

4. Host country and ethnic identification of children of Turkish immigrants³¹

Abstract

Countries have historically had different types of integration policies. The effect of these policies on the identification of immigrants has so far been little studied. In this chapter the effects of integration policies on the host country and ethnic identification of children of Turkish immigrants in Germany, France and the Netherlands are studied. These three countries markedly differ in their approach to immigrant integration. The data consist of 796 telephone surveys and 57 in-depth interviews. The analyses show that ethnic identification with Turks is high in all three countries. Host country identification is significantly higher in France and the Netherlands than in Germany. This is caused by processes of both exclusion and self-exclusion. Exclusion is present in all three countries but highest in Germany. We conclude that the integration regime has no impact on ethnic identification but, that an inclusive regime has a positive impact on identification with the host country. Policies that accommodate diversity do not affect host country identification either positively or negatively. Although in all three countries in this study identification with the host country is lower than identification with Turks, most respondents do feel a connection to the host country. Especially the place of residence is often considered 'home'.

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4.1 Introduction

Identity has become one of the focal points of integration debates in Western Europe. In particular immigrants' enduring identification with the country of origin is often met with distrust, as it would signal a lack of identification with the country of residence and hamper integration. This debate takes place in the context of a 'crisis of integration policies'. Riots in Britain and France and the continuing disadvantaged socio-economic position of many immigrant groups in most European countries have led to a re-evaluation of integration policies. In particular the effect of policies of cultural accommodation is much debated. Some argue that an extensive facilitation of cultural differences can keep migrants from identifying with the host country (Koopmans *et al.* 2005). Others, however, argue that an enduring ethnic identification can go together with strong host country identification and that policies of cultural accommodation can even promote immigrants' identification with the host country (Bloemraad 2006; Berry 1994; Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2002). In the first view the relationship between ethnic identity and host country identity is seen as zero-sum; a continuing identification with the origin group hinders the emergence of identification with the host country. In the second view the two forms of identification are considered as separate and independent dimensions. There is little debate on the positive effect of the accommodation of diversity on identification with the ethnic group. Likewise, it is generally believed that excluding immigrants from citizenship and equal rights hampers identification with the host country. These assumptions have however not been tested.

Western European countries have developed different approaches to immigrant integration. They have granted immigrants citizenship rights and accommodated immigrant cultures to varying degrees (see e.g. Castles 1995; Koopmans *et al.* 2005; Geddes and Niessen 2005). So far little cross-national comparative research has been done to investigate the effect of these different approaches on immigrants' identification (for some exceptions see Berry *et al.* 2006; Kastoryano 2002a). In this chapter the extent to which policies have an impact on host country and origin group identification is investigated. This is done by examining the host country and ethnic identification of children of Turkish immigrants in Germany, France, and the Netherlands, three countries of which the policies reflect a markedly different conception of citizenship (see Chapter 2). In this chapter, the focus is on the children of immigrants, because they have at least in part been socialized in the host countries and are therefore more likely to be influenced by its conception of citizenship. We include both people who were born in their respective host countries from Turkish parents (second generation) and those who were born in Turkey and migrated as minors (in-between generation). The analyses in this chapter are based on both the data from the telephone survey and the in-depth interviews.

First, the conceptions of citizenship and their possible influence on immigrant identification are discussed. This leads to the development of hypotheses about the relative levels of identification with the host country and the origin group for France, Germany and the Netherlands. Following the explanation of the data collection, the hypotheses are tested

first, using the data from the telephone survey, followed with the data derived from the in-depth interviews. We investigate what role exclusion and self-exclusion play in identification and how children of immigrants construct a connection to the host countries. Since the integration policies are not the only relevant factor for explaining immigrants' identifications, the analyses presented below control for several other factors that can influence identification. These include level of education, generation, and share of co-ethnics in the place of residence. We conclude that identification is influenced by both exclusion and self-exclusion. We found that ethnic identification is high regardless of the integration regime, but that the regime does have an impact on the degree of identification with the host country.

