

## **7. Conclusions**

### **7.1 Introduction**

Immigrant integration features high on the political agenda in many European countries. As immigration increases and diversifies and as more and more European countries turn into countries of immigration, questions on how to integrate immigrants become more urgent. In addition to socio-economic aspects of integration, such as labour market participation and education, socio-cultural integration has become subject of particularly heated debate. Socio-cultural aspects of integration such identification, social contacts, language proficiency and cultural norms, are seen as important factors in socio-economic integration but also as vital to social cohesion in the host countries.

Over the past two decades there has been a steady stream of books and articles comparing integration policy regimes of Western (European) countries (e.g. Brubaker 1992; Castles 1995; Freeman 1995; Joppke 1999b; Favell 2001; Guiraudon 1998; Hagedorn 2001a; Koopmans *et al.* 2005). Part of the reason behind this large interest in policies, is the assumption that policies matter for immigrant integration. Several political philosophers have suggested that policies that involve the accommodation of diversity are 'best' suited to integrate immigrants (e.g. Kymlicka 1995; Parekh 2002). These 'best' policies are mainly deduced from an ethical framework. Projects such as the *European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index* (Geddes and Niessen 2005) that aim to stimulate 'best practices' in integration policies, are also based on a normative framework and not on knowledge of the impact of policies. There is in fact very little knowledge on the effects of policies on immigrant integration, specifically on socio-cultural integration. This dissertation seeks to contribute to political and scientific debates by examining the effects of policies on the socio-cultural integration of immigrants and their descendants.

Since countries have historically pursued different types of integration policies, a cross-national comparative design provides a good framework for investigation. This study focused on France, Germany and the Netherlands, three countries that have pursued different types of policies. Policies in France grant a relatively high degree of individual equality, meaning there is an open citizenship policy and good protection against discrimination. French policies have not been very accommodative of religious and ethnic diversity. With this combination of policies, France most approaches a universalist conception of citizenship. Dutch policies combine a high degree of individual equality with policies that accommodate diversity such as ethnic consultative councils, ethnic broadcasting corporations, the possibility for Islamic schools, and for a long time low linguistic and cultural requirements for naturalisation. This policy-mix approximates a multicultural conception of citizenship. Finally, Germany, has both a relatively low degree of individual equality, best exemplified by the long reluctance to stimulate naturalisation of

immigrants of non-German descent, and a low degree of accommodation of diversity. This policy mix best fits an assimilationist conception of citizenship.

Cross-national comparative studies are complicated by the high number of intervening factors such as differences in the composition of the immigrant population and different definitions of the populations concerned (foreign citizens, immigrants, or racial or ethnic minorities). To minimise the number of intervening factors a quasi-experimental research design was used. The target group was limited to Turkish immigrants from South-Central and East-Central Anatolia who migrated before 1975, and their descendents.

This dissertation was guided by two research questions:

1. *To what extent are there differences in the degree of socio-cultural integration of Turkish immigrants and their descendents in France, Germany and the Netherlands?*
2. *To what extent can cross-national differences in socio-cultural integration be related to differences in integration policies?*

Data were gathered in a nation-wide telephone survey in each country and subsequent in-depth interviews with a selected number of survey respondents. In the statistical analyses of cross-national differences, we controlled for several individual-level factors that are known to impact socio-cultural integration, such as generation, level of education, and residential segregation.

In this chapter I will first summarise the results on country differences in adoption and retention followed by the results on the relation between socio-cultural integration and policies. After that I will discuss several alternative explanations for the findings. These alternatives can be divided into explanations that are related to the relative position of the Turkish immigrant group (so-called 'community effects' van Tubergen 2004) and explanations that point to differences between the host countries other than policies. I will then discuss the results and point out some implications for theory and policy developments. Finally, I will mention some limitations of the study and make suggestions for future research.

## **7.2 Results**

Following Berry (1997; 2001) socio-cultural integration was measured along two dimensions: the degree of retention of the ethnic culture and the degree of adoption of the host country culture. Ethnic retention was measured as identification with Turks, Turkish language proficiency, identification with Muslims and the observance of Islamic religious practices. Host culture adoption was measured as identification with the members of the host society, host language proficiency, frequency of host country language use and social contacts with host country ethnics.

*Cross-national differences in adoption and retention*

In this section I will not only discuss the country differences that remained after controlling for individual level factors, but also the impact of several of these factors themselves. The overall level of retention is high in all three countries, particularly the identification with Turks. Multivariate analyses revealed no significant cross-national differences in the degree of identification with Turks or Turkish language proficiency. We did find significant effects of generation and level of education. The higher educated and the in-between generation identify less with Turks and speak Turkish less well. People who are active in the labour market and members of the second generation are also less proficient in Turkish.

People from East-Central Anatolia identify less with Turks and are less proficient in Turkish than people from South-Central Anatolia. This might be because a significant number of them belong to ethnic minorities such as the Kurds and the Zaza. In the survey ethnicity was not asked because of the sensitivity of the Kurdish question. However, results from the in-depth interviews indeed suggest that belonging to a minority and feeling discriminated by the Turkish state has a negative effect on identification with Turks. Alevi identify less with Turks than Sunnis. This might also be because they belong to a discriminated minority in Turkey.

Identification with Muslims is high in all three countries, but in the Netherlands it is significantly higher than in Germany. France takes an intermediary position. The observance of religious practices in both France and the Netherlands is higher than in Germany. As expected the degree of identification with Muslims and observance of religious practices is lower for Alevi than for Sunni. This is in part related to the absence of Islamic practices such as Ramadan and mosque visits in Alevism.

