religious migrants. Alevism is a humanistic current within Islam. In general the relation between the sexes is different from that prevalent within Sunni Islam, and Alevi women rarely wear headscarves. According to rough estimates Alevis constitute up to 25 per cent of the Turkish population. In Turkey Alevis sometimes face discrimination because they are not considered to be "real" Muslims since they do not visit a mosque or observe Ramadan.

Generation: Dummy variables were included for the second generation born in the host country and for the in-between generation (sometimes also called 1.5th generation), who were born in Turkey but migrated before the age of 18. First-generation immigrants who migrated as adults are the reference category.[24]

Sex: A dummy for female respondents is included in the analyses; males are the reference category.

Marital status: A dummy for married respondents is included in the analyses; non-married is the reference category.[25]

Level of education: Dummy variables were included for secondary education and post-secondary education (university). The reference category is "none or only primary school."

Employment status: A dummy for respondents who are currently employed is included in the analyses; those not currently employed are the reference category

Sampling method: Dummies were included for respondents from the holiday and snowball samples. Respondents from the phonebook sample are the reference category.

Relative size of the Turkish immigrant population[26]: In Germany the Turkish-origin population makes up almost three per cent of the total population, in the Netherlands

[24] Sometimes the distinction between the 1.5th and 2nd generation is made on the school career instead of the country of birth. Children who arrived before the age of six are then counted as members of the second generation. All analyses in this paper have also been conducted using this alternative definition of generational boundaries. This produced only minor differences for the variables of interest. For Turkish language proficiency, the difference between the two origin regions is no longer significant, but Alevis show a significantly lower proficiency ($p<.05$), also the effect of education becomes insignificant. For religious practices and host country identification the difference between the first and second generation decreases to the $p<.10$ level. For host language proficiency the difference between the Netherlands and France becomes insignificant. Age was not included as a control variable because of problems of multicollinearity. However, we repeated all analyses also with age and age² instead of the generation dummies. This led to minimally different results. The most notable difference is the loss of significance of the level of host country language proficiency between the Netherlands and France.
All results available on request.

[25] We additionally considered whether respondents had children, Parenthood only had a significant negative impact on frequency of speaking the host country language ($p<.001$).

[26] For the adoption variables we also ran analyses using the share of the total immigrant population instead of the Turkish immigrant population, following the reasoning that adoption might be positively related to the population share of host-country ethnics rather than the share of non-Turks. For social contacts the difference between the

two per cent and in France only about one half of a per cent. By controlling for differences in ethnic concentration in the analyses reported below we ensure that any significant cross-national differences that remain cannot be attributed to differences in the relative size and within-country distribution of the Turkish immigrant population. Since migrant populations are usually unevenly spread across a country, leading to regional differences in concentration, the variable is operationalized at the local level. This is also the level where most interpersonal contact takes place. The variable consists of the number of Turkish immigrants (excluding the second generation) as a percentage of the total population within geographical units. The variable thus varies from 0-100. For the Netherlands data for 2005 on the municipality (*gemeente*) level were taken from the Central Statistical Agency (CBS) website. For France, data from the 1999 census on the level of the *commune* were used. For *communes* with less than 5,000 inhabitants data on the number of Turkish migrants are not available. For these *communes* the percentage of Turkish migrants within the respective *department* was used. German statistical data are generally collected on the basis of nationality. One of the few exceptions is the Mikrozensus, a one per cent sample of German households. The lowest spatial level for which the Mikrozensus allows the percentage of Turkish immigrants to be calculated is the *Kreis* (county) level. For *Kreisen* with three or fewer Turks in the Mikrozensus sample, the number of Turks is not available. This was only the case for three of the respondents in the dataset.

As Table E in the appendix indicates, the average percentage of first-generation Turks in the locality in which respondents live is 2.9 per cent in Germany, 2.6 per cent in the Netherlands, and 1.3 per cent in France. Comparing these figures to the national-level percentages, it can be concluded that Turkish immigrants are more strongly concentrated in certain geographical areas in France than in the two other countries (Cf. Jund 1992; Özüekren and Kempen 1997).

Netherlands and France then decreases to the $p<.10$ level. For the other variables the results do not change (tables available on request).

3.5 Results

Ethnic retention

We analyse the data using ordinary least squares regression analysis.[27] We first investigate the hypotheses regarding ethnic retention. Hypothesis 1 stated that retention would be highest in the Netherlands, intermediary in Germany, and lowest in France. Our dependent variables encompass four indicators of cultural retention, two referring to the ethnic Turkish culture, and two to Islamic religiosity. Table 3.1 shows the results of regression analyses with as dependent variables respondents' identification with Turks, their proficiency in the Turkish language, their identification with Muslims, and their degree of Islamic religious observance.

