

5. Rewarding integration? Citizenship regulations and host culture adoption of immigrants³⁴

Abstract

This chapter compares levels of host culture adoption of naturalised and non-naturalised immigrants in the Netherlands, France and Germany. Host culture adoption is measured by host country identification, proficiency and use of the host country language, and interethnic social contacts. Based on the assumption that easily accessible citizenship promotes host culture adoption, two hypotheses are tested. First, whether naturalised immigrants display higher levels of host culture adoption than non-naturalised immigrants. Second, whether immigrants in countries with few preconditions for naturalisation show higher levels of host culture adoption. We find that naturalisation is positively associated with host culture adoption only in those countries – France and Germany – that have traditionally required a certain degree of cultural assimilation from their new citizens. Regarding country differences, we find that Turkish immigrants in France show higher levels of host culture adoption on all four indicators. For host country identification, they share this position with Dutch Turks. The results show that limited cultural assimilation conditions tied to citizenship may be helpful in promoting host culture adoption, but also that the allowance of dual nationality does not have the negative effects that are sometimes ascribed to it.

³⁴ A revised version of this chapter has appeared as Ersanilli, Evelyn & Ruud Koopmans (2010) 'Rewarding integration? Citizenship regulations and socio-cultural integration of immigrants in the Netherlands, France and Germany' *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36(5), pp 773 — 791 special issue on 'Migration and Citizenship Attribution: Politics and Policies in Western Europe' edited by Maarten Vink . Copyright Taylor & Francis The article is available online at

<http://www.informaworld.com/smp/content~db=all?content=10.1080/13691831003764318>

We would like to thank Betty de Hart, Maarten Vink and the anonymous reviewer for their constructive comments and helpful suggestions.

5.1 Introduction

Since the turn of the century several European countries have introduced stricter socio-cultural integration requirements for naturalisation (e.g. Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany). Existing language requirements have been extended with formalised tests that sometimes also include a cultural section. In debates on changing the requirements for naturalisation two lines of argument are commonly used. Left-wing parties – such as the Social-Democrats and Greens in Germany and the Netherlands – argue that the acquisition of citizenship stimulates integration and therefore, access to citizenship should be easy. Granting immigrants citizenship means giving them a vested interest in society and signals acceptance. Conservative parties – such as the Christian Democrats in Germany and the Netherlands – tend to argue that citizenship should be the end-point of integration and only awarded to those who have made a conscious choice for their new country and can fulfil high integration requirements. In this view citizenship should be a reward for successful integration and also an incentive to integrate (see, e.g. Hailbronner 2006; de Hart 2005b; de Hart and van Oers 2006).

Despite cross-national convergence in citizenship laws, several significant differences remain (Howard 2005; de Hart and van Oers 2006). These differences allow an examination of the relation between citizenship regulations and the integration of immigrants. The European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index considers regulations that allow naturalisation after three years of residence, without any supplementary requirements such as language tests, and that accept dual nationality to be most favourable for integration (Geddes and Niessen 2005), but is this justified? This chapter addresses this question by investigating whether easily accessible citizenship indeed promotes higher levels of socio-cultural integration of immigrants. The focus is on socio-cultural integration because many countries have been implementing stricter socio-cultural requirements for citizenship access and debates about dual citizenship also focus on socio-cultural aspects of integration such as identification and language proficiency (see e.g. Staton *et al.* 2007). As explained in Chapter 1, we treat socio-cultural integration as a two-dimensional concept that can be divided into host culture adoption and ethnic retention. This chapter focuses only on host culture adoption since this dimension is most prevalent in political debates.

As shown in Chapter 2, the nationality and naturalisation policies in Germany, the Netherlands and France, display clearly different conceptions of citizenship. Until the 1990s, Germany had *ius sanguinis* based citizenship with high barriers to naturalisation. During the 1990 the barriers were lowered somewhat, and in 2000 a new Citizenship Law was introduced. Dual nationality is accepted only in a minority of naturalisations. In the Netherlands requirements for naturalisation were low until 2003, and dual nationality is mostly condoned. France unconditionally allows dual nationality. However it has traditionally imposed cultural requirements for naturalisation.