Identification with Muslims and the observance of religious practices are lower for people with a higher education and those active in the labour market. Members of the in-between generation identify less with Muslims than the generation of their parents. The share of Turkish immigrants in the place of residence has a positive impact on both aspects of religious retention. This might be because a larger community makes it easier to set-up religious organisations and mosques which in turn stimulate observance and identification. Alternatively, a larger community can lead to a higher degree of social control that enforces religiosity.

Levels of adoption are generally lower than those of retention, also for the in-between and second generation. In all three countries, the degree of identification with members of the host country is lower than the degree of identification with Turks. In France and the Netherlands host country identification is significantly higher than in Germany. The difference between the Netherlands and France is small and not significant. Education has a positive effect on host country identification, and there is also an increase from the first to the second generation. People from East-Central Anatolia have a higher degree of identification with host country members than people from South-Central Anatolia.

Proficiency in the host country language is significantly higher in France than in the Netherlands, with Germany taking an intermediate position. Host language proficiency significantly increases by generation and level of education. People active in the labour market also have a higher degree of proficiency.

Turkish immigrants and their descendants in France use the host country language significantly more often than those in the Netherlands and Germany. Nevertheless, in all three countries Turkish is the dominant language of communication with the partner, child and friends. Like proficiency, host country language usage increases by level of education and generation. For the in-between and second generation in France, the host country language is even the dominant language.

People from East-Central Anatolia and Alevis speak the host languages more often than people from South-Central Anatolia and Sunnites respectively. The share of Turkish immigrants in the place of residence has a negative impact on host country language usage. This might be because people are more used to speaking Turkish in an environment with many Turks.

Finally, the level of private social contacts with host country ethnics is higher in France than in the Netherlands and Germany. The in-between generation has more contacts with host country ethnics than the first generation, but the second generation does not. People with more education and people with a job have more private social contacts with host country ethnics. There are no significant effects of religious denomination or regional origin.

Overall significant cross-national differences were found for six of our eight measures of retention and adoption. The results are summarised in Table 7.1. The next step is to see to what extent these differences can be related to the integration policies of the host countries.

	<b>Low</b>		<b>High</b>
<b>Ethnic retention</b>			
Identification with Turks		D-NL-F	
Turkish language proficiency		F-NL-D	
Identification with Muslims	D	(F)	NL
Observance of religious practices	D		F-NL
<b>Host culture adoption</b>			
Identification with host country members	D		F-NL
Host country language proficiency	NL	(D)	F
Host country language use	NL-D		F
Social contacts with host country ethnics	D-NL		F

*Table 7.1 Summary of results. Countries between parentheses do not significantly differ from the other two countries.*

*The effects of policies on adoption and retention*

In Chapter 1 I formulated several hypotheses about the relationship between the two dimensions of conceptions of citizenship (individual equality and accommodation of diversity) on the one hand and the dimensions of socio-cultural integration (adoption and retention) on the other. I predicted that accommodation of diversity has a positive impact on ethnic retention because it increases the benefits and lowers the costs. Theories about the relation between the accommodation of diversity and host culture adoption led to two rival hypotheses. Following political philosophers and social-psychologists I predicted a high degree of accommodation of diversity can stimulate host culture adoption because it lowers the emotional costs. Conversely the argument of the main-stream in European political debates led to the hypothesis that a high degree of accommodation of diversity has a negative impact on adoption because it decreases the material benefits.

For individual equality, I predicted that a high degree will have a positive impact on host culture adoption because it shows permeability of the host country society. This effect is strengthened if host society members adopt the conception of citizenship that is expressed by the policies and are more open towards immigrants. A low degree of individual equality can on the other hand lead to reactive ethnicity, stimulating a higher degree of ethnic retention. Again this effect might be increased if less individual equality in policies also leads to the host society members being less open towards immigrants.

As shown in Chapter 2 the policies that France has pursued over the last decades are characterised by a relatively high degree of individual equality and a low degree of accommodation of diversity. German policies reflect a relatively low degree of both individual equality and accommodation of diversity. In the Netherlands, finally, policies have demonstrated both a relatively high degree of individual equality and of accommodation of diversity. Combining the policy differences with the hypotheses of the theoretical model led to the expectation that ethnic retention is highest in the Netherlands, intermediate in Germany and lowest in France. For adoption I expected the lowest level in Germany. Depending on the effect of accommodation of diversity on adoption, I expected that adoption would either be highest in France or in the Netherlands.

As Table 7.1 shows, I found limited support for the hypothesis on cross-national differences in ethnic retention. In line with this hypothesis, identification with Muslims and the observance of religious practices are highest in the Netherlands. However contrary to the hypothesis, they are lowest in Germany, and not in France. Observance of religious practices is even higher in France than in Germany. For the other two measures of ethnic retention I did not find any cross-national differences. The results provide no support for the assumption that a lower degree of individual equality leads to more retention and only minimal support for the assumption that the accommodation of diversity leads to more ethnic retention.

With regard to all four indicators of adoption, France has the highest score. For identification with host country ethnics it shares this position with the Netherlands. This

supports the hypothesis that individual equality has a positive effect on host culture adoption. We have found no support for the hypothesis that the accommodation of diversity leads to a higher degree of host culture adoption. The Netherlands does not outperform France on any of the indicators of host culture adoption. Quite to the contrary, the higher degree of host country language proficiency, host country language use and social contacts with host country ethnics in France than in the Netherlands supports the hypothesis that the accommodation of diversity has a negative effect on adoption.