For identification with Turks, we do not find support for Hypothesis 1, as there are no significant differences among the three host countries. In fact, in all three countries Turkish identification is very strong at an average of 4.46 on the scale ranging from 1 “not at all” to 5 “completely.” Respondents from East-Central Anatolia, where more ethnic minorities, especially Kurds, live, have a significantly lower Turkish identification. This is also the case for respondents who belong to the Alevi current in Islam, which is not granted an equal status within Turkey. However, with an average score of 4.02 even Alevis identify quite strongly with Turks. The in-between generation shows a lower degree of identification, but remarkably the difference between the second generation and the generation of their parents is not significant. The only further significant effect is that Turkish identification is lower for people with post-secondary education.

For Turkish language proficiency we do not find significant cross-national differences, either. Members of the 1.5th and second generations report less proficiency in Turkish. The more highly educated and the employed also have less Turkish proficiency, suggesting a negative relation between socio-economic integration and ethnic retention.

Turning to the two indicators of religious cultural retention, we find that identification with Muslims is very strong in all three countries, ranging from a score on the five-point scale of 4.32 for German Turks to 4.59 for Dutch Turks. These country differences persist when controlling for other relevant variables (see Table 3.1). In line with Hypothesis 1, the identification with Muslim of Dutch Turks is significantly stronger than that of their counterparts in Germany. Contrary to the hypothesis, Muslim identification is not lowest in France but in Germany.

Again, the in-between generation shows a lower degree of identification than the generation of their parents but, the second generation does not. Further, Muslim identification is significantly lower among people from East-Central Anatolia, among

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[27] Since, except for religious observance that is based on z-scores, our dependent variables are categorical, we have repeated the analyses with Ordered Logistic Regression. These analyses showed the same cross-national differences as OLS. The only exception is that the significance of difference in interethnic social contacts between France and the Netherlands drops to the $p<.10$ level.

Alevis, and among higher educated and working respondents. The size of the Turkish immigrant population has a significant positive impact on religious identification.

	Turkish identification		Turkish language proficiency		Muslim identification		Religious observance	
Germany (Ref cat)	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
France	.08	(.06)	-.17	(.09)	.07	(.07)	.19**	(.06)
Netherlands	.05	(.06)	-.02	(.09)	.16*	(.07)	.24***	(.06)
East-Central Anatolia	-.12*	(.05)	-.15	(.07)	-.12*	(.05)	-.09	(.05)
Alevi	-.35***	(.08)	-.23	(.13)	-.76***	(.09)	-1.48***	(.08)
Generation1	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Generation 1.5	-.18*	(.07)	-.53***	(.11)	-.18*	(.08)	-.09	(.07)
Generation 2	-.13	(.09)	-.72***	(.13)	-.08	(.10)	-.22*	(.08)
Female	-.07	(.05)	-.12	(.07)	-.01	(.05)	-.27***	(.04)
Married	-.01	(.06)	.14	(.09)	-.06	(.07)	.01	(.06)
Education, none/ primary	Ref		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Secondary education	-.05	(.07)	-.24*	(.10)	-.15*	(.07)	-.17**	(.06)
Post-secondary education	-.33***	(.09)	-.30*	(.13)	-.36***	(.10)	-.26**	(.09)
Working	-.09	(.05)	-.17*	(.07)	-.11*	(.05)	-.14**	(.05)
Phone book sample	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Holiday sample	.14	(.07)	-.10	(.11)	.08	(.08)	.09	(.07)
Snowball sample	.09	(.05)	-.10	(.07)	.09	(.05)	.02	(.05)
%Turkish immigrants	.02	(.02)	.03	(.02)	.04*	(.02)	.04*	(.02)
Constant	4.70***	(.11)	4.81***	(.16)	4.75***	(.12)	.35***	(.10)
Adj. R2	*.09*		*.14*		*.16*		*.42*	
N	*924*		*923*		*884*		*888*	

Two-tailed t-tests, * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Table 3.1 Unstandardized coefficients of OLS regression of four measures of ethnic retention (Standard errors in parentheses)

Finally, we find significantly less Islamic religious observance among German Turks. Again the difference between Germany and the Netherlands is as expected, but contrary to our expectation Dutch and French Turks do not differ significantly.[28] Alevis are much less observant of Islamic religious practices. This is unsurprising since they do not pray in the mosque and their religion does not prescribe Ramadan or headscarves.[29] Further,

[28] We have also run a regression analysis in which for males the wearing of headscarves by partners is excluded from the religious observance scale. Other than that the difference between the second and first generation is no longer significant, the results are the same.