We use data from our cross-national survey on immigrants from two rural regions in Turkey, who either themselves migrated before 1975, or are the foreign-born children

of these first-generation guest-workers. The second generation born in the host country is excluded, because in the Netherlands and France, the strong *ius soli* elements in their citizenship laws have resulted in possession of host country citizenship for virtually the entire second generation (see Table F6 in the appendix). There is thus no empirical basis for a comparison of naturalised to non-naturalised members of the second generation.

In the following section, we discuss existing research on the relationship between naturalisation and integration and formulate two hypotheses to test the claim that easy naturalisation promotes host culture adoption. We then provide an overview of the naturalisation policies in Germany, the Netherlands, and France. Subsequently, the data and the operationalisation of variables are discussed, followed by the presentation of the results of the regression analyses with host country identification, host country language use and proficiency, and social contacts with host country ethnics as the dependent variables. We conclude that host country identification is indeed enhanced by easily accessible naturalisation, but, that linguistic and social integration are not. Naturalisation is positively associated with linguistic integration only in those countries that have traditionally required a certain degree of cultural assimilation from their new citizens. However, there is no indication that the allowance of dual nationality would be detrimental to host culture adoption.

5.2 Citizenship and host culture adoption

It has been observed that in recent naturalisation policy developments ‘the concept of “naturalisation as a means of integration” is apparently being replaced by another paradigm of naturalisation as the “crowning of a completed integration process”’ (Bauböck *et al.* 2006: 24). Both paradigms presume a link between naturalisation and integration, but in a different direction. Several studies have looked into the relation between integration and naturalisation. Some of them looked at measures of integration as determinants for naturalisation (e.g. Portes and Curtis 1987; Yang 1994; Constant *et al.* 2008), other studies have looked at the effects of naturalisation on integration (e.g. Bevelander and Veenman 2006; Fougère and Safi 2008). Both types of studies have found mixed results. In the United States, Yang (1994) found a positive relation between English competence and naturalisation, but Portes & Curtis (1987) found no significant relation between knowledge of English and the likelihood of naturalisation for Mexican immigrants. In Germany, Constant *et al.* (2008) found a positive effect of having close German friends both on the intention to naturalise, and on actual naturalisation for immigrants from Turkey and Yugoslavia. However, in the Netherlands Bevelander and Veenman (2006) found no significant relationship between contacts with Dutch natives and the odds of naturalisation for Turkish and Moroccan immigrants.

If a relationship between host culture adoption and naturalisation exists, it is of course important to know the direction of this relationship. One way of testing the direction of the relationship is using panel data (e.g., Portes and Curtis 1987). However, longitudinal

studies within one country are not well suited to answer the question that is central in public debates about naturalisation, namely whether naturalisation with minimal or with strict requirements has the strongest positive impact on host culture adoption. Even if for a certain country it is established that naturalisation has positive subsequent effects on host culture adoption, it does *not* follow logically from this that lowering the requirements for naturalisation and thus increasing the number of naturalisations will have positive aggregate effects on host culture adoption because the naturalisation effect may well depend on the strictness and type of criteria attached to naturalisation. Therefore cross-national analyses that compare countries with different naturalisation regimes are necessary to complement existing single-country studies.

Although the results of previous studies are inconclusive, not least because they lack a cross-nationally comparative component, for the sake of clarity we will take the view that easily accessible naturalisation promotes host culture adoption as a basis for formulating our hypotheses. If this view is correct, two things should follow. To begin with, immigrants who hold the nationality of the country of residence should display higher levels of host culture adoption in the sense of stronger identification with the country of residence, higher language proficiency and usage, and more social contacts with host country ethnics, compared to non-naturalised immigrants (H1).

While finding such an empirical pattern is necessary for accepting the claim that easy naturalisation promotes socio-cultural integration, it is not sufficient. A positive correlation between host country nationality and socio-cultural integration would namely also fit the opposite view that strict naturalisation requirements stimulate socio-cultural integration. We therefore must also look at the data from a cross-nationally comparative angle. If the view that easy naturalisation promotes host culture adoption is correct, we should find that immigrants in countries with accessible citizenship regimes display higher levels of host culture adoption than their counterparts in countries with restrictive citizenship regimes (H2).