4.2 Citizenship, integration and identification

Different European countries have different traditions of citizenship that are reflected in their policies towards immigrants (Brubaker 1992). Following their national traditions they show more or less willingness to accept immigrants as citizens and more or less willingness to accommodate their cultural identity. We will use the typology developed by Koopmans *et al.* (2005; see also Koopmans and Statham 2000) that is explained in the Chapter 1 to capture the differences in the policies of the countries in this study. The typology of Koopmans *et al.* consists of two dimensions. The first dimension being the extent to which citizenship is open to immigrants and the extent to which immigrants receive the same individual rights as the host population. The second dimension is the degree of accommodation of diversity, measured as support for ethnic or religious group formation and granting special rights or exempting cultural groups from general rules. As shown in Chapter 2, the policies of France, Germany and the Netherlands fit with different conceptions of citizenship.

With regards to identification we also distinguish two dimensions. In line with Berry we treat the retention of the ethnic culture and the adoption of the host culture as two independent dimensions (see Chapter 1). Applied to identification, this means that people may identify with both the host country and the ethnic group, identify only with the ethnic group, identify only with the host country, or identify with neither group.

We take that conceptions of citizenship shape the identifications of immigrants by influencing the material and emotional costs and benefits of host country and ethnic identification. We use the theoretical model that has been outlined in chapter one (p. 13). Specified for identification, the model leads to the following predictions. The accommodation of cultural difference increases the benefits of ethnic identification, while reducing the costs. Benefits of ethnic identification are increased by the subsidies and political access that accommodative policies provide for ethnic media, organizations and consultative bodies. Identification with the ethnic group can give access to these funds, or organizations set up with these funds, and offers a channel of access for political demands. Ethnic organizations might try to stimulate the ethnic identification of their community as

to enlarge their funding base and underline their claims to representativeness. Accommodative policies lower the costs of retention because access to citizenship and participation in host society institutions is not conditional on abandoning the origin culture. We therefore assume that accommodation of diversity increases ethnic identification.

Because in countries with accommodative policies access to citizenship and related rights is not conditional on abandoning the origin culture, there is no incentive to identify with the host country. If identification is zero-sum, the strengthening of the ethnic identification can lower host country identification. In this case accommodative policies have a negative effect on host country identification. Conversely, it has been argued that accommodative policies do not hinder but instead stimulate host country identification. This is because they lower the emotional costs of host country identification. If immigrants feel they do not have to abandon their (parents') culture of origin to become members of the host society, the psychological stress caused by host country identification is reduced (Berry 1994). This assumes that the relationship between ethnic identity and host country identity is not zero-sum.

Social identity theory posits that the perceived permeability of group boundaries affects identification (Verkuyten 2006). In countries with a high degree of individual equality immigrants have easy access to citizenship and non-citizens also experience a relatively high level of rights. This legal inclusion indicates a permeable boundary between immigrants and host society. Legal inclusion is likely to be related to a higher degree of openness to immigrants on the part of host society members. This is both because policies are determined in interaction with the host society and because society is influenced by policies (Bourhis *et al.* 1997). A higher degree of individual equality therefore heightens the chance that immigrants identify with the host country. By contrast, a low degree of individual equality symbolises impermeable boundaries. This can have a negative impact on host country identification and also a positive effect on ethnic identification, because in search of a positive social identity immigrants withdraw in their own group. In a study on Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands Verkuyten (2006) has found that perceived permeability has a positive effect on host country identification and a negative effect on ethnic identification. Other studies have shown that exclusion measured as experienced discrimination has a negative impact on host country identification and a positive impact on ethnic identification (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Rumbaut 1994; Verkuyten and Nekuee 1999; Verkuyten and Brug 2002).

Of the three countries in this study, the Netherlands has most accommodated diversity. As shown in Chapter 2, the Netherlands has an extensive system of ethnic and religious consultative bodies and ethnic and religious groups can set up their own state-funded broadcasting corporations and (Islamic) schools. Until 2003 the integration requirements for naturalisation were modest. Immigrants also receive a high degree of individual equality. Dutch born children of immigrants can opt-in to Dutch nationality dependent on a successful public order investigation. Immigrants who came to the

Netherlands at a later age can naturalise after five years of residence. Non-citizens can work in all sections of the civil service with the exclusion of the police and army and have voting rights in local elections after five years of legal residence.