In Chapters 4 through 6 I have further examined the mechanisms through which the conceptions of citizenship in policies influence adoption and retention. Chapter 4 focused on the identification with the host country of the in-between and second generation. We found that the relatively low level of identification with members of the host country compared to the level of identification with Turks is a result of both exclusion and self-exclusion. The lower level of host country identification in Germany compared to France and the Netherlands can indeed be attributed to a lower level of perceived permeability. Respondents in Germany felt less accepted by members of host society than those in France and the Netherlands. However, also in France and the Netherlands the respondents indicated that they do not always feel accepted as host country members. Even though the policies in these two countries have a civic nature, the conceptions of citizenship of the members of the host society still have an ethnic component. Especially in Germany and the Netherlands, people with 'dark hair' are considered to be foreigners. This has been called the 'immigrant shadow' (Zhou and Lee 2007).

Identification with the host country is also limited by the strong sense of ethnic identity that the respondents were given by their parents and by a wish for cultural retention. Many respondents have a predominantly Turkish social circle not (only) because they grew up in segregated areas but also because they feel more comfortable around other Turks. In the in-depth interviews many respondents said that they wanted their children to preserve the Turkish language and identity. One of the reasons for the absence of cross-national differences in Turkish identity and language proficiency might lie in this strong sense of ethnic self-awareness and national pride. As one of the respondents framed it 'every Turk is a nationalist'. Though both exclusion and self-exclusion prevent the children of Turkish immigrants from identifying themselves as a host country member, they do feel connected to the country they grew up in. This connection runs primarily through the place of residence that is frequently considered 'home'.

Chapters 5 and 6 focused on the effects of citizenship acquisition policies from both a quantitative and a qualitative angle. In Chapter 5 the role of naturalisation requirements on host culture adoption was examined. To determine whether easily accessible citizenship, i.e. low cultural requirements, low residence requirements and the acceptance of dual citizenship, promotes host culture adoption we tested two hypotheses. First, we examined whether naturalised immigrants show higher levels of host culture adoption than non-naturalised immigrants. Second, whether immigrants in countries with

few preconditions for naturalisation have higher levels of host culture adoption. France and Germany have both had more stringent language and assimilation requirements than the Netherlands. In 2003 the Netherlands introduced a naturalisation test that demands a high level of language proficiency and societal knowledge. However the vast majority of our respondents - and of the Turkish-origin population in the Netherlands - had already naturalised in the 1990s, meaning the new rules did not affect them. France has a shorter residence requirement than Germany, and unconditionally allows dual nationality whereas Germany has a renunciation requirement with a limited number of grounds for exemption. The hypotheses were tested for all four measures of adoption. The second generation was excluded from the analyses because Dutch and French citizenship regulations have led to a near maximum degree of host country citizenship for this generation which makes it impossible to examine the difference between people with and without host country citizenship.

In the Netherlands we found no differences between naturalised and non-naturalised immigrants on any of the measures of adoption. In Germany and France, the two countries that have applied higher assimilation and language requirements than the Netherlands, we did find a positive association between naturalisation and three of the four measures of host culture adoption. Only for the degree of interethnic social contacts no relationship with citizenship status was found in any of the countries.

As demonstrated in Chapter 3, overall levels of host culture adoption are highest in France. Though the degree of host country identification in the Netherlands is equally high as that in France, these findings provide no support for the hypothesis that accommodation of diversity (in the form of low cultural requirements for naturalisation) stimulates host culture adoption. The results are more in line with the hypothesis that a lack of cultural requirements for access to rights (as those conferred through citizenship), has a negative impact on adoption, at least in the form of host country language proficiency and use.

The results also provide support for the hypothesis that a low degree of individual equality (i.e. relatively high residence requirements and limited acceptance of dual citizenship) decreases host culture adoption. Even though in Germany naturalisation is positively related to host country identification, the level of host country identification of naturalised Turkish immigrants in Germany is still lower than that of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands and France. The general levels of host country language use and interethnic social contacts are also lower than in France. The differences between France and Germany provide no support for the often-made assumption that the allowance of dual nationality (which is unconditional in France and limited in Germany) has a negative effect on host culture adoption.

In the final empirical chapter the role of material and emotional costs and benefits in naturalisation decisions in France, Germany and the Netherlands was examined. In the in-depth interviews, respondents were asked about their citizenship status and their reasons for naturalisation or remaining foreigners. In line with other studies on naturalisation

motives, I found that instrumental motives play a more important role than emotional ones. In general respondents felt that citizenship provides few benefits; the naturalisation decision is therefore primarily a function of the costs. This explains why the level of host country citizenship is so much higher in the Netherlands than in France and Germany, even though the benefits of naturalisation are lower. In the Netherlands, the relatively banal benefit of visa-free travelling was often enough an incentive for naturalisation. Obtaining voting rights, by contrast, did not figure prominently among the list of perceived benefits of naturalisation in any of the countries.

Emotional reasons for naturalisation are more present in France and Germany than in the Netherlands, which reflects the way in which citizenship has been framed in the national political debates. In Germany, however, several respondents said that naturalisation has not made them German because Germans still see them as foreigners. The results give a mixed view of the role of dual citizenship in naturalisation decisions. It seems to play a role, but a modest one.

Many of the cross-national differences in the results can be traced back to differences in policies. Overall the results from both the survey and the in-depth interviews, support the hypothesis that policies that grant a high degree of individual equality have a positive impact on adoption. Though a low degree of individual equality and a contingent lack of acceptance by the host society has a negative impact on adoption, the results provide no evidence for an increased degree of retention. The effects of accommodation of diversity on retention are modest; we only find some cross-national differences for religious retention. The results provide more support for the assumption that accommodation has a negative impact on adoption than a positive impact. The findings from Chapter 6 nuance the potential 'power' of naturalisation requirements to influence adoption. Most immigrants do not think that host country citizenship offers great benefits; it is therefore but a modest 'carrot' for adoption.