5.3 Naturalisation policies in Germany, the Netherlands, and France

Of the three countries in this study, Germany has the most rigid naturalisation regime. It is probably the most cited example of an 'ethnic' citizenship regime. Reforms in 1991 and 1993 made naturalisation somewhat easier for both first and second generation immigrants. However, for the first generation with ten to fifteen years of residence, language knowledge as well as an 'orientation towards German culture' (*Hinwendung zum Deutschtum*) remained preconditions for naturalisation, although the strictness with which they were applied varied across the German federal states (Hailbronner and Renner 1998; Hagedorn 2001a). Contrary to the Netherlands, Germany does not allow recipients of welfare or unemployment benefits to naturalise, unless they 'cannot be held personally responsible' for this situation (Koopmans *et al.* 2005; Hailbronner 2006).

The citizenship law that came into effect in 2000 lowered the residence requirement to eight years and abolished the requirement of identification with the German culture. At the same time, language criteria were formalised and a declaration of loyalty to the German constitution was introduced (Groenendijk *et al.* 2000; Koopmans *et al.* 2005). Though immigrants are still required to renounce their previous nationality, the grounds for exemption have been broadened. Between 1987 and 1999 dual nationality was tolerated in 23 per cent of all naturalisations. Since the 2000 citizenship law, the average rate has increased. This rise is largely due to the automatic granting of dual citizenship to refugees (Green 2005). In 2005 the toleration rate of dual citizenship for all immigrants was 47.2 per cent, though for Turks it was only 15.5 per cent (Statistisches Bundesamt 2006). The implementation of the 2000 law did however not lead to a higher naturalisation rate. After the peak in 2000, the rate slowly declined again. In 2005 it was down to 1.7 per cent. Several authors have suggested that the long processing time of citizenship applications deters people from applying (Green 2005; Koopmans *et al.* 2005), but the newly implemented language and civic integration tests are also likely to have played a role.

Until 1994 the naturalisation rate for Turks was lower than the general rate, e.g. in 1990 it was as low as 0.1 per cent. In the 1990s the naturalisation rate rose. Between 1993 and 1995 the naturalisation rate of Turks almost tripled (Joppke 1999a). Many naturalised Turks reacquired Turkish nationality after receiving German nationality. With the 2000 nationality law, voluntary reacquisition of a foreign nationality resulted in the automatic withdrawal of the German nationality. Due to this new rule, an estimated 40,000 Turks lost their German nationality (Hailbronner 2006).

The Netherlands is the country that most clearly shifted from the citizenship-stimulates-integration view to the view that citizenship is a crown on successful integration. From 1983 until the mid 1990s the dominant view in the Netherlands was that citizenship acquisition stimulates host culture adoption (Heijs 1995; de Hart 2007). Therefore, the new Citizenship Act of 1985 lowered the requirements for naturalisation. First-generation immigrants can obtain citizenship after five years of legal residence. In the 1985 Citizenship Act having a reasonable knowledge of the Dutch language and being accepted in Dutch society were requirements for naturalisation (van Oers *et al.* 2006), but in practice there was only a modest informal language assessment, consisting of a few oral questions on name, address, year of arrival and year of birth (Cf. van Oers 2008). Between 1983 and 2003 less than two per cent of applications were turned down on grounds of insufficient integration (*ibid.*). In 1992 dual citizenship was introduced, which was followed by an increase in the naturalisation rate from 4.2 per cent in 1991 to 11.4 per cent in 1996 (see Table 2.1). The right to dual citizenship was however highly contested and in October 1997 the obligation to renounce prior citizenship was reinstated (van Oers *et al.* 2006). Nevertheless, there are many exemptions to the renunciation obligation and the law is not applied very rigidly. In 2006, 62.7 per cent of applicants kept their original nationality (van Oers *et al.* 2006), a significantly higher share than in Germany. In 2003 a new act

introduced a naturalisation exam that not only tests oral and written language skills at a much higher level than before but also includes questions on Dutch politics and society. People who qualify for Dutch nationality through option (elderly, Dutch born, and spouses of Dutch citizens) do not have to fulfil an integration requirement. The reform led to a decrease in naturalisations, because half of the applicants failed the exam (van Oers *et al.* 2006; Bauböck 2006). In 2005 the naturalisation rate was down to 4.1 per cent, which is however still average for European standards.