Immigrants and their descendents in France also enjoy a high degree of individual equality. French born children of immigrants automatically acquire French nationality at the age of majority. Immigrants can acquire French nationality after five years of residence. With the exception of a few cities, France does not have ethnic consultative bodies nor provides funds for ethnic broadcasting corporations. It tries to maintain a universal public sphere that is free of particularistic identities.

Both France and the Netherlands provide better legal protection against discrimination than Germany. It was not until 2005 that Germany implemented the European directive on discrimination. Germany also has the most difficult access to citizenship, though reforms in 1991 and 2000 facilitated citizenship access especially for the second generation. Both Germany and France have long had stronger integration requirements for naturalisation than the Netherlands (Bauböck *et al.* 2006). In Germany membership of an ethnic organisation was long seen as contra-indication of integration. Germany also has few accommodative policies. At the local level there are consultative bodies, but these are based on foreign citizenship, not on ethnic group membership as in the Netherlands.

Since the Netherlands provides most benefits and least costs of ethnic retention we expect identification with Turks to be highest in the Netherlands. The low degree of individual equality in Germany signals impermeable boundaries which we expect to lead to a higher degree of ethnic identification than in France. Therefore, the following hypothesis can be postulated:

H1: Identification with the ethnic group will be highest in the Netherlands, intermediate in Germany and lowest in France

Since the Netherlands and France provide a higher degree of individual equality than Germany, we expect that host country identification in these countries is higher than in Germany. Whether host country identification is higher in the Netherlands or in France depends on the effect of accommodative policies. This leads to two rival hypotheses. If accommodative policies have a negative effect:

H2A: Identification with the host country will be highest in France, intermediate in the Netherlands and lowest in Germany

If these policies have a positive effect:

H2B Identification with the host country will be highest in the Netherlands, intermediate in France and lowest in Germany

4.3 Data

In this chapter data from both the telephone survey and the in-depth interviews will be used, but only for the in-between and second generation. 796 respondents of the surveys were with members of the in-between and second generation. The demographic characteristics of the sample are similar across countries (see Appendix F). There are more people from East-Central Anatolia and Alevis in the German sample, but this will be controlled for in the regression analyses.

For this chapter we selected the in-depth interviews with respondents of the in-between and second generation who received at least part of their education in the host country. In total, 57 respondents are included in the analysis.³² The interviews were coded in Atlas.ti. The demographic characteristics of the sample are similar across countries, with the exception of origin region and religious denomination (see Appendix F). The German interview respondents are less prone to identify with Turks than the survey respondents. For identification with the host country the differences are small and in the same direction for each country; the interview respondents identify more with the host country than the average for the telephone survey.

4.4 Host country and ethnic identifications; the findings of the survey

Respondents to the telephone survey were asked about their identification with Turks and with the host country. ‘Turks’ is taken to mean all people who come from the country Turkey. Because of the sensitivity of the Kurdish question in Turkey, respondents were not asked which ethnic group they belonged to. Both identifications were measured with three items. These were: ‘To what extent do you feel [group member]?’; ‘To what extent do you feel connected to [group]?’; and ‘To what extent are you proud of being [group member]?’ Answer categories ranged from 1 ‘not at all’ to 5 ‘completely.’ Exploratory factor analysis showed a two-factor solution. The items form scales for host-country identification (Cronbach’s alpha 0.78) and Turkish identification (Cronbach’s alpha 0.68).

With a mean score ranging from 4.3 (SD: 0.05) in Germany to 4.5 (SD: 0.05) in the Netherlands, Turkish identification is high in all three countries. The cross-national differences were tested using a multivariate regression analysis. In this analysis several background variables were controlled for including the relative size of the Turkish community in the place of residence of the respondent. The analysis shows that the cross-

³² Some of the respondents who migrated as minors, and are therefore treated as members of the in-between generation, did not attend school in the host country. These respondents are not included in the analysis of the in-depth interviews.

national differences are not significant (see Table 4.1). The hypothesis on the cross-national differences in ethnic identification (H1) is therefore refuted. Neither cultural accommodation nor individual equality appears to have a significant impact on the level of ethnic identification of Turkish immigrants. People with post-secondary education and people who are employed were also found to identify less with Turks. Alevis and people from East-Central Anatolia were also found to have lower identification with Turks. This finding is possibly due to the fact that a proportion of them are of Kurdish origin and have an ethnic Kurdish identification rather than a Turkish identification.