### **7.3 Alternative explanations**

Since this study includes only three countries it is not possible to rigidly test the effects of different types of policies in a multivariate or multilevel analyses. Even though the results provide support for the hypotheses about the effects of policies of individual equality or accommodation of diversity on adoption and retention, the possibility that these differences are caused by other differences between the three countries should be considered. I will now discuss several alternative explanations and investigate to what extent they can equally or more plausibly account for the patterns in the results. Broadly two types of alternative explanations can be distinguished. The first type argues that the results are not due to differences between the three countries, but to the relative position of the Turkish immigrant group (so-called 'community effects', van Tubergen 2004). The second group of alternatives does assume that the found differences can be attributed to the destination countries, but not to conceptions of citizenship that are reflected in policies.

*Community effects*

## 1. Visibility and stigmatization

The lower degree of host culture adoption in Germany compared to France can be due to the fact that in Germany Turkish immigrants are a large and negatively viewed group. This can lead to more discrimination, which in turn can hinder adoption. In France immigrants from the Maghreb, and in particular from Algeria, are most prominent. In the Netherlands, Turkish immigrants are the largest non-western immigrant group, but the slightly smaller Moroccan population has become the main target of anti-immigrant sentiments. If the relatively low degree of adoption in Germany is due the higher levels of stigmatization and visibility of Turks, then Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands and France should show higher levels of adoption than respectively Moroccan or Maghrebian immigrants. This expectation is contradicted by studies in both countries. Studies in the Netherlands show a higher degree of interethnic contacts and a slightly higher degree of host country identification among Moroccan immigrants than among Turks (see e.g. Dagevos *et al.* 2007). In France, a study by Michele Tribalat in the early 1990s revealed that Turkish immigrants have a (much) lower degree of adoption than Maghrebian immigrants. They spoke mostly Turkish, and frequented a mainly Turkish social circle (Tribalat 1995). Data from the EFFNATIS project show that Maghrebian youth in France has a higher degree of host country identification than Turkish youth in Germany, no matter their citizenship status (Tucci 2008). The higher visibility of the Turkish immigrant population in Germany can therefore not plausibly explain the cross-national differences that we have found.

## 2. Residential segregation

Cross-national differences in adoption and retention might also be caused by differences in the level of residential segregation. Immigrants who live in areas with a higher concentration of co-ethnics and fewer host country ethnics can experience more social pressure towards retention and fewer opportunities for interaction with host country ethnics that could lead to adoption.

The share of Turkish immigrants in France is much lower than that in Germany, which could mean that in general Turkish immigrants are surrounded by fewer co-ethnics. In the multivariate analyses this was taken account of by controlling for the relative size of the Turkish population in the respondents' place of residence. We found that the relative size of the Turkish community has a positive impact on identification with Muslims and religious observance and a negative impact on the usage of the host language. Nevertheless, the above cited cross-national differences exist even after controlling for this factor.

It could be that it is not the relative size of the Turkish population in the place of residence that matters, but the level of concentration within the neighbourhood. A study in the Netherlands by Gijsberts and Dagevos (2007) shows that interethnic social contacts are negatively influenced by concentration at the neighbourhood level but not by concentration at the city level. There is little data that allow for a cross-national comparison of the level

of concentration of Turkish immigrants on the neighbourhood level. Comparison is complicated by the differences in definitions (foreigners, immigrants, ethnic minorities) and the scale of comparison. Segregation indices are sensitive to the size of the measurement units (city blocks, neighbourhoods, districts). Finally, segregation also varies within countries between cities (see e.g. Musterd 2005; Özüekren and van Kempen 1997).

The data that are available suggest that segregation of Turkish immigrants is lower in Germany than in the Netherlands (Musterd 2005). This is both due to different structures of the housing market as to different anti-segregation policies. Whereas Germany used quota to limit the share of foreigners in certain neighbourhoods, similar plans in the Netherlands were blocked by the courts (Ireland 2008; Musterd 2003). The higher degree of segregation in the Netherlands might explain why, despite policies of individual equality and accommodation of diversity, Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands show comparable levels of linguistic and social adoption as Turkish immigrants in Germany.

Based on a comparison of segregation statistics in France and Germany, Tucci (2008) concludes that concentration of people of the same national origin is higher in France than in Germany. In addition the segregated neighbourhoods in France are often in the *banlieue* that are further removed from the inner cities than the segregated neighbourhoods in Germany. Differences in segregation might explain the higher degree of religious retention in France compared to Germany. However for adoption, the higher degree of segregation in France is more likely to attenuate than to be the cause of the lower levels of adoption in Germany. All in all differences in residential segregation might explain some of our findings, but not more plausibly than differences in policy types.

### 3. Selective return-migration

After the end of guest-worker recruitment, Turkish migration-streams to Germany, the Netherlands and France ran a different course. Germany has seen more return migration and less immigration than France and the Netherlands (see also Chapter 1). By design, we controlled for differential selection of post-1975 immigrants. We were however not able to control for return-migration. If return-migration is not random but selective, it is likely that return-migration is more common among the immigrants who have least taken root in the host country, and show the highest levels of retention and lowest levels of adoption. Since Germany has a higher level of return-migration than the Netherlands and France, yet a lower level of adoption, selective return-migration is an unlikely explanation of the found cross-national differences.