[29] Some Alevis pray in the so-called ‘cem evi’ and practice a lent called ‘Muharram’ but we did not ask questions about these specific practices.

members of the second generation are somewhat less religiously observant, and once more we find that there is a negative relationship between socio-economic integration and cultural retention as indicated by the significant negative effects of education and employment on religious observance. Again the relative size of the Turkish immigrant population has a significant positive effect. Possibly a larger Turkish community increases the possibilities for the set-up of religious institutions which in turn generate higher religious observance and identification. Another possibility is that social control stimulates religiousness.

Finally it appears that female respondents are significantly less observant than males. This is however mainly attributable to lower mosque attendance. For Muslim males visiting the mosque is a religious duty, but for females it is less so. When leaving out mosque attendance from the religious observance scale, the gender difference disappears.

The general level of religious observance is high. The majority of the respondents always eat halal food. This ranges from 72 per cent in the Netherlands to 67 per cent in France. The observance of Ramadan is lowest in Germany; only 55 per cent of Sunnite respondents always observe Ramadan, compared to more than 80 per cent in France and the Netherlands. Mosque attendance varies little between the countries with about 60 per cent of males and 10 per cent of females visiting a mosque at least once a week. Headscarves are worn most in the Netherlands and least in Germany. In the Netherlands 50 per cent of female Sunnite respondents indicate always wearing a headscarf, compared to 40 per cent in France and 30 per cent in Germany.

Summing up, we find limited support for our first hypothesis that retention is higher where state integration policies are more accommodating of diversity or levels of individual equality are lower. Contrary to Hypothesis 1, we found no cross-national difference in Turkish identification or Turkish language proficiency. For the two religious retention variables we found part of the expected cross-national differences. In line with Hypothesis 1, religious observance and identification of German Turks is significantly lower than that of Dutch Turks. However French Turks are not less religious than those in the Netherlands and even more religious than those in Germany.

Host culture adoption

Turning now to investigating the merits of our hypotheses regarding adoption of the host society culture, these were based on a presumed positive effect of individual equality and two rival options for the effect of accommodation of diversity; which were: either it has a negative (H2a) or a positive effect (H2b) on host culture adoption. Here too, we look at four indicators: identification with the host country, proficiency and use of the host country language, and social contacts with host country ethnics. Table 3.2 shows the results of regressions of these four variables, using the same predictor variables as in the analysis of cultural retention.

In line with the predicted effect of individual equality, we find that host country identification is significantly higher in France and the Netherlands than in Germany. Neither of the hypotheses on the effect of the accommodation of diversity is supported, since there is no significant difference between France and the Netherlands. Host country identification does not reach the level of Turkish identification in any of the countries. Whereas Turkish identification averaged between 4.37 in Germany and 4.52 in France, host country identification ranges from 2.31 in Germany to 2.80 in the Netherlands. Even among the second generation, host country identification remains below the scale mid-point of 3.00 in all three countries, though this is significantly higher than for the first generation. Completing the picture for identification, we find some significant effects that mirror those for ethnic retention. Respondents from East-Central Anatolia, who had less strong attachments to Turkish culture, are more likely to identify with the host country, as are those with a higher level of education.

Regarding proficiency in the host language we find that the only significant cross-national difference is that between Dutch and French Turks, with the latter displaying the highest level of proficiency. German Turks are situated in between. This provides support for the assumption of a negative effect of the accommodation of diversity but not for a positive effect of individual equality. Further effects again mirror those found for ethnic retention. The in-between and second generations and those who are better socio-economically integrated in terms of education and employment - who were less proficient in Turkish - are significantly more proficient in the host country language.

Results for the frequency of host country language use are broadly similar, but cross-national differences are stronger, and French Turks are significantly more linguistically assimilated than both Dutch and German Turks. This supports both the assumption of a negative effect of the accommodation of diversity and a positive effect of individual equality. The in-between and second generations, as well as the higher educated and employed, once more show higher levels of linguistic assimilation, as do people from East-Central Anatolia and Alevis. Women are also more likely to use the host country language, and married people use the host country language less often.[30] Finally, the frequency of speaking the host country language is lower in places with a relatively larger Turkish community. Among the first and in-between generations, Turkish is the dominant language in all three countries. Country differences in language use are particularly pronounced in the second generation. On a scale from 0 (always Turkish) to 1 (always the host country language) Turkish is still slightly dominant among the Dutch second generation (.46), compared to exactly equal shares in Germany (.50) and a strong predominance of French language use with the partner, children and friends among the French-Turkish second generation (.65).