	Ethnic identification		Host country identification	
Germany (Ref cat)	Ref.		Ref.	
France	.06	(.07)	.55***	(.10)
Netherlands	.06	(.07)	.49***	(.10)
East-Central Anatolia	-.15**	(.06)	.17*	(.08)
Alevi	-.39***	(.10)	.20	(.14)
Second generation	.03	(.06)	.16	(.09)
Female	-.07	(.05)	.02	(.08)
Married	.01	(.07)	.30**	(.09)
Education, none primary	Ref.		Ref.	
Secondary education	.02	(.08)	.48***	(.12)
Post-secondary education	-.26*	(.10)	.61***	(.15)
Working	-.13*	(.06)	.05	(.08)
Phone book sample	Ref.		Ref.	
Holiday sample	.17*	(.08)	-.02	(.12)
Snowball sample	.10	(.06)	-.06	(.08)
Share of Turkish immigrants	.02	(.02)	.00	(.03)
Constant	4.51***	(.13)	1.48***	(.18)
<i>Adj. R2</i>	.747		.749	
<i>N</i>	.07		.08	

Two-tailed t-tests, * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$


Table 4.1: Unstandardized coefficients of OLS regression of identification with Turks and with the host country (Standard errors in parentheses)

In all three countries, the level of identification with the host country is much lower than the ethnic identification. It ranges from 2.4 (SD: 0.06) in Germany to 2.8 (SD: 0.06) in both the Netherlands and France. Host country identification in Germany is significantly lower than in France and the Netherlands (see Table 4.1). The difference between France and the Netherlands is not significant. Both hypotheses H2A and H2B are partially confirmed. The higher degree of individual equality in France and the Netherlands indeed seems to lead to a higher degree of host country identification, than in Germany.

The cultural accommodation in the Netherlands seems to be neither a barrier nor a stimulus for host country identification. Respondents with a secondary or post-secondary education identify stronger with the host country, than those who did not attend secondary school. This suggests that prolonged school attendance as a form of host country socialization leads to higher identification (turning Turks into Frenchmen, Dutchmen and Germans). People from East-Central Anatolia - who showed lower Turkish identification - show a higher level of host country identification. Contrary to others studies (e.g. Portes and Rumbaut 2001) the difference between the second and the in-between generation is not significant.

When analysed separately the three items used to measure identification show an interesting pattern. Firstly, the difference between levels of connectedness with host country members and Turks is much smaller than the difference in feeling Turkish/host country member and especially pride in group membership (see Figure 4.1 and 4.2). Secondly, for Turkish identification, connectedness is the lowest scoring item, while for identification with the host country it is the highest scoring item.

Figure 4.1 Means by country on items for identification with Turks






Figure 4.2 Means by country on items for identification with host country

4.5 The role of exclusion and inclusion

We hypothesised that host country identification in the Netherlands and France would be higher than in Germany because of the more inclusive policies these countries pursued. We assumed that an inclusive policy translates in the majority population being more accepting of people of immigrant background as fellow citizens, and therefore less discrimination. To measure whether this is indeed the case, respondents were asked ‘to what extent do people in [country] perceive you as [host country member]?’. The same 5-point answer scale was used as for the identification questions. Respondents were also asked ‘Can you tell me how often you feel discriminated in [country] because of your origin or religion?’. The five-point answer scale ranged from 1 ‘never’ to 5 ‘all the time’.

The scores for ascribed host country identity are comparable to those of host country identification; ranging from 2.0 (SD: 0.07) in Germany to 2.7 in France (SD: 0.07). Multivariate analyses showed that respondents in the Netherlands and France feel significantly more often that they are seen as host country members than those in Germany ($p < .01$ and $p < .001$ respectively, table in Appendix G). The difference between France and the Netherlands is not significant. This is in line with our assumption that an inclusive policy is related to a higher degree of acceptance of immigrants by members of the host society. Experienced discrimination averaged 2.3 (SD: 0.08) in the Netherlands and 2.4 in both France (SD: 0.07) and Germany (SD: 0.08). Contrary to our expectation, perceived discrimination did not vary significantly between countries (table in Appendix G).