Until 1992 the naturalisation rate of Turkish immigrants was slightly below the Dutch average – 3.0 per cent in 1991. During the period of allowance of dual nationality from 1992 to 1997, almost 140,000 Turks – about half of all people of Turkish origin in the Netherlands – became Dutch citizens, compared to less than 14,000 between 1987 and 1992. Most of those who naturalised retained their Turkish nationality (Böcker 2004). This continued after the official reinstatement of the renunciation requirement. Between 1998 and 2006 the number of people holding both Dutch and Turkish nationality increased by almost 90,000 (CBS, Statline). Böcker and Thränhardt (2003a) calculated that in 2001 all naturalising Turks kept their Turkish citizenship.

For first-generation immigrants in France naturalisation is possible after five years of residence. There is no strict income requirement, but unemployment can potentially lead to rejection of the application. Applicants have to prove their language ability and sufficient assimilation. The assimilation requirement is part of French nationality law since 1945. In the 1950s sufficient assimilation mainly meant sufficient language knowledge, but in the 1970s when the number of non-European applicants for naturalisation increased sufficient assimilation also meant accepting French values. Wearing a headscarf was sometimes judged to be a sign of insufficient assimilation (Weil and Spire 2006). Between 1985 and 2003 about 25 per cent of applications were turned down. According to Weil and Spire (2007) 40 per cent of turned-down applications (i.e., 10 per cent of all applications) had to do with insufficient assimilation, five times as much as in the Netherlands. A 2003 law introduced knowledge of the rights and duties of citizenship as one of the criteria for assimilation into the French community. Despite low residence requirements and the full allowance of dual nationality the naturalisation rate in France is not very high; 2.5 per cent in 1990, increasing to 4.7 per cent in 2000 (see Table 2.1). However, this is in part explained by the fact that – unlike in the Netherlands – the second generation that obtains citizenship through *ius soli* is not represented in the French naturalisation statistics. A 1992 study by Tribalat showed that naturalisation among Turks was relatively rare. She estimates that by 1990 barely five per cent of the Turkish guest-worker migrants and their foreign born family members had acquired French nationality (Tribalat 1993). But as in Germany and the Netherlands, the naturalisation rate of Turkish immigrants in France rose during the 1990s, exceeding the average rate and reaching 5.5 per cent in 1999 and 6.1 per cent in 2005.

	France	Germany	The Netherlands
<i>Residence requirement</i>	5 years	10 years Since 2000: 8 years	5 years
<i>Language requirement</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes, simple oral test Since 2003 oral and written test
<i>Integration requirement</i>	Yes	Yes	Yes, simple oral test Since 2003 oral and written test
<i>Exclusion of welfare recipients</i>	No, but unemployment can negatively influence the decision	Yes, but with exceptions	No
<i>Allowance of dual nationality</i>	Unconditional	No Since 2000 exemption if: - recognised refugee - country of origin refuses to release or is unreasonable obstructive - significant disadvantages, in particular economic or proprietary disadvantages Länder differ in applied rigidity	1992-1997: Unconditional Since 1997 exemption if: - recognised refugee - origin country demands high fee - financial damage such as loss of inheritance or property rights - release only possible after military service - Citizenship acquired through option

Table 5.1 Overview of citizenship regulations

Table 5.1 summarises the citizenship regulations in the three countries. All three have made changes to their citizenship legislation over the past decades and in all countries both views on the relation between citizenship and integration have been present in political debates. Nevertheless, differences remain. France combines a short residence requirement and the allowance of dual nationality with fairly strong linguistic and cultural integration requirements and a strong *ius soli* for the second generation. Until 2003, the Netherlands had the lowest barriers to naturalisation with a short length of residence, minor integration requirements and a *de facto* acceptance of dual nationality. Germany has the highest naturalisation requirements and allows dual nationality only in a minority of cases. Thus, if Hypothesis 2 about the effects of accessible naturalisation is correct, we should find that levels of host culture adoption are highest in the Netherlands, intermediate in France, and lowest in Germany. The 2003 legislation change in the Netherlands is not likely to have had

a large impact on the respondents of this study since they are long-time immigrants and were eligible for naturalisation well before 2003.