[30] This effect is also present when only the language spoken with friends is analysed.

	Host country identification		Host country language proficiency		Host language use		Social contacts	
Germany (Ref cat)	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
France	.53***	(.09)	.14	(.08)	.11***	(.02)	.13**	(.05)
Netherlands	.56***	(.09)	-.03 [a]	(.08)	-.01 [c]	(.02)	-.03 [a]	(.05)
East-Central Anatolia	.21**	(.07)	.04	(.07)	.06**	(.02)	.07	(.04)
Alevi	.07	(.12)	.09	(.11)	.10**	(.03)	.04	(.07)
Generation1 (ref cat)	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Generation 1.5	.12	(.11)	.66***	(.10)	.14***	(.03)	.13*	(.06)
Generation 2	.28*	(.13)	.91***	(.12)	.21***	(.03)	.05	(.07)
Female	-.02	(.07)	-.02	(.06)	.05**	(.02)	.00	(.04)
Married	.30**	(.09)	-.14	(.08)	-.22***	(.02)	-.07	(.05)
Education, none/primary	Ref		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Secondary education	.38***	(.10)	1.04***	(.09)	.17***	(.03)	.20***	(.06)
Post-secondary education	.53***	(.13)	1.39***	(.12)	.25***	(.03)	.34***	(.07)
Working	-.02	(.07)	.16*	(.07)	.05**	(.02)	.14***	(.04)
Phone book sample	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Holiday sample	.05	(.11)	-.09	(.10)	.05	(.03)	- .07	(.06)
Snowball sample	.00	(.07)	.04	(.07)	.03	(.02)	.01	(.04)
%Turkish immigrants	.01	(.02)	.00	(.02)	-.01*	(.01)	-.02	(.01)
Constant	1.43***	(.15)	2.38***	(.14)	.16***	(.04)	1.31***	(.09)
Adj. R2	*.09*		*.42*		*.40*		*.09*	
N	*926*		*925*		*925*		*901*	

Two-tailed t-tests, *$p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

[a] the difference between France and the Netherlands is significant ($p<.05$)

[b] the difference between France and the Netherlands is significant ($p<.01$)

[c] the difference between France and Netherlands is significant ($p<.001$)

Table 3.2 Unstandardized coefficients of OLS regression of four measures of host culture adoption (Standard errors in parentheses)

The final indicator of host culture adoption refers to private social contacts with host country ethnics. The results are very similar to those for language. French Turks have significantly higher shares of host country ethnics among the people they go out with than their counterparts in the Netherlands and Germany. This result is again in line with the assumptions of a negative effect of the accommodation of diversity and a positive effect of individual equality. The higher educated and employed have significantly higher levels of

interethnic contacts. Again, the orientation of social contacts is predominantly towards other Turks, ranging from 1.57 on the scale from 1 (only Turks) to 3 (only host country ethnics) for German Turks to 1.69 for French Turks. Even among the in-between and second generations who were raised in whole or in part in the country of residence, the clear majority of social contacts remain with other Turks, although in all three countries the orientation towards host country ethnics is slightly stronger than it is among the first generation. The relative size of the Turkish population does not have a significant impact on interethnic social contacts.

Summing up, we find that the pattern for host country identification deviates from that for the language and social contact variables. The results for host country identification provide evidence for a positive effect of individual equality for host culture adoption. They however show no effect of accommodative policies in either a positive or a negative direction. The results for the language variables and for social contacts further support the assumption of a positive effect of the individual equality, but also suggest that accommodation of diversity has a negative affect on host culture adoption.

3.6 Discussion and conclusions

In this study, we have analysed ethnic retention and host culture adoption among Turkish immigrants in Germany, France and the Netherlands. By limiting the research population to Turkish guest-workers and their offspring who migrated before 1975 and who originated in two selected rural regions in Turkey, we have excluded by design several confounding factors related to regional origin and the timing and type of immigration. Even after eliminating much of such variation, our study still reveals important differences between the two regions of origin, as well as between Sunni and Alevi Muslims, a factor that has received little attention in earlier quantitative research. We additionally controlled for a range of individual level variables that might affect ethnic retention and host-culture adoption, including gender and marital status, level of education and employment status, and a context variable; the concentration of Turkish immigrants in the respondents local environment.