#### 4. Different regional origin of national Turkish immigrant populations

Even though we compared Turks from the same regions of origin in each country, this does not rule out that the regional composition of the Turkish immigrant population at large has an effect on adoption or retention. Data from the in-depth interviews show that the origins of the other Turkish immigrants in the respondent's place of residence can have an impact on adoption and especially on retention. For instance, in places with many Alevi or Christian-Orthodox Turks there is less social pressure towards wearing a headscarf than in places with many Turks from religiously conservative regions. If it is true that Turkish immigrants in Germany come from more western and less religious regions than those in France and the Netherlands, this could explain their lower level of religiousness. However, as we have seen, regional origin and religious denomination are not only negatively related to retention, but also positively related to adoption. If the low level of religious retention in Germany is caused by a relatively high share of Turkish immigrants from western and less religious regions, we would expect to see higher levels of adoption. This is however not the case. Therefore, differences in composition of the Turkish immigrant population do not provide a good explanation of the pattern of cross-national differences.

#### *Destination effects other than conceptions of citizenship*

##### 1. The school system

Maurice Crul has pioneered the role of the education system and school-work transitions in explaining the labour market integration of immigrant youth (see e.g. Crul and Vermeulen 2003; Crul and Vermeulen 2006). One could argue that the school system does not only play a role in labour market integration but also in adoption and retention. In France the education system has long been attributed an important role in immigrant integration (Brubaker 1992). Schiffauer *et al.* (2004) have shown that schools are an important place of transmission of national conceptions of citizenship.

In France most children, including the children of immigrants, start with education at the age of three and continue attending school full-time until the age of eighteen. In Germany on the other hand, many children do not start school until the age of six and primary school is mostly only half days. The Dutch schooling system most approaches the French system, with most children starting school at the age of four. All in all, children in France spend significantly more time at school than those in Germany. More time spent at school, means more exposure to the host culture, which might lead to more adoption, and less time spent at home, which might lead to less retention.

I cannot control for the number of hours the respondents spent in host country schools. Therefore all analyses were rerun including only the people who migrated after the age of five. This excludes the effect of the two years that children of immigrants in France spend at the kindergarten (*maternelle*). The cross-national differences remained the same, except for the degree of private social contacts with host country ethnics. For this variable, it is however not the difference between France and Germany that disappears but the

difference between France and the Netherlands. It turns out that the low degree of social contacts with host country ethnics in the Netherlands is mainly present among the second generation and those who arrived before schooling age.

## 2. Cultural distance

The Dutch sociologist Jan Willem Duyvendak (2004) has suggested that the progressive cultural homogeneity in the Netherlands can have a negative effect on immigrant integration. The Dutch progressive consensus on issues such as gay rights, abortion and euthanasia enlarges the cultural distance with immigrants who come from countries with less progressive views. Cultural distance complicates social interaction and can have a negative effect on host culture adoption. Ghorashi also argued that one of the reasons that Iranian female immigrants feel more at home in California than in the Netherlands is because Californian culture more approaches Iranian culture (2001). A study by Demant indicated that the differences in values between immigrants and natives is larger in the Netherlands, than in Germany and that this can be attributed to the progressiveness of the Dutch natives (2005). This difference in cultural distance leads to the expectation that host culture adoption is higher in Germany than in the Netherlands, which according to our data never the case. Nevertheless cultural distance might explain the higher level of adoption in France compared to Germany and the Netherlands.

The best way to test this theory would be to compare the attitudes of the respondents in our sample to a group of natives for each of the three countries in our study. Since natives were not surveyed, data from the European Value Survey will be used. The European Value Survey collects data on attitudes of people in most European countries including Turkey. Table 7.2 presents a rough comparison of the 'cultural distance' between Turkey and the three host countries for three domains; family and gender, religion, and the acceptance of certain actions such as homosexuality and euthanasia. The cultural distance is calculated by subtracting the mean opinion in Turkey from the mean opinion in the host country. The largest cultural distance scores are printed in bold, the smallest are underlined.

Overall, the table shows a large cultural distance between Turkey on the one hand and France, Germany and the Netherlands on the other. However, the cultural distance between Turkey and the Netherlands is not unambiguously larger than that between Turkey and France or Germany. This brief overview gives little support for the idea that a larger cultural distance is the reason between the relative low level of adoption and high level of retention in the Netherlands.

	France	Germany	Netherlands
<b>Family and gender</b>			
Disapprove of woman as single parent <sup>1</sup>	<b>-62.6%</b>	-55.0%	<u>-52.5%</u>
Men make better political leaders than women do <sup>4</sup>	<u>-40.2%</u>	-42.6%	<b>-43.8%</b>
University is more important for boy than girl <sup>4,5</sup>	-13.0%	<u>-5.0%</u>	<b>-14.4%</b>
A woman needs children to be fulfilled <sup>1</sup>	<u>-4.7%</u>	-28.0%	<b>-65.5%</b>
A man needs children to be fulfilled <sup>3, 5</sup>	<b>-66.7%</b>	<u>-26.6%</u>	-65.1%
<b>Religion</b>			
Is a religious person <sup>4</sup>	-35.7%	<b>-39.7%</b>	<u>-25.7%</u>
Raised religiously <sup>2</sup>	-6.8%	<b>-15.1%</b>	<u>-6.5%</u>
Politicians who don't believe in God unfit for public office <sup>3, 5</sup>	-51.6%	<u>-44.0%</u>	<b>-59.1%</b>
Religious leaders should not influence government <sup>3, 5</sup>	+9.3%	<u>-1.5%</u>	-12.4%
<b>Justifiable acts<sup>4, 6</sup></b>			
Homosexuality	<u>+56.2%</u>	+57.0%	<b>+69.5%</b>
Prostitution	<u>+14.2%</u>	+29.2%	<b>+46.50%</b>
Abortion	<b>+49.4%</b>	<u>+33.0%</u>	+41.70%
Divorce	<b>+41.0%</b>	+40.3%	<u>+37.40%</u>
Euthanasia	<b>+49.8%</b>	<u>+25.0%</u>	+46.8%