5.4 Data and variables

Several studies have shown that naturalisation rates vary between origin groups within the same country of residence (Yang 1994; Staton *et al.* 2007; Bevelander and Veenman 2006; Diehl and Blohm 2003; Fougère and Safi 2008). To get a clearer view of differences between countries it is therefore best to study the same immigrant group in each country. As explained in Chapter 1, our study focuses on immigrants from two rural regions in Turkey who arrived before 1975 and their Turkish-born offspring. All respondents qualified for citizenship based on the length of residence criteria in their country of residence. It is important to emphasise that our survey did not aim to be representative for the Turkish populations in Germany, France and the Netherlands. Rather the aim was to create a cross-nationally comparable sample, thus allowing a better test of causal hypotheses than would have been possible with representative samples, which would have amounted to comparing apples and oranges, without being sufficiently able to control for their different properties.

Most previous studies used a limited operationalisation of host culture adoption. Yang's data only allowed him to look at English language competence (1994), Constant *et al.* (2008) only at having German friends. Bevelander & Veenman used a more elaborate operationalisation of socio-cultural integration by measuring identification with the host country, contacts with host country nationals and levels of modernity (2006). We measured host culture adoption with four indicators; host country identification, host country language use and proficiency, and social contacts with host country ethnics. Language is often cited as one of the most important aspects of integration. Insufficient language proficiency is seen as a threat to national cohesion and a cause of insufficient (economic) independence. We will examine the relationship between the possession of citizenship of the host country and language proficiency in the host country language and frequency of host country language usage. Frequency of using the host country language was measured by asking respondents which language they spoke most frequently in three different contexts, namely with their friends, partner and children: Turkish, French/Dutch/German, or both about equally often. The answers were scored 0 'mostly Turkish', .5 'equally often Turkish and French/Dutch/German' and 1 'mostly French/Dutch/German'. A scale was constructed based on the means of the three items (Cronbach's alpha 0.66). To measure host country language proficiency respondents were asked how often they experienced problems in understanding. Responses were measured on a five point scale ranging from 1 'never' to 5 'always'. This scale was reversed scored so that a higher score meant fewer problems and therefore a higher proficiency.

Loyalty has always been an important part of citizenship. The quintessential immigration country, the United States, has therefore since long demanded an oath of allegiance of its new citizens. Loyalty is operationalised as identification with host country

nationals (Germans, French, Dutch) and measured with three items: 'To what extent do you feel connected to [group]?'; 'To what extent do you feel [group member]?'; 'To what extent are you proud of being [group member]?'. Cronbach's alpha for identification with the host country is 0.78.

As a final indicator of socio-cultural integration into the host society, we will look at social contacts. Respondents were asked about the ethnic composition of the social group they went out with. The scores are 1 'predominantly Turkish', 2 'equally often Turkish and French/Dutch/German' and 3 'predominantly Dutch/German/French'.³⁵

The difference between naturalised and non-naturalised Turkish immigrants in each of the three countries is modelled by creating six dummy variables; naturalised immigrants in Germany, naturalised immigrants in the Netherlands, naturalised immigrants in France, non-naturalised immigrants in the Netherlands, non-naturalised immigrants in France, and non-naturalised immigrants in Germany. The latter serve as the reference category since our hypotheses predict they will have the lowest level of socio-cultural integration. In this way, we can investigate simultaneously the difference between naturalised and non-naturalised immigrants within a country, and the differences between countries. In addition to the regressions with non-naturalised German Turks as the reference category reported in the table below, we also ran regressions with the other five categories as reference groups in order to be able to test the significance of the difference between each pairwise contrast, e.g. between naturalised and non-naturalised immigrants in France, or between naturalised immigrants in the Netherlands and Germany. We report these significance levels in the text. The tables are included in Appendix H.

In addition, the analyses are controlled for individual-level factors that are known to influence host culture adoption and naturalisation (gender, generation, level of education, employment, and marital status). Generation is added as a dummy variable that distinguishes between immigrants who migrated as adults (the first generation) and those who migrated as minors (the in-between or 1.5th generation). Three additional demographic characteristics were controlled for, region of origin, religious denomination, and relative size of the Turkish immigrant community. Finally, we control for sample type. The phonebook sample serves as the reference category.