A first important result of our study is that across all three immigration countries the degree of ethnic retention among Turkish immigrants and their descendants is high and the level of orientation on the host country culture is substantially lower. Turks in Germany, France, and the Netherlands identify more strongly as Turks and as Muslims than as nationals of their countries of residence. They predominantly speak Turkish, and social contacts tend to be primarily with other Turks. Finally, relatively high levels of observance of Islamic religious practices are identified throughout. Notwithstanding these similarities, we also found several significant differences across countries.

The analysis was structured according to five assumptions regarding the relationship between the types of policies in the host countries and the levels of ethnic retention and host culture adoption of immigrants. We hypothesised that ethnic retention is

facilitated by policies that set up few cultural barriers to the acquisition of rights and for participation in public life, and provide access to resources based on particularistic identities. In line with this hypothesis, we found that ethnic retention in the form of Muslim identification and observance of Islamic religious practices such as wearing a headscarf or observing Ramadan was stronger in the Netherlands than in Germany. However, contrary to this hypothesis we did not find any significant differences between France and the Netherlands.

Based on social identity theory and theories of reactive ethnicity we assumed that lower levels of individual equality lead to more retention. We found no evidence of this. Quite to the contrary, Germany, the country with the lowest level of individual equality, showed lower levels of religious retention than the other two countries.

Our second set of hypotheses regarded expectations about the relationship between immigrant integration policies and the degree of host culture adoption. We expected that policies that provide a high degree of individual equality have a positive effect on adoption because they signal high permeability. The consistently higher level of adoption in France than in Germany supports this assumption as does the higher level of host country identification in the Netherlands.

We argued that accommodation of diversity can have two competing effects. Either policies that accommodate diversity have a negative effect on adoption because they lower the material benefits, or they have a positive effect because they lower the emotional costs. For host country identification neither of these hypotheses was supported. The results on language proficiency and use and social contacts, however, provide support for a negative effect of accommodative policies.

These results suggest that policies that promote individual equality of immigrants promote host culture adoption. This does however not mean that no demands should be made on immigrants. A (modest) degree of adoption as a precondition for access to certain rights may promote host culture adoption. Policies that accommodate immigrants' distinctiveness can inhibit adoption.

An alternative explanation of the comparatively low degree of host culture adoption in the Netherlands is that we overstated the degree of permeability because we based our hypothesis on policies instead of on societal and political discourse. It could be that immigrant adoption in the Netherlands decreased in response to the rise in anti-immigrant discourse that was initiated by the rise of right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn in 2002. Indeed reactive ethnicity theory argues that anti-immigrant sentiments in public discourse can lead immigrants to reinforce their ethnic identity and turn away from mainstream society (see e.g. Portes and Rumbaut 2001). However, it is exactly identity where Dutch Turks have levels to French Turks. The differences lie in aspects that are less likely to change overnight; namely host country langue ability and use, and social contacts. In Chapter 7 the explanatory power of this alternative explanation will be discussed.

It should be emphasized that although we found significant cross-national differences for all but two (Turkish identification and Turkish language proficiency) of the indicators of retention and adoption, these country differences are usually modest in size. Several other variables were important. Not surprisingly, we found stronger host culture adoption and somewhat less ethnic retention among the in-between and second generations. Confirming the importance of variation within the country and culture of origin, respondents originating in East-Central Anatolia, which is more ethnically diverse and less religiously conservative, displayed less ethnic retention and more host culture adoption. The same was true for those belonging to the liberal Alevi branch of Islam. We also found strong and consistent negative relationships between socio-economic integration and cultural retention, and positive relationships with host culture adoption.

The generalizabilty of our findings is of course affected by the limitation to immigrants from Turkey. For instance, it is possible that the high social cohesion among Turks (e.g. Fennema and Tillie 1999) results in a stronger ethnic orientation than for groups with less strong community structures. However, the restricted nature of the sample is also the major strength of this study, since it minimizes cross-national composition effects, which previous comparative studies have not been able to control for sufficiently. We realise that with three immigration countries, we have not been able to model cross-national differences in a multivariate way. We believe, however, that controlled comparative designs such as ours can fill an important gap between single-country case studies on the one hand, and broad, large-N studies, on the other. Future work along these lines should extend the perspective to other immigrant groups and additional immigration countries.