Table 7.2 Differences between average opinion in Turkey and in France, Germany and the Netherlands. Largest differences printed in bold, smallest differences underlined

<sup>1</sup> Average of waves 1990 and 1999-2001

<sup>2</sup> Wave 1990

<sup>3</sup> Wave 1999-2001

<sup>4</sup> Wave 2005

<sup>5</sup> Agree or agree strongly

<sup>6</sup> Answers 6-10 of a 10-point scale

Source: European Value Study, waves 1990, 1999- 2001, 2005

### 3. Discursive exclusion or reactive ethnicity

As mentioned in the first two chapters, the Netherlands has recently seen a shift in political discourse from an accommodative stance, to a frequent blaming of immigrants for their own disadvantaged position and seeing them as cause of problems for society, particularly for social cohesion and safety. In this discourse the culture of immigrants is seen as a source of many of the integration problems. Even though Dutch policies still most approach a multicultural conception of citizenship (see Chapter 2), it might be that the levels of adoption and retention of Dutch immigrants are more affected by the change in discourse than by the relative continuity in policies. Reactive ethnicity theory argues that anti-

immigrant sentiments in public discourse can lead immigrants to reinforce their ethnic identity and turn away from mainstream society (see e.g. Portes and Rumbaut 2001).<sup>46</sup> To plausibly argue that the relatively low levels of adoption and high levels of retention in the Netherlands are not caused by policies that accommodate diversity but by a shift in discourse that has led to a reactive ethnicity, two conditions need to be met. First, the change in discourse must have led to a decrease in adoption and an increase in retention in the Netherlands. Second, discourse in the Netherlands must be more negative than that in France and Germany.

Identity is arguably the most flexible of the measures of socio-cultural integration. It is 'easier' to identify with a different group than to change language capabilities or one's circle of friends. Reactive ethnicity theory also mainly predicts an identity shift, though behavioural shifts (choice of language, observance of customs) can follow. It is however precisely on host country identification that Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands are on the same level as those in France and even on a higher level than those in Germany. For ethnic identity there are no cross-national differences. A study among Turkish and Moroccan origin youth in the city of Rotterdam showed a modest *rise* in the identification with the Netherlands between 1999 and 2006 (Entzinger and Dourleijn 2008). The study also showed a decrease in Muslim identification of Turkish youth. However in support of the reactive ethnicity argument the Entzinger and Dourleijn study did indicate a rise in religious observance. The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) regularly surveys immigrants in the Netherlands on different aspects of integration. Dagevos *et al.* (2003) investigated the developments on several measures of adoption and retention from 1991 to 2002. The points of measurement are 1991, 1994, 1998 and 2002. Over the entire period, there was an increase in host language proficiency and usage. There are fluctuations in the share of Turkish immigrants who never receive visits from host country ethnics or mostly spend time with members of their own group. Over the entire period there was a decrease in contact with host country ethnics. The authors of the report suggest this might be due to the continuing high influx of marriage migrants who are known to have fewer contacts to host country ethnics, an increase in residential segregation that lowers the odds of coming into contact with host country ethnics, or more negative attitudes on the part of host country ethnics. They explicitly conclude that there is no evidence of a reaction to the events in 2002, since the decrease in interethnic social contacts already started between 1994 and 1998.<sup>47</sup> On the whole, longitudinal data provide limited support for the assumption that the change in discourse in the Netherlands has led to a reactive ethnicity.

Since there are no recent systemic cross-national data on the discourse on immigrants in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, it is hard to determine whether discourse in the Netherlands has been more negative than in the other two countries. However, there are serious reasons to doubt this. A study by Koopmans *et al.* (2005) on

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<sup>46</sup> See also the theoretical model in chapter one.

<sup>47</sup> There are some authors who argue that the shift in Dutch discourse already set-on in the 1990s (e.g. Vink 2007).

political claims-making in the 1990s shows that in Germany and particularly in France, extreme-right actors are more present in the public debate than in the Netherlands. A brief overview of more recent political and societal debates in France and Germany also shows evidence of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim discourse. In the presidential elections in France in 2002, the extreme-right Jean Marie Le Pen came in second with 17 per cent of the votes. Le Pen's *Front National* has been successful since the 1980s and is also well-represented in several communities in the Alsace where many Turkish immigrants live. The riots between youngsters and the police in the *banlieue* in 2005 and then Minister of Interior Sarkozy's statements on cleaning the streets from '*racaille*' (scum or rabble) also left its mark. Finally, for the Turkish community in France the discussion on the recognition of the Armenian genocide by the Turkish authorities has led to negative sentiments.<sup>48</sup> It is thus doubtful that the lower degree of adoption in the Netherlands compared to France is a result of a stronger anti-immigrant discourse.

Germany does not have an influential extreme-right party, but, especially during the 1990s, had problems with groups of, sometimes violent, extreme-right activists. Turkish media were quick to see a 2008 house fire in Ludwigshafen that left nine Turkish immigrants dead as a repetition of the racist arson attacks in Solingen in 1993. Investigation showed that the fire was accidental, but the knee-jerk reaction reveals a continuing fear of extreme-right activism. In parliamentary debates, several politicians from main-stream parties have claimed that Germany is a Christian country and the Christianity should receive more privileges than Islam. It is therefore unlikely that the higher degree of religious retention in the Netherlands compared to Germany is caused by reactive ethnicity.