To see whether feeling accepted as a host country member and experienced discrimination affects the degree of host country identification and can explain the cross-national differences, we set up two models. The first model repeats the analyses with

country and demographic characteristics for each of the three items of host country identification. In the second model the variables 'being perceived as a host country member' and 'perceived discrimination' were added. We also added the three items of identification with Turks. This provides an additional test of the zero-sum hypothesis of identification. Although the country comparisons showed that the level of host country identification in the Netherlands is not lower than in France despite the former country's policies of accommodation, it does not necessarily follow that identification is not zero-sum. Results are presented in Table 4.2.

In line with Figures 4.1 and 4.2, the results show that the country differences are smallest for feeling connected to the host country and highest for being proud of being a host country member. Adding feeling perceived as a host country member, experienced discrimination and identification with Turks in the second model significantly increases the amount of explained variance ($p < .001$, see Table 4.2). The degree to which children of immigrants feel perceived as host country members has a positive impact on all three items. Discrimination only has a negative impact on feeling connected with host country members but not on feeling German, French or Dutch or on being proud of being a host country member.

The identification with Turks has no significant effect on the degree of connectedness with host country members. However, the degree to which people feel Turkish has a negative impact on the extent to which they feel themselves host country members and are proud of being a host country member. Though the effect is not large, it does provide some support for a zero-sum approach to identification.

In the second model the country differences for all three items are smaller than in the first model. For feeling connected to the host country they remain only marginally significant ($p < .10$). This provides support for the assumption that inclusion by the host country stimulates host country identification.

The cross-national differences for pride remain the largest of all three identification items. Probably this is also a reflection of the different degrees of national pride in the host population. In Germany national pride became tainted after the Nazi-era. In this sense a relatively low degree of pride of German immigrants can be seen as a sign of integration.

In the remainder of this chapter the focus is on the data from the in-depth interviews to further investigate the role of acceptance in host country identification and look for explanations for the relatively low levels of host country identification compared to Turkish identification.

	Connected		Feel		Pride	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Germany (ref)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
France	.31** (.11)	.19 (.11)	.55*** (.13)	.40** (.12)	.83** (.13)	.69*** (.13)
Netherlands	.30** (.11)	.21 (.11)	.49*** (.13)	.38** (.12)	.66*** (.13)	.55*** (.12)
East-Central Anatolia	.03 (.09)	.03 (.09)	.20 (.11)	.16 (.10)	.30** (.11)	.27** (.10)
Alevi	.14 (.16)	.05 (.16)	.27 (.19)	.09 (.18)	.29 (.19)	.19 (.18)
Second generation	-.07 (.10)	-.12 (.09)	.27 (.11)	.21 (.11)	.30** (.11)	.22* (.11)
Female	.14 (.09)	.03 (.08)	-.05 (.10)	-.19 (.10)	-.01 (.10)	-.13 (.10)
Married	.18 (.10)	.16 (.10)	.33** (.12)	.29* (.12)	.34** (.12)	.30* (.12)
None or primary education (ref)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Secondary education	.62*** (.14)	.53*** (.13)	.53** (.16)	.37* (.15)	.39* (.16)	.23 (.15)
Post-secondary education	.57** (.17)	.41* (.16)	.77*** (.20)	.46* (.19)	.59** (.19)	.32 (.19)
Working	.11 (.09)	.09 (.08)	.02 (.10)	-.05 (.10)	.07 (.10)	.02 (.10)
Phone book sample (ref)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Holiday sample	.05 (.13)	.01 (.03)	-.13 (.15)	-.15 (.14)	.00 (.15)	-.02 (.15)
Snowball sample	.03 (.09)	-.04 (.09)	-.09 (.11)	-.16 (.10)	-.05 (.11)	-.12 (.10)
Share of Turkish immigrants	-.01 (.03)	.01 (.03)	.01 (.04)	.04 (.03)	.02 (.04)	.05 (.03)
Perceived as host country		.24*** (.03)		.33*** (.04)		.29*** (.04)
Perceived discrimination		-.10** (.03)		-.02 (.04)		.00 (.04)
Feels Turkish		-.03 (.06)		-.14* (.07)		-.17* (.07)
Proud of being Turkish		.02 (.05)		-.05 (.06)		.02 (.06)
Connected to Turks		.04 (.04)		-.04 (.05)		.02 (.05)
Constant	2.37*** (.20)	2.12*** (.35)	1.20*** (.24)	1.86*** (.40)	0.65** (.24)	.91* (.40)
<i>Adj. R2</i>	.04	.12	.06	.18	.09	.18
<i>N</i>	699	699	700	700	689	689