5.5 Results

The percentages of naturalised citizens in our sample are presented in Table 5.2. The data show the expected pattern with a high share of host country citizenship possession in the Netherlands and lower shares in France and Germany. The second column shows the percentage of people with dual citizenship among those who were naturalised. These data fit with the trends among immigrants in general and Turks in particular within the three

³⁵ The middle category includes a small number of respondents (n=49), who indicated that the majority of their social contacts were with members of immigrant groups other than Turks. We also ran the analyses excluding this group and found similar results as those reported below.

countries as displayed in Chapter 2. In the Netherlands and France about 90 per cent of naturalised Turkish immigrants retained their Turkish passport; in Germany only 24 per cent did so.

	Host country nationality (per cent of total)	Dual nationality (per cent of naturalised)
Germany	39.6%	24.4%
The Netherlands	82.8%	91.5%
France	36.0%	90.0%

Table 5.2 Possession of host country nationality and dual nationality by country

We now turn to the multivariate analysis to investigate how these different patterns of naturalisation have affected the socio-cultural integration of Turkish immigrants. Table 5.3 shows the results of ordinary least squares regressions with each of the four indicators of socio-cultural integration as dependent variables. Starting with host country identification, we find that in the Netherlands, the difference between naturalised and non-naturalised Turks is not significant. In France and Germany there is however a significant difference between immigrants who did and those who did not naturalise ($p < .001$, respectively $p < .05$). Thus in two of the three countries, these results provide support for the Hypothesis 1 that predicted a positive relationship between naturalisation and identification.

Turning to the cross-national differences addressed by Hypothesis 2, we see that identification with the host country is higher in France and the Netherlands than in Germany, regardless of naturalisation status (compared with non-naturalised Dutch Turks $p < .05$, all other differences with Germany $p < .01$). Identification of non-naturalised immigrants in the Netherlands is higher than of non-naturalised immigrants in France ($p < .05$), but for naturalised immigrants, the difference goes in the opposite direction ($p < .05$). These results largely support our second hypothesis; immigrants in countries with accessible citizenship regimes display higher levels of identification with the host society.

For frequency of speaking the host country language the results show a different pattern. In both France and Germany naturalised Turkish immigrants speak the host country language more often than those who did not naturalise ($p < .05$, respectively $p < .01$). In the Netherlands, however, the difference is not significant. Again the first hypothesis is only partly confirmed.

	Host-country identification		Freq. of using host country language		Host-country language proficiency		Social contacts	
Germany non-naturalised	Ref		Ref		Ref		Ref	
Germany, naturalised	.34*	(.14)	.09*	(.04)	.35*	(.14)	.08	(.09)
Netherlands, naturalised	.73***	(.12)	.03	(.03)	.13	(.12)	.13	(.07)
France, naturalised	1.06***	(.14)	.17***	(.03)	.40**	(.14)	.23**	(.08)
Netherlands, non-naturalised	.88***	(.19)	.00	(.05)	-.04	(.19)	.11	(.12)
France, non-naturalised	.50***	(.12)	.09***	(.03)	.09	(.12)	.15*	(.07)
Female	-.07	(.08)	.03	(.02)	.07	(.08)	.02	(.05)
Generation 1	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Generation 1.5	.12	(.11)	.14***	(.03)	.60***	(.11)	.11	(.06)
Education, none / primary	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Education, secondary	.37***	(.10)	.15***	(.02)	.97***	(.10)	.20***	(.06)
Education, post-secondary	.29	(.16)	.24***	(.04)	1.28***	(.16)	.33***	(.09)
Sunni	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Alevi	-.04	(.14)	.08**	(.03)	.01	(.14)	.05	(.08)
South-Central Anatolia	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
East-Central Anatolia	.23**	(.08)	.04	(.02)	-.01	(.08)	.07	(.05)
Married	.14	(.14)	-.26***	(.03)	-.18	(.14)	-.01	(.08)
Working	-.09	(.09)	.04*	(.02)	.18*	(.09)	.13*	(.05)
Phonebook sample	Ref.		Ref.		Ref.		Ref.	
Holiday sample	.10	(.13)	.06	(.03)	-.03	(.13)	.00	(.08)
Snowball sample	.03	(.09)	.01	(.02)	.13	(.09)	.06	(.05)
Share of Turkish immigrants	.01	(.03)	-0.01*	(.01)	.00	(.03)	-.01	(.02)
Constant	1.50***	(.20)	.21***	(.05)	2.35***	(.20)	1.16***	(.12)
<i>Adj. R2</i>	.13		.37		.40		.09	
<i>N</i>	646		645		645		626	

Two-tailed t-tests, * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Table 5.3: Unstandardised coefficients of OLS regression for four measures of socio-cultural integration

Regarding country differences, Turkish immigrants in France use the host country language significantly more often than their Dutch and German counterparts, regardless of naturalisation status. Non-naturalised French immigrants even use the host country language marginally more often than naturalised Dutch immigrants ($p < .10$). The differences between the Netherlands and Germany are not significant. Contrary to identification with the host country, frequency of speaking the host country language therefore does not display the pattern that Hypothesis 2 predicted, as Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands do not use the host country language more than their German counterparts, and significantly less than those in France.