None of the seven alternative explanations discussed provides a more plausible account of the cross-national differences in adoption and retention than the hypotheses on the effects of policies of individual equality and accommodation of diversity. This is not to say that these factors do not influence adoption and retention, but only that they do not fully explain the found cross-national differences.

#### 7.4 Implications

Theories of post- and transnationalism predict a diminishing importance of the nation-state for the life of immigrants. Postnationalists argue that the nation-state is losing relevance because the rights of immigrants are more dependent on 'universal personhood' than on citizenship status (Soysal 1994; Bauböck 1994). Transnationalists argue that the life of immigrants is no longer connected to one nation-state but spans a transnational space (Basch *et al.* 1994; Sassen 1998). Both theories lead to the prediction that there are no cross-national differences in integration. This study has shown that, at least for socio-cultural integration, the nation-state is still relevant. Significant cross-national differences

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<sup>48</sup> This debate was more pronounced in France than in the Netherlands because of the presence of a significant and influential Armenian community in France

were found on two of our four measures of ethnic retention and on all four measures of host culture adoption. Most of these differences can be traced back to differences in integration policies.

These results lead to a number of tentative suggestions for policy development. Policies with a high degree of individual equality, in particular accessible citizenship and strong anti-discrimination policies, can stimulate host culture adoption. The positive effect is not only caused by the *de facto* legal equality, but also because these policies signal that immigrants are full and equal members of the host society. In that sense they show a higher degree of permeability of the host society. The concept 'perceived permeability' has thus far mainly been used by social-psychologists to explain individual-level differences in identification. Our study indicates that this concept can also be helpful in understanding cross-national differences in identification and other aspects of adoption (Cf. Alba 2005). Bloemraad (2006) argues that policies that reflect a certain conception of citizenship can have an effect on integration even if this conception is not shared by all members of the host society. Nevertheless, a discrepancy between official policies and host society attitudes can diminish policy effects. As discussed in Chapter 4, even in France, where immigrants have incorporated the French civic view of citizenship, host country identification is sometimes negatively affected by an ethnic conception of citizenship of some members of the host society.

Based on the analyses of naturalisation motives, several recommendations can be made to stimulate host country citizenship acquisition. Our results suggest that the 'best practice' is low application fees and short and transparent naturalisation procedures. Both the Dutch experience and the experience of some of the German *Bundesländer* suggest that informing immigrants about the possibilities and advantages of host country citizenship can also stimulate naturalisation. The supposed effects of dual citizenship are much debated in particularly Dutch and German parliaments. We found no evidence that the allowance of dual citizenship has a negative impact on host culture adoption. On the other hand we did not find that it was the main obstacle to naturalisation either.

Contrary to the 'best practice' in MIPEX our results suggest that linguistic or even some limited cultural demands for citizenship acquisition can have a positive impact on host culture adoption. However, showing some support for the postnationalism thesis, many of the immigrants I interviewed did not see large benefits in host country citizenship. The impact of citizenship requirements to act as an incentive for adoption should therefore not be overestimated.

Against the arguments of philosophers of multiculturalism, our overall results suggest that the accommodation of diversity has a negative effect on host culture adoption measured as language use and proficiency and social contacts with host country ethnics. The only exception is host country identification. Here the accommodation of diversity does not have a negative effect, though it does not have a positive effect either. Multiculturalist policies reflect a thin national identity. This might explain why

identification is higher than linguistic and social adoption. Immigrants can identify with the host society even when their actual level of interaction with host society is relatively low.

It is important to realise that the cross-national differences that we found were generally modest in size and that individual-level factors such as education and generation had a larger impact on adoption and retention. Nevertheless it is important to know what these policy effects are, because it is through policies that host societies can influence processes of adoption and retention. There is an ongoing scientific debate on the convergence of integration policies. Most comparative studies show that there are still significant and fairly consistent cross-national policy differences (Koopmans *et al.* 2005; Howard 2005; Bauböck *et al.* 2006). This does not mean that policies have not changed in recent years. However due to the path-dependent nature of policy development these changes are generally modest. As research in the Dutch city of Rotterdam suggests, the changes in implementation might be even more limited (Poppelaars and Scholten 2008). Change, including radical change, is however not impossible. In less than thirty years time, Canada went from an immigration policy that was based on racist criteria to an immigration policy that is free from ethnic criteria and a celebration of diversity as a vital part of its national identity. Policies in the Netherlands and in Germany show some indications of an upcoming paradigm shift; in the Netherlands towards less accommodation and in Germany towards more individual equality. However, even when policies change significantly, these changes are not likely to have an immediate effect on immigrant integration. Immigrant integration is a long-term process that therefore shows a degree of inertia. New policies will not completely erase the effects of previous policies, especially not for immigrants who have been in the host countries for a long time. The new naturalisation requirements in the Netherlands, for instance, have not had a large impact on our target population because most of them had already naturalised in the 1990s. Though the new citizenship law in Germany has been in place for nine years, those most affected by it through the attribution of *ius soli* citizenship are still very young. Our results suggest that this policy change can eventually lead to a higher degree of adoption in Germany.