Two-tailed t-tests, * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Table 4.2: Unstandardized coefficients of OLS regression of three items of identification with the host country (Standard errors in parentheses)

4.6 The interviews: homeland is not home

In the interviews the respondents were again asked about their identification with the host country and with Turks. As in the telephone survey the responses in general showed a strong identification with Turks. The majority (N=41) did identify with the host country but to a lesser extent than with Turks. The arguments behind the two identifications differed. The Turkish identity was mainly grounded in origin, primarily in having Turkish parents. Being Turkish is experienced as a biological identity; you are a child of your parents:

‘I know that my parents come from there, and I am simply from there, I cannot be a German, I am a Turk’

(Germany, second generation, male)

Many respondents wanted their children to preserve Turkish culture and identity. This attachment to Turkish culture seems to originate from the strong national self-awareness and pride of Turks. As one respondent put it; ‘[in] every Turk, nationalism flows through the veins.’ Being Turkish is an identity you inherited from your parents and a cultural one in which you should take pride. This explains the high scores in all three countries on the questions to what extent they felt Turkish and felt proud of being Turkish

The identification with the host country was based on living there, having grown up there, and attending school there. Many respondents had a better knowledge of the host country society and culture than of Turkish society and culture.

‘I can express myself better in German and, I mean, I grew up here, learned everything here. I know that on the 24th Christmas is being celebrated here and the other things, the Day of German Unity, I know the German ..., for example the German history better than the Turkish history’.

(Germany, in-between generation, female)

The identification with the host country thus had an experiential basis. Yet, why was the host country identification then so low? People’s identifications will be influenced, we reasoned, by their everyday experiences. Many live in segregated neighbourhoods and the majority of the respondents has a predominantly Turkish social circle. Differences in cultural values appeared to impede mixed friendships. Hence, the low identification with the host country is partly the result of self-chosen exclusion; they have little interethnic contacts and they feel a cultural distance with the host country. How about forced exclusion?

Although several respondents reported many instances of discrimination, this was not the general experience. Their identification with the host country is hampered by a more subtle lack of acceptance: lack of recognition. This is in line with the results from the survey that also show a larger effect of recognition than of discrimination. Asked about

identification with the host country, respondents in all three countries often reported that they do not feel accepted as host country members.

‘I live here, I have my residence here, I should be French. I do not feel excluded, I do my shopping, I go downtown, I do everything everybody does, but at those moments when people say ‘look you’re this’ then you wonder whether you’re really French. I vote, I listen to the news, I keep up to date on what happens in France, but unfortunately....’

(France, second generation, female)

‘But the first impression of people, who don’t know me, they see the dark skin, and they are always, no matter where I am, surprised. ‘You speak accent free German! Where are you from if I may ask?’ And then I amuse myself and say ‘I am from [name of German city]’. ‘No, I mean *originally*. You are so dark-skinned.’ [laughs] [...] I am surprised every time again, that people think that those who are dark-skinned cannot speak German. We grew up here. We have been here for thirty years!