The second language variable shows a similar pattern. It can be seen from the third column in table 5.3 that naturalised immigrants in Germany experience fewer problems with German than their non-naturalised counterparts. In France this difference is also significant ($p < .05$). However, the Netherlands again diverge from the expected pattern; there is no significant relationship between proficiency in the Dutch language and possession of the Dutch nationality. Again, we find support for Hypothesis 1 in Germany and France, but not in the Netherlands.

Cross-nationally, we find that naturalised Turks have fewer problems with the host country language in France than in the Netherlands ($p < .05$). Among the non-naturalised Turks we do not find any significant cross-national differences.

Finally, we look at social contacts with host country ethnics. In none of the three countries the difference in the extent of interethnic contacts between the naturalised and the non-naturalised is significant. In other words, we find no support for Hypothesis 1 in regard to this variable. Comparing across the three countries, we find that naturalised French Turks have higher levels of interethnic social contacts than the reference category of non-naturalised German Turks. The difference with naturalised Dutch Turks is also marginally significant. If we hold nationality status constant, we find no significant country differences among naturalised immigrants. Among non-naturalised immigrants, the only significant difference found is between French and German Turks. As far as the relatively low levels of interethnic contacts among German Turks are concerned, this result fits Hypothesis 2. However, the fact that interethnic contacts are somewhat more strongly developed among French than among Dutch Turks is not in accordance with this hypothesis.

5.6 Conclusions

Despite convergence, citizenship legislation still varies between countries. Moreover, European immigration countries still carry the imprint of the more strongly divergent policies of past decades. These differences are reflected in naturalisation rates and in the prevalence of dual nationality among the naturalised. In the Netherlands, which, at least until 2003, had the easiest access to naturalisation, the majority of Turkish immigrants have naturalised. In France the long-time presence of *ius soli* has led to a high degree of citizenship possession for the second generation, but despite a similarly short residence

requirement and the full allowance of dual nationality the naturalisation rate of Turkish immigrants is much lower than in the Netherlands. This is related to the much stricter linguistic and cultural assimilation requirements that applied to naturalisations in France compared to those in the Netherlands before 2003.

Based on the assumption that easily accessible naturalisation promotes host culture adoption, we formulated two hypotheses. The first implication of this assumption pertains to within-country differences, and states that naturalised immigrants should display higher levels of host culture adoption than those who did not naturalise. This hypothesis received support for the German and French cases regarding identification and language. Naturalised Turkish immigrants in France and Germany identified more strongly with the host country, used French or German more often and reported higher proficiency in it. In the Netherlands, however, Hypothesis 1 had to be fully rejected as we found no significant differences between the naturalised and the non-naturalised on any of the indicators of host culture adoption. This result reflects the absence in the Netherlands of significant linguistic and cultural assimilation preconditions for naturalisation until very recently. However, the absence of significant differences between the naturalised and the non-naturalised in the Netherlands also indicates that naturalisation has not had significant positive subsequent effects on the socio-cultural integration of those who became naturalised, as the argument that easy naturalisation promotes host culture adoption would have led one to expect.

The second implication of the assumption that easily accessible naturalisation promotes host culture adoption pertains to cross-national differences. Along the lines of the best practices for naturalisation recommended by the authors of the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index (Geddes and Niessen, 2005), it is implied that levels of host culture adoption should be higher in countries with high naturalisation rates and minimal naturalisation requirements. Hypothesis 2 therefore, stated that levels of host culture adoption should be highest in the Netherlands, intermediate in France, and lowest in Germany. This hypothesis could only be partly confirmed for identification with the host country, which was significantly stronger in France and the Netherlands than in Germany, both for the naturalised and the non-naturalised. The fact that levels of identification with the host country are not higher in the Netherlands than in France does not support the hypothesis, however. We find a similar though less outspoken pattern for interethnic social contacts, which are most frequent among French and least among German Turks, with Dutch Turks in between.