It is too early to tell what the effects of policy innovations such as civic integration courses will be in the long run. None of the respondents in our study have had to participate in civic integration courses, because they immigrated well before the implementation of these programmes. The results from this study suggest that requiring a degree of adoption as a condition for access to rights may have a positive effect on host culture adoption. However this is only the case when these policies are combined with a high degree of individual equality. Only if boundaries are perceived as permeable will adoption take place.

To what extent our results are applicable to other domains of integration remains open to investigation. Despite the consistent positive relation that we found between socio-economic integration (i.e. education and labour market participation) and adoption, studies show that labour market integration of immigrants in France is lower than in Germany (van

Tubergen 2004; Tucci 2008). Educational attainment on the other hand is highest in France and lowest in Germany (Crul and Vermeulen 2003).

### **7.5 Limitations and suggestions for future research**

The restricted nature of the sample is the major strength of this study, because it minimises cross-national composition effects. However, it also limits the possibilities for generalisation. Turks are an immigrant group with a strong national self-awareness. This is likely one of the reasons behind the high levels of retention. It is possible that other groups show a generally lower level of retention and more cross-national variation. This study should therefore be repeated with other immigrant groups that have a lower degree of cohesion and national pride. In such investigations composition effects should however again be minimised as much as possible.

An important contribution of our study is that it showed the influence of regional origin and religious denomination on adoption and retention. These two factors are rarely taken into account in quantitative cross-national studies. Future studies should also take these factors into account. An interesting avenue is to investigate the role of regional origins, religious denomination and ethnic minority status in adoption and retention. For example a study on Moroccan immigrants could pay attention to differences between Arabic Moroccans and those from the different Berber tribes.

This study only included three countries, each approximating a different conception of citizenship. Even though the alternative explanations explored above do not provide a better explanation of the pattern of cross-national differences than the hypotheses on policy effects, the results should be treated with care. To further test the theories on policy effects this study should be repeated in other countries with differing degrees of individual equality and accommodation of difference in their policies. For subsequent studies, it is advisable to include a comparison group of natives. This allows a better investigation of the cultural distance hypothesis and a further exploration of the mechanisms connecting conceptions of citizenship and immigrants' socio-cultural integration such as the attitudes and behaviour of host society members. The TIES study on the immigrant second generation and a comparison group of natives in eight European countries and fifteen cities is an example of such a project.

This study has measured four aspects of host culture adoption and four aspects of ethnic retention but has not paid much attention to their interrelations. Structural equation modelling techniques, such as Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Path-Analysis, can help determine how these eight aspects are related to one another and whether for instance the relation between discrimination and identification is mediated by interethnic social contacts. More advanced statistical techniques such as Latent Class Analysis can be used to see to what extent the four acculturation orientations that Berry discerns (assimilation, segregation, marginalisation, and biculturalism) are also present in social reality. An additional interesting venue is to investigate whether there is a relation between the policies

of the host country and the prevalence of the four different acculturation orientation among immigrants; do immigrants in multicultural countries more often resort to biculturalism and less often to assimilation than immigrants in universalist countries?

A cross-national longitudinal study that follows immigrants over a period of several years can help in the exploration of the effects of policy changes. It also provides the most rigorous test of relations between different elements of adoption and retention because the direction of causality can be determined.

Finally, all of the research suggestions above would be served by better cross-national data on residential segregation. These data should be gathered using the same definitions and the same size of measurement units in all countries.

### **7.6 Two sides to a coin**

As many have noted, integration is a two-sided story. Processes of adoption and retention are both influenced by the opportunities in the host society and by the wish for cultural retention or adoption among immigrants. For Turkish guest-worker migrants, the initial plan to return led to a lack of commitment to host culture adoption and to sheltering children (especially girls) from the host society. One of the French respondents explained why he did not want his daughters to continue their education in another town, 15 kilometres from their place of residence; 'I did not want my daughters to change, to become like the French. Now they are married and have a proper family'.

The children of these first generation immigrants have by-and-large taken foot in their host countries, though some still keep open the possibility of a return to Turkey. This generation is shaped by their parents' stress on the preservation of Turkish language and culture. Their parents taught them that feeling Turkish is being Turkish, and that being Turkish is different from being French, German or Dutch in several ways, especially when it comes to family values. The children of Turkish immigrants have largely incorporated their parents' desire for retention, and intend to teach their children that they are "Turks". The wish for cultural preservation does not mean there are no changes in the Turkish immigrant communities. One of the German respondents says she want to be a friend to her granddaughter, 'I want her to be able to tell me if she has a boyfriend'. One of the French respondents regretted that she made her daughters get married instead of continue their education, 'because I haven't been to school myself, I could not know that education was important. But if I could do it all over, I would do it differently'.

The high degree of social cohesion in the Turkish community and the ensuing social control exert pressure towards retention. It takes courage to go against the grain as some parents did by allowing their daughters to attend school in other cities, take driving lessons or even live on their own before marriage. After initial social ridicule and gossip these practices have become more accepted. Values are slowly changing. Education is valued more, also for girls, the age of marriage is increasing, and the number of children decreasing.

In many ways Turkish immigrants and their children have become French, German or Dutch. They are confronted with this when they visit Turkey. Here they are seen as foreigners as well and also notice differences between their own attitudes and manners and those of Turks in Turkey. One of the Dutch respondents of the second generation predicted that despite efforts to retain Turkish culture, the descendents of Turkish immigrants will inevitably assimilate into the host society: 'Look, in a few generations it [Turkish culture, EE] will all fade, then my great-great grandchild will say "my great-greatgrandfather came from Turkey and was a Kurd." This is what will happen. [...] We will eventually all become Dutchified, the grandchildren and children. It will become a multicultural society. So. Eventually, it will go in that direction'.