(Germany, in-between generation, female)

Their dark hair and uncommon names, and for some women their headscarves, were generally taken as a sign of ‘foreignness’ no matter their passport, place of birth or language proficiency. Zhou and Lee (2007) refer to this as the ‘immigrant shadow’; the idea that all people with a certain physical appearance – in their study Asians and Latinos – are immigrants. They argue that questions on origin and compliments on language proficiency, that both hint at being perceived as immigrants, hinders the identification of these children of immigrants as ‘American’. The experiences of Turkish children of immigrants in Europe also reflect this immigrant shadow. Exclusion on the basis of physical appearance is more often cited in the Netherlands and Germany than in France. This possibly reflects a less ethnic or ‘thick’ national identity, but the fact that the French population is on average less light skinned and blond haired than the Dutch and German population, might also play a role.

The experience of exclusion made some respondents idealise Turkey and dream of one day ‘returning’. The majority however said they had no intention to live in Turkey. Most felt as much foreigners (and were treated as such) in Turkey as in the host country. The above might suggest that we are dealing here with an alienated group of people, identifying as Turks, yet not living in Turkey and not accepted by native Turks as countrymen and on the other hand seen as aliens by members of the host country and themselves not identifying with the host country identity. Yet, this is not the case. Coming back from a holiday in Turkey to the host country is perceived as coming home.

‘When I’m on holiday, I want to go back to Germany. Finally go home, to [place of residence]. I feel better there, I was born and raised there.’

(Germany, second generation, female)

‘When I’m in Turkey I really feel like being on vacation, of not being at home. And when I return to France I am home. It is true that you sometimes don’t completely feel at home, because you are sometimes viewed negatively. Nevertheless I feel more at home in France than in Turkey [...] In Turkey people have another way of dressing, talking. They are not like us.

(France, in-between generation, female)

The connection with the host country is most felt at the *local* level (Cf. Kasinitz *et al.* 2004: 15-16; Ehrkamp 2005). This sense of home is not only present among respondents that live in large cosmopolitan cities, but also among those who live in smaller towns and villages. The majority of respondents have lived in the same town since they arrived in the host country, or for the second generation, since their birth. This has created a strong sense of attachment to the host country at the town or even the neighbourhood level.

‘So you feel more at home in the Netherlands?’

Yes. More at home. More at home. Yes, because your neighbourhood, when I go to the other side of town...When I see the skyline of my neighbourhood I already feel at home’

(Netherlands, in-between generation, female)

So despite feelings of exclusion and strong attachments to Turkish identity, the majority of the respondents felt an affective connection to the host country. How can we account for this apparent contradiction? The German language knows several words for ‘home’ that have different connotations. *Heimat* evokes the idea of roots, of having been there forever (Räthzel 1994: 89). It is an idealized place. *Haus* or *Zuhause* more refers to the physical home but also to a place where one feels secure. It seems then that our respondents in Germany, but also in France and the Netherlands feel at home in the host country, yet could not and were not allowed to call it their *Heimat*.³³ As one respondent from Germany expressed it:

‘I say my *Heimat* is Kurdistan, my *Zuhause* is Germany. That is my opinion’.

(Germany, in-between generation, male)

33. Only one German respondent referred to Germany as her ‘*Heimat*’.

Therefore the respondents found the question 'Do you feel more a host country member or more Turkish' difficult to answer. And thus one French respondent answered:

'It is a mixture of both, if you'd like. We live as Turkish families in France.'
(France, in-between generation, female)

This problem seems to be that there is no appropriate conceptualisation for children of immigrants' feelings of connectedness with the host country. This explains the peculiar asymmetry in the connectedness-item that we found in the survey and also the much lower scores on the feel and pride items for host country identity than for ethnic identity. They feel connected to the place they grew up, but are not recognized by the host country as fellow citizens, and find it also harder to identify as host country members and take pride in that identity because of how they experience their Turkish identity. They feel Turkish, because their parents are Turkish, which makes not feeling Turkish and being proud of it a denial of their parentage.