For the language variables we found no support for the second hypothesis whatsoever. Turkish immigrants in France, and not those in the Netherlands, turn out to have the highest levels of host country language proficiency and use. In the case of language use, this result applies both to the naturalised and the non-naturalised French Turks. Even non-naturalised French Turks use the host country language more often than naturalised Dutch Turks. Turkish immigrants in Germany and the Netherlands do not differ significantly regarding language use, but those in the Netherlands report somewhat less host

country language proficiency. The fact that Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands overall show the lowest levels of linguistic integration clearly contradicts Hypothesis 2.

Combining the results of the two hypotheses we can conclude that there is little support for the assumption that low barriers to naturalisation promote host culture adoption. If we compare the naturalised to the non-naturalised within countries, we find that the positive relationship between naturalisation and host culture adoption is strongest in France and Germany, and entirely absent in the Netherlands. In other words, precisely in the country with the easiest access to naturalisation, we find the least evidence of a positive impact of naturalisation on host culture adoption. If naturalisation has an effect on host culture adoption on the individual level, this effect is limited to the two countries that have made naturalisation conditional on a certain degree of linguistic and cultural assimilation.

The cross-national differences that we found did not provide much evidence for beneficial effects of naturalisation with minimal conditions, either. France, the country that has historically most emphasised linguistic assimilation as a precondition for citizenship, is also the country where Turkish immigrants display the highest levels of host language proficiency and usage. Conversely, the lack of emphasis on linguistic assimilation that long prevailed in the Netherlands has promoted lower levels of host country proficiency and usage. The only aspect of host culture adoption where Dutch Turks did perform similar to their French counterparts, and at a much higher level than German Turks, was host country identification. This aspect of host culture adoption, with the sense of belonging and acceptance that is attached to it, is of course not an unimportant dimension of integration and in that sense past Dutch naturalisation policies have at least achieved one of their aims. There is little reason to fear, however, that this positive effect will erode now that the Netherlands have made citizenship less easily accessible, particularly by introducing stricter language requirements. This policy shift brings the Netherlands close to the kind of naturalisation policies that France has long pursued, and as our results show levels of host country identification in France have not been harmed by such demands for assimilation to the dominant language.

Apart from the result for host country identification, there is a second reason why our results should not be taken as support for the view that host culture adoption is best promoted by very strict naturalisation requirements. Had we taken this assumption as the point of departure for formulating our hypotheses, we would also have found little support for it, as Germany, which clearly has had the most restrictive naturalisation regime, performs relatively poorly on all four indicators, particularly identification and interethnic social contacts. Our results rather indicate that the French combination of short residence requirements, strong *ius soli* elements – which of course do not affect our respondents directly, but may affect them importantly through their children – coupled with certain demands of linguistic and cultural assimilation, has been the optimal mix for promoting the host culture adoption of immigrants.

It is worth emphasizing that this French mix includes the unconditional toleration of dual nationality. Dual nationality is often framed in political debates as antithetical to host culture adoption. In full contradiction to this view, France, the only among our countries that unconditionally allows dual nationality, is simultaneously the country where the positive effects of naturalisation on host culture adoption are strongest, including a comparatively strong sense of identification with the host country. By contrast, Germany is the country that has the strongest restrictions on dual nationality, but this has not led to higher levels of adoption among German Turks than their French counterparts on any aspect of host culture adoption.

Of course, these results should be treated with some caution because our data pertain only to Turkish immigrants. Even though Turks are the most important immigrant group in Europe, this limits the generalisability of our findings. The naturalisation behaviour, as well as the determinants and consequences of naturalisation may differ for other immigrant groups. It is therefore important to extend this kind of study to other immigrant groups and to other immigration countries.

We see the cross-nationally comparative approach that we have followed in this chapter as an important complement to single-country studies of the relationship between naturalisation and integration. However, future work should try to combine the strengths of cross-national and longitudinal approaches. This would require cross-nationally comparable panel data containing information on immigrants before and after their naturalisation, and on a comparable group of immigrants in the same country who did not naturalise.