4.7 Conclusion and discussion

In this chapter we examined the effect of conceptions of citizenship on the identification of the children of Turkish immigrants. We hypothesised that the higher level of accommodation of diversity in the Netherlands, would lead to a higher level of identification with the ethnic group than in France and Germany. The results from our survey did however not show significant country differences. Identification with Turks was high in all three countries. For identification with the host country, we predicted this would be lowest in Germany as the country that has pursued the most exclusionary policy. Depending on whether accommodation of diversity stimulates or hinders host country identification we predicted that it would be highest in the Netherlands or France. While overall host country identification is (much) lower than identification with Turks, the survey data showed that host country identification in Germany is significantly lower than in France and the Netherlands. However there was no significant difference between the Netherlands and France. We thus found no support for the assumption that the accommodation of diversity has an adversarial effect on host country identification. Though the accommodation of diversity does not impede identification with the host country, the results from Chapter 3 suggest that it might have a negative effect on other aspects of socio-cultural integration. No support was found for the assumption that the accommodation of diversity has a positive effect on host country identification either. It is possible that accommodation has a positive effect but, in the Netherlands it has been cancelled out by the negative discourse on immigrants since the Fortuyn revolt in 2002. A survey among immigrant youngsters in the Dutch city of Rotterdam in 1999 and 2006 however shows little change in host country identification (Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008). Discourse in France is not all that positive either. In the 2002 presidential elections extreme-right

politician Le Pen won seventeen per cent of the votes. In Chapter 7 more attention is paid to this alternative explanation.

At the individual level there is a negative relation between feeling Turkish and feeling, and being proud of being French, German or Dutch. This supports the idea that identification is zero-sum. However, the relation is modest. People who feel more Turkish tend to feel less French, German or Dutch, but this does not mean that they do not feel French, German or Dutch at all.

We investigated the extent to which the cross-national differences in host country identification can be explained by the degree of acceptance by host country members and experienced discrimination. We argued that an inclusive policy would translate into less discrimination and more recognition as fellow citizen. Though we found no significant cross-national differences in discrimination, German Turks did feel significantly less recognized as host country members than Turks in France and the Netherlands. Adding this variable to the regression analysis lowered cross-national differences. Our data therefore support the thesis, that the lower host country identification of Turks in Germany is partly an effect of its more exclusionary integration policy. Caution is warranted however, because the found differences between the countries are rather small and our expectations regarding the policy effects on ethnic identity retention were not upheld.

Identification with the host country and with the Turks was measured in the survey through three questions; to what extent do you feel, feel connected to and take pride in being Turkish/Turks and host country member/identity. The level of connectedness to the host country was not much lower than that of the connectedness to Turkey. Differences were much more pronounced for the degree to which respondents felt, and felt proud of being Turkish or a host country member. The data from in-depth interviews allowed a further exploration of this pattern. Identification with Turks is strong in the sense that is what the respondents are and what they take pride in, but to a lesser extent feel connected with. Turkey is not the world the respondents intimately know by experience. They often feel at least as much alien there as in their country of residence. Host country identification is weak in terms of what they feel they are and take pride in, yet stronger in terms of actual connectedness with the everyday world. They feel connected to the host country as the place where they grew up and spent their lives. In that sense the host country is their home. It is an identification however, that is primarily with a local, not a national identity.

Our respondents feel that since they are born out of Turkish parents, they *are* Turkish. Turkish identity is experienced as a matter of phenotype, ancestry and culture, hence as an ethno-cultural identity. But, so is the host country identity experienced by the host country majority population. At least, this is how we interpret the Turkish respondents' experience of not being recognized as fellow host country citizens. This was most felt in Germany, the country in which the policies grant the lowest degree of individual equality. However it was also frequently felt in the Netherlands and France, countries in which the policies express a more civic conception of citizenship. Though this civic conception of

citizenship is reflected in policies, everyday reality reflects a 'thick' notion of citizenship, which does not include people of a different ethnic origin, especially if they have a different skin colour or religion. This makes it hard for the children of Turkish immigrants to say they *are* French, German or Dutch. As Zhou & Lee write for the United States 'While the ability to claim multiple identities may be a fundamental part of the American identity experience for White ethnics, this privilege has not been extended to America's newest second generation.' Zhou & Lee continue: 'These constraints highlight the point that, if today's second-generation Asians and Latinos do not identify simply as American, it is not because they are failing to incorporate or because they are rejecting assimilation; rather, it is often because others do not view them as such.' (Zhou and Lee 2007: 201). We found that the respondents' weak identification with the host country is a result of both exclusion and self-exclusion.